Domestic Policies on Economy

First Plan (1953–1957)

Since 1953, Chinese economic policies have been based on 5-year plans with
social and economic development initiatives. However, since 1949 the
Communist Party of China was already guiding and guiding China to a socialist
society through development plans, establishment of growth targets and
incorporation of reforms. Planning is a key characteristic of socialist economies,
and one plan established for the entire country normally contains detailed
economic development guidelines for all its regions.
The administration adopted the Soviet economic model, based on state
ownership in the modern sector, large collective units in agriculture, and
centralized economic planning. The Soviet approach to economic development
was manifested in the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957). The key tasks
highlighted in the Plan were to concentrate on the construction of 694 large and
medium-sized industrial projects, including 156 with the aid of the Soviet Union,
so that the primary foundations for China's socialist industrialization; to develop
agricultural producers' cooperatives to help in the socialist transformation of the
agriculture and handicraft industries; to put capitalist industry and commerce on
the track of state capitalism so as to facilitate the socialist transformation of
private industry and commerce.
Accumulated investment in capital construction was 55 billion yuan and fixed
assets increments reached 46.05 billion yuan, 1.9 times higher than at the end of
1952. About 595 large and medium-sized projects were completed and put into
production, laying the framework of China's industrialization. The gross value of
industrial products in 1957 increased 128.6% from 1952.
Achievements
 Steel production in 1953 was 1.35 million metric tons-which.
 By Plan's end in 1957, Soviet Union-assisted Chinese production had
risen to 5.35 million metric tons
 Coal production in 1957 reached 131 million tons, increasing 98% from
1952.
 Gross output value from industry and agriculture rose from 30% in 1949 to
56.5% in 1957, while that of heavy industry increased from 26.4% to
48.4%. In 1957, grain production reached 195 billion kilograms and cotton
output 32.8 million dan (1 dan = 50 kilograms), both surpassing the targets
set in the Plan.
Problems:
The two major problems that arose during this period were the following:
Agricultural production could not keep pace with industrial production. The Plan
considered gross industrial output value accounting for 70% of the gross output
value of industry and agriculture and of production accounting for 60% of the
gross industrial output value as indicators of industrial modernization, which
ignored the development of agricultures in some sense.

In addition, investments in capital construction in 1956 totaled 14,735 billion yuan,

increasing 70% over the previous year. Fiscal expenditure in the form of
infrastructure loans rose to 48% from 30% from 1955, putting a strain on the
national budget as a result.
By 1956 approximately 67.5% of all modern industrial enterprises were state
owned, and 32.5% were under joint public-private ownership, with no privately
owned companies remaining. During the same period, the handicraft industries
were organized into cooperatives, which accounted for 91.7% of all handicraft
workers by 1956.

Second Plan (1958–1962)

This plan was created to accomplish several tasks, including:
 Expanding heavy industry in China.
 Furthering the cause of socialism by transferring more property to
collective ownership.
 Encouraging the economic growth of China through industry, agriculture,
handicrafts, transportation and commerce.
 Cultivating cultural and scientific development of the Chinese people.
 Strengthening national defense and improving living standards in China.
The Political Bureau of the CPC had determined that gross value of agricultural
products should increase 270%; in fact, the gain was a considerably more modest
35%. Nevertheless, the plan was successful in some respects. The country saw
increases in capital construction over those observed during the first Five-Year
Plan and also saw significant increases in industry (doubling output value) and
income (workers and farmers, increase by as much as 30%).
However, the Great Leap Forward, which diverted millions of agricultural workers
into industry, and the great sparrow campaign, which led to an infestation of
locusts, caused a huge decrease in food production. Simultaneously, rural
officials, under huge pressure to meet their quotas, vastly overstated how much
grain was available. Thus, a massive nationwide famine ensued, which was
avoidable, but the government continued with its policy.

Third Plan (1966–1970)

The Plan contained two comparatively detailed schemes: one was the
Preliminary Tentative Plan of the 3rd Five-year Plan (1966–1970) proposed by
the State Planning Commission and agreed by the Central Government Work
Meeting in May 1964; the other was the Report Syllabus about the Arrangement
of the 3rd Five-year Plan drawn out by the State Planning Commission and
agreed by the central government in September 1965.
The Tentative Plan set out the following basic tasks:
1. To spare no efforts to develop agriculture, solve widespread problems
concerning people's food, clothing and other basic needs;
2. To strengthen national defense, and endeavor to make breakthroughs in
technology;
3. In order to support agriculture and strengthen national defense, to
enhance infrastructure, continue to improve production quality, increase
production variety and quantity, to build an economy of self-reliance, and
to develop transportation, commerce, culture, education and scientific
research.
The Plan also called for the prioritization of national defense in the light of a
possible big war, actively preparing for conflicts and speeding up construction in
three key areas; national defense, science and technology, and industry and
transport infrastructure.
The outputs of other newly added major products were 68.06 million tons of coal;
8.60 million kilowatts of electricity; 27.77 million tons of petroleum; 6.53 million
tons of steels; 35.90 million tons of iron ore; 2.44 million tons of synthesized
ammonia; 2.04 million tons of fertilizers; 15.33 million tons of cement; 187,000
tons of plastics; 3.22 million tons of cotton spindles; 12,300 tons of chemical
fibers; 3,894 kilometers of newly constructed railways and 31,223 kilometers of
newly constructed highways were put into operation; and handling capacity of the
coastal harbors were over 11.91 million tons.
This plan was more successful than anticipated, with the industrial and
agricultural goals exceed by 14.1% and industrial gross output value goals by
21.1%. Agricultural gains also exceeded goals, but more moderately, with a 2.2%
rise above expectations. According to the Official Portal of the Chinese
Government, however, the focus on accumulation and rapid development in this
and preceding plans were impediments to long-term economic development.

Fourth Plan (1971–1975)

A first draft of the Plan was developed and agreed upon in September 1970 at
the 2nd Plenary Session of the 9th Communist Party Central Committee, which
stipulated:
 The average annual growth rate of gross output value of industry and
agriculture reach 12.5%
 130 billion yuan would be budgeted for infrastructure construction within
five years
 Expected industrial output would reach between 300 and 325 billion
kilograms of grain, between 65 and 70 million piculs (3.9–4.2 billion
kilograms) of cotton, between 35 and 40 million tons of steel, between 400
 and 430 million tons of coal, between 200 and 220 billion kWh of electricity,
and between 900 million and 1 billion tons of railway freight
In July 1973, the State Planning Commission amended the draft, lowering some
of the targets initially set. Steel output was reduced to between 32 and 35 million
tons and later further reduced to 30 million tons. The national economy took a
favorable turn in 1972 and 1973. By 1973, all major economic indices had been
fulfilled or exceeded, making it the year with the fastest economic growth.

Domestic policies on propaganda

Colorful propaganda posters have accompanied almost every event or
development that took place in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since its
founding in 1949. These posters were intended to mobilize, inform, congratulate,
inspire, instruct, or appease the people. The accessibility of the poster message
for the large number of illiterates in China was an important reason behind the
production of posters.
The medium of the poster has had an enormous visual impact on Chinese
society, and this continues until today, even though it now lost ground to
commercial advertising and television. A walk through the poster gallery of the
People’s Republic that history has left us enables us to get a glimpse of the
changes in how China and its ruling Communist Party perceived itself, and its
future, over the years.
Although the propaganda poster was very much part and parcel of the political
reality of the PRC, its usage was not invented by the Communist Party and could
boast of a long tradition. Through all of its long history, the Chinese political
system had used the arts to present and spread correct behavior and thought.
Literature, poetry, painting, stage plays, songs and other artistic expressions
were produced to entertain, but they also were given an important didactic
function: they had to educate the people in what was considered right and wrong.
According to the political theories adhered to at the time, as long as the State
provided examples of correct behavior, this automatically would make the people
believe what was seen as proper
Mao explicitly laid out the political role of culture in his 1942 "Talks at the Yan'an
Forum on Art and Literature". The propaganda system, considered a central part
of CCP's "control system", drew much from Soviet, Nazi and other totalitarian
states' propaganda methods. It represented a quintessential Leninist
"transmission belt" for indoctrination and mass mobilization. David Shambaugh
observes that propaganda and indoctrination are considered to have been a
hallmark of the Maoist China; the CCP employed a variety of "thought control"
techniques, including incarceration for "thought reform," construction of role
models to be emulated, mass mobilization campaigns, the creation of ideological
monitors and propaganda teams for indoctrination purposes, enactment of
articles to be memorized, control of the educational system and media, a
nationwide system of loudspeakers, among other methods. While ostensibly
aspiring to a "Communist utopia," often had a negative focus on constantly
searching for enemies among the people. The means of persuasion was often
extremely violent, "a literal acting out of class struggle."
According to Anne-Marie Brady, an Associate Professor at the University of
Canterbury's School of Political Science and Communication, CCP propaganda
and thought work traditionally had a much broader notion of the public sphere
than is usually defined by media specialists. Chinese propagandists used every
possible means of communication available in China after 1949, including
electronic media such as film and television, educational curriculum and
research, print media such as newspapers and posters, cultural arts such as
plays and music, oral media such as memorizing Mao quotes, as well as thought
reform and political study classes.
China Central Television has traditionally served as a major national conduit for
televised propaganda, while the People's Daily newspaper has served as a
medium for print propaganda. During the Mao years, a distinctive feature of
propaganda and thought work was "rule by editorial," according to Brady. Political
campaigns would be launched through editorials and leading articles in People's
Daily, which would be followed by other papers. Work units and other
organizational political study groups utilized these articles as a source for political
study, and reading newspapers in China was "a political obligation". Mao used
Lenin's model for the media, which had it function as a tool of mass propaganda,
agitation, and organization.
During the Cultural Revolution, PRC propaganda was crucial to the formation and
promotion of the cult of personality centered around Chairman Mao Zedong, as
well as mobilizing popular participation in national campaigns. Past propaganda
also encouraged the Chinese people to emulate government approved model
workers and soldiers, such as Lei Feng, Chinese Civil War hero Dong Cunrui,
Korean War hero Yang Gensi, and Dr. Norman Bethune, a Canadian doctor who
assisted the Communist Eighth Route Army during the Second Sino-Japanese
War. It also praised Third World revolutionaries and close foreign allies such as
Albania and North Korea while vilifying both the American "imperialists" and the
Soviet "revisionists" (the latter of whom was seen as having betrayed Marxism–
Leninism following the Sino-Soviet split).
According to Barbara Mittler, Maoist era propaganda left memories of violence
and slander upon many Chinese, and their psychological strains drove many to
madness and death. Today, Maoist era propaganda are no longer used by the
CCP, and are largely commercialized for the purposes of nostalgia.

http://www.iisg.nl/publications/chineseposters.pdf
 Domestic policies on Education
Policies in Chinese education, particularly higher education, have undergone
major periodic shifts since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in
October, 1949. Few other major policy areas have been as sensitive to the
general swings in Chinese policy, ideological debates and the political fortunes
of different leaders and factions.
This is hardly surprising. As a developing nation the critical importance education
plays as a steering force in the nation's development is obvious. As a
revolutionary socialist society its leaders have strongly held about the values and
norms, as well as the professional training, education must provide. Education is
an explicit device of the party designed to inculcate and sustain revolutionary
values and Marxist-Leninist theories, as well as an instrument of the state used
to promote its modernization.
The duality of 'redness' and 'expertness' has been at the essence of Chinese
educational objectives, while swings in emphasis between the two have been a
major characteristic of policy change. As a controlled society (some would argue
totalitarian), leaders and leadership groups have been able to impose sudden
and dramatic shifts and reversals in the field of education policy as in other areas.
In the early 1950's Chinese policies, including those in Chinese education,
particularly at the post-secondary level, followed by the Soviet model. This
emphasized scientific and technological training directed at the needs of an
industrializing society. For example, in 1949 China had 180 institutions of higher
education enrolling 80,000 students By 1957 enrollment had jumped to 440,000.
The Chinese Academcy of Sciences, the national organization primarily
responsible for the training of research scientists, had thirty-one research
institutes in 1952 and 170 in 1958.2 When Mao abandoned much of the Soviet
model in the Great Leap Forward of 1958, policies in education shifted
accordingly.
Less priority was given to the advanced training of a scientific and technological
group needed to manage an industrializing economy. Politics and class
background were presented as criteria for admission to university. Priority was
given programs which aimed at achieving mass literacy, providing local initiative,
expanding rural educational opportunities, encouraging curricular and structural
innovation and politicizing education at all levels. Many of these policies including
programs like the part-work / part-study schemes had their roots in the Chinese
Communists' revolutionary tradition long before Liberation and had been
continued in the early 1950's.
But they were given renewed priority in the great Leap period. Enrollment in
China's primary schools almost doubled between 1957 and 1965, jumping from
51,000,000 in 1952 to 64,000,000 in 1957 and 116,000,000 in 1965.
This represented 84.7% of school age children. In the same period middle
(secondary) school enrollment increased from 3,100,000 to 7,000,000 in 1957
and 14,400,000 in 1965. The failure of the Great Leap generally and the
economic difficulties that followed led to a retreat in these educational priorities
along with a major shift in the country's economic policies as a whole.
As China moved to a more moderate set of policies in the recovery years of the
early 1960's, education policies began to shift their emphasis away from the more
politically oriented ones of the Leap years to those associated with economic
development. While mass literacy and universal primary education remained
important targets, a renewed emphasis was given higher education, particularly
in the training of scientists and engineers in both universities and research
institutes. By 1965 university enrollment had reached 670,000.
Community run primary and middle schools offered at least some education to
most at the local level. But academic quality and opportunities for professional
development and mobility rested in a state run system which included "key"
schools at each level. To the key schools went the best teachers, students and
equipment. Unified entrance examinations channeled the best students from
each level into the key institutions at the next level. Class background and political
activism remained criteria for admission to universities, but the basic evaluation
was made on the academic record of the student, particularly in the form of his
or her mark on the college entrance exam.
The quality of middle and primary schools was largely judged on the basis of the
percentage of their students who entered college. At the top of the hierarchy
China's best universities were designated "key" universities and made directly
responsible to the Ministry of Education. In 1965 education in China, especially
higher education, favored city over countryside, intellectual ability over class
background or political activism and 'expert' over 'red'. To Mao Zedong these
policies, like many at that time, were 'revisionist' and the work of 'capitalist
roaders' in the party. China and especially its youth had to be redirected away
from the revisionist model of the Soviet Union with whom China had fallen out in
1960, to a purer Chinese revolutionary one. In 1966 he launched the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
In June of that year university classes were suspended, initially for six months, to
revise curricula, teaching methods and admission procedures. In the summer of
1967 a few institutes of higher education such as the Aeronautics Institute of
Peking resumed limited work, but essentially China's system of higher education
remained closed. In October, 1967 a central directive ordered universities,
secondary and primary schools everywhere to commence classes immediately.
Primary and middle schools which had also been widely suspended resumed
classes at different points between then and 1969. But China's universities
remained torn by revolutionary upheaval.
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ228175.pdf