Professional Documents
Culture Documents
by A. Harding Ganz
ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 27
ment depots, the hated "repple dep- tacked by the Jabos - Jagdbombers, take the initiative and act decisively
pIes," and allocating them to units as or fighter-bombers, troops would pile and independently.
needed.) out of the vehicles while crews would
put up a barrage of fire. As in Russia, the policy for the com-
But maintaining this regional rela- bat companies (panzer, panzer grena-
tionship proved ever more difficult Allied artillery had plentiful ammu- dier, and recon) was that a third of the
given wartime demands, and by 1944 nition, and its effectiveness was en- unit be rotated back to the field re-
replacements were usually allocated hanced by accurate observation and placement detachment. They would
by Anny and Anny Group headquar- corrections from spotter planes aloft. get a rest, would be available as a re-
ters as needed. It was the nucleus of Panzer artillery fire control exercises serve, and would provide an experi-
veterans and the unit commanders, emphasized coordination of artillery, enced cadre in case of extensive casu-
who now provided the cohesion and rocket, and mortar fue on concentra- alties in the company, given the tre-
continuity that kept the II th Panzer tion points, and rapid displacement to mendous enemy fuepower. In the
an effective combat organization. The avoid counter-battery fire. Wire com- course of the coming campaigns, one
unit commanders came from within munication would be destroyed by is struck by the heavy casualties suf-
the division, and the battalion com- shell fire and by bombing; radio fered, especially among unit com-
manders of 1944 had been lieutenants would be the primary means of com- manders - in the next eight months
in 1940. Karl Thieme, for example, munication, recognizing transmission the two panzer battalions would have
was a platoon leader and then a com- range limitations imposed by a topog- eight different commanders, the two
pany commander in Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110. raphy of wooded hills. battalions of Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110 would
In May 1944, he was promoted com- have at least six, and the veterans of
American ground advances were,
mander of its 1st Battalion (half- Pz.Gren.Rgt. III cannot recall all
however, methodical and cautious,
tracked) as major, and in November, their battalion commanders; even Cap-
halting at any resistance, and as a rule
promoted to lieutenant colonel, would tain Franz Thelen, regimental adjutant,
ending at nightfall. The Amis lacked
become the regimental commander - can list and date the last five regimen-
the grim stubbornness of the Tommys
"For me a dream come to fulfillment," tal com.manders but, 'The battalion
or the Ivans, preferring to call for ar-
he said. Wounded six times, Thieme commanders changed too frequently,
tillery support. Training by Major He-
had received the Knight's Cross for one after another." The casualties re-
inz BOdicker's Pioneer (Engineer)
the Kursk fighting, and subsequently flect aggressive leadership up front -
Battalion 209 was emphasized for all
was awarded the Oak Leaves and the adjutant himself often took tempo-
units, as delaying tactics with mines
Swords. rary command - and it is notable how
and obstacles would further slow an
unit cohesion was yet maintained, and
enemy advance. Aggressive recon-
the division remained combat-capable,
naissance by all units would be im-
Tactical Realities in the West the result of this rotation policy.
portant, not only for security, but also
to take advantage of the occasional To engage the Allied beachhead in
With the long-awaited Allied inva- negligence of the more powerful en- Normandy, German panzer units con-
sion at Nonnandy in June 1944, Gen- emy and launch surprise attacks. verged on that front. Soon, only the
eral Wietersheim dispatched a number 11 th PO was left as the mobile strike
of the division's officers north to ob- Other techniques employed on the force for all of Anny Group G south
serve how battle conditions differed Eastern Front were still considered of the Loire, and even it lost some of
from the Eastern Front. Their reports valid, if modified: its tanks and annored cars. General
were analyzed and discussed in com- Wietersheim had to prepare for three
manders' conferences, and tactical re- Clear, concise Sattelbejehle ("saddle possible scenarios if the Allies also
sponses were improvised: Allied air- orders" or frag(mentary) orders) were invaded southern France: an Allied
power was all-pervasive, as already imperative, given the pace of panzer landing on the Riviera, a landing near
demonstrated in North Africa and It- warfare, rather than detailed orders the Rhone River delta, or simultane-
aly. What Luftwaffe remained was and control measures. This exempli- ous landings near Narbonne and on
committed to defense of the Reich it- fied the original concept of Auftrags- the Biscay coast, to cut off Fascist
self. Therefore, standard vehicle road- taktik - mission tactics, upon which Spain. The theater of possible opera-
march procedures (a panzer battalion German mobile warfare doctrine was tions was thus over 600 kilometers in
moving by day at 20 kmph and 50 based. The Kampjgruppe concept of extent (400 miles), and response time
meter intervals had a time length of mixed battle groups, the mix of pan- could be 4-6 days, given probable Al-
about 30 minutes and a road space of zer and panzer grenadier units tailored lied air attacks. Only a mobile
some 8,000 meters) were now unreal- to the situation, would be even more counter-attack strategy after any land-
istic. Vehicles, well-camouflaged with appropriate, but for small-unit engage- ing was feasible. Training intensified
nets and branches, with constant air ments because of Allied air power - with a new seriousness, while officers
lookouts, would have to "spring" from not mass maneuvers as on the steppes did endless map exercises and route
cover to cover in Einzelgruppen of southern Russia. This further re- reconnaissances to identify secondary
single groups of 3-5 vehicles. If at- quired that company-grade officers routes and river fording sites, aSSUffi-
ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 29
Map 1
11 th Panzer Division
in the West, 1944
Sept-Dec 19<W" Count....ttkks .nd
mobile det..... thl.wrt Plltton'a
Third Army drive 10 the W.,to,nlf
~'){-
~,on
~Medift:rranean Sea
ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 31
( Map2 •
Haraucour1
Muleev.
•
Vlc-5ur-5lelle
Movenvle
Juvellze J~1111
• ~l60mm
Donnelay
•
• LezeV
1~111
-'ev
2~'"
Y.1
~7""
• MoncQun
•
urdenn
'0··
~.--
'~110 eColneourt
210~~KpowN Laga,de
Bauzemont
~11
"..,..--
Marne-Rhine Canal
.
Mouacourt • ~
• Xu,...
~
.~
..
.......;...-.t\
•
•
hydraulic power was that the engine IVs of Captain Rodenhauser's 2nd the II-man American rifle squad,
had to be running since the pumps Battalion were less fonnidable, but with two belt-fed MGs (Machine Gun
were driven by the engine transmis- did have a lower silhouette. The Ger- 42s) and the automatic MPi (Machine
sion shaft. But 1st (panther) Battalion man disadvantage in the Arracourt Pistol 40) and selective-fire Sturm-
commander Major Jiirgen Reichardt fighting was that they were attacking, gewehr (Assault Rifle 44), to the U.S.
and Sergeants Lange and Filla said under cover of morning mist, thus ne- box magazine BAR and semi-auto-
that in battle the engines were running gating their long-range gunnery ad- matic M 1 Garand rifle. Both sides
anyway, according to the maxim "fire vantage. And they met their match in were perennially short of infantry, and
and movement." In defense, said Zin- the skilled tankers of Wood's 4th Ar- the Germans were now mass-produc-
dler, a tank would be in hull defllade, mored, who maneuvered their more ing fully automatic weapons, compen-
with its gun tube oriented toward the agile M4s and M18 "Hellcat" tank de- sating for personnel shortages with
most likely armor approach, and final stroyers around the undulating coun- firepower. But GIs traded MIs for
gun-laying manually was no problem. tryside in close-quarter engagements. "Tommy Guns" and platoons were
supported with mortars and heavy ma-
The apprehension Americans had Pz.Gren.Rgt. Ill, under the tempo-
chineguns, and both sides were sel-
about fighting the German Panther rary command of Major Karl Thieme,
dom at full strength anyway.
was reflected in XII Corps operations came up on the right of the 110th as
notes to units, advising flank engage- CCA fell back from Juvelize to Hill Concealed from American air power
ments, and warning that head-on at 265. The panzer grenadiers, riding the in the patches of woods east of the
1,000 yards, 75mm rounds might panzers or following in their tracks, Bourdonnay road were the few artil-
penetrate "only when hitting the lower came in against the armored doughs lery pieces available. Menzel's 88s
half of the mantiet, when they are de- in their foxholes along the perimeter. were sited near Gelucourt and tied in
flected down, penetrating thin hull Captain Thelen confmns that, at to division artillery, adding flat-trajec-
top-plate," but that the "Hull is invul- strength, the eight-man panzer grena- tory fire support across the open
nerable to all calibers." The Panzer dier squad had more firepower than fields. But alert 4th Armored ob-
ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 33
unit morale kept the men fighting. Elastic Defense On 7 November, the 11 th Panzer
Nazi ideology was no longer a factor. went on alert, and that night elements
Most combat troops held the civilian moved into position north of Morchin-
The division received replacements
leadership in contempt, and Schaefer- gen (Morhange) in a steady rain. On
while in bivouacs east of Met'z, and
Kehnert often heard the division com- the 8th, Patton's Third Army jumped
tank strength was brought up to 40
mander refer to Hitler: "Once again off with six infantry divisions and
Panthers, 20 Panzer IVs, and 10
the idiot has ordered....;" but not in three armored divisions, supported by
Jagdpanzer IV turretless assault guns.
the presence of the artillery com- 38 field artillery battalions and the
But 5th Panzer Army headquarters
mander, who was a convinced Nazi, fighter bombers of XIX TAC. By the
had gone north (to prepare for the Ar-
and who was therefore often detached 9th, the armor was committed, the
dennes offensive), and the 11th PD
with a Kampfgruppe on missions long armored columns passing
was the sole reserve for Army Group
away from the division. through the infantry. But the Ameri-
G. During the eight-day rest, Wieters-
can armor was road-bound, restricted
The 11th PD veterans also resented heim met with his unit commanders to
by the minefields and mud; and sharp
the preference and publicity accorded discuss tactics against the next Ameri-
German counterattacks resulted in a
the Nazi Waffen-SS (Combat SS), can offensive, expected in November,
succession of bloody engagements.
who alone were credited with the cap- toward the Saar industrial basin.
ture of Belgrade and of Kharkov ear- American artillery and airpower, even
lier. By 1944, NSFOs - National So- with the anticipated poorer weather, The 88s of the 9th Flak Division
cialist Leadership Officers, were man- made large-scale armored operations stopped one American column at Fon-
dated to give "political instruction" to impractical, and enemy numerical su- teny, and a Kampjgruppe of Pz.Gren.
periority made the OKW (Wehrmacht Rgt. 11 I occupied Viviers during the
the troops. But the Nasojiis were not
High Command) order to hold every night, cutting off another column
eager to go up to front-line units, and
meter of ground unrealistic. which had reached Hannocourt.
in the 11 th Panzer members who had
(These were Task Forces Maybach
a record of leadership in the HJ
In a defense in depth, the infantry and Churchill of the 4th Armored's
(Hitler Youth) or SA (Storm Troop-
divisions would hold positions two or Combat Command B.) The Americans
ers) were authorized to give troop in-
three kilometers forward of the HKL finally cleared Viviers but couldn't
formation classes. These were not re-
with a minimum of forces only, to clear the flanking fue from the for-
ally taken seriously by cynical combat
"absorb" the initial bombardment and ests. The bitter fighting for Fonteny
veterans anyway.
attack. The HKL itself consisted of flared up again on the 11th before the
extensive field works and was cov- Germans pulled back. Two American
Finally the 11 th PD was pulled back ered by minefields. The 11 th PD was battalion commanders, one of them
into reserve, with the 361st VoIksgre- held back as an operational reserve. Colonel Alfred Maybach, were among
nadier Division taking over the sector As the Delme Ridge and the Nied the killed in action. The village cost
by the end of October. Captain River were designated the first and the "Ghosts" as well. The 2nd Battal-
Schneider collapsed from exhaustion, second positions of the HKL, sharp ion of the I 10th had come in the night
but awoke to find his concerned divi- local counterattacks would be before; Lieutenant Klele's platoon of
sion commander sitting by his side. mounted to slow the American ad- 8th Company was wiped out in the
Schneider insisted he not be evacu- vance. "Speed, movement, and sur- house-to-house fighting against the
ated, as the battalion was now in re- prise," recorded Major Thieme, stubborn GIs, and the battalion com-
serve. The general agreed, but ordered "should offset the numerical and ma- mander, Captain Schneider, was badly
the adjutant to report on how much terial superiority of the enemy." wounded by shell fragments and hos-
sleep the captain was getting. "Yes, Mixed companies, Panzerkampjtrupps pitalized until the end of the war.
General von Wietersheim was 'like a or "tank battle teams" of a tank pla-
father' with his soldiers!" he recalled. toon and two panzer grenadier pla- Also on II November, Lieutenant
Tn addition, even Army Group com- toons each, would fight these actions. Walter Rahn, adjutant of the Panther
mander Balck, who had commanded Small sections of one tank, one Battalion of Pz.Rgt. 15 (and later bat-
the division in Russia, came down to halftrack, and an artillery forward ob- talion commander), was at his com-
visit with some of the veterans. Mo- server, if possible, would link the mand post in the Foret de Chateau
rale of any military unit is highly de- front. Their sudden presence and fire Salins when an excited infantry ser-
pendent on sensing the concern com- would hopefully magnify their small geant of the 559th Volksgrenadier Di-
manders have for the welfare of their numbers, encourage their own infan- vision burst in reporting that a hun-
men. A few of the division received try, and make the advancing Ameri- dred Ami tanks were advancing up
leave, and others received additional cans more cautious. While these tac- the valley. Rahn immediately alerted
training. Major Karl Thieme went tics did not conform to the principles the crews of five tanks that were
back for regimental command school- of mass and concentration, they nearby awaiting maintenance, and
ing, and would return as a Lieutenant seemed the only practical way to slow mounted a Kettenrad to reconnoiter.
Colonel, to command his cherished a powerful American advance along a The American column was road-
Panzer Grenadier Regiment I 10. very broad front. bound, moving up the valley of the
34 ARMOR - March-Apri/1994
flooded Petite Seille. Though the Pan- with the 4th Armored's own attack under the blows of the American 6th
thers were technically deadlined, and (Task Force Oden) in the early morn- Armored and 80th Divisions, and the
averaged only six rounds of ammo ing fog. Biedermann's command tank remnants of the 559th VGD evacuated
each, Rahn found them a reverse- No. 301 was hit and the ammunition Morhange. In the days that followed,
slope position near Dalhain from exploded. He was thrown out of his Pz.Gren.Rgt. III lost its regimental
where they could engage the Ameri- turret hatch with a severe leg wound commander, Lieutenant Colonel von
can column at 1,500 meters from hull and his crew members were killed. Ruepprecht, mortally wounded at Hil-
defilade, only the turrets being ex- Delk Oden's 35th Tank Battalion M4s sprich on 23 November. When Allied
posed. Several American tanks and and Major Art West's 10th Armored forces suddenly broke through the
vehicles were knocked out; others Infantry Battalion then shot their way Zabern (Saveme) Gap, Hitler released
drove ahead, while the rest of the col- across Dordal Creek and into Gue- the Panzer Lehr Division to close it.
umn backed up, turned around, and bling. But the 110th Panzer Grena- But the PLD's attack ran head-on into
detoured on a secondary road. (This diers concentrated that night and deci- a swing by the 4th Armored east of
was Task Force Bill Hunter's 37th mated the American defenders, and the Saar and it was pulled out again a
Tank Battalion of Creighton Abrams' Colonel Abrams agreed they should week later, leaving 11th Panzer ele-
CCA.) Contrary to the perception of be pulled out the next day. Oden com- ments to cover east to the Vosges
German regimentation, the initiative plimented the 11 th Panzer troopers Mountains, a 50-kilometer front.
shown by, and encouraged in, junior when he said, "those Goddarnn Ger-
officers and NCOs, was a major rea- mans were the hardest fighting things
son for the success of Gennan panzer we had ever tangled with." The 26th The three artillery battalions were
forces. "Yankee" Division finally crossed the more dispersed than ever. To super-
creek again on the 18th, but took vise his scattered batteries Captain
heavy casualties from Pz.Gren.Rgt. Schaefer-Kehnert, whose 3rd Battal-
The 11th Panzer battle teams were ion usually supported Pz.Gren.Rgt.
the "fire brigades," trying to intercept 110, now commanded by Karl
Thieme, back as a lieutenant colonel. 111 (now under Colonel Graf von
the American thrusts. The pattern of Kielmansegg), divided his headquar-
fighting was of the American infantry Though badly outnumbered, the 11 th ters into a rear command post admin-
advancing through the dripping for- Panzer was constantly thwarting each istered by his adjutant, and a fOlWard
ested hills against the Gennan infan- American thrust by a skillful shifting command post from which he himself
try, and the armor advancing along of available forces. American air did operated. The battalion commander
the valleys, thwarted by the mud, not fly at night, and this is when the preferred a captured American jeep
mines, and 11th Panzer counterat- Germans moved. H&I fire at road nicknamed Kleinen Willy ("Little Wil-
tacks. The cold rain and cloud cover junctions was fairly predictable, and lyZ) from the Willys Overland
kept off the fighter-bombers, though tracked vehicles in particular could builder's plate, because it was light,
seldom the ubiquitous L-4 observation utilize country lanes. German vehicles maneuverable, easy to cover with a
Cubs that droned aloft and called in road-marched, led by a guide on foot camouflage net, and with its four-
the deadly artillery fire. Casualties or in a VW Kiibelwagen ("bucket wheel drive more powerful than the
mounted on both sides in this struggle car") with hooded lights. Tank drivers VW Kiibel.
of attrition. followed the marker light of the tank
ahead, the four slits blurring into two
The 26th Infantry Division reached cat-eye images at the correct vehicle Panzers in Defensive
Rodalbe, but at dusk on the 13th a interval of 25 meters. During the con- Fortifications
Kampjgruppe of liith Panzer Grena- stant fighting and moving, the crews
diers riding ten Panthers charged in, "just cat-napped when we could," rue-
The bitter fighting in the cold mud,
and most of the 3rd Battalionll04th fully said Martin Lange, tank driver
rain, and sleet continued around Sarre
Infantry were captured. Captain Ferdi- and mechanic. Frequently, the drivers
Union and Domfessel as the Germans
nand Biedermann, the panzer com- dozed off whenever the column
delayed back to their border. The op-
mander (of 3rd Company), then re- halted, and then someone would have
posing 4th Armored lost two battalion
ceived orders from Wietersheim to to go back on foot or on the company
commanders wounded and then, after
make a night road march south to Kettenrad and bang on the fender to
clashing with his corps commander
mount a spoiling attack on the 26th wake them up again. It was important
over the frustrating, exhausting strug-
Division's right flank, near Guebling. for crewmen to rotate positions, spell-
gle, the able General Wood himself
His Kampjgruppe included 17 tanks, ing the driver, the others slumped in
was relieved by General Patton. The
and panzer grenadiers in halftracks the seats or curled on the turret basket
I Ith Panzer was falling back through
under Captain Heinz Wolff, com- floor alongside the ammo.
the old French Maginot Line fortifica-
manding 1st Battalion of the 110th. On the night of 18 November the tions, its works of little use since they
II th Panzer was ordered to redeploy only faced eastward. Nonetheless
Biedermann was just about to launch back near St. Avoid, for meanwhile some of the bunkers afforded shelter
his attack on the 14th when it collided the 48th Division had disintegrated from artillery fire, though unit com-
ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 35
manders had to enJOIn their men
not to become trapped in them. Karl Heinz Loschke, now secretary of
At Singling on 6 December, a the 11 th Panzer Division Association,
small unit action typical of the at right, with the author on a research
visit to Braunschweig in 1989. Loschke
campaign was fought when Cap-
served as an artillery officer with the
tain Engelmann's 1st Battalion of 11th PO in Russia.
Pz.Gren.Rgt. III met the advance
of the 4th Armored's Task Force
Abrams. A tank-infantry team un-
der Captain Jimmie Leach of the advance, enabling the Wehrmacht to
37th Tank Battalion attacked the regain the initiative. General Wieters-
town, the armored doughs riding heim felt his "cavalry tactics" carried
the tanks because the halftracks out by even the smallest battle
couldn't negotiate the mud. But groups, were justified by the results.
Leacb found the position domi- The "Gespenster" could take pride in
nated by the high velocity German reading a captured document in
tank guns on the Welschoff Farm which the American x:n Corps com-
ridge, 1,200 yards to the north, mander complimented the 26th Infan-
and four of his 14 tanks were try Division, confronted by "some of
knocked out. Lieutenant Karl Zin- the best German fighting forces," spe-
dler's platoon of Major Reichardt's cifically the "tough and experienced
Panther Battalion launched a 11th Panzer Division."
counterattack supported by artil-
lery fire, but lost two panzers in
turn. One was Zindler's, with two Conclusion
of his crew wounded when they
bailed out. Leach recently wrote
Zindler that it was probably Ser- The II th Panzer Division well
geant Bob Fitzgerald's B-13, mount- test the 90th Division's bridgehead at represents the tremendous fighting
ing a new 76mm gun, that had Dillingen. ability of the German Wehrmacht,
knocked him out. even as defeat loomed by 1944. Stud-
The Westwall could be a formidable
ies have been done to explain German
The German advantage was their defensive line. Though the bunker ap-
fighting power, yet none are really
longer-ranged tank guns. They lost ertures were too small for the antitank
satisfactory. An interesting attempt to
that advantage in an attack that closed guns of 1944, the concrete pillboxes
measure fighting power through
the range with the M4, and were more with machineguns were sited for enfi-
mathematical models rests on ques-
successful when they returned to lading fire to cover the minefields and
tionable data and methodology, and a
dominating the position by fire. As "dragon's teeth" anti-tank traps, and
conclusion in terms of Nazi ideology
Lieutenant Bill Marshall's C Com- they could be held by a minimum of
does not explain German combat ef-
pany of Major Albin Irzyk's 8th Tank troops. Major Arnold Kessler's assault
fectivenes/' in 1870 or 1914-1918,
Battalion came up to relieve Leach's guns covered the bunkers near Zwei-
well before Nazism. Leadership, train-
Team B, one of its tanks was also de- brticken, and the role of the panzer
ing, weaponry, national character, and
stroyed, and the Americans aban- Kampfgruppen was to counterattack
traditions all seem to be part of a
doned the town as not worth the cost. any breakthrougb. The Westwall
complex formula. In the II th PO a
could have been even more formida-
nucleus of capable and experienced
These sharp, sudden clashes were to ble, but the combat troops had been
unit commanders and NCOs, and a di-
buy time, slowing the relentless denied familiarization with the system
vision commander of ability and dedi-
American advance until the German because the Supreme Command
cation, used resourcefulness and
border Westwall defenses themselves wanted to discourage a "defeatist" at-
imagination to continually assimilate
("Siegfried Line" to the Allies) could titude.
ill-trained replacements, adapt tactics
be occupied. But the 11th Panzer was Patton's divisions which had borne
to adverse circumstances, and credit-
stretched thin, aI!l along the Saar River the brunt of the November offensive
ably carry out tbe missions given
line, its battle tearns buttressing the in Lorraine were relieved by fresh
them.
depleted infantry units. Elements of units to recuperate; and on 16 Decem-
Thieme's Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110 counterat- ber some 19 German divisions to the The "Gespensterdivision" was reha-
tacked the 35th Division at Obergail- north launched a massive counter-of- bilitated in the Eifel while in OKW
bach; and ten of Captain Roden- fensive against the American lines in reserve, receiving new drafts and new
hauser's Panzer IVs were dispatched the Ardennes. The II th Panzer bad equipment. In 1945 it would continue
even further to the right to help con- played its part in slowing the Allied to fight, to tbe end, at the Orscholz
ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 37