Role of the Military Commander by Brigadier Bruce Osborn I very much appreciate the opportunity to be here to review a period

that was professionally one of the most rewarding and enjoyable of my 33 years in the Army. I am sure that the vast majority of people, who have served with the TMG and PMG, whether they were military or civilian, would share that level of satisfaction. I think it is particularly useful and instructive for us to identify why military and civilians from four regional countries derived such a high level of personal satisfaction. The same questions are relevant to the success of the peacekeeping operation itself when the vast majority of similar operations over the last 43 years have failed. I was on holidays at Christmas in '97 when the Chief of Army advised I that I had been selected to command the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) and that I was expected to assume that position in January 1998. I rushed back, got myself organised and tried to get up to speed as quickly as possible. But preparations became complicated when Australia and New Zealand engaged in a debate as to whether NZ should retain command. Eventually Australia decided that the integrity of the peace process was more important at the time than the leadership issue and a mutual decision was taken which resulted in New Zealand retaining command. I was subsequently advised in March that I would assume command of the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) on 1 May. I was grateful at the time for having been given a few months to properly prepare for my coming command and the challenges it would bring. Looking back now, I realise how important that period was in allowing me to familiarise myself with the situation on the ground and to be involved in planning for the transition from the TMG to the PMG. The saying that time well spent in preparation is never wasted is still as important now as it ever was. I would like to share with you some views that emerged in my mind as I prepared to deploy to Bougainville. Like all military commanders at any rank, I did a military appreciation of all the factors relevant to achieving the objectives of Bougainville peace process. What I was seeking to achieve was clarity in my own mind about the various courses open to me to achieve these and what I would need to facilitate the best course. I wanted to also briefly address the role of the Commander in relation to the peace process and the PMG. I will also consider some of the lessons learnt. Firstly, I think that in some offices in Canberra there was a tendency to underestimate the complexity of the Bougainville situation and to therefore understate the complexity of the peace process itself. I think some people thought this would be a like going to a Club Med: we were all going to go off and talk with the Bougainvilleans and the PNG Government and come to a solution. The simple fact was that the conflict had been long, drawn-out and complex and finding a workable solution was going to be equally challenging.

I was in Arawa the day of the cease-fire ceremony on 30 April 1998. It was the second time I had ever visited Bougainville, my first visit being a half day whistle-stop tour with CDF General Baker a month earlier. But as I stood there, I reflected on how we might go forward and I remember reviewing the Cease-fire Agreement that was being signed that day. I recall that the parties to the Agreement and the TMG had only reached consensus on its contents at about 3.50 that same morning on HMAS TOBRUK having worked for two or three days to achieve an outcome. But the document itself was far from perfect because it was vague in many areas. I was concerned that although it would provide flexibility it would also allow great parties great room to manoeuvre and that this would cause significant problems when pressure came on to adhere to the spirit of the Agreement. My initial fears were soon justified as each of the parties sort to interpret or ignore the agreement to suit their own purposes. I also thought that the timetable for the peace process was particularly optimistic in that only seven months had been allowed for a democratically elected provincial government to be established. This simply did not allow sufficient time for the Bougainvillean people and its representatives and the PNG Government to find consensus on what steps needed to be taken to facilitate an election to achieve this end. But I was quickly to learn that Melanesian clocks are different from any other timepieces in the world and that perhaps I was the only one involved in the process that was particularly concerned about the tight time frame. I think that I quickly adapted to the Melanesian approach despite some protestations from time-to-time from Canberra. I had decided early on that a first step in the peace process after the ceasefire signing ceremony was to have all Bougainvillean people have a common objective and for their leaders to speak with a single voice. Little if anything would be achieved until this had occurred. It was therefore a major concern that Francis Ona had continued to remain outside the peace process and that he and his supporters had the capability to stop the process through a variety of means if they so chose. It was equally clear that despite his lack of involvement to date his still was seen as a Bougainvillean leader and highly respected by many Bougainvilleans. I decided that he needed to be brought into the process as soon as possible and, if this was not possible, then his position should be respected so as to ensure that he did not interfere in the process. I retained this approach throughout my tour even when Ona wrote to me the day after I assumed command and told me that all Australians and New Zealanders should leave because he could not ensure their safety. Another conclusion I reached early on in my thinking of the Bougainville peace process was that the solution to the Bougainville problem had to be Bougainvillean. I saw the need for the peace process and the establishment of a reconciliation government had to be built on a solid foundation and in this regard it was obvious to me that the people of Bougainville should drive the process, not their political leaders. It was therefore always my intention to try

to force the political leaders to toe the line and follow what their people wanted rather than vice versa. I therefore encouraged the growth of people power across Bougainville and reminded Bougainvillean leaders on many occasions that their political futures remained inextricably linked to their ability to represent their peoples views not vice versa. The strategy proved a challenge but I also think that it worked. Progressively ordinary Bougainvilleans became involved in the peace process and, by the time I left Bougainville, they had become the strength of the process and the hope for the future. When I went around and talked to people at the cease-fire ceremony and listened to what PNG and Bougainvillean leaders said during their speeches I realised that they all had different objectives. I was concerned that those objectives were not necessarily complementary and that they could all end up pulling Bougainvilleans in different directions. I therefore thought from the outset it was essential that the parties to the cease-fire agreement must have a common goal and that was a strategy that the PMG tried to get in place very quickly. The message was a simple one. The establishment of the BRG, a provincial government, a single voice for all Bougainvilleans, was clearly the first step, regardless of whether you were looking for independence, autonomy or to remain a province of PNG. I think that the strategy was successful and it remained a cornerstone of the process during my six months in Bougainville. While there was significant pressure early on from Canberra to speed up the process I quickly learnt that the peace process had to progress at the pace of the slowest participant. I always thought if we were not careful then we would risk overheating the process and losing what had been achieved to date. On a couple of occasions I nearly learnt that lesson the hard way. The simple fact that the Bougainvillean factions were not well organised political parties, as we know them with large administrative staffs to support them. Rather they were often one-man bands with a very limited capacity to do things in a hurry. I always remember making my first visit to Joseph Kabuis village where I quickly realised that the BIG head office consisted of Joseph Kabui and with a single fax machine and his unreliable satellite telephone. The important role the PMG played in facilitating the peace process on Bougainville and between Bougainville and Port Moresby should not be understated. Flexibility was an obvious principle we needed to apply at all levels in the PMG given that there were few days on Bougainville, which turned out the way I planned it. Again the Melanesian way of doing things gradually inculcated our thinking. While we carefully planned the activities of the PMG and developed long-term plans and objectives, we also quickly learned that flexibility was a key factor in our success and we adopted this approach at all levels. But this situation was also one of the most satisfying aspects of our tours to Bougainville. How boring it would have been if we had never been surprised.

In my early days on Bougainville I quickly realised was that the pace of the peace and reconciliation process was uneven across the island. In the southwest reconciliation was well progressed to the point that the various factions were co-existing with few problems and they were focused on receiving the peace dividend. In the north of Bougainville and Buka the process was behind that of the south-west but advanced to the stage that a district cease-fire committee had been established and there was strong signs of forward momentum. In the central region, the heartland of the BIG/BRA, little reconciliation had occurred and the problems that manifested from this situation were no more evident than in Arawa, the location of the PMG HQs. Getting the various areas of Bougainville and the Bougainvillean factions to the point where they could all equally contribute to the peace process was one of the great challenges of the PMG. That we focused more PMG resources on certain groups and areas was one of the more visible outcomes of this situation. Before I arrived in Bougainville I thought that the BRA was a strongly united organisation. However, after arriving I quickly learned that it was one of the most factionalised organisation on the island. People in the north hadnt seen Sam Kauona and Joseph Kabui for several years while they had been rarely sighted in the southwest. A number of BRA leaders outside the central region were sceptical of whether Kabui and Kauona represented them and whether they shared their longer term objectives. It was essential that the BIG/BRA not be allowed to further factionalise or the peace process would have been placed at great risk. I made a conscious decision at the time to facilitate a number of BIG/BRA activities which would hopefully allow reconciliation to be achieved between the various factions and to allow them to develop consensus on where they wanted to go and how they could get there. But in doing this the PMG was accused by the PNG Government of favouring the BIG/BRA. I also quickly realised was that there was virtually no effective communications throughout Bougainville and communications between Bougainville and Port Moresby were difficult and unreliable. As a result, people and their leaders were not getting any clear picture of what was happening and in an information vacuum I quickly discovered that there was a tendency for rumour to run rife. I also found out that the PNG Government leaders were overly dependant on information flowing from PNGDF and RPNGC reporting out of Bougainville and this meant that it was invariably not timely and sometimes incomplete. This situation created another task for the PMG, which was to keep all parties to the peace process informed about developments across the island and in Port Moresby. The PMGs ability to provide accurate, unbiased and timely information to all Bougainvilleans developed into one of the most important and responsible tasks which the PMG undertook. It was also one of the most challenging given the importance of the PMG neutrality. I developed a simple analogy for describing the peace process which related it to building a house. The house was based upon a foundation of the Bougainvillean people. The walls of the house were simply the various parties

to the peace process. You had to shape, strengthen and unify those walls in order to support the roof, which was the reconciliation government, the one voice of Bougainville. Using that analogy was perhaps one of the smarter decisions I made because most Bougainvilleans could identify with what I was saying. The PMG The TMG had been very successful and I think that New Zealand had done wonderfully well in facilitating the peace process to the point that the PMG was established. I decided that it was important for a whole range of reasons to build on the foundation established by that organisation. I impressed upon all ranks of the PMG that the transition between the two organisations and to Australian leadership had to be as seamless as possible and that there was to be no obvious change in what Bougainvilleans saw or dealt with. In reaching that decision I was very conscious of the emotive baggage carried by many Bougainvilleans in relation to Australia and the perception that Australia had assisted the PNGDF in their operations in Bougainville during the conflict. I think that the establishment of the PMG was seamless and that the PMG and its Australian members quickly won the confidence of the Bougainvillean people. The TMG had been responsible for monitoring a truce, however, the PMG was required not only the monitor the cease-fire; but was also responsible for facilitating a peace process. Objectives for the peace process had been established and now there was going to be pressure on all the parties to deliver on their commitments to achieve those objectives. That pressure would translate into considerable stress on the various leaders but it was also to fair and squarely put the PMG into a central position in the peace process rather than outside it. There had been significant debate in Australia before my departure as to what was meant by the PMG facilitating the process and to what extent the PMG should involve itself. I always realised that the PMG and its Commander could simply not sit back and hope that things would happen but rather it would need to involve itself to the extent necessary to ensure that forward momentum was always maintained. There was an expectation amongst Bougainvilleans that the a PMG could provide guidance, direction and support and I was initially happy to do all of those things so longs as we were balanced in our approach. As the peace process progressed I found, as expected, that the Bougainvilleans assumed greater responsibility for the process and the PMG shifted further into the background as this occurred. But there was no doubt in my mind that the PMG provided the political space for the process to go forward and we were a key player in that regard. The PMG provided the one constant in the process that gave confidence to the various parties to move forward. There can be no doubt that the multi-national nature of the PMG and its cultural diversity remained its strength. The strength of the PMG was the sum total of its individuals and I was fortunate to have a group of individuals who

were committed, resourceful and exceptionally strong and talented: if you put the right people in the right groups you could achieve anything. There is no doubt in my mind that Australia would not have been as effective by itself. I think the PMG would still be at the starting line if we did not have the contribution of the civilians, other Melanesians, the Polynesians and the New Zealanders. While I was an Australian I was always aware that I was the commander of a multi-national force and that I was equally responsible to the governments of the four nations contributing personnel to the PMG, as well as the Bougainvillean people and the PNG Government. I was also conscious that I needed to treat all of the people in the PMG as equals and I always did so. The PMG comprised over 300 people, many of them from different cultures, from different backgroundssome serving, some out of uniform, some men, some women. I never found that overly demanding because I always had strong deputies and national component commanders with me who were equally committed to the Bougainville peace process. I was also fortunate to have two political advisors in Greg Moriarty and then Rhys Puddicombe who provided invaluable support and advice. The safety of the people of the PMG remained a fundamental issue for me during my period of command. You will recall that the PMG was unarmed and that the safety of its people was very much in the hands of the Bougainvillean people. In the first two or three week there were a number armed robberies in Arawa and similar but fewer incidents in other areas. While the object of the robberies was materiel the potential for PMG personnel to become accidentally involved remained high given that many of the robbers were inebriated. I was always confident that the Bougainvillean leaders were aware that contributing governments could be expected to withdraw their personnel if the security situation deteriorated. Indeed my confidence was rarely misplaced and I think that this responsibility was one of the issues that galvanized the Bougainvillean people into taking control of the peace process and their own destiny. The PMGs facilitating responsibilities were focused on providing ideas, information, communications and transport. Clearly communications and transport were our greatest challenge given the state of the infrastructure and the need for the Bougainvillean people to be able to interact effectively. But I should also point out that we supported facilitation at all levels. In the early days it was particularly focused at the grass roots levels as we sought to ensure that all Bougainvilleans were made aware of the peace process and what it sought to achieve. As the peace process progressed this facilitation shifted to providing assistance to the Bougainvillean leaders at all levels for meetings and the passage of information from these meetings back to the people. There were other aspects to facilitating. Which may not appear obvious yet were fundamental to allowing the peace process to progress. The rescinding of the call out was one such issue that nearly brought the peace process to a standstill. It proved to be a constant sticking point given that there was initially

reluctance by the PNG Government to meet this obligation as agreed in the Arawa Cease-fire Agreement and indeed, the PNGDF was actively working against its implementation. For the BIG/BRA leadership the issue represented a litmus test to determine whether the PNG Government was fully committed to the peace process. The decision by the PNG Government to rescind the call out in Arawa resulted from a meeting in Port Moresby between the PMG Commander and Prime Minister Skate. Lessons Learned I now want to address some of the lessons learned from my experience in Bougainville. I also dont think that many in Canberra realised the fundamental importance of the PMG; some people simply underestimated its significance and centrality to the whole process. It appeared that once the PMG was successfully established and once they had gotten over the initial concerns about safety, DFAT, Defence and other departments focussed on the next problem. All of a sudden I found myself somewhat isolated in Bougainville in an information and political sense and felt that too much responsibility was being placed on me to drive the peace process. The situation reminded me when I was in New York in 1992 and Lieutenant General John Sanderson, the Military Commander of UNTAC in Cambodia rang me one day and said, I feel like Ive been deserted. Indeed he had been as the UN Secretariat and Security Council were focusing on the next problem rather than supporting the exiting operations as well. I recall that as a result of General Sandersons and mission head Akashis representations the major countries contributing to UNTAC established the Group of Ten in New York and Phnom Penh to politically backstop the process. Here I was in Bougainville some several years later feeling exactly the same way. There must be a whole-of-government approach to the political backstopping of a mission, not just in the preparatory stages, but during and after. All of the government departments need to be part of a common plan where theyre all going forward with a clear view as to what we are looking to achieve, instead of departments working in conflict or in competition with each other, both back here in Australia and in Bougainville. I believe that it is worth noting that government departments did not always have the same end-state for Bougainville. Things were further complicated by the fact that Australia and New Zealand also did not share the same views on the future of Bougainville. The selection process for PMG personnel was initially not satisfactory in that people who volunteered for the mission by and large went on the mission. Many people received inadequate warning with some getting as little as three days to prepare for an operation in which many people were the essential element in progressing the process. As COL Breen alluded to in his paper, various countries had different standards in the selection and sending of personnel. We had people with welfare problems who had to be sent back

within a couple of weeks of their arrival. Another problem was that there were different lengths of tour for the various national components which made it difficult to manage on the ground and, from time-to-time, was divisive. I had a strong but small information processing organisation, which did a marvellous job in gathering information on developments across the island and allowed me to monitor the peace process and breaches to the cease-fire while at the same time keeping parties to the peace process informed of developments. However, I was not as well served by external agencies that could have provided updates on developments outside of Bougainville, which could effect developments on the island. It would have been particularly useful to have the insights of others who were not as closely involved and who were looking at the situation in a more holistic sense. Conclusion There are numerous lessons to be learned from the Bougainville experience to date and hopefully this seminar will help record them. In my view the TMG and the PMG have been outstanding successes whatever criteria you apply to measure their performance and it is essential that we record those lessons so that we or our successors do not have to relearn them again. But it is equally important that every peacekeeping mission is different and that it will be necessary to adapt the lessons to each one. But at the end of the day it is the Bougainvillean people who deserve the most praise for being brave enough to embrace peace and for providing the foundation for its growth.