INDIA - PAKISTAN

URI ATTACK
-What Happened?

In the early dawn of September 18, Pakistani irregulars belonging to the Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM) attacked an Army camp in the Uri sector of Jammu and Kashmir, killing 18 jawans and inflicting
grievous casualties on many more. The fidayeen were able to breach the Line of Control as also the
a p s se u it , e plo i g a o i atio of i e dia g e ades a d lose-quarter weapons to
inflict heavy casualties.

WEIGHING POLICY OPTIONS:

1. Mature Response with Strategic Restrain

Views M.K. Narayanan:

There is a message in the latest attack, coming as it does straight from the deepest recesses of the
Pakista i Deep “tate that lesso s f o the Patha kot i ide t ha e ot ee filte ed do , a d a
similar carefully planned attack could take place.

 Mature response is the key. India faced a similar situation during 26/11. But mature
judgment based on a cost-effe ti e a al sis, led to the ithholdi g of di e t a tio i the
form of an overt attack on Pakistani targets. A mature nation like India could hardly afford to
fu tio like a ogue state , viz. Pakistan.

 The need for caution is even more imperative today, as not only is the world more
interconnected and events in any one region do have a geopolitical impact, but the stakes
fo I dia as o e of the o ld s leadi g e o o i po e s ha e e o e o side a le.

 Any escalation could p o e da ge ous at a ti e he e otio s a e u i g high. Pakista s

military is anxious to engage in a conflict not so much to assess its own capabilities, but to
gauge how soon the world and its allies like China would step in and internationalise the
conflict, including issues such as Kashmir.

 It is important to recognise that while we can choose our friends, we cannot select our
neighbours. Once diplomatic relations are broken, healing the rift will become still more
difficult.

 The next issue for India would be whether it is possible to impose a heavy economic burden
on Pakistan. India must understand that very few countries would be willing to take part in
this. It is critical for China for its OBOR plan, and even ASEAN would not be too willing.

 Utmost care again needs to be taken when considering any military option. Pakistan may be
a asket ase app o i ati g to No th Ko ea, ut like the latte it is a ilita ised state
hi h has u lea teeth . Just like i 2008, I dia did t take a ilita option because it
would be indeterminate. This added to the prestige of India as I dia o the perception
 war , gai i g i te atio al suppo t a d s path , hile Pakista as o sig ed to the
positio of a i te atio al out ast .

 India lacked the capability to carry out spectacular raids like the one that took out Osama
Bin Laden, because I dia s se u it age ies, i ludi g the a ed fo es, still do ot ha e
adequate capabilities of this kind.

 In an interconnected world where India is seen as a rising, responsible power, it is necessary

to temper the voices being heard about paying Pakistan back in its own coin

Views of Pratap Bhanu Mehta:

India is well within its rights to take any action that it thinks appropriate. But this will be a game of
many moves.

 Whatever one may think of strategic restraint, it is not a doctrine of defeatism. It makes
realistic assumptions about the nature of the Pakistani state.

 I dia s poli of “t ategi ‘est ai draws on recent historical experience. Societies are not
weakened just by terrorism as much as they are by overreactions. Under some
circumstances, restraint can be a form of deterrence, since the other side does not get the
political leverage it hoped for. It was also based on the recognition that the India-Pakistan
dispute is not a conventional problem; it is a long psychological and historical process.
‘est ai t also pla s to I dia s ad a tage; I dia s st e gth a d sta di g ha e i eased
immeasurably during the last decade or so.

 Pakista s st ateg of i te atio alisatio has al a s ested o eati g a se se of

apocalyptic violence in South Asia. It operates on the assumption that bad behaviour that
a e sho to desta ilise the egio ill get the o ld s atte tio . The efo e, I dia s
restrained response actually has it chafing.

2. Cyber Sabotage and Cyber Warfare

Views of M. K. Narayanan:

I dia s est optio ould e to e gage i e sa otage a d e warfare, hiding behind the
plausible deniability available in such attacks. Our capacity in this area is considerable, and it should
be possible to engage in extensive cyber sabotage and cyber warfare to bring Pakistan to its knees.
This a e o th e a i i g, i stead of adopti g tit fo tat ethods ith a ogue atio .

3. Flaws of India’s Policy - Need for a more coherent policy towards Pakistan
Views of Suhasini Haider:

 I dia s o es o Pakista i the past fe ea s ha e ee a series of such missteps,

misperceptions and a complete misunderstanding of the Pakistani responses to them.
  The dialogue process has been on-again off-again with red lines being drawn and erased.
 Nothing upsets the elements of the Pakistani establishment that carry out terror attacks
against India more than a consistent dialogue process, and in the past too, it is when India
and Pakistan have come closest to a breakthrough that their attack is the hardest. The last
few years, however, have seen neither what Winston Churchill famously called jaw-jaw
(talks), nor has there been an outright war- a , a d it s that situation of disorder that
empowers those destructive elements the most.
 Until India builds a coherence in its own strategy, and unity in focus and purpose, it will
continue to face such challenges from across the border, as well as comforting but empty
words of solidarity from the rest of the world.

4. Alternative Views
Views of Happymoon Jacob: In the grand strategic scheme of things, Pakistan is an irritant, not a
strategic threat: so treat it like it, and focus on the real strategic threats.

Views of Pratap Bhanu Mehta on Balochistan: In our diplomatic offensive, we have to be clear what
o e a t to hold Pakista to: The hu a ights sta da d a d the pa if sou es of oss-
o de iole e sta da d i o te t of Balo hista o k at oss pu poses i the short run.

View of Stephen P. Cohen: Not much will come from a state that encourages or tolerates this kind of
iole e. The o de is a de fa to dispute, [ ut] Pakista should e usi g its ilita po e to stop
new and threatening events, such as those pertaining to Islamic extremism.

5. Steps taken by India and steps under consideration:

 Indian External Affairs Minister’s Speech at the UN:

Indian External Affairs Minister made a bold statement at UNGA, o e ti g Pakista s e o d of

nuclear proliferation to its support of terrorism and the dangers it posed to global security. In her
o ds, The land of Taxila, one of the greatest learning centres of ancient times, is now host to the
Ivy League of terrorism. It attracts aspirants and apprentices f o all o e the o ld.

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj's emphatic speech at the United Nations General Assembly
UNGA has a ked the o tou s of I dia s poli towards Pakistan, from now on:

I. The first element of this contour is that India shall no longer be defensive, but assertive.
II. The second is that human rights violations in Balochistan will be an embedded part of
such policy.
III. The third is that Pakistan-sponsored terrorism will be portrayed effectively as not just an
India-specific issue, but one of global concern.

 Diplomatic Pressure: India Cancelled its Participation in SAARC

o India stepped up diplomatic pressure on Pakistan by cancelling Indian participation
at the SAARC Summit in Pakistan.
o This was followed by Bangladesh, Bhutan, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka also deciding to
sta a a f o the “u it, iti g oss o de te o atta ks , i te fe e e a d
 i posed iole e , sa e easo s as I dia. This has ulti atel led to the
cancellation of the SAARC Summit.

 Reviewing Indus Water Treaty

The Prime Minister chaired a review meeting of the Indus Water Treaty, during which it was decided
that I dia ill e ploit to the a i u the water of Pakistan-controlled Rivers, including Jhelum, as
per the water sharing pact.

Indus Water Treaty: Is abrogating the treaty an option?

The Treaty has survived wars and innumerable phases of frosty relations. So much so, it is cited as
the global model for cooperation on the use of trans-boundary river waters. The success of the
Treaty also lends weight to the theory that when it comes to water, nations tend to cooperate rather
than get into a conflict.

It is not possible to abrogate the treaty because of the following reasons:

o The treaty has no provision for either of the countries walking out of the pact
unilaterally. Still if India wants to go about abrogating it, the country should abide by the
1969 Vienna convention on the law of treaties
o The waters of Eastern Rivers are fully allocated to India. For the Western rivers, India can
use 20% of the water, but it currently uses only 4% due to lack of storage facilities. India
i tuall has o sto age i este i e s a d thus a t stop the ate flo to Pakista .
o Pakistan could be pressured even without stopping the waters or violating any other
provisions of the Indus Treaty.
o I dia s g eate e gage e t ith Afgha ista on the development of the Kabul River
that flows into Pakistan through the Indus basin.
o India has water-sharing arrangements with other neighbours as well. It could lose its
voice with China in case it decides to do something similar.

 Reviewing MFN Status

India had granted the MFN status to Pakistan in 1996 as part of its commitments on joining the
World Trade Organisation. There have been calls in India for tough action against its neighbour,
including the revocation of the MFN status.

International trade experts said India could consider aki g use of a se u it e eptio clause in
the GATT to deny the MFN status to Pakistan or bring in certain trade restrictions. However, GATT
and WTO practice shows that the countries have by and large observed self-restraint in using the
national security exception.

However, according to ASSOCHAM, Snapping business ties with Pakista a ot hu t I dia s

interest as India–Pakista t ade is a s all lo a ou ti g fo less tha half a pe e t of I dia s
total global trade. Bilateral trade between the two nations was just $2.6 billion in 2015-16 (of which
$2.2 illio o stituted I dia s e po ts to Pakista — which represented a minuscule 0.4 per cent of
I dia s o e all goods t ade o th $643.3 billion in the same year. Therefore, even if India revokes
the MFN status, it would only have a s oli i pa t

 Surgical Strikes:
I dia A ed Fo es o du ted su gi al st ikes i PoK. Afte ea s of st ategi est ai t, I dia s
Pakista poli got a defensive-offence’ posture. India has cast these in the form of a pre-emptive
self-defence, as is allowed under Section 10 of the UN Charter. It was a strong tactical repost.

Views of Pratap Bhanu Mehta:

 The ope atio itself is ot u p e ede ted. But the ope atio s pu li use as a state e t of
I dia s i te t a d esol e is e . The ope atio , by its public embrace, becomes the
declaration of a policy.
 The India-Pakistan relationship is almost psychoanalytic. While the government may want a
calibrated strategic escalation, the psychological escalation is now out of control.
 The exaggerated posturing and jingoistic loud talk are unworthy of the great-power status
that India aspires to; they only serve to erode our credibility.
 There is widespread exasperation with Pakistan. There is also a leadership vacuum in global
politics: From Syria to Afgha ista , the U“ is dise gaged o stu k. Chi a s o e ea h a d
ideological imperatives make it difficult for it to be an effective international actor in
diplomatic terms. This vacuum has given India some breathing space. But this space has,
paradoxically, ee a o se ue e of I dia s elati e est ai t. It ould e foolish to assu e
unequivocal support for India if hostilities escalate. The international community may be
exasperated with Pakistan. But in a global leadership vacuum, there will also be wariness of
action that challenges the authority of the Pakistani military beyond a point.

Views of Rajiv Sikri

Our pretentions to be a great power were quite hollow if we could not tackle these terrorist threats
on the ground on our own. This step signalled that we have the capability and the political will to do
so. We need to continue with this aggressive diplomacy.

Views of Rakesh Sood

Given the domestic compulsion on the government in New Delhi, it was understood that it had to
take some sort of punitive action. But the way the operation was configured has also signalled
towards de-escalation. Along with this, the support of international community is needed to ensure
diplomatic isolation. At the same time, India needs to walk the tightrope that cooperation of
international community to ensure the isolation is best done by also exercising the strategic restrain.