IASDELHI.

ORG

India-China Relations
GS1, GS2
Gajanan
22/08/2018

This document is to give some thought provoking insights about India – China relations. Content is
sourced from standard sources and internet.
Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

Contents
Observations about Chinese Strategy ............................................................... 3

Suggestions ....................................................................................................... 6

List of Major Irritants ........................................................................................ 8

List of Areas/Foras of Cooperation ................................................................... 8

Brief History .................................................................................................... 10

1962 War ......................................................................................................... 12

Timeline After 1962 War ................................................................................. 15

Lal Bahadur Shatri ......................................................................................... 15

Indira Gandhi ................................................................................................ 16

Rajiv Gandhi .................................................................................................. 16

Post 1991 ...................................................................................................... 17

UPA ............................................................................................................... 18

Modi ............................................................................................................. 19

GAJANAN WADJE Page 2

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

Observations about Chinese Strategy

1. Depsang and Doklam conflicts have given India the reality check that, no
matter that China is now India’s largest trading partner, India’s
relationship with China is essentially a political and strategic one arising
out of the fact that India and China are neighbours with an unresolved
boundary dispute.
2. China’s position has put India under psychological pressure, and created
fresh uncertainties in the minds of the Indian political and military
leadership about China’s long-term intentions towards India.
3. Unlike the Chinese, Indians in general lack a strong sense of history.
Decisions in India also tend to be personalized, with key figures at the top
often more inclined to go by their instincts, or to be concerned about
leaving behind a ‘legacy’ than trusting the dispassionate analysis and
advice of professionals.
4. China is not likely to settle the boundary question with India unless it has
definitively resolved the question of Tibet on its terms and Tibet comes
firmly under its control. Arunachal Pradesh matters to China because the
Chinese leadership has projected it as ‘southern Tibet’ and therefore
China’s inability to annex Arunachal Pradesh could be seen as weakening
China’s claim to Tibet itself.
5. The specific claim to Tawang on the specious ground that this is the
birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama is not because the Chinese have any
respect for this institution (quite the contrary) but because they see it as
legitimizing their control over the institution of the Dalai Lama and
thereby Tibetan Buddhism which, as the Dalai Lama has said, is the
ultimate source of threat for Tibet’s separation from mainland China.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 3

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

6. Essentially, China is adopting dilatory tactics in its boundary negotiations

with India. There are no great issues of principle involved in the Chinese
approach. It is illogical that China should not accept the McMahon Line as
the boundary with India when it has done so with Myanmar in January
1960, and had made a similar offer to India in April 1960.
7. Nor does China’s argument that the 1914 Shimla Agreement be
considered invalid carry any substance. After all, imposed on a weak China
in 1898 and patiently waited till 1997 to peacefully resume sovereignty
over Hong Kong. China scrupulously observed the 99—year lease on Hong
Kong that the British
8. China has routinely and brazenly violated its solemn bilateral
commitments. China has re-opened very aggressively its claim to
Arunachal Pradesh, has not fully accepted Sikkim as a part of India, and
does not want an early settlement of the boundary question. In launching
a border war in 1962, China has also not followed the letter and spirit of
the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement.
9. Steady economic integration of Tibet and Nepal into China’s fold is also
expected to strengthen China’s bargaining position.
10. China aims to keep India unsure about China’s intentions. That will make
it difficult for India to free up resources from defence to development
priorities. War is not necessary if psychological pressure and controlled
border aggression serve the purpose.

11. India has yet to acquire the kind of economic clout that China already
has. Furthermore, surely, one of the criteria to be counted as a major
power ought to be the capacity to produce at home the major weapons
systems needed for modern warfare-fighter and bomber aircraft, long
range artillery, tanks, AWACS, helicopter gunships, and so on. Woefully,
more than 60 years after Independence, we are totally dependent on
foreign suppliers in respect of all these strategic items. Having a few

GAJANAN WADJE Page 4

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

nuclear warheads and missiles is not going to make us a global power;

even Pakistan has them.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 5

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

Suggestions

1. There is agreement for exchange of hydrological data, but it would be

much better if India, Pakistan and Bangladesh could jointly broach this
subject with China. India could also consult with countries that face a
similar problem vis-à-vis China. e.g. Russia
2. Like China, India too should not show undue anxiety to settle the
boundary question. India can keep China engaged and let the border talks
continue, but it must change its tactics. India has started to build up its
logistics and infrastructure in the border areas.
3. If China can lay claim to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds of its
cultural, historical and spiritual links with Tibet, the case for India’s claim
to Kailash–Mansarovar region on similar reasoning is more substantive.
4. India should also bring up the Shaksgam valley of POK that was
transferred from Pakistan to China in 1963, and reassert its concern over
the Karakoram Highway linking POK with Xinjiang.
5. Strengthen US–Japan–Australia–India strategic dialogue
6. Beef up its presence and activity in the Indian Ocean, and make
increasingly frequent forays into the west Pacific Ocean too. Such
measures will help to exert counter psychological pressure on China.
7. India should make a conscious effort to project its culture and
achievements in a positive light.
8. India’s intellectual and spiritual advancements can be seen in the fact that
India gave birth to sophisticated religions and philosophies that had a wide
appeal in other parts of Asia.
9. India should undertake a systematic campaign to puncture the Chinese
concept of it being the ‘Middle Kingdom’. It should be argued that this is
GAJANAN WADJE Page 6
Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

merely China’s self-perception born out of its ignorance and isolation from
the rest of the world.
10. India must create greater public awareness of the myriad challenges that
China faces.

As a strategic rival and a difficult neighbour, China will not easily give up its
policy of creating difficulties for India through Pakistan and India’s other neighbours.
China will always retain a high priority in India’s foreign and security policy and poses
one of the most complex challenges to Indian diplomacy.
The global standing of India in the 21st century will depend to a large extent
on whether India lives up to its promise and potential, whether China manages to
sustain its economic growth, and the inter-relationship between the two giants.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 7

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

List of Major Irritants

1. Border Disputes
2. The Dalai Lama and Tibet
3. Arunachal Pradesh and Stapled Visa
4. String of pearls
5. River Water Dispute
6. NSG
7. Terrorism
8. CPEC as part of BRI
9. Bhutan and Nepal
10. Trade Imbalance

List of Areas/Foras of Cooperation

1. BRICS & NDB

2. AIIB
3. SCO
4. WTO Negotiations
5. Climate Change
6. G20

Cultural Relations

1. India and China have entered into an agreement on co-production of movies.

2. Yoga is becoming increasingly popular in China.

Education Relations

1. Education Exchange Programme (EEP)

GAJANAN WADJE Page 8

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

2. BRICS Network University and BRICS Think Tank Council. BRICS Network
University, where 12 universities from each of the 5 countries will engage with
each other in education research and innovation, is another commendable
initiative. Five areas of cooperation are prioritised which are Communication
and IT, Economics, Climate Change, Water Resources and Pollution, and BRICS
study.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 9

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

Brief History

China and India have also had some contact before the transmission of
Buddhism. India-China cultural exchanges date back to many centuries and there is
some evidence that conceptual and linguistic exchanges existed in 1500-1000 B.C.
between the Shang-Zhou civilization and the ancient Vedic civilization. Chanakya’s
Arthshastra refers to "cinapatta" (Chinese silk bundle) in his Arthashastra. In the
Records of the Grand Historian, Zhang Qian (d. 113 BCE) and Sima Qian (145-90 BCE)
make references to "Shendu", which may have been referring to the Indus Valley.

From the 1st century onwards, many Indian scholars and monks travelled to
China, such as Batuo (fl. 464-495 CE)—first abbot of the Shaolin Monastery—and
Bodhidharma—founder of Chan/Zen Buddhism. Many Chinese scholars and monks
also travelled to India, such as Xuanzang (b. 604) and I Ching (635-713), both of
whom were students at Nalanda University in Bihar.

The Chola navy conquered the Sri Vijaya Empire of Indonesia and Malaysia
and secured a sea trading route to China. During the 7th century, Tang dynasty
China gained control over large portions of the Silk Road and Central Asia. Wang
Xuance had sent a diplomatic mission to northern India, which was embroiled by
civil war just following the death of Emperor Harsha (590–647). During the 8th
century, the astronomical table of sines by the Indian astronomer and
mathematician, Aryabhatta (476-550), were translated into Chinese.

Between 1405 and 1433, Ming dynasty China sponsored a series of seven
naval expeditions led by Admiral Zheng He. Zheng He visited numerous Indian
kingdoms and ports, including India, Bengal, and Ceylon, Persian Gulf.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 10

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

In the 18th to 19th centuries, the Sikh Confederacy expanded into

neighbouring lands. It had annexed Ladakh into the state of Jammu in 1834. In
1841, they invaded Tibet and overran parts of western Tibet. Chinese forces
defeated the Sikh army in December 1841, forcing the Sikh army to withdraw, and in
turn entered Ladakh and besieged Leh, where they were in turn defeated by the
Sikh Army. At this point, neither side wished to continue the conflict. The Sikhs
claimed victory. as the Sikhs were embroiled in tensions with the British that would
lead up to the First Anglo-Sikh War, while the Chinese was in the midst of the First
Opium War. The two parties signed a treaty in September 1842, which stipulated no
transgressions or interference in the other country's frontiers.

The British East India Company used opium grown in India as export to China.
The British used their Indian sepoys and the British Indian Army in the Opium
Wars and Boxer Rebellion against China. They also used Indian soldiers to guard the
Foreign concessions in areas like Shanghai.

Even the 1914 Shimla Agreement that delineated the McMahon Line was
signed between India and Tibet. The Chinese representative only initialed the
agreement and China later denounced it.
Despite Chinese protests, India invited Tibet as a separate delegation to the
Asian Relations Conference that was convened in New Delhi in March 1947.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 11

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

1962 War
In retrospect, it is clear that China’s policy towards India in the 1950s was
formulated with the objective of securing China’s control of Tibet.

1. China lulled India into complacency with its mendacious Bhai-Bhai and
Panchsheel, and got India to vacate its presence in Tibet as well as to
recognize Tibet as a region of China in the 1954 India–China Trade
Agreement.
2. It cleverly put off the settlement of the India–Tibet border alignment so that
it could quietly go ahead with the construction of the Xinjiang–Tibet highway
passing through Aksai Chin that was critical for China to consolidate its hold
on Tibet.
3. When the Dalai Lama fled Tibet for India in 1959, China was uncertain about
India’s attitude and feared that India could become a platform to launch
attacks on Tibet.
4. The content and the timing of Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai reported
package deal offer to Prime Minister Nehru in April 1960 to let China keep
Aksai Chin in return for recognition of the McMahon Line is significant—the
strategic Aksai Chin area would not be given up, but China was willing to
recognize the McMahon Line in order to get some breathing space to
consolidate its hold over Tibet.
5. Adoption of “forward policy” without development of necessary supporting
infrastructure for the army was a flawed policy.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 12

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

In Parliament Resolution of 1962, India has regrettably signalled its

willingness to compromise on its principled position. China, on the other hand, has
not given up any claim; rather, it has hardened its position on Arunachal Pradesh.

The Forward Policy involved the establishment of a few symbolic posts in

Ladakh so that India might be in a position to take action to recover any territory
within Chinese possession. It also sought to block potential lines of further Chinese
advance.

China and India - Panchsheel agreement.

(1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
(2) Mutual non-aggression;
(3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
(4) Equality and mutual benefit, and
(5) Peaceful coexistence

After war, China sent a note signed by Zhou Enlai to India reiterating the
three-point ceasefire formula.-

1. Both parties would respect the Line of Actual Control,

2. The armed forces would withdraw 20km from this line and;
3. Talks between the prime-ministers of both countries to seek a friendly
settlement.

India accepted and later on 10 December endorsed Colombo proposals.

1. Six non-aligned nations--Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and

Indonesia met in Colombo and formulated these proposals.
2. The proposals, negotiated between Zhou Enlai and Nehru, stipulated
Chinese withdrawal of 20km from the traditional customary lines as

GAJANAN WADJE Page 13

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

claimed by China, without any corresponding withdrawal on the Indian

side.
3. In the east, the LAC recognized by both governments was to be treated
as a ceasefire line, while the status quo would be maintained in the
middle sector.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 14

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

Timeline After 1962 War

 2 March 1963: China and Pakistan sign a boundary settlement in Beijing
between Kashmir and Xinjiang where Pakistan ceded 5080 sq. km of Pakistan
occupied Kashmir territory.
 23 March 1963: Official sources confirm induction of additional Chinese troops
into Tibet, raising concerns in Delhi.

Lal Bahadur Shatri

 16 Oct 1964: China conducts its first nuclear explosion in Lop Nor.
 26 March 1965: Sino-Pak boundary protocol involving territory in Jammu
and Kashmir signed in PoK between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Pakistani
President Ayub Khan.
 April 1965: China extends support to Pakistani aggression in Rann of Kutch.
 Sept 1965: China supports Pakistan during the Indo-Pak conflict in Chhamb
across the international border of Jammu and Kashmir and officially accuses
India of 'criminal aggression.'
 30 November 1965: Chinese troops intrude into north Sikkim and NEFA once
again.
 Jan 1966: China condemns the Tashkent Agreement between India and
Pakistan as a product of joint US-Soviet plotting.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 15

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

Indira Gandhi
 Sept –Oct 1967 : Nathu La & Cho La Skirmishes - The competition to control
the disputed border land in Chumbi valley is seen as a major cause for
heightening the tensions in these incidents. It was also sthe most unstable
period of Cultural Revolution in China, which coincided with these incidents
 25 Oct 1971: The UN General Assembly voted to give China's seat in UN to the
Government of PRC, expelling Nationalist China functioning as the 'Republic
of China' from Taiwan (Formosa).
 July 1972: China vetoes an Indian sponsored resolution for the admittance of
Bangladesh to the UN.
 May 1974: China criticizes India’s first peaceful nuclear explosion.
 April 1975: China expresses strong condemnation and utmost indignation at
merger of Sikkim with the Indian Union.
 April 1976: India and China decide to restore the level of diplomatic
representation in both countries to the ambassadorial status after a 15year
diplomatic hiatus.
 February 1979: Indian foreign minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visits China.

Rajiv Gandhi
 1986: Differences surface over the precise limits of the Mc Mohan Line in the
Sumdorung Chu area of Arunachal Pradesh.
 8 December 1986: Beijing express strong condemnation over the
establishment of Arunachal Pradesh as a full-fledged State of the Indian
Union.
 December 1988: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visits China. Agreement to set
up a Joint Working Group on Boundary question and a Joint Group on
Economic Relations, Trade, Science and Technology signed.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 16

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

Post 1991
 September 1993: Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visits China, signs
agreement on Border Peace and Tranquillity and the setting up of the India-
China Expert Group of Diplomatic and Military Officers to assist the work in
Joint Working Group.
 August 1995: India and China agree to pull back their troops on the
Sumdorong Chu Valley in the eastern sector.
 August 1997: The India-China Joint Working Group meets in New Delhi.
Instruments of ratification in respect to Confidence Building Measures
agreement exchanged.
 May 1998: Defence minister George Fernandes reported claim that China was
India’s threat number one offends China.
 July 1998: China urges India and Pakistan to give up their nuclear ambitions
and sign the NPT.
 June 1999: China displays neutrality on the Kargil conflict and agrees to
establish a security mechanism with India.
 Sept 1999 China objects to the creation of a new Indian Army Unit, the 14th
corps, to be based in Leh to look after the Ladakh region.China asks New
Delhi to stop the ‘splitting activities’ of Dalai Lama from Indian soil to improve
bilateral relations.
 January 2000: Karmapa Lama flees China, reaches Dharamshala and joins the
Dalai Lama. Beijing warns that giving political asylum to the Karmapa would
violate the five principles of peaceful coexistence. India officially declares to
China that the 17th Karmapa has arrived in Dharamshala, but has not been
granted refugee status. The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) build a
permanent road network and sets up bunkers 5km in the Indian side of the
LAC in Ladakh’s Aksai Chin area. China sign a bilateral trade agreement in
Beijing to facilitate China’s early entry into the WTO.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 17

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

 March 2000 India and China initiate the first ever bilateral security dialogue in
Beijing on global and regional issues of mutual interest.
 April 2000 Beijing thanks India for support in defeating a US sponsored
resolution in Geneva criticizing the Chinese record on human rights.
 Jan 2001 Sino-Indian leaders jointly agreed to form India-China Parliamentary
Friendship Groups in their respective Parliaments.
 April 2001 China supports gradual evolvement of trilateral cooperation with
Russia and India but rules out triangular alliance.
 Jan 2002 Six MOUs signed in New Delhi to enhance cooperation in Science and
Technology, outer space, tourism, phytosanitary measures and supply of
hydrological data relating to the Brahmaputra river between India and China.

UPA
 July 2006: China and India re-open Nathu La Pass, which was closed since the
Sino-Indian war in 1962.
 May 2007: China denies a visa to Arunachal Pradesh chief minister, arguing
that since the state is in fact a part of China he would not require a visa to
visit his own country.
 August 2010: India cancels defense exchanges with China after Beijing refuses
to permit Lt. Gen. B.S. Jaswal, head of the northern command, a visa because
he “controlled” the disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir.
 November 2010: China started the practice of issuing stapled visas to people
from Jammu and Kashmir.
 April 2013: The Chinese troops intruded into Depsang Bulge in East Ladakh,
approximately 19 km inside our perception of the Line of Actual Control (LAC)
claimed it to be a part of its Xinjiang province.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 18

Telegram : @iasdelhi India-China Relations Gajanan/Adesh

Modi
 September 2014: Xi visits India, and Modi, breaking protocol, receives him in
Ahmedabad. They spend an evening strolling on the banks of the Sabarmati
river. China promises $20 billion worth of investments in India over five years.
Both countries, however, remain engaged in a face-off at the border in
Ladakh, after Chinese troops allegedly crossed over to the Indian side,
through the entire visit.
 November 2014: Xi invites Modi to attend the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation) summit in Beijing. Modi declines the offer, but travels to
Myanmar, Australia and Fiji.

 January 2015: During US president Barack Obama’s Republic Day visit, Obama
and Modi reportedly spend some 45 minutes talking about China, and both
express concern about Beijing’s expansionist stance, especially in the South
China Sea.

 May 2017: India declines Chinese invitation to attend the Belt and Road
Initiative summit in Beijing and issues a detailed statement listing its
objections.
 8-9 June 2017: India admitted to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO) as full-member along with Pakistan.

GAJANAN WADJE Page 19