Dumangas v. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil.

541
G.R. No. L10778, March 29, 1916
Facts:
The municipality of Dumangas, Province of Iloilo, petitioned the CFI of Ilo-Ilo the
registration of six parcels of land totalling 41 sqm land is located in the Barrio of
Balabag, Dumangas, Iloilo of which said municipality claimed to be the absolute
owner and in possession since time immemorial.
The application for registration was opposed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Jaro. They contend that the said lots absolutely and exclusively belonged to the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, which had been in quiet and peaceable
possession of same since time immemorial.
It to have been duly proven that the disputed lot 1 of parcel 4, is adjacent to the
same wall that forms the side of the church in which there is a side door that
serves as passage for the faithful and that in order to do so they are compelled
to cross the subject land.
But, I is also conclusively proven that the Mun. of Dumangas has been in the
possession of the lot and have performed thereon acts of undisputable
ownership erecting flag staff, use of land as corral, a place for posting posters,
building a theater, a school and even a cockpit and a billiard hall. At present
private several houses are erected by private parties who pays rental to the
Municipality.
Issue: Who owns the land? What right does the Church have, if any?
Ruling and Ratio:
The Municipality of Dumangas is the owner. SC affirmed the decision of CFI- Iloilo
ordering the inscription in registry of the property in their name.
But in view of the time that has elapsed since the church was built and during
which period the municipality has not prohibited the passage over the land by
the persons who attend services customarily held in said church, it is evident
that the Church has acquired a right to such use by prescription - not only by the
church, but also by the public. The easement of right of way shall be understood
to be to such extent as may be necessary for the transit of persons and fourwheeled
vehicles.
There are good grounds for presuming that in apportioning lands at the time of
the establishment of the pueblo of Dumangas and in designating the land
adjacent to the church as a public square, this latter was impliedly encumbered
with the easement of a right of way to allow the public to enter and leave the
church (I accordance with Art. 567 of C.C.)

Ronquillo v. Roco, 63 Phil. 86

G.R. No. L10619, February 28, 1958
Facts:
The plaintiffs (Ronquillo, et. al) alleged that they have been in the continuous
and uninterrupted use of a road or passage way which traversed the land of the
defendants (Roco et, al) and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad
Street and the market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back.
They claimed that have been long recognized and respected the private legal
easement of road right of way (20 years).
On May 12, 1953, the defendants and their men constructed a chapel in the
middle of the said right of way which, accordingly has impeded, obstructed and
disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of
way.
On July 10, 1954 defendants planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and
closed hermitically the road passage way and their right of way against the
plaintiffs protests and opposition. This prevented the plaintiffs from going to or
coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of
Naga.
Issue: Whether or not the easement of right of way can be acquired thru
prescription.
Held:
No. The decision in this case apparently contradicted the jurisprudence
established in Dumagas v. Bishop of Jaro that an easement of right of way can be
acquired thru prescription.
The majority of the Justices (this is an en banc proceeding) is in the opinion that
an easement of right of way though it may be apparent is, nevertheless,
discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired
through prescription, but only by virtue of a title.
Under the New Civil Code, easements may be continuous discontinuous
(intermittent),apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more
or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man (Articles 615).
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or prescription,
continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones whether apparent
or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 620 and622)
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, particularly the articles thereof aforecited,
it would therefore appear that the easement of right of way maynot be acquired
through prescription. Even Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for

prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property, excludes there
from the exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous
easements, such as, easement of right of way.

Amor v. Florentino, 74 Phil. 404

G.R. No. L48384, October 11, 1943
Facts:
Over 50 years ago, Maria Florentino owned a house and a warehouse in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur. The house had and still has, on the north side, three windows on the
upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor. Through these windows the
house receives light and air from the lot where the warehouse stands.
In 1985 she transferred the house and land it is built-on by will to Gabriel
Florentino and to Jose Florentino (respondents). While the warehouse and the
land it is built-on was transferred to Encarnacion Florentino. Upon the death of
Maria Florentino, nothing was done in regard to the windows in question.
In 1911, Encarnacion sold here lot and warehouse to Severo Amor (petitioner).
Who destroyed the warehouse to build a two-story warehouse.
The respondents filed an action to prohibit petitioner from building the new
warehouse higher than the original one because it will shut-off the light and air
that had for many years been received through the windows mentioned.
Issue: Whether or not there is an easement which prohibits Amor from
doing the aforementioned construction (**in accordance with the Civil
Code).
Held:
Yes. The easement involved in this case is of two aspects: light and view and
altius non tollendi. These two aspects necessarily go together because an
easement of light and view prevents the owner of the sevient estate from
building to a height that will obstruct the windows.
Article 541 applies to a division of property by succession. Easement are
established by law or by will of the owners or by title.
At the time the devisees took possession of their respective portions of the
inheritance, neither the respondents nor Maria Encarnacion Florentino said or did
anything with respect to the four windows of the respondents' house. The

respondents did not renounce the use of the windows, either by stipulation or by
actually closing them permanently.
The easement was therefore created from the time of the death of the original
owner of both estates, so when petitioner bought warehouse and the land where
it is construted from Encarnancion, the burden of this easement continued on
the real property so acquired because according to Article 534, easements are
inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively pertain.
**Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the effectivity of
the Old Civil Code. The facts show that it happened after the effectivity of the said code
so the law on easement is already applicable. In any case, even if we assume Amors
supposition, the law on easement was already integrated into the Spanish Law and in
fact, had been established by Jurisprudence.
Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the warehouse above the level of the
window. [The issue includes question as to the applicability of the Old Civil Code
because of the timing of Marias death)

North Negros v. Hidalgo, 63 Phil. 664

G.R. No. L-42334 October 31, 1936
Facts:
North Negros Sugar Co. (NNSC) is the owner of a site known as the mill site. It
is where its sugar central, with its factory building and residence for its
employees and laborers are located. It also owns the adjoining sugar plantation
known as Hacienda Begoa.
Across its properties NNSC constructed a road connecting the mill site
with the provincial highway. Through this road it allowed vehicles to pass
upon payment of a toll charge of P0.15 for each truck or automobile. Pedestrians
are allowed free passage through it.
Immediately adjoining the mill site is the hacienda of Luciano Aguirre, known
as Hacienda Sagay, where a billiard hall and a tuba saloon is built. Like other
people in and about the place, Hidalgo used to pass through the said road of the
NNSC because it was his only means of access to the Hacienda Sagay.
Later on, by order of the NNSC , every time that the Hidalgo passed driving his
automobile with a cargo of tuba plaintiff ,the gatekeeper would stop him
(asshole) and prevent him from passing through said road. Hidalgo in such
cases merely deviated from said road and continued on his way to Hacienda
Sagay across the fields of Hacienda Begoa, likewise belonging to the
NNSC.
Issue: Whether or not NNSC can enjoin Hidalgo from passing the
property.
Held:
NO. The case of an easement of way voluntarily constituted in favor of a
community.
As may be seen from the language of Art. 594, in cases of voluntary easement,
the owner is given ample liberty to establish them: NNSC considered it
desirable to open this road to the public in general, without imposing any
condition save the payment of a fifteen-centavo toll by motor vehicles, and it
may not now go back on this and deny the existence of an easement.
Voluntary easements are not contractual in nature; they constitute the act of the
owner. If he exacts any condition, like the payment of a certain indemnity for the
use of the easement, any person who is willing to pay it may make use of the
easement. If the contention be made that a contract is necessary, it may be
stated that a contract exits from the time all those who desire to make use of the
easement are disposed to pay the required indemnity.
NNSC contends that the easement of way is intermittent in nature and can only
be acquired by virtue of a title under Art. 539. Hidalgo, however, does not lay
claim to it by prescription. The title in this case consists in the fact that NNSC has
offered the use of this road to the general public upon payment of a certain sum
as passage fee in case of motor vehicles.

Here defendants contention is, that while the road in question remains open to
the public, he has a right to its use upon paying the passage fees required by
NNSC. Indeed the latter may close it at its pleasure, as no period has been fixed
when the easement was voluntarily constituted, but while the road is thrown
open, NNSC may not capriciously exclude Hidalgo from its use.
Furthermore, plaintiffs evidence discloses the existence of a forcible right of way
in favor of the owner and occupants of the Hacienda Sagay under the Civil
Code, Art. 564, because, according to said evidence, those living in Hacienda
Sagay have no access to the provincial road except thru the road in question.