Minucher vs. Hon. CA, G.R. No.

142396, February 11, 2003

Digested by: Alyssa Diane Adarna

FACTS: Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 was filed against Khosrow
Minucher, an Iranian National and one Abbas Torabian following a buy-bust operation in
Minucher’s house conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents at the behest of the
defendant, Arthur Scalzo wherein a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. On
May 27, 1986, two weeks after the plaintiff came to know the defendant and the latter
acting as poseur-buyer, the defendant came back to the plaintiff’s house and directly
proceeded to his room, where the plaintiff and his countryman, Abbas Torabian were
playing chess. The defendant requested the plaintiff to accompany him to his cab
waiting outside as he would be leaving the Philippines very soon. Without much ado, he
followed the defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete
surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. Together
with 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed, the plaintiff was handcuffed.
After the arrest, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision acquitting the two
accused.
Minucher later on filed a civil case for damages due to what he claimed to have been
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The defendant invoked
the doctrine of state immunity from suit since he was acting on behalf of the United
States and that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
Justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity
RULING: YES. The Court ruled that Arthur Scalzo is entitled to the defense of state
immunity from suit.
According to the Court, a foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state. The official exchanges of communication between
agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the
participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust
operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be
inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter, but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency.
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner v. MANUEL V. MORAN, resp.
G.R. No. L-44896, July 31, 1936
Digested by: Alba, Alfonso Sebastian I.
Criminal Law 1 – Case Digest
JD – 1M
FACTS: Petitioner was a duly accredited, honorary consul of Uruguay in Manila, the
Philippines on June 11, 1934. He was charged with the crime of falsification of private
documents before the Court of First Instance of Manila (hereby referred to as CFI). He
objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that both under the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines that the court had no
jurisdiction over him.
His objection having been overruled, he then filed for a writ of prohibition against the
CFI of Manila to prevent the taking of notice of the criminal action filed against him.
ISSUES: Whether or not he had diplomatic immunity or if he should be tried under the
jurisdiction of the CFI of Manila
RULING: The court ruled against Schneckenburger. A consul is not entitled to the
privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and
regulations of the country to which he is accredited.
It is also established that the jurisdiction of the court is not exclusive, and that the
Supreme Court shall possess "original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls.
The CFI retains jurisdiction over the case and the petitioner may be tried. The petition
for a writ of prohibition was then denied.
Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
Digested by: Necah Marie Alba, I - Manresa

Facts: In the 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was accused of receiving millions of
pesos in jueteng money and excise tax before the Blue Ribbon Committee. On
November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. The
trial was put on a halt due to the ruling against the opening of the second envelope
which allegedly contained evidence that he held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde" which caused the collective resignation of public and
private prosecutors before the Impeachment Tribunal. Thousands protested in the Edsa
Shrine to plead Estrada to resign. On January 20, Chief Justice Davide administered
the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. The petitioner and his
family left Malacañang Palace on the same day.

Issues and Rulings:

1. Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question. The cases at
bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution.

2. Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President. Using the totality test,
the Supreme Court held that the petitioner resigned as President. The intent to
resign is clear when he said words of resignation and agreed to the rounds of
negotiation for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power. It was also confirmed
by his leaving Malacañang.
3. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to Act as
President. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure president made
by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the SC.
4. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he
enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity. The Supreme Court rejected his
argument that he cannot be prosecuted because he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was
aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of
the presidency. Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted.
5. Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined
due to prejudicial publicity. The Supreme Court holds that there is not enough
evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than
hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.
ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, Respondent. A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009
Case Digest by: Austria, Patricia M., JD – 1M
FACTS:
The Judicial Bar Council sent out public invitations for the nomination for impending
vacancy of Chief Justice Position. However, the Judicial Bar Council would eventually
inform the applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify
for nomination and therefore Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, not being one of the
incumbent members of the Court, would be disqualified for such position. As a result of
her disqualification for the Chief Justice Position, she has uttered remarks during her
privilege speeches before the Senate:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal.
I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that,
I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this
nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in a different environment than in a Supreme
Court of idiots. x x x
Antero J. Pobre has filed a petition to pursue disbarment or other disciplinary actions
against Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago. According to J. Pobre, her remarks during her
speech showed a total disrespect towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago should be disbarred or
subjected to disciplinary proceedings as a result of her utterances during her privilege
speeches before the Senate.
RULING: No. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago should not be disbarred or be
subjected to disciplinary proceedings.
Pursuant to Section 11, Article VI of the 1987, Senator Defensor-Santiago is granted
parliamentary immunity. As per provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution
"A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress
is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof."

Her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under

the Rules of Court.
Jeffrey Liang v. People of the Philippines G. R. No. 125865, January 28,2000
Ynares-Santiago, J
Digested by – Jean Mikhail D. Bacayo
FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese national working with the Asian Development Bank
(ADB). In 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker
Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation.The MeTC judge received
an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the
ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. According to said protocol communication
that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration. Motion
was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings. Petitioner
then seeked a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the
Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases
were filed in court.
ISSUE: Wether or not 1) Was the basis of the protocol communication enough for
MeTC judge to dismiss charges without notice to the prosecution. 2) Does Criminal acts
fall under the immunities provided in accordance to the Agreement between ADB and
Philippine Government that protects foreign officials working in the Philippines.
RULING: Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the
DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain
person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts.
Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides: Officers and staff of the Bank
including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for
the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities: a)immunity from legal
process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the
Bank waives the immunity. The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject
to the exception that the acts was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to
determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Slandering a person
could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not
allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. Under
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner
is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the
case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

REAGAN VS. COMMISSION ON INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. L-26379 30 SCRA 968, December 27, 1969

Digested By: Jeraldine R. Calderon

Criminal Law 1 – Case Digest
JD – 1M
Petitioner: William C. Reagan
Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
FACTS: The petitioner disputes the payment of the income tax assessed on him by the
respondent on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of
the United States Marine Corps where sale transaction took place at the Clark Field Air
Base at Pampanga. Petitioner contends that the sale was made outside Philippine
Territory and therefore beyond the jurisdictional power to tax.

It appears that the petitioner is a citizen of the United States and an employee of an
American corporation which provides technical support to the United States Air Force at
Clark Air Base, Philippines.

ISSUES: Whether or not the sale transaction was outside Philippine territory.
Whether or not the petitioner was liable for the income tax.

RULING: The Clark Field Air Base is not foreign soil or foreign territory both in the
political and geographical sense. The fundamental principle of everyone within the
territorial domain of a state being subject to its commands:” For undoubtedly every
person who is found within the limits of a government, whether for temporary purposes
or as a resident, is bound by its laws”. It is further settled in the United States and
recognized elsewhere that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land areas
under its dominion.

The Court of Tax Appeals found nothing objectionable in the assessment. Thus, the
Petitioner was liable for the income tax due on a sale of his automobile under Philippine
jurisdictional power to tax. The Petitioner’s request for refund of payment is denied and
cannot make out a case for reversal.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LOL-LO and
SARAW, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

Criminal Law 1 – Case Digest

JD – 1M

Facts: Defendant-apellants Lol-lo and Saraw were pirates in this 1922 case. On June
30, 1920 two boats with a dozen Dutch subjects left either Matuta or Peta, Dutch
possessions. The second boat arrived between the islands of Buang and Bukid in the
Dutch East indies. There, their boat was surrounded by six vintas with twenty four
armed Moros aboard them. They were robbed of their food, cargo, with some of the
men being attacked and two of the women raped. All Dutch subjects with the exception
of the two raped women were then placed back on to their boats with holes with the
idea that their boat would sink. Although it did not. The two captive women were able to
escape their captors at Maruro. Lol-Lo was one of the marauders who had raped one of
the women, along with Saraw.
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code at the time regarding the crime
of piracy could be applied to the case at bar.
Ruling: The provisions remain in full effect. Along with the crime of piracy, there were
accompanying crimes against chastity and abandonment of persons without apparent
means of saving of saving themselves. These served as aggravating circumstances that
were not necessary in the commission of the crime, showing that the pirates had taken
advantage of their superior strength and means were employed adding ignominy to the
natural effects of the dastardly acts, which were also taken into consideration when
affixing the penalty.
Lol-Lo was tried and found guilty of the said crimes. He was sentenced to hang by the
neck until dead.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014

CASTILLO, JOHN PAUL Q.

CRIMINAL LAW 1 – CASE DIGEST
1ST YEAR – MANRESA

FACT: On or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real,

Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of
Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicate crime group as
they all help one another, for purposes of gain in the transport of illegal drugs, and in
fact, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding and abetting one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously transport by means of
two (2) motor vehicles, namely a Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with
commemorative plate to read "Mayor" and a municipal ambulance of Panukulan,
Quezon Province, methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug which is
commonly known as shabu, and with an approximate weight of five hundred three point
sixty eight (503.68) kilos, without authority whatsoever.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 1 August 2007 convicted Morilla
and his co-accused Mayor Mitra, then incumbent Mayor of Panukulan, Quezon, of
illegal transport of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, with
an approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos. However, it
absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the prosecution’s failure to present sufficient
evidence to convict them of the offense charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor
Mitra as they were caught in flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous drugs in two
vehicles driven by each of them.
RULING: Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of
transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the
Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another."It was well
established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of
Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act of transporting
methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense
under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs
need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.
ATIZADO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 173822 | 2010-10-13
Digested by: Kristine Faith Ceniza

Facts: Petitioners Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal and a certain Danilo Atizado
were charged with the murder of Rogelio Llona, a Sangguniang Bayan member of
Castilla, Sorsogon. The information alleged conspiracy, treachery and evident
premeditation. State witness Simeona Mirandilla testified that she and the victim
Rogelio Llona, her common-law husband, had gone to the house of Manuel Desder that
fateful night. While seated in the sala, she heard "thundering steps" as if people were
running and then two successive gunshots, she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the
prostrate body of the victim Llona. She heard three clicking sounds, and turning, saw
Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving backwards and simultaneously
adjusting the cylinder of his gun. Llona was brought to a hospital where he was
pronounced dead. Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back. Denying the
accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. They claimed that at the time of the crime,
Atizado had been in his family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon,
because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had been in the house
of a certain Ariel also in the same barangay. The RTC convicted the petitioners
Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal of murder with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery but acquitted Danilo. Petitioners were sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua.
ISSUE: Monreal was a minor at the time of commission of the crime. Is there a
Retroactive application of RA 9344 to juveniles already serving sentences? YES

Held: Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. However, reclusion perpetua was not the correct
penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The
RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal's minority at the time of the commission of
the murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.
The proof of Monreal's minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with *Section 7 of
RA 9344, also known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006:
The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall
enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be 18 years
old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies
of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In
case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
*Section 68 of RA 9344: “Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence
at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18)
years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and
are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.”
*Section 41 of RA 9344, Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, from the time of
his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreal's
detention should be credited in the service of his sentence, the revision of the penalty
now warrants his immediate release from the penitentiary.
 [G.R. No. L-8919. September 28, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellees, vs. AGUSTIN
MANGULABNAN alias GUINITA, DIONISIO SARMIENTO, ARCADIO BALMEO,
PATRICIO GONZALES, FLORENTINO FLORES, CRISPIN ESTRELLA, FELIPE
CALISON, PEDRO VILLAREAL, CLAUDIO REYES, “PETER DOE” and “JOHN
DOE” Defendant, AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN, Appellant.
Digested by: Joselle D. Collado
Criminal Law 1 – Case Digest
JD – 1M
FACTS: Vicente Pacson’s house was robbed by intruders, one identified as Agustin
Mangulabnan. One of the two unidentified persons who were with Agustin fired his gun
at the ceiling, killing Pacson who was hiding there at that time.

ISSUE: Where the killing of Pacson is undertaken by an unpremeditated act of a co-

participant of the crime, is Mangulabnan guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide?

RULING: Yes, Mangulabnan is guilty. The crime committed in the case at bar, of which
Appellant Agustin Mangulabnan is a co-participant, is the crime of robbery with
homicide covered by Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code. In this case, the
penalty to be imposed upon Agustin Mangulabnan is the next lower in degree or
reclusion perpetua.

RATIONALE:

The record shows that Appellant participated in the criminal design to commit the
robbery with his co-Defendants and it is settled rule in this jurisdiction that unity of
purpose and action arising from a common design makes all parties thereto jointly
liable, each being responsible for the result, irrespective of the character of their
individual participation. Since the English version of Art. 294, No. 1, of the Code is
poorly translated, the prevailing Spanish text of said paragraph is referred to, which
reads as follows:c
“1. ° Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con ocasion del
robo resultare homicidio.”
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with
homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason on the occasion of the
robbery. This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances
leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would
supervene by mere accident.
People of the Philippines vs. Wong Cheng

Digested By: Andrea Isabel Concepcion

Criminal Law 1 – Case Digest
JD – 1M

FACTS: Wong Cheng was caught smoking opium aboard a merchant ship vessel
named Changsa, of English nationality whie it was anchored in Manila Bay two and half
miles from the shore of the city.

ISSUES: Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction of over crime that is
committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in out jurisdiction waters

RULING: The Court ruled against Wong Cheng.

APPLICATION: There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter the French
Rule and the English Rule. The French Rule, according to which crimes are committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessel should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country
within hwose territorial jurisdiction there were committed, unless their commission
affects the peace and security of the territory.
On the other hand, English Rule based on the territorial principle, which follows the
principle that crimes that are perpetrated under such circumstances are in general
triable in the courts of the country within territory there were committed.

Mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit is not triable by our courts,
because the primary object of our Opium law is to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against disastrous effects of this drug in our country, but to smoke opium
within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of
public order because the act causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within
our territory.
Case: US v. Ah Sing 36 Phil 978
G.R. No. L-13005
October 10, 1917

Digested By: Corral, Cede

Facts: Ah Sing is a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which
arrived in the port of Cebu from Saigon on April 25, 1917. He bought 8 cans of opium in
Saigon, brought them on board and had them in his possession during the said trip. The
8 cans of opium were found in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine by
authorities who made a search upon anchoring on the port of Cebu.
The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had
purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the
opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug.

Issue: Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine
Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.

Ruling: Defendant is charged of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine islands.
As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person who unlawfully imports
or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is
found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign
country and is within the jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty of the crime of
illegal importation of opium, unless contrary circumstances exist, or the defense proves
otherwise.
It would be foolish to believe that the defendant was merely carrying opium from Saigon
to Cebu for the mere pleasure of it or that such large quantities of opium was for his
personal use.
Without any better explanation as to the reason of the defendant’s action, it was
logically deduced that the defendant intended to bring opium into the Philippine Islands
from a foreign country.