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Mendoza V Comelec PDF
Mendoza V Comelec PDF
RESOLUTION
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J : p
"Sec. 43. Term of Office. — (a) The term of office of all local elective
officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years,
starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for
by law, except that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local
officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992.
"( b ) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected." 2
Madam President, I think the vote on continuous service of nine years for
the Members of the House of Representatives or the lifetime
limitation of three terms has a very serious implication. The
interpretation of Commissioner Davide in the case of the Members
of the House is that they are allowed three consecutive terms.
They can hibernate for one term and can have another three
terms.
I withdraw the motion, Madam President. We can handle this after lunch.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Can we have the proposals now, so that when we resume, we are ready
to vote on these?
"MR. ROMULO.
"MR. ROMULO.
Yes, Madam President.
"MR. DAVIDE.
We want a vote on that particular issue so the Committee can now
finalize the substitute proposal in the draft.
"MR. GUINGONA.
Madam President, as manifested by Commissioner Monsod, this is a very
important question. Maybe we could allow one speaker to explain
very briefly each side of the issue.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Can we have those speeches after lunch?
"MR. GUINGONA.
Yes, Madam President.
"THE PRESIDENT.
I would just like to have the proposals now so that during lunch break, at
least we can think about them, although I suppose we will have
some indigestion in the process. May we now have the proposal we
are going to speak about or vote on when we resume the session?
"MR. ROMULO.
Yes, the Garcia interpretation. Madam President.
"THE PRESIDENT.
We ask Commissioner Garcia to please state his interpretation.
"MR. GARCIA.
I propose that the local officials be reelected twice and that they be
prohibited from running again after a total term of nine years in
public service for the same office.
"THE PRESIDENT.
"THE PRESIDENT.
All right, for both Representatives and the local officials.
"MR. ROMULO.
I think the same question can be raised as to Senators.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Senators have one reelection.
"MR. RODRIGO.
Before we take our lunch break, may I ask Commissioner Garcia a
question on his proposal.
"Let us say, a mayor has served for nine years, can he, after that, run as
governor?
"MR. GARCIA.
He can run for other offices if he wishes.
"MR. RODRIGO.
As long as it is another office.
"THE PRESIDENT.
May we have the other proposal.
"MR. ROMULO.
Commissioner Davide would like to be recognized.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
"MR. DAVIDE.
The other proposal, Madam President, is: These officials who can seek
two reelections can serve for a total term of nine years, after that,
they cannot seek another reelection. They should rest for one term
or more, but it will not bar them from running again after the lapse
of the term following the expiration of the nine-year period.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"MR. ROMULO.
"MR. REGALADO.
May I just ask Commissioner Garcia for a clarification. Under Alternative
No. 1, which says: 'No further election after a total of three terms,'
the three terms referred to here need not have been served
consecutively?
"MR. GARCIA.
The Commissioner is correct, madam President.
"MR. REGALADO.
In other words, whether there were interruptions, whether the
interruption took over a span of 20 or 25 years, as long as he has
been in that office for a total of nine years , he is banned from
running for the same office.
"MR. GARCIA.
The Commissioner is right, madam President.
"MR. REGALADO.
Thank you.
"MR. ROMULO.
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I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
"MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I asked to
speak because in this draft Constitution, we are recognizing
people's power. We have said that now there is a new awareness, a
new kind of voter, a new kind of Filipino. And yet at the same time,
we are prescreening candidates among whom they will choose. We
are saying that this 48-member Constitutional Commission has
decreed that those who have served for a period of nine years are
barred from running for the same position.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Thank you, Madam President.
"I think the issue is on Alternative No. 1 which is: 'no further election after
a total of three terms.' I will just put into action what we have
approved this morning which is Scheme No. II, providing for a term
of three years for the Members of the Lower House of Congress
and a term of three years also for the local officials, from governor
down. We also approved this morning the alternative that the
Members of the Lower House shall have only two reelections,
meaning, one basic election plus two reelections will give them three
terms in the House; that the local officials shall have two
reelections, meaning, one basic election plus two reelections or
three terms. Let us compare that now to the number of years in
accordance with Scheme No. II. Under Scheme No. II, the Members
of the Lower House and the local officials shall serve for the firm
term of not three years but five years so that we can synchronize
elections after that for every three years. So the Representatives
have already a term of five years on the first term, and another of
six years. So they will serve for eleven years before they will be
disqualified under that first issue. I understand that the three terms
mentioned there are only for nine years. It is not so if we follow
what we approved this morning.
"In the case of the Senators, we approved that there is one reelection.
Under Scheme No. II, the Senators will have a term of five years for
the first election, and one reelection for a term of six years, which
will give them a total term of eleven years.
"Where does Alternative No. 1 stand now? May I ask the proponent
where it stands now? Is it for nine years or for two reelections as
we approved this morning? May I ask the proponent of Alternative
No. 1, Madam President.
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"MR. GARCIA.
I am sorry but I think there are two different questions here: for the term
of office of the Senators, it is a maximum of 12 years; for the
Representatives, it is a maximum of nine years.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
What happens now to what we approved this morning? We approved
Scheme No. II which provides a term of five years for the
Representatives.
"MR. GARCIA.
I am sorry again, but for the first election, the term of office will have to
be fixed by the Commission on Elections simply for adjustment
purposes because of the current term of the President, for
synchronization and for transitory purposes. But once it is
regularized, it will be different.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Is it a total of nine years ?
"MR. GARCIA.
Yes, it is still a total of nine years .
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Excluding those who were first elected under Scheme No. II?
"MR. GARCIA.
Proper adjustments will have to be made for the first election.
"MR. DE CASTRO.
Who will make the proper adjustments?
"MR. GARCIA.
"I would not speak for Batangas nor speak for Laguna, because their
people have the right to choose their own Representatives for a
term that they think is appropriate. We cannot speak for Sulu or
even for Cotabato because the situation is different. Maybe we will
have more leaders or maybe we will have only one of our faith and
our confidence. Why limit his total number of years of service to
nine years?" 4 (Emphasis provided)
If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbent's being
unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall
proceedings negates "one term" for purposes of applying the three-term limit, as
so intimated in Lonzanida, it stands to reason that the balance of the term
assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall election should not also be
held to be one term in reckoning the three-term limit. In both situations, neither
the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the elected local
official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official
following the recall election could be considered to have served a full three-year
term set by the Constitution.
This view is not inconsistent, but indeed in line, with the conclusion ultimately
reached in Socrates vs. Commission on Elections, 8 where the Court has
considered Hagedorn, following his three full terms of nine years, still qualified to
run in a recall election conducted about a year and a half after the most recent
regular local elections. A recall election term then, not being a full three-year
term, is not to be counted or used as a basis for disqualification whether it is held
prior or subsequent to the nine-year full three-term limit.
MENDOZA, J .:
In several cases 1 decided over the past four years, this Court held that the
application of this provision requires the concurrence of two elements: (1)
election in regular elections for three consecutive terms and (2) service for the
full terms, each consisting of three years, for which the local official was elected.
Thus, in the first case, Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, decided on September 3, 1998, this
Court held that a vice mayor, who had succeeded to the office of mayor of
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Pateros, Rizal, was qualified to run for the same position in three successive
regular elections without running afoul of the constitutional prohibition in
question.
The same ruling was made in Arcos v. COMELEC, decided on October 6, 1998:
Respondent, who as vice mayor of Legaspi City had become mayor by succession
on December 2, 1991 and had been elected to the same position in 1992 and
again in 1995, was qualified to run in 1998. Said the Court:
Indeed, on facts similar to those in the case at bar, this Court recently
held in Benjamin U. Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra, that the constitutional
provision which provides that "no (elective) local official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms in the same position" contemplates
instances where an individual has not only fully served three consecutive
terms in the same elective local office but has also been elected to the
same position for the same number of times.
The ruling in Borja, Jr. was applied to a recall election in Lonzanida v. COMELEC,
decided on July 28, 1999, in which it was held that a municipal mayor, who had
been elected for three consecutive terms and whose third election had been
declared void, was qualified to run for the same position in the immediately
succeeding election. This was because said local official had not previously been
elected in three successive elections nor had he served for three consecutive
terms.
The principle of Borja, Jr. was again applied in the recent case of Adormeo v.
COMELEC, decided on February 4, 2002. This Court held that a municipal mayor,
who had twice been elected to the same position and had lost in his bid for a
third term, was qualified to run in the immediately succeeding election even if in
the third term he had served in the same position by virtue of a recall election.
It will thus be seen that, in all the cases, this Court did not count the term during
which succession took place or a recall election was held in determining whether
an elective local official had served for more than three consecutive terms.
However, on November 12, 2002, this Court, while citing Borja, Jr. and its
progenies — Arcos, Lonzanida and Adormeo — in effect overruled these
precedents in Socrates v. COMELEC 2 by ruling that a city mayor, who had served
for three consecutive terms, was qualified to run in a recall election held in the
following term because of an "interruption" in the service caused by the holding
of a regular election. The Court said:
One cannot stitch together Hagedorn's previous three-terms with his
new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term
because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June
30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or
consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as mayor. [pp. 18-19] [A]
necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the
start of a new term following the interruption. An official elected in recall
election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired
term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. [p.
23] [Were it] otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term
can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising the recall
term plus the regular three full terms. [p. 24] 3
Indeed, it is error to think that, because a regular election is held between the
end of three terms and the term during which a recall election is held, there
occurs thereby "an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term
for which [the official concerned] was elected" within the meaning of Art. X, § 8.
But it is "the continuity of the service for the full term" — not "the continuity of
a full term" — that is in question. We are talking here of "interruption in the
continuity of service," which can only refer to service which is being rendered.
For after service for three consecutive terms has been rendered there can be no
more interruption of service. The local official concerned, who has served for
three consecutive terms, can run in a recall election not because of any break in
his service but because the term to which he is elected is less than three years.
If, then, as in Socrates v. COMELEC, an elective local official can be elected in a
recall election even if he has already previously served for three consecutive
terms, 4 it should make no difference in principle that the recall election in which
he is elected comes at the beginning of a series of three terms. The term for
which he is elected is likewise less than three years and, therefore, it should
likewise not be counted in determining how many consecutive terms he has
served in all.
To summarize, in applying the three-term limit, the term during which succession
takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted, either with the
three consecutive terms preceding, or with the three consecutive terms
succeeding, such term. It should not be counted not because of any interruption
in the continuity of the service but because such term is for less than three
years. Hence, the unexpired portion of a term, whether filled by succession or by
election in a recall, cannot be considered one full term. In the case at bar, since
respondent Roman's first election in 1993 was in consequence of a recall and not
a regular election and he had not fully served three consecutive terms when he
was elected on May 14, 2001, I submit with respect that his last election is valid.
Indeed, the cases of Borja, Jr. and Arcos are on all fours with the instant case. In
these cases it was held that a vice mayor who had succeeded to the office of
mayor can serve for three more consecutive terms as such if elected after the
expiration of the term during which he had served by succession. There is no
reason why the result should be different simply because in this case respondent
became governor by virtue of election in a recall, rather than by succession,
before winning in three consecutive regular elections. Succession and recall
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election are alike. They are both modes of succession for the purpose of
automatically filling permanent vacancies in elective local offices to prevent a
hiatus in office. 5 The local official who succeeds to the office or is elected in a
recall simply finishes the term of his predecessor.
This is in contrast to a special election called to fill a vacancy either in the House
of Representatives or in the Senate. There the person elected wins a term even
though it is for less than three years (in the case of Representatives) or six years
(in the case of Senators) because, between the time the vacancy occurs and a
special election is held, there is an appreciable period during which the vacancy
exists so that the unexpired portion of the term is considered one term. There is
no automatic succession in such case. It is even possible that the vacancy will not
be filled because no special election has been called.
It may be that Borja, Jr.'s interpretation of the three-term limit can result in
giving an elective local official a longer tenure than the equivalent of three
consecutive terms, which is nine years. But so let it be. The Constitution does not
really prohibit service for more than three terms if continuity of service is
interrupted by means other than the voluntary renunciation of the incumbent.
To hold otherwise would result in limiting an elective local official's term to less
than three years, which is contrary to the Constitution. For as pointed out in
Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, the three-term limit in Art. X, § 8 of the Constitution
actually embodies two complementary and reinforcing ideas:
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term,
derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of
a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from
the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish
to govern them be preserved. [I]ndeed, a fundamental tenet of
representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose
those whom they please to govern them [U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 US. 729, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995)]. To bar the election of a
local official because he has already served three terms, although the first
as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would
therefore be to violate this principle. 6
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, I vote to dismiss the petition in this case and to
declare the election on May 14, 2001 of respondent Leonardo B. Roman, as
governor of Bataan, valid.
PANGANIBAN, J .:
"In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular
sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms . . .
The real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate
development of the social edifice." 1
The private respondent in Borja was a vice mayor who succeeded to the office of
mayor of Pateros upon the death of the incumbent. After serving the latter's
unexpired term of two years and ten months, the former ran for and was elected
mayor for three more terms of three years each. This Court ruled that he was
not disqualified to serve the last term. The three-term rule did not apply to him,
because his first term (his succession to the mayoralty) was not by virtue of an
election but by operation of law.
By not disqualifying the said respondent, the Court permitted him to hold the
same office for an uninterrupted period totaling eleven years and ten months.
How different is that case from the present one in which Respondent Roman, if
allowed to serve out his current term, would be in office for a continuous period
o f only ten years? To argue and differentiate — that in one case there was
succession to office and in the other a recall election — would be to quibble over
an apparent distinction that does not make a real difference.
Petitioners opine that in establishing term limits, the Constitution intended to
prevent a local official from holding the same office for a period longer than three
consecutive terms or a total of nine years . Note, however, that whether the
initial accession to office was by virtue of succession/operation of law or by virtue
of a recall election, the same evil (monopoly of political power) might still arise
at some point down the road.
In other words, the manner in which local officials first got into office is of no
moment, whether or not they will later proceed to monopolize political power
and perpetuate themselves in office. More plainly, one unusual mode of entry
into public office would be simplistically favored over another if one official is
allowed to serve more than three terms, on the ground that the excess was by
virtue of a legal succession to a vacant office; and to disallow another from so
serving, simply because the excess was by reason of a recall election. Specifically,
assumption of office by operation of law would be favored over that by recall
election.
More significantly and disturbingly, such line of reasoning puts a higher premium
on an accidental or opportunistic succession to office (for example, through the
death of the incumbent local official) over a collective and earnest expression of
the people's sovereign will (as through a recall election).
I cannot agree that a recall term must be deemed one full term for purposes of
computing the number of successive terms allowed. Under this theory,
Respondent Roman is disqualified from running for reelection in 2001 and thus
ineligible to serve out his current term of office. This would in effect cut short his
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service to less than nine years (the recall term of one year plus two terms of 3
years each and the expired portion of his current term) and thereby effectively
shortchange his constituents. It would in effect uphold legalism over the
people's will, the exercise of which was with the voters' expectation that
respondent would serve out his entire three-year term from 2001 to 2004.
The Borja Doctrine Should Apply Equally to Succession and Recall
I cannot help but ask how reducing the stay of Respondent Roman in office could
possibly make more sense than allowing him to hold on for one year more than
the nine years normally accorded to local officials. And here, the rationale in
Borja seems to be altogether apropos: "To consider C in the third case to have
served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for
reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right
of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. . . . To consider C as
eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the
Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the
evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken
that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed." 8
Still on the concept of the recall term being one term , as mentioned earlier, the
dissenters place much weight on the opinion expressed by then Commissioner
Davide during the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on term limits.
Nevertheless and with due respect, I see nothing in that exchange between him
and Commissioner Suarez that would in any manner support the claim that the
recall term of an elective local official must be treated as one term, in the same
manner as the term of office of a senator or a congressman who wins in a special
election is deemed as such.
I have likewise scoured Borja, but found nothing that would support such a
hypothesis. Indeed, the only reason the exchange between the two respected
commissioners was quoted in that case was to highlight the difference between
the situation of a vice mayor (an elective local official), who succeeds to the
mayorship by operation of law; and that of a congressman, who is elected to fill a
vacancy. In the latter instance, there is reason to regard the service of the
unexpired term as the congressman's first term for purposes of determining term
limits. But that is neither here nor there, because that particular pronouncement
in Borja does not in any way shed light on the issue in this case, which involves a
recall term.
Socrates' Pronouncement on Recall Was Merely an Obiter
This Court's pronouncement in Socrates is of no avail either. The analysis
therein, as quoted earlier, cannot be regarded as controlling insofar as the
instant case is concerned. In that case, the main issue was whether a recall
election that took place after the fourth consecutive election had taken place was
to be deemed an "immediate reelection" to a fourth term. The Court answered
"No," there was "no immediate reelection after three consecutive terms." May I
quote below the rationale it articulated in that Decision:
"Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a
fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as
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long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term: A recall election midway in the term following the third
executive term is a subsequent election but not immediate reelection after
the third term." 9
Obviously then, the issues in Socrates did not include the question whether a
recall term should be considered one term for purposes of reckoning term limits.
Therefore, the Court's ratiocination and analysis that a recall term is one term
for purposes of counting the three-term limit may be regarded merely as an
obiter dictum.
Thus, I find no firm or sound jurisprudential basis for considering the recall term
of an elective local official as one term. Instead, I respectfully submit that, being
much less than the full term involved in the case of Respondent Roman, it should
not be counted as one term for purposes of reckoning the number of successive
terms allowed; and that, consequently, he should not be considered as being in
breach of the three-term limit.
A Proper Balancing of Policies Is Needed
Borja stressed the need to strike a balance between enforcing the policy of
preventing the establishment of political dynasties and the policy of enhancing
the freedom of choice of the people. And as held in Socrates, the concept of term
limits is, by its very nature, a restraint on the sovereign will of the people to
freely elect whomsoever they please. Term limits, though ensconced in the
Constitution, must thus be construed delicately to prevent them from unduly
subverting the manifest sovereign will of the electorate.
I submit that term limits should refer and strictly apply to the normal or
expected duration of electoral terms, barring unexpected or unforeseen
contingencies such as acts of nature or political upheavals as in this case. As
reiterated in Borja, the framers of the Constitution — in their deliberations on
Article X, Section 8 — "were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power."
The Ponencia Would Result in Massive Disenfranchisement
Moreover, I believe that applying the holding in Socrates to the instant case,
thereby causing the unceremonious removal of the hapless governor from office,
would be an unwarranted "reaching back." It would be a retroactive and
inappropriate application of a jural doctrine to a situation that has never clearly
and unmistakably violated any statutory or constitutional prohibition.
Furthermore, to paraphrase Aquino v. Comelec, 10 a retroactive application of
Socrates would lead to a massive disenfranchisement of tens of thousands of
voters who, through no fault of theirs, voted in favor of candidates whom they
believed (and who themselves believed that they) could be validly voted for.
Such an unhappy result, triggered by a legal technicality, would go against the
guiding principle in election law: that in every election, the people's choice is the
paramount consideration; and their expressed will must, at all times, be given
effect. 11 Of similar import is our holding in Frivaldo v. Comelec, 12 reiterated in
Torayno Sr. v. Comelec. 13 We held therein that our electoral laws must be
liberally and equitably construed in order "to give fullest effect to the manifest
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will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give
life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. In
other words, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the
sovereign will." 14
Obscure Legalisms Must Yield to Popular Sovereignty
Needless to say, after having won the last election by an overwhelming margin,
15 Mr. Roman is unarguably the choice of the voters. This Court cannot simply
turn a deaf ear to, much less stifle, the people's voice. Elections and the contests
attendant thereto involve public interest of the highest priority. Thus,
technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand, if they
constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in
the choice of their elective officials.
Verily, the resolution of this case hinges on a question of legal philosophy. Should
this Court interpret election laws literally in favor of obscure legalisms? Or
liberally in favor of upholding popular sovereignty? As held in Frivaldo:
"At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and
perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal
or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate
purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context
of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters'
obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon
the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny
and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience." 16
In conformity with the legal philosophy set forth above, I should point out that
petitioners have not discharged their burden. They have not clearly
demonstrated that the ineligibility of respondent governor is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding it and thereby
giving effect to the people's will would ultimately be more prejudicial to the
democratic fundamentals and juristic traditions of our country.
I n Socrates, I voted with the majority, not so much because of the strict legal
rationalization that a recall election midway to the fourth term was not an
"immediate election" after three consecutive terms. Rather, I did so because the
ponencia therein upheld the clear choice of the people: Mr. Edward Hagedorn. I
could not in conscience vote to place in office Petitioner Dennis Socrates, who had
clearly been defeated in the then just concluded recall election. Verily, this Court
did not inflict a rejected candidate upon the people of Puerto Princesa, for such
action would have constituted "judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault"
upon its own conscience.
By the same token, to unseat herein Respondent Leonardo B. Roman, the sitting
governor of Bataan, would constitute an unwelcome judicial imposition upon the
people. To do so would be to remove the one who has won the clear popular
mandate in an honest and credible election and to install in his place, by judicial
fiat, an obscure candidate who has been absolutely rejected by the electorate, or
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another official (the vice governor) whom nobody voted for governor.
At bottom, tortuous and contentious legal arguments can be made in favor of
either (1) granting or (2) dismissing the herein Petition. In what would otherwise
be a legal dead heat arising from two conflicting legal positions of almost equal
weight, I believe that, in an election contest, the scales of justice should be tilted
in favor of the people's overwhelming choice. Indeed, as earlier alluded to in the
quotation at the beginning of this Opinion, "in applying election laws, it would be
far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but
little understood legalisms." Finally, in a democracy, people should — as much as
legally possible — be governed by leaders freely chosen by them during credible
elections.
WHEREFORE, in this instance, I choose to uphold popular sovereignty over
complex and contentious legalisms and thus vote to DISMISS the Petition.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
On May 25, 2001, petitioners Melanio Mendoza and Mario Ibarra, residents and
registered voters of Tenejero, Balanga, Bataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a
petition for quo warranto, 3 docketed as EPC No. 2001-5. Petitioners alleged that
respondent Roman has served as governor of Bataan for three (3) consecutive
t erm s counted from his assumption of office by virtue of the 1993 recall
election. As such, he is disqualified/ineligible to seek a fourth term for the same
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position in 2001, as he would violate the three-term limit for local elective
positions. Petitioners thus prayed that respondent Roman's proclamation as the
elected governor of Bataan in the 2001 elections be nullified.
In a Resolution dated August 15, 2001, the COMELEC dismissed petitioners'
petition for quo warranto on the ground that respondent Roman has not
exceeded the three-term limit because his service by virtue of the 1993 recall
election cannot be counted as a full term and, therefore, should not be
considered in applying the three-term limit. The COMELEC's ruling reads in part:
". . . We again state, for the record, that the term of respondent (Roman)
from 1995—1998 was his second full term if reckoned from his first full
term from 1988-1992 and only for purposes of applying the three (3)-
term limit set forth by law. Hence, from the same reckoning point, the
third term was from 1998-2001. This was so because the 1993 recall
election was not counted as a full term and therefore, for purposes of the
three-term limit, was not included in the counting. It constituted an
interruption in the service of the full term of three (3) years which a local
elective official should, under the law, serve fully for purposes of counting
the term limit.
"In the present case, the reckoning point is the 1995—1998 term of
respondent, the 1995 elections being the first regular election from the
interruption caused by the recall elections of 1993. Applying this new time
frame for purposes of the 2001 elections, the first term of respondent
was from 1995—1998. The second consecutive term was from 1998
—2001 and the third term will commence from June 2001 to June 2004."
4 (emphasis added)
Undaunted, petitioners come to this Court via the present petition maintaining
that respondent Roman violated the three-term limit rule for local elective
officials when he ran for reelection as governor in the 2001 elections and,
therefore, his proclamation as such should be set aside.
On February 26, 2002, Congressman Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. of the second district of
Bataan filed a petition-in-intervention which was admitted by this Court in its
Resolution of March 19, 2002. 5 As a registered voter and Representative of his
district, he joins petitioners in questioning the eligibility of respondent Roman.
In his comment 6 on the petition, respondent Roman contends that he is eligible
to run in the May 14, 2001 elections "for the Office of Governor in the Province
of Bataan" since he did not serve the full 1992—1995 term; what he served was
only "the unexpired portion of Governor Enrique 'Tet' Garcia's 1992 to 1995
term." 7 In support of his contention respondent Roman cites Lonzanida vs.
Comelec 8 which held that the official concerned should have fully served three
consecutive terms in the same local government post for the three-term limit to
apply.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the petition to
declare respondent Roman's disqualification should be dismissed on the ground
that a recall election is not a regular election. 9 As such, service of an official
elected in a recall election should not be counted as a full term.
I find the petition meritorious.
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Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years an d no
such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected." (emphasis added)
This Court has further ruled in Claudio vs. Commission on Elections, 12 also
through Mr. Justice Mendoza, that "election" includes recall "by means of which
voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his
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replacement."
On the requirement that the official should have served three consecutive terms,
then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., now Chief Justice of this Court,
expressed the following opinion in answer to a query during the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution:
"Commissioner Suarez: For example, a special election is called for a
Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the
unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a
term, which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would
disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of
this provision on disqualification, Madam President?
"Commissioner Davide: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a
special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that
particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms
for the Members of the Lower House." 13 (emphasis added)
While the above discussion on term limits specifically refers to special elections
for Senators and Representatives, the same principle equally applies to a recall
term of local officials. The constitutional provision is explicit that "the term of
office of elective local officials, . . . shall be three years and no such officials shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms." In other words, the Constitution
limits the service of elective local officials to a total of nine consecutive years. To
exclude the service of such official who won the recall election would certainly
permit a circumvention of the purpose of the three-term rule, since he may hold
the same elective position longer than three consecutive terms, or more than the
maximum nine consecutive years, as in the case of respondent Roman. In the
recent case of Socrates vs. Comelec, 14 this Court en banc, speaking through Mr.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, ruled:
"This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional
Commission: . . . . Although the discussion referred to special elections
for Senators and Representatives of the House, the same principle applies
to a recall election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who
serves a recall term can serve for more than nine consecutive years
comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full terms. . . . ."
At this juncture, it bears stressing that the object of the three-term limit is to
forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local official
who intends to perpetuate himself in office. Another purpose is to broaden the
choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse
new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the
same office after serving nine (9) consecutive years. 15 It is in the light of these
objectives that this Court should interpret the constitutional proscription. 16 The
courts, in construing the Constitution, should consider the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied.
As shown earlier, respondent Roman served as governor of Bataan from 1986 up
to the present. To date, he has perpetuated himself in the said position for more
than sixteen years. Is this not precisely the vice that the framers of the
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Constitution intended to avert in prescribing the three-term limit rule? To say
that a recall term is not a full term is to provide a fertile ground for
circumventing the three-term limit rule. As in the construction of statutes, the
Constitution should be construed not so much according to the letter that killeth
but in line with the purpose for which it has been enacted. The Constitution is to
be given such construction as will advance its object, suppress or prevent the evil
it seeks to avoid, and secure the benefits intended. The interpretation of the
Constitution should be done with a view to realizing its fundamental objective.
17
This Court, just a month ago, emphatically declared in Socrates 18 that although
an official elected in a recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled
official, this "unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the
three-term limit." It went further in saying that a "local official who serves a
recall term should know that (such) term is in itself one term although less than
three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in
the recall election." It now boggles my mind why the majority has made a
complete turn-around and totally disregarded this significant pronouncement
which could have given life to the constitutional mandate.
In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between term and
tenure. Term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the
office as a matter of right. Upon the other hand, tenure represents the period
during which the incumbent actually holds office. Tenure may be shorter than
term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. 19 In the case of
herein respondent who was elected in a recall election, his tenure was only for
the remaining term of the recalled official, then Governor Garcia. Be that as it
may, his election is still for a particular term inasmuch as during the unserved
period of the recalled official, he has a claim to hold such office as a matter of
right. In short, his service for the remaining period is considered tenure for the
full term for which he was elected.
In fact, in Borja, 20 this Court, after citing the opinion of Father Joaquin G. Bernas
and Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then members of the Constitutional
Commission, made the categorical pronouncement that the unexpired portion of
the term is rightly counted as a full term, thus:
"Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas' comment on Art. VI, Section
7, which similarly bars members of the House of Representatives from
serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that 'if
one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another,
that unexpired term, no matter how short , will be considered one term
for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed
(Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution 637 [1996]).
Thus, although respondent only served the unexpired term of then Governor
(now Congressman) Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., the former's recall term as governor of
Bataan from 1994 to 1995 is rightly counted as his first term for purposes of
applying the three-term limit. This was immediately followed by his election to
the same position for three more consecutive terms, to wit: 1995 to 1998; 1998
to 2001; and 2001 to 2004. Considering that his recall term is his first term, his
reelections in the 1995 and the 1998 elections are his second and third terms,
respectively. Consequently, he is disqualified to run as governor in the 2001
elections, as that would already be his fourth consecutive term.
Respondent Roman cites Lonzanida vs. Comelec. 21 In this case, the two
requisites for the application of the three-term rule were absent so that the ban
against holding a further term did not apply to Lonzanida. To recall, Mayor
Lonzanida was ordered by the COMELEC to vacate his post on the ground that he
was not duly elected. Thus, his severance from office was involuntary and
constituted an interruption of the continuity of his service under the
Constitution 22 and the law. 23 His renunciation being involuntary, this Court
ruled that he could not be considered to have served a full term for the purpose
of applying the three-term rule. As can be seen, the factual backdrop and the
ratio decidendi of Lonzanida are not on all fours with the present case.
Respondent, therefore, cannot invoke this Court's ruling in Lonzanida.
In fine, I am fully convinced that respondent Roman is ineligible for the elective
position of governor of the province of Bataan.
The political system of our country is one of democratic and republican
government. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. Also,
in a republican government, these laws are decreed by the people through their
representatives and through them, the people dictate the qualifications as well
as the disqualifications for service in government positions. Respondent is clearly
disqualified to serve as governor of the Province of Bataan for 2001 to 2004 as
he has exceeded the allowable term limit for local elective officials. The will of a
majority or plurality of the voters of the province of Bataan should not be
considered to have cured such disqualification. To do so will seriously violate the
fundamental law itself. Simply put, the will of respondent Roman's constituency
should not prevail over the will of the entire Filipino people as expressed in the
Constitution.
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It is basic that the Constitution is the people's quintessential act of sovereignty,
embodying the principles upon which the State and the government are founded.
24 Having the status of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks for all the
people all the time, not just for the majority or for the minority at intermittent
times. Every constitution is a compact made by and among the citizens of a
State to govern themselves in a certain manner. 25 Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban himself, in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, 26 assured that "the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant
made by all the Filipinos to govern themselves. No group, however blessed, and
no sector, however distressed, is exempt from its compass."
Indeed, this is a sad day for me. Perhaps I will never understand why the
majority has allowed the will of respondent Roman's constituency to prevail over
the will of the entire Filipino people, thus completely disregarding the noble
purpose of the constitutional three-term limit rule.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the challenged
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated August 15, 2001 in EPC No. 2001-5.
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman is declared ineligible to assume office as
governor of the province of Bataan for the term 2001—2004.
CARPIO, J .:
The sole issue is whether a recall term is considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term limit of elective local officials. I see no other way but to
consider a recall term as one term.
First, the framers of the 1987 Constitution unmistakably intended a recall term,
which is the unexpired term of the recalled official, to be considered as one term
for counting term limits. The following exchange during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission shows this clear intent, thus:
"MR. SUAREZ: For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and
the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of
the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term
is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the
correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned
from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification,
Madam President?
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MR. DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of 'term,' and if there is a special
election, he will serve only the unexpired portion of that particular term
plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the
Members of the Lower House." 2
"MR. DAVIDE: The other proposal, Madam President, is: These officials
who can seek two reelections can serve for a total of nine years , after
that, they can seek another reelection. . . . ." 4
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. GARCIA: I would like to advocate the proposition that no further
election for local and legislative officials be allowed after a total of three
terms or nine years. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Turnovers in public office after nine years will ensure that new ideas and
new approaches will be welcome. . . . ." 5
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. DE CASTRO: . . . I understand that the three terms mentioned there
are only for nine years. . . . ." 6
xxx xxx xxx
"MR. GARCIA: I am sorry again, but for the first election, the term of office
will have to be fixed by the Commission on Elections simply for
adjustment purposes because of the current term of the President, for
synchronization and for transitory purposes. But once it is regularized, it
will be different.
MR. DE CASTRO: Is it a total of nine years?
AZCUNA, J .:
The adoption of term limits is new to our polity. It is a departure from the rule
that in a democracy the sovereign people can choose whoever is fit and qualified
to be their leader for as often as is their will.
The restriction has for its reason the concern against accumulation of power
resulting from prolonged stay in office.
These two ideas, however, represent the rule and the exception. The rule is the
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fundamental tenet of representative democracy that the people should be
allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them. The exception is the
term limit provided for in the Constitution.
It follows that in applying the exception, it must be strictly construed, so that
only if it clearly applies should it be applied.
To my mind, the provision in question, the term limit for elective local officials,
applies only if such official has served three consecutive terms in full.
Consequently, service of less than a full term, be it succession or recall election,
does not count in determining whether such official has served three consecutive
terms.
The Constitution is clear. The terms must be consecutive and the service must
be full, for the prohibition to apply:
"Sec. 8, Art. X. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms .
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected." (Emphasis supplied.)
Once these conditions obtain, however, the prohibition sets in and what is
prohibited is not simply an "immediate reelection, " 1 as contended by the
majority in Socrates v. Comelec, 2 but rather serving for more than three
consecutive terms, i. e., service in the immediately following term, the fourth
term.
Serving during such term, whether from the start, in the middle or at the end,
would still consist in service "for more than three consecutive terms." In
reference to the prohibited service, it is not required that it be for the full term.
What is proscribed is service, of any length, during the prohibited term, for such
would still constitute service for more than three consecutive terms.
There was a clear intent to require the person who has served in full the number
of consecutive terms, in this case three, to rest until the election for the term not
immediately following the last of the consecutive terms served. Hence, in
Socrates I joined in the separate opinion of the Chief Justice, as I agreed with
him that once an elected local official, in that case a mayor, has served three
consecutive terms in full, that person cannot serve for any time during the
immediately following term, whether by immediate reelection or by recall
election.
In the present case, respondent Roman's election as governor in the recall
election of 1992 should not be counted as one full term. For the disqualification
to attach, three consecutive terms must be served in full. This is the exception to
the rule, so it must be strictly complied with. Service for less than a full term,
except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not be counted to
determine the existence of the disqualification.
I therefore vote to DISMISS the petition in this case and to declare respondent
Leonardo B. Roman as NOT DISQUALIFIED to run for governor in the election of
May 14, 2001, as this was only for his third consecutive term. cACEHI
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May 14, 2001, as this was only for his third consecutive term.
Footnotes
7. At p. 613.
8. G.R. No. 154512, 12 November 2002.
9 . I n Onofre Cruz vs. Leonardo B. Roman (SPA No. 98-198) promulgated 28 May
1998 and affirmed by the En Banc on 03 September 1998; Bautista and
Magdalena vs. Roman (SPA No. 98-265) promulgated 10 December 1998 and
Ramos vs. Roman (SPA No. 01-068) promulgated 08 May 2001 and affirmed
by the COMELEC En Banc on 28 May 2001.
1 0 . S ee Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832; Pangandaman vs. COMELEC, 319
SCRA 283.
MENDOZA, J .:
1 . Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
133639, Oct. 6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999);
Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002.
5. Thus, the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) provides:
SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor,
and Vice Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become
the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the
governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking
sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor,
mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said
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office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according
to their ranking as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest
ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability,
the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong
barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be
resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify,
dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian
shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each
winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in
the immediately preceding local election.
SEC. 72. Effectivity of Recall. — The recall of an elective local official shall be effective
only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on
recall. Should the official sought to be recalled received the highest number of
votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.
6. 295 SCRA 165-166 (1998).
PANGANIBAN, J .:
1. Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727, 769, 772, June 28, 1996, per
Panganiban, J.
"The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
1. Filed under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 (review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC, among others) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
2. For the purpose of the synchronization of the regular national and local elections,
Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and
the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992." (emphasis added)
3 . Pursuant to Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg.
881), which states that "any voter contesting the election of any Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election." (emphasis added)
4. Rollo, at 64.
5. Id., at 190.
6. Id., at 76-85.
7. Comment, Rollo, at 82.
8. 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999).
16. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970); Co
vs. Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991).
17. Acar, et al. vs. Rosa, 19 SCRA 625, 626 (1967).
18. Supra.
19. Estrada vs. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108, 150 (2001); Gaminde vs. Commission on
Audit, 347 SCRA 655, 663 (2000).
20. Supra, at 166-167.
21. Supra, at 611-613.
22. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
26. 347 SCRA 128, 320 (2000), see separate opinion of Justice Panganiban.
CARPIO, J.:
1. This provision is reiterated in Section 43 of R.A. No. 7160, the Local Government
Code.
2. p. 592, Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II.
10. Ibid.
11. 295 SCRA 166 (1998).
12. G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002.
13. G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 & 155083-84, November 12, 2002.
AZCUNA, J.:
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1. This phrase does not appear anywhere in the Constitution.
2. G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 & 155083—84, November 12, 2002.