G.R. No.

L-21897 October 22, 1963

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as
Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO
BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO,
Secretary of Justice, respondents.
Facts:
It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized
the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and
created a rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents for the
implementation of said proposed importation.
On September 25, 1963, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales a rice planter, and president of the
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the
production of rice and corn filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or
attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which
allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220 explicitly prohibits the importation of
rice and corn "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency;" that
petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties
during the pendency this case and to prevent the judgment therein from coming ineffectual.
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary
injunction be forthwith issued restraining respondent their agents or representatives from
implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign
rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.
The contracts with Vietnam and Burma
It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2)
contracts for the Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under
international law; that such agreements became binding effective upon the signing thereof
by representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter
should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the
conflict must be resolved under the American jurisprudence in favor of the one which is
latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive
relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and
the aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the
Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable
letters of credit in favor of the sell of the said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense.
Issue:

W/N the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the proposed
importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was
authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for military stock pile purposes" in the
exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1?
Held:
This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee of
our Government, our government agencies and/or agents.
In the contracts with Vietnam and Burma, the Court is not satisfied that the status of said
tracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established. The parties to said
contracts do not pear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even
assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same
are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President
may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction
which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main
function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of
law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
The writ of preliminary injunction
The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not
respondents herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed
importation. However, the majority favors the negative view, for which reason the injunction
prayed for cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary
had and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his
jurisdiction in granting said authority; said importation is not sanctioned by law and is
contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed
for must be and is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.

Tuesday, July 28, 2009

Gonzales vs. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230
Facts:
Respondent executive secretary authorized importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources. Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter and president of ilo-ilo

palay and corn planters asso., filed and averring that in making or attempting to make
importation of foreign rice are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because
RA 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration
or any government agency.
Issue:
Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.
Held:
The power of judicial review is vested with the supreme court in consonace to section 2 art.
VIII of the constitution. the alleged consummation of the contracts with vietnam and burma
does not render this case academic. RA 2207, enjoins our government not from entering
contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under conditions prescribed
in said act.
A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our
government to default in the performance of such obligations as it mat have contracted with
the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may be
complied without importing the said commodity into the phils., the proposed importation
may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned law.
Ichong v Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115
Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents,
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180,
brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to
enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of
the Act, contending among others that: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of
the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law; it
violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; and its
provisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to
entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII
and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition
in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to
continue to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law,
until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after

the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an
exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a
provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the
laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws
relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or
opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of
retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to
present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their
businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and
liabilities and their offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a provision
allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such
business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
Held: The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power. It has
been said that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible
to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it
does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co- extensive with selfprotection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to
almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost allembracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee
the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and
progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by
which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve public interest or welfare. So it
is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what
they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due
process clause and the equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or

reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the
legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask
when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there
can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and
persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal
protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there
must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope
of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and
efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a
matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case
such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion
the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law
are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void
for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered
into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty
or any other conventional agreement. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the
law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of
China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of
the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty,
the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law , and the
same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.
Ichong vs Hernandez

Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the Retail Business
was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations
owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by
the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and
treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity
between the Philippines and China was violated according to him.

Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then
provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a
contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual
danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes
upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of
the state.
Kuroda vs Jalandoni
83 Phil 171

Facts:
Shinegori Kuroda, a former lieutenant-general of the Japanese Imperial Army and
commanding general of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before
the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. Being the commanding general of the
enemy forces during the war period, he was tried for failing to discharge his duties well and
permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in clear violation of the laws
and customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the
law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that
using as basis the Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the
war crimes committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such
rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of
interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional.

2. Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes
Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals is constitutional as it is
aligned with Sec. 3, Article 2 of the Constitution which states that, The Philippines
renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted
principles of international law includes those formed during the Hague Convention, the
Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudence established by the United Nations.
These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of
planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and
offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine
of incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try
persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its
citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere
incorporation of such principles in the constitution.

The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been
equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for.
By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and
that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by
the very provisions of this special law.
Kuroda vs Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 195, L-2662, March 26, 1949
Facts : Shigenori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Imperial Forces of the Philippines was charged before a Military
Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He had
unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as a commander to control the
operations of members of his command.
Petitioner was duly prosecuted for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and
the Geneva Convention through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.
Executive Order No. 68 provided the organization of such military commissions, established
National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of
accused war criminals.
Attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port of the United States of America participated in the
prosecution of the case in behalf of the United States of America.

Issue : Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional.

Held : This court holds that the Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional as
provided in Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution, that-

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

The participation of the two American attorneys although under our law, they are not
qualified to practice law is valid and constitutional. Military Commission is a special military
tribunal governed by special law not by Rules of the Court, which govern ordinary civil
courts. There is nothing in Executive Order No.68 which requires counsels need to be
qualified to practice law in the Philippines. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that
counsels for the parties are usually military personnel.
Under the doctrine of incorporation, although the Philippines was not a signatory of the
Hague and Geneva Conventions, international jurisprudence is automatically incorporated in
Philippine law, thus making war crimes punishable in the Philippines.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction
over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No 68, and
having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody,
the court will not interfere with the due process of such Military Commission.
Petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Agustin vs Edu, 88 SCRA 195, L- 49112, February 22, 1979
Facts : This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an
early warning device mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibition
proceeding as being violative to the constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as the
rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned.
The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Ferdinand Marcos aimed to prevent
road accidents and in the interest of safety on all streets, highways including expressways.
All motorist and motor vehicle owners shall have at all times one pair of early warning
device. These hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Roads and
Signs and the United Nations Organization (UN). Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207
ratified the said Vienna convention requiring the installation of road signs and devices.
Herein respondent Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the

implementing rules and regulations of the said instruction.

Issue : Whether or not the assailed Letter of Instruction is invalid and violated constitutional
guarantees of due process.

Held : The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was
no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified,
police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of
police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: The Philippines ------ adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the nation. Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not
for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our countrys
word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna
Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 . The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of
such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the principle of international morality.
In Santiago vs Far Eatern Broadcasting Company , it was held that the constitutionality of the
law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon and
adequately argued. Equal protection is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of
which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect success will crown his efforts. The law is
anything but that.
Petition is DISMISSED and the restraining order is lifted.
AGUSTIN vs EDU
88 SCRA 195

FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition.Petitioner was an
owner of a volkswagen beetle car,model 13035 already properly equipped when it came out
from the assembly lines with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device in
case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as
the Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land
transportation Commission.Respondent Land Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu
issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It

required the use of early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that
the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful
and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction were considered valid and constitutional?

HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as the
implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of
police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United Nations
Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices.It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance,between the International law and municipal law in
applying the rule municipal law prevails.
Secretary of Justice vs. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion
Facts:
On January 13, 1977 P.D. 1069 was issued prescribing the Procedure of the Extradition of
Persons who have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country. The Decree is founded on The
Doctrine of Incorporation under the Constitution Art II, Sec 2 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
On November 13, 1994 Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon signed in Manila the Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of U.S.A. It was
ratified by the Senate.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs
of U. S. a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States who are charged in
the U.S. with the violation of the following: conspiracy, attempt to evade tax, false
statement or entry, election contributions in the name of another.
Pending evaluation of the extradition documents, Mark Jimenez, through a counsel, on July 1,
1999, requested copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government as well
as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall received copies of the requested papers.
Mark Jimenez insisted the constitutional rights particularly the following:
1. the right to be furnished the request and supporting papers;
2. the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the
request, and to present evidence is support of the opposition;

The Depart of Justice Denied the request.

On Aug 6, 1999 Mark Jimenez filed with the R.T.C against the Secretary of Justice, Secretary
of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI for Mandamus (to compel them to furnish to
Mark Jimenez the extradition documents.), Certiorari (to set aside the Sec. of Justice letter
dated July 13, 1999), Prohibition (to restrain the Sec of Justice from considering the
extradition request).
On August 10, 1999 the Judge ordered:
The Secretary of Justice et al ordered to maintain the status quo by refraining from
committing the acts complained of.
Thus this petition, arguing that Honorable Lantion (Presiding Judge of RTC Manila)acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
abuse discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO:
1. by ordering the Secretary of Justice to refrain from committing the acts complained of
(i.e to desist from refusing Mark Jimenez access to the official extradition request and
documents.)
2. Secretary of Justice was unqualifiedly prevented from performing legal duties under the
extradition treaty and the Philippine Extradition Law.
Issue:
Would Mark Jimenez entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty?
Held:
Petition Dismissed.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the
land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the
domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to

be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited
constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are
organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain
to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is
the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion
Posted on June 29, 2008 by asteroids08
FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs
U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent
Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of
and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark
Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official
extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment
on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner
denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in
Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in
any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad
duties under a treaty.
RULING:
Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another
state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under
generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of
the law of the land.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE vs DUQUE III
March 6, 2009 by raquel
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. HEALTH
SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President
Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of
the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by
the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to
diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents
and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which
was to take effect on July 7, 2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to nullify Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of The Milk Code,
assailing that the RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending
and expanding the coverage of said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR
RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for
being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from

implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the respondents,
UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may
implement them through the RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into
our domestic system. Custom or customary international law means a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. Generally accepted principles of international law refers to norms
of general or customary international law which are binding on all states. The Milk Code is a
verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms of
promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that
advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are
duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA
Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This
may constitute soft law or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state
behavior. Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions,
although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least
a majority of the member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA
Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by
executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand,
the petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how such
protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory provisions
under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no
harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are
in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code.