Terrorist Attack on Madrid Bombing

By: David Raja Marpaung S.IP M.Def1

The “new” Islamist terrorism in Europe differs from that in the past in
several respects. First, it involves multiple Salafi-Jihadi movements
originating from several Arab-Islamic countries. Secondly, it is aimed
almost exclusively at Western targets. Thirdly, the majority of the
militants have received paramilitary and/or terrorist training camps run
by al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan. Because of this, analysts
perceive the recent patterns of Islamist terrorism in Europe as a new front
in Usama Bin Ladin’s and al-Qaida’s “global jihad” mainly directed
against the U.S., Israel and their closest allies2.

On March 11, 2004 terrorists attacked the Madrid commuter rail system by
detonating ten backpack bombs, killing 191 people and wounding 1,841. The attack was
the most devastating act of terrorism in European history, except for the 1988 bombing
of Pam Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The ruling Popular Party led by
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar initially blamed the attack on ETA, the
Basque separatist group responsible for more than 800 deaths since its founding in
1959. However, the investigation quickly led police to conclude that the bombings were
the work of Islamic extremists. The political dilemma of the PP was twofold:
Firstly, announcing that an Islamist organization2 had perpetrated a terrorist
attack in Spain was going to make PP’s unpopular decision to support the American
military intervention in Iraq a damaging issue in an election it was fully expecting to win.
In many people’s minds the horror of the March 11 bombings would not have occurred if
Aznar had not been so eager to sustain his alliance with George W. Bush and Tony
Blair. Survey polls carried out at the time of Spain’s involvement in the war coalition in
Iraq revealed that the vast majority of the Spanish population were against such a
governmental decision.
Secondly, by hinting at ETA, the PP Government attempted to endorse its hard
line towards Basque nationalism.There was an effort by the Spanish government to
blame ETA, something which was perceived to be a move for political advantage.5 A
popular reaction against the interpretations given by government officials translated into
an unexpected swing of votes to the main opposition party (PSOE). Large sections of
the electorate among young voters and former abstainers mobilised with their votes
against the PP and made possible the victory of the PSOE.
The conclusion was cemented a day before the election when a video was
released, in which a man calling himself Abu Dujana al Afghani, the spokesman for al
Qaeda in Europe claimed responsibility for the bombings and stated that they were
retaliation against Spanish military participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
1 David Raja Marpaung. Associate Lecture University of Indonesia, also Indonesia Politic and
Defense Consultant. Email: davidrajamarpaung@gmail.com Phone: +62 81219588360

2 Nesser, Petter. “Jihad in Europe – A survey of the motivations for Sunni Islamist terrorism in postmillennium
Europe.”
decision to commit troops to the Iraq war had been hugely unpopular with the Spanish
public and the next day Spanish voters turned out in record numbers to vote Aznar’s
Popular Party out of office. The Spanish Socialist Workers Party won and its candidate
for Prime Minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero immediately announced his intention
to pull Spanish troops out of Iraq. He also took initiatives which made effective the
realignment of Spain’s foreign policy with that of its traditional European allies, France
and Germany in particular.

Tragedy
Ten bombs explode on four packed earlymorning commuter trains in Madrid killing 191 people
and leaving at least 1800 injured. Spanish officials later say their investigations are focusing on
the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group which is said to support alQaeda's war against the
West. The 11 March 2004 attacks consisted of a series of ten explosions that occurred at the
height of the Madrid rush hour aboard four commuter trains (Cercanías in Spain). Thirteen
improvised explosive devices were reported to have been used, all but three of which
detonated.
Terrorists chose to attack land transport for several reasons. The first advantage
is the panic-spreading ubiquity of the city bus or metro which reinforces the perception
among the civilian population that anyone using public transport could become a victim
of the next terror attack. Secondly, land transport provides the terrorists with a high
concentration of people in a confined space, creating a mass casualty environment. It’s
been documented that attacks against land transport targets have been nearly twice as
lethal as terror attacks overall. Thirdly, a terror campaign targeting commuter transport
can deter people from everyday travel, and have a profound economic impact by
crippling the mobility of the work force and scaring away investors and tourists. Fourthly,
continuous attacks against such frequently-used means of transport can severely
undermine a government’s authority as the populace grows increasingly frustrated over
time, eventually blaming the government for its inability to maintain order. Fifthly,
terrorists pick land transport targets because they are an essential feature of large
population centres and thus represent in the mind of the terrorist the heart of the enemy.
And finally unlike civil aviation land transport is a soft target that provides the terrorists
with an almost infinite number of options for operations with a high probability of
success and low level of risk. In short, commuter transport is an attractive terrorist
target; that is a reality that is unlike to change soon
Time Line
All of the trains left Alcala de Henares within 15 minutes of each other, from 0600GMT
onwards. As each train passed through the station, investigators say, the bombers
loaded rucksacks each containing about 10 kg (22 lb) of explosives onboard.
At 0639, as the first train drew to a halt inside Atocha station, three bombs exploded in
the third, fourth and sixth carriages. At least 34 people were killed and scores wounded.
Almost simultaneously, four bombs detonated in the first, fourth and sixth carriages of
the second train about 500m outside the station. At least 59 people were killed and
scores wounded
At 0641, two bombs went off in the fourth and fifth carriages of the third train as it
passed through El Pozo station, back down the line from Atocha. At least 70 people
were killed and many more wounded.
At about 0642, the fourth train was passing through Santa Eugenia station when a
bomb exploded in the fourth carriage, killing at least 17 people and wounding dozens
At 0840 the Spanish Red Cross put out an urgent appeal for blood amid dwindling
supplies. The Interior Ministry warned motorists to stay off the capital's roads to allow
the swift transfer of the wounded to hospital.

By 0927 all incoming trains were stopped due to fears of further explosions.

Victims
The blasts killed 191 people and wounded 1,841

Nationality Deaths
Spain 142
Romania 16
Ecuador 6
Poland 4
Bulgaria 4
Peru 3
Dominican Republic 2
Columbia 2
Morocco 2
Ukraine 2
Honduras 2
Senegal 1
Cuba 1
Chile 1
Brazil 1
France 1
Philippines 1

Actors
Seven of the key suspects - including the alleged mastermind, Tunisian Serhane ben
Abdelmajid Fakhet - died in an explosion at a Madrid flat in April 2004 as police were
closing in on them. A policeman also died.
Twenty one people, mostly Moroccans, were convicted of involvement in the attacks.
Three of the key defendants received maximum jail sentences.
The attacks were one of the first signs that Europe was vulnerable to attacks from
groups residing within the continent and who were inspired - but not necessarily formally
directed - by al-Qaeda's leadership.

Effect
The March 11, 2004 terror attack in Madrid played a significant role in ousting the ruling
Popular Party from power in the Spanish elections that took place on March 14, 2004.
The results of the Popular Party’s defeat included the election of the Socialist Party’s
candidate for Prime Minister, Jose Zapatero and the withdrawal of Spanish troops from
Iraq.
Al-Qaeda Interest with Spain

Al-Qaeda had certainly shown an interest in Spain in the period preceding the attacks.
In November 2001, Spanish authorities arrested eight men suspected of being al-Qaeda
operatives, one of whom reportedly had past links with Basque ETA.
Osama bin Laden issued a public threat in October 2003 to carry out suicide bombings
against any countries joining the US-led invasion of Iraq: "We reserve the right to
retaliate at the appropriate time and place against all countries involved, especially
Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan and Italy." At the time, Spain had some 1,300
soldiers stationed on Iraqi soil. In addition, bin Laden had spoken earlier of wishing to
return the southern Spanish region of Andalucia to Muslim control, reversing the
Reconquista of 1492.
Conclusion

Members of Spain’s Muslim Diaspora, most of whom lacked any prior affiliation with
terrorism, carried out the March 2004 bombings, which killed 191 and wounded
1,841.Although it is believed that they were inspired to action after hearing an October
2003 tape from Osama bin Laden, calling for attacks against countries participating in
the Iraq war, it appears that none of the attack’s perpetrators received instructions or
support of any kind from al Qaeda’s leadership. That a group, which largely consisted of
petty criminals and bluecollar workers could plan, fund, and carry out an attack of this
complexity and size, independent of al Qaeda’s leadership, illustrates the changing
nature of the terror threat since 9/11.
In particular, these facts indicate that going after al Qaeda’s leadership alone will
not\ prevent attacks like Madrid that are carried out by independent cells of al Qaeda
Network members and al Qaeda Locals. The primary challenge posed to authorities by
al QaedaNetwork is the difficulty in identifying or profiling individuals who have not
attendedforeign training camps or fought in foreign jihads, and who generally lack
discernableties to terrorism that would otherwise distinguish them as a threat and place
them under the scrutiny of law enforcement. This makes them ideal recruiting targets
and as the Madrid attack demonstrated, they are capable of carrying out large scale
attacks when led by even a couple of experienced terrorists

Recommendation

Improving systems to counter an extremely rare terrorist attack is costly and

improvements should also serve the dual purpose of crime or safety improvement
• Remove or closely monitor hiding places for devices (trash cans, lockers,
bathrooms, etc)
• Improve CCTV coverage of station areas
• Reduce sources of secondary fragmentation (ground level glass, vending
machines, chairs, decorations, etc)
• Improve transparency, visibility and lighting to all areas of station
• Control air circulation and establish ventilation procedures in the event of a
chemical or biological attack
• Use non-combustible and non-toxic materials in stations and rolling stock
• Improve interagency communication systems and protocol
• Encourage passenger vigilance
• Analyze security survey
• Analyze business continuity

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