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How to generate F-N curves

INSE 6320 -- Week 5
Risk Analysis for Information and Systems Engineering The frequency of events which causes at least N fatalities is plotted
against the number N on log log scales
F-N Curves The difference between the frequency of events with N or more
Fault Trees fatalities, F(N), and that with N+1 or more, F(N+1), is the frequency of
events with exactly N fatalities, usually represented by f(N), with lower-
Event Trees case f. That is, f(N) = F(N)-F(N+1)
Because f(N) must be non-negative, it follows that F(N) F(N+1) for all
N, so that FN-curves never rise from left to right, but are always falling
or flat
The lower an FN curve is located on the F-N graph, the safer is the
system it represents, because lower FN curves represent lower
frequencies of fatal events than higher curves.

Dr. A. Ben Hamza Concordia University

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F-N curves Societal risk

Usually used to express societal risk.
Important to define acceptable / tolerable risk
Risk acceptability is mostly defined on the basis of F-N curves
F-N curves show the number of Fatalities against annual frequency.
The value F(1) is the frequency of accidents with 1 or more
fatalities, or in other words the overall frequency of fatal accidents.
This is the left-hand point on FN-curves, where the curve meets
the vertical axis (usually located at N = 1 with logarithmic scales).

FN curves can be constructed based on historical data in the form

of number of events (floods, landslides, etc) and related fatalities

They can also be based on different future risk scenarios, in which

for a number of events with different magnitudes the number of
casualties is estimated
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How to calculate F-N curves
In this exercise you will calculate F-N curves for accidents that have occurred in
Europe in the period 1967 to 2001 (i.e., 35 years).
Three different types of accident data area available: for roads, railroad and aviation.
The analysis is based on empirical data, collected from historical accidents records.
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How to calculate F-N curves
First calculate the total number of fatalities for road, railroad and aviation accidents by multiplying
the number of events with the fatality class. Also calculate the average number of fatalities per
year..
Then calculate the cumulative number of events, starting with the lowest one in the table (related
to 146 fatalities) and summing them up upwards.
Then calculate the cumulative frequency of events per year, by dividing the cumulative number by
the number of years.
How to calculate F-N curves
Plot these values in the graph indicated at the bottom of the spreadsheet in a log-log manner,
with Fatalities (N) or the X-axis, and the cumulative frequency per year on the Y-Axis.
Compare the results. What can you conclude on the:
Severity of the accident type
Frequency of the accident type
Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Probabilistic Risk Assessment usually answers three basic questions:
1) What can go wrong with the studied technological entity, or what are the initiators
or initiating events (undesirable starting events) that lead to adverse
consequence(s)?
2) What and how severe are the potential adverse consequences that the
technological entity may be eventually subjected to as a result of the occurrence
of the initiator?
3) How likely to occur are these undesirable consequences, or what are their
probabilities or frequencies?
Two common methods of answering this last question are Fault Tree Analysis
and Event Tree Analysis.
A fault tree is an event tree, where failures are emphasized rather than
successes
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Fault Tree Analysis Fault Tree Analysis

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of the most important logic and probabilistic The undesired event is stated at the top of the tree
techniques used in Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and system reliability
assessment. The fault tree gates specify logical combinations of
basic events that lead to the top event
Fault Tree Analysis is a deductive method for identifying ways in which hazards
can lead to accident.
Fault trees can be used to identify system weaknesses
Fault trees can help recognize interrelationships
The approach starts with a well defined accident, or top event, and works between fault events
backwards towards the various scenarios that can cause the accident.
Fault trees consist of logic gates and basic events as AND Gate:
Fault trees are used to determine the probability of a top event (e.g., core inputs to the logic gates
damage).
Logic Gates: Boolean operations (union or
Top event defines the failure or success of a system or component intersection) of the input events

Fault trees use a structure of logical operations to calculate the probability of the Basic Events: Faults such as a hardware failure,
top event as a result of basic events inputs human error, or adverse condition

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Fault Tree Analysis Applying Fault Tree Analysis

Fault tree analysis is a graphical representation of the combination of faults
that will result in the occurrence of some (undesired) top event.
In the construction of a fault tree, successive subordinate failure events are Postulate top event (fault)
identified and logically linked to the top event. Branch down listing faults in the system that must occur for the
The linked events form a tree structure connected by symbols called gates.
top event to occur
Consider sequential and parallel or combinations of faults
Use Boolean algebra to quantify fault tree with event probabilities
Determine probability of top event

Fault Tree Logic

Use logic gates to show how top event occurs

Higher gates are the outputs from lower gates in the tree
Top event is output of all the input faults or events that occur
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FTA Symbols Intersection

Basic Event: A lower most event that can not be further developed.
Over-heated
E.g. Relay failure, Switch failure etc., D Wire D=E.F
D= E Intersection F
An Event / Fault: This can be a intermediate event (or) a top event. They E AND F must occur
are a result logical combination of lower level events. for D to occur
E.g. Both transmitters fail, Run away reaction
E F
OR Gate: Either one of the bottom event results in occurrence of
the top event. 5mA Current Power Applied
E.g. Either one of the root valve is closed, process signal in System t >1ms
to transmitter fails.

AND Gate: For the top event to occur all the bottom events should
occur.
E.g. Fuel, Oxygen and Ignition source has to be present
for fire.

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Union Fault Tree Basics

Top level event
No Current A=B+C A fault tree involves:
A
A=B Union C Specifying a top level event (TLE) Intermediate
representing an undesired state. events
B OR C must occur
Find all possible chains of basic events
for event A to occur that may cause the TLE to occur.

B C A fault tree:
Switch A Battery B Is a systematic representation of such
Open 0 Volts chains of events.
Uses logical gates to represent the
interrelationships between events and
Basic events
TLE, e.g. AND, OR.
An example fault tree
Logically: (A + (B + C)) . (C + (A . B))
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Fault Tree Basics Minimal Cut Set Theory

The fault tree consists of many levels of basic and intermediate events linked
Logically, fault trees are equivalent if the associated logical together by AND and OR gates. Some basic events may appear in different
formulae are equivalent.
places of the fault tree.
Example:
The minimal cut set analysis provides a new fault tree, logically equivalent to
(A + (B + C)) . (C + (A . B)) C + (A . B)
the original, with an OR gate beneath the top event, whose inputs (bottom) are
minimal cut sets.

Cut Set: is a set of basic events whose simultaneous occurrence ensures that
the TOP event occurs.
Minimal Cut Set: is a cut set that does not contain another cut set as a
subset.
Each minimal cut set is an AND gate with a set of basic event inputs
necessary and sufficient to cause the top event.

The fault tree can be represented by the TOP structure and the minimal cut
sets connected through a single OR-gate.

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Procedure Minimal Cut Sets

Procedure for Fault Tree Analysis
This shape is of particular interest
representation in terms of Minimal Cut Sets
Explore each
Define TOP Define overall branch in (MCS).
event structure. successive level
of detail.
Minimal cut set = smallest set of basic events
which, in conjunction, cause the top level event
to occur.
Perform
corrections if Solve the fault Logically: Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) =
required and tree disjunction of conjunctions of basic events.
make decisions
MCSs

Solve the Fault Tree: The fault tree on the left has two minimal cut
sets: C (single point of failure) and A.B (cut
Assign probabilities of failure to the lowest level event in each branch of the tree. set of order 2).
From this data the intermediate event frequency and the top level event frequency
can be determined using Boolean Algebra and Minimal Cut Set methods.
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Procedure Fault Tree Construction

Consider the following block diagram. Let I/P and O/P be the input and output terminals.
Steps to get the final Boolean equation: There are two sub-systems A and B that are connected in series.
TOP
1. Replace AND gates with the product of their inputs.
IE1 = A.B
X1 X3
IE2 = C.D INPUT OUTPUT
2. Replace OR gates with the sum of their inputs. IE1 IE2
X2 X4
TOP = IE1+IE2
= A.B+C.D SUB - SYSTEM (A) SUB - SYSTEM (B)
A B C D
3. Continue this replacement until all intermediate event gates
have been replaced and only the basic events remain in the
For this the fault tree analysis diagram shown in next slide
equation.
TOP = A.B+C.D

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Procedure
Continue.. F (S) Top event
Boolean Algebra Reduction Example:
TOP = IE1 + IE2
OR
= (A.B) + (A + IE3)
TOP
= A.B + A + (C.D.IE4)
= A.B + A + (C.D.D.B)
IE1 IE2
= A + A.B + B.C.D.D (D.D = D) F (A) F (B)
intermediate event
= A + A.B + B.C.D (A + A.B = A)
A B A IE3
= A + B.C.D

C D IE4 AND AND

So the minimal cut sets are:
CS1 = A
CS2 = B.C.D D B
meaning TOP event occurs if F( X1) F( X2) F( X 3) F( X 4)
Basic event
either A occurs OR (B.C.D) occurs.
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Continue.. Uses of FTA

Use of FTA to understand of the logic leading to the top event.

Here F(X1) , F(X2) , F(X3), F(A4) Are Events Fail Use of FTA to prioritize the contributors leading to the top event.
F (A) = SUB SYSTEM (A) FAILS Use of FTA as a proactive tool to prevent the top event.

Use of FTA to monitor the performance of the system.

F(B) = SUB SYSTEM (B) FAILS
Use of FTA to minimize and optimize resources.
THEN F(A) = F(X1) AND F(X2) Use of FTA to assist in designing a system.

AND F(B) = F(X3) AND F(X4) Use of FTA as a diagnostic tool to identify and correct causes of the top event.

FINALLY THE FAILURE OF THE SYSTEM

Advantages Disadvantages
F(S) = F(A) OR F(B)
Begins with top event. Complicated process.

Use to determine the minimal cut sets. Require considerable amount of time to complete.

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Calculation of Reliability from Fault Tree Event Trees

CONSIDER THE EARLIER BLOCK DIAGRAM Event trees begin with an initiating event & work towards the final result.
The probability of failure of sub system (A) is indicated as shown in below,
This method provides information on how a failure can occur & the
P(A) = P (X 1 and X 2)
probability of occurrence.
P(A) = P( X1) . P( X 2)
Similarly for sub system (B)
Event trees can be viewed as a special case of fault trees, where the
branches are all ORs weighted by their probabilities.
P(B) = P( X 3 and X 4)
P(B) = P( X 3) . P( X 4) Event trees are generated both in the success and failure domains.
FAILURE OCCURS WHEN SUB SYSTEM (A) or (B) FAIL.., This technique explores system responses to an initiating challenge and
F (S) = P(A) or P(B) THEN F(S) = P(A) + P(B) ( P(A) . P(B) ) enables assessment of the probability of an unfavorable or favorable
IF THE RELIABILITY OF THE ELEMENTS ARE GIVEN BY R1,R2,R3,R4 outcome. The system challenge may be a failure or fault, an undesirable
event, or a normal system operating command.
THEN
P( Xi ) = 1 Ri
In constructing the event tree, one traces each path to eventual success or
RELIABILITY OF SYSTEM R(S) = 1 - F(S)
failure.
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Event tree development procedure

Step 1: Identification of the initiating event

Step 2: Identification of safety function

Step 3: Construction of the event tree

Step 4: Classification of outcomes

Step 5: Estimation of the conditional probability of each branch

Step 6: Quantification of outcomes

Step 7: Evaluation

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Event Tree Structure Event Tree Analysis

ADVANTAGES
Structured, rigorous, and methodical approach.

Can be effectively performed on varying levels of design detail.

Permits probability assessment.
DISADVANTAGES
An ETA can only have one initiating event, therefore multiple ETAs will be
required to evaluate the consequence of multiple initiating events.

Partial successes/failures are not distinguishable.

Requires an analyst with some training and practical experience.