Analysis of the EC’s 2nd Proposal for Delineation in Selangor

January 18, 2018

Outline:

 Limited Changes compared to Status Quo

 Past Malapportionment Retained
 Past Gerrymandering Retained
 Pre-Delineation Changes
 National Trend
 Impact on GE14

by Penang Institute’s Political Studies Programme:

o Dr Wong Chin Huat

o Yeong Pey Jung
o Ooi Kok Hin
o Nidhal Mujahid
o Kenneth Cheng

With maps and data assistance from

o DART (Bersih 2.0 and Engage)

o Merap
o Politweet
o Tindak Malaysia

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 Limited Changes compared to Status Quo

What the Federal Constitution Says:

Article 113 (2) (i)

Subject to paragraph (ii) [on interval], the Election Commission shall, from time to time, as they deem
necessary, review the division of the Federation and the States into constituencies and recommend
such changes therein as they may think necessary in order to comply with the provisions contained in
the Thirteenth Schedule; and the reviews of constituencies for the purpose of elections to the
Legislative Assemblies shall be undertaken at the same time as the reviews of constituencies for the
purpose of elections to the House of Representatives.

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 Past Malapportionment Retained
Parliamentary Constituencies
Pro- Que 1st Display 2nd Display

State Constituencies
Pro- Que 1st Display 2nd Display

>33.33% >125,956
>15.00% to 33.33% 108,639 - 125,956
-15.00% to 15.00% 80,299 - 108,639
<-15.00% to 33.33% 62,982 - 80,299
< -33.33% <62,982

What the Federal Constitution Says:

Section (2) (c), the Thirteenth Schedule

the number of electors within each constituency in a State ought to be approximately equal except
that, having regard to the greater difficulty of reaching electors in the country districts and the other
disadvantages facing rural constituencies, a measure of weightage for area ought to be given to such
constituencies;

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Parliamentary Constituencies

4
State Constituencies

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 Past Gerrymandering Retained

N45 Selat Klang consists of two parts that are not contiguous, a strip of urban settlement (Bandar
Baru Sulaiman) and Islands including Pulau Ketam.

N41 Batu Tiga will continue to span across three municipalities: Klang, Shah Alam and Subang Jaya.

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N25 Kajang remains odd-shaped with local communities broken up by electoral boundaries.

What the Federal Constitution Says:

Section (2) (d), the Thirteenth Schedule

regard ought to be had to the inconveniences attendant on alterations of constituencies, and to the
maintenance of local ties.

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 New Gerrymandering Introduced

Local ties in Banting and Jenjarom are badly severed in the EC’s proposal,
evident in odd-shaped boundaries.

All three constituencies were won by PR. By shifting voters around, BN may win back N51 Sijangkang
and N53 Morib

+BN- +BN- -BN-

Constituencies BN-PR lead lead lead New BN-PR
N51 Sijangkang -2,942 1606 -3292 -1566 1,956
N52 Teluk Datuk -5,391 -1566 1606 -8,563
N53 Morib -766 -3292 2,526

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 Pre-Delineation Changes
(A) Status Quo

P001/N01/01 P001/N02/01

P001/N02/05
P001/N01/02 P001/N01/03
P001/N02/02 P001/N02/03

P001/N01/04

P001/N01/05 P001/N02/04

(B) Constitutional Alteration of Polling Districts

P001/N01/01
P001/N02/01
P001/N01/03 P001/N02/05
P001/N01/02
P001/N01/04 P001/N02/02

P001/N02/03
P001/N01/05 P001/N01/06
P001/N02/04

(C) Unconstitutional Alteration of Polling Districts

P001/N01/01
P001/N02/01
P001/N01/03 P001/N02/05
P001/N01/02
P001/N01/04 P001/N02/02

P001/N02/03
P001/N01/05 P001/N01/06
P001/N02/04

Boundaries of at least 21 state constituencies in Selangor have been changed before delineation in the process of reorganising polling districts.

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 National Trend
About half of the parliamentary and state constituencies including many super-small ones
are left untouched, and objections has made in a difference in about 30% of constituencies.

Parliamentary Constituencies

State Unaffected Changes Retained Changes Reversed Changes Modified

Perlis 3
Kedah 10 3 0 2
Kelantan 6 5 1 2
Terengganu 3 3 2
Penang 13
Perak 10 11 3
Pahang 10 4
Selangor 5 4 12 1
Kuala Lumpur 3 2 6
Negeri Sembilan 4 2 2
Malacca 3 1 2
Johor 11 5 4 6
FT Putrajaya 1
FT Labuan 1
Sabah 18 7
Malaya & Sabah 98 40 32 21
% 51.31% 20.94% 16.75% 10.99%

State Constituencies
Newly
Changes Changes Changes Introduced
State Unaffected
Retained Reversed Modified Changes in
2nd Proposal
Perlis 15
Kedah 23 9 0 4
Kelantan 15 6 9 15
Terengganu 11 13 6 2
Penang 40
Perak 24 26 6 3
Pahang 29 8 5
Selangor 10 14 31 1
Negeri Sembilan 22 3 6 5
Malacca 9 2 10 7
Johor 15 23 7 11
Sabah 33 34 6
Malaya & Sabah 246 117 90 63 2
% 47.49% 22.59% 17.37% 12.16% 0.39%

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 Impacts on GE14 and Voters’ Options
 In 2013, a parliamentary vote for BN was 1.42 times more valuable than a vote for
PR.
 All things being equal, votes for BN will have even greater value in 2018, because of
these reasons:
o Persistent past malapportionment
o Persistent past gerrymandering
o New gerrymandering
o Pre-delineation changes (backdoor delineation)
o Manipulation in Voter Registration and Electoral Rolls
 Coupled with multi-cornered contestations, it is likely that the same percentage of
vote share, 47%, will get BN 15 more seats to regain its 2/3 majority and a free hand
to add seats and trigger another round of delineation (unbounded by the 8 years gap
if seats are added).
 This is however reversible if voters decide to punish the beneficiary of
malapportionment and gerrymandering.
o Gerrymandering generally used two tactics:
 Packing – concentrate opponents’ voters in a few strongholds so that
opponents will get less seats;
 Cracking – scatter opponents’ voters so that opponents cannot win marginal
constituencies.
o Voters cant fight back packing, except giving their supported parties greater vote
share and greater legitimacy;
o Voters’ backlash will make cracking a disaster if marginal constituencies are lost
in large number.
o In the past, BN was guaranteed an upper hand because seat increase allows
them to carve out sure-win constituencies.
o This time, without seat increase, thanks to Bersih’s staunch objection, packing
can only happen with cracking hand-in-hand. So, gerrymandering may just
backfire.
 The 2nd Proposal for Selangor may be further malapportioned and gerrymandered
because EC can entertain malicious objections during the second display (January 15-
February 14). To prevent this and also force the EC to correct past
malapportionment and gerrymandering, voters must submit even more objections
than the 1st Display.
 While objections and litigation have worked to some extent, the ultimate solution to
malapportionment and gerrymandering is a change in the electoral system, to make
it more proportional. One way is to introduce a Party List Proportional
Representation (List-PR) component besides the existing First-Past-The-Post (FPTP)
component, which will render malapportionment and gerrymandering completely
useless, as in the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system Germany and New
Zealand.

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