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Thischapterpresentsthecomponentsinacollisionscenariobyusingastructuralmodelwith
scenarios,primarycausesandunderlyingfactors.
Thepurposeofthethesisistoidentifyallfactorsthatmaycontributetotheriskforship
collisionsandanewmodelwasthereforedeveloped.Bythisanewperspectiveisachieved,
whichmaynothavebeenpossibleifthemodelsdescribedinChapter5wereused.The
identificationandevaluationoffactorswasperformedinseveralsteps.Firstly,scenariosthat
cancauseacollisionweredeterminedfromliteraturereviews,accidentstatistics,riskanalysis
modelsandhazardsidentificationsthroughworkshops(refertoSection2.2).Secondly,all
factorsthatcontributetoaccidentsweregatheredandcategorisedinfourscenariogroups.The
aimwasbothtoassessfactorsthathavebeenidentifiedinearlierstudiesandtrytofindnew
factorsthatcontributetothecollisionrisk.
Externalinfluencessuchasthesurroundingsocietyandlegislationwerenottakenintoaccount
whenidentifyingfactors,onlyelementswithintheorganisationofashipwereconsideredwhen
discussingtheriskforacollision.
Thefactorsaredividedintoprimarycausesandunderlyingfactors.Primarycausesareactions
thatdirectlyleadtoascenarioandaredependentuponunderlyingfactors.Thescenariosand
primarycausescanbeseenasactivefailures,whiletheunderlyingfactorscanbecomparedto
latentcondition(refertoSection3.2).Theunderlyingfactorsforaspecificprimarycausewillnot
beregardedascontributingtothecollisionriskiftheprimarycauseisnotimportantforthe
scenario.Inthesamewaywilltheprimarycausebeseenaslessimportantifitsoverlying
scenarioisnotcontributingtothecollisionrisk.
Itissometimesappropriatetoexplainascenariobybothprimarycausesandunderlyingfactors.
Otherscenariosarecomplicatedtodescribeinspecificprimarycausesandarethereforedirectly
outlinedbyunderlyingfactors,duetothelargeamountofpossibleeventsandhenceadifficulty
tocategorisethese.
AsseeninFigure10,scenarios,causesandfactorsthatmaycauseacollisionarestructuredina
hierarchicalmodelcreatedbytheauthorsofthisthesis,withfourlevelswherecollisionisthe
topevent.
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Figure10:Ahierarchicalmodelthatshowstheconnectionbetweenacollisionandthescenarios,primary
causesandunderlyingfactors.
Theunderlyingfactorsarepresentedseparatelywithinthisthesisandcategorisedintogroupsas
inmostotherresearchprojects,e.g.agroupoforganisationalfactors.Thefactorsmaybemore
orlesscorrelatedwitheachother,whichmakesitchallengingtofullyseparatetheminto
categories(refertoSection3.3).Byreferringtothedefinitionsofeachfactor(refertoAppendix
D)andalwayskeepingtheminmindwhenreadingthisthesis,therewillhopefullynotbeany
majordifficultiesinunderstandingthefactorsandtheircontext.
Asummaryofallintroducedscenarios,primarycausesandunderlyingfactorscanbefoundlast
inthischapter(Figure12,p.41).
7.1 Fourscenarioscontributingtothecollisionrisk
Theoverlyingcategorisationinfourscenarios
representsthefirstlevelbelowtheoutcomecollision
andcanbedescribedasgroupsofreasonstowhy
collisionsoccur,whereallscenarioscontributetothe
collisionrisk.
Theycanseparatelybetheprimaryreasonfora
collisionbutcanalsooccurduringthesamechainof
eventsthatleadtoanaccident.
Fourscenariosareidentifiedandassessedinthisthesis:
Intentionalfailure
Technicalproblems
Lackofawareness
Handlingerror
Intentionalfailureisasituationwhensomebodyonashipaimstocollidewithaninstallation,
e.g.anactofterror,whichmeansthatthescenarionotcanbeclassifiedasanaccident.
Intentionalfailureisveryseldommentionedinliteratureandnocollisionswithoffshore
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installationshaveeverbeenreportedduetothistypeofactions.Thereisalotofsecrecywithin
organisationsaboutthreatsandemergencypreparedness.
Technicalproblemsinvolvefailureswithsteeringequipment,machineryetc.thatmayhindera
shipfromchangingcourseawayfromaninstallation.Theofficeronwatchisinthisscenario
awareofthecollisioncourseandthepotentialdangerbutcannotdoanythingaboutit.Ifthis
scenariowouldresultinacollisionitcouldbecomparedtotheconceptdriftingcollision(refer
toSection5.2.4).Dataaboutthiskindoffailurescanbefoundinaccidentreportsortechnical
equipmentreliabilitydata(refertoSection7.1.2)anditisoftenrathercleariftheprimary
reasonforanaccidentisatechnicalproblem.
Lackofawarenessisdescribedaswhentheofficeronthebridgeforsomereasonisnotawareof
theoffshoreinstallation,thecollisioncourseorthepositionoftheshipitself.Thismeansthatno
actionstoavoidacollisionareundertakenontheship.Lackofawarenessincludesforexample
thattheofficeronwatchisdistractedorasleep.Thisscenarioisawellknownproblemamongst
peopleworkingwithinthemaritimesectorandisoftenreferredtoinliteratureandaccident
reports,evenifotherconceptssometimesareused.
Handlingerrorarisesfromasituationwheretheofficeronwatchisawareofanoffshore
installationbutforsomereasonfailstoavoidcollision.Thismeansthattheofficeronwatch
possessessituationalawareness,butthereisafailurewhenundertakingcollisionavoidance
measures.Anexamplecanbeifashipischangingcourseawayfromaninstallationbutnot
enoughtoavoidanaccident.Theconcepthandlingerrordoesnotseemtobediscussedwhen
assessingthecollisionrisk,butfailuresthatcanbelongtothiscategoryarehowevermentioned
inaccidentreports.Thescenariohasalsobeendiscussedandsupportedduringworkshops.
7.1.1 Interactionbetweenscenarios
Asalreadymentioned,thecausesbehindeachscenariocanbeinfluencedbydifferent
underlyingfactors.Atechnicalproblemcouldforexampledependoninsufficientmaintenance
whichmaybeclassifiedasanorganisationalfactor.Thescenarioscanalsobecorrelatedwith
eachother.Onescenariocaninitiateasituationwhereasanotherscenarioistheprimaryreason
forthecollision.Forexamplecanatechnicalfailure,suchasablackout,leadtoanawareness
failurewhichthenistheprimaryreasonforthecollision.
AsdiscussedinChapter5.2.1wherethecollisionriskmodelsaredescribed,theoutcomeofa
scenarioisnotonlydependentontheactionsofaship.Handlingerrorandlackofawareness
canbepreventedthroughexternalcommunicationfromlandbasedstationsand/ortheoffshore
installation.Externalcommunicationwillprobablynotaffectanintentionalfailureortechnical
problem.
7.1.2 Selectionofscenariostoassess
Inthenextsectionsthescenarioslackofawarenessandhandlingerrorarefurtherevaluated.
Thethesisisnotlookingcloserintointentionalfailuresbecauseoftheassumednegligible
likelihood,thedifficultieswithconfidentialityandproblemswitheffectivepreventivemeasures
aspreviouslymentioned.
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Technicalproblemstendtobeareappearingcausetocollisionsandmaritimeaccidents,butits
contributionvariesbetweendifferentsources.Informationfromsomestatisticaldocumentsis
summarisedbelowtogivecontexttohowoftentechnicalproblemscontributetomaritime
accidents:
4%ofallnearmissesbetweenshipsandplatformswererelatedtosteering
failureand20%ofallnearmissesbetweenshipsandplatformsinUKwaters
wererelatedtoenginefailure(HSE,2003)
5%ofallcollisionsinCanadianwaters(Baker&McCafferty,2005)
5%ofallcollisionsinUKwaters(Baker&McCafferty,2005)
6%ofallcollisionsinAustralianwaters(Baker&McCafferty,2005)
Inviewofthepreviousbriefdiscussion,adecisiontonotfurtherassessdirecttechnical
problemsismadebecauseofhowthereexistsmoredataandstatisticswithintheareaof
technicalreliabilitythanwhencomparedtohumanreliabilitydata.
Awarenessfailureandhandlingerrorseemtobemorecomplexandinvolvehumanand
organisationalfactorsthatarenoteasytofinddataorstatisticsabout.Thesetypeoffailuresare
alsoquitevaguelydescribedintheexistingmodelsforcollisionriskanalysis,whyitisimportant
toevaluatethemfurther.
7.2 Lackofawareness
Alackofawarenessmayresultinanaccident,dependingonwhen(orif)awarenessisachieved
again.Thelongerthedistanceisbetweenthevesselandtheoffshoreinstallation,themore
likelyitisthattheofficeronwatchregainsawarenessbeforeacollisiontakeplace.Afew
minutesofunawarenesswillprobablynotresultinacollision.Inthisthesis,lackofawareness
thatcanresultinacollisionisconsideredandthereforeincorporatesdurationtosomeextent.A
comparisoncanbemadetotheRABLprojectwhereitistakenintoaccountthatawatch
keepingfailuremustlastfor20minutestocauseanaccident(Technica,1987).
Eightprimarycausesbehindtheconditionlackofawarenesshavebeenacknowledgedinthis
thesis.Thescenariowatchkeepingfailure,whichisusedinthecollisionriskmodelstoday(e.g.
CRASH),mainlyconsistsofthesamekindoffailuresthatareadoptedinthisthesisasprimary
causes.
7.2.1 Primarycauses
Theprimarycausesthatareidentifiedtolie
behindlackofawarenessareillustratedinFigure
11below,followedbyexplanationsofthe
causes.Severalsourcesrecognisetheprimary
causesbelowasreasonstowhyalackof
awarenessoccur(e.g.HSE,1999;Technica,
1987).Therearethoughsomedifferenceswithin
theconceptlackofawarenessbetweenthetwo
sourcesofliterature.Informationfromthe
documentshasbeenusedasabasistogether
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withreflectionsfromtheauthorsofthethesisof
whatisconsideredtoaffectthelikelihoodfor
thescenariolackofawareness.Additionstothe
existingtheoriesare:
Failurerelatedtonavigationalequipment
Externalcommunication
Figure11:Thescenariolackofawarenessandtheprimarycausesbehindthisscenario.
Afailurerelatedtonavigationalequipmentincludeseverythingregardingthenavigation
process.Thereforefailureswhenusingtheequipment,actualtechnicalmalfunctionsandlacking
devicesetc.areconsidered.
Anexternalcommunicationfailureisrelatedtoproblemswiththetechnicalcommunication
system,anerrorinreceivingorinterpretinginformationandlackofcommunication.This
situationisthereforeconsideredtobeatwowaycommunication,wherethefailureoccursat
theship.Thisprimarycausedoesonlyconsiderincomingcommunicationfromothervessels,
installationsorlandbasedstationsandnotthecommunicationthatoccursinternallyonthe
vessel.
Lackofawarenessduetosubstanceabuseconsidersiftheofficeronwatchispresentonthe
bridgebutundertheinfluenceofsomesortofsubstancesuchasalcohol,drugsormedication,
whichdecreasesthecapabilitiesoftheperson.
Anotherreasontowhyanofficeronwatchlacksawarenessofasituationmaybeduetothe
personbeingasleeponthebridge.
Asuddenillnessofthepersonbeingresponsibleofwatchkeepingcanresultinalackof
awareness.Thiscanbelinkedtoforexampleaheartattack,astrokeoranepilepticattack.
Anotherprimarycauseisidentifiedtobeifapersonalinjuryoccurstotheofficeronwatchthat
preventsthepersonfrombeingfullyawareofthesituation.Thiscategoryincludespersonal
injuriesforinstancefalls,headinjuriesetc.
Distractioncanoriginateintheofficeronwatchperformingothertaskssimultaneouslywith
watchkeepingsuchaspaperworkandphonecallsorthatmanypeoplearepresentonthe
bridge.
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Ifthewatchkeeperisabsentfromthebridgeduringthewatch,thisinevitablyresultsinlackof
awareness.
7.3 Handlingerror
Handlingerrorisnotdiscussedinthemodelsforship
collisionanalysis(DNV,1998;Technica,1987).Inthis
thesistheconceptisadoptedandahandlingerroris
directlybrokendownintounderlyingfactors,incontrary
tothescenariolackofawarenesswhichfirstisdivided
intoprimarycauses.Thisisbecauseofthemany
differentkindsofhandlingerrorsthatcanbeidentified
andtheproblemtocategorisethese.Ifahandlingerror
doesoccur,itisverylikelytoresultinanaccident.Ifthe
installationisidentifiedatalatestagethisalso
influencestheexecutionandsuccessoftheactionsto
avoidacollision.
7.4 Underlyingfactors
Anoverviewoftheinteractionsbetweenunderlying
factorsandprimarycausesarevisualisedinFigure12.
Presentedbelowarealltheunderlyingfactorsthatare
identifiedtocontributetothecollisionrisk,tooneextent
oranother.Thefactorsaresortedalphabeticallywithin
eachgroup,notinrelationtothecontributionofthe
factor.Manyoftheunderlyingfactorsareconsideredto
playaroleinmorethanonescenario,whereassomeof
thefactorsaremorelikelytobespecifictoonescenario.
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Figure12:Anillustrationofhowtheidentifiedscenarios,causesandfactorsarelinked.
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