INTRODUCTION

Importance Of Land Registration

One of the importance of land registration is to protect property rights. Once a title is registered the owner may rest
secure in the knowledge that recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. All claims to the
parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate.

GOVERNING LAW

Property Registration Decree (PD 1529)

Sec. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. - Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands
throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the
Torrens System. Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration
of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through
its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits,
orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of
stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.

In rem - A lawsuit against an item of property, not against a person; An action in rem is directed towards a property
rather than against a person.

Sec. 3. Status of other pre-existing land registration system. - The system of registration under the Spanish
Mortgage Law is hereby discontinued and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens
title shall be considered as unregistered lands. Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under
the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 113 of this Decree, until the land shall have been brought
under the operation of the Torrens System.

Laws Codified

The Public Land Act (CA No. 141 [later])

The law, which was passed in 1903, governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands.

The Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States.

The term “public land” referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government
and are open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands.

CA No. 141, approved November 7, 1936, applies to lands of the public domain which have been declared open to
disposition or concession and officially delimited and classified. It contains provisions on the different modes of
government grant, e.g., homesteads, sale, free patents (administrative legalization), and reservations for public and
semi-public purpose.

The Land Registration Act (Act No. 496)

It established the Torrens system of registration in the country. The purpose of the Act was to bring the land titles in
the Philippines under one comprehensive and harmonious system, the cardinal features of which are indefeasibility
of title and the intervention of the State as a prerequisite to the creation and transfer of titles and interests, with
the resultant increase in the use of land as a business asset by reason of the greater certainty and security of title.

The Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259)

To have titles to all lands in the stated area adjudicated, upon the initiative of the government. The principal aim is to
settle as much as possible all disputes over the land and to remove all clouds over the land titles as far as practicable,
in a community. Nature of a proceeding in rem.

LEGAL BASIS AND NATURE OF LAND REGISTRATION

Regalian Doctrine

Under the Regalian Doctrine, lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land. 1) All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership, 2) public lands
not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the
State and 3) all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
State as part of the inalienable public domain.

This doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.

Concept

Sec. of DENR vs Yap (GR No. 167707, October 6, 2008) [consolidated case]

FACTS:
On Novermber 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued a proclamation declaring Boracay Island as tourist
zones and marine reserves. This proclamation and its implementing circular raised doubts on the respondents on
their right to secure title over their occupied land in Boracay. They then filed a petition for declaratory relief. They
claim that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial; that the
proclamation and its implementing circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. According to them,
since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. They also allege that under
the Public Land Act, they had right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. He countered
that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as
"public forest", which was not available for disposition. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

During the pendency of the case, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroya issued a proclamation classifying Boracay
Island into a reserved forest land and certain parts as agricultural land.

Another group of petitioners filed a petition the nullication of said proclamation since the same infringed on their
prior vested right over portions of Boracay. They claims that they have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.

The OSG opposed their petition and argued that petitioners did not have vested right over their property since
Boracay is an unclassified public forest land.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a right to secure titles over right occupied portions in Boracay Island by way
of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. PLA

HELD:
In discussing the merits of the case, the Supreme Court mentioned that our present land law traces its roots to the
Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in
the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.

Under the Regalian Doctrine, lands of the public domain belong to the State: All lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership and all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain; and
Before these inalienable land of public domain becomes alienable and disposable, there must be a positive act from
the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.
A person applying for registration or claiming ownership of a land must overcome the presumption of State
ownership by proving with irrefutable evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

Applying these principles to the case, petitioners [now respondents] were not able to present to the court any statute
or proclamation showing that the lands they occupied were claimants were subject of a government proclamation
that the land is alienable and disposable. Hence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by
private claimants were already open to disposition.

Respondents reliance on an old case is misplaced since this case were decided when there was no provision vesting in
the President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural
so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.

Respondents continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. And such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. Issued by
president marcos. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto
considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

Proclamation made by then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. There is
nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in the Circular to
"private lands" and "areas declared as alienable and disposable" does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. THe circular makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands and
merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA
No. 141. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It
does not address the areas' alienability.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to
private ownership. Therefore, private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two
requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification
of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do
they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law.

There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain

Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess. For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim
good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another,
they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead 131 or sales
patent, 132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.

Republic vs Munoz (GR No. 151910, Oct. 15, 2007)

FACTS:

On June 14, 1996, Respondent applied for registration of title. In his title claimed that the property was donated by
his parents who have been in possession thereof since time immemorial. Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, opposed the application on the grounds, among others, that the parcel applied for is part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent has proven by competent evidence that the property is alienable and
disposable property of the public domain.
HELD:

Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. Therefore, all lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the alienable public
domain.

No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and
(1) it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the
State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. (2) To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government
that the land applied for is alienable and disposable. memorize

In the present case, respondent failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the
land subject for registration is indeed alienable and disposable.

A CENRO certificate, which respondent failed to secure, could have evidenced the alienability of the land involved.
Considering that respondent has failed to convince this Court of the alienable and disposable character of the land
applied for, the Court cannot approve the application for registration.

RURAL BANK of ANDA vs RCALD (GR No. 155051, May 29, 2007, citing Lee Hong Hok vs David)

FACTS:
There is a disputed lot in located in Pangasinan. This lot is being claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of
Binmaley.

In 1997, the local council of Binmaley passed and approved a resolution converting the subject from an institutional
lot to a commercial and authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural
Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736. So the lot was fenced and construction worked started. After the director of
the seminary discovered this, he had a discussion with the mayor about the situation and they agreed that the
construction of the building should stop but a year later, the mayor informed him that work on the building will
resume but he is willing to discuss with respondent on how to resolve the disputed lot.

Respondent filed a complaint for abatement of illegal constructions. The trial court found that Lot 736 is not covered
by any Torrens title either in the name of respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The trial court
held that Lot 736 is public in nature. CA agreed with the trial court.

ISSUED: Whether or not the resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan are invalid.

HELD:

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has never
been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the
public domain and is owned by the state.

Citing a ruling in the Hong Hok vs David case, the court held that no public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and (1) it is indispensable that the person claiming title
to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by
law. (2) To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation,an executive order a legislative act
or a statute.

This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and waters of the public
domain. Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the state."
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior grant from the
government. Since the land is owned by the state, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and
the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.

Cruz vs Sec. of DENR

FACTS:
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) on the ground that it amounts to an unlawful deprivation of the State’ s ownership over lands of public domain
and all other natural resources therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of Indigenous Cultural Communities or
Indigenous People (ICCs/IPs) to the their ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the basis of native title.

Petitioners also content that certains sections of the act violate the rights of private landowners, by providing for an
all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas.

Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the
right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources
therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

Respondents file their comments through the Solicitor General, who, is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that
the petition be granted in part.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act is unconstitutional.

HELD:

After due deliberation on the petitioner, seven members of the court voted to dismiss the petition while seven
members of the court voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary
majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Justice Puno in discussin his opinion wrote that the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional
mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to
correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.

The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the
country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas.

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands by
issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian.[5] Private land titles could only be
acquired from the government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown.

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.The Spanish Mortgage
Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.

Under our present Constitution, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein,
whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is
being violated by the IPRA.

The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way
of life.[96] This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal
Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and
domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of individual land
ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental
policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not
inexistent.

SECTION 2, ARTICLE XII, 1987 CONSTITUTION

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

NATIVE TITLE: EXCEPTION TO REGALIAN DOCTRINE

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far
back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership
peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands
and domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are,
therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.

Cariño vs Insular Gov’t

FACTS:

This was an application to the Philippine court of land registration for the registration of certain land. The application
was granted by the court but on appeal the CFI dismissed the application upon grounds of law. The applicant and
plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the
treaty of Paris. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle,
according to the custom of the country, some of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date. His father
had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had
been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father, in accordance
with Igorot custom.

ISSUE:

HELD:
Cariño institutionalized the concept of native title, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under
a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception
to the theory of jura regalia.

As stated in Cariño: “Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has
been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way
from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”

The applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of
those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.

TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION

VENUE

Real actions – when the action affects title to or possession of real property and the action must be filed in the court
having territorial jurisdiction of the real property.
Ex: land registration proceeding
Personal actions – when the property involved is personal property and the action may be filed where the plaintiff or
defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

PARTIES

In an in rem proceeding, all the world are parties to the proceeding while in an personam proceeding, only specific
individuals or defendants are privy to the proceeding.

TITLE vs CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

You’re title is the foundation of ownership while certificate of title is a mere piece of paper evidencing your
ownership to that title. To prove that we indeed own the title, we need to have a certificate of title be issued in our
favor.

DISTINCTION

Title is defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of
ownership of property, real or personal.
Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.
Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of
the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original registration.

CASTILLO vs ESCUTIN

FACTS:
- Petitioner Castillo as a judgment creditor of Raquel, proceeded to levy on execution a Lot 13713, covered by a only
by tax declaration in the name of Raquel and two co-owners. The Register of Deeds issued a certification that the
subject lot is not covered by a certificate of title.
- Petitioner also learned that this lot was inside the Summit Point Subdivision owned by Summit Realty. When she
inquired from their President about the subject lot, the latter was not able to show her any document to prove
ownership of Lot 13713.
- The public auction sale of this lot proceed and petitioner bought Raquel’s share in Lot 13713 which was the
recorded in accordance with Act No. 3344. She was also issued a Tax Declaration No.
- When peititioner Castillo attempted to pay the real estate taxes for the subject lot, she found out (without being
informed) that her Tax Declaration No. was cancelled as the lot was said to be part of Lot 1-B, covered by a TCT and a
Tax Declaration No. issued in the name of Catigbac. The TCT issued to Catigbac was eventually cancelled and a new
TCT was issued to Summit Reatly.
- This prompted her to file a complaint chargin several public officials with conspiracy in cancelling her TD and issuing
a TCT to Catigbac.
ISSUE:

HELD:
- Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B because it purchase the same from Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, the
registered owner of the property. They then sought the issuance of the new owner’s duplicate of TCT 181 so it could
register its sale. Thus eventually a new TCT was issued in the name of Summit Realty.
- The cancellation of petitioner’s TD was because Lot 1-B encompasses the lot petitioner lays claims to, which is
covered by a TCT.
- A certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. All persons must take notice,
and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.
- And since Lot 1-B is already covered by a TD in the name of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax declaration for the
same property in the name of another person, not supported by any certificate of title, must be cancelled. Otherwise,
the City Assessor would be twice collecting realty tax from different persons on the same property.
- As between Catigbac's title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioner's title, evidenced only by a tax
declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same
property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbac's ownership of Lot 1-B.
- the Court has ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or
ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the same. (td=proof of possession)

TYPES OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE

Original certificate of title – is the first title issued over the unregistered land.
Transfer certificate of title – is the subsequent title that is issued upon the cancellation of the previous.

LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND ITS REGISTRIES OF DEEDS (Chapter II, Sections 4-13)

Chief = Commissioner
- Appointed by the President
- Duly qualified member of the Philippines Bar (at least 10 years in practice in the legal profession)
- Same rank, compensation and privileges as those of a Judge of the RTC
Assistant Chief = Deputy Commissioner
- Same qualification as the Commissioner
- Receive compensation three thousand pesos per annum less than that of the Commissioner
- Act as the commissioner during the absence or disability of the Commissioner and when there is a vacancy in
the position until another person shall have been designated or appointed in accordance with law.
General functions of the Commissioner:
- Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land registration proceedings and
cause the issuance by the Registers of Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title;
- Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the Courts of First Instance
throughout the Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and functions in relation to the
registration of lands;

FUNCTIONS OF LRA
- Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank, and other
agencies in the implementation of the land reform program of the government;
- Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings;
- Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands titled under the Torrens
system, including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands.

EO 292, SECTION 29. Organizational Structure. — The Authority shall be headed by an Administrator who shall be
assisted by two (2) Deputy Administrators, all of whom shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary.

PD 1529 Chapter II, SECTION 7.Office of the Register of Deeds. — There shall be at least one Register of Deeds for
each province and one for each city. Every Registry with a yearly average collection of more than sixty thousand
pesos during the last three years shall have one Deputy Register of Deeds, and every Registry with a yearly average
collection of more than three hundred thousand pesos during the last three years, shall have one Deputy Register of
Deeds and one second Deputy Register of Deeds.

SECTION 6.General Functions. —

(1)The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the following functions:

(a)Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land registration proceedings and
cause the issuance by the Registers of Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title;
(b)Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other personnel of the Commission;
(c)Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of, Registers of Deeds;
(d)Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the Courts of First Instance
throughout the Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and functions in relation to the
registration of lands;
(e)Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the registration of lands and issue,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefor;
(f)Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties
titled under Act No. 496 except those covered by P.D. No. 957.

MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE LRA TO ISSUE DECREES

GR- The duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial.
- It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with
the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter.
EXC- However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is
their duty to refer the matter to the court.
- They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the
court.

GOMEZ vs CA

FACTS:
- Petitioner (heirs of Teodoro Gomez: father of Consolacion)applied for registration of several lots (1-12;15,16,34,41)
which they inherited from Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion owned these lots by virtue of a court declaration in
another case (GPI vs Abran).
- On August 1981, the court rendered a decision adjudicated the subject lots in favor of the petitioner.
-On October of that same year, trial court issued an order declaring the August 1981 as final and directed the Chief of
the GLRO to issue the corresponding decree of registration .
- On July 1984, respondent Silverio Perez, Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission,
submitted a report stating that the subject lots (15, 16, 34, 41) were already covered by a homestead patent issued in
1928 and 1929 and registered under the LRA.
- Petitioners opposed the report, claiming that there was no opposition during the registration proceeding and as the
decision of August 1981 had become final and executory, the decree of registration must be issued as a matter of
course
ISSUE: WON Silverio have no alternative but to issue the decrees of registration as decreed on August and October of
1981, their duty to do so being purely ministerial;
HELD:
- The duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial in the sense that they
act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the
data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in
relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court.
- In the instance case, the land registration official found out that the lots covered by the decree were already
covered by a homestead patent, so it his his duty to inform the court of his findins, otherwise it would result to a
double titling over the same parcel of land.

Adjudication:
- Adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding only becomes final after the expiration of one
year after the entry of the final decree of registration.
- As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission and the period of one (1) year
has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.

On the contention that Silversio should have submitted the report to the court before the decision became final:
- They would be putting land registration officials into an unnecessary pressure which would result in haphazardly
prepared report just to beat the deadline.
- It has been previously held that the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to
the period before the court's decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but not beyond the lapse
of one (1) year from the entry of the decree
ANGELES vs JUSTICE

FACTS:
- On May 1965 Petitioner Fidela Angeles together with other individuals, all of them claiming to be heirs of a certain
Maria Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her share in a parcel of land otherwise known as the
Maysilo Estate (105,969 sq.m.), covered by OCT 994 and allegedly registered on April 1917, filed a civil action for
partition and accounting of said property.
- Some the heirs were able to get a TCT over the estate. This led the court to believe that OCT 994 was registered
twice: On April 1917 and May 1917;
- The court granted the partition and accounting and directed the register of Deeds (Caloocan; Quezon) to issue
transfer certificates of title in the name of all the co-owners, including petitioners.
- But then the register of Deeds refused to comply with the order because they were still awaiting word from the LRA
administrator before proceeding.
- The LRA administrator then sent a letter to petitioner informing them that in view of a DOJ directive that there is
only 1 OCT 994 which was issued on May 1917 and NOT on April 1917. There was also a Senate hearing regarding the
subject lot and they found that OCT 994 was issued or registered on May 1917 and that OCT 994 dated April 1917 is
non-existent; The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heir of the late Maria Vidal as
government findings showed the physical and genetic impossibility of such relationship; There were former registrar
of deeds who fraudulently issued certifications to the effect that OCT 994 was issued on April 1917; As early as 1917,
the subject property has already been partitioned and divided among the true owners.
- Petitioner argues that once a decision has become final, the court can no longer amend, much less set aside the
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LRA or Register of Deeds neglected to perform their duties to issue the TCT to petitioners.
HELD: No
- The issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find
that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land.
- Otherwise, such issuance may contravene the policy and destroy the integrity of the Torrens system of registration
- In the case at bar, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled with the RTC order since there were existing TCT
covering the subject parcels of land . AND
- They had sufficient basis (LRA circular, Senate Report, previous SC ruling: Manotok case) that OCT 994 dated April
1917 which the plaintiff anchored their rights, did not exist.

REGISTER OF DEEDS

FUNCTIONS

- is the public repository of records of instruments AFFECTING registered or unregistered lands and chattel
mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated.
- to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property
which complies with all the requisites for registration.
- If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of
such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by
consulta

GURBAX SINGH vs REYES

FACTS:
- Petitioners Gurbax Singh and others entered into a contract of lease with John Tan Chin Eng in which the former
would construct a building on the latter’s land and the sum spent in the construction would be considered as rentals.
That after a certain period they would start paying rentals and eventually the the building becomes the property of
the landowner.
- At the time they signed the contract, there was an existing mortage over the land in favor of the Calvos which was
cancelled and a new mortgage was executed in favor of Respondent Reyes.
- Petitioners Gurbax Singh requested to respondent Reyes to allow them to take the certificates of title to the office
of the Register of Deeds in order for them to annotate their contract of lease. Respondent’s son informed petitioners
that they request could not be granted until the owner of the land pays his overdue interest first.
- Petitioners filed a motion praying that an order be issued to compel the mortgagee to deliver the certificate of titles
to petitioner in order that the RoD can annotate their contract of lease.
Respondent opposed claiming that the contract of lease violated the provision of the mortgage in that the owner
could not encumber the mortgaged property w/o the consent of the mortgagee.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a right to have said deeds registered.
HELD: Yes
- The purpose of registering an instrument is to give notice thereof to all persons.
- A subsequent registration does not destroy or otherwise affect already registered rights over the land, subsisting
at the time of the registration.

-The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be registered.
-How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know of their invalidity before they become aware, actually or
constructively, of their existence or of their provisions?
- If the purpose of registration is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or invalidity of
instruments are expected to be decided after, not before, registration.
- Motion for the surrender of the certificates of title for the registration of the contracts of lease is granted.

BALBIN vs REGISTER OF DEEDS

FACTS:
- Petitioners, who appeared to be donees of 2/3 an undivided land (donated by Cornelio Balbin), presented a
duplicated copy of the owner’s OCT and the deed of donation to the register of deeds to have the instrument be
annotated on the title.
- The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in
law" as there are 3 other duplicate titles of the land from three previous sale involving 3 different individuals.
- When petitioners referred the matter to the Commission of Land Registration, the latter agreed with the register of
deeds and concluded that as there are 3 other duplicated copies of the title, these duplicated must likewise be
surrendered to the register of deeds.
- Petitioners contend that only the owners copy needs to be presented and the duplicated copies were issued illegally
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the Register of Deeds to deny the application
HELD: Yes
- The SC court agreed with the findings of the Register of Deeds and the Commission of Land Registration in that since
there are 3 other duplicate copies of the title, the same should also be surrendered to the RD, otherwise, each
different duplicate would carry a different annotation. Such would destroy the integrity and reliability of the
Torrens system of registration.
- Also the property is presumed to be conjugal but the instrument of conveyance bears the signature of only one
spouse. (the donor might be donating more than his/her share in the conjugal property)

INSTANCES WHERE REGISTER OF DEEDS MAY DENY THE REGISTRATION

1) When there are several copies of the owner’s title and only one is presented with the instrument to be
registered.
2) When the property is presumed to be conjugal but the instrument of conveyance bears the signature of only
one spouse.
3) When there is a pending case in court where the character of the land and validity of the conveyance are in
issue.

REMEDY

Where any party in interest does not agree with the register of deeds, the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration, whose ruling on the matter shall be binding upon all register of deeds. If the
party disagrees with the decision of the Commissioner, he may appeal to the Court of Appeals within the period and
in the manner provided in Republic Act No. 5434.

ALMIROL vs RoD

FACTS:
- Petitioner Almirol purchase a parcel of land from Arcenio Abalo and covered by a certificate of title in the name of
Arcenio and his Nicolasa.
- When petitioner attempted to register the deed of sale and secure a certificate of title in his name, he was refused
by the register of deeds on the grounds that the subject lot is considered a conjugal property and since his wife
already died, 1) the property must be liquidated and transferred in the name of the surviving spouse and the heirs of
the deceased wife; 2) the consent must be heirs with regards to the sale must be obtained first.
- Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus to compel the register of deeds to register the sale and issue the
corresponding certificate of title, claiming that respondents duty is but ministerial and he has no other remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
- Respondent in his answer, argued that petitioner has other remedy at law by the appealing the decision of the
respondent to the Commissioner of Land Registration.

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the register of deeds to register the deed of sale.
HELD:
- The court held that a register of deeds is precluded exercising his discretion when confronted with the problem of
whether to register the deed or not on the ground that it is invalid.
- When he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed presented to him for registration, all
that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall,
after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.
- However, this notwithstanding, the petition for mandamus is denied as administrative remedy must be resorted
first by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.

SECTION 177 PD 1529

SECTION 117.Procedure. — When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration,
or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any
such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds,
or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds.

Where the instrument is denied registration, the Register of Deeds shall notify the interested party in writing, setting
forth the defects of the instrument or legal grounds relied upon, and advising him that if he is not agreeable to such
ruling, he may, without withdrawing the documents from the Registry, elevate the matter by consulta within five
days from receipt of notice of the denial of registration to the Commissioner of Land Registration upon payment of a
consulta fee in such amount as shall be prescribed by the Commissioner of Land Registration.

The Register of Deeds shall make a memorandum of the pending consulta on the certificate of title which shall be
cancelled motu proprio by the Register of Deeds after final resolution or decision thereof, or before resolution, if
withdrawn by petitioner.

The Commissioner of Land Registration, considering the consulta and the records certified to him after notice to the
parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His resolution
or ruling in consultas shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds, provided, that the party in interest
who disagrees with the final resolution, ruling or order of the Commissioner relative to consultas may appeal to the
Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner provided in Republic Act No. 5434

EFFECT OF REGISTRATION OF AN INVALID INSTRUMENT

- The act of registration does not validate an otherwise void instrument.

- Registration is a mere ministerial act by which an instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office
of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed,
contract, or instrument.
- While it operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others, 1) it does not add to its validity nor 2)
converts an invalid instrument into a valid one as between the parties, nor 3) amounts to a declaration by the state
that the instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in the land. 4) The registration of a void instrument is not an
impediment to a declaration by the courts of its invalidity.

ORIGINAL REGISTRATION

WHO MAY APPLY

SECTION 14.Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1)Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2)Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3)Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion
under the existing laws.
(4)Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original
registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the
registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be
substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless
prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

INITIATOR OF ACTION

In registration under the Public Land Act, Property Registration Decree and Indigenous Peoples Rights Act is
voluntary, the person claiming ownership initiates the action, while registration under the Cadastral, it is the
government itself, which initiates the petition.

EFFECT OF CO-OWNERSHIP

Since a co-owner cannot be consi- dered a true owner of a specific portion until division or partition is effected, he
cannot file an application for registration of the whole area without joining the co-owners as applicants.

SALES WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE

It is to be noted that a sale with pacto de retro transfers the legal title to the vendee and the vendee is subrogated to
all the rights and actions of the vendor, subject to the latter’’s right of redemption. Having the legal title to the land,
the vendee a retro has therefore a registrable title thereto which may be the subject of initial registration. The right
to redeem the property retained by the vendor a retro should only be noted in the decree and certificate of title that
may be issued.

REQUISITES FOR REGISTRATION

There are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) —
1) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation,
2) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and;
3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

REPUBLIC vs CA/NAGUIT

FACTS:
- Respondent Naguit applied for registration of a parcel of land. The application also seeks judicial confirmataion of
respondent’s imperfect title over the land.
- On the initial hearing, the public prosecutor appeared for the government and the heirs of Angeles also opposed the
petition.
- During the trial, it was revealed that the land was originally declared for taxation purposes by Urbano from 1945
until 1991. On 1992 he executed a Deed of Quitclaim renouncing all of right over the land and confirming the sale
made by his father to Maming. Subsequently the heirs of Maming sold the lot to respondent Naguit, whose
administrator planted trees in addition to the existing coconut trees that were 50 to 60 years old.
- The court ordered that the title be registered in the name of Naguit.
- The Solicitor General then filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the land applied for was declared as
alienable and disposable on October 1980. Said motion was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is necessary that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before an
applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership begins to start.
HELD: No.
- To sustain the position of the SG general would mean that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length
of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
- It even precludes the government from disposing the land even if it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable.
- The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered
as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
- If at the time the application is made and the land is still inalienable, the presumption is the government is still
reserving the right to use the property. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to relinquish its rights over
the property.
- Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945.
- Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are a good indicator of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
- They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

ALVAREZ VS PICOP

FACTS:
- SEC. 3.Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office.
ISSUE:
HELD:
- The term "claim" in the phrase "claim of ownership" is not a document of any sort.
- The phrase "claim of ownership" means "the possession of a piece of property with the intention of claiming it in
hostility to the true owner".
- It is also defined as "a party's manifest intention to take over land, regardless of title or right".

ONG VS REPUBLIC

FACTS:
- Petitioner Charles Ong filed for an application for registration of a property he and brothers purchase.
In his application he claims that the property was purchase from Spouses Bautista; Said lot is presently unoccupied;
they they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful occupation of the lot in the
concept of owner for more than 30 years.
- Respondent opposed the application arguing that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945
as required by CA 141, amended by PD 1073; that the lot is part of the public domain which cannot be subject of
private appropriation.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
HELD: No.
- Petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
- The earliest tax declaration for that lot was issued in 1971. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership, they constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject
property.
- Even if they will trace the claim of ownership of its alleged predecessors-in-interest back to Spouses Cacho in 1971,
still this would fall short of the required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
- Further, possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law
requires possession and actual occupation.
- Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property.
- In the instance case, petitioners neither actually occupied the lot, and no improvements have been made on said
lot; The most they have even done is visit the lot on several occassions.
- Clearly, petitioner's evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his
predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.
MALABANAN vs REPUBLIC-

FACTS:
- Petitioner Malabanan filed application for land registration over a parcel of land in Cavite. He claims that he had
purchased the property from Velazco and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years.
- During the trial, he presented a certification from CENRO-DENR that the property was “verfied to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per land classification map.
- The trial court approved the application. However, upon appeal, the CA ruled that Malabanan had failed to prove
the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. any period of possession prior to the
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession
ISSUE:
HELD:
- Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.
- There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.
- Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date LATER than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by
virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
- under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to
acquisitive prescription.
- Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, or through extraordinary
prescription of thirty (30) years. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith, as well as just
title.
- Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and
thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
- Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
- Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
- It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law.
- Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription
according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14 (2) falls wholly within the framework
of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified
as public dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
- In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also
be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
- It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over
the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945
or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence — the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular — is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
- Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status
as property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
SECTION 14 (2)Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.

PRESCRIPTION, MEANING

Prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership over a property through the lapse of time in the manner and under the
condition laid down by the law.

The legal basis of acquiring ownership through lapse of time otherwise known as prescription in general is Art. 1106
of the Civil Code. The legal basis of acquiring ownership by individuals over patrimonial property is Art. 1113 of the
Civil Code.

ART 1106 By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and
under the conditions laid down by law. In the same way, rights and actions are lost by prescription.

ART 1113 All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.

ART 1117 Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.

ART 1137 Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

Property of the State or any subdivision not patrimonial in character shall not be subject of prescription. By
implication, if the property is patrimonial then it may be subject of prescription. For so long as it is declared as no
longer intended for public use and development of national wealth then it shall be considered as patrimonial
property.

ARTICLE 420.The following things are property of public dominion:

(1)Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2)Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth

ARTICLE 421.All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial
property.

Art. 420 enumerates the properties which are considered of public domain. Art. 421 tells you that if the property is
not included in the enumeration then that property is considered as patrimonial.

ART 422 Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of
the patrimonial property of the State.

So property owned by the State not belonging to the enumeration in Art. 420 + A and D as classified by the State +
declared as no longer intended for public use and the development of national wealth = PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY

TYPES OF PRESCRIPTION

1) Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription – acquisition of patrimonial property through possession of at least 10 yrs
in good faith and with just title.
2) Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription – acquisition of patrimonial property through uninterrupted adverse
possession for at least 30 yrs regardless of good faith and just title.

GOOD FAITH vs BAD FAITH

Possessor in Good Faith – one who reasonably believes that the person who transmitted ownership to him owns
such parcel of land and has every right to transmit such ownership. There is no shadow of doubt on him that this
person does not own the property.
Just Title – would just tell you also that you acquired that property not only in good faith but you have just title
meaning you possessed it legally. Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and
which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one
cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.

Difference between Sec. 14(1) and Sec. 14 (2)

Sec. 14(1) – based on possession (reckoned from June 12, 1945 or earlier + declared A and D prior to
registration)
Sec. 14(2) – based on prescription (possession after June 12, 1945 + classified as patrimonial + Ord.
Acquisitive Prescription/ Extra. Acquisitive Prescription)

You already know that prescription does not run against the State unless it allows it to run against it which is upon
express declaration that the property is not anymore intended for public use and for the development of national
wealth.

Express Declaration is made through:

1) Legislation
2) Presidential Proclamation

MALABANAN vs REPUBLIC

FACTS:
- (1998) Petitioner Malabanan filed application for land registration over a parcel of land in Cavite. He claims that he
had purchased the property from Velazco and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years.
- During the trial, he presented a certification from CENRO-DENR that the property was “verfied to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per land classification map.
- The trial court approved the application. However, upon appeal, the CA ruled that Malabanan had failed to prove
the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. any period of possession prior to the
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession
ISSUE:
HELD:
- Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, considers that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as
a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
- However, lands of the public domain become only patrimonial property when there is a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable AND an express government declaration that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth.
-And since the Civil code provides that property of the State which are not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription, if follows, only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
- In the instant case, while the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no evidence
that said property is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence.
Therefore, petitioners cannot invoke Sec. 14 (2) as a basis for registration.

POSSESSION, CONCEPT UNDER PRESCRIPTION

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in possession.

There must be an actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property (Planting trees and constructing a house on the
land). The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all is
a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. Of course, there are a
number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to
the portion actually in possession of the claimant.

To consolidate prescription, the possession must be that of owner, and it must be public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. Acts of a possessory character done by virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the part of the real
owner are not sufficient.
Section 14 (3)Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.

Accession – refers to the change of the course of the river. The owner affected by such change of course of the river
owns the part which dried up.
Accretion – is a process whereby soil is deposited in an area due to the current of the river. (alluvium is the soil
deposited on the estate fronting the river bank;)

REPUBLIC vs ABRILLE

FACTS:
- Defendant Abrille, owners of a registered parcel of land with an area of 525,652 sqm., applied for and got approval
by the Land Registration Commissioner for a subdivision plan.
- However, the corresponding area under the subdivision plan has a total area of 607,779 sqm., which is 82, 127 sqm.
more that the original area covered by a TCT.
- The excess area is formerly a part of the Davao river which dried up by reason of the change of course of said river.
- Defendant Abrille was then able to secure a court order directing the Register of Deeds to correct the area in the
TCT and thereafter cancel the same and issue to new TCTs. RoD then issued the corresponding TCTs.
- The Director of Lands, representing the Republic, then filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of title alleging
that the excess are belongs to the public domain and as a consequence the TCT which covers the lot is null and void
ab initio.
- Defendants admit that there was an increase in the area but the same was with the knowledge of the defendant,
Land Registration Commissioner and the Court of First Instance.
- Defendants also admit that no registered owner has been affected or prejudiced in the increase in area as only Luisa
Villa Abrille as the registered owner holds property adjacent to the parcel of land in question;
- RTC cancelled the TCTs which included the excess area.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in cancelling the TCTs.
HELD: No.
- In order to bring the excess area under the operation and coverage of the Torrens system, proceedings in
registrations of land title should have filed instead of a petition for approval of a subdivision plan.
- An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is
covered by a Torrens title.
- Even assuming that the excess area belonged to the owner of the land, the subdivision of a registered land does not
authorize the inclusion of land a not embraced in the titled or in excess of what is stated in the title.
- And the approval of the Court of such subdivision plan does not lend validity to it. The subdivision must be limited to
the area stated in the title.
- Thus, defendants should first file for an application for registration of the excess area.

GRANDE vs CA

FACTS:
- Petitioners owned a parcel of land located in the province of Isabela.
- In 1930, when it was surveyed for purposes of registration its northeastern boundary is the Cagayan River.
- Since then, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, so much so, that by 1958, the bank had receded
to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters had been
added to the registered area.
- Petitioners filed an action to quiet title to said portion claiming that they have been in open, peaceful and
continuous possession of said area until in 1948 when respondents entered upon the land under claim of
ownership.
- In their answer, respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open,
and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
ISSUE: Whether or not accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is
covered by a Torrens title.
HELD: No
- An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such accretion is
covered by a Torrens title.
- Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another.
- Under Art 457 of the CC, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered
owners of the land to which it adjoins.
- However, petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property which formed sometime after petitioner’s
property was covered by an original certificate of title in 1934.
- The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection
of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system.
- Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
- SC affirmed the findings of the CA that respondents acquired the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription in
accordance with law.

IGNACIO vs DIRECTOR LANDS

FACTS:
- Petitioner Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land(mangrove)
- He alleges that he owns the parcel of land by right of accretion, citing Art 457 of the CC which provides that “To the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters”
- Respondent Director of Lands opposed the application claiming that the parcel applied for is a foreshose land, part
of the public domain.
Bay = an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a
lake.
ISSUE:
HELD:
- The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the
accretion in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.
- Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the public domain, having been
gained from the sea, the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or purpose,
and therefore, became disposable and available for private ownership.
- Until there is a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the
Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for public use, they continue to be part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.
- Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through acquisitive prescription, having
possessed the same for over ten years. In answer, suffice it to say that land of the public domain is not subject to
ordinary prescription.

HEIRS of EMILIANO NAVARRO vs HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL

FACTS:
- Respondent Pascual owns the property which is adjoins the lot sought to be registered. Subject lot is bounded on
the East by the Talisay River, on the West by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay.
- In 1960, Pascual applied for registration of this lot, which he claims to be an accretion caused by the joint action of
the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and western boundaries to his property.
- The Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry opposed the application on the ground that the subject lot is part
of the public domain, hence it is own by the Republic.
- Petitioner Navarro also opposed the application on the grounds that said lot is a foreshore land and that he is a
lessee and possessor of that property by virtue of a fishpond permit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accretion is caused by the joint action of the Talisay River and Bulacan River or by the
waters of Manila Bay.
HELD:
- Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
(1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and
(3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
- Clearly lacking is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's
land which is adjacent to the river bank.
- Second, Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water the
Manila Bay is.
- If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the
alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of petitioners' own
tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay, which is what is happening in
the case at bar.
- The accretion on the northern portion of Pascual’s lot was caused by the combined and interactive effect of the
planting of palapat and bakawan trees, the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying
up of its former foreshore, and the regular torrential action of the waters of Manila Bay.
LAND ACQUISITION BY PRIVATE CORPORATION

Sec 3. Article XII, 1987 Constitution

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.

May a private corporation acquire lands of the public domain? Why not?
- No. To promote the acquisition of Filipino individuals.
Is there a limit in the acquisition of the lands of the public domain?
- Yes, a private corporation can lease alienable lands of public domain not exceeding 1,000 hectares in area
- Individuals, on the other hand, can lease not more than 5,000 hectares or acquire not more than 12 hectares.

PURPOSE OF PROHIBITION

Why do you have to prohibit a corporation from acquiring lands of the public domain when corporations are just a
group of individuals? Isn’t this prohibition just redundant?
- The Constitution prohibits private corporations in order to prevent circumvention and land grabbing by private
individuals because private individuals are allowed to acquire only 12 hectares and if an individual wants to buy more
than 12 hectares then what he has to do is just to form a corporation.
If private corporations are prohibited by the Constitution from acquiring lands of the public domain, how come there
are so many corporations owning so many hectares of land?
- The prohibition is only on lands of the public land. If the character of the land is private then the prohibition does
not apply. This is the same case as that of private individuals also for as long as it is already private land. The
prohibition extends only to lands of the public domain.

DIRECTOR LANDS vs IAC and ACME PLYWOOD

FACTS:
- In 1962, ACME corporation purchased a parcel of land from Mariano and Acer Infiel, who were member of the
Dumagat tribe, a cultural minority.
- Mariano Infiel owned this parcel of land since time immemorial; before Magellan discovered the Philippines.
- From 1962, ACME has been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land.
- In 1981, ACME applied for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title to the subject lot.
- The Director of Lands opposed the application contending that private corporations cannot own alienable lands of
public domain, since the application was one in 1981, then the applicable law should be the 1973 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from owning alienable lands of the public domain except by lease.
ISSUE: whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the
latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the
prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding
1,000 hectares
HELD:
- The issue can be answered by determining the character of the land at the time of the registration proceedings.
- The Iand in question were already private lands by the time the Infiels sold the land to ACME. (Considering the fact
that the Infiels who were members of a cultural minority, were already in possession and ownership of the land since
time immemorial.
- Since they are private lands, it does not matter whether to apply the 1935 or 1973 Constitution as both Constitution
contains no prohibition on private corporations from owning private lands.
- under the Public Land Act, alienable public lands held by a person or his predecessors in interest openly, continuously
and notoriously for the prescribed period of 30 years, is converted to private property by the mere lapse of said
period.
- The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete.
(b)Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.

REPUBLIC vs IGLESIA ni CRISTO

FACTS:
- Respondent Iglesia Ni Cristo bought 2 parcels of land. The first in 1952 and the second in 1959. Both parcels of land
were owned by Sabuco. (The second lot was bought by Badanguio which he later sold to respondent)
- In 1998, Iglesia ni Cristo, represented by Eraño G. Manalo, as corporate sole, applied for registration of Title.
- The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application on the grounds that the
subject lot was only declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain only in 1993, therefore INC and its
predecessors cannot claim ownership or possessory right as the period of possession prior to its declaration cannot
be included in the computation for period of possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prospers when the subject property has been
declared as alienable only after June 12, 1945?
HELD: Yes
- Such issue raised is not novel as this has already been settled in the case of Republic vs Naguit.
- Section 14 (1) merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed.
- In the instant case, the subject lot has already been declared alienable and disposable by the government at the
time application for registration was filed by INC.
- In regards to possession, INC and its predecessors-in-interest including Sabuco, who inherited it from his parents,
have been in possession of the subject lot way before June 12, 1945 in the concept of owners: open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property.
- These had not been disturbed ever since.

CORPORATION SOLE
- A corporation sole is qualified to own and register private agricultural land.
- A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy.
- A corporation sole by the nature of its incorporation is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and
personal property.

JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT OR INCOMPLETE TITLE

Judicial confirmation of imperfect title is based on sec. 48 of the Public Land Act. This is also the basis for your sec. 14
par. 1 of PD 1529.

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act , to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

PD 1073 (b)Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
SUSI vs RAZON

FACTS:
- In 1899, Valentin Susi purchased a lot from Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, who purchased the same from
Nemesio Pinlac in 1880.
- Susi and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption,
except when Angela Razon, on September 1913, commenced an action to recover the possession of said land.
- As the action was dismissed, she then applied to the Director of Lands to purchase said lot.
- Susi opposed the application but the Director of Lands overruled her opposition and sold the parcel of land to
Razon.
- Razon, having been issued a certificate of title, she then proceeded to an action for forcible entry and detainer
which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property
-DoL contends that the land is part of the public domain.
- Susi then filed an action to annul the sale of the subject lot and for her to be declared as the sole and absolute
owner of that parcel of land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Susi and
HELD:
- Based on the evidence, it appears Susi and his predecessors-in-interest has been in possession of the land in
question openly, continuously, adversely and publicly, since the year 1880
- It appears that Susi has complied with all the (sec 45[b] act 2874; since 1894) necessary requirements for a grant by
the Government
for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.
- So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor (1914), Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government,
- Since Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, and beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
- Consequently, the sale by the Director of Lands to Razon is null and void as he no longer had control of the subject
land.

REPUBLIC vs CA/NAGUIT

FACTS:
- Respondent Naguit applied for registration of a parcel of land. The application also seeks judicial confirmataion of
respondent’s imperfect title over the land.
- On the initial hearing, the public prosecutor appeared for the government and the heirs of Angeles also opposed the
petition.
- During the trial, it was revealed that the land was originally declared for taxation purposes by Urbano from 1945
until 1991. On 1992 he executed a Deed of Quitclaim renouncing all of right over the land and confirming the sale
made by his father to Maming. Subsequently the heirs of Maming sold the lot to respondent Naguit, whose
administrator planted trees in addition to the existing coconut trees that were 50 to 60 years old.
- The court ordered that the title be registered in the name of Naguit.
- The Solicitor General then filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the land applied for was declared as
alienable and disposable on October 1980. Said motion was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is necessary that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before an
applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership begins to start.
HELD: No.
- To sustain the position of the SG general would mean that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length
of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
- It even precludes the government from disposing the land even if it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable.
- The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered
as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
- If at the time the application is made and the land is still inalienable, the presumption is the government is still
reserving the right to use the property. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to relinquish its rights over
the property.
- Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945.
- Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are a good indicator of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
- They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

REPUBLIC vs HERBIETO

FACTS:
- Respondents Jeremiah Herbieto and his brother David Herbieto applied for registration of two parcel of lands which
they purchased from their parents in 1976.
- Their application included a certification from the CENRO that the subject lots became alienable and disposable in
1963.
- Petitioner Republic opposed the application contending that the respondents failed to comply with the period of
adverse possession as required by law and that the subject lots were lands of the public domain, not subject to
private appropriation.
- MTC set the initial hearing on Sept. 3, 1999 and published the notice of the application and initial hearing on August
2, 1999 in the official gazette and on Freedom Banat news on December 19, 1999.
-During the initial hearing, MTC ordered a general default except for the Republic.
-On December 1999, MTC granted the application and ordered the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of
registration.
- Republic appealed the ruling, and this time raised the issue that respondents filed a single application for
registration of the Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were
actually seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent were able to comply with the require
HELD:
On the issue of misjoinder:
- The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with
respondents' application for registration.
- Public Registration is silent on this issue; Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and
parties involve an implied admission of the court's jurisdiction.
- It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to
order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to
be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
On the issue of publication:
- Respondents failed to comply with the publication requirements, thus the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over the
lots as a Land Registration Court
- Although a publication in the Official Gazette is enough for the court to acquire jurisdiction, nonetheless, a
publication in the general circulation is mandatory as this serves as a notice to anyone who has a claim to the subject
lot.
- In the instant case, the hearing was set on September 3, 1999 but the publication of the notice of the initial hearing
was only made on December 19,1999; Anyone who had a claim to this lot and had only read the Banat News
publication would surely be denied of due process since he would no longer be able to oppose the application for
registration and present his claim.
- The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no
publication at all, having the same ultimate result.
- Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to
acquire jurisdiction over respondents’ application for registration thereof.
- Therefore, the MTC Judgment, is void for having been issued without jurisdiction.
On the issue of possession:
- The doctrine enunciated here is that the land must have been declared alienable and disposable prior to the
computation of the period for possession with regard to judicial confirmation of title (no longer controlling). The
Malabanan case and the Naguit case rule otherwise.

REPUBLIC vs CA

FACTS:
- In 1930, the Court of First Instance of Cagayan issued a decree in favor of Spouses Carag covering a parcel of land
with an area of 7,047,673 sqm.
- They were issued an Original Certificate of Title. This OCT was cancelled to discharge of an encumbrance. So 2 TCTs
were issued after, 1 to the Province of Cagayan and another to the Respondents.
- In 1994, Bienvenida De Dayag and others filed a letter-petition to the DENR requesting the latter to file an action for
annulment of the Decree that was issued to Carag back in 1930 on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of said land as it was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the
issuance.
- DENR then created an investigating team which came up with a report that a portion of the subject lot was still
withing timber land and only declared as alienable and disposable in 1982.
- Petitioner DENR then filed a petition for the annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of the
titles.
- Respondents claimed the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to
grind against private respondents
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate land to Spouses Carag.
HELD: Yes.
- Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
filing of the action.
- Under the applicable law at the time, all lands owned by the State are alienable lands unless declared as mineral or
forest zone, or reserved by the State for public purpose.
- In the instant case, petitioner has not presented any evidence which shows that the State has declared the subject
land as forest or mineral zone or reserved by State for some public purpose.
- While it is true that under the prevailing law at that time (Act No. 2874), the disposition of lands is confined to those
which have been declared alienable or disposable, this provides for an exception such as those lands that were
already private lands.
- Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in, trial courts had jurisdiction to
adjudicate these lands to private parties.
- when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction
to determine whether the subject property, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court
determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a
certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law,
did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and
beyond review.
- Even the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to
the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution".
- When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an
existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by
the trial court.

DIAZ vs REPUBLIC

FACTS:
- In 1976, Petitioner Garcia applied for registration of a parcel of land. She alleges that she has been in open,
continuous, public and adverse possession of the same for 26 years.
- Republic, through the OSG, opposed the application on the ground that there was already a previous ruling
dismissing the registration proceeding over the same property. The court in that case held that the subject property
was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation.
- This notwithstanding, the court ruled in favor of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in not applying the previous ruling regarding the same subject lot.
HELD: Yes
- The lower court should have dismissed the application for registration as the same subject lot was already declared
as part of the public domain, thus inalienable.
By not applying our previous ruling, the lower court nullified the decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave
abuse of discretion. A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in legal
contemplation.
On the contention of possession of 30 years.
- Forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and
categorical manner, coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-interest.
- Any occupation or possession of a forest land prior to its conversion cannot be counted in reckoning compliance
with the 30 year possession requirement.
- Even if the possession is for more than 30 years, it could never ripen into ownership.
- The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING vs DUMYUNG

FACTS:
- The Republic filed 3 separate civil actions for annulment of the free patent and the corresponding certificates of title
issued to 3 private respondents Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan on the ground of
misrepresentation and false data and information furnished by respondents.
- The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company intervened alleging that a portion of the titled lands in question was
within its ordinary timber license, and other portion, embraced in its mineral claims.
- Before the start of the civil cases, the Republic filed 3 criminal cases for falsification of public documents against
same respondents for allegedly making untrue statements in their application for free patents over the subject lands
- The proceedings on the three (3) civil cases were suspended pending the outcome of the criminal cases.
- The criminal cases were dismissed by the lower court for insufficiency of evidence.
- Upon motion of private respondents and without having received any evidence in the civil cases, the lower court
dismissed said cases, and ruled that respondents' original certificates of title had become indefeasible, that they were
entitled to the benefits of Republic Act 3872 as members of the cultural minorities, and their acquittal in the criminal
cases for falsification was a bar to these civil cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the civil cases without receiving any evidence.
HELD: Yes
- The lower court should not have dismissed the civil cases simply on the basis that the respondents were members
of the cultural minorities.
- There is no evidence that respondents are members of the National Cultural Minorities or that they have
continuously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest the lands in
question since July 4, 1955;
- It was premature for the lower court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the patents awarded to the
private respondents have become indefeasible.
- It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or
timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for
value, shall be cancelled.
On the issue of dismissing the civil case because the criminal cases were dismissed:
- The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel
their titles.
The only issue in the criminal cases for falsification was whether there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that
the private respondents had committed the acts of falsification.
- The factual issues of whether or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands and whether or not the
private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872 were not in issue in the criminal cases.
-Case remanded to lower court as there is need to remand these cases to the trial court for the reception of evidence
on (1) whether or not the lands in question are timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether the private respondents
belong to the cultural minorities and are qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be issued free patents on said lands.

PUBLICATION, OPPOSITION AND DEFAULT (SECTION 23)

SECTION 23.Notice of Initial Hearing, Publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five
days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1.By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration
shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern". Said
notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the
prayer of said application shall not be granted.
2.By mailing. —
(a)Mailing of notice to persons named in the application. — The Commissioner of Land Registration shall also, within
seven days after publication of said notice in the Official Gazette, as hereinbefore provided, cause a copy of the
notice of initial hearing to be mailed to every person named in the notice whose address is known.
(b)Mailing of notice to the Secretary of Public Highways, the Provincial Governor and the Mayor. — If the applicant
requests to have the line of a public way or road determined, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a
copy of said notice of initial hearing to be mailed to the Secretary of Public Highways, to the Provincial Governor, and
to the Mayor of the municipality or city, as the case may be, in which the land lies.
(c)Mailing of notice to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the Director of
Public Works, the Director of Forest Development, the Director of Mines and the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources. — If the land borders on a river, navigable stream or shore, or on an arm of the sea where a river or
harbor line has been established, or on a lake, or if it otherwise appears from the application or the proceedings that
a tenant-farmer or the national government may have a claim adverse to that of the applicant, notice of the initial
hearing shall be given in the same manner to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Solicitor General, the Director of
Lands, the Director of Mines and/or the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, as may be appropriate.
3.By posting. —
The Commissioner of Land Registration shall also cause a duly attested copy of the notice of initial hearing to be
posted by the sheriff of the province or city, as the case may be, or by his deputy, in a conspicuous place on each
parcel of land included in the application and also in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the municipal
building of the municipality or city in which the land or portion thereof is situated, fourteen days at least before the
date of initial hearing.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs ABISTADO

FACTS:
- Abistado filed a petition for registration of this title.
- During the pendency of his application, applicant dies, so one of his heir was appointed as guardian ad litem and his
heirs were substituted as applicants.
- LRC dismissed the petition stating that the applicant failed to comply with the mandatory provision of Sec 23(1) of
PD 1529 requiring the applicant to public the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, therefore
the court has not legally acquires jurisdiction over the land.
- Respondents appealed to CA which reversed the decision of the lower court. CA held that publication in the Official
Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
ISSUE: Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or
directory?
HELD:
- Absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the LRC cannot confirm and register the title of private
respondents.
- The said word "shall" denotes the mandatory character of a statute.
- A land registration, being an in rem proceeding, requires publication in order for the courts to have constructive
seizure upon the land.
- This is also to let third persons know that there is such an application so that if they have any interest over the
property they may protect their interest through the filing of an opposition.
- The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as
newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all.

PUBLICATION: PURPOSE

The purpose of publication is:

1) To confer jurisdiction upon the court over the res; and
2) To notify the whole world of the pending registration case so that they may assert their rights over the land
and oppose the application.

POSTING

This requirement is also mandatory. The purpose of the law in requiring the giving of notice by all three modes is to
strengthen the Torrens system through safeguards to prevent anomalous titling of real property.

PROOF REQUIRED IN REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

REPUBLIC vs DELA PAZ

FACTS:
- Respondents represented by Jose Dela Paz applied for registration of land before the RTC.
- They also submitted 1) SPA; 2) Conversion Consolidated plan with the annotation that the land surveyed is
aliendable by the Bureau of Forest Development; 3) Technical Description; 4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate; 5) Tax
Declaration; 6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob; 7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namaty; 8)
Certificate thth the lots are not covered by any land patent or any public land application; and 9) Certification from
the Office of the Treasurer that the tax of the real property for the year 2013 has been paid.
- Respondents allege that they acquired the subject lot by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob executed by their
parents who earlier acquired the property from their grandparent.
- That they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of
more than fifty (50) years
- OSG opposed the application contending among others that the muniments of title or tax declarations and tax
payments of the applicants do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land
applied for. AND that the lot applied for is part of the inalienable public domain.
- RTC granted the respondents application.
- To prove their continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented several tax
declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest.
ISSUE:
HELD:
- Since the respondents are claiming that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier, then they must prove such claim by clear and
convincing evidence.
- Respondents reliance on a survey plan prepared by a Geodetic Engineer with the annotation that the survey is
inside a map classified as alienable and disposable is misplaced.
- The notation of the geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area" is insufficient
and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the
inalienable public domain.
- Further, to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order or a
legislative act or statute.
- He must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR.
- He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as
alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or
PENRO.
- Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant
to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
- tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
supported by any other evidence. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

OPPOSING APPLICATION

REQUIREMENTS

What are the requisites for the filing of an opposition?

1. Oppositor must have an interest over land applied for.
2. He should state the ground for his objection as well as the nature of his claimed interest
- Opposition must be based on the right of dominion or some other real right opposed to the adjudication of
ownership to the applicant, whether limited or absolute.
3. He should indicate the desired relief; and
4. The opposition should be signed and sworn to by him or by his duly authorized representative.

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FILE OPPOSTION

The effect of his failure to oppose is the forfeiture of your right to claim the property especially so if one year has
lapsed from the time that the certificate of title has taken effect.
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO APPEAR (read Director of Lands vs Santiago)

No, the court will still consider the documents submitted for opposition. The important thing is there is a filing of
opposition but of course the non-appearance should be justifiable and reasonable for the court to entertain the
opposition.

ORDERS OF GENERAL AND SPECIAL DEFAULT

A special default is directed to parties named in the application but did not file any opposition while general default
will be issued by the court against all unknown parties who did not submit or file an opposition. General default is
directed against the whole world while special default is directed against specific persons named in the application
as defendants but did not file their answer or opposition.

PERSONS DEEMED TO HAVE LEGAL STANDING

The following persons are deemed to have interest necessary to give them legal standing as oppositors:
1) a homesteader who has not yet been issued his title but has fulfilled all the conditions required by law for the
issuance of patent;
2) a purchaser of friar land who is deemed to have an equitable title to the land even before the issuance of
patent;
3) an awardee in a sales application who is authorized to take possession of the land to enable him to comply
with the requirements for the issuance of patent;
4) A person claiming to be in possession of the land and has applied with the Lands Management Bureau for its
purchase.

PRIVATE PERSONS MAY NOT OPPOSE IN BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT

It has been settled that the interests of the government cannot be represented by private persons. Only the Solicitor
General, as lawyer of the government, can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Thus,
actions filed in the name of the Republic or its government agencies, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, will be
summarily dismissed.

OPPOSITION BY THE GOVERNMENT (illo)

The government, acting through the Office of the Solicitor General, is represented by the Director of Lands/Forestry
as public oppositor in all land registration proceedings.

REPUBLIC vs TIOTIOEN

FACTS:
- In this case, respondent Tiotioen applied for confirmation and registration of 2 parcels of land. He died later on and
was substituted by his heirs.
- Republic, through the OSG, and the the Municipality of La Trinidad opposed the application. The OSG then
informed the court that it authorized the Provincial Prosecutor to appear in the case. However with regards to
actions which appear to compromise the interest of the Government, only notices of orders, resolutions, and
decisions served on him will bind the party represented.
- RTC granted the application
- The petitioner and the municipality received a notice of the adverted decision of the land registration court on
September 6 and 7, 2001, respectively.
- on September 20, 2001, The municipality timely filed its motion for reconsideration of the said judgment.
- on October 5, 2001, The provincial prosecutor adopted this motion for reconsideration of the municipality which
was beyond the fifteen-day period counted from receipt of the petitioner of a copy of the decision.
- December 6, 2001, The land registration court denied the said motion for reconsideration of the municipality in its
Resolution dated.
- The OSG was not furnished with a notice of such resolution.
- on January 4, 2002, The OSG was informed by the provincial prosecutor of such denial when it received the Letter
dated December 19, 2001 of the Provincial Prosecutor.
- on January 11, 2002, The OSG filed the subject notice of appeal for the petitioner which the land registration court
denied for having been filed way beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period to appeal which the said court
reckoned from September 6, 2001.
ISSUE:
HELD:
- Contention of the OSG: that the date of service of such copies to the OSG is the reckoning period in counting the
timeliness of its appeal.
- Further, it contends that the OSG was not furnished with the Resolution dated December 6, 2001 of the land
registration court which denied the adverted motion for reconsideration of the municipality.
- The belated filing of an appeal by the State, or even its failure to file an opposition, in a land registration case
because of the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents does not deprive the government of its right to
appeal from a judgment of the court.
- Republic, or its government, is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
- This is based on the principle of Regalian Doctrine which provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony.
- The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is
in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice
and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must always be avoided.
- The vast tracts of land involved in this case are claimed by the petitioner to be a protected watershed area, which
allegedly preserves the main source of water of the Municipality of La Trinidad. Relative thereto, the petitioner
raises substantial factual and legal issues which should be decided on their merit instead of being summarily
disposed of based on a technicality.

ISSUANCE OF DECREE

WHEN JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL

SECTION 27.Speedy Hearing; Reference to a Referee. — The trial court shall see to it that all registration
proceedings are disposed of within ninety (90) days from the date the case is submitted for decision. all the
evidence are presented

The court, if it deems necessary, may refer the case or any part thereof to a referee who shall hear the parties and
their evidence (so the judge can devote his time to other cases), and the referee shall submit his report thereon to
the court within fifteen days after the termination of such hearing. Hearing before a referee may be held at any
convenient place within the province or city as may be fixed by him and after reasonable notice thereof shall have
been served the parties concerned. The court may render judgment in accordance with the report as though the
facts have been found by the judge himself: Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion 1) accept the
report, or 2) set it aside in whole or in part, or 3) order the case to be recommitted for further proceedings.

When does judgment becomes final?

Within 15 days from the receipt of the notice of the decision by the court. But if incontrovertibility, that is one year
from the time the certificate of title was issued by your RD. Decree of Reg transcribed in the Registry of Deeds

GOMEZ vs CA

There was already a decree of registration and after the lapse of so many years, your LRA did not enter the decree of
registration because it found out that the several portion of land was covered by a patent and so it gave a report to
your LRC and the court reversed its decision and deny its application.
Applicant said that it was a grave abuse of discretion because there was already lapse of more than a year already
that it reversed its own decision.
The SC said that yes that order judgment must have already become final but the one year incontrovertibility period
did not start to run yet because there was no entry of the decree of registration. If there was no entry of the decree
of registration then definitely there is no transcription in the registry of deeds so from the time that the court heard
or received the application up to the time of one year after the transcription of the decree of registration, the SC said
that the LRC has jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the application so it may reversed itself.

Adjudication:
- Adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding only becomes final after the expiration of one
year after the entry of the final decree of registration.
- As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission and the period of one (1) year
has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
REPUBLIC vs NILLAS

FACTS:
- In 1997, Respondent Nillas filed a petition for revival of judgment with the RTC with regards to a judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance way back in 1941, adjudicating several lots, one of which her parents bought
which she later acquired.
- According to her, no decree of registration were issued to the subject lot despite the 1941 decision. (gubat gud!)
- RTC granted her petition and ordered the revival of the 1941 decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and registration based on the
1941 Decision.
- The Office of the Solicitor General appealed the decision, arguing that under Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
a final and executory judgment may be executed on a motion within 5 years from the date of its entry, after which
time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by statute of limitations
- CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE:
HELD: No.
- The court held that neither laches nor the statute of limitations apply to decisions in land registration
proceedings.
- Rule 39 applies only to ordinary civil actions and not to other extraordinary proceedings governed by a specific law
such as land registration cases.
- Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the
decision and the order of the issuance of the decree by the court and the issuance of the decree of registration on
the part of the LRA is merely a ministerial duty.
- Such that failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of
registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to
follow up with said authorities can.
- In this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates —
her predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still in the names of the original
prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in interest.

WRIT OF POSSESSION vs WRIT OF DEMOLITION

A writ of possession is writ issued by the court to enforce a judgment to recover possession of the land. It commands
the shefirr to enter the land and give possession of it to person entitled under the judgment.

VENCILAO vs VANO

L-25660
FACTS:
- 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of the parcels of land allegedly inherited by
them from Juan Reyes.
- 1951, administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo filed an amended application for registration. After hearing, the land
was registered under Original Certificate of Title.
- 1962, Petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance of real properties.
- They alleged that they are the lawful owners of their respective parcels of land
- However, these lands were included in the parcels of land applied for registration by the heirs of Juan Reyes, either
by mistake or fraud .
- The lower court dismissed the case on the grounds of res judicata.
- Petitioners appealed the case contending that they were not informed of the date and time of the initial hearing of
the registration nor were they given copies of the decision of the court.
- They also argued that res judicata does not apply to an action for reconveyance.
ISSUE: Whether or not res judicata applies to petitioners action for reconveyance.
HELD: Yes
doctrine of res judicata is that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once and when a
right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, it should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
-The principle of res judicata applies to ALL cases including land registration proceedings.
- There may be res judicata, when (a) The former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there
must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action
- In the instance case, there court already rendered its decision over the subject lot and there was already a decree of
registration and the case was already terminated in 1958.
With regards to the subject matter:
- The court held that the subject matter is the same (parcel of land)
With regards to the cause of action:
- The causes of action in both cases are the same, i.e., ownership of the land although the forms of action are
different: the first is a land registration and the second is an action for conveyance. However, the court has held that
notwithstanding the difference in the form of two actions, the doctrine of res judicata will apply where it appears
that the parties in effect were litigating for the same thing. A party cannot, by varying the form of action, escape
the effects of res judicata
With regards to the identity of parties:
- The court held that the parties in the first and second action need not be exactly identical, it is enough that the
parties in the subsequent case are either successors-in-interest or are heirs.
- In the instance case, many of the plaintiffs were not oppositors in the former registration case, but many are
children of the former oppositors.
- And the court has determined that these oppositors were informed of the registration proceedings, thus the
decision in such proceeding is conclusive and binding not only to the former oppositors but also to their heirs as well.

L-32065
FACTS:
- After the death of the subject lots administrator, a TCT was issued to Pedro Luspo and another TCT was issued to
several persons.
- And in spite of a writ of possession (59, 61, 66) being issued against the petitioners, the latter refused to sign and
vacate the premises.
- In 1967, Ogilve, one of the registered owners of the land filed a petition for contempt against the petitioners for
refusing to vacate the land.
- The court found 22 of the respondents guilty of contempt and so they filed an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of contempt for refusing to vacate the land despite the issuance of a writ
of possession.
HELD: No.
- The court held that if the judgment involves the delivery of a possession of a real property, a party may be punish
for contempt only if the sheriff has already ejected the losing party and delivered the possession thereof to the
winning party, and the losing party subsequently enters or attempts to enter the subject property for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or disturbs the possession of the winning party, then and only then may
the loser be charged with and punished for contempt.
- In the instance case, the sheriff has not yet ejected the losing party much less delivered the land to the winning
party, therefore petitioners could not be punished for contempt.

L-33677
FACTS:
- Ogilve filed a motion for a writ of demolition which was granted by the court.
- Petitioners opposed the petitioner contending that the court cannot issue a writ of demolition while the former
case is still pending
ISSUE: Whether or not the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of demolition
HELD: No
- The former case is not a bar for the issuance of a writ of demolition.
- If a writ of possession is issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of the possession of the land to
the winning party, then a writ of demolition must also be issued considering that the latter is a complement of the
former, and without which, the writ of possession is ineffective.
- The issuance of the writ of demolition is reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner who is being deprived of
the possession of the lots by reason of the continued refusal of respondent to remove his house and restore
possession of the premises to petitioner.

POSSESSION OF THIRD PERSONS AFTER ISSUANCE OF FINAL DECREE, REMEDY

CONSEQUENCE OF REFUSAL TO VACATE

WHEN OCT TAKES EFFECT

An OCT takes effect from the date of the transcription of the decree in the Register of Deeds

MANOTOK REALTY vs CLT REALTY

FACTS:
-
ISSUE:

HELD:

CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC LANDS

WHO CLASSIFIES THE LAND

The President or the Executive Department; agricultural lands; mineral lands; timber/forest lands; national parks

Sec 9, Act 141. The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time
to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer
lands from one class to another.

LAW GOVERNING CLASSIFICATION

CA 141 PUBLIC LAND ACT

Among 4, only agricultural lands can be alienated

No way at all that you can own a forest and mineral land?
-No. Can still own forest and mineral land
Prior to 1935 constitution
After 1935 constitution up to present: only after RECLASSIFICATION from forest/mineral land to agricultural land AND
after a DECLARATION that it’s no longer intended for public use
-now become Patrimonial and can be owned through prescription

CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS

DIRECTOR OF LAND vs CA and BISNAR

FACTS:
- In this case, applicants Bisnar and Ibarra applied for registration of 2 parcel of lands. They claim that they inherited
the land and were paying taxes thereon. That they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
land as owners for more than fifty (50) years.
- The Director of the Bureau of Forest Development and the Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground
that land applied for is a forest land belonging to the public domain and not subject to private appropriation.
- The court granted the application
ISSUE: whether or not the lots in question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141
HELD: No
- Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
- Section 48(b) applies exclusively to public agricultural land.
- The only way you can own a forest land is if there is a 1) positive act from the government converting such forest
land into alienable and disposable land for agricultural or other purposes; and 2) There must also be a declaration
that the property is no longer intended for public use, public service or the development of national wealth. Then and
only then can the period of prescription start to run.

REPUBLIC vs CA & HEIRS of CARAG

FACTS:
- In 1930, the Court of First Instance of Cagayan issued a decree in favor of Spouses Carag covering a parcel of land
with an area of 7,047,673 sqm.
- They were issued an Original Certificate of Title. This OCT was cancelled to discharge of an encumbrance. So 2 TCTs
were issued after, 1 to the Province of Cagayan and another to the Respondents.
- In 1994, Bienvenida De Dayag and others filed a letter-petition to the DENR requesting the latter to file an action
for annulment of the Decree that was issued to Carag back in 1930 on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of said land as it was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the
issuance.
- DENR then created an investigating team which came up with a report that a portion of the subject lot was still
within timber land and only declared as alienable and disposable in 1982.
- Petitioner DENR then filed a petition for the annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of the
titles.
- Respondents claimed the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to
grind against private respondents
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate land to Spouses Carag.
HELD: Yes.
- Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the filing of the action.
- Under the applicable law at the time, all lands owned by the State are alienable lands unless declared as mineral
or forest zone, or reserved by the State for public purpose.
- In the instant case, petitioner has not presented any evidence which shows that the State has declared the subject
land as forest or mineral zone or reserved by State for some public purpose.
- While it is true that under the prevailing law at that time (Act No. 2874), the disposition of lands is confined to
those which have been declared alienable or disposable, this provides for an exception such as those lands that
were already private lands.
- Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in, trial courts had jurisdiction to
adjudicate these lands to private parties.
- when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The
trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the
decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as
required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial
court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final
and beyond review.
- Even the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to
the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time
of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution".
- When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already
an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930
by the trial court.

LEONARDO De CASTRO vs MAYOR YAP

FACTS:
- 1978, PD 1801 issued by Pres. Marcos declared Boracay Island as tourist zones and marine reserves
- Respondents in order to clarify if the said proclamation precluded them from filing for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, filed a petition for declaratory relief.
- They declared that they or predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuos, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
- They claim that PD 1801 did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since it is classified as a tourist zone,
it is susceptible to private ownership.
- OSG opposed the petition for declaratory relief, contending that Boracay is an unclassified land of the public domain
and is part of a mass of land classified as forest land.
- Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen
into ownership.
- During the pendency of the case, Pres. Arroyo issued a proclamation classifying .certain parts of Boracay into forest
land and agricultural land.
- Petitioners then filed a petitioner to nullify said proclamation contending that such proclamation infringed on their
vested rights over portions of Boracay.
- They further argued that there is no need to reclassify it into agricultural land as it is not classified as mineral or
timber then it necessarily is deemed agricultural.
- OSG once again opposed claiming that Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to PD 705.
ISSUE: Whether or not private claimants have a right to secure title over their occupied portions in Boracay.
HELD: No.
- Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively
classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
- "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply.

REMEDIES (7-29-13)

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION (RULE 37, RULES OF COURT)

Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. — Within the period for taking an appeal,
the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or
more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:

(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and
by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or

(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.

Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages
awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or
final order is contrary to law.

PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT (RULES 38, RULES OF COURT)

When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

REMEDIES UNDER THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE IN CASES OF FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION

PETITION FOR REVIEW (SEC 32)

ELAND PHILIPPINES vs GARCIA

FACTS:
- March 2, 1998 Respondents Garcia filed a complaint for quieting of title against the petitioner.
- They claim they are the owners of a parcel of land in a fee simple title by occupation and possession under CA 141
and they were not aware of any other person who has a claim or interest on that land until they requested the lot
be declared for tax purposes.
- They then found out that the lot has been subject of a land registration proceeding and there was already a decree
issued by the court on August 20, 1997(Court decision: June 7, 1997)
- They also claim they were not notified of the land registration proceeding.
HELD:
- The court first discussed the nature of the action of quieting of title
- That this is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt with respect to the title to real property.
- its purpose is to secure '. . . an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the
complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from
any danger of hostile claim.'
- For this action to propose, two requisites must concur: (1) the complainant has a legal title or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
- To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a)The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land;
(b)He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration;
(c)The petition must be filed within one year from the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority; and
(d)The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
In the present case, the one-year period before the Torrens title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible has not
yet expired; thus, a review of the decree of registration would have been the appropriate remedy.

A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for new trial and the right to
the remedy is not affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it may have been
presented.

LOPEZ vs PADILLA

on February 28, 1939, Juan Padilla was the applicant of a public land under Homestead Application.
On December 16, 1952, the Director of Lands issued the order for the issuance of the patent for the homestead lot
Juan Padilla applied for
on December 27, 1965, the heirs of the said Juan Padilla were issued Original Certificate of Title No. 183 which was
transcribed in the Registration Book of the Province of Cebu pursuant to the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496
on June 10, 1966, petitioners filed a complaint for cancellation of title and injunction alleging that in the year 1958,
they have reclaimed part of the subject and later constructed their dwellings and they filed an application with the
BoL to lease the area and that they were not informed of the proceedings.
Lower court dismissed their case.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Whether or not the case at bar falls within the scope of the provisions of Section 38 of Act 496, otherwise known
as the Land Registration Act:
- SC held that the trial court correctly held that "in ordinary registration proceedings involving private lands, courts
may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree, only when application for review is filed by the
party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.
- Applied to homesteads the decree of registration corresponds to the promulgation of the order of the Director of
Lands for the issuance of the patent and not the actual issue of the patent.
- In the the instant case, the order for the issuance of the patent for the homestead lot was issued by the Director of
Lands on December 16, 1952.

Whether or not the plaintiffs are the proper parties to bring the action:
- the lower court likewise correctly ruled that plaintiffs could not properly institute the action for cancellation of
defendants' homestead patent and original certificate of title issued, since the land clearly had ceased to be public
land and private ownership thereof had vested in favor of defendants Padillas and their transferee Woolbright.

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cebu has jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action as well as
the power to cancel the patent and title issued to the defendants on the ground of fraud.
The torrens title issued to defendants in pursuance of the homestead patent is no longer susceptible to collateral
attack through the present action filed by plaintiffs, who as mere applicants of revocable lease permits or
miscellaneous applications of what is now concededly titled property of private ownership, have no personality or
legal interest in the first place to institute the action, nor to question the sale of the homestead.

the lower court correctly ruled itself to be bereft of authority to grant the relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants on the
basis of their lack of a valid cause of action.

RAMOS vs RODRIQUEZ

FACTS:
Ramos applied for the registration of a parcel of land.
On on July 28, 1988, judge rendered a decision adjudicating the lot to Ramos
On September 12, 1988, the court issued an Order for Issuance of Decree stating that the July 28, 1988 decision had
become final and directing the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NLTDRA)1 to to prepare the decree and certificate of registration.
On September 12, 1988, the court a quo issued an Order for Issuance of Decree stating that the July 28, 1988
decision had become final and directing the Administrator of National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA)1 to comply with Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, that is, to prepare the decree
and certificate of registration.

Instead of issuing the said decree, NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio submitted a report recommending that the July
28, 1988 decision be set aside after due hearing because the subject lot is already covered by title issued on October
29, 1924, in Case No. 1037 in the name of the Payatas Estate Improvement Company, and which was assigned
Decree No. 1131 on January 31, 1905.
- The court opined "that it cannot set aside its (July 28, 1988) decision on the basis of the report dated September 26,
1988, which was received by this Court on October 10, 1988, after the finality of its decision." It added that the
proper remedy of the government was an action for annulment of judgment.
- However on May 1990, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by Bonifacio, it denied Ramos’ application and set
aside its earlier decision.
- Petitioners are now asking the Court to set aside the Trial Court's May 29, 1990, order on the strength of the
principle of finality of judgments.
ISSUE:
HELD:
- Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become
final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after (sic) the entry of the final decree
of registration.
- As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period
of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering
it
On the issue that it is only a ministerial duty:
- However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their
duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative
officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to 'extend assistance to courts in
ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings
- In the case at bench, Administrator Bonifacio filed his report as an officer of the court precisely to inform the latter
that the NLTDRA cannot comply with the order to issue a decree because the subject lot sought to be registered was
discovered to have been already decreed and titled in the name of the Payatas Estate. Under these circumstances,
the LRA is not legally obligated to follow the court's order.
On the issue of GAD:
- The court a quo could not have committed grave abuse of discretion because it was merely following the earlier
recommendation of the LRA which was then acting as an agent of the court.
- a strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of
registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.

WALSTROM vs MAPA

FACTS:
- There was controversy involving a parcel of land in Pico, La Trinidad.
- The predecessors in interest of respondent Mapa applied for a Miscellaneous Sales Application which was awarded
to her in 1934.
- While the predecessors in interest of the petitioner filed a Free Patent Application for the same parcel of land in
1956.
- Their dispute was referred to the Bureau of Lands for investigation.
- On August 12, 1964 the regional land officer decided that free patent application of Dionson shall cover only portion
B of Lot 1, Lot 2, and Lot 3 and the MSA of Mapa will cover Portion B of Lot 1.
- On September 9, 1966, the Director of Lands, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by Gabriela Walstrom,
issued an order setting aside the decision of August 12, 1964.
- On June 13, 1968, the DANR Secretary set aside the order of the Director of Lands dated September 9, 1966 and
ordered that the decision of the regional land officer in Dagupan City dated August 12, 1964 be reinstated.
- On June 8, 1970, Gabriela Walstrom filed a petition for relief with the DANR. Which is unresolved
- on September 30, 1971, respondent register of deeds issued Original Certificate of Title, pursuant to Miscellaneous
Sales Patent
- According to Hilda Waldstrom, since the 1970 petition for relief filed by Gabriela, she was prompted to file an action
in the CFI [July 19, 1972] since the 1 year prescriptive period for seeking judicial relief was about to lapse. (DANR
Secretary issued an order, dated January 9, 1972, giving due course to the said petition.)
- The court a quo dismissed petitioner Hilda Walstrom's petition on the ground of "failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
- Petitioner Hilda Walstrom filed a civil complaint against the respondents praying for the nullification of the Mapas'
sales patent and certificates of title issued by the register of deeds..
ISSUE:
HELD:
- a decree of registration may be reopened or reviewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence of
five essential requisites, to wit: (a) that the petitioner has a real and a dominical right; (b) that he has been deprived
thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that
the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.

first element is patently not present because the petitioner can not allege that she has already a real and dominical
right to the piece of property in controversy.

The second element is also absent since corollary to the aforecited ruling of the DANR Secretary, the petitioner can
not aver that she was deprived of property because she did not have a real right over portion "A".

Apropos the third element, the records are bereft of any indication that there was fraud in the issuance of the
certificates of title. As matters stand, the prerequisites have not been complied with. The petitioner's recourse to
Section 38 would not have prospered; accordingly, the respondent court's dismissal of petitioner's complaint was
proper .

The petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a flaw which to our mind is fatal to a court review at this
time.

Instead of invoking Section 38, the petitioner should have pressed for the speedy resolution of her petition with the
DANR. The petitioner avers that since the one-year prescriptive period for seeking judicial relief provided for in Sec.
38 of the Land Registration Act was about to lapse, she was compelled to file the action to nullify said patent.

The petitioner's submission is not correct. Her fear of the futility, or even only inefficacy, of exhausting the
administrative remedies granted her by law is clearly unfounded.

We have ruled before in Amerol vs. Bagumbaran 16 that notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title
already issued in the name of another person, he can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject
property to the rightful owner. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the
person in whose name it is registered. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one
who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.

In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is
the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. This is what reconveyance is all
about.

Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

FRAUD

Fraud, to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
successful party which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party or his agents, attorneys,
where such party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. Intrinsic fraud refers to the act of
a party during the trial, such as forged documents, false testimony.

PALANCA vs AFM

FACTS:
- Petitioner Palanca filed an application to register the trademark LION (head) with PPO, alleging that she had been
using the trademark since 1958 on bechin (food seasoning).
- Respondent opposed the application on the ground that it was suing the trademark since 1953.
- on June 14, 1961, the Director of Patents denied the applicationon grounds that respondent has prior use of the
trademark before petitioner did.
- The record shows the petitioner's counsel was furnished with copy of the decision on June 16, 1961. 3 No appeal
was taken from the decision of the Director of Patents within the reglementary period from June 16, 1961.
- On December 14, 1961, however, petitioner filed with the Patent Office a petition to set aside the judgment of June
14, 1961, invoking Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, alleging fraud committed by her former counsel.
1) that her former counsel failed to file a memorandum before the case was submitted for decision;
2) that she had been fraudulently kept in total ignorance of the proceedings in the case;
3) that her counsel had not informed her of the decision, thus preventing her from resorting to all the legal remedies
available to her;
- Director of patents ruled that from the facts established, no extrinsic or collateral fraud would warrant the setting
aside of the judgment herein already rendered.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or order entered against a party through fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence may be set aside upon proper petition to that effect.

Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment.

Fraud, to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
successful party which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party or his agents, attorneys,
where such party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. Intrinsic fraud refers to the act of a
party during the trial, such as forged documents, false testimony.

In the instance case, the failure to submit a memorandum was also the negligence of her counsel and could not in
any manner be attributed to any fraud or deception practiced by her opponent.

FRIAS vs EZQUIEVEL

FACTS:
- Petitioner Frias applied for registration of a residential lot with an area of 2,974 sqm.
- Respondents opposed the application claiming that they are owners of a portion of 1,357 sqm they inherited from
the parents.
- They also sought the postponement of the proceeding pending final outcome of the civil case they filed which
involves the ownership and possession of the same land, with the petitioners herein as the defendants.
- In that civil case, Anastacia Esquivel sold the whole property to Frias knowing that at the time of the sale, she only
own a part of the land and that Frias had taken possession and refused to reconvey it despite repeated demands.
- 1952, Court ordered postponement of the hearing but later issued an order of general default except as against
oppositors and the DoL.
- In 1956, court in the civil case declared the sale by Anastacia valid except as to the minor heirs of Alvaro.
- On October 2, 1957, in the aforesaid registration proceedings, after due notice and hearing, the Court rendered
judgment adjudicating the land described in the plan Exhibit A in favor of the applicants.
- After the same had become final and executory, the Court ordered the issuance of the Decree of Registration, and
on December 11, 1957 the Chief of the General Land Registration Office issued Decree of Registration No. 60798 in
favor of the Frias spouses.
- On December 8, 1958, Rosario Esquivel-Gonzales, as the duly appointed guardian of the minors Reynaldo and
Ricardo Esquivel, filed a verified petition to reopen the decree of registration on the ground of fraud
- applicants had falsely represented to this Honorable Court during the hearing of their application that they
were the owners of the entire residential lot
- when at that time they knew fully well they were not the owners thereof in its entirety;
- that they were aware of such fraudulent representation when they made it because they were parties in Civil
Case No. 998 of this Court involving precisely the validity of their title to the aforementioned lot

ISSUE:
HELD:
To justify the setting aside or review of a decree of registration under Section 38 of Act No. 496, the party seeking
relief must allege and prove, inter alia, that the registration was procured through fraud — actual and extrinsic. It has
been held in this connection that if the fraud alleged in the petition to set aside the decree is involved in the same
proceedings in which the party seeking relief had ample opportunity to assert his right, to attack the document
presented by the applicant for registration, and to cross- examine the witnesses who testified relative thereto, then
the fraud relied upon is intrinsic. The fraud is extrinsic if it was employed to deprive a party of his day in court, thus
preventing him from asserting his right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.

Upon consideration of the facts relied upon by appellants to justify a review of the decree in question, we find that
the same do not constitute the extrinsic fraud required as justification for the granting of the relief sought by them.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs CFI

FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:

PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys a property belonging to another person by simply relying on what appears
on the face of its title.

It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser
for value intervenes.

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any
notice of another person's claim. Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another.

When dealing with registered land, prospective buyers are normally not required by law to inquire further than what
appears on the face of the Torrens certificate of title on file with the Register of Deeds. Equally settled is the
principle, however, that purchasers cannot close their eyes to known facts that should put a reasonable person on
guard; they cannot subsequently claim to have acted in good faith, in the belief that there was no defect in the
vendor's certificate of title.

The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies upon one who asserts that status. This
onus probandi cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the ordinary presumption of good faith.

A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a
shield for fraud.

ANNOTATION OF ADVERSE CLAIM

The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real
property, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming
an interest on the same or may have a better right than the registered owner thereof.

RATIONALE Othewise, the integrity and reliability of the Torrens system would be eroded since every buyer would
now have to make unnecessary investigations just to make sure the land he is about to buy is clean from any adverse
claims or encumbrances.

EXCEPTIONS

1) The seller of the property is not the person named in the title.
2) Reconstituted title
3) Ocular inspection.
4) Notice of adverse claim annotated in the TCT

ROSALES vs BURGOS

FACTS:
Petitioners owned a parcel of land which is the subject of this controversy.

In 1978, Elvira dells Reyes forged the signature or Adoracion and Angel Reyes to make it appear that the couple sold
the lot to her. A new TCT was issued to her.

Later, the Rufloes filed a complaint against her alleging that she falsified their signatures in the Deed of Sale because,
at the time of the sale, Angel Rufloe was already deceased (1974).
In 1984, During the pendency of the case, Reyes sold the property to the Burgos siblings and a new TCT was issued to
them. They then sold the lot their aunt Leonarda. Although the sale was not registered and no title was issued to her.

After the court in the civil case declare that the signature in the Deed of Sale was indeed forged, the Rufloes then
filed another complaint for the cancellation of the TCT of respondents Burgos and nullification of the contract the
siblings had with their aunt.

In their answer, the respondents argued that they are innocent purchasers in good faith and for value since they
simply relied on the genuine title that Reyes showed to them.

The trial court declared that Leonarda and the Burgos siblings were not innocent purchasers for value. It also held
that the conveyance of the property by the Burgos siblings to Leonarda was simulated.

The trial court then directed the Register to reinstate the title of the spouses Rufloe, and to cancel all other titles
subsequent to the said title

ISSUE: whether or not respondents were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value despite the forged deed of
sale of their transferor Delos Reyes

HELD:

As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title issued and will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

However, this rule admits of an exception, as such when the purchase has knowledge of a defect in the title.

In the insant case, the Rufloes caused a notice of an adverse claim to be annotated on the TCT of Reyes in 1979.
Despite the notice of the advsere claim, the Burgos proceeded in buying the lot. Thus they were not purchasers in
good faith.

Second, when Reyes sold the property to the Burgos, she was not in possession of such property. Amado Burgos
should have exercised ordinary prudence and inspected the land to see whether there are occupants in the land and
to inquire on the nature of their possession. Not having done this, the Burgos’ can hardly claim that they are innocent
purchase in good faith and for value.

SC also affirmed the findings of the trial court that the sale between the Burgos siblings and their aunt was simulated
as she never registered the sale, never caused the issuance of a title in her name. In fact, it was still the Burgoses who
continued to pay the taxes for the property and she was never in possession of the property.

FULE vs DE LEGARE

FACTS:

In this case, there was an intruder who demanded P10,000 from Emelia Legare and threatened to kill her if she
cannot come up with that amount the next day. John Legare, who is her adopted son, asked her to sign a piece of
paper so he could secure from the US Veterans Administration the amount. After Emelia signed the paper, John took
them to a hotel and told them to stay there.

When Emelia finally came back to her house, it was already occupied by the plaintiff Fule who told her that John sold
the lot to them. She then realized that the papers she signed was actually a deed of sale.

She then filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed of sale and conveyance.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.

HELD: Yes, they are innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.

1) Petitioners did not rely solely upon the deed of sale in favor of John and the fact that he had in his possession the
certificate of title of the owner. They insisted that the sale in favor of John be registered first and the transfer in
their favor be likewise registered. It was only after this that the petitioner paid the purchase price. In other words,
the petitioner spouses relied not really on the documents exhibited to them by John W. Legare, but, on the
registerability of those documents. This in our view, satisfies the measure of good faith contemplated by law.

2) It is true that at the time the herein petitioners purchased the properties from John W. Legare, he was not yet the
registered owner of the same. This fact alone, however, could not have caused the herein petitioners to lose their
status as innocent purchasers for value. John's possession of the certificate and his subsequent production of it to the
herein petitioners operated as a "conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a
new certificate."

The production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration
shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a new certificate or to make
a memorandum or registration in accordance with such instrument,

It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser
for value intervenes.

3) Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to secure a
registered title to the house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We
have indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 49
Phil., 19). However, we have also laid down the doctrine that there are instances when such a fraudulent document
may become the root of a valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from
the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an
innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.

YU vs PACLEB

FACTS:
Baltazar Pacleb and his first wife Angelita Chan are owners of a parcel of land which is the subject of this controversy.

In 1992, there were three unregistered sale that purportedly transferred the ownership of the property from Baltazar
to Rebecca. Then from Rebecca to Javier, who entered into a contract to sell with Spouses Yu.

In 1993, the Spouses Yu filed a specific complaint against Javier to compel him to deliver to them ownership,
possession as well as title to the property. In their complaint, they claim that after the sale, they discovered that the
lot was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb.

In 1994, the court ruled in favor of the Spouses Yu and directed the defendant to deliver the title to the former.

In 1995, Baltazar Paclerb filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale against the purported sale between them
and Rebecca but later dismissed the complaint since Rebecca could not be found.

In 1996, Baltazar again filed a case for removal of cloud from title. He alleges that the sale between them and
Rebecca could not have been possibly executed because at the time of the purported sale, he was residing in the US
and his wife died 20 years ago.

Spouses Yu, in their answer, argued that they are purchasers in good faith. As they simply relied on the testimony of
Ramon and on the validity of the deed of sale which was notarized

Trial court dismissed the case however CA reversed the lower court's ruling.

ISSUE: whether petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. The second is whether
ownership over the Langcaan Property was properly vested in petitioner spouses by virtue of the Decision in Civil
Case.
HELD:Petitioner spouses cannot be considered as innocent purchasers in good faith.

First, there were inconsistencies on their statement. In the present case, they contend that the bought the property
after talking with Ramon, who claimed he was the son of the owner. However, on the civil case they filed against
Javier, the said that only learned about Ramon after the sale with Javier.

Second, they should have exercised a higher degree of prudence knowing that the person who was selling the lot
was not the registered owner. They should not have only relied on the certificate of title they should also have
inquired if there are flaws in the title of the transferor or his capacity to transfer the land. (Yu are relative with
Ramon’s wife)

On the issue of the dismissal of the civil case: case was dismissed bec Rebecca could not be found, the dismissal of
that case could not have prejudiced the present one.
On the issue that the civil case the Spouses Yu filed against javier was binding to Baltazar: A civil case for a specific
performance is an action in personam, thus it only binds the parties thereto.

DOMINGO vs REED

FACTS:
Guillermo Reed, who was an overseas contract work purchased a lot in Pasig. Later a TCT was issued in the name of
his Lolita Reed (his wife), married to Guillermo.

Later, his brother Dominador and his wife who was allowed to stay in his property was summoned to the barangay
because there was a complaint for ejectment filed by Eduaro Quiteves who claimed to own the lot.

When Guillermo went to the Register of Deeds, he found that by virtue of a SPA that he allegedly executed
authorizing his wife to sell his property, his wife Lolita sold this lot to 3 different persons. (Edward Quitevez; Sps
Villanera; Sps Domingo)

He then filed a complaint for reconveyance of property against his wife and the person she dealt with alleging that
these persons conspired with each other to make it appear that he authorized his wife to sell their property.

RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed the RTC

ISSUE: Whether or not purchasers were buyers in good faith.
HELD: Purchasers were not buyers in good faith.

As to the spouses Domingo who knew that the property belongs to the conjugal property of Guillermo and Lolita,
they should have inquired into her authority to sell the property. When they executed the Deed of Sale, Lolita
showed no SPA and the Spouses Domingo merely relied on Lolita’s verbal claim of having been authorized to sell
the property.

As to petitioner Quitevez, he should verified the SPA Lolita had since in the acknowledgment portion of the SPA, only
Lolita appeared before the lawyer who notarized the document. He should have inquired whether the SPA was
valid.

They had knowledge of facts that should have led them to inquire and to investigate, in order to acquaint themselves
with possible defects in her title. Having thus failed to do anything that an ordinary prudent person would have
done in a similar situation, petitioners cannot now claim to be buyers in good faith.

SPA is not authentic:

1) Guillermo denies having signed the document;
2) Lolita admitted that merely sent the document and when it came back it was already signed by Guillermo
3) Nobody saw Guillermo affixed his signature in the SPA
4) Only Lolita appeared before the lawyer who notarized the document.

ST. DOMINIC CORPORATION vs IAC

FACTS:
In 1961, People's Homesite and Housing Corporation awarded the subject property to Cristobal Santiago and a TCT
was issued

Sometime in 1965, the Robes mortgaged the property to Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company. The mortgage lien
was annotated on the TCT.

On February 27, 1968, Castulo and Ebreo filed a complaint for cancellation of the TCT in the name of Robes and
Francisco. Claiming legal interest in the property, the Bustamante spouses were allowed to intervene in the case.

On March 25, 1968, a notice of lis pendens was annotated on TCT 84387 at the instance of the Bustamante spouses.
The subject property was then foreclosed by the bank after the Robes failed to pay its obligation. The property was
purchased by Franciso. After no one redemmed the property, a TCT was issued in the name of Francisco.

In 1976, Francsico sold the property to St Dominic Corporation and a new TCT issued to the latter.

Later, the civil case filed by the Castulo/Ebreo proceeded to judgment declaing the allocation and sale to Santiago as
void; declaring the sale between the Santiago to Robes and Francisco as void, cancelling their TCT and ordering the
NHA to process the application of Bustamante

When Bustamante applied for a writ of execution it was granted by the court on the condition that it cannot be
implemented against St. Dominic Corporation. Upon a MR which now included St Dominic and Francisco, the court
granted their prayer.

Petitioner filed a MR.

ISSUE:
HELD:
On the issue of including the petitioner in the writ of execution:
a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action. It is clear from the records that petitioner St.
Dominic Corporation had never been impleaded as a party to Civil Case No. Q-11895 filed by Ricardo Castulo and Juan
V. Ebreo. The complaint had for its purpose the nullification of the award to Cristobal Santiago, Jr., and the
subsequent sale between Santiago and the spouses Adalia Francisco and Carlos Robes.

On the effect of the trial court's judgment on the mortgagee bank's rights and on the foreclosure of the property:
The court held that where a Torrens title was issued as a result of regular land registration proceedings and was in
the name of the mortgagor when given as a security for a bank loan, the subsequent declaration of said title as null
and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage rights of the bank which had acted in good faith

A mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the certificate of title. There is no showing in the
records that the mortgagee bank was aware of any shadow affecting the title of the mortgaged property when it was
mortgaged.

The title to the property given as security to the Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Co., by the spouses Robes was valid,
regular, and free from any lien or encumbrance. The mortgage was executed prior to the institution of Civil Case No.
Q-11895, thus establishing it as a lien superior to whatever claims the plaintiffs therein may have as a result of the
subsequent litigation.

This being so, the adverse claim in Civil Case No. Q-11895 could not affect the rights of the mortgagee. The fact that
the foreclosure of the mortgage and the subsequent auction sale were effected after the annotation of the adverse
claim is of no moment. The foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of registration of the mortgage.

A person who takes a mortgage in good faith and for a valuable consideration, the record showing a clear title in the
mortgagor, will be protected against any equitable titles to the premises or equitable claims on the title, in favor of
third persons, of which he had no notice, actual or constructive.

Any subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificate of title cannot in any way prejudice the
mortgage previously registered and the lots subject thereto pass to the purchaser at public auction free from any lien
or encumbrance.

Upon proper foreclosure of a first mortgage, all liens subordinate to the mortgage are likewise foreclosed.

ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE

An action for reconveyance is a legal remedy granted to the owner of the land which has been wrongfully registered
in the name of another, in order to compel the latter to reconvey the land to him.

It can be filed after one year from the issuance of the decree. It does aim not re-open the registration proceeding but
only to show the person who secured the title is not the owner. It does not seek the set aside the decree but only
reconvey the land to its rightful owner.

No action for reconveyance can take place against a third party who had acquired title over the registere property in
good faith and for value.
The remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is,
after one year from the date of the decree is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages against
the persons who cause such fraud.

REQUISITES OF RECONVEYANCE

[;[;[;[;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

SECTION 53.Presentation of Owner's Duplicate Upon Entry of New Certificate. — No voluntary instrument shall be
registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument,
except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown.

The production of the owner's duplicate certificate, whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration,
shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make
a memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument, and the new certificate or memorandum shall be
binding upon the registered owner and upon all persons claiming under him, in favor of every purchaser for value and
in good faith.

In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the
parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of
title. After the entry of the decree of registration on the original petition or application, any subsequent registration
procured by the presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title, or a forged deed or other instrument, shall be
null and void.

SECTION 96.Against Whom Action Filed. — If such action is brought to recover for loss or damage or for deprivation
of land or of any estate or interest therein arising wholly through fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or
misfeasance of the court personnel, Register of Deeds, his deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the
performance of their respective duties, the action shall be brought against the Register of Deeds of the province or
city where the land is situated and the National Treasurer as defendants. But if such action is brought to recover for
loss or damage or for deprivation of land or of any interest therein arising through fraud, negligence, omission,
mistake or misfeasance of person other than court personnel, the Register of Deeds, his deputy or other employees
of the Registry, such action shall be brought against the Register of Deeds, the National Treasurer and other person
or persons, as co-defendants. It shall be the duty of the Solicitor General in person or by representative to appear
and to defend all such suits with the aid of the fiscal of the province or city where the land lies: Provided, however,
that nothing in this Decree shall be construed to deprive the plaintiff of any right of action which he may have against
any person for such loss or damage or deprivation without joining the National Treasurer as party defendant. In every
action filed against the Assurance Fund, the court shall consider the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration

HEIRS OF MAXIMO LABANON vs HEIRS OF CONSTANCIO

FACTS:
Constancio settled on a piece of land and cultivated the said lot and introduced some improvements. Having difficulty
applying for a Homestead Patent, he let his brother Maximo file the application with agreement that they would
divide the lot as soon as possible.

After Maximo was issued a Homestead Patent and a corresponding OCT, they executed a document wherein Maximo
assign and conveys the ownership of certain portion of the lot to Constancio and his heirs so they can occupy and use
such lot.

Later, Maximo executed another sworn statement reiterating his desire that his brother and his heirs shall own the
eastern portion of the lot.

After the Constancio died, his heirs sold the eastern portion of the lot to the husband of one of Constancio’s children.
They then discovered that the heirs of Maximo were taking steps to deprive the heirs of Constancio of their
ownership over the eastern portion of the lot.

In 1991, the heirs of Maximo filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Recovery of Ownership. RTC granted
their complaint but CA reversed the ruling of the lower court which recognized the ownership of the heirs of
Constancio on the eastern portion of the lot.
Petitioners appealed to the SC arguing that respondents can no longer question Maximo Labanon's ownership of the
land after its registration under the principle of indefeasibility of a Transfer Certificate of Title

ISSUE: Whether or not the OCT issued in 1975 to Maximo has become indefeasible and conclusive.
HELD:
Respondents are not precluded from challenging the validity of the OCT.

While Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the title becomes indefeasible after a year from the issuance of the
decree, it does not totally deprive a party of any remedy to recover the property fraudulently registered in the name
of another.

Section 32 of PD 1529 merely precludes the reopening of the registration proceedings for titles covered by the
Torrens System, but does not foreclose other remedies for the reconveyance of the property to its rightful owner.

The remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is,
after one year from the date of the decree, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

In the instance case, respondents are not precluded from recovering the eastern portion of the property. The action
for Recovery of Ownership before the RTC is indeed the appropriate remedy.

On the issue of trust: The court held that unrepudiated written express trusts are imprescriptible.

AGUILA vs CFI

FACTS:
The subject lot in this case is being claim by the children of Juliana Matienzo, the petitioner being the only surviving
child of his second marriage and the respondents being the children of his first marriage.

In an earlier action, respondents sued for the partition of said property which rendered in favor of them. Plaintiff
then filed for a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court.

The court then levied upon the propertu and sold it at public wherein the respondents where the highest bidder.

Petitioner then filed a complaint for reconveyance claiming he was deprived of the opportunity to submit his
evidence in the earlier case.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action for reconveyance is proper in this case.

HELD: No.

An action for reconveyance is a remedy when by reason of mistake or fraud, property is registered in the name of a
person not its owner.

1) Clerical error in designating the real owner is a valid ground for reconveyance after the decree shall have
become final following the lapse of one year therefrom.
2) When a person not entitled to the property succeeded in registering it in his name to the prejudice of the real
owner.

However, it cannot be employed to negate the effects of a valid decision of a court of justice determining the
conflicting claims of ownership of the parties in an appropriate proceeding.

The decision in that case was a valid resolution of the question of ownership over the disputed properties and cannot
be reversed now through the remedy of reconveyance.

When petitioners lawyers were negligent in performing their duties, he should have immediately replace them.
Instead, petitioner retained his lawyers until everything was too late.

GASATAYA vs MABASA

FACTS:
Respondent’s father was granted a Homestead lot, he then mortgaged such lot to DBP. After he failed to pay his
obligation, DBP foreclosed the sold and they were the highest bidder.

Later, DBP allowed the respondent’s daughter to reacquire the property through a deed of conditional sale.
Respondent then entered into an agreement with Petitioner’s father for the latter to assume payment of her
obligation to DBP.

Upon representation by Sabas Gasataya that respondent's obligation to DBP had already been settled, they entered
into another agreement denominated as "Deed of Sale of Fishpond Lands with Right to Repurchase.

Later, respondents found out that petitioner stopped paying DBP and as a result revoked her right to repurchase.
They also found out that DBP held an auction on their property and petitioner is the highest bidder.

Respondent then filed a complaint in the RTC for reconveyance of titles of lands claiming that petitioner deliberately
reneged on their obligation to pay DBP which led to their right to repurchase the lot being revoked by DBP.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent and order petitioner to reconvey to respondent the TCT. CA upheld the ruling of the
lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in reconverying the property to the respondent.
HELD:
Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the person with a better right than the
person under whose name said property was erroneously registered.

While respondent is not the legal owner of the disputed lots, she has a better right than petitioner to the contested
lots on the following grounds: first, the deed of conditional sale executed by DBP vested on her the right to
repurchase the lots and second, her right to repurchase them would have subsisted had they (the Gasatayas) not
defrauded her.

Petitioner cannot discredit the deed of conditional sale just so he can to keep his titles to the lots. Petitioner should
be reminded that DBP revoked respondent's right to repurchase the lots under said deed because of the deceitful
maneuverings that he and his father employed. If we were to sustain petitioner's argument, then we would, in effect,
reward him for his misdeed.

Moreover, the law only protects an innocent purchaser for value and not one who has knowledge of and
participation in the employment of fraud.

BENIN vs TUASON

FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of 3 cases which has the same cause of action against the same defendant. All of the
plaintiffs allege that they and their predecessors in interest were in open, continuous, adverse, peaceful possession
of subject lots since time immemorial and that after the war, the leased their respective lots to evacuees from Manila
who were paying monthly rentals. That in 1953, they discovered that their land had been fraudulently or erroneously
included in parcel 1 of OCT 735 issued in the names of the Tuasons.

They further allege that the defendants OCT are null and void because during the land registration proceedings, the
area of parcel 1 were altered and amended without any subsequent publication; And since their OCT is null and void,
it follows that all the subsequent TCTs that were issued are also null and void.

Plaintiffs prayed that the court declare them owners of their land and revoke the title of the defendants.

Respondents, in their answer, claim that the plaintiffs action is barred by prior judgment, precription and laches;

RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and declared the decree and title issued in the LRC as null and void and without any
effect whatsoever; Declared all TCTs derived from that OCT as null and void;

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring such OCT and TCTs as null and void.
HELD: Yes

With regards to the land registration proceedings:

There was no irregularity in the contested land registration proceeding; Although there was an amendment in the
original plan there was no inclusion of any additional area, but only a reduction thereof as a result of the Tuasons and
the government agreeing that the government would withdraw its opposition if the Tuasons would not include some
areas that would be used as roads; Therefore there was no necessity of a new publication.
With regards to the trial court declaring null and void OCT 735:
The court cannot simply declare OCT 735 as null and void as the parcel of lands that the plaintiffs were contesting
comprised only 2% of the whole area which OCT 735 covers.

With regards to the addition of 27.10 sqm:

This number is too minimal to be of decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of OCT 735; this was
already included in the original plan an was a result of a mere error which was corrected when the amended plan was
prepared; Besides in cases were a certificate of title was issued covering lands that were the RC has no jurisdiction,
the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns lands which the RC had no jurisdiction.

With regards to the OCT not properly transcribed in the Registration Book:
This is only a formal, not a substantial defect. What matter is that the original certificate contains the full
transcription of the decree; For a certificate of title cannot be invalidated simply by the mere errors committed by the
employees of the register of deeds

Whether or not appelles still have legal right over the six parcels of land:
No, an action for recoveyance can only prosper if the land claimed to be wrongfully registered is still registered in the
name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. No action for reconveyance can be had when an
innocent third party has purchase the land in good faith and for value.

In the instant case, JM Tuason bought the land in good faith and for value from the Heirs of D Tuason, who bought it
from Mayorasgo Tuason. Therefore, an action for reconveyance instituted by the plaintiff cannot prosper since the
land is no longer registered to the person who procured the wrongful registration and it has already been bought by
an innocent purchase in good faith and for value.

Besides, their action is barred by res judicata and prescription. Res judicata because this dispute has already been
settled in an earlier ruling by the court which upheld the validity of OCT 735; And prescription because the land
became incontrovertible in 1915 and the plaintiff only filed their case in 1955 or after a lapse of some 41 years.

DATU KIRAM SAMPACO vs HADJI SERAD MINGCA

FACTS:
Respondent Hadji Lantud filed an action to quiet title aginst petitioner Datu Kiram. He alleges that he is an owner in
fee simple of a parcel of land in Marawi which is covered by an OCT. He claims that Datu Kiram and his daughter
entered his property and destroyed several improvements and after that, the Barangay captain and the local council
issued a decision which states that Datu Kiram is the owner of the subject parcel of land.

Datu Kiram, in his answer argues that he inherited the lot from his father and that the OCT issued to Hadji has been
issued through fraud since the land is an residential land which cannot be subject of free patent since only
agricultural land can be the subject thereof.

RTC ruled in favor of Datu Kiram, however CA reverse the ruling of the lower court

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in sustaining the validity of the Hadji’s OCT
HELD:
No. The torrens title is conclusive evidence of ownership of land. Petitioner was not able to prove that the OCT was
issued through fraud. He was was not able to show that the land was indeed residential as classified by the President
per recommendation by the Secretary of DENR. (At present pwede napud ang residential)

With regards to his action for reconveyance:

In an action for recoveyance, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title
and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. To do this, he must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming
by describing the location, area and boundaries and then show his title.

In the instant case, petitioners was not able to identify his property by metes and bounds. Second, he merely claims
that he is in open, continuous and adverse possession of the property in the concept of owner. Respondent on the
other hand, has an OCT to show proof of his possession. Between he and respondent, the latter clearly has a better
claim.

With regards to fraud:

Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be
presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not being
adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which must be proved.

WHERE TO FILE

The Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to or any interest in
property where the assessed value exceeds P20,0000 or in MM: P50,000.

If the assessed value does not exceed P20,000 or P50,000 in Metropolitan Manila, it is the Municipal Court who has
jurisdiction.

REPUBLIC vs MANGATORA

FACTS:

ISSUE:
HELD:

QUANTOM OF PROOF

LASQUITE vs VICTORY HILLS

FACTS:
In this case, a certain Jose Manahan executed a Deed of Quitclaim and Assignment of Rights over a land to petitioner
Lasquite. He then applied for a free patent over the lot and sold half of the land to Andrade and both were issued
an OCT (NP) [1981]

Later the Prescillas filed a case for reconveyance against the petitioners on the ground that he forfed the signature
of Jose Manahan. The heirs of Manahan was allowed to intervene and later respondent Victory Hills also intervened
in the case.

Victory Hills claimed that they traced their title to Lot 3050 to OCT 380 which was allegedly registered to Jose
Manahan by virtue of a Homestead Patent, who then sold it to Hieras then to Angeles who then transferred it to
Victory Hills.

Petitioners, on the other hand, question the validity of OCT 380 which is the source of respondent’s title. They claim
that the certificate of title does not bear the signature of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. However, CA reversed their ruling

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent Victory Hills is entitled to reconveyance of the subject lot.

HELD:
No, in an action for reconveyance of title, party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of
evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.

In the instant case, The copy of the OCT 380 showed that it was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources but by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. To give OCT 380 a probative value in court
would be to allow circumvention of the requirement laid don in Act 2874.

Second, there is no proof in the records of the Bureau of Lands that the Homestead Patent which OCT 380 was
based upon ever existed.

Third, the original registration date of the TCTs bore different dates.
Fourth, respondent cannot even establish that the Jose Manahan from whom it derived its title is the same Jose
Manahan that petitioner bought the subject lot.

Thus respondent failed to dispense such burden.

Respondent avers that petitioner Lasquite forged the Deed of Quitclaim/Assignment of Rights to make it appear that
Jose Manahan conveyed Lot No. 3050 to him. It must be stressed, however, that whoever alleges forgery has the
burden of proving the same. Forgery cannot be presumed but should be substantiated with clear and convincing
evidence.

CAVILE vs LITANIA-HONG

FACT:
In 1937, the spouses Cavile executed a Deed of partition over their parcels of land. It also stated that the legal heirs
sold their share of lots covered by TD No 7143, 7421 and 7965 to Castor Cavile, making him the sole owner of such
properties.

In 1960, Castor and his sister Susana executed a Confirmaton of Extrajudicial Partition where Castor confirmed that
the lots which bore the same boundary as the lot mentioned in the earlier partition is owned by Susana.

In 1974, the daughters of Susana filed a complaint for reconveyance against Perfecta Cavile, daughter of Castor.
According to them, they inherited the lot from their mother who was in possession of the lots, paying the realty
taxes and she was even able to obtain a loan from the bank by mortgaging the subject lots; That in 1968, Perfecta
Intruded and excluded the respondents from the subject lots.

Petitioner, in his answer, argued that their father fully possessed the subject lots after their partition in 1937; Then
1962, Castor sold to her the subject lots and she was able to obtain a free patent over the same lot in 1962; That the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition executed by her father and Susana was a nullity since it was only done to so
that she would be able to obtain security for a loan she applied with a bank.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners however, CA reversed the lower courts ruling.

ISSUE: Who among the parties have a better right to the subject lots.
HELD:
The court held that between Perfecta and Justina/Genoveva, it is the former who has a better right.

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
"Preponderance of evidence" is the value of the aggregate evidence on either side. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Factors to consider: fact, circumstances, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility
so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

The court gave credence to the evidences submitted by Perfecta such as the Deed of Partition entered into by the
Spouses Cavile, the OCT which was issued to her in 1962 which already became indefeasible by the time the
respondents filed their action, the testimony of Luciana, whose husband was a tenant working for the subject lot.
They also believe her contention that the deed signed in 1960 was only to accommodate Susana’s loan with the bank.

The court also explained that between the deed signed in 1937 and the one signed in 1960, the former clearly
explained how Castro came to fully owned the subject lots while the latter filed to shed light on why the said
property wholly pertained to her.

Tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership and merely evidences a claim of ownership.

And even if respondents' Complaint was filed on time, the Court would still rule that respondents failed to
satisfactorily prove that they were in possession of the subject lots prior to the grant of free patents and issuance
of Torrens titles over the same in favor petitioner Perfecta.
PRESCRIPTION

Action based on fraud – four (4) years

An action for reconveyance can only be instituted within 4 years after discovery of alleged fraud. Such discovery is
deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original certificate of title.

Action based on implied trust – ten (10) years

A person acquiring property through fraud becomes by operation of law a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive* trust prescribes
in ten (10) years from the date of issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of title, for such
registration constitutes constructive notice to third persons of the respondent’s adverse claim to the property.

To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, plaintiff’s possession of the
disputed property is material. The ten (10) year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey
the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of
the property also remains in possession of said property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the
property does not run against him. In such as case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

*A constructive trust is an equitable remedy resembling a trust imposed by a court to benefit a party that has been wrongfully deprived of its
rights due to either a person obtaining or holding legal right to property which they should not possess due to unjust enrichment or
interference.

Action based on a void contract – imprescriptible

Action to quiet title where plaintiff is in possession – imprescriptible

An action for reconveyance is actually on to quiet title. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of
any cloud of doubt or uncertainty with respect to real property. To avail of the remedy of quieting of title… page 337

(LIWALUG DATOMANONG)AMEROL vs BAGUMBAYAN

FACTS:
In 1952, Mandal Tando transferred his land to Liwalug Datomanong (erroneously surnamed Amerol), who took
possession of the land and introduced improvements such as coconut and coffee plantation besides his farm house, a
mosque and cassava plantation.

In 1953, Liwalug applied for a free patent application over his land but was somehow never acted upon by the
government. Meanwhile in December 27, 1954, defendant Molok Bagumbaran also applied for a free patent over the
same parcel of land and was issued a Free Patent No. in August 16, 1955 and was also given an OCT that same year.

Since plaintiff never knew of defendant’s application nor was he notified of the administrative proceedings regarding
defendants application, he was only able to file a formal protest in April 24, 1964. He also filed his counterclaim in
December 4, 1964 praying for the reconveyance of his land

The trial court denied the counterclaim of Liwalug Datomanong holding that his action for reconveyance has
prescribed after 4 years from the date of the registration of said patent. Plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiffs action for reconveyance has prescribed.

HELD:
The court held that the prescriptive period for such an action for reconveyance, as this case, is ten years. The ten-
year prescriptive period commences to run from, the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the real
property.

The court held that Molok acquired the property through fraud and misrepresentation. First, he knew that Mandol
Tando and Liwalug were the owners of the subject land as evidenced in his tax declarations, yet he fraudulently
misrepresented that the was the occupant and possessor of the land in question. Second, he falsely pretended that
there was no prior application for a free patent over the land.
Under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, the act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in actual possession and
occupation of the property in question, obtaining a patent and Original Certificate of Title in his name, created an
implied trust in favor of the actual possessor of the said property under article 1144 this action must be brought
within 10 years from the time the action accrues.

ART 1456 If property is acquired through mistake or fraud; the person obtaining it is by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

The action for reconveyance filed by the plaintiff has not yet prescribed since Between August 16, 1955, the date of
the issuance of the OCT and December 4, 1964, when the Liwalug filed his cournterclaim, is less than 10 years.

On the argument by Molok that an this action prescribed in 4 years:

In all the cases he cited, the cause of action accrued prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code.

On the issue that he has already mortgage said property to DBP:

The judgment for reconveyance could be negated at the will of the holder of the title by the simple expedient of
constituting a mortgage or other encumbrance on the property, the remedy of reconveyance would become illusory.

The consequences of the void mortgage must be left between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. In no small
measure the Development Bank of the Philippines might even be faulted for not making the requisite investigation on
the possession of the land mortgaged.

RAMIREZ Case:
Independently, however, of the alleged fraud on the part of Ramirez, the right to demand a reconveyance
prescribes after 10 years from accrual of the cause of action, on June 22, 1944, the date of registration of the patent
and of the issuance of OCT No. 282-A in his name. 14 In short, the right, if any, of Paguia to sue for a reconveyance
expired either in 1945, or, at the latest, on June 22, 1954.

DACLAG vs MACAHILIG

FACTS:
In 1984, Maxima Macahilig sold to spouses Daclag a parcel of land and on that same year an OCT was issued to
petitioner Rogelia Daclag by virtue of her free patent application.

In 1991, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession claiming that they were the lawful owners of the
land and Maxima illegally sold it to petitioners.

Petitioners contend that the 10-year period for reconveyance is applicable if the action is based on an implied or a
constructive trust; that since respondents' action for reconveyance was based on fraud, the action must be filed
within four years from the discovery of the fraud

ISSUE: Whether or not the their action for reconveyance prescribes in 4 or 10 years.

HELD: Neither

A review of the factual antecedents of the case shows that respondents' action for reconveyance was not even
subject to prescription.

That the deed of sale executed by Maxima in favor of petitioners was null and void since she was not the owner of
the land she sold to petitioners, the deed is subject to attack anytime, since an action to declare the inexistence of a
void contract does not prescribe.

when there is a showing of such illegality, the property registered is deemed to be simply held in trust for the real
owner by the person in whose name it is registered, and the former then has the right to sue for the reconveyance of
the property. An action for reconveyance based on a void contract is imprescriptible.

As long as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the person who caused such
registration, an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the real owner. In this case,
title to the property is in the name of petitioner Rogelia; thus, the trial court correctly ordered the reconveyance of
the subject land to respondents.
Previous ruling:

The RTC concluded that when Maxima executed the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners on May 23, 1984, Maxima
had no right to sell that land as it did not belong to her; that she conveyed nothing to petitioners; and that the deed
of sale should be declared null and void.

ACTION FOR DAMAGES (SEC 32)

Xxx Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy
by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.

RECOVERY FROM THE ASSURANCE FUND (SEC 95)

Action for Compensation from Funds A person who, without negligence on his part, sustains loss or damage, or is
deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in consequence of the bringing of the land under the operation of
the Torrens system of arising after original registration of land, through fraud or in consequence of any error,
omission, mistake or misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry or memorandum in the registration book,
and who by the provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of any law from
bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein, may bring an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction for the recovery of damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund.

DBP vs BAUTISTA

FACTS:

Respondent Lourdes Bautista applied to the Government for a parcel of land and she granted one by virtue of a Sales
Patent and a corresponding OCT was issued in her name.

Bautista then applied for a loan with Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (predecessor-in-interest of petitioner DBP).
She mortgaged her parcel of land as a security for her loan.

Bautista failed to pay her loan so RFC foreclosed the mortage extrajudicially with RFC as the highest bidder. Upon her
failure to redeem said property, RFC consolidated its ownership and the register of Deeds cancelled Bautista’s TCT
and issued a new one in the name of RFC.

On or about this time, a civil case was filed by the Ramos’ against the government and RFC, claiming ownership of the
land in question and seeking the annulment of the TCT of the government, the OCT of Lourdes Bautista and the TCT
of RFC. The court therein declared those titles as null and void.

The bank already sold the lot to a certain Conrada when the decision was rendered, so when the title was annulled,
they reimbursed her.

DBP then filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against Lourdes.

ISSUE: Whether such action can prosper

HELD: No
The judgment in that civil case is not binding to Bautista since she was not named as one of the parties/respondents
in that case. She could not be bound by a proceeding that was strictly an action in personam, otherwise her right to
the due process of law would be greatly violated. She could not be made to suffer, directly or indirectly from the
effects of such decision.

When DBP reimbursed Conrada it acted on its own peril and it could not have bind Lourdes at all.

On the contention of DBP that if no right existed against Bautista, then it could recover its loss from the Assurance
Fund:
The law only allows recovery upon a showing that here is no negligence on the part of the party sustaining any loss or
damage. In the instant case, DBP is solely responsible for the plight in which it now finds itself, thus it cannot recover
its loss from the Assurance Fund.
OTHER REMEDIES AVAILABLE:

ACTION FOR CANCELLATION OR REVERSION (SEC 101, CA 141)

All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS (RULE 47, RULES OF COURT)

SECTION 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders
and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. (n)
SECTION 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new
trial or petition for relief. (n)

SECTION 3. Period for filing action. — If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four (4) years from
its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. (n)

SECTION 4. Filing and contents of petition. — The action shall be commenced by filing a verified petition alleging
therein with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's
good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

The petition shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies, together with sufficient copies corresponding to the
number of respondents. A certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to the
original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause
of action or defense and a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts
and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (n)

SECTION 5. Action by the court. — Should the court find no substantial merit in the petition, the same may be
dismissed outright with specific reasons for such dismissal.

Should prima facie merit be found in the petition, the same shall be given due course and summons shall be served
on the respondent. (n)

SECTION 6. Procedure. — The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the
reception of the evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. (n)

SECTION 7. Effect of judgment. — A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or
resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper
court. However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the
court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.

SECTION 8. Suspension of prescriptive period. — The prescriptive period for the refiling of the aforesaid original
action shall be deemed suspended from the filing of such original action until the finality of the judgment of
annulment. However, the prescriptive period shall not be suspended where the extrinsic fraud is attributable to the
plaintiff in the original action. (n)
SECTION 9. Relief available. — The judgment of annulment may include the award of damages, attorney's fees and
other relief.

If the questioned judgment or final order or resolution had already been executed, the court may issue such orders of
restitution or other relief as justice and equity may warrant under the circumstances. (n)

SECTION 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts. — An action to annul a judgment or
final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. It
shall be treated as an ordinary civil action and Sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule shall be applicable thereto.

CRIMINAL ACTION FOR PERJURY

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT (SECS 33, 34)

Appeal from Judgment, etc. The judgment and orders of the court hearing the land registration case are appealable
to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the same manner as in ordinary actions.

Rules of Procedure. The Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provision of this Decree, be
applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient