Navarro vs.

Villegas [GR L-31687, 26 February 1970]

1. The Mayor of the City of Manila (Villegas) expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful
assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause
unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken
Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of demonstration sought to be held that afternoon.
2. The Mayor believes that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as to compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as
he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace,
criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that
it has no means of preventing such disorders.
Navarro filed the petition for mandamus.

Issue: Whether the Mayor possesses discretion to determine the public places to be used for assembly, i.e. the
Sunken Garden, instead of Plaza Miranda.

Held: the Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used
for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and to minimize the risks of disorder and
maintain public safety and order. Consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community
is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts
boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public. Civil rights
and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an ordered society. Navarro has failed to show a clear specific
legal duty on the part of Mayor to grant their application for permit unconditionally. Thus, the Court denied the
writ prayed for by Navarro and dismissed their petition.
NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS - Sunken Gardens as alternative to Plaza Miranda - The Mayor cannot be
compelled to issue the permit. A permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a
public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no change was made.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. and Court of
Industrial Relations (1973)
Facts Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (PBM) were dismissed for allegedly violating
the no strike-no lockout provision of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) after staging a mass
demonstration at Malacaang. PBMEO was set to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969
against abuses of the Pasig police, where employees on the first, regular, and third shifts will participate.
PBMEO informed company two days before the said demonstration and asked to excuse all the workers
participating. But a day before the demonstration, PBM said the rally should not prejudice normal office
operations, thus employees without prior filing of a leave of absence who fail to report for the first and regular
shifts on March 4 shall be dismissed for violating their CBA. However, union officers said there was no
violation because the demonstration was against the Pasig police and not the company. They added that the rally
was an exercise of their freedom of speech. In a decision penned by Judge Joaquin Salvador of the Court of
Industrial Relations, eight of the Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization (PBMEO) officers were
found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and were thus removed as employees of PBM. PBMEO filed a motion
for reconsideration, which CIR dismissed the motion for passing two days late from the 10-day deadline the
court allowed.
Issue Whether or not CIR and PBM Co. Inc. violated PBMEOs freedom of expression and assembly on the
grounds that PBM Co. illegally dismissed its employees for participating in a mass demonstration.
Held VIOLATED. The rally was not against the company and therefore there is no violation of the no strikeno lockout provision of their CBA. To charge PBMEO of bargaining in bad faith extends the jurisdiction of the
CBA and inhibits freedom of speech. The company failed to protect its employees from the Pasig polices abuse
of power, went to the extent of dismissing their employees, and instead prioritized material losses. Moreover,
CIR could have easily accepted the motion for reconsideration. Procedural rules do not supersede the
Constitution and may be overruled in a bid to achieve justice, especially in cases of free speech.
CBA collective bargaining agreement; a contract between a company and its employees that lays out work
hours, wages, and other terms and conditions of employment
Strike right of employees to refuse to go to work; cessation of work
Lockout right of employers to suspend work and to refuse to hire workers

Jose B.L. Reyes vs Ramon Bagatsing

November 26, 2011 125 SCRA 553 Political Law Freedom of Speech Primacy of the Constitution over
International Law
Retired Justice Jose BL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally
from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has
been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence
reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No.
7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it
was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we adhere to generally
accepted principles of international law.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution.
Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element.
And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But
the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and
guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by
respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The mere assertion that
subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police
chief assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance
cannot be applied yet because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius
(besides, theres also the question of whether or not the mayor can prohibit such rally but, as noted by the SC,
that has not been raised an an issue in this case).

MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO [129 SCRA 359; G.R. NO.62270; 21 MAY 1984]
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent Gregorio Araneta University.
They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00
P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at

the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), However, they held the general
assembly at the second floor lobby of the VMAS, contrary to what is stated in the permit. At such gathering
they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute
of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched toward the Life Science
Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the
period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an
illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive suspension
for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners
both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private respondents Director of NCR of the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly
which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and
oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was
an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
Held: Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally
they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with the activity taking place in the
school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is
without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and
scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an
assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances
that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such
request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of
the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if,
however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

BAYAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006
Facts
Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally was violently dispersed. 26
petitioners were injured, arrested and detained by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly,

are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being
followed to implement it.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and
others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent
dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to
the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which
the expression is sought.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the
right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the
valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them
and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding
the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in
B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880
cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to
this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and
convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement
to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue
would possibly wane. As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action
even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy.
Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it
causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public
inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral
regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the
Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place
and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all
rallies.
Issue Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.
Held No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of
petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880.
B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference
to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection
and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no
priorrestraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck
down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to
justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared
null and void.

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of
at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days
from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required
to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality
that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR),
insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and
respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of
maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED

Aglipay v. Ruiz (Case Digest)

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937
Facts:
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the
Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling,
as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose for the benefit of a
particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
Held/Reason:
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate
any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourist and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus,
not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court
stressed that Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion
and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Emphasizing that, when the Filipino people implored the
aid of Divine Providence, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain
general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.

ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO

G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.

FACTS:

Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San
Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and
cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic
parish church during the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of
the image. After the fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused to
return custody of the image to the council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because
church funds were used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against
the priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed an
action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when they
were adopted, the barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang
Barangay was not allowed to participate; and that they contravened the constitutional provisions on
separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or
church.
ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for purchase of saint's image with private funds in
connection with barangay fiesta, constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "reviving the traditional socioreligious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron
saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the
construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through the
"selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was
purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a
secular matter. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion or
interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass.
Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio,
then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display
of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious
affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and
drudgery of the lives of the masses.

Garces v. Estenzo statue of San Vicente Ferrer A resolution of the barangay council for soliciting contributions
to buy a statue of the barangays patron saint and the use of such fund for said purpose does not violate the
Constitutions provision prohibiting use of public funds for religious purpose; statue was purchased by barangay
funds so it belongs to the barangay and not to the parish

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., herein represented byPROF.

ABDULRAFIH H. SAYEDY,
petitioner, vs.

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVESECRETARY of the Office of the President of the Philippines, herein
represented by HON.ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, and the OFFICE ON MUSLIM
AFFAIRS,herein represented by its Executive Director, HABIB MUJAHAB HASHIM,
respondents.
G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc. is is a non-governmental organization that extends
voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner
carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified
products and manufacturers. Respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 which designated
respondent OMA (Office on Muslim Affairs) the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other
related regulatory activities resulting to the lost revenues on the part of the petitioner. Petitioner assails the
constitutionality of EO 46 first on the provision on the Separation of Church and State. It is unconstitutional for
the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a
function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the
Muslims. According to petitioner, the subject EO was issued with utter haste and without even consulting
Muslim people's organizations like petitioner before it became effective.
Issue: Whether or not EO 46 violates the principle of separation of Church and State?
Ruling: Yes. OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure the integration of
Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions,
and institutions." Furthermore, OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the nonestablishment clause and the "free exercise of religion provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution.
Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an
and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46encroached
on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what
food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah
on halal food. Accordingly, only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. But in the case at bar, we find no compelling
justification for the government to deprive muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to
classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected
by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications.

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993,Bishop de
la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of
the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction

against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court. They contended that their expulsion was illegal
because it was done without trial thus violating their righto due process of law.
Issue: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of religious intramurals?
Held: The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to
the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to
exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather,
it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.Civil Courts
will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property
rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine
controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property. Obviously, there was no violation of a
civil right in the present case.

American Bible Society v City of Manila GR No. L-9637, April 30, 1957
FACTS:
In the course of its ministry, the Philippine agency of American Bible Society (a foreign, non-stock, non-profit,
religious, missionary corporation) has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof
throughout the Philippines. The acting City Treasurer of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the
business of general merchandise since November 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayors
permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028
and 3364. The society paid such under protest and filed suit questioning the legality of the ordinances under
which the fees are being collected.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila are constitutional and valid
2. Whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at bar
RULING:
1. Yes, they are constitutional. The ordinances do not deprive defendant of his constitutional right of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing and
carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as part of his religious system. It seems clear,
therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff society.
2. The ordinance is inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. Even if religious groups
and the press are not altogether free from the burdens of the government, the act of distributing and selling
bibles is purely religious and does not fall under Section 27e of the Tax Code (CA 466). The fact that the price
of bibles, etc. are a little higher than actual cost of the same does not necessarily mean it is already engaged in
business for profit. Thus, the Ordinances are not applicable to the Society.