2-HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODS - Finish PDF

September 30, 2013 – October 1, 2013
Trainer:
Prof. Dr. Heri Hermansyah, ST., M.Eng
Free Powerpoint Templates

Page 1
Outline
 Methods of Hazard Identification
 Non-Scenario-Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure
 Preliminary Hazard Analysis
 Safety Review
 Relative Ranking
 Checklist Analysis
 Scenario-Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure
 What If Analysis
 What if/Checklist Analysis
 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOPS)
 Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
 Cause Consequence Analysis (CCA) & Bow-Tie Analysis
 Selection of Hazard Evaluation Techniques

Page 2
Definition of Hazard & Hazard Identification
Hazard: physical or chemical characteristic that has the

potential for causing harm to people, proverty, or the
environment.
Hazard Identification:
(1)Identification of spesific undesirable consequences,
(2)Identification of material, system, process, and plant
characteristic that could produce those consequences.

Page 3
Methods for Hazard Identification
1.1.Analyzing Material Properties and Process Condition

Analyzing Material Properties and Process Condition
2.2.Reviewing Organization and Industry Process Experience

Reviewing Organization and Industry Process Experience
3.3.Developing Interaction Matrixes

Developing Interaction Matrixes

Page 4
1. Analyzing Material Properties and
Process Condition
Typical Material Properties That Useful for Hazard Identification

Adverse
Consequences
Environmental
Human Impacts Economic Impacts
Impacts
- Consumer Injuries - Off-site contamination - Property damage

- Community Injury - Air - Inventory loss
- On-site personnel - Water - Production outage
injury - Soil - Poor product quality/
- Unit personnel - On-site contamination yield
injuries - Air - Loss market share
- Loss of employment - Water - Legal liability
- Psychological effects - Soil - Negative image
Some of the best resources are the chemical manufacturers and /or
suppliers; they can provide product literature, access to their chemical
experts, and material safety data sheet (MSDSs).
Page 5
Common Material Property Data for Hazard
Identification
 Acute toxicity & Chronic  Physical properties  Reactivity

toxicity  Freezing point  Process material
 Inhalation  Coefficient of expansion  Desired reaction
 Oral  Boiling point  Side reaction
 dermal  Solubility  Decomposition reaction
 Vapor pressure  Undesired reaction
 Stability  Density or specific volume  Kinetics
 Shock  Corrosivity/erosivity  Material of construction
 Temperature  Heat capacity  Raw material impurities
 Light  Specific heats  Contaminants
 polymerization  Decomposition products
 Flammability/Explosibility  Incompatible chemical
 LEL/LFL  Pyrophoric materails
 Exposure limits
 UEL/UFL
 TLV®
 Minimum oxygen
 PEL
concentration for combustion
 STEL®
 Dust explosion parameters
 IDLH
 Minimum ignition energy
 ERPG
 Flash point
 AEGL
 Autoignition temperature
 Energy production
It is not sufficient to consider only the material properties when identifying

hazards; the process conditions must be also be considered.
Page 6
2. Reviewing Organization and Industry
Process Experience
Some Activities to Gain Industry Process Experiences:

• Analyst use knowledge about the process that can be used in hazard identification activities.
• Laboratory experiments reveal the basic physical properties of a compound, its toxic effects, and its
reaction kinetics.
• Computer software can be used to predict the heats of reactions as well as the stability of new
compounds.
• Pilot plant experience may reveal unexpected byproducts of the reaction, show that the process
conditions must be changed to achieve maximum performance, and corroborate speculation on the
effects of typical process contaminants.
If the organization’s experience has been documented, it should be used

just like an other source of data for hazard identification. If the experience
has not been recorded, then it may be necessary to assemble a team of
knowledgeable personnel to participate in the hazard identification process.

Page 7
List of several classes of chemical compounds that, based
on industrial experience, would warrant investigation as
hazards
Acids Ethers
Aldehydes Halogens
Alkaline metals Hydrocarbons
Alkyl metals Hydroxides
Amines Isocyanates
Ammonia and ammonium Mercaptans
compounds Nitro compounds – organic
Azo and diazo compounds and Organophosphate
hydrazines
Peroxides and hydroperoxides
Carbonyls
Phenols and cresols
Chlorates and perchlorates
Silanes and chlorosilanes
Cyanides
Epoxides

Page 8
3. Developing Interaction Matrixes
Interaction Matrix Technique:

A simple tool for identifying interactions among specific parameters (including
materials, energy sources, environmental conditions, etc).
Parameters commonly used in an interaction matrix

 Chemicals
 Process conditions such as temperature, pressure, or static charge
 Environmental conditions such as temperature, humidity, and dust
 Materials of construction such as carbon steel, stainless steel, and asbestos gaskets
 Concentration of material in diluent and the particular diluent used
 Common contaminants such as air, water, rust, salt, and lubricants
 Contamination from other materials handled in the same process equipment or area
 Order of mixing of the interacting materials; ratio of materials combined
 Human health effects including short-term and long-term exposure limits
 Environmental effects including odor thresholds and aquatic toxicity limits
 Legal limits for inventory, spills, or waste disposal

Page 9
Initial Assessment of Worst-Case Consequences
After specific process hazards are identified and before hazard evaluation techniques
are employed, it beneficial to estimate the worst-case consequences for the identified
hazards, or at least for what are judged to be the most significant identified hazards.
The purpose is :
 It highlight what consequences are possible if the hazards are not contained and controlled.
 It can be used to help decide an appropriate analysis methodology (e.g., a more rigorous
analysis method may be used if the potential consequences are more severe).
 It can aid in the later hazard evaluation by helping the review team determine the severity of
consequences of scenarios involving the hazardous material or energy.
 It can focus the review team’s efforts on the part of the process that involve the greater
hazards.

Page 10
Strategies or approaches to reduce the process risk and
address the hazard
 Inherent – Eliminate the hazard by using non-hazardous materials and process

conditions (e.g., substituting water for a flammable liquid as a solvent)
 Passive – Reduce risk by process and equipment design features that reduce
frequency or severity without the active functioning of any device (e.g., robust
vessel pressure design; drainage and contaminants; blast – resist construction).
 Active – Use controls, instrumented protective systems, and other devices such as
excess flow valves, remotely actuated block valves, and safety relieve valves for
responding to abnormal situations (e.g., a pump that is shut off by a high level
switch when the tank is 90% full) or mitigating loss event impacts. These systems
are sometimes called engineering controls.
 Procedural – use policies, operating procedures, administrative checks,
emergency response, and other management approaches to prevent or minimize
the effects of an incidents (e.g., hot work permitting, emergency plans). These
approaches are often called administrative controls.
Inherently safer design strategies are considered more reliable

than passive, active, or procedural approaches.
Page 11
Inherent safety review process :
1. Define the required product. 6. Define physical , chemical, and toxic

properties.
2. Describe the optional routes to • Provide NFPA hazard rating or
manufacture the desired product (if equivalent
available) including raw materials,
intermediates and waste streams. 7. Define process conditions (pressure,
temperature, etc).
3. Prepare simplified process flow diagram.
• Include alternative processes 8. Estimate quantities used in each
process system (tanks, reactors, etc)
4. Develop chemical reactions • State plant capacity
• Desired and undesired • Estimate quantities of waste /
• Determine potential for runaway emissions
reactions/decomposition
9. Define site-specific issues
5. List chemicals and materials employed. (environmental, regulatory, community,
• Develop a chemical compatibility spacing, permitting, etc.).
matrix

Page 12
Non-Scenario-Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure

Page 13
Non-Scenario-Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure
1. Analyzing Material Properties and Process Condition

1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis
2. Reviewing Organization and Industry Process Experience

2. Safety Review
3. Developing Interaction Matrixes

3. Relative Ranking
4. Applying 4.
Hazard Evaluation Techniques
Checklist Analysis

Page 14
Purpose
•To evaluate hazards early in the life of process.
•Generally applied during the conceptual design or R&D phase of plant
and can be vary useful when making site selection decision.
•Used as design review tool before a process P&ID is developed.
Description
•Focuses in general way on the hazardous materials and major process
areas of a plant.
•Conducted early in the development of a process when there is little
information on design details or operating procedures, and is often a
precursor to further hazard analysis.
•Illustrate a cost-effective way to identify hazards early in a plant’s life.
•Formulates a list of hazards and generic hazardous situations by
considering various process characteristics.

Page 15
Type of Results
•Qualitative description of the hazards related to a process design.
•Qualitative ranking of hazardous situations that can be used to prioritize
recommendations for reducing or eliminating hazards in subsequent
phases of the life cycle of the process.
Resource Requirements
• Analyst have access to available design criteria, equipment
specifications, material specifications, and other sources of information.
• Performed by one or two people who have a process safety background.
Time estimates for using the PHA technique

Scope Preparation* Evaluation Documentation*
Small System 4 to 8 hours 1 to 3 days 1 to 2 days
Large System 1 to 3 days 4 to 7 days 4 to 7 days
* Team Leader Only
Page 16
Analysis Procedure
1.Preparing for the review

• Gather available information about the subject plant (or system),
from any similar plant, or even from a plant that has a different
process but uses similar equipment and materials.
• Draw experience from as many sources as possible (hazard studies
of similar facilities, operating experience from similar facilities, and
checklist.
• Write a description of conceptual design (basic chemicals, reactions,
and process parameters involved should be known, as well as the
major types of equipment).
* Team Leader Only

Page 17
Analysis Procedure
2.Performing the review

• Identify major hazards and incident situations that could result in an undesired
consequence.
• Identify design criteria or alternatives that could eliminate or reduce those hazards.
• Identify hazards and evaluate the possible causes and effects of potential incidents
involving these hazards.
• Evaluate the “effects” of each incident; these effects should represent the reasonable-
worst-case impacts associated with the potential incidents.
• Assign each potential incident situation to one of hazard categories, based on the
significance of the causes and effects on the incident:
• Hazard Category I Negligible
• Hazard Category II Marginal
• Hazard Category III Critical
• Hazard Category IV Catastrophic
• Define these categories for the team so that they can judge each hazard appropriately.
• List any suggestion they identify for correcting or mitigating the hazards.

Page 18
Analysis Procedure
3.Documenting the Results

• Record the results in a table, which displays the hazards identified,
the causes, the potential consequences, hazard category, and any
idetified corrective or preventive measures.
Area: Meeting date:

Drawing number: Team members:
Hazard Corrective / preventive
Hazard Cause Major effects
category measures suggested
Typical format for a PHA worksheet

Page 19
2. Safety Review
Purpose
•Ensure that the plant and its operating and maintenance practices match the design
intent and construction standards.
Description
•Involve a walk-through inspection that can vary from an informal, routine visual
examination to a formal team examination that takes several weeks.
•Identify plant conditions or operating procedures that could lead to an incident and
result in injuries, significant property damage, or environmental impacts.
•Interviewing many people in the plant: operator, maintenance staff, engineers,
management, safety staff, and others.
•Viewed as cooperative efforts to improve the overall safety and performance of the
plant.
•Focuses on major risk situations.
•Complement other process safety activities, such as routine visual inspections,
checklist analysis, and what if analysis.
•At the end of safety review, the analyst or team makes recommendations for
specific actions that are needed, justifies the recommendations, assigns
responsibilities, and lists goal completion dates.
Page 20
2. Safety Review
Types of Resluts
•Qualitative descriptions of potential safety problems and suggested corrective
actions.
Resources Requirements
•Access to applicable codes and standards; previous safety studies; detailed plant
description, such as P&IDs and flowcharts; plant procedures for start-up, shutdown,
normal operation, maintenance, and emergencies; personnel injury reports;
pertinent incident reports; maintenance records such as shutdown system functional
checks, pressure relief valve tests, and pressure vessel inspections; and process
material characteristics (i.e., toxicity and reactivity information)
Time estimates for using Safety Review technique

Small System 2 to 4 hours 6 to 2 hours 4 to 12 hours

Page 21
2. Safety Review
Analysis Procedure

• Define which systems, procedures, operations, and personnel will be
evaluated.
• Assemble detailed description of the plant (e.g., plot plans, P&IDs, PFDs)
and procedures (e.g., operating, maintenance, emergency shutdown and
response).
• Review the known hazards and process history with the review team
members.
• Review all of the applicable codes, standards, and company requirements.
• Review the status of the recommendations of the previous safety review.
• Schedule interviews with specific individuals responsible for safe process
operation.
• Request available records concerning personnel injuries, incident reports,
equipment inspection, pressure relieve valve testing, safety / health audits,
etc.
• Plan kick-off and wrap-up visits with the plant manager or an appropriate
management representative.

Page 22
2. Safety Review
Analysis Procedure

• Tour of the plant and progress to specific inspections and
interviews.
• Obtain and review current copies of plant drawings as well as
operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures.
• Determine weather the operating staff follows the company’s
written operating procedures.
• Evaluate the control of maintenance activities, such as routine
equipment repair, welding, vessel entry, electrical lock-out, or
equipment testing.
• Asking staff members to respond to an exercise as they would in a
real emergency.
• Observe the exercise and provide a critique to the participants
afterward.

Page 23
2. Safety Review
Analysis Procedure

• Preparing a report with specific recommended actions.
• The review team provides justifications for their recommendations
in the report, and they summarize their impressions about the
facility or system.
• Findings and recommendations are reviewed with appropriate
plant management.

Page 24
3. Relative Ranking
Purpose
•Determine the process areas or operations that are the most significant with respect
to the hazard of concern, the potential severity of consequences, or the overall risk in
a given study.
Description
• Can address fire, explosion, and/or toxicity hazards and associated safety, health,
environmental, and economic effects for a process or activity.
• May be used during any phase of a plant or process lifetime to:
• Identify the individual process areas that contribute most to the anticipated
overall hazard and incident attributes of a facility.
• Identify the key material properties, process conditions, and / or process
characteristics that contribute most to the anticipated hazard and incident
attributes of a single process area or an entire facility.
• Use the anticipated hazard and incident attributes to discriminate among
competing design, sitting, or operating options.
• Compare the anticipated hazard and incident attributes of process areas or
facilities to others whose attributes are better understood and/or more
commonly accepted.

Page 25
3. Relative Ranking
Types of Resluts
•The result in an ordered list of processes, equipment, operations, or activities. The
list may have several stratified layers representing levels of significance.
•The result as indexes, scores, factor scales, graphs, etc., depend upon the particular
technique used to perform the ranking.
•Depend upon each ranking methods unique needs.
•Require basic physical and chemical data on the substances used in the process or
activity.
Time estimates for using Relative Ranking technique

Large System 1 to 3 days 4 to 8 hours 2 to 4 hours

Page 26
3. Relative Ranking
Analysis Procedure

• Gather the information about site plans; lists of materials, chemical
properties, and quantities; general process diagrams and equipment layout
drawings; design and operating data; technical guides for the selected
ranking technique.

• The analyst should follow the instructions in the technical guide for that
technique to perform the evaluation.
• Site visits and interviews to verify information and to answer process
questions.
• The analyst should be technically reviewed by other engineers or managers,
and all assumption should be recorded.
• The calculated risk index numbers (and any other factors calculated from
the evaluation) should be summarized to facilitate comparisons among
areas that have been reviewed.

Page 27
3. Relative Ranking
Analysis Procedure

• The risk index numbers and the other factors generated by the
evaluation should not be considered as accurate reflections of the
absolute risks posed in process areas.
• The results should be considered as estimates to compare the
relative risks of the areas analyzed.
• The analyst may determine the most important contributors to the
index numbers by reviewing the analysis documentation to help
determine if corrective actions or design modifications should be
undertaken to reduce the anticipated risks of the facility.
• The analyst may identify specific areas of the unit process where the
safety weakness exist and develop a list of action items to correct
the problems.

Page 28
4. Checklist Analysis
Non Scenario-Based
Why Checklist Analysis ??
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Hazard evaluation is needed, but • Safety Review
what technique should be used. • Relative Ranking
• Checklist Analysis
Check!
1. The project is not yet a well-defined Scenario-Based
process.
2. The project is not existing yet (not • What-If Analysis
• What-If/Checklist Analysis
constructed yet).
• Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies
3. Team has little idea of the plant
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
layout, equipment types and sizes, (FMEA)
and chemical inventories at this stage • Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
in the design. • Event Tree Analysis {ETA)
4. Good checklist to follow for this • Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA)
project is available.
Checklist analysis is a systematic evaluation against pre-established criteria in

the form of one or more checklists.
Page 29
Purpose
•Used primarily to ensure that organizations are complying with standard practices.
•Used to familiarize inexperienced personnel with a process by having them
compare a process’s attributes to various checklist requirements.
•Provide a common basis for management review of the analyst’s assessments of a
process or operation.
Description
• The hazard analysis uses a list of specific items to identify known types of
hazards, design deficiencies, and potential incident situations associated with
common process equipment and operations.
• A Checklist Analysis of an existing process usually includes touring the subjects
process area and comparing the equipment to the checklist.
• Checklist are limited by their authors’ experience; therefore, they should be
developed by authors with varied backgrounds who have extensive experience
with the system they are analyzing.

Page 30
Types of Results
•A completed checklist contains “yes”, “no”, “not applicable”, or “ needs more
information” answers to the questions.
•Qualitative results vary the specific situation, but generally they lead to a “yes” or
“no” decision about compliance with standard procedures.
•Required resources include an appropriate checklist, an engineering design
procedures and operating practices manual, and someone to complete the checlist
who has basic knowledge of the process being reviewed.
•It is important that the checklist are reviewed periodically to include the latest
codes, standard, regulations or practices.
Time estimates for using Checklist Analysis technique


Page 31
Analysis Procedure
1.Selecting a Checklist
• Select an appropriate checklist from available resource (e.g., internal
standards, consensus codes, industry guidelines).
• If no specific relevant checklist is available, then the analyst must use his or
her own experience and the information available from authoritative
reference to generate an appropriate checklist.

• Tour and visual inspections of the subject process areas by the hazard
evaluation team members.
• During the tours, the analyst compare the process equipment and
operations to the checklist items.
• Notes the deficiency when the observed system attributes or operating
characteristics do not match the specific desired features on the checklist.
• A Checklist Analysis of a new process, prior to construction, is usually
performed by the team members in a meeting and focuses on review of the
process drawings, completion of the checklist, and discussion of the
deficiencies.
Page 32
Analysis Procedure

• The hazard evaluation team should summarize the deficiencies
noted during the tours and/or meetings.
• The report should contain a copy of the checklist that was used to
perform the analysis.
• Any specific recommendations for safety improvement should be
provided along with appropriate explanations.

Page 33
Scenario-Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure

Page 34
Scenario-Based Hazard Evaluation Procedure
1. What-If Analysis
2. What-If/Checklist Analysis
3. Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies
4. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
5. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

6. Event Tree Analysis (FTA)
7. Cause Consequence Analysis (CCA)
8. Bow-Tie Analysis

Page 35
1. What If Analysis
Theory of “What-if analysis”?

Definition of What-If Analysis :
Brainstorming approach in which a group of
experienced people are familiar with the subject of
question and answer or attention to the possibility of
events that are not desirable.
Purpose :
Identify hazards, hazardous situations or a series of
special events that result in unintended consequences.

Page 36
1. What If Analysis
Type of Results :
What-If Analysis technique generates a list of questions, answers about
the process and produce a tabular list of dangerous situations
(generally there is no ranking or quantitative implications of the
identified potential incident scenarios), consequences, safeguards, and
options that allow for risk reduction.
Resource Requirements :
Time and cost of What-If Analysis is proportional to the complexity of
the plant and the amount of the analyzed area. The cost of What-If
Analysis method can be efficient in evaluating the danger if it has had
the experience.

Page 37
1. What If Analysis
Analysis Procedure :
•The information needed for What-If Analysis includes chemical data,
process descriptions, drawings, and operating procedures.
•The review meetings should begin with a basic explanation of the
process, given by plant staff having overall plant and process
knowledge plus expertise relevant to the team’s investigation area.
Time estimates for using the What-If Analysis Technique

Cakupan Persiapan Evaluasi Dokumentasi
Sistem kecil 4 – 8 jam 4 – 8 jam 1 – 2 hari

Proses besar 1 – 3 hari 3 – 5 hari 1 – 3 minggu

Page 38
1. What If Analysis
3. Mendokumentasikan results :
•Documentation is the key to transforming discoveries into the
measurement team for elimination or reduction of hazards. This table
below is an example What-If Analysis worksheet.
•In addition to completed tables, the hazard evaluation team usually
develops a list of suggestions for improving the safety of the analyzed
process based on the tabular What-If Analysis results.
Area: Tabel 2. Tipikal format worksheet What-If Analysis

Meeting Date:
Drawing Number: Team Members:
What-If Hazard Consequence Safeguard Recommendation

Page 39
The what-If/Checklist Analysis technique combines

the creative, brainstorming features of the What-If
Analysis method with the systematic features of the
Checklist Analysis method.
Purpose
•Identify hazards, consider the general types of incidents that can
occur in a process or activity, evaluate in a qualitative fashion the
effects of these incidents, and determine weather the safeguards
against these potential incident situations appear adequate.

Page 40
Description
• This hybrid method capitalized on the strengths and compensates for the
individual shortcomings of the separate approaches. For example, the
Checklist Analysis method is an experienced-based technique, and the quality of a
hazard evaluation performed using this approach is highly dependant on the
experience of the checklist’s authors. If the checklist is not complete, then the
analysis may not effectively address a hazardous situation. The What-If Analysis
portion of the technique encourages the hazard evaluation team to consider
potential abnormal situations and consequences that are beyond the experience of
the authors of a good checklist, and thus are not covered on the checklist.

Page 41
Type of Results
• Usually generates a table of What-If question (initiating causes), effects, safeguards
and action items.
• Some organizations use a narrative style to document the results of such studies.
• Performed by a team of personnel experienced in the design, operation, and
maintenance of the subject process.
• The number of people needed for such a study depends upon the complexity of
the process, and to some extent, the stage of life at which the process is being
evaluated.
Time estimates for using What-If/Checklist Analysis technique

Large System 1 to 3 days 4 to 7 days 1 to 3 weeks

Page 42
Analysis Procedure

• The hazard evaluation team leader assembles a qualified team,
determines the physical and analytical scope for the proposed study,
and, if the process/activity is rather large, divides it into functions,
physical areas, or tasks to provide some order to the review of the
process.
2. Developing a list of What-If questions and issues

3. Using a checklist to cover any gaps
4. Evaluating each of the questions and issues
5. Documenting the results

Page 43
3. Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)
Definition:
Hazard and Operability Study, otherwise known as HAZOP hazard
analysis is a standard technique used in the preparation of the
establishment of security in new systems or modifications to the presence
of potential hazards or problems operabilitasnya.
Purpose:
Reviewing a process or operation in a system systematically, to determine
whether the deviation could lead to an accident scene or unwanted.

Page 44
Characteristic of HAZOP
a) Systematically, using a high structure or by relying on keywords and ideas to

continue the team and ensure appropriate safe guards in place or not and the
object being tested.
b) Specialization forms by various disciplines held by team members.
c) Can be used for a variety of systems or procedures.
d) Used more as a system in peril interpretation techniques.
e) Initial estimate, so as to produce good quality although the quantity is also
affected.

Page 45
Concept of HAZOP
Term - the term terminology (keywords) that are used to facilitate the
implementation of HAZOP are as follows:
a.Deviation (deviation) is a combination of keywords that are being applied
(a combination of local words and parameters).
b.Cause (cause) is the most likely cause will result in a deviation.
c.Consequence (result / consequence) is a consequence in determining
the boundaries should not be done because it can be detrimental to the
conduct of research.
d.Safeguards (Business Protection) is a preventive devices that prevent
the causes or consequences of safeguards against loss will be
documented in this column. Safeguards also provide information on the
operator of the irregularities that occurred and also to minimize the effect.

Page 46
Concept of HAZOP
e. Action (Actions Do). When a cause is believed to lead to negative

consequences, it should be decided action - what action should be done,
both actions that reduce or even eliminate the cause.
f. Node (Point Study). Is the separation of a unit process into several parts
so that studies can be done better organized. The point of the study
aims to assist in outlining and studying a part of the process.
g. Severity. Is a severity level that is expected to occur.
h. Likelihood. Is the possibility of consequences with existing security
systems.
i. Risk or risk a possible combination likelihood and severity.

Page 47
HAZOP Analysis
HAZOP aims to review the use of a process in a systematic system

and determine whether the deviation can lead to incidents or
accidents that are not desirable.
HAZOP analysis is a part of the safety philosophy of planning

required in anticipation of security, safety and health during the
process of installation and operation of the equipment.

Page 48
HAZOP Analysis Flowchart

Page 49
4. Failure Modes and Effective Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is a systematic proactive approach in order to evaluate

the process to identify where and how the process will fail and
make an assessment of the impact resulting from many
different causes of failure At A tool / equipment.
“ACCIDENT PREVENTION”

Page 50
FMEA Phylosophi

Page 51
FMEA Steps
1. Identifying the process of a system and use of the

appliance
2. Identify potential hazards that can occur in parts / tools
(single point of failure-failure mode)
3. Identify the cause at the point of failure occurred
4. Formulate preventive measures (safeguards)
5. Formulating measures superbly when failure occurs

Page 52
5. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is one of the several deductive logic model
techniques, and one of the most common hazard identification tool.
 The deduction begins with a stated top level hazardous/undesired
event.
 It uses logic diagrams and Boolean Algebra to identify single events
and combinations of events that could cause the top event.
 Probability of occurrence values are assigned to the lowest events in
the tree in order to obtain the probability of occurrence of the top

event.

Page 53
FTA Symbol Explained
Basic Event: A lower most event that can not be further developed.
E.g. Relay failure, Switch failure etc.,
An Event / Fault: This can be a intermediate event (or) a top event. They
are a result logical combination of lower level events.
E.g. Both transmitters fail, Run away reaction
OR Gate: Either one of the bottom event results in occurrence of

the top event.
E.g. Either one of the root valve is closed, process signal
to transmitter fails.
AND Gate: For the top event to occur all the bottom events should
occur.
E.g. Fuel, Oxygen and Ignition source has to be present
for fire.

Page 54
FTA Symbol Explained
Incomplete Event: An event which has scope for further development but
not done usually because of insufficient data.
E.g. Software malfunction, Human Error etc.,
External Event: An event external to the system which can cause failure.
E.g. Fire.
Inhibit Gate: The top event occurs only if the bottom event occurs and
the inhibit condition is true.
E.g. False trip of unit on “maintenance override” not ON.

Page 55
Simple Example
Example 1: 0.28
Transmitter Failed
OR
0.1 Transmitter 1 Transmitter 2 0.2

Failed Failed
0.000002(2E-06)
Example 2: Valve Failed
AND
Valve 1 Valve 2
0.001 0.002
Failed Failed

Page 56
Procedure
Procedure for Fault Tree Analysis
Define TOP Event
Define overall structure
Explore each branch successive level of

detail
Solve the fault tree
Perform correction if required and make

decisions

Page 57
Procedure
1. Define Top Event:

 Use PHA, P&ID, Process description etc., to define the top event.
 If its too broad, overly large FTA will result. E.g. Fire in process.
 If its too narrow, the exercise will be costly. E.g. Leak in the valve.
 The boundaries for top event definition can be a System, Sub-system, Unit,
Equipment (or) a Function.
 Some good examples are: Overpressure in vessel V1, Motor fails to start,
Reactor high temperature safety function fails etc.,

Page 58
Procedure
2. Define overall structure:
Determine the intermediate events &

combination of failure that will lead to the top
event.
Arrange them accordingly using logical

relationship.

Page 59
Procedure
3. Explore each branch in successive level of

detail:
 Continue the top down process until the root cause for each branch is
identified and/or until further decomposition is considered unnecessary.
 So each branch will end with a basic event or an undeveloped event.
 Consider Common cause failure & Systematic failures in the process of

decomposition.
 A good guide to stop decomposing is to go no further than physical (or)

functional bounds set by the top event.

Page 60
Procedure
4. Solve the Fault Tree:
 Assign probabilities of failure to the lowest level event in each branch of the
tree.
 From this data the intermediate event frequency and the top level event
frequency can be determined using Boolean Algebra and Minimal Cut Set
methods.

Page 61
Procedure
Steps to get the final Boolean equation:

1. Replace AND gates with the product of their inputs. TOP
IE1 = A.B
IE2 = C.D
2. Replace OR gates with the sum of their inputs.
TOP = IE1+IE2 IE1 IE2
= A.B+C.D
3. Continue this replacement until all intermediate event gates
have been replaced and only the basic events remain in the A B C D
equation.
TOP = A.B+C.D

Page 62
Procedure
Minimal Cut Set theory:
 The fault tree consists of many levels of basic and intermediate events linked
together by AND and OR gates. Some basic events may appear in different
places of the fault tree.
 The minimal cut set analysis provides a new fault tree, logically equivalent to
the original, with an OR gate beneath the top event, whose inputs (bottom)are
minimal cut sets.
 Each minimal cut set is an AND gate with a set of basic event inputs necessary
and sufficient to cause the top event.

Page 63
Procedure
Boolean Algebra Reduction Example:

TOP = IE1 + IE2 TOP
= (A.B) + (A + IE3)
= A.B + A + (C.D.IE4)
IE1 IE2
= A.B + A + (C.D.D.B)
= A + A.B + B.C.D.D (D.D = D)
= A + A.B + B.C.D (A + A.B = A) A B A IE3
= A + B.C.D
C D IE4
So the minimal cut sets are:
CS1 = A
CS2 = B.C.D D B
meaning TOP event occurs if
either A occurs OR (B.C.D) occurs.

Page 64
Procedure
5. Perform corrections and make decisions:

 Application of Boolean Algebra and Minimal Cut Set theory will result in
identifying the basic events(A) and combination of basic events(B.C.D)
that have major influence on the TOP event.
 This will give clear insight on what needs to be attended and where
resources has to be put for problem solving.

Page 65
Advantage of FTA
Plus points of FTA:

 Deals well with parallel, redundant or alternative fault paths.
 Searches for possible causes of an end effect which may not have been
foreseen.
 The cut sets derived in FTA can give enormous insight into various ways top
event occurs.
 Very useful tool for focused analysis where analysis is required for one or two
major outcomes.

Page 66
Disadvantage of FTA
Minus points of FTA:

 Requires a separate fault tree for each top event and makes it difficult to
analyze complex systems.
 Fault trees developed by different individuals are usually different in structure,

producing different cut set elements and results.
 The same event may appear in different parts of the tree, leading to some
initial confusion.

Page 67
6. Evant Tree Analysis (ETA)
• Event Tree Analysis is analysis techniques to identify and evaluate the

sequence of events in a potential accident scenarios;
• ETA using visual logic tree structure known as the event tree (ET).
• The purpose of ETA is to determine whether an event will develop into a
serious accident or if such events can be controlled by the safety systems
and procedures applied in the design of the system;
• ETA can produce a wide range of possibilities of the output of an initiating
event, and can predict the likelihood of accidents for each of the output
analysis;

Page 68
Definitions at ETA Method
 Accident scenario
A series of events that ultimately lead to accidents. The sequence of events
beginning with the initial event (trigger) and is usually followed by one or
more other significant events that ultimately leads to undesirable end state
(an accident).
 Initiating event (IE)
Errors or undesirable events that start from the beginning of a series of
accidents. IE can result in a crash depends on the success or failure of the
implementation of hazard mitigation methods are designed into the
system.

Page 69
Definitions at ETA Method
 Pivotal Events (PE)

Important intermediary events that occur between the initial event and the
final crash. PE is a failed or successful incident of established safety
methods to prevent IE in order not to cause an accident. If the event is
important to work with a successful, was to stop the accident scenario and
called the incident ease. If the key events fails to work, then the accident
scenario is allowed to progress and called the event burdensome.
 Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
Comprehensive analysis methods, structured, and logical to identify and
evaluate the risks in complex technological systems. PRA objective is the
identification and assessment of detailed accident scenarios with quantitative
analysis.
 Event tree (ET)
Graphical model of a scenario accident that resulted in several outcomes and
the probability of the outcome occurred.

Page 70
ETA Diagram
Accident Scenario Concept
Event
Free Tree Concept
Powerpoint Templates
Page 71
ETA Methodology

Page 72
Example of ETA Structure
Chasing area crossing dan LBCV Terjadi
Initiating Event Ignition Outcomes Prob
LBCV area crossing kebocoran
Yes
(P=0,001) Gas Cloud = 0,001 x 0,01 x 0,001 x
Leak
disperses safety 0,001 = 1E-11
(P=0,001)
No (P=0,999) = 0,001 x 0,01 x 0,001 x

Yes Save 0,999 = 9,99E-09
(P=0,01)
Yes
(P=0,0005) Gas Cloud =0,001x0,01x0,999x0,00
Capture (P=0,999) disperses safety 05=4,995E-09
No
(P=0,9995) =0,001x0,01x0,999x0,99
Save 95=9,985E06
Loss of Containment of Yes
gas at location A (P=0,3)
Fire =0,001x0,99x0,3x0,3
(P=0,001) =0,0000891
Leak(P=0,3)
No (P=0,7) Gas Cloud =0,001x0,99x0,3x0,7

disperses safety =0,0002079
No (P=0,99) Yes
(P=0,8)
Capture(P=0,7) Fire =0,001x0,99x0,7x0,8 =
0,0005544
No (P=0,2) Gas Cloud =0,001x0,99x0,7x0,2 =

disperses safety 0,0001386

Page 73
Advantage & Disadvantage of ETA
Advantage of ETA: Disadvantage of ETA

1. Structured and rigorous approach; 1. ETA has only one initiating event
2. Most of the work can be computerized; (IE) ETA therefore some will be
necessary to evaluate the
3. Can be effectively carried out at various levels of
consequences of some earlier
the design;
events;
4. Visual models that show a causal relationship;
2. ETA can ignore dependencies when
5. Relatively easy to learn, do, and followed; modeling the system events;
6. Relationship modeling complex systems in a way 3. Success or partial failure is not
that is easy to understand; distinguished;
7. Combining hardware, software, environment, and 4. Requires an analyst is trained and
human interaction; experienced;
8. Allows assessment of probability; 5. Mistakes that are common in ETA
9. ETA method widely available software. method.

Page 74
7. Cause Consequence Analysis
Cause Consequence Analysis (CCA) is a blend of the Fault Tree

Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) technique.
Purpose
•To identify the basic causes and consequences of potential incidents.
Description
•Combine the inductive reasoning features of Event Tree Analysis with the
deductive reasoning features of Fault Tree Analysis.
•The CCA diagram displays the relationships between the incident outcomes
(consequences) and their basic causes.
•This technique is most commonly used when the failure logic of the analyzed
incidents is rather simple, since the graphical form, which combines both fault trees
and event trees on the same diagram, can become quite detailed.
Type of Results
•A CCA generates diagrams portraying incident sequences and qualitative
descriptions of potential incident outcomes.
Page 75
7. Cause Consequence Analysis
• Requires knowledge of the following data and information sources:
• knowledge of component failures or process upsets that could cause
incident.,
• Knowledge of safety systems or emergency procedures that can influence
the outcome of an incident, and
• Knowledge of the potential impacts of all of these failures.
• A CCA is best performed by a small team (2 to 4 people) with a combined range
of experience. One team member should be experienced in CCA (or FTA and
ETA), while the remaining members should have experience with design and
operation of the system included in the analysis.
Time estimates for using CCA technique

Model Qualitative
Scope Preparation* Documentation*
Construction Evaluation
Small System 1 to 2 days 1 to 3 days 1 to 3 days 3 to 5 days
Large System 4 to 6 days 1 to 2 weeks 1 to 2 weeks 3 to 5 weeks

Page 76
CCA Analysis Procedure
Selecting an event
to be evaluated
Identifying safeguards and developing

event sequence paths
Developing the intermediate and safeguard

failure events to determine basic cause
Evaluating the incident sequence

minimal cut sets
Documenting the results

Page 77
Advantage & Disadvantage of CCA
The Advantage of CCA:

1. Can yield quantitative results
2. Analyze the causes and consequences of hazards
3. Can be used to test the type of damage with coverage (e.g.,
people, processes, hardware and software)
4. Explain the logic of the sequence of events
The Disadvantage of CCA:

1. Consuming a time and cost for complex systems
2. Testing should be performed with a high level of expertise or an
error will be generated
3. There is a possibility Initial be neglected Event

Page 78
8. Bow-Tie Analysis
• Analisis bowtie (dasi kupu-kupu) adalah metode diagramatis untuk menggambarkan

dan menganalisis jalur suatu risiko dari penyebab hingga dampaknya.
• Metode ini sering dianggap sebagai kombinasi dari metode pohon kesalahan (FTA,
fault tree analysis) yang menganalisis penyebab peristiwa dengan metode pohon
peristiwa (ETA, event tree analysis) yang menganalisis dampak.
• Metode ini disebut bowtie karena diagram yang dihasilkan menyerupai dasi kupu-
kupu dengan penyebab dan dampak masing-masing menjadi dua sayap kiri kanan
yang mengapit peristiwa risiko di bagian tengah.
• Metode bowtie analisys ini lebih berfokus kepada penghambat (barrier) antara
penyebab dan risiko, serta antara risiko dan dampak.
• Bowtie analisys ini berkembang dari industri minyak dan gas bumi pada sekitar akhir
1970-an untuk manajemen K3 (health & safety).
• Royal Dutch Shell adalah perusahaan migas besar yang pertama diketahui
menerapkan sistem analisis ini dalam praktik bisnis mereka dalam sistem yang
disebut THESIS (The Health, Environment, Safety Information System).

Page 79
8. Bow-Tie Analysis
Proses analisis bowtie dapat diuraikan sebagai

berikut:
Gambarkan suatu peristiwa risiko tertentu
dalam bentuk lingkaran sebagai pusat diagram
(risk).
Daftarkan penyebab peristiwa di bagian
sebelah kiri (root cause). Hubungkan tiap
penyebab dengan peristiwa risiko di bagian
tengah.
Gambarkan penghambat (preventive control)
yang mencegah tiap-tiap penyebab tersebut
menimbulkan peristiwa risiko.
Daftarkan dampak peristiwa di bagian sebelah
kanan, misalnya (consequences). Hubungkan
tiap dampak dengan peristiwa risiko di bagian
tengah.
Gambarkan penghambat (preparedness
control) yang mengurangi besar tiap-tiap
dampak.

Page 80
Selection of Hazard Evaluation Techniques

Page 81
Criteria for Successful Hazard Evaluation
 The need for risk information has been met

 The results are of high quality and are easy for decision makers to use
 The study has been performed with the minimum resources needed to get
the job done.
Hazard evaluation specialist should be allowed some freedom to select

one or more proper methods for the job. Selecting the most
appropriate hazard evaluation method is a critical step in ensuring
the success a hazard evaluation.

Page 82
Factors Influencing the Selection of Hazard
Evaluation Techniques
• Motivation for the study The most important

factors that analyst
• Type of results needed consider
• Type of information available

• Characteristics of the analysis Represent conditions over
problem which the analyst typically
has no control
• Perceived risk associated with the
subject process or activity
• Resources availability and analyst Should not dominate the

selection of hazard
/ management preference evaluation techniques

Page 83
Criteria for Selecting Hazard Evaluating Techniques
Define motivation
 New review Recurrent review Revalidate previous review Redo previous review Special requirement
Determine type of result needed

 List of hazards List of problems/incidents Prioritization of results
 Hazard screening Action items Input for QRA
Determine type of result needed

 Materials Similar experience Existing process
 Chemistry Process flow diagram Procedures
 Inventory P&ID Operating history

Page 84
Examine characteristic of the problem

Complexity / size Type of process Type of operation
Simple / complex Chemical Electrical Fixed facility Batch
Small / large Physical Electronic Transportation Continuous
Mechanical Computer Permanent Semi batch
Biological Human Temporary
Situation / incident /
event of concern
Nature of hazard
Single failure Loss of function
 Toxicity Reactivity Dust explosibility
Multiple failure event
 Flammability Radioactivity Physical hazard
Simple loss off Process upset
 Explosivity Corrosivity Other
containment event Hardware
Software Procedure
Human

Page 85
Consider perceived risk and experience

Length of experience Incident experience Relevance of experience Perceived risk
 Long Current Non changes High
 Short Few Few changes Medium
 None Many Many changes Low
 Only with similar process None
Consider resources and preferences

 Availability of skilled personnel Time requirement Funding necessary Analyst / management preference
Select the technique

Page 86
Combined Hazard Reviews
Type Of Combined Hazard Reviews
Templating similar unit process: Takes the hazard evaluation completed for
one operation and uses it as the starting point for studying a similar unit
operation.
Hazard evaluation of generic technologies: Conduct a hazard evaluation on

one basic system, then apply the findings and recommendations from that
study to the generic design and consider the hazard evaluation to cover any
number of systems supplied to different customers.
Batch process and product families: Use the same basic equipment,
controls, and procedures to manufacture a whole range of similar products by
changing raw materials within a family of compounds (e.g., using the same
organic compound but with a different carbon chain length).

Page 87
Combined Hazard Reviews
Benefit of Combined Hazard Reviews

Saving in time and effort gained by reducing the level of effort needed to
complete all required hazard evaluation.  main benefit
Promoting consistency between hazard evaluations conducted on similar unit,
and giving incentive to focus a more detailed and in-depth review on the
standard process.  side benefit

Page 88
Thank You

Page 89

2-HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODS - Finish PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

2-HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODS - Finish PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

September 30, 2013 – October 1, 2013

Free Powerpoint Templates

Free Powerpoint Templates

Hazard: physical or chemical characteristic that has the

Free Powerpoint Templates

1.1.Analyzing Material Properties and Process Condition

2.2.Reviewing Organization and Industry Process Experience

3.3.Developing Interaction Matrixes

Free Powerpoint Templates

Typical Material Properties That Useful for Hazard Identification

- Consumer Injuries - Off-site contamination - Property damage

 Acute toxicity & Chronic  Physical properties  Reactivity

It is not sufficient to consider only the material properties when identifying

Some Activities to Gain Industry Process Experiences:

If the organization’s experience has been documented, it should be used

Free Powerpoint Templates

Free Powerpoint Templates

Interaction Matrix Technique:

Parameters commonly used in an interaction matrix

Free Powerpoint Templates

Free Powerpoint Templates

 Inherent – Eliminate the hazard by using non-hazardous materials and process

Inherently safer design strategies are considered more reliable

1. Define the required product. 6. Define physical , chemical, and toxic

Free Powerpoint Templates

Free Powerpoint Templates

1. Analyzing Material Properties and Process Condition

2. Reviewing Organization and Industry Process Experience

3. Developing Interaction Matrixes

Free Powerpoint Templates

Free Powerpoint Templates

Time estimates for using the PHA technique

1.Preparing for the review

* Team Leader Only

2.Performing the review

Free Powerpoint Templates

3.Documenting the Results

Area: Meeting date:

Typical format for a PHA worksheet

Free Powerpoint Templates

Time estimates for using Safety Review technique

Free Powerpoint Templates

1.Preparing for the review

Free Powerpoint Templates

2.Performing the review

Free Powerpoint Templates

3.Documenting the Results

Free Powerpoint Templates

Free Powerpoint Templates

Time estimates for using Relative Ranking technique

Free Powerpoint Templates

1.Preparing for the review

2.Performing the review

Free Powerpoint Templates

3.Documenting the Results

Free Powerpoint Templates

Checklist analysis is a systematic evaluation against pre-established criteria in

Free Powerpoint Templates

Time estimates for using Checklist Analysis technique

Free Powerpoint Templates

2.Performing the review

3.Documenting the Results

Free Powerpoint Templates