Abbas vs.

Abbas, 689 SCRA 646, January 30, 2013

Facts:
This is a case filed by Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license, as
provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Syed and Gloria met at Taiwan in 1991 and were married there on August 9, 1992. On
January 1993, a ceremony was conducted in the Philippines between them solemnized
by Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola.
Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and
Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a
marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona,
Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.
In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to a certain
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.

Ruling:
No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on January 9, 1993, the Family
Code is the applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the
absence of the essential and formal requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides
that those marriages which are solemnized without a license are void from the
beginning in exception to those covered by the preceding chapter.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, he requested
certification that no such license was issued at the MCR of Carmona, Cavite.

Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.

Nicart, Jr. vs. Titong, 744 SCRA 630, December 10, 2014

Facts:
Titong and Abrugar, together with 93 others, were appointed as department heads by
the then Governor Evardone of Samar a few days before the end of his term. Their
appointments were disapproved by the CSC Regional Office for violation of CSC rules
and for not having met the requirements laid down in Nazareno vs City of
Dumaguete case. Titong and Abrugar filed a petition for review before the CSC Main,
which granted and declared their appointments as valid. The new Governor Nicart
sought for reconsideration, but it was denied. Before the CA, he appealed arguing that
their appointments cannot be valid since there was no need to fill up the positions and
that their appointments were en masse.
Meanwhile, the CSC Main issued a writ of execution ordering Gov Nicart and the
provincial government to pay the salaries and emoluments of Titong and Abrugar. Gov
Nicart refused, so they filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC even while the
case before the CA was still pending.
The RTC decided the petition on the basis of the CSC memo circular 82 which states
that the non-issuance of a restraining order or injunction would make the CSC
resolution executory pending appeal. Since there was no TRO or injunction, and its
opinion that the CA decision would not constitute res judicata or in any way affect the
petition for mandamus, the RTC issued a writ of mandamus and went even further in
deciding that the appointments were valid.
Issue:
Whether or not it is proper for the RTC to take cognizance of the petition for mandamus
even while the issues involved is still pending resolution before the CA.
Ruling:
No. First, it is erroneous for the RTC to opine that the CA decision would not affect the
petition before it because clearly, the mandamus petition heavily relies on the validity or
invalidity of the appointments which issue is yet to be resolved by the CA. Second, even
while there is no preliminary injunction or TRO issued by the higher court, ordinarily it
would be proper for a lower court or a court of origin to suspend the proceedings on the

precept of judicial courtesy. Hence, the RTC erred when it decided on the mandamus
petition for disregarding such principle.
Republic vs. San Mateo, 739 SCRA 445, November 10, 2014
Facts:
A Petition for Registration of Title filed by respondents before the RTC. Subject of the
petition was a 12,896 square-meter parcel of land located in Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig
City.
Respondents averred that the land used to be owned by their grandfather and
predecessor-in-interest, Leocadio. the property can be traced from Tax Declaration (TD)
No. 3659, issued in 1948. When Leocadio died, the property was inherited by his three
children, Crisanta, Amador, and Juanito. Both Juanito and Amador subsequently
mortgaged their share to Crisanta and her husband, and failed to settle their obligations.
Thus, in 2000 and 2001, the respective widows of Juanito and Amador executed
waivers of rights in favor of the respondents, the heirs of Crisanta. Respondents then
executed an extra-judicial settlement among themselves.
The case was set for initial hearing. The concerned government agencies, as well as
the owners of the adjoining lots, were notified of the hearing. Moreover, the notice was
posted in several public places in Taguig City, and was published in Peoples Journal,
Taliba and the Official Gazette.
Globe Steel Corporation (GSC), represented by Kenneth Yu (Yu), New Donavel
Compound Neighborhood Association, Inc. (NDCNAI), and the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA), all registered their opposition to the petition. GSC
contended that the application might have encroached on its properties, because it
owned the adjoining parcels of land. NDCNAI argued that it had a better right of
possession to apply for registration of ownership, because the lot would have been unfit

for human habitation, were it not for the fillings introduced by the association to the lot.
Moreover, its members, who are informal settlers, are the actual occupants of the lot.
LLDA, on the other hand, claimed that the petition should be denied because the lot is
located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, and, thus, the lot forms
part of the Laguna Lake bed, and is considered inalienable and indisposable public
land, and within the jurisdiction of the LLDA.
In the meantime, on July 25, 2008, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) filed a report
and adjusted the area of the property to 12,776 square meters, to rectify a discrepancy
in the technical description.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case
2. Whether or not the respondents have possessed the property for the length of
time required by law
3. Whether or not respondents proved that the property is alienable and disposable
Ruling:
1. YES. The Supreme Court held that the CA correctly held that the RTC properly
acquired jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the subject property. As the CA found, the names
of the owners of the adjoining lots were indicated in respondents Amended Petition on
April 28, 1999, and these persons have been properly notified of the proceedings.
Moreover, there was proper publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, along with the
technical description of the property. Given that this is an action in rem, the publication
of the notice is sufficient notice to all claimants to the property.
As this Court held in Republic v. CA and Heirs of Luis Ribaya: only where the original
survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of land not

previously included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer
jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added after the publication
of the original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an addition, but on
the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was published, no new publication is
required. The amendment of the area was not a result of any substantial amendment in
the property to be covered by the petition for registration, but was done merely to
conform to the cadastral mapping of Taguig.
2. The court find that to be a question of fact, and thus, it is the trial court that is in the
best position to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the respondents is
sufficient to prove their claim of possession since 1948. We find no reversible error in
the CAs affirmance of the RTCs reliance on the tax declarations presented by the
respondents.
3. The court find that the respondents failed to prove that the property sought to be
registered is indeed alienable and thus subject to registration. Respondents merely
relied on the certification of DENR-South CENRO to the effect that the subject property
is alienable. But as discussed below, this is insufficient, as respondents failed to present
any proof that the DENR Secretary approved such certification. We rule that the CAs
reliance solely on the DENR-South CENRO certification constitutes reversible error on
its

part.

Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and
disposable are a certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) and a certified true copy of the DENRs original
classification of the land. The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized and affirmed
applications for land registration on other substantial and convincing evidence duly
presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the ground of
substantial compliance.

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) vs.

Carpio-Morales, 740 SCRA 368, November 12, 2014

Facts:
Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1977, the
applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in RA 3019, the law in
force at that time. What is, then, left for the Courts determination is the reckoning point
for the 10-year period. Act No. 3326, Section 2 of which provides for two reckoning
points for the counting of the prescription of an offense: 1) the day of the commission of
the violation of the law; and 2) if the day when the violation was committed be not
known, then it shall begin to run from the discovery of said violation and the institution
of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment.
In 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating a
Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) and
Memorandum Order No. 61 prescribing certain criteria to be used by the Ad Hoc
Committee as a guide in investigating and studying loans granted by government
financing institutions that amount to behest loans. One of the loan accounts referred to
the Ad Hoc Committee for investigation was that of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC),
which was 37.2% owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a known Marcos business associate.
From 1969 to 1977, RHC obtained a number of loans totalling P86.9 million. To secure
said loans, RHC offered as collaterals the assets that were acquired by these loans. In
1980, 40% of the amount were converted into DBPs common shareholding in RHC,
and the balance of P58.4 million was restructured. The properties were foreclosed in
1983 with arrearages of P11.97 million. On the basis of the foregoing, the Ad Hoc
Committee found that DBPs total exposure as of 1986 amounted to P99.1 million. On
January 4, 1993, the Ad Hoc Committee then submitted a report to the President where
it concluded that the RHC account qualifies as behest in character. An AffidavitComplaint was filed on January 6, 2003 with the Office of the Ombudsman, against
respondent directors and officers of RHC and the directors of DBP for violation of
Sections 3(e) and 3 (g) of RA No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Ombudsman issued an Order dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the Ombudsman issued another Order
dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription, effectively denying the motion
for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the Affidavit-Complaint dated January 6, 2003 on the ground of prescription UST Law
Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015

RULING:
The petition is without merit. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable
under said law shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased to 15
years with the passage of BP Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982. This does
not mean, however, that the longer prescriptive period shall apply to all violations of RA
3019. Following the Courts pronouncements in People v. Pacificador, the rule is that in
the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to
the accused is to be adopted. As such, the longer prescriptive period of 15 years
pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of
the said amending law on March16, 1982. Considering that the crimes were committed
in 1969, 1970, 1973,1975, and 1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the
ten-year period set in RA 3019, the law in force at that time. What is, then, left for the
Courts determination is the reckoning point for the 10-year period. Notably, RA 3019 is
silent as to when the period of prescription shall begin to run. This void, however, is
remedied by Act No. 3326, Section 2 of which provides in part: Sec. 2. Prescription shall
begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceeding for its investigation and punishment. xxx. Based on the above, there are two
reckoning points for the counting of the prescription of an offense: 1) the day of the
commission of the violation of the law; and 2) if the day when the violation was
committed be not known, then it shall begin to run from the discovery of said violation
and the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment. In the case
at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which the Court has recognized as
a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the simple
expedient of suppressing their documentation, the second mode applies. The Court,
therefore, counts the running of the prescriptive period from the date of discovery
thereof on January 4,1993, when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
reported to the President its findings and conclusions anent RHCs loans. This being the
case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman on January 6, 2003, a little over ten (10) years from the date of discovery
of the crimes, is clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-year period within which to
institute the action has already lapsed, making it proper for the Ombudsman to dismiss
petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription.

MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp., 739 SCRA 432, November
10, 2014
Facts:
MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from
Monark
Equipment Corporation (Monark) for various periods in 2000, the lease
covered by a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus, Monark delivered five (5)
pieces of heavy equipment to the project site of MCMP in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac,
Quezon, the delivery evidenced by invoices as well as Documents and acknowledgment
receipts received and signed by representatives of MCMP, namely, Jorge Samonte on
December 5, 2000 and Rose Takahashi on January 29, 2001, respectively. The latter
failed to pay rental fees for the use of five (5) pieces of heavy equipment as stated in
their Rental Equipment Contract, as started in the agreement and so, SUIT FOR SUM
MONEY was filed against MCMP.
During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Reynaldo Peregrino, (its Senior
Account Manager. Peregrino testified that there were two (2) original copies of the
Contract, one retained by Monark, while the other was given to MCMP. He further
testified that Monark's copy had been lost and that diligent efforts to recover the copy
proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the Contract which he
personally had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the Contract arguing that there were no diligent efforts to search
for the original copy. Notably, MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract
notwithstanding the directive of the trial court to produce the same.
The lower court ruled in favor of Monark, on appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the
lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the presentation of the secondary evidence should not be allowed.
Ruling:
The petition has been denied by the SC. The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate
requiring the production of the original document whenever its contents are the subject
of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:
"Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the

offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. "In the instant
case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the
RTC gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the
possession of Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the
same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been
repeatedly held by this Court, "finding of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses
are matters best left to the trial court."
Hence, the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of
Peregrino.

Grande vs. Antonio, 716 SCRA 698, February 18, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to
someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born. The children were not
expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in
the Civil Registry.
Respondent Antonio filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of
the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the
minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary
public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity
of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental
custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent father (Antonio) could compel his illegitimate children to
use his surname.
Ruling:
No. There is no legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to
that of the respondent because the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255. Art. 176
gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate
the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must
be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation. Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from
ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the
word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is
under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

Baculi vs. Belen, 681 SCRA 489, September 24, 2012

Facts:
Baculi, a Provincial Prosecutor, filed an Information against a person-accused for
frustrated homicide. Belen, a RTC Judge, directed Baculi to submit evidence that the
notice of preliminary investigation was duly served and received by such person. After a
series of pleadings filed by Baculi, Belen directed the former why he should not be cited
for tempt of court for making unfounded statements in his pleadings. No such reason
was given, thus Belen found Baculi guilty of direct contempt for making scurrilous
(vulgar) and contumacious (rebellious) statements in one of the latter's Motions, and
subsequently for indirect contempt. Baculi moved that such order be set aside, but was
denied by Belen, stating that such Decisions are final and executory. Therefore, Baculi
filed a complaint against Belen, denying the claims against him, and added that Belen
was induced by revenge because it was Baculi who indicted him in a previous libel case
against him, and that Belen had a 'power complex'.
Issue:
Whether or not Belen is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for citing Baculi in
indirect contempt.
Ruling:
YES! Suspended for 6 months and Stern warning.
RATIO:
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Indirect contempt is any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. The scurrilous and
contumacious statements constitute direct contempt because it is equivalent to
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. But such is not the reason for indirect contempt. And even if
such statements were considered as indirect contempt, Belen did not follow the proper
procedure under the Rules of Court. This strengthens the OCA's findings that Belen is
grossly ignorant of basic procedure.
Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic procedural
rules must be at the palm of his hands. When the law is so elementary, such as the
provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does not know the
same, and failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a
judge like Belen.

Seeres vs. Commission on Elections, 585 SCRA 557, April 16, 2009
Facts:
In 1999, Melquiades Robles was elected president and chairperson of BUHAY, a partylist group duly registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year term for all its party officers, without reelection. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its
president. All the required Manifestations of Desire to Participate in the said electoral
exercises, including the Certificates of Nomination of representatives, carried the
signature of Robles as president of BUHAY. On January 26, 2007, in connection with
the May 2007 elections, BUHAY again filed a Manifestation of its Desire to Participate in
the Party-List System of Representation. As in the past two elections, the manifestation
to participate bore the signature of Robles as BUHAY president.
Dr. Hans Christian Seeres, on the other hand, filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
Deny Due Course to Certificates. In it, Seeres alleged that he was the acting president
and secretary-general of BUHAY, having assumed that position since August 17, 2004
when Robles vacated the position. Seeres also claim that the nominations made by
Robles (nominations pertaining as to who should represent BUHAY in Congress) were,
for lack of authority, void owing to the expiration of the latters term as party president.
Furthermore, Seeres asserted that Robles was, under the Constitution, disqualified
from being an officer of any political party, the latter being the Acting Administrator of the
Light Railway Transport Authority (LRTA), a government-controlled corporation. Robles,
so Seeres would charge, was into a partisan political activity which civil service
members, like the former, were enjoined from engaging in.
On July 9 and July 18, 2007, respectively, the COMELEC issued two resolutions
proclaiming BUHAY as a winning party-list organization for the May 2007 elections
entitled to three (3) House seats and it also declared Robles as the duly authorized
representative of BUHAY.
ISSUE: Whether or not Robles should be disqualified as president of BUHAY.

RULING: No, Robles is not disqualified as the president of BUHAY. His being the
chairman of LRTA and the president of BUHAY, a party-list group, is not compatible.
There is no law prohibiting that the LRTA chair cannot be a president of a party-list
group. Further, Robles is not guilty of electioneering. Robles act of nominating BUHAY
representatives to Congress is not electioneering. The crime electioneering is clearly
defined under Section 79 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code but Robles did not commit
any act defined thereunder.
Anent the issue that Robles term as president of BUHAY already expired when he
made the nominations hence the nominations are void, the Supreme Court ruled that
the nominations are valid. This is because of the Hold-Over doctrine under corporation
law. As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold over after the
expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or
appointed. The holdover doctrine has, to be sure, a purpose which is at once legal as it
is practical. It accords validity to what would otherwise be deemed as dubious corporate
acts and gives continuity to a corporate enterprise in its relation to outsiders

People vs. Dela Cruz, 612 SCRA 738, February 16, 2010
Murder -- Qualified by Treachery
Facts:
In an Information filed on August 11, 2003, accused-appellant Leozar Dela Cruz y
Balobal was indicted for the crime of murder of Vincent Pimentel under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the charge.
On September 5, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Leozar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder attended by treachery and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua. On February 27, 2008, the CA rendered the appealed decision, affirming the
findings of the RTC and the conviction of Leozar but modifying the award of damages.
Accused raises the same assignment of errors as in his Brief, to wit: first, that the
courts a quo erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery;
and second, that the courts a quo gravely erred in convicting him of murder instead of
homicide.
Issue:
Was there treachery?
Ruling:
Yes. The fact that Leozar and Vincent did not quarrel prior to the killing is indicative of
the treachery employed by Leozar. After Vincent paid Leozar some money, he left and
went inside the alley. When Vincent came back to Mockingbird St. from the alley, Leozar
deliberately employed means with treachery affording Vincent no opportunity to defend
himself, i.e., Leozar draped his arm around Vincent and slash/slit his neck using a 24inch bladed samurai. The fatal neck wound caused Vincents death, described in his
death certificate as "hemorrhagic shock secondary to an incised wound of the neck." All
told, the victim was unaware of the imminent attempt on his life, and was not in a
position to defend himself. Clearly, treachery was present in this killing.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the

offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a
warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be
considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that
gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
People vs. Satonero, 602 SCRA 769, October 02, 2009
Murder; Self-Defense
Facts:
At around five oclock in the afternoon of December 25, 1997, Leticia and her
nephew, Ramon Amigable were in Brgy. La Esperanza, Tulunan waiting for a tricycle
ride to a place called Mlang. Leticia had just received a gift from her sister. Accusedappellant Romeo SATONERO, Leticias nephew too, happened to be nearby. Accusedappellant, upon seeing the gift Leticia was holding, inquired where it came from. When
told of the source, accused-appellant mocked the gift-giver for giving more to those who
have more in life. Accused-appellant then asked Leticia if she knew who he was,
followed by a remark that he would throw her into the irrigation ditch.
At that moment, Leticia told Ramon not to mind accused-appellant because he was
drunk. When Ramon was about to board the tricycle, accused-appellant followed him,
shot him three times with a short-barreled gun, then stabbed him several times. All told,
Ramon sustained nine stab wounds on different parts of his body. Ramon died as a
result.
On May 16, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of murder,
discrediting the SATONEROs theory of self-defense. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Did the RTC and CA err in not appreciating self-defense?
Ruling:
No. The conviction was proper. There was no self-defense.
The Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the finding of the CA, confirmatory of that
of the RTC, that there was no self-defense on the part of accused-appellant in the
instant case.
One who admits killing another in the name of self-defense bears the onus of proving
the justifiability of the killing. The accused, therefore, must convincingly prove the
following elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense: (1) unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
claiming self-defense. While all three elements must concur to support a claim of
complete self-defenese, self-defense relies first and foremost on a showing of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. Absent clear proof of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim, self-defense may not be successfully pleaded
In the instant case, accused-appellant failed to discharge his burden of proving unlawful
aggression. From a perusal of the trial courts decision, the prosecutions testimonial
evidence, notably Leticias testimony, had been carefully weighed and was found by the
trial court to be more credible and convincing than the bare and self-serving testimony
of accused-appellant as to who initiated the fight and what transpired after the initial
assault ensued. The testimony of a single eyewitness to a killing, if worthy of credence,
is sufficient to support a conviction for homicide or murder, as the case may be.
The allegation of accused-appellant which pictured Ramon as purportedly pulling out a
knife and attempting to stab the former came uncorroborated, although several
onlookerspotential witnesses allwere at the situs of the crime. And while claiming to
have grappled for some time with Ramon for the possession of the knife, accusedappellant managed to stay unscathed, which in itself is incredible.