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Of Menace and Mimicry: The 2008 Beijing Olympics
Author(s): Jennifer Hubbert

Source: Modern China, Vol. 39, No. 4 (July 2013), pp. 408-437
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Article
Modem China
39(4) 408-437
Of Menace and ) The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/0097700413481764
Beijing Olympics mcx.sagepub.com
Jennifer Hubbert1
Abstract
This article examines the Olympic narratives of young, educated urbanités
in China to consider the 2008 Beijing Olympics' role as a "diagnostic event"
through which global conflicts and controversies coalesce and national
identities are constructed. It illustrates how students and young professionals
analyzed the Beijing Olympics to invoke discourses of similarity in the form
of Western economic development models and difference in the form of
essentialized tropes of Chinese culture to counter global images of China
as a threat to international well-being. Exploring theories of mimicry to
understand these appeals to similarity as a form of national value, this article
also reveals how students and young professionals in China recommended
the forms of culture manifest in the Olympics as an expression of difference
to question and reformulate hierarchies of global power.
Keywords
Beijing Olympics, China, mimicry, nationalism, culture
The Olympic games are a "badge of nationhood" and a "story of the country"
(Roche, 2000: 6, 135), a stage upon which host nations present themselves to
the global community. This is particularly true of developing countries whose
'Lewis & Clark College, Portland, OR, USA
Corresponding Author:
Jennifer Hubbert, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Department of East Asian
Studies, Lewis & Clark College, 0615 SW Palatine Hill Road, Box 60, Portland, OR 97219, USA.
Email: hubbert@lclark.edu
Hubbert 409
economic grow
chies of power,
utante ball" or
global embrace
The first two
offer a valuabl
New York Times
The cmshing def

from which the
chivalrous na by
once opposed. . .
conference, and
Japanese the fin
("Japanese Thro
Seoul's 1988 Oly

Times emphasiz
reflect the nat
toward democr
South Korea is m
land of Pork C
China's 2008 Ol
case its econom
(Hubbert, 2010
sort of attenti
this comparison
The 1964 Tokyo O

stage, and the Se
... sees the Olym
countries someti
2008: 18)
Rather than showcase China's economic prowess, he proceeded to enumer

ate its failings, its human rights violations and factory closures (which
ensured clean air when the International Olympic Committee visited during
the bid process), two among many. "The final gold medal," a New York
Times editorial argued, to similar effect as Kristof's commentary, could be
"safely awarded to China's Communist Party leadership," not for its tally of
awards, but for its "authoritarian image management" ("Beijing's Bad Faith
Olympics," 2008).
410 Modern China 39(4)
Media reports on the 2008 Olym

and coming-out party referen
Beijing, China was "cast repeat
light of milestones such as Beij
Olympics" (Schattle, 2008: 138)
even more than accession to the
means China can fully interact w
such accolades were matched an
erage that represented China as fo
supporting cast.2 Indicative of
Olympics, dubbed the "Beijing Bu
2008), commentary on the Oly
turned spectacularity and theatr
might.3 "They know this cold," N
America, speaking in a languag
"massive scope," and "intimidatio
"massive 1.3 billion population.
Matt Lauer responded, "Bob, a na
this and people at home are no
inspiring and perhaps a little int
earlier in the rehearsal to smile m
of it." The Economist described t
spectacular, but with touches of th

2,008 soldiers dressed in traditional
It sets an uncomfortably martial ton
who raise the Olympic flag do not
2008)
Noted film critic Roger Ebert analyzed the ceremony through a language of
individualism and collectivism. Whereas "our [Western] emphasis" on large
ceremonial productions is on individuals, China's was on "masses of per
formers, meticulously trained and coordinated. . . . The closest sight I have
seen to Friday night's spectacle [the 2008 opening ceremony]," he claimed
"is the sight of all those Germans marching wave upon wave before Hitler in
'Triumph of the Will'" (Ebert, 2008).4 Such reporting has concrete repercus
sions. Data that Peter Gries et al. collected and subsequently called "the
Olympic Effect," reveal that "American attitudes toward China hardened
over the course of just two and a half weeks of increased exposure to China
during the Olympic Games" and that preferences "for a tougher US China
policy all increased" (Gries et al., 2010: 226).
Hubbert 411
This article con

2010: 220; see
through which
world's most i
Olympics are co
of national pos
the extent of g
lar configurati
moment. Japan
ernization, but
than did China
the nation's eco
the West as a co
firmation of li
1988 Seoul Olym
state demonstr
growth (Han; 1
racy" (Tagsold
Beijing Olympic
Some even cred
(Yates, 1988; se
China's rapid d
Japan and Kore
host of the Oly
cussions of a Ch
omy" (Bremmer
1996), and the e
Rather than bei
seen to lay "sieg
the realities of
2010: 420).
Voices of the Nation
While global media play a tangible and highly influential role in constructing
images of the nation-state, other significant voices also contribute to these rep
resentations, providing alternative and sometimes conflicting accounts of
national value and status. Internationally, the educated elite assume a central
position in articulating public concepts of the nation (Boyer and Lomnitz, 2005).
This article turns to this sector of China's population, examining how young,
educated Chinese disputed the "China threat theory" (weixielun) through
invoking the 2008 Beijing Olym

Olympics would showcase the nat
that China's growing economic an
well-being of the global community
was the role of the Olympics open
splendors and its intended harmoni
Chinese youth protests over un
state have met globally with accu
New Nationalists Revealed," 200
fervor" (Zhao, th 2008: 48). Indeed
article layered on China reflected
the negotiations evident in the co
professionals' discussions about t
and contradictory process of iden
through one of the world's most na
more than the sum of its citizens' nationalist endeavors. While these citizens
promoted China as a modern cosmopolitan state, legitimate as a global power
for its similarity to Western, consumer-oriented forms of modernity, they also
promoted "traditional" forms of Chinese culture in a parallel claim to accept
ability.5 Likewise, while they endorsed particular cultural forms as an anti
dote to perceptions of a China threat, they were frequently critical when the
government engaged in similar promotions.
One of the most important aspects of the complex national identity con
struction of these students and professionals relates to their desires for China
to attain the same sort of consumer-based, free-market modernity Japan and
Korea had shown to the world through their Olympics decades earlier, and
for China's Olympics to demonstrate this modernity to the global public. To
understand both these desires for sameness and how they function to main
tain hierarchies of economic, political, and cultural influence, this article
turns to theories of mimicry. Mimicry, Homi Bhabha notes, is "one of the
most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge"
(1984: 126; see also Anderson, 1991). Emerging nations are "haunted,"
argues Benedict Anderson (1998), by the inevitability of evaluating and con
structing national value against established global standards for belonging
that privilege the dominant domestic practices and values of ascendant
nations (Dirlik, 2008; Ferguson, 2002; Modleski 1999; Munasinghe, 2002;
Rofel 2007). Haunted by this desire for what they do not have, less-powerful
nations mimic the practices of powerful nations to gain access to greater
authority and status.
Theories of mimicry suggest that emerging nations whose practices and
values begin to reach standards of global belonging are perceived as a threat
Hubbert 413
by those in po
through imitati
limited by a "c
economic/ritua
ability to obta
"culturalize" th
talism, gender
ble ("China's I
2010). Greater
social integrati
that maintains
ferences allow
ization pre but
but not quite"
The desires for
and young prof
to maintain hie
graphic examin
and contradict
ceived power is
ical hierarchy t
sameness of th
distinctiveness
historical mom
than backward
potential to un
power. This exa
the Olympics' p
public space fo
vides the publi
tion of China in
Methods
This article is based on ethnographic and textual research begun in July 2001
when I arrived in Beijing shortly after the International Olympic Committee
awarded the games to China. Ethnographic research methods included par
ticipant observation and focus group, semi-structured and unstructured inter
views with Chinese urban high school, college, and graduate students and
young professionals. These occurred in Kunming during the summer of 2006
and in Beijing during the summers of2007 and 2008.6 Participant-observation
414 Modem China 39(4)
research included visits to Olymp

museum exhibits, as well as atte
Beijing. In Kunming, I held focus
approximately thirty high school
main provincial university; one
teachers college; and one group o
university.7 Each focus group ses
able to meet with several membe
low-up interviews. In addition, I
several young professionals who
cal engineering to middle-school
included eight single-session, in
one to three hours with college s
multiple-session, in-depth interv
fessionals; and a one-hour focus
dents that continued through an
over dinner.8 During these semi-
view sessions, I began discussions
that were open-ended enough to
experience but closed-ended enou
ferent individuals. In this article
group interview sessions and wit
a full range of both representat
research in this article includes
documents such as official Olym
Chinese blogs, and newspaper ar
tual coding and examining textua
goal of understanding the geo
Olympic games. This cohort's ev
tive on the nature of China's rol
ously assertive and tentative self
and uncanny ways, China's rapidl
hierarchies of authority and posit
Revolution and Bound Feet
I had only been in China a few days in the summer of 2006 when I was side
lined with the question, "Why do you think we're a threat?" I had begun th
summer's research in Kunming, a medium-sized city in southwestern China
where I had lived and worked periodically since the mid-1980s. I contacted a
friend and colleague from the provincial university who introduced me to
Hubbert 415
severalof her g
students from
with five stude
from my apart
the most import
First, it establis
of national iden
importance of n
negating percep
My conversatio
Kunming, expl
Olympics educa
and secondary s
Olympics, a wh
the character f
looks a bit like
like an athlete."
and modern tec
cious color."
I asked Bi how she thought the Olympics were going to help China and
she responded that they would help Chinese communicate with foreigners,
acquire new languages, leam how to face crises (she referred to the bombings
at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics), and benefit China economically. "Lots of
people will be doing business in China, so this will help develop China." At
this point, Bi switched to how the Olympics would help the global commu
nity understand China. "The Olympics will help spread Chinese culture
around the world and help people to understand Chinese culture and China.
This will help [the world] understand China more deeply."
Bi's words set off a flood of commentary from her fellow students who
appeared far less concerned about what China would gain from the Olympics
than what foreigners would leam about China. Xu Bingwen, a young gradu
ate student from a mral suburb, offered comments that are worth quoting at
length as their general objective and impressions were repeated often by my
informants over subsequent years.
In some foreigners' eyes, they think that China is a threat to the world. The
Olympics will help them to lessen this idea of threat and see that China has a
developed economy. Then they can understand Chinese culture and we can
understand each other. The Olympics will give the world a new view of China. So
many people have never been here before. They only know of China through the
media. This isn't the real China. What the foreigners see is all very negative, or
very exoticized, like all that stuff ab

Or they think that it's all about rev
I later followed up on this conv

Chuntao. "How" I asked, "were pe
after attending the Olympics?" as
When people get to Beijing for the

what China is. The traditional cultur
they come here isn't visible, for exam
see is that we are just like they ar
themselves. It's no different. The clothes we wear are the same. The cars we drive
are the same. Beijing has lots of expensive, imported cars; Beijing has lots of
skyscrapers, just like New York. At first glance people will just think it's just like
New York.
Huang's and Xu's protestations of similarity—to being developed and just

like New York—whose "truth" was to be visually experienced through the
Olympics, reflect a classic strategy of mimicry in which lesser powers imitate
the practices and values of greater powers in order to improve their status, to
claim the "rights of full membership" (Ferguson, 2002: 555) in a world in
which capitalist, economic prowess is one of the dominant standards for
belonging. As an erstwhile lesser player, whose citizens experienced decades
of material deprivation, China adopts the economic market practices and con
sumerist values of dominant nations, undergoes rapid economic expansion,
joins the World Trade Organization, bids successfully for the Olympic games,
and consequently joins the ranks of powerful, legitimate world leaders. In
fact, it was China's rapid market privatization and dramatic economic growth
that rendered the Beijing Olympic games both initially conceivable and ulti
mately achievable. By many indices, China is already a major "player at the
table" (Zoellick, 2005), a full participant in, as the Olympics slogan suggests,
the "One World, One Dream" of development defined by a nation's practices
of capital accumulation and expenditure, with little need to reassert its simi
larity for legitimacy.
Although Xu and Huang maintained that these games would allow China
to showcase its economic modernity as a marker of common cause, China's
attempts to improve its status through similarity have often been perceived as
a menace. China's economic "miracle," which blends market capitalism with
a single-party, state ideology of socialism, presents a challenge to the ideolo
gies of liberal democracy. If the "free choice" of liberal democracy is not a
prerequisite for market success, might a global public increasingly threatened
Hubbert 417
by economic r
and Alexei Yur
Socialism is n
authoritarianism
the conviction t
order that wou
Huang and X
through access
Such assertion
China. Studies
has emerged in
ism and globa
Nelson, 2000;
than mere exte
in which Chin
economy, desp
Their assertio
nomic growth
nuclear missil
driven free m
results of plan
Mimicry is ef
dards that sym
politically, eco
never quite a
tary made thi
Olympics to s
quite." China's
behavioral exp
trash disposal,
press, in tacit
respondent inq
field of saliva
Olympic event
pack? What if
able 'Beijing c
The visual rec
modernistic sk
struction rubb
carts, piled high with live chicke

advertising Prada, Rolex, and Bur
citizens wore Prada and Rolex, th
to queue properly, and ate scorp
2008). Through such taming, mem
"culturalized" (Ferguson, 2002: 5
that render the similarity of co
ment insufficient for full belongi
archy secure as disciplinary tools
The Color Red
During the summer I was in Kunming, I was invited to hold an Engl

language discussion of the Olympics—covered by the local media— with
class of juniors at the high school associated with the university where I liv
What began as a stilted English-language recitation of official represent
tions of the Olympics, quickly became—once the reporters departed—
lively, Chinese-language debate over the value of the Olympics and the leg
imacy of global representations of China. The change of tone was marked
the first post-media topic when a young man, Zhou Chanming, asked me
whether I thought China could produce "really smart people." Before I had
chance to answer, he followed with, "Then why hasn't it produced a Nob
Prize winner?" A sideways glance from the class teacher and giggles from h
fellow students failed to deter his questioning and Zhou spent the rest of t
afternoon, both during our group discussion and afterward when
approached me to continue the conversation, countering his fellow studen
and engaging me with sharp questions about my position and that of the West
I recount select segments of this conversation for what they reveal about t
important role of culture in these Olympic narratives, especially how it h
the potential to represent both national stagnation and national liberation.
was this latter possibility—the interpretation of Chinese culture as futu
oriented rather than backward—that marked the emerging role of "diff
ence" in shifting hierarchies of global power.
A discussion of the three official themes of the Beijing Olympics (the
Eligh-Technology Olympics, the Green Olympics, and the People's Olympic
launched our group conversation. The students quickly explained and move
on from the first two themes, and then spent considerable time discuss
what exactly defined the People's Olympics.12
The theme of the People's Olympics provides a good chance to show Chine
culture to the world, to make the world know about Chinese culture. It will also
Hubbert 419
bring other cult

dealof Chinese c
This is a symbol
Chinese culture
experience Chin
how Chinese peop
and elders. Chin
definitely has t
Beijing, they wil
At this point t
this mix of the
Beijing was an im
still lots of old,
of this is being t
won't like the old
will feel] they ar
modem convenie
of China.
When I asked L
"backwardness
People get these

They see all thes
Zhang Yimou ha
China. He shows
Li's comments
Zhang Yimou.
Zhang had also
closing ceremo
Prize, jumped in
know the cond
know the probl
Li responded,
Yes, but he exaggerates these things on purpose. He does this for a foreign
audience. He exoticizes the problem and then it seems that this is all there is of
China. Foreign audiences are looking for this. It's what they expect. When people
come here [for the Olympics], they will see a lot of modem things and this will
surprise people who are used to the Zhang Yimou representation of China.
As will be discussed later, discussi

turn after the opening ceremonies,
ones.A long conversation about the
from Kunming, included several s
and their representations of China.
Bird's Nest stadium in Beijing, exp
hideous," and the selection of a no
tects just don't understand our desi
the topic of Zhang Yimou to expres
It's great that there is a Chinese dire

people in the ceremony will be Chinese
of Chinese characteristics, like taiji,
practices . .. that can show the world
She paused at this point, however,
Well, Zhang Yimou was not a good cho

something.... The images are very m
films are not so popular here. ... He
early films revealed the ugly aspect of
this was the only aspect of China th
very shallow representation of China.
never represented. The films should
Daoism. Visually [in the films], China
Terra Cotta Warriors. This is made-u
He needs to show a more complete pic
his films are that China is very back
they are very narrow minded. Lots of
to show the ugly sides of China, to
foreign movie awards.
Zhang Yimou's films are known in

tations of Chinese culture—abunda
quets, mystical rites, and multigen
the high school students noted abo
in contrast, Zhang's brilliant scarlet
of suicidal concubines (in Raise the
ian regimes (in Red Sorghum). Wh
represent the care and respect acc
Zhang Yimou films they are recast
tyrannical, and authoritarian (as in
Hubbert 421
These students
cultural symb
directly into cl
ket, in which th
stagnation and
(Dirlik, 1997;
how the cultur
calls "metonym
tions of identit
ingly difficu
skyscrapers mig
Mimicry's abili
ation of essenti
However, these
contemporary
tions about thr
marked by an
(Jacques, 2009;
experiences an
ing nations aro
2007). As more
tions such as th
to China to bo
out" of the Oly
this bypassing
may no longer
rather than lac
"modernity—n
Although the
complementari
gan, "New Bei
world order in
hegemons prov
addition to con
and skyscraper
professionals
Olympics were
the success of China's marketization but also "how China is different from
the world. This is the biggest fortune China can give to the world."
The 2008 opening ceremonies were replete with the symbolic aesthetic
for which Zhang's earlier productions were renowned—brilliant colors,
ancient drams, traditional ink p

Wall dominating the stage. A sp
visual display, the "brilliantly
attracted 'gee-whiz' coverage by
2008). Yet, such praise was rarely
event. At the same time as this
phy of lights, music and actors [
2008), it also posed the drummer
to this article, as "authoritarian
cle to Hitler's grand moments of
Alternatively, media frequently b
New York Times coverage, descri
works, lavish spectacle and a c
tional good will" (Yardley, 2008),
and "tightening security clampdo
code, as Rey Chow reminds us,
20). Such representations perpet
tions of symbolic culture with
"essential" nature.
In contrast, the students and young professionals discussed here posited
that the reappearance of such cultural attributes within a new geopolitical
context was an occasion for celebration rather than censure. Faced with pro
testations to similarity that met with global indifference and even hostility,
and with representations of Chinese culture as stagnant and potentially
destructive, these individuals offered the global spectacle of the ceremonies
as a space for reassessment and praise for difference. When I asked Fang
Meizhen, a graduate student in sports sociology who volunteered at the
Olympic games, why she changed her mind about director Zhang Yimou and
his presentations of Chinese culture, she responded,
In the 2008 Olympics ceremony, under Zhang's direction, we impressed the whole
world. It absolutely met the needs of the Chinese. We showed our nation's charms
and were proud of them. I guess that's why we changed our minds after the great
ceremony.
Wang Baojia, a communications major in Beijing, spoke at length and

with conviction about the positive role the Olympics would play in represent
ing China to the world, repeatedly stressing how the 2008 opening ceremony
was an encouraging move in the right direction.14 One of the many who had
earlier expressed dissatisfaction with the artistic endeavors of Zhang Yimou,
he explained his change of heart:
Hubbert 423
To be honest, I d
I thought the pe
parts of the open
particularly the
zither. . . . The
goal. . . wasn't a
China's culture a
Culture for W
tity, but a live
contexts and t
same symbols
ized, and "not
chance at equiv
Zhang Yimou
changing conte
fetishized and
symbol for the
that of a cultu
Chinese threat.
One of the thing

China has a grea
known image, is
Rather, China h
making friends w
they would hav
believe in this "
growing more p
Whoever doesn't
Harmony:
Slogan?
Many of the themes and symbols of cultural difference offered by these stu
dents and young professionals as antidotes to perceptions of Chinese threat
were articulated in an essentialized language that reflects what Geremie
Barmé felicitously calls "History Channel-friendly" Chinese culture (2008).
History Channel-friendly cultural difference is defined by a range of behav
ioral traits and symbolic entrapments as typically "Chinese," including the
familiar trope of "Asian values" and the ubiquitous and customary array of
dragons and pandas on glossy Western travel brochures advertising "Exotic
Asia" (see Chow, 1995; Ong 1997;

and superficial nature of such pr
tle about the content of Chinese
day experience. However, the tac
antidote to threat speaks volume
position as a socialist market eco
not the definitional task of cultu
and young professionals instrum
image as threat and what role cul
mediate hierarchies of power. Th
event with global scope, was to o
ence China as a peaceful, respe
advanced weaponry, communis
China's economic growth and its
the possibilities for the disruptio
viduals offered Chinese culture as a "harmonious" alternative.
I encase the word harmonious in quotation marks on purpose, for more
than any other cultural trait, references to Confucian notions of harmony and
harmonious society were evoked to explain how China was not a threat to the
international community. As Wang Baojia claimed above, foreigners will
consider China a threat to their power unless they comprehend the impor
tance of harmony in defining Chinese culture. Harmony as a cultural trait was
seen not only as prescriptive, as a metaphor for China, but also as productive,
through its perceived ability to offer the world a model for peaceful develop
ment and global relations (Guo and Guo, 2008). Yet, harmony was central to
these Olympics narratives not only because of the ubiquity with which it was
posited as a threat-mitigating cultural principle. Indeed, how students and
young professionals critically assessed the larger official discourse of har
mony was equally essential to how they invoked harmony as a cultural trait
in their effort to undermine global representations of China as a threatening
nation of authoritarian, communist difference.
This concept of harmonious society is part of a widespread campaign
introduced by President Hu Jintao in late 2004. Seemingly prompted by
China's widening income gap and the consequent potential for domestic
social instability (Guo and Guo, 2008; Solé-Farràs, 2008), harmonious soci
ety has also been used to describe strategies behind China's international
relations (Alden and Hughes, 2009; Hubbert, forthcoming [2014]; Callahan,
2004), and educational and environmental policies (Brownell, 2009b; Liao,
2007), to name a few of its potential applications. Representations of har
mony took center stage at the Beijing Olympics: official materials promoted
harmony as the "core and soul" of the games and the torch relay sported the
Hubbert 425
title "Journey
times during t
series of rising
able type. A gr
gan itself was a
Theslogan "One
great unity: "Th
seeks uniformit
but keep the dive
Harmony was
in Beijing in 2
department th
translation pro
and after disc
Olympics. Harm
pointed out,
Honestly, they talk about all this harmony, and the Olympics Charter talks about
world peace, but really, you have to admit that [the Olympics] are all about
competition. [Harmony] is really just a government slogan. What it does is to
make jobs because the government comes up with these slogans and then hires all
these researchers to figure out what to do with it.
Sun's cynicism about harmony was common. As a graduate student at the

same university explained to me, "Really, Hu Jintao brought it [the concept
of harmony] up in a speech and it's all over the newspapers so everyone feels
they have to talk about it, to give him face." However, as Sun and I continued
our discussion about harmony within the context of the Olympics, he also
offered an alternative interpretation. This second perspective reflected Wang
Baojia's outlook on harmony's importance as a representation of China, turn
ing mimicry's disempowering culturalizing practice on its head.
China does have this philosophical tradition about harmony, about people being in
harmony with each other and the environment. This really will be the biggest
effect of the Olympics. People are going to come here and see what an incredibly
hospitable people we are, how friendly and courteous. We really do value harmony.
This is the most important part of Chinese culture.
Promotional slogans from government campaigns such as the harmony

one often lead to cynical commentary in China (and elsewhere). Sun's cynicism
about harmony as a cultural trait

Chinese culture, reflects insight
Chinese state and the potential f
this cynicism, slogans such as "
become part of public culture, th
"public opinion is formed, nat
image is set apart" (Brownell, 19
such linguistic "protests" as som
per se, we may also consider how
ceptions of China. Confucian no
reflecting classic Weberian argu
order and hierarchy as a barrier
dents and professionals offered h
refute negative perceptions of C
bers of a cosmopolitan cohort of
their government and consequ
among modern states.
It is important for the specific
mentators were college-bound hig
university students, graduate st
educated elite of the Deng Xiaopin
have been far less disenfranchis
cohorts. Their cynical comment
crete political critiques and more
national cohort of modern citizens free to raise concerns about the nation-state.
When Fang Meizhen criticized Zhang Yimou's films, she was not critical of
what she called his "cultural consciousness," his willingness to address
China's "common social problems." "If we deny this history, we betray our
history." What did make her uneasy was his spreading the "ugly side ... all
over the world." However, even though she was not entirely comfortable with
publicizing the "ugly" of China, she and her cohort were also aware that such
"willingness" marks a form of global belonging. Their critical commentary
permits them to demonstrate that China, often characterized outside its bor
ders as a threatening communist nation of censorship and authoritarian
oppression, in fact permits its citizens to voice some dissent without fear of
retaliation. As Fang explained,
People in the West, governments in the West, seem to view China as a threat. Now
they will come here [for the Olympics] and see that we are in general a very
friendly people, that we are not a threat. . . . We can now speak very openly about
politics [emphasis added].18
Hubbert 427
Harmony, onc
rematerializes w
students and y
ference), on dis
rise correlates w
Second, and in
emerged as evi
global communi
thus had the th
censuring the s
to permit criti
example of wh
performance of
familiar, a "vol
dict that has b
2002: 115).19
Conclusion
The 2008 Beijing Olympics were a monumental emblem of contemporary

China's emergence as a major player in the global order of nation-states.
Although the Olympics function as a platform for both international recogni
tion and domestic splendor, the content of the accompanying narratives—of
both domestic citizens and global media—reveals much about how the plat
form of this diagnostic event is embedded within conflicting hierarchies of
power. That the Olympics narratives of students and young Chinese profes
sionals simultaneously invoked and revoked historically Western models of
economic modernity, essentialized tropes of Chinese culture, and official dis
course suggests that the Olympics as a platform for the constitution of national
identity is not a seamless, taken-for-granted one. The narratives in this article
reveal the tensions and ambiguities of China's position on the global stage. On
the one hand, they reflect how China's rapid economic growth and penetration
into the world capitalist market, in combination with its continued rule by the
Communist Party, is perceived to threaten Western liberal democracy and
undermine current global hierarchies of power. On the other hand, these nar
ratives also suggest the potential transformation of global positionality as
Cold War anti-communism increasingly confronts an ideological utilitarian
ism among nations seeking alternative models of development. The contested
nature of the 2008 Olympics opening ceremony and its controversial director
exemplified these tensions and ambiguities. For the individuals featured in
this article, Zhang Yimou served as an important cultural broker, one whose
earlier artistic productions were

about China's modernity, but wh
embody not only the nation's past
global geopolitical hierarchies
Nonetheless, the spectacularity of
tion for global viewers who, whil
appeal, also stressed its perceived
as if the song and dance routine r
The Olympics narratives of thes
how certain standards for globa
nant global practices and consequ
plays an aggressive role in reinfo
tion of the narratives and lived p
mimicry to comprehend fully co
power. When Huang Chuntao ass
find that Beijing is just like New
ceptions of a China threat, she w
incite desire for these global stan
voice to mimicry's fear that Bei
high school students offered dif
friendly cultural traits as an an
mindful of how mimicry funct
aware that such practices had b
"proof' of China's inability to ob
different cultural trait as repre
expressed an awareness of chang
tion that compulsory imitation m
to belonging and status. When Su
relations nonsense and central to
and similarity might coexist as c
tity and value that are recognized
their mindfulness also reminds us
very cultural essentialism that st
value and hierarchies of power.
Anna Tsing once noted that mar
the instability of social categ
1993).20 Might these Olympics n
static but mobile? That what is o
that what is in the center can b
complicated and mediated margi
destabilizing both the perceiv
Hubbert 429
perception tha
practice and v
how such mar
ceptions" (Cho
replication of
which citizen
drance to rath
Acknowledgm
Special thanks g
lier versions of
China for their i
Author's Note
Portions of this article were presented at University of Washington (2008), University

of Puget Sound (2006), Pacific Lutheran University (2010), the 2007 Forum on the
Humanities and Social Sciences and Beijing Olympic Games International Conference,
Beijing (2007), and the American Anthropological Association Annual Meeting in
San Jose, California (2008).
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article:
A travel grant from Lewis & Clark College for a research trip to China.
Notes
1. The upcoming 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro have already been marketed,
both domestically and internationally, as the venue for Brazil to "present its new
face to the world" (Brazil's Gold, 2010) and as "an affirmation of its rising global
importance" (Barrionuevo, 2009).
2. Jeffrey Wasserstrom divides depictions of China's Olympics into two categories.
The "pessimists," he argues, often compare the 2008 games to those of Nazi
Germany in 1936, making historical analogies to the Tiananmen Square massa
cre in 1989. The "optimists," in contrast, suggest that the Beijing Olympics mark
a potential turning point for a China that is on its road to "openness and freedom"
(2008: 166). I focus here on the "threat" angle as that was the most prominent
perception in the narratives of the individuals featured in this research.
3. Overone billion worldwide view

4. Opening ceremony coverage al
perceived counterfeit nature, for
minority costumes were Han and th
Motherland" was actually lip-synci
5. Zhao Litao and Tan Soon Heng (
the distrust" of the international com
6. I chose these two cities with the in
the host city, with those in a smal
had less access to the public educat
in perception and representation to
7. On the Chinese educational syst
8. A native-speaking research assis
low-up interviews with eight key in
9. See Brownell, 2009b, on the Oly
tifying characteristics of informan
10. On post-Mao perceptions of the "
Rofel, 1999 and 2007; Wang, 2003
11. These campaigns are part of a d
ity" (suzhi) of the population. The w
ple, Anagnost, 2004; Fong, 2007; H
and Yan, 2003.
12. The following quotation is an amalgamation of the comments of several differ
ent students who were addressing the issue all at the same time and with similar
language.
13. On Chinese discussions of Zhang Yimou's "self-orientalism," see Chu, 2008.
14. Geremie Barmé (2009) provides an excellent analysis of the opening ceremonies.
15. Arif Dirlik (2001: 3) suggests that these symbols represent "little more than
clichés" that render culture as a category of analysis essentially meaningless.
Barmé (2008) argues that the "artifice" of this History Channel-friendly Chinese
culture, engineered by the state, functions to gloss over the more unpalatable
forms of China's cultural history.
16. Pal Nyiri and Juan Zhang (2010: 27) argue that the overseas Chinese youth
nationalism surrounding the Olympics was intended to gamer the support of other
Chinese youth, not necessarily to support the government. Judith Farquhar and
Qicheng Zhang (2005: 303) also note that the "convergence of personal views
with state policies and official propaganda is neither surprising nor problematic."
On the contradictory nature of Chinese youth nationalism, see Fong, 2004a.
17. See, in particular, Weber, [1915] 1951. Aihwa Ong (1993) has written on the
topic in the contemporary era.
18. Couching political policy in terms of Confucian philosophy has other inter
esting effects. Although Hu Jintao's speeches call for a harmonious society
that features democracy, the rule of law, justice, amity, and vitality, much of
the specifics and ensuing discussions address policies for increased equitable
Hubbert 431
development.
ist principles,
return to Mao
"unnatural" an
when couched i
be considered a
by being incor
China as defin
the nation the
focused on "so
moting socialis
cepts of harm
2008; Wang, 2
My appreciation
ing me on this
ism (see the Co
Much of the lit
tive. For examp
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Author Biography
Jennifer Hubbert teaches anthropology and is Director of East Asian Studies at
Lewis & Clark College in Portland, Oregon. She is currently writing a book on
Chinese soft power policy and global citizenship.

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Of Menace and Mimicry: The 2008 Beijing Olympics

Author(s): Jennifer Hubbert

Mimicry: The 2008 sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Beijing Olympics mcx.sagepub.com

'Lewis & Clark College, Portland, OR, USA

The cmshing def

Seoul's 1988 Oly

The 1964 Tokyo O

Rather than showcase China's economic prowess, he proceeded to enumer

Media reports on the 2008 Olym

spectacular, but with touches of th

This article con

Voices of the Nation

invoking the 2008 Beijing Olym

research included visits to Olymp

Revolution and Bound Feet

very exoticized, like all that stuff ab

I later followed up on this conv

When people get to Beijing for the

Huang's and Xu's protestations of similarity—to being developed and just

carts, piled high with live chicke

The Color Red

During the summer I was in Kunming, I was invited to hold an Engl

bring other cult

People get these

As will be discussed later, discussi

It's great that there is a Chinese dire

She paused at this point, however,

Well, Zhang Yimou was not a good cho

Zhang Yimou's films are known in

ancient drams, traditional ink p

Wang Baojia, a communications major in Beijing, spoke at length and

One of the thing

Asia" (see Chow, 1995; Ong 1997;

Sun's cynicism about harmony was common. As a graduate student at the

Promotional slogans from government campaigns such as the harmony

about harmony as a cultural trait

The 2008 Beijing Olympics were a monumental emblem of contemporary

earlier artistic productions were

Portions of this article were presented at University of Washington (2008), University

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

3. Overone billion worldwide view

ALDEN, CHRIS and CHRISTOPHER HUGHES (2009) "Harmony and discord in

BESNIER, NIKO (2004) "Consumption

CALLAHAN, WILLIAM (2004) "Remembering the future—utopia, empire, and

CHOW, REY (19

GUO, SUJIAN and BAOGANG GUO

"Let the games b

OSNOS, EVAN (2008) "Angry youth: t

SU XIAOKANG and WANG LUXIANG (1988) Heshang (River elegy). Beijing:

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