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7 Identificationoffactorsincollisions

Thischapterpresentsthecomponentsinacollisionscenariobyusingastructuralmodelwith
scenarios,primarycausesandunderlyingfactors.

Thepurposeofthethesisistoidentifyallfactorsthatmaycontributetotheriskforship
collisionsandanewmodelwasthereforedeveloped.Bythisanewperspectiveisachieved,
whichmaynothavebeenpossibleifthemodelsdescribedinChapter5wereused.The
identificationandevaluationoffactorswasperformedinseveralsteps.Firstly,scenariosthat
cancauseacollisionweredeterminedfromliteraturereviews,accidentstatistics,riskanalysis
modelsandhazardsidentificationsthroughworkshops(refertoSection2.2).Secondly,all
factorsthatcontributetoaccidentsweregatheredandcategorisedinfourscenariogroups.The
aimwasbothtoassessfactorsthathavebeenidentifiedinearlierstudiesandtrytofindnew
factorsthatcontributetothecollisionrisk.

Externalinfluencessuchasthesurroundingsocietyandlegislationwerenottakenintoaccount
whenidentifyingfactors,onlyelementswithintheorganisationofashipwereconsideredwhen
discussingtheriskforacollision.

Thefactorsaredividedintoprimarycausesandunderlyingfactors.Primarycausesareactions
thatdirectlyleadtoascenarioandaredependentuponunderlyingfactors.Thescenariosand
primarycausescanbeseenasactivefailures,whiletheunderlyingfactorscanbecomparedto
latentcondition(refertoSection3.2).Theunderlyingfactorsforaspecificprimarycausewillnot
beregardedascontributingtothecollisionriskiftheprimarycauseisnotimportantforthe
scenario.Inthesamewaywilltheprimarycausebeseenaslessimportantifitsoverlying
scenarioisnotcontributingtothecollisionrisk.

Itissometimesappropriatetoexplainascenariobybothprimarycausesandunderlyingfactors.
Otherscenariosarecomplicatedtodescribeinspecificprimarycausesandarethereforedirectly
outlinedbyunderlyingfactors,duetothelargeamountofpossibleeventsandhenceadifficulty
tocategorisethese.

AsseeninFigure10,scenarios,causesandfactorsthatmaycauseacollisionarestructuredina
hierarchicalmodelcreatedbytheauthorsofthisthesis,withfourlevelswherecollisionisthe
topevent.

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Figure10:Ahierarchicalmodelthatshowstheconnectionbetweenacollisionandthescenarios,primary
causesandunderlyingfactors.

Theunderlyingfactorsarepresentedseparatelywithinthisthesisandcategorisedintogroupsas
inmostotherresearchprojects,e.g.agroupoforganisationalfactors.Thefactorsmaybemore
orlesscorrelatedwitheachother,whichmakesitchallengingtofullyseparatetheminto
categories(refertoSection3.3).Byreferringtothedefinitionsofeachfactor(refertoAppendix
D)andalwayskeepingtheminmindwhenreadingthisthesis,therewillhopefullynotbeany
majordifficultiesinunderstandingthefactorsandtheircontext.

Asummaryofallintroducedscenarios,primarycausesandunderlyingfactorscanbefoundlast
inthischapter(Figure12,p.41).

7.1 Fourscenarioscontributingtothecollisionrisk
Theoverlyingcategorisationinfourscenarios
representsthefirstlevelbelowtheoutcomecollision
andcanbedescribedasgroupsofreasonstowhy
collisionsoccur,whereallscenarioscontributetothe
collisionrisk.

Theycanseparatelybetheprimaryreasonfora
collisionbutcanalsooccurduringthesamechainof
eventsthatleadtoanaccident.

Fourscenariosareidentifiedandassessedinthisthesis:

Intentionalfailure
Technicalproblems
Lackofawareness
Handlingerror

Intentionalfailureisasituationwhensomebodyonashipaimstocollidewithaninstallation,
e.g.anactofterror,whichmeansthatthescenarionotcanbeclassifiedasanaccident.
Intentionalfailureisveryseldommentionedinliteratureandnocollisionswithoffshore

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installationshaveeverbeenreportedduetothistypeofactions.Thereisalotofsecrecywithin
organisationsaboutthreatsandemergencypreparedness.

Technicalproblemsinvolvefailureswithsteeringequipment,machineryetc.thatmayhindera
shipfromchangingcourseawayfromaninstallation.Theofficeronwatchisinthisscenario
awareofthecollisioncourseandthepotentialdangerbutcannotdoanythingaboutit.Ifthis
scenariowouldresultinacollisionitcouldbecomparedtotheconceptdriftingcollision(refer
toSection5.2.4).Dataaboutthiskindoffailurescanbefoundinaccidentreportsortechnical
equipmentreliabilitydata(refertoSection7.1.2)anditisoftenrathercleariftheprimary
reasonforanaccidentisatechnicalproblem.

Lackofawarenessisdescribedaswhentheofficeronthebridgeforsomereasonisnotawareof
theoffshoreinstallation,thecollisioncourseorthepositionoftheshipitself.Thismeansthatno
actionstoavoidacollisionareundertakenontheship.Lackofawarenessincludesforexample
thattheofficeronwatchisdistractedorasleep.Thisscenarioisawellknownproblemamongst
peopleworkingwithinthemaritimesectorandisoftenreferredtoinliteratureandaccident
reports,evenifotherconceptssometimesareused.

Handlingerrorarisesfromasituationwheretheofficeronwatchisawareofanoffshore
installationbutforsomereasonfailstoavoidcollision.Thismeansthattheofficeronwatch
possessessituationalawareness,butthereisafailurewhenundertakingcollisionavoidance
measures.Anexamplecanbeifashipischangingcourseawayfromaninstallationbutnot
enoughtoavoidanaccident.Theconcepthandlingerrordoesnotseemtobediscussedwhen
assessingthecollisionrisk,butfailuresthatcanbelongtothiscategoryarehowevermentioned
inaccidentreports.Thescenariohasalsobeendiscussedandsupportedduringworkshops.

7.1.1 Interactionbetweenscenarios
Asalreadymentioned,thecausesbehindeachscenariocanbeinfluencedbydifferent
underlyingfactors.Atechnicalproblemcouldforexampledependoninsufficientmaintenance
whichmaybeclassifiedasanorganisationalfactor.Thescenarioscanalsobecorrelatedwith
eachother.Onescenariocaninitiateasituationwhereasanotherscenarioistheprimaryreason
forthecollision.Forexamplecanatechnicalfailure,suchasablackout,leadtoanawareness
failurewhichthenistheprimaryreasonforthecollision.

AsdiscussedinChapter5.2.1wherethecollisionriskmodelsaredescribed,theoutcomeofa
scenarioisnotonlydependentontheactionsofaship.Handlingerrorandlackofawareness
canbepreventedthroughexternalcommunicationfromlandbasedstationsand/ortheoffshore
installation.Externalcommunicationwillprobablynotaffectanintentionalfailureortechnical
problem.

7.1.2 Selectionofscenariostoassess
Inthenextsectionsthescenarioslackofawarenessandhandlingerrorarefurtherevaluated.
Thethesisisnotlookingcloserintointentionalfailuresbecauseoftheassumednegligible
likelihood,thedifficultieswithconfidentialityandproblemswitheffectivepreventivemeasures
aspreviouslymentioned.

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Technicalproblemstendtobeareappearingcausetocollisionsandmaritimeaccidents,butits
contributionvariesbetweendifferentsources.Informationfromsomestatisticaldocumentsis
summarisedbelowtogivecontexttohowoftentechnicalproblemscontributetomaritime
accidents:

4%ofallnearmissesbetweenshipsandplatformswererelatedtosteering
failureand20%ofallnearmissesbetweenshipsandplatformsinUKwaters
wererelatedtoenginefailure(HSE,2003)
5%ofallcollisionsinCanadianwaters(Baker&McCafferty,2005)
5%ofallcollisionsinUKwaters(Baker&McCafferty,2005)
6%ofallcollisionsinAustralianwaters(Baker&McCafferty,2005)

Inviewofthepreviousbriefdiscussion,adecisiontonotfurtherassessdirecttechnical
problemsismadebecauseofhowthereexistsmoredataandstatisticswithintheareaof
technicalreliabilitythanwhencomparedtohumanreliabilitydata.

Awarenessfailureandhandlingerrorseemtobemorecomplexandinvolvehumanand
organisationalfactorsthatarenoteasytofinddataorstatisticsabout.Thesetypeoffailuresare
alsoquitevaguelydescribedintheexistingmodelsforcollisionriskanalysis,whyitisimportant
toevaluatethemfurther.

7.2 Lackofawareness
Alackofawarenessmayresultinanaccident,dependingonwhen(orif)awarenessisachieved
again.Thelongerthedistanceisbetweenthevesselandtheoffshoreinstallation,themore
likelyitisthattheofficeronwatchregainsawarenessbeforeacollisiontakeplace.Afew
minutesofunawarenesswillprobablynotresultinacollision.Inthisthesis,lackofawareness
thatcanresultinacollisionisconsideredandthereforeincorporatesdurationtosomeextent.A
comparisoncanbemadetotheRABLprojectwhereitistakenintoaccountthatawatch
keepingfailuremustlastfor20minutestocauseanaccident(Technica,1987).

Eightprimarycausesbehindtheconditionlackofawarenesshavebeenacknowledgedinthis
thesis.Thescenariowatchkeepingfailure,whichisusedinthecollisionriskmodelstoday(e.g.
CRASH),mainlyconsistsofthesamekindoffailuresthatareadoptedinthisthesisasprimary
causes.

7.2.1 Primarycauses
Theprimarycausesthatareidentifiedtolie
behindlackofawarenessareillustratedinFigure
11below,followedbyexplanationsofthe
causes.Severalsourcesrecognisetheprimary
causesbelowasreasonstowhyalackof
awarenessoccur(e.g.HSE,1999;Technica,
1987).Therearethoughsomedifferenceswithin
theconceptlackofawarenessbetweenthetwo
sourcesofliterature.Informationfromthe
documentshasbeenusedasabasistogether

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withreflectionsfromtheauthorsofthethesisof
whatisconsideredtoaffectthelikelihoodfor
thescenariolackofawareness.Additionstothe
existingtheoriesare:

Failurerelatedtonavigationalequipment
Externalcommunication

Figure11:Thescenariolackofawarenessandtheprimarycausesbehindthisscenario.

Afailurerelatedtonavigationalequipmentincludeseverythingregardingthenavigation
process.Thereforefailureswhenusingtheequipment,actualtechnicalmalfunctionsandlacking
devicesetc.areconsidered.

Anexternalcommunicationfailureisrelatedtoproblemswiththetechnicalcommunication
system,anerrorinreceivingorinterpretinginformationandlackofcommunication.This
situationisthereforeconsideredtobeatwowaycommunication,wherethefailureoccursat
theship.Thisprimarycausedoesonlyconsiderincomingcommunicationfromothervessels,
installationsorlandbasedstationsandnotthecommunicationthatoccursinternallyonthe
vessel.

Lackofawarenessduetosubstanceabuseconsidersiftheofficeronwatchispresentonthe
bridgebutundertheinfluenceofsomesortofsubstancesuchasalcohol,drugsormedication,
whichdecreasesthecapabilitiesoftheperson.

Anotherreasontowhyanofficeronwatchlacksawarenessofasituationmaybeduetothe
personbeingasleeponthebridge.

Asuddenillnessofthepersonbeingresponsibleofwatchkeepingcanresultinalackof
awareness.Thiscanbelinkedtoforexampleaheartattack,astrokeoranepilepticattack.

Anotherprimarycauseisidentifiedtobeifapersonalinjuryoccurstotheofficeronwatchthat
preventsthepersonfrombeingfullyawareofthesituation.Thiscategoryincludespersonal
injuriesforinstancefalls,headinjuriesetc.

Distractioncanoriginateintheofficeronwatchperformingothertaskssimultaneouslywith
watchkeepingsuchaspaperworkandphonecallsorthatmanypeoplearepresentonthe
bridge.

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Ifthewatchkeeperisabsentfromthebridgeduringthewatch,thisinevitablyresultsinlackof
awareness.

7.3 Handlingerror
Handlingerrorisnotdiscussedinthemodelsforship
collisionanalysis(DNV,1998;Technica,1987).Inthis
thesistheconceptisadoptedandahandlingerroris
directlybrokendownintounderlyingfactors,incontrary
tothescenariolackofawarenesswhichfirstisdivided
intoprimarycauses.Thisisbecauseofthemany
differentkindsofhandlingerrorsthatcanbeidentified
andtheproblemtocategorisethese.Ifahandlingerror
doesoccur,itisverylikelytoresultinanaccident.Ifthe
installationisidentifiedatalatestagethisalso
influencestheexecutionandsuccessoftheactionsto
avoidacollision.

7.4 Underlyingfactors
Anoverviewoftheinteractionsbetweenunderlying
factorsandprimarycausesarevisualisedinFigure12.
Presentedbelowarealltheunderlyingfactorsthatare
identifiedtocontributetothecollisionrisk,tooneextent
oranother.Thefactorsaresortedalphabeticallywithin
eachgroup,notinrelationtothecontributionofthe
factor.Manyoftheunderlyingfactorsareconsideredto
playaroleinmorethanonescenario,whereassomeof
thefactorsaremorelikelytobespecifictoonescenario.

Equipmentrelatedfactors Factorsrelatedto Organisationalfactors


Blackout handling Bridgeprocedures
Failurerelatedtonavigation Familiarisationwithship Healthmanagement/culture
equipment characteristics withintheorganisation
Inadequatetechnical Failuretoensurefitnessat Layoutofthebridge
equipment handover Organisationalculture
Maintenance Lackofcommunication Reportingandfollowup
Technicalfailureof Misunderstanding Timeintothewatch
communicationequipment Notfollowingguidance Typeofwatchsystem
Technicalfailureof Notusingindependent Workloadtoohigh
navigationequipment referenceequipment Workloadtoolow
Overrelianceontechnical Workpressure
Externalfactors equipment
Durationofjourney Personalstress Personalcharacteristics
Extremeeventonship Wishfulthinking Ageandgeneralhealth
Levelofothervesselactivity Competence
Timeofday Fatigue
Weather Language
Perceptionofnegative
effectsfromsubstances

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Figure12:Anillustrationofhowtheidentifiedscenarios,causesandfactorsarelinked.

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