Long Range Planning 33 (2000) 779-804 www.elsevier.

com/locate/lrp

Managing Change at Novotel:

Back to the Future
Roland Calori, Charles Baden-Fuller and Brian Hunt

Novotel is one of the world’s major hotel chains, occupying a leading place in Europe
and with locations globally. We interpret Novotel’s change management programme in
the 1990s in three parts. First, we summarise the actions that managers took in terms
of strategy and organisation. Second, we consider the sequence and timing of events,
and how this resulted in rapid transformation in an organisation employing more than
30,000 people. Third, we emphasise the dialectical nature of the change processes: an
element often ignored in the literature that likes to see things as an either–or rather
than a both. We observed both deliberation and experimentation; both integration and
differentiation. We also observed both preservation and transformation, as noted in our
sub-title ‘Back to the Future’. Finally, we wrap up with a discussion explaining how our
story can add to better thinking about change. We suggest that we can shed new light
on some old debates and provide tangible guides for action. ! c 2001 Elsevier Science
Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction Roland Calori is Professor of

The study of organisational dynamics has produced innumerable Business Policy, Lyon
accounts and theoretical frameworks, and yet neither prac- Management School, 23
titioners nor scholars seem to be satisfied with the stock of exist- Avenue Guy de Collongue, BP
ing knowledge. This is probably because organisational changes 174, 69132 Ecully Cedex,
are complex phenomena that can be viewed from different and France. Tel.: +33 4 78 33 7929;
complementary perspectives.1 Each perspective reveals different fax: +33 4 78 33 7927; Email:
angles. Here we focus on the insights from a longitudinal process calori@em-lyon.com
perspective.2 In this paper we reflect on the particular scenario
of strategic change which took place at Novotel, the international Charles Baden-Fuller is the
three-star hotel chain which is part of the Accor Group of France, editor-in-chief of this journal
between 1992 and 1995. since 1999. He is also Professor
Accor has been established for more than 20 years and has of Strategy at City University
been evolving continuously to fit with the changing environment Business School, and part-time
by launching new concepts such as the Formula One hotel chain Professor at the Rotterdam
(written up elsewhere3 and by rejuvenating its existing businesses School of Management,

0024-6301/01/$ - see front matter ! c 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 0 2 4 - 6 3 0 1 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 9 0 - X

Erasmus University Rotterdam.
He has recently benefited from
visiting positions at the Haas
School, University of California
at Berkeley and the Wharton
School, University of
Pennsylvania. He has served on
commissions that looked to
evaluate research programmes
of business schools in several
European countries, and this
has stimulated this project.
Brian Hunt is Director of
Research at Mahidol College of
Management, Bangkok,
Thailand. In the UK he has held
posts at Reading University,
Bath University, City University
Business School and Imperial
College. Brian is co-editor (with
Stuart Barnes) of the book, E-
Commerce and V-Business
published by Butterworth-
Heinemann.
780
including the Novotel chain. Here, we emphasise the rejuven-
ation side of Accor’s renewal strategy, and the Novotel story.
This shows how an old business can be turned around, and that
this process need not be slow, and moreover how it can benefit
from a dialectical approach. This rejuvenation was radical, and
at the same time distinctly European in a global business.
Our study has some valuable lessons. By taking a longitudinal
perspective spanning many levels inside the firm, and by making
connections to the competitive environment, we isolate the value
of seeing change as a holistic phenomenon.4 Real stories of
change, like this one, exhibit many interconnected facets of
activities that theorists often see as distinct.5 Rich descriptions
also add value to theories in use. Most managers are guided by
experience, and ours stresses the value of dialectical thinking.
In studying Novotel, our first stage was inductive. We collected
data without any particular theory of change in mind by listening
to stories told by Novotel staff of their experiences and by read-
ing the documents of the company. The results of this exercise
have been published elsewhere as a case study that stressed the
chronological aspect of events.6 In this article we report on the
second stage of the study, where we interpret the story in the
light of three theoretical frameworks that appear appropriate a
posteriori to explain Novotel’s success. We begin by a short
description of the context of Novotel and the way we collected
our material before moving to interpreting the story of the
change we observed. We interpret the story by identifying eight
factors that summarise the strategic and organisation dimensions
of what we saw. We suggest that for Novotel our eight factors
are inclusive, and in some ways complete. We also discuss the
timing and sequence of the change path, a matter we suggest is
critically important. In this case good timing coupled with fortu-
itous circumstances resulted in a speedy transformation. We end
the article by showing how for Novotel the change processes were
both ambivalent and dialectical. The sub-title of this article—
Back to the Future—was the name of the change project that
Novotel adopted, and it reflected their dialectical approach look-
ing both forwards and backwards. It was also a name that
emerged from within the change process, not being imposed
from the top at the start, but adopted by common consent dur-
ing the change period. This and many other observations we
make below suggests how the Novotel story can inspire the devel-
opment of better conceptual frameworks taking a more inte-
grated view and improve managerial practice.
The background
Two entrepreneurs, Paul Dubrule and Gérard Pélisson, neither
of whom came from a hotel background, founded Novotel in
1967. During the 1970s Novotel expanded at an average rate of
one new hotel every month; and by the 1990s it had become the
market leader in Europe. (In 1991 it had 191 hotels in 18 Euro-
pean countries.) It was also a global firm with 50 more hotels
Managing Change at Novotel
outside Europe. In all Novotel controlled more than 36,000
rooms and had more than 30,000 employees.7 The Novotel stra-
tegic positioning was pioneering in Europe during the 1970s and
1980s. It mixed facets from four-star and three-star hotels and
emphasised standardisation. For example, standardised guest-
rooms at 24 square metres were larger than average for the price.
The standardised buffet breakfast was typically better than aver-
age for three-star (or even some four-star) hotels. Yet service was
inflexible and typically at a level of three-star hotels. Guests were
expected to carry their own bags from reception. Business travel-
lers, tourists, young and old were treated alike, and there was
little attempt to create differentiation even in notable locations.
This mix of four-star facilities and three-star service at a three-
star price was part of a winning formula in the 1970s and 1980s.
There were other innovative dimensions, including siting hotels This mix of four-star
outside city centres near motorways and airports, where land was
inexpensive and there were few competitors. Other hotel chains facilities and three-
such as Choice International (Comfort, Quality Inn and Sleep
Inn brands), Forte (with its Travelodge in the UK and mainland star service at a
Europe) and Holiday Inn copied it.
Novotel’s unique proposition was losing its edge by the early three-star price was
1990s. These were lean times for hotels in Europe. An economic
recession was beginning to bite. Cash-strapped companies sought part of a winning
to trim travel budgets and fewer business trips were permitted.
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in late 1990 and the Gulf war formula
in early 1991 together with the threat of terrorist activity in Euro-
pean cities further inhibited international travel and all hotels
saw fewer guests. Many hotels responded by cutting room rates
and guests could often name their own price. Some hotels offered
incentives to existing guests to encourage longer stays or further
visits. Other events were shaking up the industry. Forte, the UK’s
largest hotel group, was locked in an aggressive takeover battle
with Granada. Bid and counter-bid ensued and events became
increasingly bloody and personal as Sir Rocco Forte and Grana-
da’s Gerry Robinson traded high-profile insults in the media.
Granada (representing the new) eventually won.
In France, Novotel’s owner, Accor, was achieving success with
a new concept, the Formula One budget hotel. Launched in 1985,
Formula One was a less expensive, no-frills yet comfortable con-
cept hotel, occupying a different market segment from Novotel.
It was more modern, and by the 1990s it was clearly successful,
taking business away from other budget hotels. In retrospect, the
success of Formula One, albeit in a different market segment;
the changes in demand; and the arrival of new competitors sig-
nalled that traditional firms such as Novotel could not rest on
their laurels, and that they had to recognise the more customised
nature of the marketplace.8 Internally, this sense was picked up.
In 1992 the co-presidents of Accor, Novotel’s owners, Dubrule
and Pélisson realised that action should be taken. They appointed
Gilles Pélisson (Gérard’s nephew) and Philippe Brizon as the new
co-presidents of Novotel. They replaced Claude Moscheni, who
had been at the head of Novotel for 10 years, and who moved

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 781

 to take charge of Pullman International Hotels, another division
of Accor. Table 1 summarises very briefly the history of Novotel
to the end of the major change programme in 1995.

Collecting data and interpreting the story

Our principal data collection effort occurred in 1994 while the
major changes in Novotel were progressing. We gathered a mass
of documents about Novotel and the industry, from inside and
outside the firm, and conducted more than 60 in-depth inter-
views. The documents included some internal memoranda writ-
ten by senior managers, descriptions of quality control systems, a
videotape of a major management conference, and other relevant
material. Our interview programme was extensive and compre-
hensive, conducted using traditional research methods. All were
tape recorded, and were analysed carefully by two or three
researchers. Among those interviewed were one of the hotel’s
co-presidents, most of the top management team, many senior
managers at Novotel’s head office in Evry, and general managers
and their staff in seven different hotels. Three of these hotels
were in France, two in Germany and two in the UK. We also
watched people at work. The scope of the study was large, for
it spanned all the levels of the firm, and several countries. It also
delved into perceptions as well as details of operations, and
allowed some observations of change processes and their out-
comes. The results were written up chronologically in a factual
style that emphasised the actors’ perspectives and minimised
interpretation. The whole was checked with the participants to
assure accuracy and absence of bias, and subsequently pub-
lished.9 Now some years later, the data have been reviewed and
some of the more recent progress of Novotel has been included.
Here we propose interpretations of the success of this change
process at Novotel.
The change process we observed was both top-down and bot-
tom-up, it involved the centre of the firm and the periphery, it
involved designing new image, new procedures, new pricing and
indeed changes to almost every facet of the business. Most of
the changes struck at the heart of the old concept of standardis-
ation, and sought to increase flexibility while cutting costs and
increasing attractiveness. The scale of the changes was dramatic:
in the context of the industry, costs fell almost immediately by
more than 10 per cent with increased differentiation and flexi-
bility. Occupancy rates at Novotel, which had hit a low in early
1993 at the start of the change programme, rose thereafter.
Obviously, it would be best to benchmark Novotel’s progress
against the competition, but data are not available. However, we
can indicate the extent of Novotel’s success by measuring its pro-
gress against other parts of the Accor group.10 Formula One,
a well-documented global success story, provides a demanding
marker.11 Novotel did not quite catch up with Formula One
(where return on net assets—RON—was between 13 per cent
and 14.3 per cent), but it did post a strong rate of return in 1997,

782 Managing Change at Novotel

Table 1. Chronological summary of key events and actions

1967 Creation of Novotel by Paul Dubrule and Gérard

Pélisson
1967–1983 The entrepreneurial era, Novotel becomes a key player
in the hotel industry
1983–1992 Development of the Accor Group. Novotel is a key
division alongside Sofitel, Mercure and Ibis
1985 Formula One, a new budget hotel concept, is launched
1991 Gulf war, all industry is hit. Novotel posts record profits
in December, although occupancy is falling in all hotel
groups
1992 April ‘Open-space’ meeting of hotel managers in
Fontainebleau. Managers say they want freedom to take
decisions and try new ideas. Occupancy continues to fall
in industry throughout the summer
1992 December Philippe Brizon and Gilles Pélisson propose a
viable project outline for Novotel and are appointed co-
presidents. Claude Moscheni who had been president of
Novotel for 10 years is appointed president of Pullman
International within the Accor group
1993 January The co-presidents choose the 18 members of
the new top management team and reduce the super-
structure by two layers
February The new top management team starts working
together, with two anthropologists (consultants). They
define three work systems: communication, management
and commercial. The quality control system is abolished.
A new profile of hotel general managers is outlined and
new performance measures are defined. The new
management system is established in the war room at
the headquarters in Evry
March–April Each director of operations organises
three-day meetings with their hotel managers and the
two co-presidents, to refine the project
May–June Selection of hotel managers, and reduction of
the management structure in hotels by one layer
Summer Hotel general managers go through the new
assessment centre and personal development plans are
designed. New marketing initiatives are taken
Autumn The three-day convention is held (with more
than 300 participants). Personal development plans start.
The restoring of hotels starts. The ‘progress groups’ and
‘clubs’ are launched
1994 First quarter ‘Progrès Novotel’ is launched, the
competencies of all employees are assessed. New
marketing initiatives are taken. Propositions made by
progress groups and clubs are implemented
1994–1995 ‘Progrès Novotel’, developing competencies, further
implementation

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 783

 1998 and 1999 at more than 11.4 per cent.12 RONA, according to
the group, is a key management tool and is computed in the
usual way of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by
fixed assets plus working capital.

A systemic understanding and set of actions

There have been many studies of firms in transition, and most
point to a common set of factors involved in the change pro-
cess.13 Here we reflect on eight key factors that deal with the
strategic and organisation dimensions that influenced change in
the Novotel case and are summarised in Table 2. Some of these
eight may seem like common sense, such as the importance of
maintaining links with key outside stakeholders, others are more
complex and less obvious, such as form change as a project. The
point we like to make is that all the steps were necessary. For
Novotel not to have done something listed here would almost
certainly have resulted in failure. Other organisations in different
circumstances may need different steps, but ours are commonly
found in many cases of renewal.
Novotel recognised customer needs
Many successful firms fall into trouble because they fail to per-
ceive and act on environmental changes. At Novotel, the two co-
presidents identified the need for a change in the organisation
because customers were not being satisfied. Such identification
was not easy, for three traditional top management indicators
impeded understanding. First, profits were rising, not falling, and
at the time of the identification stood at their highest level ever.
Top management recognised that the peak in profits represented
the result of price increases above the level charged by the compe-
tition, rather than improved product performance. A second
indicator, that of quality control, was also showing good results.
The hotel had instituted a programme of checking 95 factors
(‘les 95 boulons’) to assess quality. These showed high levels
of performance.
Rather than believe the good signs that things were going well,
the top management saw and amplified the danger signals that
they thought really mattered. One of these was falling occupancy
that was moving opposite to data on profits and quality control.
Occupancy had been falling on a moving average basis from a
high of 68 per cent in December 1990 to 62 per cent by June
1992.14 This fall of 6 points in occupancy was not very different
from that experienced by other parts of the group (and others
in the industry). Mercure had also experienced a decline from
64 per cent to 58 per cent over the same period. The star of the
group, Sofitel, performed no better: it experienced a decline from
67 per cent to 60 per cent in the year from December 1990 to
December 1991. The falling occupancy during this period was
attributed to a mini-recession in Europe and the Gulf war. The
fact that profits rose even though occupancy fell was attributed
to a changing mix of customers who now paid on average
higher prices.

784 Managing Change at Novotel

Table 2. Actions and processes in the Novotel change programme

Novotel’s Actions Content of Novotel’s Change Programme

Recognise " Recognised that falling occupancy was more

customers needs important than rising profits
" Recognised that first-hand customer data was
important
Form and " Appointed two co-presidents with different skills
motivate new top and styles
team
" Formed a team strongly operations oriented, with
commitment to change
Change as a " Process of change led by two co-presidents, with
project top management team as the key work group
" All other important change projects co-ordinated
in single room at HQ (the ‘war room’)
Develop new " Defined new competencies primarily in terms of
competencies and people, for instance front-line workers have to be
capabilities multi-skilled and flexible, and managers have to be
leaders
" Made incentives geared to competence building
" Invested in building new routines such as room
cleaning
Obtain external " Obtained prior commitment from main board to
stakeholder large-scale change and to its financial costs
support
Redistribute " Increase the span of control and remove layers of
power and management to give more power to the front line
change the
structures
" Involved middle and front line in the change
process, giving them power to shape the outcomes
" Accepted from a front-line manager the name
‘Back to the Future’ as the title for the overall change
programme
" Abolished the formal TQM system, allowing front-
line workers to be empowered to make decisions
Design the " Removed many layers of hierarchy so that each
communication hotel reports directly into the TMT. This gives voice
strategy to the front line and making it easier for the
messages from the top to reach them
" Organised 12 three-day meetings with hotel
managers, set up progress groups, and reflective clubs
and many other such meetings
Shape new " Recruit new people and eliminate top managers
behaviours not committed to change
" Get all middle managers to participate in collective
symbolic actions (e.g. paint a common picture)
" Publicise key individual actions at local level that
symbolise new ways of working
" Hold distinctly local activities in hotels to reinforce
the balance between standardisation and individuality

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 785

 Even more important to top management than occupancy
data were the views of lower level managers that customers were
not being properly served, and the view of those on the front
line that many were getting poor value for money. One front
desk employee explained vividly the general lack of flexibility and
lack of customer orientation caused by overly rigid enforcement
of procedures:

When a client comes in at ten o’clock in the evening and

asks for the room rate, what do you do when you tell him
the rack rate (full price) and he says ‘That is too expensive
for me, could you not do it for a lower price?’ I had to say
‘No, I am sorry sir, I am not allowed to deal with prices.’

While many Novotel formed a new top-team that took action

Individuals can do little in an organisation, collectively they can
organisations reduce move the world. Central to managing strategic change in many
organisations is the formation of a motivated team, galvanised
the size of their by mutual trust, empowered, and composed of individuals who
complement each other in terms of cognitive styles and styles
teams when in a of authority.15
In the case of Novotel the appointment of two new co-presi-
crisis, Novotel went in dents was a major step. Having two at the head of an ambitious
project helps a lot: it provides mutual encouragement, reduces
the opposite direction. the risks of individual biases, and increases the capacity of inter-
actions with the other members of the organisation. Most
importantly, Philippe Brizon and Gilles Pélisson had different
and complementary skills and styles. Some senior managers
described Brizon as ‘an intellectual with an artistic mind ’, ‘excel-
lent with figures’, ‘marketing-oriented ’, and ‘visionary’. Accord-
ing to Jung’s typology of cognitive styles he was viewed as an
‘intuitive’ and a ‘thinker’. Pélisson was regarded as very ‘oper-
ations-minded’, ‘close to the terrain and the people’, and ‘an
effective implementer of strategies’. According to Jung’s typology
of cognitive styles he was viewed as a ‘feeler’ and a ‘sensor’.16
Together, in tandem, they combined the necessary qualities to
stimulate and conduct innovation: imagination, motivation,
planning and experience. The next major step was the transform-
ation of the top management team.
While many organisations reduce the size of their teams when
in a crisis, Novotel went in the opposite direction. The previous
team of eight members was changed to a team of 18, of whom
12 were directors of operations. This was a very operation-
minded top management team. To counter the danger that
greater size would undermine effectiveness Brizon and Pélisson
assembled their core management team very quickly and took
in people whom they could trust and who had previously dem-
onstrated their desire to innovate.
The team at the top usually has the formal authority to make
decisions concerning the four dimensions of change: strategy-
making, developing resources, reorganising and promulgating
new norms of behaviour. If they are smart, they recognise that

786 Managing Change at Novotel

they can be the co-authors of the new strategy and they personify
the new norms of behaviour. Clearly the members of the man-
agement team convey symbols of innovation, deliberately or not.
In the case of Novotel, the tandem of two young new co-presi-
dents recalled the glorious entrepreneurial innovative epoch of
the co-founders of the company 25 years before. The duo did
not subscribe to the myth of the powerful charismatic visionary
leader who saves the firm and its people from danger. They
believed in a skilful, motivated top team with complementary
styles and exemplary behaviour.

In Novotel change was conceived as a project

Change can be formulated as a strategic project that can be
initiated by the top team and refined and updated by the oper-
ational units. In such a mode of operation, the change process
takes a hybrid form between two extreme modes of strategy-
making: vision-mission on the one hand against long-range
revolving plans on the other. The ‘strategic project’ is composed
of three parts. A largely qualitative long-term scenario at the cor-
porate level and at the level of each business; a bunch of focused
projects concerning a few major strategic moves, very concrete
short-term (one year) action plans; and a decentralised scanning
system for real-time updating of strategic options.17
Such a system was set up at Novotel in 1993. The project was
composed of a few pages that explained the new identity of the
company, in terms of competitive advantage, key resources,
organisational formula and norms of behaviour. Then a simple
framework was adopted that was composed of the three items:
clients, administration (costs) and people (the ‘tripod’) to guide
the formulation of strategies from the corporate level to the level
of each hotel. These items reflected the business necessities of
restoring profits and growth.
Novotel went further, and established simple measures to
identify progress, release energy and goad employees to deliver.
The walls of the ‘war room’ in Evry were lined with charts, each
representing one Novotel, and grouped by regions. Each chart
contained a few simple performance measures (under the head-
ings: clients, costs and people). Adhesive stars indicated improve-
ment programmes and degrees of progress in the implementation
of action plans. Meetings at the regional level, and ‘open space’
meetings between hotel managers and the top management ful-
filled the tasks of environmental scanning.
The success of the business project approach was not related
to the use of external consultants. Novotel did not use any major
consulting firm, and the consultants were anthropologists (not
from a business school!). This choice had logic, management was
concerned to preserve the best from the past that would build a
platform for the future.

Novotel developed new competencies and capabilities

The resource-based view of the firm emphasises that firms can-
not change their orientation without developing new com-

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 787

 petencies and capabilities.18 This takes time. Hiring and grafting
may accelerate the process, but in a large organisation generally
the mass of individuals has to go through a gradual learning
experience (both training and on the job). Organisations need
to be focused on the population of critical persons, those
involved in the most critical tasks and interfaces. Most strategic
changes require very significant intangible investments of this
sort.19
At Novotel in 1993 the top management focused on the per-
sonal development of the 280 hotel general managers, clearly the
critical persons in the rejuvenation of Novotel. After carefully
defining the new profile and role of hotel managers, and after
selecting the individuals that had the potential to become
‘Maı̂tres de Maison’, an assessment centre was set up. All hotel
All front-line staff managers went through assessment to facilitate the design of per-
sonal development plans and start tailor-made training pro-
became multi-skilled, grammes. This was the first step of the ambitious programme
for developing human resources: ‘Progrès Novotel’. In this pro-
multi-task workers gramme the competence of all employees was assessed, and start-
ing from 1994 monitored large-scale training programmes were
implemented by the ‘Accor Academy’.
By taking these steps, the task of change was delegated from
the large organisation of more than 33,000 people to 280 units,
each of which typically had 120 people. This delegation also
allowed the units to act more quickly than the organisation as a
whole. Moreover, each unit could tailor its responses to fit the
unique reservoirs of skills and local environment. The structure
also allowed the units to reinforce the new message that stan-
dardisation was no longer the watchword and stress the need for
greater flexibility and customer orientation. As a result, all front-
line staff became multi-skilled, multi-task workers who had an
improved capacity to please and satisfy the customer.

Novotel obtained external stakeholder support

The success of ambitious projects often relies on the use of exter-
nal resources, and at least the support or the neutrality of power-
ful external stakeholders. Negotiating and leveraging resources
and support from stakeholders (clients, suppliers, investors, etc)
can be crucial in new business ventures; it may also crucial to
foster radical change in mature organisations.20 Ideas such as the
balanced score card are predicated on these principles.21
At Novotel in 1993 the negotiation took place within the Accor
group with the co-presidents of Accor. On the basis of their pro-
ject outline and early results, Brizon and Pélisson, negotiated and
obtained the support of the corporate level, and the financial
resources to restore the hotels and achieve intangible invest-
ments. In this case, these were substantial resources exceeding
one billion FFrs.22 Most of this was needed to pay for the
redeployment of excess workers, the brand relaunch, and the
upgrading of the physical capital. Other expenses included
retraining the existing workforce and paying for specialist pro-
jects to deal with specific issues.

788 Managing Change at Novotel

Novotel redistributed power and changed structures
The politics of radical change involve external stakeholders as
well as coalitions, groups, and individuals within the organis-
ation. Radical change generally questions the existing, formal and
informal power structure and requires a new distribution of
power.23 By definition the top management team has the auth-
ority and the responsibility of distributing power. For change to
be effective, there are two main rules for this redistribution: a)
give more power to the middle managers and lower echelons;
and b) empower the individuals and the organisational units who
are in charge of critical activities and demonstrate a positive atti-
tude toward the project. These two rules may sound simplistic
to those who have experienced the complexities of restructuring
or re-engineering, however in Novotel’s case they led to a num-
ber of precise applications.24
For instance, Brizon and Pélisson decided to empower the 280
hotel general managers (at least those who were willing and cap-
able to fulfil the new role of ‘Maı̂tre de Maison’). Practically,
they reduced the management superstructure (head office) by
two layers, so that every hotel general manager reported directly
to a member of the top management team (one of the 12 direc-
tors of operations) and were only one step away from the co-
presidents. This structure gave more power to operations. The
12 directors of operations were selected from former regional
directors.
Hotel managers and the rest of the staff were also empowered
by the suppression of other systems that impeded flexibility and
responsiveness. The most notable of all these systems was the
quality control system (‘les 95 boulons’) that had been giving
false signals about the organisation’s health and that was
inhibiting local and individual initiatives. By abolishing this sys-
tem quickly, top management released energy and gave power
to the front-line workers. In addition, all hotels were required
to reduce their internal structures by at least one layer, and most
removed even more layers, which further reinforced the impor-
tance of the front line.

Novotel designed the communication

Not only is information power, but its effective deployment can
shape perceptions and help change behaviour. In times of radical
changes communication of strategic priorities and debates on
strategic issues may have several functions: they may concentrate
efforts, reduce perceived uncertainties, progressively convince the
mass, contribute to personal development, stimulate creativity,
and translate general ideas into concrete projects. However com-
munication flows have to be selective and carefully managed in
order to avoid dilution and waste of time. Two main principles
should guide the design of the communication network: first, the
upper echelons should be easily accessible for discussion (not
just ‘one-minute management’) and members of the top man-
agement teams should go out and meet staff where the action
takes place, in other words face-to-face communication is

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 789

 needed. Second, the set of meetings (committees, project groups,
task forces, etc.) should have balance: some projects should orig-
inate at the top (top-down) and some should originate at the
bottom (bottom-up), some should be specific to a unit and some
should be across units (functional or regional), most of them are
temporary (until the goal has been reached) and some will be
maintained when they usefully complement the hierarchical
structure.
Novotel adopted these principles from the start. The strategic
project ‘Back to the Future’ was refined and multiplied in 12
three-day meetings in spring 1993. The meetings were organised
by each director of operations with his or her 25 hotel general
managers and were attended by the co-presidents. A second cate-
gory of top-down workshops were organised—the ‘progress
groups’. These groups operated across geographical areas and
sometimes across functions with the aim to improve service,
and/or reduce costs, and/or improve management. Bottom-up
‘reflective clubs’ were set up for improvement inside a given
hotel, and bottom-up ‘clubs’ were organised across hotels by
managers who shared problems and could share solutions. At a
more general level, Novotel continued with yearly open-space
meetings. The general meeting of October 1993 was an opport-
unity of face-to-face large-scale communication.

Novotel shaped new behaviours

The above actions combined to shape new norms of behaviour
at Novotel. Particularly, the members of the top management
team can become role models for the staff, and some of their
acts can take a symbolic meaning.25 Any discordance in this
domain may nullify the effects of other actions. When consist-
ency is achieved, the question becomes: ‘How should top man-
agement affect the development of new behaviour norms?’ If top
management is to formalise the new norms, write them down
and communicate them, they need to make it clear how these
new norms are translated into very concrete normal practices
(that illustrate and prove the respect of the norm). Without this,
confusion is likely. The second step is to recruit new members
according to their personal behaviour, and to help individuals
change their behaviour through personal development pro-
grammes. The third step is to reinforce behaviour in the appraisal
and reward systems, alongside performance and/or competence.
The co-presidents of Novotel and the new directors of oper-
ations took care to personify the desired behaviour in the eyes
of the staff. They sometimes used symbolic effects to reinforce
their message. For example, during the October convention the
participants painted together a huge picture representing ‘Back
to the Future’. This picture allowed individual expression, but
emphasised the unity of the whole. The picture was cut in 280
pieces and every manager at that meeting took his/her piece back
home. Other messages were more formal. Some new norms of
behaviour were articulated in a widespread document, and com-
municated repeatedly at events such as the October convention,

790 Managing Change at Novotel

when new recruits were brought in and when personal develop-
ment plans were discussed.
In Novotel, managing radical change required efforts in all
the eight above domains, overlooking any would have probably
compromised or delayed the process. When combined, they pro-
duced a systemic effect necessary to overcome inertia or block-
ages. As emphasised, some actions fulfilled the political require-
ments of change; some actions fulfilled the cognitive
requirements of change; and some fulfilled normative-symbolic
requirements. Indeed the political, the cognitive, and the sym-
bolic facets are inseparable.

Appropriate timing
It is commonly believed that speedy change requires doing things Rather than take
differently from that of more evolutionary change.26 In the case
of Novotel, we found this was not so. Far from trying to take short cuts, the
short cuts, the management just appeared to do the basic things
more quickly than usual. It seems that time and rhythm are management
important in managing change, things have to be done in a cer-
tain order even if one leaves room for some disorder. In the case appeared to do the
of mature companies undertaking a change process, Baden-Fuller
and Stopford proposed that rejuvenation should go through four basic things more
successive stages: galvanise, simplify, build, and leverage.27 Before
that, someone (in the top management team, or in a local unit, quickly than usual
or among shareholders) has to make sense of signals that trig-
ger change.
In Table 3 we list these four key stages and note alongside the
details of the timing of the moves of Novotel’s management. It
can be seen that there is a correspondence, which we amplify
below. Regarding the first category, ‘galvanise’, usually it is top
management that has to make sense of signals for change. Some
(external and/or internal) pressure is necessary to stimulate the
desire to change, but the pressure must not be too high, other-
wise it may reduce the capacity to react (insufficient resources
and/or low degrees of freedom). Put differently there is a window
of opportunity for action, before it may be too early, and after
it may be too late. Some signals may not be evident and/or may
not be consonant with the cognitive schemas of decision-mak-
ers.28 Hence freedom of speech and listening to expressions of
dissatisfaction or doubt within the organisation is a prerequisite
of reflexivity and reactivity.
At Novotel the use of large-scale ‘open-space’ meetings showed
early signals of a need for change: hotel managers felt that things
were going wrong and said they wanted more autonomy as early
as April 1992. As noted earlier, it seems that the top management
of the Accor group was able to recognise these signals, despite
the good news of record profits in December 1991. The Accor
top management also had other news from rival divisions. Unlike
past years, it seems that few people wanted to be transferred into
Novotel from other divisions. This further supported the notion
that all was not well.

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 791

 Table 3. Timing of steps for rejuvenation

The Conceptual Step: and Novotel’s Actions During This Period

Novotel’s Timing

Making sense of the signals: Ignore signals of record profits and

April 1992 to December 1992
Galvanising the top team:
January 1993 to March 1993
Simplifying the agenda:
January 1993 to June 1993
Building new capabilities: May New Spirit
1993 to December 1993
Leveraging the advantages: End Require all achievements to be
1993 onwards
positive results of TQM
Focus on customer dissatisfaction and
junior employee dissatisfaction
Appoint new people committed to
change
Define their role as change leaders
Reduce number of reporting levels
Abandon costly inflexible control
systems
Simplify reports to five items
New role definitions for managers as
leaders
Make junior staff flexible and multi-
skilled
Build new image
Establish new purchasing system
Establish new operating systems
communicated
Form cross-functional, cross-
geographical and cross-hierarchical
teams to communicate difficulties and
common successes
Keep pressure to change high even after
good results appear

An important early stage in the crescendo model is to simplify

the organisation. Simplifying the business reduces costs, concen-
trates scarce resources on a smaller agenda and so increases the
chances of effective results. Simplification also signals that some-
thing positive is happening. As Table 3 shows, like many others
Novotel reduced the number of levels in the hierarchy. This led
to reduced costs. In Novotel’s case, no hotels were closed, but
special attention was given to the 10 worst performing hotels
(about 5 per cent of the total).
Many firms do not understand the importance of cutting out
costly systems when there is a crisis. They tend to think that
more information is required. In fact, the problem is often that
the systems give wrong signals and the people will do closer to
the right thing if they are given the freedom. This was certainly
the case in Novotel, where the total quality management (TQM)
systems reflected old organisational imperatives rather than the
changing customer needs. Novotel abolished the bureaucratic

792 Managing Change at Novotel

quality control systems that gave false messages and set up the
simple operational planning system in the ‘war room’. All reports
were simplified to speed up communication and to increase
effectiveness. All these actions, and many more, were taken dur-
ing the first six months of 1993. They allowed the organisation to
shed people and costly procedures that were not adding value.29
‘Building’ comes after cutting, it is the third stage in the cres-
cendo model. In comparison with sensing, galvanising and cut-
ting, building is far more difficult. It is here that the actions of
Novotel really stand out:

# New Spirit for the group;

# New definition of the role of general managers (maitres de
maison);
# New assessment and reward system;
# Make staff flexible with respect to tasks (‘polyvalence’);
# Build a new image;
# Create new simplified internal communications system;
# Establish new purchasing systems;
# Establish new systems for operations in areas such as room
cleaning.

At Novotel the first steps in building the new organisation were

taken by the top management team at the beginning of 1993
during the simplification stage. Progressively, in spring, building
was extended to include actions led by hotel general managers.
The building phase bloomed in summer 1993 and went on for
about a year. Learning started slowly. Over time the organisation
invested in deepening existing skills, acquiring new ones and
developing new systems. Teamwork was developed first on a
small scale to deal with essential tasks but then growing across
the whole organisation.
The last stage in the crescendo model is about leveraging
advantages and maintaining the momentum. Leveraging capa-
bilities means two things: the development of competences and
capabilities is extended to the whole organisation including the
lower levels in the hierarchy, and the local experiments that pay
off are transferred to the rest of the firm. Maintaining the
momentum is another challenge. After a year or more, the
change agents may feel the need to relax and exploit the changes
that have already been made, to some extent this is a normal
attitude and some opportunities to relax should be given to the
ones who have been in the front. However too much relaxation
may end in heavy sleep, during which competitors imitate the
best strategies and reduce the gap, a phenomenon that Miller
called the ‘Icarus paradox’.30 Then the challenge is to stimulate
a continuous flow of innovations, and consider change (and not
equilibrium) as the principle of life.
At Novotel the development of competencies was extended to
the whole population of employees starting from 1994 with the
‘Progrès Novotel’ programme. The experimentation taken up by
the clubs and the progress groups was extended to other hotels.

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 793

 Highly-skilled competent members of staff were asked to act as
consultants and advisors to their counterparts in the other units.
Essentially momentum was maintained by the creation of many
teams that crossed functional, regional and hierarchical bound-
aries. The Novotels in other continents became more active in
the leverage stage. The flow of innovations continued for some
time but slowed down in 1995, precisely when the first signs of
success (internal job rotation, sales turnover, and profits)
became evident.

Ambivalences and dialectics; process and

content
Describing the processes for change is easy, achieving them is
another matter, especially for executives in large complex organ-
isations. One key success factor for Novotel was the loose-tight
combination often mentioned by other management writers
studying successful process. The processes and content of Novot-
el’s changes were characterised by this loose-tight ambivalence
and hyper-dialectics in three domains. These were deliberation
and experimentation, integration and differentiation, and preser-
vation and transformation.

Deliberation and experimentation

In successful cases of business rejuvenation, Baden-Fuller and
Stopford noted that: ‘The common purpose expressed in terms
of visions and a direction for progress is typically phrased in
simple terms that all can understand. Making progress along the
chosen path requires managers to experiment and to discover
what can work and what fails.’31 This ambivalence of the strategy
process has been an important theme in organisation studies,
different authors taking different perspectives in relation to this
theme.32 Strategic ‘deliberation’ is a dominantly ‘top-down’
approach. Information and influences may originate from all
parts of the organisation (and beyond) but the upper echelons
are responsible for the corporate (global) and business (local)
strategy design, and the strategy, once formulated, is communi-
cated to the lower echelons for local adaptations and implemen-
tation. Experimentation requires actions, and action is taken at
the middle and lower echelons and at the local level in the organ-
isation. Thus strategic ideas based on experimentation follow a
‘bottom-up’ process.
Bower analysed the two processes, top-down from global to
local and bottom-up from local to global, and concluded that
they should be combined for effective strategy-making.33 Mintz-
berg and Waters revealed another facet of the deliberation-exper-
imentation ambivalence, the ‘realised’ strategy ‘walks on two
feet’: ‘deliberate’ plans—voluntaristic normative anticipations,
and ‘emergent’ patterns—learned in action.34 The deliberative
approach also corresponds to what Burgelman described as a
process of ‘retention-selection-variation’. In the retention phase
the strategy designed by managers (a set of choices under

794 Managing Change at Novotel

constraints) is prescribed to the whole organisation.35 Through
selection managers retain and stimulate the emerging initiatives
that are consistent with their general orientations. Hence the
organisation progresses towards a state of equilibrium. Then
variation, individual and local autonomy and creativity is neces-
sary to stimulate new dynamics of change. On the other hand
the experimentation approach corresponds to Burgelman’s
description of creative evolution as a process of ‘variation-selec-
tion-retention’. In the variation phase individual local initiatives
are stimulated and emerge. Then selection retains some of these
initiatives and retention consolidates them and gives them the
status and the scope of organisational strategies. Burgelman con-
cluded that the two processes often coexist in effective organis-
ations. Vandangeon-Derumez opposed the concepts of ‘pre-
scribed change’ vs ‘constructed change’ and showed that firms Most of the
that adopt the first approach focus on defining the content of
strategy, whereas firms that adopt the second approach define innovations developed
the organisational processes that will give birth to strategies.36
Again the two approaches are viewed as complementary. by Novotel were born
Novotel is a case of ambivalent change process in which delib-
eration and experimentation were intertwined. Open space meet- in the workgroups
ings, such as the one in Fontainebleau (April 1992) where hotel
managers expressed their wish to be more autonomous, were
important elements of a bottom-up process for the emergence
of variations. In December 1992 the two new co-presidents
drafted an outline of their strategy to ‘Re-Novotelise Novotel’.
This strategy was expressed in a few simple concepts: the tripod
for improvements (clients, costs, people), and the new role for
hotel general managers. They shared these views and enriched
them with the 16 other members of the new top management
team and with the consultants (first quarter 1993). Then the top
management set up the processes by which bottom-up initiatives
could emerge: the 12 meetings organised by directors of oper-
ations with the co-presidents and the hotel general managers in
their business area. These meetings also gave the top manage-
ment team the opportunity to communicate the new orientations
down the management structure. Progress groups, organised by
the top management who selected the topics and the participants,
also contributed to refine the project. On the other hand the
‘clubs’, within hotels and between hotel managers contributed to
variations, first experimented at the local level, and often trans-
ferred to the whole organisation. Indeed most of the innovations
developed by Novotel in the project ‘Back to the Future’ were
born in the multiple workgroups that had been set up or encour-
aged by the top management team: the new communication, the
Dolphi Club, the new organisation of housekeeping, the bath-
room of the year 2000.

Integration and differentiation

The dialectics of unity and diversity and the movements towards
these opposite states—integration and differentiation—is
another important theme in organisation studies. Generally the

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 795

 levels or organisational integration and differentiation are con-
sidered in relation with environmental characteristics, parti-
cularly the international structure and dynamics of industries.37
Here we take distance with these contingency frameworks and
suggest that any organisation should maintain some unity and
some diversity so as to stimulate change. According to Bateson
without the tension that exists between simultaneous opposites
in organisations, a cycle of ‘schismogenesis’ occurs, a degenerat-
ive syndrome where an attribute in the organisation perpetuates
itself until it becomes extreme and thereby dysfunctional.38
Instead of trying to maximise anything an organisation should
seek to ensure that it maintains at least a minimal threshold of
desirable attributes, for instance a minimal degree of consensus
but not so much as to stifle the dissension that is the life blood
Individuals with a of innovation.39 The one and global identity of the firm should
leave some room for differentiation (or diversification) processes
high level of that lead to multiple local identities. In turn some local identities
should be transferred to the rest of the organisation and become
competence in their part of the one and global identity.40
The first years of Novotel saw extreme standardisation of some
job were asked to dimensions of the services—rooms, meals, style. However there
was also an entrepreneurial spirit with attitudes to customers,
communicate their expansion, new ideas and in the direct relationships between
hotel managers and the presidents. Growth and bureaucratis-
knowledge to others ation in the 1980s reduced entrepreneurship, for instance with
the ‘95 boulons’ quality control system. ‘Back to the Future’
maintained the basic principle of standardisation but it also gave
room for local initiatives and differentiation. The ‘95 boulons’
were abolished and replaced by general norms of behaviour:
trust, common sense, listening to others, rigour, solidarity, cour-
age and humour. Individual initiatives were encouraged in sev-
eral areas: decoration of hotels, menus, entertainments, etc. Then
some successful innovations were transferred across hotels and
regions. Some individuals with a high level of competence in
their job (for instance managing a bar or direct marketing to
corporate clients) were asked to communicate their knowledge
to the others, becoming ‘pilots’ in the generalisation of best prac-
tice. The (multi-hotel) clubs organised by hotel managers had
the same function. In brief, starting from 1993 Novotel rein-
vented the necessary ambivalence, the creative dialectical tension
between unity and diversity.

Preservation and transformation

Volberda emphasises the paradoxical nature of flexibility, and
the tensions between the control capability of management and
the controllability of the organisation.41 He suggests that the
organisation can move back up the natural path from the
planned to the flexible if it adopts a more organic structure, and
a more heterogeneous, open and externally orientated culture.
However, if it fails to retain some stability, the organisation
becomes chaotic.
Weick too sees that flexibility without stability results in

796 Managing Change at Novotel

chaos.42 Stability relies on the preservation of some existing
characteristics on top of which new characteristics are developed.
This view originates in the concept of ‘creative evolution’ defined
by the French philosopher Henri Bergson.43 For him everything
which lives (including organisations composed of human beings)
endures: the past is prolonged into the present, time is duration,
and duration is a source of creation. In other words the past
cannot and should not be denied, our identity resulting from
our past experience should be preserved, at least part of it. For
Bergson creation also springs from a vital impetus that drives us
toward the future. Our identity is transformed by the impetus
of our desired future that drives our new creative acts. Making
sense of and learning from these experiences becomes part of
our renewed identity.44 This is how the opposition between
identity and change can be resolved and become a construc-
tive tension.
The members of an organisation can withstand the stress and
uncertainties of change programmes for sometime but not for
too long. On the one hand ‘going for the big hit’ or cutting stages
and going directly from galvanising the top team to leveraging
generally leads to failure. On the other hand advancing too slowly
generally creates feelings of lassitude, frustration, and distrust
among the motivated members of the organisation. The concep-
tion of time as ‘duration’ is typical of Bergson’s ideas about ‘cre-
ative evolution’. Simply put, the person who conceives time as
duration considers that the past, the present and the future are
equally important and intertwined. The past and its positive and
negative influence on the present and the future are not denied,
and what we do in the present is seen in a continuous flow of
actions from the past to the future.
Indeed at Novotel the fundamental theme of the project ‘Back
to the Future’ expressed this concept of time as duration: in its
early years Novotel found the entrepreneurial innovative spirit
that was required to face the challenge of 1992 and beyond. The
project communicated a sense of identity that was preserved
while at the same time transformed. This was one of the many
ambivalences of the innovation process at Novotel.
As its differentiation had eroded, confronted with increased
competitive pressures at the beginning of the 1990s, Novotel
managers were pushed by their vital impetus and driven toward
new creative acts. However they did not deny their past. On the
contrary they looked in their past to find traces of their identity
on which they could rely to innovate in the future. Indeed the
spirit of the change process was contained in the title of the
project, ‘Back to the Future’. They abstracted the entrepreneurial
and innovative characteristics of the early age, in that sense the
transformation preserved the original identity of Novotel by
being a pure rejuvenation (recovering the vigour of youth). The
consultant anthropologists helped managers to travel in the his-
tory of their organisation and find the necessary confidence to
embark in a transformation. The reconciliation of past and future
was symbolised in the tandem of new co-presidents, Philippe

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 797

 Brizon and Gilles Pélisson who also reflected the tandem of Pélis-
son elder and Dubrule, the founders of Novotel.

Discussion: inspiration for developing theories

and improving managerial practice
The story of Novotel’s rejuvenation may inspire theorists and
practitioners. A single case study cannot test theory, but can
(modestly) help develop them. We suggest that Novotel’s story
corroborates some existing frameworks about managing radical
strategic change; suggests some important parameters that mod-
erate relationships between managerial actions and success; and
stimulates the search for an integrative and dialectical theory.

Developing theories
First, there is a strand of writing that emphasises the multifaceted
systemic process of change. Tichy’s Three Stranded Rope presents
the technical, political and cultural dimensions of change pro-
cesses, and Johnson comes even closer to our three strands of
cognitive, political and symbolic.45 When describing the practice
of change, we believe it is important to show our three dimen-
sions. Most managerial actions have a multidimensional charac-
ter. For example, when an organisation forms a complementary
and motivated top team, its actions will have cognitive, political
and symbolic implications and effects. Our case shows how the
three dimensions appear many times.
Second, the Novotel story shows the importance of timing
when theorising about strategic change. We already drew atten-
tion to theoretical frameworks that include time as a moderator
of effectiveness, and noted that when change is too slow it fails
the competitive test, and when it is too fast it often results in
instability. We also draw attention to the frameworks that argue
for a sequence of actions. For instance that simplification must
precede building the new. Such views are exemplified in the
Baden-Fuller and Stopford crescendo model that has both
sequence and rhythm in its outlook.46
Timing may depend on a combination of internal and external
factors that are partially within and partially outside the control
of top managers.47 A careful analysis of the scenario facing Novo-
tel highlights four parameters that define its particular circum-
stances at the outset of the change process. (1) The internal polit-
ical forces were favourable to change, and (2) being part of a
large group, Accor, gave a high flexibility in terms of resources.
Specifically at the end of 1992 the majority of hotels’ general
managers asked for more autonomy and freedom to innovate,
and financial and human resources (job rotation) could be nego-
tiated with the corporate level. Then (3) the top management
built the sense of pressure (declining performance and increased
competition) to stimulate the will to change; and finally (4) Nov-
otel still had sufficient resources for top management initiative
to be offensive. By offensive we mean the ability to regain the
competitive advantage and leadership, as opposed to being

798 Managing Change at Novotel

defensive and running after industry leaders. An offensive strat-
egy has different timing from a defensive strategy: one can lead
and the other usually follows. In sum, the circumstances were
favourable for the kinds of strategic choice that John Child dis-
cusses where organisational agents enjoy a kind of ‘bounded’
autonomy: they can take initiatives without being completely
limited by the environment in which they are operating.48 We
suggest that these favourable circumstances may explain the
remarkable speed of Novotel’s rejuvenation and radical change
processes. The possibility of achieving fast change may be con-
siderably reduced if some or all of the parameters are reversed.
For example different outcomes may occur if there was strong
internal political resistance; and (or) there was little flexibility
in internal resources; and (or) there was a serious deficiency of
capabilities that made the business lag behind competition. Like- An offensive strategy
wise, not having a strong external crisis gave managers more
room for manoeuvre, albeit with less incentive to do something. has different timing
Third and most important, we believe that our story sheds
insight into a dialectical framework on change. Dialectical pro- from a defensive
cesses of organisational change are often described as a conflict
between two (or more) entities who have opposing views that strategy
are resolved through a synthesis.49 At Novotel the tension
between many hotel general managers who wanted more auto-
nomy and the top management stimulated the change process.
Later on tensions between the past and the future, and between
global standardisation and local differentiation stimulated the
search of creative solutions. In the case of Novotel the dialectical
movement was not destructive (the defeat of one entity by the
other), it was characterised by the preservation of original con-
cepts (or forces) in the synthesis within a single complex
thought.50 This process recalls the dynamics of change described
by Charles Hampden-Turner as the resolution of dilemma.51 It
is important to note that, in the case of Novotel, the tensions
between the opposite forces were maintained after the synthesis.
In other words the tensions never stop, and the synthesis does
not mean closure.52
We do not wish to construct here a theory of dialectical move-
ment, but we suggest that Merleau Ponty’s concept of ‘hyperdia-
lectics’ could help clarify the nature of the creative tensions
experienced at Novotel.53 Hyperdialectics stresses creative ten-
sions between opposites (here organisational characteristics), and
the coexistence of the opposites. In this case, it is ambivalence
that appeared to characterise Novotel’s rejuvenation.

Inspiring practice
Practice does not just require good theory, but concrete examples
with methods and outcomes. The Novotel story tells us that any-
one, or organisation group, interested in questioning its identity
could learn something from consulting ethnographers, especially
if the challenge of the change is to go back to the future. It tells
us that managing change in tandem, as Pélisson and Brizon did,
may be a very strong concept that can be used elsewhere. Regular

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 799

 uses of open-space meetings that help express dissatisfaction
from the bottom up, in a constructive manner, may be a very
powerful device to stimulate smooth revolutions. These and
many other concrete ideas from the Novotel story can be used
in other places and circumstances.
As far as frameworks are concerned, those who have to orches-
trate a change process may be inspired by the following guide-
lines derived from this case-study.

# Assess the four parameters that influence the speed of change

and the politics of the project. Are internal political forces
favourable? Is there a flexibility in resources? Will the environ-
ment permit latitude in the chosen courses of action? Can the
organisation be offensive or must it be defensive? When they
are favourable, fast change may be accomplished more easily.

# Design a systemic set of actions that matches cognition, poli-

tics and symbolism into a single framework. The Novotel
actions described in Table 3 are obviously particular, but may
be a useful starting point.

# Design and control the dynamics of the change process over

time. The crescendo model proposed by Baden-Fuller and
Stopford may well apply: galvanise, simplify, build and lever-
age. Whether the project is moving slowly or quickly, we know
of several other organisations that failed because the sequence
and rhythm of destruction (simplification) and creation
(building) were not adequate. In more concrete terms, there
were cases where the redundancies and divestments (cutting)
were not followed by a sufficient intensity of grafting and
growing.

# Understand change as a dialectical process, and adopt dialecti-

cal instead of binary logic. This is not easy, as it touches the
cognitive structures of change masters and relates to their
ability to accept dialogue instead of imposing discourse
through traditional rhetoric. It is not easy as it implies that
the process will be both deliberate and emergent; orchestrated
and improvised.

Although we separated the text on theorising and practice, all

in all, these practical guidelines are very similar to the theory
developments suggested above. The only difference is that they
are expressed in different words with a different style. In short,
from the Novotel story, academics may see the value of organic
theories that are synthetic and integrative rather than mechan-
istic.54 Practitioners may also retain a framework that signals the
complexity of managing change BUT simplifies the task to
guide actions.

800 Managing Change at Novotel

References We are grateful to the executives
1. A. H. Van de Ven and M. S. Poole, Explaining development of Novotel for their assistance
and change in organizations, Academy of Management Review during the preparation of the
20(3), 510–540 (1995). case. We are also grateful to
2. A. H. Van de Ven, H. L. Angle and M. S. Poole (eds), Henk Volberda, senior editor, for
Research on the Management of Innovation: The Minnesota guiding the paper through the
Studies, Harper & Row, New York (1989); C. Smith, J. Child review process and accepting it
and M. Rowlinson, Reshaping Work, The Cadbury Experience, for publication, and we thank
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1990). the two anonymous reviewers
3. For more about Formula One, see for instance: Value inno- for their helpful and insightful
vation: the strategic logic of high growth, Harvard Business comments. The authors are
Review January–February, 102–115 (1997). responsible for any remaining
4. Our perspective encompasses those who also look at inertia, shortcomings.
such as D. Leonard-Barton, Core capabilities and core rigid-
ities: a paradox in managing new product development, Stra-
tegic Management Journal 13, 111–125 (1992); M. T. Hannan
and J. H. Freeman, Structural inertia and organizational
change, American Sociological Review 49, 149–164 (1984),
and more recently, R. Henderson and K. Clark, Architectural
innovation: the reconfiguration of existing product techno-
logies and the failure of existing firms, Administrative Science
Quarterly 35, 9–30 (1990).
5. Van de Ven and Poole (1995) (see Reference 1).
6. See European Case Clearing House no 395-113-1 Novotel and
B. Hunt, C. Baden-Fuller and R. Calori, Novotel, in R. C.
Lewis, Cases in Hospitality Strategy and Policy, pp. 375–403,
Wiley, New York (1998).
7. See 1991 Accor annual report.
8. See for instance B. J. Pine, Mass Customization, Harvard
Business Press, Boston.
9. see Reference 6.
10. According to the Accor annual reports, first, we establish
that Accor, which posted a loss of FF264 million in 1994,
regained profitability in 1995 thanks in part to the achieve-
ments at Novotel.
11. See Reference 3.
12. See recent annual reports. These figures are the adjusted
numbers.
13. There are those which emphasise financial turnround such
as Grinyer, Hayes and McKirnan, Sharp Benders: The Secrets
of Unleashing Corporate Potential, Blackwell, Oxford (1988).
Some emphasise renewal of the corporation, through the
buying or selling of units such as Markides. Others, more
relevant here discuss the reorientation of the strategic dimen-
sions of the business, and they include C. Baden-Fuller and
J. M. Stopford, Rejuvenating the Mature Business, Harvard
Business Press, Boston (1994).
14. See for instance the 1994 Accor annual report.
15. See for instance: R. Calori and T. Atamer, How French man-
agers deal with radical changes, Long Range Planning 23, 44–
55 (1990); and Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1994) (see Refer-
ence 13).

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 801

 16. See for instance D. K. Hurst, J. C. Rush and R. E. White,
Top management teams and organizational renewal, Strategic
Management Journal 10, 87–105 (1989).
17. See Calori and Atamer (see Reference 15).
18. See for instance: R. M. Grant, The resource based view of
competitive advantage, California Management Review 33(3),
114–135 (1991).
19. P. M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline, The Art and Practice of the
Learning Organization, Doubleday, New York (1990).
20. I. C. MacMillan, The politics of new venture management,
Harvard Business Review November–December, 8–16 (1983).
21. See for instance Kaplan and Norton (1996).
22. According to a later annual report of Accor.
23. A. M. Pettigrew, The Politics of Organizational Decision-mak-
ing, Tavistock, London (1973).
24. See Calori and Atamer (see Reference 15).
25. G. Johnson, Strategic Change and the Management Process,
Blackwell, Oxford (1987).
26. See for instance the literature on re-engineering.
27. Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1994) (see Reference 13).
28. See Johnson (1987) (see Reference 25).
29. Several simplifications were painful for several managers who
lost their job, however job opportunities were offered in
other divisions of Accor.
30. D. Miller, The Icarus Paradox, Harper Collins, New York
(1990).
31. See Referencee 22.
32. A. J. Meyer, P. J. Frost and K. E. Weick, 1998. The Organiza-
tion Science Jazz Festival: improvisation as a metaphor for
organizing, Organization Science 9(5), 540–542 (1998); J. B.
Quinn, Strategies for change: Logical incrementalism, Irwin,
Homewood, IL (1980).
33. J. L. Bower, Planning and control: bottom-up or top-down?,
Journal of General Management 1(3), 20–31 (1974).
34. H. Mintzberg and J. A. Waters, Of strategies, deliberate and
emergent, Strategic Management Journal 6(3), 257–272
(1985).
35. R. A. Burgelmann, Intraorganizational ecology of strategy
making and organizational adaptation: theory and field
research, Organization Science 2(3), 239–262 (1991).
36. I. Vandangeon-Derumez, Changement prescrit et
changement construit: La conduite des processus de
changement et les logiques d’actions sous-jacentes, VIIIème
Conférence Internationale de Management Stratégique,
Ecole Centrale, Paris (1999).
37. P. R. Lawrence and J. W. Lorsch, Organization and Environ-
ment, Harvard University Press, Boston, MA (1967) and C.
K. Prahalad and Y. L. Doz, The Multinational Mission: Bal-
ancing Local Demands and Global Vision, The Free Press,
New York (1987).
38. G. Bateson, Naven, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge (1936).

802 Managing Change at Novotel

39. B. L. T. Hedberg, P. C. Nyström and W. H. Starbuck, Camp-
ing on seesaws: Prescriptions for a self-designing organiza-
tion, Administrative Science Quarterly 21, 41–64 (1976).
40. R. Calori, Philosophies of becoming and relating. 15th EGOS
Colloquium, Warwick Business School, Coventry, UK, July
(1999).
41. See H. Volberda, Building the Flexible Firm, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford (1998) and H. Volberda, Towards the
flexible form, Organization Science 7, 359–374 (1996).
42. K. E. Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2nd edn,
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA (1979); and K. E. Weick,
Management of organizational change among loosely
coupled elements, in P. S. Goodman and Associates (Eds.),
Change in Organizations: New Perspectives in Theory, Research
and Practice, pp. 345–408, Jossey Bass, San Francisco (1982).
43. H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, University Press of America,
Lanham, MD (1907) (1983 edition).
44. See Calori (1999) (see Reference 40).
45. See for instance: N. M. Tichy and M. A. Devanna, The trans-
formational Leader, Wiley, New York (1986); N. M. Tichy,
Managing Strategic Change, Wiley, New York (1983); John-
son (1987) (see Reference 25); and Calori and Atamer (1990)
(see Reference 15).
46. See Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1994) (see Reference 13).
47. The literature on punctuated versus incremental innovation
emphasises the importance of the environmental forces in
determining the speed of change, see for instance: M. L.
Tushman and E. Romanelli, Organizational evolution: a
metamorphosis model of convergence, in L. L. Cummings
and B. L. Staw (eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior,
vol. 7, pp. 171–222, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT (1985); and
A. Dean, Y. Carlisle and C. Baden-Fuller, Punctuated and
continuous change: the UK water industry, British Journal of
Management 10, S3–S18 (1999).
48. J. Child, Organizational structure, environment and per-
formance: the role of strategic choice, Sociology 6, 1–22
(1972).
49. See for instance Van den Ven and Poole (1995) (see Refer-
ence 1).
50. See G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, Humanities Press Inter-
national, Atlantic Highlands, NJ (1816) (1989 edition); J. W.
Burbidge, 1993. Hegel’s conception of logic, in F. B. Beiser
(Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, pp. 86–101, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge (1993).
51. C. Hampden-Turner, Charting the Corporate Mind, from
Dilemma to Strategy, Free Press, New York (1990).
52. See Calori (1999) (see Reference 40).
53. According to Merleau Ponty (1968), “The opposites, no
longer in competition, are at rest the one against the other,
unextensive with one another ”, “And the dialectical move-
ment becomes pure identity of the opposites, ambivalence
…. And there is no good dialectic but that which criticises

Long Range Planning, vol 33 2000 803

 itself and surpasses itself as a separate statement; the only
good dialectics is the hyperdialectics …. What we call hyperd-
ialectics is a thought that, on the contrary, is capable of
reaching truth because it envisages without restriction the
plurality of the relationships and what has been called ambi-
guity”.
54. H. Tsoukas, Refining common sense: types of knowledge in
management studies, Journal of Management Studies 31(6),
761–780 (1994); and R. Calori, Philosophizing on strategic
management models, Organization Studies 19(2), 281–306
(1998).

804 Managing Change at Novotel