SALONGA vs PAÑO

G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985

Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause,
alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him.
Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and
persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September
and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of
those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation” in People v.
Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-
entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12, 1980″ and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from
receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that
up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any
copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March
1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD
1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the
prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a
resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40
people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of
the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the
prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the
lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court

Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment had been arrived at, and
a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent
Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the
petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the
exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from
circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court’s crowded agenda for further
deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been
rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions
rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has
the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable,
the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be
required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through
an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s
legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and
development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not
prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever
printed in the Reports.

DE CASTRO VS. COMELEC267 SCRA 806Petitioner: Jimmy de CastroRespondents:

COMELEC and Amando Medrano Ponente: J. HermosisimaFACTS : Petitioner was
proclaimed Mayor of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro during 1995 elections, and
privaterespondent as Vice -Mayor.Jamilla, a rival candidate filed an electio n protest
at the RTC. However, Jamilla died at the pendency ofthe co ntest. The case was
dismissed ruling that this case is personal and the death of the
protestantextinguishes the case itself. The respondent learned about the
dismissal and later on filed an Omnibus Petition/Motion (ForInterventio n
and/or Substitution with Motion for Reconsideratio n) but was dismissed by the RTC
rulingthat this case is of personal interest to the protestant and is terminated by his
death.Consequently, the respo ndent filed a petition for certiorari to the COMELEC
alleging that the RTC acted ingrave abuse o f discretion with the dismissal of the
case.COMELEC granted the petitio n for certiorari and mandamus. It ruled that an
election contest involvesboth the private interests of the rival candidates and the
public interest, an election contest necessarilysurvives the death of the protestant or
the protestee. ISSUES: Wether or not the death of a real party of interest extinguishes
personal action to an election contest?HELD:No. Public office is personal to the
public officer and is not a property transmissible to his heirs upondeath. Thus,
applying the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona, upon the
death of theincum bent, no heir of his may be allowed to continue holding his office
in his place. However, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protesteesuch that the death of either wo uld oust the court of
all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Itinvolves not merely conflicting
private aspiratio ns but is imbued with paramount public interests.Hence, SC denied
the petition for certio rari. COMELEC’s decision is affirmed

CASE DI GEST ON LAGU NZ AD V. GONZALES [ 92 S 476 (1979)] - An agreem ent whe reby a f ilm produc er
wo uld pay t he heirs and rela t iv es of M ois es Padilla a s um of m oney inorder t o depic t t hem in t he m ov ie
w h i c h h e i n c l u d e d a l o v e i n t e r e s t a n g l e d e p i c t i n g t h e m o t h e r a n d a s we e t h e a r t , i s n o t a v i o l a t i o n o f f r e e d o m
of ex-pression. W hile it is true that the film producer purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises
P a d i l l a S t o r y , " t h a t d i d n o t d i s p e n s e wi t h t h e n e e d f o r p r i o r c o n s e n t a n d a u t h o r i t y f r o m t h e d e c e a s e d ' s h e i r s
to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family.
As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, "a priv ilege may be giv en the surv iv ing relativ es of a deceased person to
protect his memory, but the priv ilege exists for the benefit of the liv ing, to protect their feelings and to
p r e v e n t a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e i r o wn r i g h t s i n t h e c h a r a c ¬ t e r a n d m e m o r y o f t h e d e c e a s e d . "
"Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's rig ht to priv acy. The right
t o inv ade a pers on's priv ac y t o dis s em inat e public inf orm at ion does not ext end t o f ic t ional or nov eli zed
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a p e r s o n , n o m a t t e r h o w p u b l i c a f i g u r e h e o r s h e m a y b e . I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , wh i l e i t i s
true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true -to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he
i n c l u d e d a l i t t l e r o m a n c e i n t h e f i l m b e c a u s e wi t h o u t i t , i t wo u l d b e a d r a b s t o r y o f t o r t u r e a n d b r u t a l i t y . "
"The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occup ies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civ il liberties.
Ho wev er, it is lim it ed by t he c lear and pres ent danger rule and t he balanc ing of int eres t t es t . The lat t er
requires the court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of int erest observ able in a
giv en situation. The interests observ able in this case are the right to priv acy and freedom of expression.
T a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e i n t e r p l a y o f t h o s e i n t e r e s t , we h o l d t h a t u n d e r t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s
presented, and considering the obligations in the contract, the validity of such contract must be upheld
b e c a u s e t h e l i m i t s o f f r e e d o m o f e x p r e s s i o n a r e r e a c h e d wh e n e x p r e s s i o n t o u c h e s u p o n m a t t e r s o f
essentially private concern."

Soriano vs. La Guardia

G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009

Facts:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37,

made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were

lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in

connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was

then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue:

Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and within

the protection of Section 5, Art.III.

Held:

No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s

utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB

properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that

petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent

punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a

broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has

its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be

expressed by the use of less offensive language.

LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
160 SCRA 449

FACTS
Violeta Delmo who was supposed to graduate magna cum luade was not allowed to do so because of her act of lending
money to members of organization of which she was a member. According to the school authorities, that act was against school
rules and regulations. This the President of the state college did, despite her qualifications and the Bureau of Public School’s
instruction not to deprive her of the honors due to her, but just the same, she was graduated as a plain student. The Supreme Court
said that she went through a painful ordeal brought about by the President’s neglect of duty and callousness. Hence, moral
damages and exemplary damage were proper. The basis of the decision was article 27, NCC, where a person suffering material or
moral loss because a public employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action of
damages and other relief again the latter.
ISSUE:

Is the school president liable for damages?

HELD:

It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal, which was
brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages
are but proper.

The Solicitor- General tried to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform
Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of
the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty
to enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he received the
decision XXX and even though he sent it back with the records of the case, he
undoubtedly read the whole of it, which consisted of only 3 pages. Moreover, the
petitioner should have had the decency to meet Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform
the latter, at the very lest of the decision. This, the petitioner failed to do, and not without
the attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its decision.

Facts of the Case

Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from
unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages as well as the transmission
of information which depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner deemed "offensive" by community standards.
After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent
protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's
special review provisions.

Question

Did certain provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth Amendments by being overly broad and vague in
their definitions of the types of internet communications which they criminalized?
Yes. The Court held that the Act v iolated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a
content-based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communicat ions,
l i m i t i t s r e s t r i c t i o n s t o p a r t i c u l a r t i m e s o r i n d i v i d u a l s ( b y s h o wi n g t h a t i t w o u l d n o t i m p a c t a d u l t s ) , p r o v i d e
supportiv e statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or conclusiv ely
demonstrate that the transmission of "offensiv e" material is dev oid of any social value. The Court added that
s i n c e t h e F i r s t A m e n d m e n t d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t we e n " i n d e c e n t " a n d " o b s c e n e " s e x u a l e x p r e s s i o n s , p r o t e c t i n g
o n l y t h e f o r m e r , t h e A c t c o u l d b e s a v e d f r o m f a c i a l o v e r b r e a d t h c h a l l e n g e s i f i t d r o p p e d t h e wo r d s " o r
indecent" from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. PBM, 51 SCRA 189
Post under case digests, labor law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization

(PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front
of Malacañang to express their grievances against the
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration,

Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the
leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned
demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was
stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike
against the company but was in fact an exercise of the
laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of
expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for
redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for

it would interrupt the normal course of their business
which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed
up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would
lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company

reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts
should not absent themselves to participate , otherwise,
they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel
the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the
PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the
‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the

officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in
bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations
for being filed two days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike
violated the CBA.
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity."
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription;
but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of
civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of

peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed.”
J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983
Facts : Petitioner, retired Justice JB .L Reyes filed a petition to respondent, Mayor Ramon Bagatsing,
the city mayor of manila that on behalf of anti-bases coalition sought a permit from the city of manila
to hold a peaceful march and rally on october 26, 1983 from 2.00 to 5.00 in the afternoon, starting
from the luneta, a public park, to the gates of united states embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once
there, and in an open space of the public property, a short program would be held.

On october 20, 1983 the petitioner filed a suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction because due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been
informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. On october
25, 1983, the answer of respondent mayor was filed on his behalf by assistant solicitor general eduardo
g. montenegro. It turned out that on october 19, suc permit was denied.
Issues :

1. Whether or not holding a rally in front of the US embassy would be applicable or a violation of
Ordinance no.7295 of the city of manila.

2. Whether or not the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably
assembly was justified by clear and present danger.

Ruling : The petition was granted. The Supreme Court granted the mandatory injunction allowing the
proposed march and rally. The court found that there was no clear and present danger of a substantive
evil to a legitimate public interest that would justify the denial of the exercise of the
constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly.

Our country is signatory of the Vienna Convention. It is binding in our laws. The second paragraph of
its Article 22 that the receiving state is under a special duty to take appropriate steps tp protect
the premise of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace
of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The constitution adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were clear and
present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the of the peace of the mission, or
impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the
terminal point would be the embassy.