Professional Documents
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Civrev Digests
Civrev Digests
RUBEN BALANE)
ARTICLES 774/776
Union Bank v. Santibanez
452 SCRA 228 | Abu
FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation
(FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the
amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment
of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof,
Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of
the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another
loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and
one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a
promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later
loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund
and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence.
Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father
to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank,
wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union
Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but
the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank
filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City.
Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and
there was no information on his address or the date of his return to
the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and
void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint
agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had
passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in
Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of
the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny
her liability under the said document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that
Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased
Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the
probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of
the joint agreement there was already an existing probate
proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was
voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still
have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
ISSUE:
W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the
probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim
Santibaez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and
Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was void
considering that it had not been approved by the probate court.
W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is
probated.
HELD:
ARTICLE 77
Uson v. Del Rosario
92:530| Andres
FACTS:
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of
his wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal. He was
appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose
became the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife
Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with the
CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special
administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise
agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of the compromise
agreement. She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs
cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating
the will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the
will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE:
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of
Francisco has not yet been probated.
HELD:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000
as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco
and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate
of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of
his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance
by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant,
creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is
transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death
of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of
death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and
they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the
determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of
the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before
judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died, her claim or
right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was
not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs
upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the
properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case.
There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow
their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to
quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and
principally property and property rights and therefore is one that
survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the
respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased
plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the
respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the
deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the
complaint. This should not have been done for under Section 17,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the
legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased.
Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its
discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules of
Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
ARTICLE 783
Vitug v. CA
183 SCRA 755 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER
FACTS:
Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators of
Dolores Vitugs (deceased) estate. Rowena Corona was the
ARTICLE 804
Suroza v. Honrado
110 SCRA 388 | Atcheco
FACTS:
HELD:
ISSUE:
W/N the will was valid.
HELD:
YES. As to the clarity of the ridge impressions, it is so
dependent on aleatory requirements as to require dexterity that
testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the
provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the
provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents- appellees
stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys- in-fact of
the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while
oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties
not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on
penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to
probate given the allegations of forgery of the testators signature,
or that the will was executed under circumstances constituting
fraud and undue influence and pressure?
Icasiano v. Icasiano
11 SCRA 422 | Dela Cuesta
FACTS:
HELD:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States
and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old.
But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in
English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983but
acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of
this will was opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister. According to the
notary public who notarized the testators will, after the testator
instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will,
the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to
give him time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned
on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so
they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983.
The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned
he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983
because he did not like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioners argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was
already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting
witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the
attestation of the will.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify
accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his
shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife
as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will
did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of
fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant.
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense,
by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such
character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the
nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it
may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the
deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain
will which, but for fraud, he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving
the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden
to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a
showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due
execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,
because the law does not even require that a notarial
will be executed and acknowledged on the same
occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its
supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and
persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental
witnesses.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or
trickery.
ARTICLE 808
Garcia v. Vasquez
32 SCRA 489 | Grapilon
FACTS:
YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter
was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the
substantial requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity
of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when
they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account,
may only defeat the testators will.
Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was
not totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and
codicil were executed, but he can be so considered for purposes of
Art. 808.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
the testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only
with respect to the form or the language of the attestation clause.
The defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the
will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.
Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case
for the intestate proceedings shall be revived.
Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will
when it does not pertain to the form or language of the will. This is
because there is not substantial compliance with Article 805.
Azuela v. CA
487 SCRA 119 | Jalipa
ARTICLE 810
Roxas v. De Jesus
134 SCRA 245 | Lantion
FACTS:
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate
of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of
letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
1. Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a
will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the
death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the
Rules of Court;
2. the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a
disposition of property after death and was not intended to take
effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely
an instruction as to the management and improvement of the
schools and colleges founded by the decedent;
3. the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof,
must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect
because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills
4. the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise,
executed and attested as required by law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an
opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the
probate of the will stating that in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104
Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of
Ajero v. CA
236 SCRA 488 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER
FACTS:
petitioners. The CFI and CA found that the will to be probated had
been revoked by the burning thereof by the housemaid upon
instruction of the testatrix.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was revoked by Adriana.
HELD:
ISSUE:
Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the annulment
of the will of Florentino and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of
land adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.
HELD:
Roberts v. Leonidas
129 SCRA 754 | Suarez
FACTS:
FACTS:
probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator
was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living
in concubinage with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground
that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the
petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the
respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent
court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of
the petitioner is null and void.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring
the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly
drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision.
HELD:
No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when
after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon
the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of
the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate
proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the
Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on
its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the
issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations
shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and Article
1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning
donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
Reyes v. CA
281 SCRA 277 | Tan
FACTS:
This case involves a 383 sq.m. parcel of land owned by
pettitioners and respondents father. Petitioner alleges that a Deed
of Exrajudicial Partition (Deed) was entered into between him and
the respondents. Petitioner managed to register 335 sq.m. of the
land under his name; while 50 sq.m. of the land was registered
under the name of his sister, Paula (one of the respondents). After
discovering the registration of the Deed, respondents denied
having knowledge of its execution and disclaimed having signed
the same; nor did they ever waive their rights, shares and interest
in the subject parcel of land. According to respondents, subject
Deed was fraudulently prepared by petitioner and that their
signatures thereon were forged. They also assert that one Atty.
Jose Villena, the Notary Public who notarized the said Deed was not
even registered in the list of accredited Notaries Public of Pasay
City.
Thereafter, petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
selling 240 square meters of the land to his children. After the
property was partitioned, petitioner, his children and private
respondent Paula allegedly executed a Deed of Co-owners' Partition
dividing the property among themselves. This led the respondents
to file a Complaint for "Annulment of Sale and Damages With
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order" before the RTC,
which ruled that private respondents' signatures on the questioned
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement were indeed forged
and simulated. The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Deed was forged.
2. Whether petitioner(s) had become absolute owners of the
subject property by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
RULING:
1. YES. Petitioner(s) cast doubt on the findings of the lower court
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals regarding the existence of
forgery. Factual findings of the trial court, adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and
no. 288-A by a Deed of Sale, and thus, a TCT was issued under the
name of the Camayas.
However, come now the decision of the probate court
admitting the codicil, and disposing that the Deed of Sale in favor
of the Camayas, and the corresponding TCT issued in their name
are null and void, and that the Register of Dees was ordered to
issue instead corresponding certificates of titles to the aforesaid
four children of the testatrix, and her grandson Mangulabnan to the
extent of 1/5 each pursuant to the codicil.
The Camayas and Mangulabnan filed an MR. But the probate court
denied this. The CA affirmed the decision of the probate court.
Thus, the case was brought to the SC via a petition for review on
certiorari.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
1. Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it
declared null and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCT
of Camayas and the deed of sale.
2. Whether the final judgment in partition case bars the allowance
of the codicil.
HELD:
1. As to the first issue, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction
when it declared the deed of sale as null and void, and also as
to the cancellation of the TCTs under the name of the Camayas.
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should not be included in the inventory.
If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do
so. Having been apprised of the fact that the property in
question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the
name of such third parties, the respondent court should have
denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
Camaya v. Patulandong
423 SCRA 480 | Valdez
ARTICLE 854
Reyes v. Barretto-Datu
19 SCRA 85 | Ventura
FACTS:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When
Bibiano Barretto died he left his share in a will to Salud Barretto and
Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two
sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and
nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow,
Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project
of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the
shares delivered.
Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was
discovered that she executed two wills, in the first, she instituted
Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in
the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in
favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the
first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as
guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that Salud
was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her
husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the SC,
which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria
Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls
back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano
Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo.
Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her
right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of
all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for
being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of
Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of
the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based
thereon as well.
ISSUE:
W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab
initio and Salud did not acquire valid title to it.
HELD:
Aznar v. Duncan
17 SCRA 590 | Villarica
FACTS: