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Angola Strategic Performance Unit

BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

Document Number:

ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005

Document Revision:

A1

Copyright BP Angola Programme 2006

All rights reserved
None of the contents of this document shall be disclosed, except to those directly concerned with
the subject and no part of this document may be reproduced or transmitted in any way or stored in
any retrieval system without the prior written permission of BP Angola Programme general
management.

ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)
ANGOLA PROGRAMME : Document Control Sheet
Title:

BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

Company/Dept:

BP ANGOLA PROGRAMME

Author(s):

Tania Roach, Nick Aldis

Owner:

Nick Aldis

Preparation Date:

Date document was prepared 11/Nov/2008

Abstract:

The purpose of this note is to convey lessons learned from a flare header incident
that occurred on a BP facility resulting in a high potential gas release.

Document Number:

ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005

Classification:

RESTRICTED
SURF

FPSO

Sub Surface

Operations

Drilling &
Completions

Programme
Management

Procurement
/Contracts

Project
Services

HSE

Exploration

Commercial

Asset

Internal Notification:

Programme Engineering

Appraise / Select

Other:
External Notification:

Partners

Contractor

Approved by:
Approval:

M. Hodgkinson
Martin Hodgkinson, FPSO Engineering Team Leader, Angola Programme

Hardcopy Location

Original signed copy to be passed to BP Document Control Manager for central filing
Programme

FPSO

SURF

Drilling &
Completions

Pre-Operations

Appraise &
Select

SubSurface

Sector Relevance

Revision Control
A1
01
Rev

Issued for use

Issued for comment
Description

08/Dec/08
13/Nov/08
Date

TMR
TMR
Prepared

Page 2 of 16

NMA
NMA
Checked

MGH
MGH
Approved

ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this note is to convey lessons learned from a flare header incident
that occurred on a BP facility resulting in a high potential gas release. It should be
noted that the information associated with this incident is confidential and is to be
used solely on BP projects.
BP expects contractor to review and act on the following recommendations which
are summarised below and detailed in the subsequent sections of this document:
1. The slope of all flare headers shall be designed to ensure 1:100 under all
anticipated vessel trim and list operating scenarios, as detailed in this
document. This requirement shall be clearly marked on all relevant
engineering drawings e.g. P&IDs, piping isometrics
2. During detailed design the FPSO contractor shall produce a detailed piping
study of the flare and drain header networks to ensure confirmation of header
slope and that routing is free draining under all anticipated operating
scenarios. This document must be reviewed and approved by BP prior to
construction. Subsequent changes will be by MOC and endorsed by relevant
competent people in the contractor and client teams.
3. The flare headers and sub-headers will be designed for No Pockets as far as
practical and clearly marked on engineering drawings such as P&IDs and
piping isometrics. Where designing for No Pockets is not practicable
provision for drainage is required.
4. Pressure and temperature transmitters will be provided on flare headers.
5. Confirm the requirement for a Glycol Contactor pressure control valve to flare
during detailed engineering.
6. The routing and segregation of fluids into the flare system must be reviewed
for all programme FPSOs to ensure that cold uninhibited gas cannot be
allowed to enter wet gas flare systems for prolonged periods of time.
7. Isolation of inlet and outlet cooling medium lines to shell and tube exchangers
shall meet the highest form of integrity as per Institute of Petroleum
Guidelines (Ref 1).
8. Operating guides to be developed for all process systems (especially gas
system) that indicate abnormal operating modes such as flaring to maintain
production in addition to steady state normal operation. In addition, these
guides should clearly identify the safe operating envelopes for start up,
shutdown and normal operation.
The Angola Programme FPSO contractors are required to demonstrate to BP how
the above recommendations have been incorporated into the FPSO design.
Many of these recommendations are considered good engineering practice and
should not present additional effort over and above what is expected as part of
FEED and detailed engineering activities.

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ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

The above actions shall be included into a formal Hazard tracking process and will
require BP approval, supported by documentary evidence where appropriate, to
assure close-out.

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ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

Contents
1

INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................6

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT ....................................................................................7

KEY FINDINGS ......................................................................................................8

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ADDRESSED IN PROGRAMME DESIGN

10
4.1

Flare Header Drainage ................................................................................10

Recommendation 1: ....................................................................................................... 10
Recommendation 2: ....................................................................................................... 11
Recommendation 3: ....................................................................................................... 11

4.2

Pressure Instrumentation.............................................................................12

Recommendation 4: ....................................................................................................... 12

4.3

PCV to Flare on Glycol Contactor ...............................................................12

Recommendation 5: ....................................................................................................... 12

4.4

Segregation of Fluids...................................................................................13

Recommendation 6: ....................................................................................................... 13

4.5

Safe Isolation of Cooling Medium Lines ......................................................14

Recommendation 7 ........................................................................................................ 14

4.6

Safe Operating Envelopes...........................................................................14

Recommendation 8: ....................................................................................................... 14

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................16

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ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

1 INTRODUCTION
A high potential incident occurred on a BP facility resulting in a significant gas
release.
The purpose of this note is to briefly describe the incident and its causes and to
convey lessons learned from this incident.
This note makes recommendations relating to process and piping system design,
management of change processes and development of system operating guides.
BP expects contractor to review and act on recommendations contained herein.

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ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

2 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
An incident occurred on a BP FPSO facility on Saturday, 16 August 2008. A
blockage occurred in the wet HP flare header due to liquid accumulation and
subsequent freezing by cold gas (-28Deg C) as a result of prolonged flaring of both
wet gas from the Slug Catchers and cold gas from the top of the Glycol Contactor.
Both vessels were flaring to the same HP wet flare header simultaneously. This
ice/hydrate blockage led to pressure rises in the flare header to c. 20-30 bar. Within
seconds, rupture discs on the MP gas compression coolers gave way, followed by
the HP gas compression coolers. In total, rupture discs on five of the ten gas
compression coolers had burst as a result of reverse rupture from the flare system.
Pressure transmitters in the cooler shells sensed the high pressure and triggered
compressor shutdowns. The resulting action was to isolate each compression train
individually and blow down the compressor cases and knockout drums to flare.
The HP compressors blew down to the un-blocked dry (cold) flare header. However,
the MP compressors blew down to the still-blocked HP wet flare header, further
increasing the inventory connected to the blocked header.
Simultaneous with the blowdown, the seawater inlet and outlet XVs on all the
coolers were commanded to close. Event logs show that 18 of the 20 valves closed
within ~15 seconds. However, both the inlet and outlet valve on the HP Train 1 first
stage discharge cooler (X-33101) failed to close.
In the seconds prior to the remainder of the valves closing, a large volume of gas
would have escaped into the seawater discharge header. This gas quickly found its
way to the disposal caissons, primarily the starboard-aft caisson, as this is located
nearest the gas coolers.
The unclosed cooler XVs on X-33101 acted as a flow path for gas entering the HP
wet flare header. The outlet seawater line from the exchanger was restricted by the
temperature control valve in this line, which went to its default position of 5% open.
Therefore the primary path of gas out of the cooler was reverse flow back into the
seawater supply header.
Hydrocarbon gas release occurred via this route to the seawater caissons which
resulted in topsides detection near the overboard water disposal caissons. This
resulted in a Yellow Shutdown and subsequent full facility blowdown
The facility was subsequently shutdown for a prolonged period whilst remedial work
was carried out.

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ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

3 KEY FINDINGS
Process Finding 1: Free water was able to accumulate in the HP Wet Flare Header.
The source of water was saturated gas flared from the first vessels in the separation
process (inlet Slug Catchers).
Issues encountered:

The Flare headers were not free draining back to the flare drum under all
anticipated operating scenarios. The need to provide a continuous slope was
not stated on the P&IDs or reflected in the final piping design. The flare
header design was flat relative to the FPSO deck and this was deemed
sufficient due to the anticipated trim of the vessel, expected to be down
towards the flare drum. However the trim requirement was not documented
to support flare header functionality in operations.

No Pockets was stipulated on the P&IDs, although an expansion loop, added

to the layout of the HP wet flare header late in the design of the process, did
not compensate for the full range of vessel list and trim, leading to liquid holdup in the flare header. Although the loop was technically flat, with respect to
the FPSO main deck, and therefore had No Pockets, this would be true only
when the vessel was perfectly level. This late design change was not
communicated to appropriate people in the project.

Process Finding 2: Sub-freezing (-28Deg C) gas was flowing from the top of TEG
contactor into the HP wet flare header for an extended period of time in combination
with wet gas from the Slug Catchers.
Issues encountered:

Gas streams to flare were not appropriately segregated between the wet and
cold HP flare headers.

The PCV off the top of the glycol contactor was intended to operate in the
following scenarios:
o During start up of the glycol system to enable gas to achieve dew
point specification before commencing gas injection or gas lift.
o As a mitigation to avoid lifting the glycol contactor PSVs in the event of
sudden pressure rise due to HP compression shut-down.

It was never envisioned that the PCV would be operationally flaring for long
durations. Production flaring was intended during start-up and for short
durations following compressor upsets via the Slug Catchers.

The design made provision for methanol injection upstream of the PCV to
flare should the water content of the gas be off-spec. The injection of
Methanol was covered by operational procedure.

The interaction between MP compressor discharge pressure override in the

performance controller and the Glycol Contactor PCV to flare pressure
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ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

controller was not implemented as the design of the process control system
had intended. The override was to reduce load on the MP compressors by
flaring from the Slug Catchers. The set point of the MP compressor second
stage discharge pressure override was not intended to be higher than the
opening point of the PCV to flare on the Glycol Contactor. The intended setpoints for the high pressure override and PCV to flare was 112barg and
113barg respectively. The override function was left disabled during
commissioning. As a result of these controllers not being implemented
correctly during commissioning, prolonged flaring from the Glycol Contactor
occurred before MP compressor cut back.

HP Wet Gas Flare Header

To Flare
Horizontal Exp. Loop
High Pressure
Override + AntiSurge Limit loop

Suction
Pressure
Control

P
PC

Gas Dehydration
105 barg, 35C

P
SC

From Wells
MP Compression
Slugcatcher
29 barg, ~52C

(2 x 50%)

Seawater Disposal
Caisson

Page 9 of 16

Dry Gas to HP
Compression
(2 x 50%)

ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

4 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE ADDRESSED IN

PROGRAMME DESIGN
The following key recommendations are to be addressed by the FPSO contractor in
the design of the facility.

4.1 Flare Header Drainage

Recommendation 1: The slope of all flare headers shall be designed to ensure
1:100 gradients under all anticipated vessel trim and list operating scenarios, as per
guidance by The Institute of Petroleum (Reference 1). This requirement shall be
clearly marked on all relevant engineering drawings e.g. P&IDs, piping isometrics.
This specification of a slope of 1:100 is applied generally to offshore systems and
must recognise the variation in vessel trim associated with floating production
systems. In addition to a slope of 1:100, the vessel orientation possibilities should
be taken into account, i.e. the design should ensure that slopes are provided to
ensure a fall in all reasonable foreseeable conditions of trim and list.
The following are considered normal operating scenarios for topsides:
1.

Cargo oil tank loading and unloading conditions

2.

Hull tank inspection and repair conditions

In these conditions the flare headers shall drain correctly and there should not be
any special interventions required. Likewise all other piping including drains should
function normally. The Trim and Stability Report should demonstrate that the
topsides design list and trim are not exceeded during inspection/repair offloading
cycles.
The topsides flare headers should also account for other abnormal conditions such
as the dynamic portion of the inclination e.g. dynamic rotation (pitch). For these
abnormal conditions an additional drain valve at the aft end of the flare headers may
be considered (see later recommendation 3).
The simple diagrams below are used to illustrate flare header slope requirement.
Accommodation is shown at one end of the vessel, and the flare at the other.

Offshore flare headers to be designed with a slope of 1:100, at all

foreseeable trim and operating scenarios, e.g. Cargo Oil Tank
loading/offloading, tank inspection and repair, etc.

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ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

Stern

1:100

Bow

If, for example, normal operations include up to 1 trim1 at stern, the flare
header would therefore need to account for 1 (1:57) and 0.573 (1:100) as
per IP guidelines, i.e. 1.573 or 1:36. Note that 1:36 is relative to an axis on
the FPSO, which is deemed to give a 1:100 slope of the flare header relative
to sea level.

1:36
Stern

Bow

Recommendation 2: During detailed design the FPSO contractor shall produce a

detailed piping study of the flare and drain header networks to ensure confirmation
of header slope and routing is pocket-free, which is expected as part of good
engineering practice. This document will be reviewed and approved by BP prior to
construction and subsequently confirmed by site survey in the construction yard.
Subsequent changes will be under a management of change procedure reviewed
and endorsed by relevant competent people in the contractor and client teams BP.
The Piping Document will outline the expected trim and list (static inclinations) of
the vessel and demonstrate free draining can occur under all anticipated operating
scenarios. This should address the slope required for various systems (not just
flare) by piping direction e.g. stern to bow/transverse etc. The document will contain
piping isometrics detailing the pipe lengths, fall and orientation of main flare and
drain headers and sub-headers.
Recommendation 3: Flare headers and sub-headers will be designed for No
Pockets. This requirement shall be clearly marked on all relevant engineering
drawings e.g. P&IDs, piping isometrics. Where designing for No Pockets is not

Please be clear that this degree of trim if for illustrative purposes only.
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ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

practicable, pockets and expansion loops in the flare headers and sub-headers will
require drain points.
Drainage schemes off the flare headers/pockets should be evaluated e.g. valved
systems (e.g. dead man valve type) or a drip legs with a restriction orifice are
feasible however FPSO contractor must follow guidance provided in API code and
GP 44-80. Additional valving will be required to allow valve/RO maintenance and
cleaning.
Since the fluids can be volatile careful consideration of the routing of these fluids
must be given whilst recognising BPs requirements for a closed drains system. If
routed to the cargo, slop tanks or HC gas blanketing header the potential for gas
blow-by must be assessed and addressed in the design. In general the use of drain
pots with automated valves, switches or pump-out requirements should be avoided
as the increased complexity associated with these schemes can reduce system
reliability. However they can be considered on an exception basis.
Note that the requirement for no pockets shall also apply to PSV tail-pipes which
shall be designed to ensure free drainage on the discharge side of the PSV.

4.2 Pressure Instrumentation

Recommendation 4: Provide pressure and temperature transmitters on flare
headers. This will allow for confirmation of back pressures and temperatures in the
header such that dynamic flare studies will be validated giving credibility to the flare
design.
The location and type of the transmitters on the HP Wet, HP (cold) Dry and LP flare
headers shall be determined in detailed design. The risks associated with the fatigue
of small bore connections from acoustic induced fatigue and turbulence induced
fatigue must be considered for example use of non-intrusive temperature
instruments may provide sufficient temperature monitoring requirements. Pressure
transmitters could be located at the upstream end of the headers in order to sense
downstream blockage.

4.3 PCV to Flare on Glycol Contactor

Recommendation 5: Confirm the requirement for a Glycol Contactor pressure
control valve to flare.
For the programme gas treating and gas compression system configuration, a PCV
off the glycol contactor would normally be required to operate in the following
scenarios:
1. To reduce the likelihood of the PSVs off the contactor lifting in the event of an
HP compressor trip

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ANG-PROG-20-BP-FAC-TEC-0005
BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

2. To allow start-up of the gas treating system and ensure gas can achieve the
dew point specification before starting HP gas compression
In order to confirm the requirement for the Glycol Contactor PCV in scenario 1, the
hydraulic response of the designed system shall be checked by the FPSO contractor
during detailed design through simulation modelling to ensure the PSVs on the
glycol contactor do not lift if one or both HP compressors trip with the PCV to flare
not operational.
Firstly, an operable steady state condition must be demonstrated when the MP
compression unit is operating in full recycle and all gas is flared via the HP separator
flare pressure control valve(s). If steady state operation is proven, then the dynamic
response of the system in transition from normal operating scenarios to HP
compression shutdown should be simulated. The pressure in the glycol contactor
must remain below the glycol contactor PSV set point without the action of the
glycol contactor flare PCV and all other operating constraints must be met.
The FPSO contractor must also demonstrate a safe and operable method of startingup the glycol contactor/dehydration system should this flare valve be considered
unnecessary.
Should studies confirm the requirement of the glycol contactor PCV, provision must
be made for flaring off the contactor with the following restrictions/qualifications.

The operating conditions must be clearly defined for the valve i.e. pressure,
temperature, composition, worst case J-T cooling etc and any risks
associated with acoustic of turbulent induced fatigue.

Consider removal of any wet gas bypasses around the glycol contactor to
limit likelihood of wet gas flaring.

Consider routing the glycol contactor flare valve to HP cold flare header.
Temperatures are anticipated to be low and liquids are not expected to be
produced in any significant volume. See later recommendation on
segregation.

Ensure methanol is injected upstream of PCV during off spec (wet gas)
flaring. Consider automating this methanol injection.

If the PCV is retained, the MP compressor high discharge pressure override set
point shall be lower than that of the PCV to flare off the glycol contactor to reduce
the likelihood of continuous prolonged flaring from this PCV. Set points shall be
verified by dynamic simulation. Further, this PCV can be used when starting up,
however it is anticipated glycol will be recirculating at temperature before significant
gas volumes are brought forward for HP compression.

4.4 Segregation of Fluids

Recommendation 6: The routing and segregation of fluids into the flare system
must be reviewed for all programme FPSOs to ensure that cold uninhibited gas is
not being allowed to enter wet gas flare systems for prolonged periods of time.
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BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

Routes to flare and flare headers themselves must be clearly designated on P&IDs,
PFDs and SFDs into the following:

HP wet flare header (VHW)

HP cold flare header (VHC)

LP flare header (VL)

For example, it is expected that the PCVs off the HP separators and MP
compression trains will be routed to the HP wet flare header. The potential to route
high pressure cold gas, e.g. glycol contactor and HP compression system, to the
cold/low temperature flare header must be considered. This should include
consideration of blowdown and relief valves where they may be leaking or failed
(failed open).

4.5 Safe Isolation of Cooling Medium Lines

Recommendation 7: Isolation of inlet and outlet cooling medium lines to shell and
tube exchangers shall meet the highest form of integrity as per Institute of
Petroleum Guidelines (Ref 1).
On Greater Plutonio it was noted that 2 out of the 20 XVs on the shell and tube
exchangers failed to close after the bursting discs had ruptured due to inability to
close against such high pressures. This resulted in the primary path of HP wet flare
gas through the cooler and reverse flow back into the seawater supply header. As it
transpired, the failure of these XVs to close possibly prevented a larger incident
occurring. However the design intent of the XVs was to prevent hydrocarbons
entering the seawater system in a burst tube scenario and to vent safely via the
bursting discs to flare assuming a free flow path.
Institute of Petroleum guidelines section 3.7.4.4. state that an ESD valve may be
fitted on outlet pipework whilst the inlet can have a check valve. However it goes on
to recommend that higher integrity isolation can be afforded by also fitting an ESD
valve upstream of the check valve on the inlet line. BP requires this higher form of
integrity for applications where tube rupture is considered a risk.

4.6 Safe Operating Envelopes

Recommendation 8: Operating guides to be developed by the FPSO contractor for
all process systems (especially gas system) that describe abnormal operating modes
(such as flaring to maintain production) in addition to steady state normal
operation. In addition, these guides should clearly identify the safe operating
envelopes for start-up, shutdown and normal operation.
For this specific lesson, the operating guides must seek to align operating
procedures for wet gas flare systems on all Programme FPSOs with the different
system bases of design.
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BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

Gas system operating guide is to clearly outline the reasoning for the MP
compressor discharge pressure set point being lower than that of the glycol
contactor, i.e. to ensure any process flaring due to compression capacity limitations
occurs off the HP separators and not from the glycol contactor.
Operating guides to provide clarity on where points where continuous flaring
cases/scenarios can occur. For example, continuous flaring can occur from the HP
separators and LP compressors only, i.e. no prolonged continuous flaring from the
glycol contactor. An inherently safe design approach should be utilised such that
active and procedural protection is avoided.

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BP Angola Programme Process Technical Note (Flare)

5 REFERENCES
1. Guidelines for the safe and optimum design of hydrocarbon pressure relief
and blowdown systems, The Institute of Petroleum, 2001
2. Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems, ANSI/API Standard 521, 5th
Edition, January 2007
3. GP 44-80 Guidance on Practice for Relief Disposal Systems, BP Group
Engineering Practices, March 2006.

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