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S. Cross
SC3144, 2790144
2011
Undergraduate study in
Economics, Management,
Finance and the Social Sciences
This subject guide is for a 300 course offered as part of the University of London
International Programmes in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences.
This is equivalent to Level 6 within the Framework for Higher Education Qualifications in
England, Wales and Northern Ireland (FHEQ).
For more information about the University of London International Programmes
undergraduate study in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences, see:
www.londoninternational.ac.uk
This guide was prepared for the University of London International Programmes by:
Steve Cross, London College of Communication, University of the Arts London.
This is one of a series of subject guides published by the University. We regret that due to
pressure of work the author is unable to enter into any correspondence relating to, or arising
from, the guide. If you have any comments on this subject guide, favourable or unfavourable,
please use the form at the back of this guide.
Contents
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144 Historical sociology
Notes
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1: Introduction
Historical sociology is a ‘300’ course offered on the Economics, Management,
Finance and the Social Sciences (EMFSS) suite of programmes.
Historical sociology is a wide-ranging subject that explores in depth the
historical ‘roots’ of contemporary social, economic and political conditions.
Sociologists have always been interested in the historical context of
social institutions and political systems. The sociologist Philip Abrams once
famously remarked that ‘sociology is history’. In other words, without a
historical context it is impossible to understand how and why our present
is as it is. This was certainly an idea that the founders of the discipline
of sociology in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would have
endorsed. Each of them paid considerable attention to the historical
developments that had led to the major changes that they saw affecting the
societies around them. These changes are usually referred to as ‘modernity’
and this subject guide will look in detail at some of the processes that
contributed to the formation of key aspects of the ‘modern’ world.
There are many possible ways of approaching historical sociology. In
this course we will focus on the complex range of factors that were at
work in the rise of the modern state. By focusing in this way, we will be
able to examine a range of sociological ideas about social, political and
institutional change.
What we hope you will take from this course is an understanding of the
complex processes that have been involved in producing the world that we
live in. Through your studies, you will have developed an understanding
of the context of and the background to many of the institutions, ideas
and problems that we encounter today. You will also become aware of the
difficulties that attempts to interpret the past pose for both sociologists
and historians. The course will enrich your understanding of social science
methodologies as well as introducing you to competing ideas about how
and why social change happens and how best to interpret it.
I hope that you enjoy studying this course.
Learning outcomes
At the end of this course and having completed the Essential reading and
activities you should be able to:
• identify and describe the conditions and processes that have contributed
to the development of key aspects of the contemporary world
• locate contemporary social phenomena in a historical context
• recognise the ways that philosophies and theories of history have shaped
the ways that we understand processes of historical and social change
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144 Historical sociology
2
Chapter 1: Introduction
Essential reading
Each chapter of the subject guide begins by identifying the appropriate
chapter or chapters of your main textbook or from the readings. Some
material that you will be expected to read is available in the University of
London Online Library.
For this course you need to purchase one textbook:
Hall, S. and B. Gieben Formations of Modernity. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992)
[ISBN 9780745609607].
The following essential texts can be found at the back of this
subject guide:
Chapter 3 of Hobsbawm The Age of Empire. (London: Random House, 1989)
[ISBN 9780679721758].
Chapters 5 and 6 of Dean, Mitchell Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern
Society. (London: Sage Publications, 1999) [ISBN 9780803975897].
Chapter 6 of Smith, Anthony D. Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey
of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism. (London: Routledge, 1998)
[ISBN 9780415063401].
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Further reading
At the beginning of each chapter there is a list of Further readings
and some of these are highlighted with an asterisk. You will find these
particularly useful if you wish to explore ideas contained in the chapters
further. The remainder of the Further reading may be dipped into if you
wish to explore a particular topic in more depth.
Please note that as long as you read the Essential reading you are then free
to read around the subject area in any text, paper or online resource. You
will need to support your learning by reading as widely as possible and by
thinking about how these principles apply in the real world. To help you
read extensively, you have free access to the VLE and University of London
Online Library (see below).
For ease of reference the following is a full list of all the Further reading in
the guide, including these asterisked titles.
The first five titles below are highly recommended Further reading for the
course:
Bayly, C.A. The Birth of the Modern World: 1780–1914. (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2004) [ISBN 9780631236160].
Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity, 1985)
[ISBN 9780520060395].
Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986) [ISBN 9780521313490].
Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993) [ISBN 9780521445856].
Tilly, C. Coercion, Capital, and the European State. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
[ISBN 9781557863683].
Other useful texts for this course include:
Abrams, P. Historical Sociology. (Shepton Mallet: Open Book Publishing, 1980)
[ISBN 9780801492433].
Adams, J., E.S. Clemens and A.S. Orloff Remaking Modernity: Politics, History
and Sociology. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005)
[ISBN 9780822333630]. **
4
Chapter 1: Introduction
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144 Historical sociology
6
Chapter 1: Introduction
Polanyi, K. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our
Time. (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1957) [ISBN 9780807056790].
Rose, N. and P. Miller ‘Political power beyond the state’, British Journal of
Sociology, 43 1991, pp.173–205.
Said, E. Culture and Imperialism. (New York: Vintage, 1994)
[ISBN 9780679750543].
Said, E. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. (London: Penguin
Books, 2003) twenty-fifth anniversary edition [ISBN 9780141187426] **
Scott, J. Social Theory: Central Issues in Sociology. (London: Sage, 2006)
[ISBN 9780761970873] Chapter 7.
Skocpol, T. States and Social Revolutions. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979) [ISBN 9780521294997].
Skocpol, T. Vision and Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984) [ISBN 9780521297240].
Smith, A.D. National Identity. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991)
[ISBN 9780874172041].
Smith, A.D. The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates About Ethnicity and
Nationalism. (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2000)
[ISBN 9781584650409].
Smith, D. The Rise of Historical Sociology. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991)
[ISBN 9780877229209].
Spillman, L., and R. Faeges ‘Nations’ in Adams, J., E.S. Clemens and A.S. Orloff
Remaking Modernity: Politics, History and Sociology. (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2005) [ISBN 9780822333630].
Tonkiss, F. Contemporary Economic Sociology. (London: Routledge, 2006)
[ISBN 9780415300940]. Chapter 1.
White, H. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe.
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973) [ISBN 9780801817618].
Wolf, E. Europe and the People Without History. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1997) second edition [ISBN 9780520048980].
Zammito, J. ‘Koselleck’s Philosophy of Historical Time(s) and the Practice of
History’, History and Theory, 43, 2004 pp.124–35.
The VLE
The VLE, which complements this subject guide, has been designed to
enhance your learning experience, providing additional support and a
sense of community. It forms an important part of your study experience
with the University of London and you should access it regularly.
The VLE provides a range of resources for EMFSS courses:
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Reading advice
All of the texts we have chosen are important in advancing your
understanding of key aspects of the course. They might introduce you to
important debates within the field that you are studying or they might
outline a theoretical or a practical problem.
In either case they will be much more detailed than the chapters in the
subject guide and they will treat topics in far more depth. They will almost
certainly introduce you to complex and perhaps unfamiliar material which
might well have a specific and specialist vocabulary of its own. Do
not panic! Getting the most out of reading a text involves following a few
basic steps.
A word of warning, however, before you begin! If you think that the texts
that you have been set to read will be too difficult, too complicated,
8
Chapter 1: Introduction
or even too boring then you will be fighting a losing battle with them.
Writers do not set out to baffle, confuse or bore their readers. If you
approach the task of reading with an open mind and a determination to
discover useful, important and above all interesting information about
a topic, you will find that it is relatively easy to overcome any initial
difficulties. In this sense reading academic articles, chapters and books
successfully depends on developing a positive attitude to the task. It is
worth doing this as quickly as you can as the benefits are clear. Students
who read widely always get better grades than those who do not. And as
an additional benefit, they also tend to get much more out of their studies!
Syllabus
Sociology and history. A critical introduction to theories and ideas
about the nature and meaning of historical change and development
in Enlightenment, Hegelian, Marxist, neo-Marxist, liberal and post-
structuralist and postcolonial thought; an introduction to historical
sociology as a sub-discipline and the relationship between history and
sociology as disciplines; a consideration of the centrality of the state
and its development to historical sociological traditions; the emergence
and development of the state form in different historical/sociological
perspectives.
The emergence of the early modern state. A survey of historical state forms
through ancient empires, the feudal state to the early modern state; a
comparison of ancient ‘imperial’, feudal and early modern state forms;
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Chapter 1: Introduction
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144 Historical sociology
Notes
12
Chapter 2: Time, history and modernity
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
• explain how ideas about history and historical thinking have changed
over time and how these ideas shape the way that we regard the
present and the future as well as the past
• show how ideas about the ‘modernity’ of European societies emerged
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and helped shape historical
and sociological thinking
• construct some preliminary arguments of your own about history and
historical change.
Essential reading
Hall, S. ‘Introduction’ in Hall, S., and B. Gieben Formations of Modernity.
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) [ISBN 9780745609607].
Further reading
KEY **= particularly recommended for this chapter.
Braudel, F. ‘History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Duree’ and ‘History
and Sociology’ in Matthews, S. (trans.) On History. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982) [ISBN 9780226071510].
Delanty and Isin (eds) The Handbook of Historical Sociology. (London: Sage
Publications, 2003) [ISBN 9780761971733] Introduction.
Hall, S. ‘The West and the Rest’ in Hall and Gieben (eds) Formations of
Modernity. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) [ISBN 9780745609607].
**Koselleck, R. ‘The Semantics of Historical Time’ in Futures Past: The Semantics
of Historical Time. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004)
[ISBN 9780231127714].
Koselleck, R. The Practice of Conceptual History. (Stanford CA: Stanford
University Press, 2002) [ISBN 9780804743051] Chapter ‘Concepts of
Historical Time and Social History’.
**Kumar, K. From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society. (Oxford: Blackwell,
2004) second edition [ISBN 9781405114295] pp.66–85.
Scott, J. Social Theory: Central Issues in Sociology. (London: Sage, 2006)
[ISBN 9780761970873] Chapter 7.
Skocpol, T. Vision and Method in Historical Sociology. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984) [ISBN 9780521297240].
Smith, D. The Rise of Historical Sociology. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991)
[ISBN 9780877229209].
White, H. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe.
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973) [ISBN 9780801817618].
Zammito, J. ‘Koselleck’s Philosophy of Historical Time(s) and the Practice of
History’, History and Theory, 43 2004, pp.124–35.
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144 Historical sociology
Works cited
Gibbon, E. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. (Phoenix Press, 2005)
[ISBN 9780753818817].
Hegel, G.W.F. Introductory Lectures on the Philosophy of History. (Cambridge,
MA: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997) [ISBN 9780872203709].
Koselleck, R. ‘The Semantics of Historical Time’ in Futures Past: the Semantics of
Historical Time. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004)
[ISBN 9780231127714].
Kumar, K. From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society. (Oxford: Blackwell,
2004) second edition [ISBN 9781405114295] pp.66–85.
Marx and Engels The Communist Manifesto. Various editions.
Skocpol, T. Vision and Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984) [ISBN 9780521297240].
White, H. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe.
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973) [ISBN 9780801817618].
Introduction
This chapter explores two specific but interrelated areas. Firstly, it looks at
influential ideas about time, history and historical processes and at how
these developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into notions
of a unique European or Western ‘modernity’. Secondly, it looks briefly at
how these ideas relate to sociology, which itself developed as a separate
academic discipline in the nineteenth century. This chapter is closely
related to the one that follows on from it and in Chapter 3 we will go on to
explore the importance of historical thinking in sociology as it emerged as
a discipline and at the development of historical sociology as an important
and specific area of study in its own right.
Most people tend to think that ‘history’ is a very straightforward concept.
It simply describes things that happened in the past. However, this is by no
means the case! As this chapter will demonstrate, the way that we think
about the past and attempt to describe it is never straightforward. History
is a contested concept. Ideas about what actually happened in the past
and about how we should interpret events that happened in the past
have always been the subject of fierce debates. Indeed, it has famously
been claimed that history is written by the victors of wars or conflicts and
is therefore a celebration of the success of the powerful. We will see how
to some extent this claim can be applied to the early sociologists’ concern
with what they saw as the unique dynamism and success of European
societies in comparison to societies of the past and to other less ‘developed’
or ‘advanced’ contemporary societies. The social, cultural, political and
economic condition of these ‘more successful’ European societies is
usually referred to as ‘modernity’. We will therefore look closely at
the ways in which ideas about history and historical change that became
an integral part of sociological thinking were related to ideas about the
special condition (the ‘modernity’) of European societies, economies and
cultures in contrast to other types of society. We will then go on in Chapter
3 to look at how the idea of historical progress towards ‘modernity’
developed and how it has been challenged.
Although these two chapters will sometimes look critically at the ideas
that have traditionally informed sociological and historical thinking,
they will also make a case for the overwhelming importance of historical
thinking in sociology. It has after all, and quite rightly, been argued
that it is impossible to understand the present without a sound grasp of
the processes that have produced the economic and social structures,
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Chapter 2: Time, history and modernity
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16
Chapter 2: Time, history and modernity
the premise that the birth of Christ represents an absolutely new and
unprecedented event in history. According to Christian belief, from this
point on, time moves in a ‘straight line’ (in a linear direction) towards
the Second Coming of Christ. This future event, it was believed, would
herald the ‘last judgement’ and the end of the world. In contrast to the
beliefs of the classical, pagan world, Christianity was responsible for
instituting ideas about time that were future oriented. In other words,
in Christian thought, time and history are seen as moving towards a
single, predetermined future event. This idea that history moves toward a
predetermined end is known as teleology. As we will see, teleological
thinking is present in different forms in much of the sociological and
historical thinking that emerged in the nineteenth century.
However, despite its new linear conception of time, the Christian
philosophy of history was similar in many respects to that of the
ancient world. In other words, its assumptions about the secular (as
opposed to the spiritual) world were that change was equivalent to decay
and that the world was growing old. Modern times, modern people and
modern ideas were most often compared unfavourably with those of the
past.
During the course of the fifteenth century, significant changes began
to take place in European societies. These were cultural, economic and
political. The period is usually referred to as the Renaissance (literally the
‘rebirth’). Scientific and technical developments in navigation and ship-
building led to the so-called ‘voyages of discovery’ and the colonisation
of the Americas (the ‘new world’, as it was known to Europeans). In the
visual arts, architecture, literature and philosophy there was a general and
quite widespread ‘rediscovery’ of the ancient or classical past, which was
used as a model. Indeed, the people of the Renaissance first began to use
a distinctively ‘modern’ form of periodisation (the division of history
into specific ages or periods): ancient, medieval and modern. They
looked back to the (ancient) classical world as a period of civilisation and
accomplishment and at their own (modern) age as one of a rebirth in the
arts and sciences. The intervening period (of approximately 1,000 years)
they referred to as the Middle Ages (or the medieval period), which they
regarded as a time of barbarism and backwardness.
However, despite the general belief that the present could be distinguished
from the barbarism and superstition of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance
was nonetheless uncertain about its own status. After all, it saw itself as
primarily involved in a ‘re-discovery’ of the glories of a past civilisation and
as such as a ‘re-birth’ rather than the invention of something new. As such
it tended to regard the present as ‘imitative and uncreative’ rather than
genuinely innovative (Kumar, 1995: 74). Indeed, the revival of interest
in classical antiquity saw a turn away from the spiritual concerns of the
Middle Ages and a new interest in secular history – that is, the history
of empires, nations, cities and peoples. The classical historians of course
provided the model for this. Naturally, the historians of the ancient world
had shared the general belief in the cyclical nature of time and history
and, as a consequence, this idea, along with much else, was revived.
On one hand we can see that during the Renaissance period the present
was considered to be radically different from the immediate past, that it
marked a break with the ‘stagnation’ of the Middle Ages. However, on the
other hand it was also assumed that the present age marked a return to a
more civilised past. History was therefore seen in terms of the movement
of a wheel or a circle ‘that returns to its beginning’ (Kumar, 1995:74). This
is clearly not an idea of progress in any ordinary sense of the word.
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The Pantheon in Rome was built in about 120 CE by the Roman emperor Hadrian (76–138 CE).
Villa Almerica built by Andrea Palladio (1508–1580 CE) in 1566 CE. This is an example of the
classical revival that emerged during the period of the Renaissance.
Activity
Read the following short passage by Edward Gibbon, the English historian of the Roman
Empire.
In the second century [CE]…the empire of Rome comprehended the
fairest part of the earth, and the most civilised portion of mankind. The
frontiers of that extensive monarchy were guarded by ancient renown and
disciplined valour. The gentle but powerful influence of laws and manners
had gradually cemented the union of provinces. The peaceful inhabitants
enjoyed and abused the advantages of wealth and luxury…If a man
were called to fix the period in the history of the world, during which the
condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous, he would
without hesitation, name that which elapsed from the death of Domitian
to the accession of Commodus [Emperors marking the beginning and the
end of this period: 96–180 CE]. The vast extent of the Roman Empire was
governed by absolute power, under the guidance of virtue and wisdom.
(Gibbon, E. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire)
• What is the writer’s attitude to the Roman Empire?
• Which features of Roman life does he appear to most value and respect?
• Does he regard this period as better than the times in which he is writing?
Now think about how we tend to think about the relationship between the past and the
present.
• Is there any time in the past that you think is better than the present?
• If so, when is that? Why do you think that it might have been better?
• Do you think that the present is better than the past?
• If so, why? What specific features of the present make it better than the past?
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Chapter 2: Time, history and modernity
It was during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that a much more
recognisably ‘modern’ outlook on time and history began to develop.
In the works of scientific and philosophical pioneers such as Montaigne
(1533–1596 CE), Bacon (1561–1626 CE) and Descartes (1596–1650 CE),
the authority and the superiority of ancient or classical authors began to
be challenged. The present began to be seen as quite possibly superior
in terms of its arts, sciences and technologies to the past. However,
‘throughout the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth centuries there
persisted the view that decay and degeneration were as much part of the
human story as growth and progress’ (Kumar: 77). Christian conceptions
of the present as a time of waiting for the inevitable return of Christ and
the end of the world persisted and intensified during periods of religious
revival. Classical conceptions of the historical cycles of birth, decay and
rebirth continued to be influential, as we can see in the passage from
Gibbon quoted above. It is very important to remember that even during
the Enlightenment2 period of the eighteenth century (a period that is 2
The Enlightenment was
generally associated with the development of specifically modern forms a key period in European
intellectual history which
of thinking), important and influential figures such as Voltaire and Adam
spanned the eighteenth
Smith held onto the idea that civilisations, including their own, were century.
capable of degeneration and decay. It is important that we remember
this as we need to be aware of just how radically different the ‘modern’
conception of time and history was when it developed fully.
In the latter half of the eighteenth century this new conception of time
and history had begun to predominate. By the later seventeenth century it
had already become commonplace to compare the history of humanity to
that of a single individual progressing from infancy, through childhood, to
maturity. Accordingly, the present age would be ‘naturally’ wiser than past
ages. There was an important qualification to this comparison, however.
The French mathematician Fontenelle (1657–1757 CE) wrote that, unlike
the individual, humanity itself will ‘have no old age’ and that it ‘will never
degenerate, and there will be no end to the growth and development of
human wisdom’ (quoted in Kumar: 77). In this statement we can see a
new and powerful affirmation of an idea that was to become dominant
throughout the following two centuries; that of a limitless progress in
which the present is seen as an improvement on the past and the future is
seen as open to yet further beneficial development.
Interestingly, it was an older idea that provided the model for this new
way of thinking. It was through the secularisation of the Christian
concept of time and history that the modern attitude to change and
progress was able to develop. We have already seen that Christianity saw
time as moving in a linear direction toward the promised return of Christ.
For Christians, this would mean the final establishment of the kingdom
of heaven. However, once this idea was secularised, that is, once the
spiritual dimension was removed, it developed into a ‘dynamic philosophy
of history’ (Kumar: 78). What this means is that the Christian idea of the
movement of time towards a better future was adopted by writers and
thinkers who retained the essential structure without the spiritual aspects.
This had profound implications for the ways in which time and history
began to be thought about.
The philosophies of history that emerged out of the secularisation of
Christian thought emphasised the radical newness of the present and
saw the past as meaningless except as a preparation for the present.
Instead of the past having meaning and authority, or providing a model
for how things ought to be, as it had for the people of the Renaissance for
example, it was now regarded as less rather than more enlightened or
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Activity
Read the following short passage. This is taken from an essay on the nature of ‘historical
time’. So far, we have seen how time and history were thought of (a) in the ancient
or classical world, where history was thought of as being like a wheel with all things
returning in a cycle, and (b) in Christian thought, as moving toward the ‘last days’ in
which Christ would return. We have also begun to look at the idea that developed
comparatively recently, that history can be seen in terms of ‘progress’. According to
Reinhart Koselleck, thinking about time and history always takes place within what
he refers to as a ‘horizon of expectation’. The Christians expected a second coming of
Christ, for example, and the ancients expected that all things returned cyclically. Since
the eighteenth century our ‘horizon of expectations’ consists of the idea that the future is
‘open’, that it will almost certainly be ‘better’ than both past and present. In other words,
that history is ‘progressive’.
Reflection [on the idea of historical time] took place through the medium
of the philosophy of history, which is a product of the eighteenth
century…[T]he level of reflection can be deduced from the use of two
central notions of time: that of modern time and that of progress. Modern
time differs from that of earlier ‘age’ theories in that it is experienced not
retrospectively but directly. This is one of the novelties of this particular
new notion. It is less of a retrospective notion because it has arisen from
the present, which is opening out toward the future. The future of modern
time is thought to be open and without boundaries. The vision of last
things or the theory of the return of all things has been pushed aside
by the venture of opening up a new future: a future which…is totally
different from all that has passed before…Modern time was identified
with progress, since it was progress that conceptualised the difference
between the past so far and the coming future…One could also say that
progress is the first genuinely historical definition of time that has not
derived its meaning from other areas of experience such as theology or
mythical foreknowledge. Progress could only be discovered when people
began to reflect on historical time itself. In practice this means that
progress can only occur if people want it and plan for it. That the future
should be a horizon of planning, not only of days, weeks, or even years,
but of the long-term kind is one of the features of a historical time that is
seen as progressive.
(Reinhart Koselleck ‘Historical Time and Social History’)
• What does Koselleck mean by ‘progress’? What do you understand by this term?
• How is this idea different from previous ways of thinking about history?
• We are now so embedded in the idea of ‘progress’ that it has become ‘second
nature’ or common sense to think that the both society and ourselves as
individuals can and should permanently ‘improve’.
• Do you think that the society that you live in can and should ‘develop’ or
‘progress’ further? How do you regard the concept of progress? Is it in economic
terms, social or political terms, cultural terms? Is ‘progress’ in any of these areas
related to progress in another?
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Chapter 2: Time, history and modernity
• Now write down the reasons why you personally have decided to take this course.
In what way is this tied to an idea of personal progression or development?
• Thinking about what you have just written, do you think that there is a link
between your own personal sense of development and ‘progress’ and that of the
society around you?
• Thinking about all of these areas, can you write down what you understand by
Koselleck’s ideas of the ‘horizon of expectation’? Can you imagine what it might
be like to have a very different ‘horizon of expectation’ about the present and the
future? Can you see how this relates to the way that we experience the idea of
history?
Modern times
As we have seen, from about the middle of the eighteenth century, the
present came to be seen as a time of unprecedented novelty. The idea of
the modern as something which is not simply new but also better became
current. Events such as the American (1776 CE) and the French (1789
CE) revolutions, which occurred in the late eighteenth century, were
interpreted not so much as revolutions of a wheel, returning things to how
they might have been before, but as unprecedented events that heralded
the birth of a new (social and political) world and a new beginning.3 3
Although they did of
Indeed, in France a revolutionary calendar was adopted in which the first course in part ‘borrow’
some of the ‘clothes’
year of the revolution (1789 CE) was marked as the year zero (the starting
of the past in order
point of a new historical epoch), with years being counted onwards from to disguise the real
this decisive point. nature of the social
and economic upheaval
that they heralded, as
Marx puts it in The
Eighteenth Brumaire of
Louis Napoleon.
Figure 2.2 French revolutionary calendar: the seated figure wears the ‘liberty
cap’, a symbol of freedom from the tyranny and superstition of the old regime.
What else do you notice about the seated figure and the things she is surround-
ed by? What sort of impression does this give?
However, significant (revolutionary) political change was not the only
way in which the radical difference of the present from the past was
experienced. The coming of industrialisation also had a significant
impact on the development of the ideas of ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’.
The ‘industrial revolution’ which gathered pace from the mid-eighteenth
century onwards saw unprecedented technological advances, the massive
expansion of a centralised factory system and rapid urbanisation which
transformed both physical and social landscapes. This had its (non-
material) origins in the sixteenth-century transformation of religious
21
144 Historical sociology
22
Chapter 2: Time, history and modernity
removed from the light of self-conscious history and wrapped in the dark
mantle of night… In this main portion of Africa, history is in fact out of
the question. Life there consists of a succession of contingent happenings
and surprises. No aim or state exists whose development could be
followed.
• Hegel is writing about Africa. What is his attitude to ‘Africa’?
• According to Hegel, does Africa have a history?
• In what way is Africa different from Europe? How does this provide a contrast
with the ‘civilisation’ of Europe?
• Does this attitude towards Africa continue into our own present?
Activity
In Stuart Hall’s ‘Introduction’ to Formations of Modernity (on page 6) you will find a
good general outline of four defining characteristics of ‘modern’ societies. Read this
carefully. Throughout this course we will be using the term ‘modern’ to describe societies,
economies, political institutions and states as ‘modern’. ‘Modern’ will often be contrasted
with ‘traditional’. Remember, we are using the term ‘modern’ in precisely the sense that
sociologists use the term: that is, as a description of a particular type of society with
specific and well-defined characteristics.
23
144 Historical sociology
Activity
Read the following short text:
The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display
of vigour in the Middle Ages, which reactionaries so much admire, found
its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the
first to show what man’s activity can bring about. It has accomplished
wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic
cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former
Exoduses of nations and crusades.
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and
with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes
of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition
of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all
earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones
become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air,
all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with
sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.
(Karl Marx and Frederick Engels The Communist Manifesto)
24
Chapter 2: Time, history and modernity
Remember (you may have encountered this idea in 21 Principles of sociology) the
bourgeoisie are the dominant class in the capitalist ‘mode of production’.
Answer the following questions:
• What has the bourgeois class (and what Marx and Engels elsewhere term
‘modern industry’) been able to accomplish?
• How does this compare to the achievements of previous civilisations?
• In what way is modern capitalist (‘bourgeois’) society different from previous
societies? How does this society relate to the past?
• Reading through this short passage, can you see any connection between the sort
of rapid change that Marx and Engels describe and contemporary societies today?
Marx and Engels account for these changes and for the dynamism of contemporary
societies in terms of the productive powers unleashed by the capitalist economy.
How might these ideas about the dynamism of capitalism relate to Hegel’s idea about
Africa’s place ‘outside’ history?
Conclusion
The passage from Marx and Engels which you will have read in the activity
box above is in many ways typical of the kind of response that sociologists
have had to modern societies. Sociology seeks to describe and account
for their dynamism and their ‘modernity’ and it has frequently done so
through recourse to forms of historical explanation. In the next chapter
we will see how sociology and history relate to one another and how they
are similar and yet often quite different modes of academic inquiry. The
historical sociologist Philip Abrams claimed that ‘sociology is history’. We
will ask how far and why this statement can be upheld or disputed.
25
144 Historical sociology
Notes
26
Chapter 3: History and historical sociology
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
• explain how history and sociology relate to one another as fields of
academic study
• explain the differences and similarities between historical research and
sociological research methodologies, and why these differences and
similarities are important
• construct some preliminary arguments of your own about the
relationship between history and sociology as distinctive but related
fields of inquiry.
Essential reading
Goldthorpe, J.H. ‘The Uses of History in Sociology: Reflections on Some Recent
Tendencies’, British Journal of Sociology, 42(2) 1991, pp.211–30.
Mann, M. ‘In Praise of Macro-Sociology: A Reply to Goldthorpe’, British Journal
of Sociology, 45(1) 1994, pp.37–54.
Further reading
KEY **= particularly recommended for this chapter.
Abrams, P. Historical Sociology. (Shepton Mallet: Open Book Publishing, 1980)
[ISBN 9780801492433].
** Adams, J., E.S. Clemens and A.S. Orloff Remaking Modernity: Politics, History
and Sociology. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005)
[ISBN 9780822333630] Chapter 1.
Braudel, F. ‘History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Duree’ and ‘History
and Sociology’ in Matthews, S. (trans) On History. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982) [ISBN 9780226071510].
Burke, P. History and Social Theory. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) second
edition [ISBN 9780801472855].
Calhoun, C. ‘Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory,
and Historically Specific Theory’, The American Journal of Sociology, 14(3)
1998, pp.846–71.
Dean, M. Critical and Effective Histories. (London: Routledge, 1994)
[ISBN 9780415064958] Chapter 1.
Delanty and Isin (eds.) The Handbook of Historical Sociology. (London: Sage
Publications, 2003) [ISBN 9780761971733] Introduction.
Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge. (London: Routledge, 2002) second
edition [ISBN 9780415287531] Introduction.
27
144 Historical sociology
Works cited
Abrams, P. Historical Sociology. (Shepton Mallet: Open Book Publishing, 1980)
[ISBN 9780801492433].
Burke, P. History and Social Theory. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) second
edition [ISBN 9780801472855].
Goldthorpe, J.H. ‘The Uses of History in Sociology: Reflections on Some Recent
Tendencies’ The British Journal of Sociology, 42(2) 1991, pp.211–30.
Jordanova, L. History in Practice. (London: Hodder Arnold, 2006) second
edition [ISBN 9780340814345].
Mann, M. ‘In Praise of Macro-Sociology: a Reply to Goldthorpe’ The British
Journal of Sociology, 45(1) 1994, pp.37–54.
Skocpol, T. Vision and Method in Historical Sociology. (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1984) [ISBN 9780521297240] Chapter 1.
Smith, D. The Rise of Historical Sociology. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991)
[ISBN 9780877229209].
Introduction
This chapter builds on the arguments and ideas that were introduced
in Chapter 2. In that chapter we looked at the importance of the idea of
‘modernity’ for sociological thought. We saw how a specific consciousness
of time and of historical change emerged (broadly) during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries and at how ‘modern’ times and ‘modern’ societies
came to be seen as radically different from those of the past. We also saw
how, during the nineteenth century, sociology emerged as a discipline with
a particular interest in defining and describing these ‘new’ or ‘modern’
forms of society and in accounting for their emergence.
In this chapter we will look more closely at the relationship between
history and sociology as they developed as disciplines. As we will see, this
has sometimes been a fruitful and productive relationship, but at other
times it has been characterised as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Burke, 2005:
3). In other words, the methodological and thematic concerns of the two
disciplines have often been seen to be widely divergent. In this chapter we
will look closely at both the similarities and the differences between the
approaches of historians and sociologists to both the past and the present.
The chapter will also look at the specific and distinctive work that
historical sociologists actually do. In doing so, we will also find out what
is distinctive about historical sociology.
28
Chapter 3: History and historical sociology
29
144 Historical sociology
HISTORY SOCIOLOGY
Diachronic: this approach is concerned Synchronic: this approach is concerned
with sequences of events that occur over with mapping and accounting for a given
time, and with mapping and accounting system at a given moment and how
for change as it occurs over time. each part fits into the system. It gives a
‘snapshot’ of a specific moment in all its
complexity.
Ideographic: explanation for specific Nomothetic: explanation for classes of
events is sought through detailed events is sought in careful examination of
examination of specific preceding events. general categories or classes of preceding
Typical question: what were the causes of events.
the French Revolution?
Typical question: what are the necessary Empirical: uses detailed and first-hand
preconditions for a bourgeois-democratic archival, textual or archaeological sources
revolution? of information to explain specific cases.
Theoretical: generalises from specific
examples and constructs explanatory
models.
Activity
Read the following two brief extracts:
A. The Ottoman state had a class structure similar to that of all tributary
states. In law and theory, its population was divided into two groups or
estates, representing in effect the economically dominant class and its
dependants – a military class with a monopoly of the right to bear arms
and receive revenues and allocations of lands; and an exploited and
producing class, a hereditary and permanent tenancy of (predominantly)
peasants and farmers…In this respect the Ottoman state clearly rested on
the same fundamental structural principles common to all tributary social
formations.
30
Chapter 3: History and historical sociology
B. Unlike Alexios and John, Manuel was able to maintain his influence in
Antioch after his return to Constantinople in 1159. He achieved this partly
by a marriage alliance. In 1162 after the death of his first wife Bertha of
Sulzbach, he married Maria, one of the daughters of Raymond of Poitiers
and the sister of the young Bohemond III. He also put Bohemond III in his
debt by paying his ransom of 100,000 dinars after the prince had been
captured by Nur ed-Din at the battle of Harim in 1164…There were of
course limits to the influence that Manuel could wield in distant Antioch.
In 1170 an earthquake brought the sanctuary of the cathedral in Antioch
crashing down. The unfortunate Patriarch Athanasius, who happened to be
celebrating the liturgy at the time, was buried under the rubble and killed.
Which of these two texts do you think is from a work of history, and which do you think
is from a work of historical sociology? Can you explain why you think this? What are the
specific features that make one of these extracts ‘sociological’ and one ‘historical’?
31
144 Historical sociology
Indeed, it started out from the premise that what needed explaining was
how and why what we refer to as ‘modernity’ had developed in the way
that it had and how and why it developed in the part of the world that it
did. Above all, it wanted to do away with ideas of general social ‘evolution’
(of which ‘modernisation’ theory is a good example). In the next chapters
we will look in more depth at how ideas about social change and social
‘development’ have challenged straightforward ideas about social progress
or social evolution.
We have already seen that one of the ways that the disciplines of history and
sociology were distinguished from one another was through characterising
history as ideographic and sociology as nomothetic. We have also seen
how these distinctions were to a large extent broken down in historical,
sociological and historical sociological work. However, debates that took
place in the 1990s highlight important differences between sociologists
about key aspects of historical sociology. We will begin this section with a
close look at an article by Goldthorpe that began one such debate.
32
Chapter 3: History and historical sociology
Activity
Read pages 211–15 of the Goldthorpe article and answer the following questions. You do
not to have to write down answers to all of these questions, but it might be helpful if you
jotted down a few notes in order to help you understand the outline and the details of
the argument that Goldthorpe makes.
• What does Goldthorpe mean when he argues (on p.213) that ‘a historical fact is
an inference from the relics’?
• What does Goldthorpe mean by ‘relics’?
• Goldthorpe goes on to argue that ‘we can only know the past on the basis of
what has physically survived from the past’. What does he mean by this?
• What sort of ‘relics’ have survived from the past?
• Why does Goldthorpe argue that ‘limitations on the possibilities of historical
knowledge exist simply because it is knowledge of the past – because it is
knowledge dependent on relics’?
• In what way is this different to the sort of evidence that sociologists can use?
• According to Goldthorpe, what sort of evidence can sociologists use?
33
144 Historical sociology
Activity
Imagine that our contemporary societies were wiped out in a global catastrophe and all
that survived for future historians were a handful of popular television programmes, the
Florida Disneyworld, the novels of J.K. Rowling and an i-Pod.
• How representative are these items?
• What sort of impression would future historians have of the societies that we live
in?
• What sort of evidence do you think would be more representative? Why?
34
Chapter 3: History and historical sociology
Extended activity
Read section II of the article, pp.215–19.
Goldthorpe discusses the work of three sociologists who have used historical themes
and sources. He presents specific examples to help to illustrate his argument about the
different types of evidence available to historians and sociologists and the implications
that this has for the sort of work that they can do. You will need to read this section
carefully and to help you do this try focusing on the following questions:
• What does the first of the books (Wayward Puritans) state is the purpose of its
study?
• Which sociological hypotheses (about deviance) does this study aim to examine?
• Why does this study make use of puritan (seventeenth-century) America in order
to examine these hypotheses?
• Why does Goldthorpe argue that this is a ‘necessary failure’?
• How is this failure related to the available evidence? What sort of evidence does
the study use? What sort of evidence is not available? In what ways does the lack
of certain types of evidence mean that the study is not fully able to deal with the
first hypothesis? What is the problem with the crime statistics that the study uses
when discussing hypothesis two?
• Why does the fact that the theory used in this study ‘pretends to a very high level
of generality’ mean that the available evidence is inadequate and unconvincing?
What does Goldthorpe conclude from his examination of this study?
• What does Goldthorpe think would be an area of study in which sociologists
might legitimately use historical sources?
Goldthorpe now discusses two further works of sociology that both aim to test specific
theories: the disruption of kinship patterns by industrialisation and the Weber thesis
about the connection between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism. Goldthorpe is
much more positive about these studies, but he nonetheless recognises that they both
have serious limitations relating to the evidence that is available. The type of evidence
that we can draw on determines how successfully (or not) some types of question can be
answered.
Read this section carefully and make a list of the key problems that Goldthorpe notices
with the studies that he discusses here. In particular, look at what Goldthorpe says about
the study by Marshall.
In the last paragraph of section II on p.219, Goldthorpe argues that ‘what is crucially
lacking [in the studies that he has discussed] is material from which inferences might be
made, with some assurance of representativeness, about the patterns of social action
that are of interest within particular collectivities…[T]he data from which historians work
only rarely allows access to the subjective orientations of actors en masse, and inferences
made from actual behaviour tend always to be question-begging.’
Can you try and explain in your own words what Goldthorpe means by this? What
sort of crucial evidence does he argue is in very short supply in the studies that he has
examined? Why does the short supply of this particular type of evidence mean that it will
be difficult to make representative inferences about the reasons for specific types of social
action or behaviour? How would a sociologist in the present tackle deficiencies in his/her
evidence?
Think carefully about the points that Goldthorpe makes about the availability of
EVIDENCE and the possibility of making accurate and representative inferences about
the reasons for particular types of social action and behaviour. Now look at the exercise
below and write a short answer (about 400 words), drawing on what you have learned
so far about evidence.
35
144 Historical sociology
You keep a diary in which you write down your thoughts and feelings about entering onto
your course of study on the University of London External Programme. Your diary is discovered
500 years in the future. At the same time, statistical records showing that increasing numbers
of people in your society were entering higher education are also discovered.
How useful will your diary be for sociologists in the future who wish to account for the
reasons for an increase in the number of students entering higher education in your
society at this point in time?
Now read section III (pp.219–26).
36
Chapter 3: History and historical sociology
Activity
Goldthorpe uses an example to illustrate his point about the tenuous link between
evidence and argument. The example he uses is from a classic work of historical sociology,
Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Moore’s work is a
highly important and path-breaking work of comparative sociology. Moore’s concern was
the transformation of pre-industrial agrarian social relations into ‘modern’ ones. One of
the key arguments that Moore makes relates to the social and economic transformation
of elements of the English aristocracy prior to the Civil War of the mid-seventeenth
century and the way that this determined which side they chose in the conflict between
king and Parliament.
• Carefully read from the top of page 222 down to the bottom of the first
paragraph on page 223.
Jot down some notes while you think about how Goldthorpe argues that the evidence
that historical sociologists draw from secondary sources is ‘tenuous’. Keep the notes as
they will help you with the more formal piece of writing that you are asked to do as part
of the next activity.
Activity
Carefully read from the top of the second full paragraph on page 223 (beginning with the
line’ As regards my second charge…’) down to the bottom of the first paragraph on
p. 224.
37
144 Historical sociology
Jot down some notes while you follow Goldthorpe’s argument about the arbitrary
relationship between the evidence that historical sociologists use and their own arguments.
Now, using the notes that you have made in this and the previous activity, answer the
following question (write about 500 words):
According to Goldthorpe, in what way is the evidence that Moore uses to make his
arguments both tenuous and arbitrary?
Now read to the end of the article.
Goldthorpe has argued in this article that history and sociology are very
different from one another and that attempts by historical sociologists to
claim that they ‘are and always have been the same thing’ are mistaken
and ‘dangerously misleading’. The major source of this difference
lies in the ‘nature of the evidence that the two disciplines use’, with
historians reliant on the limited evidence that has survived for the past
and sociologists able to collect or generate data in the present. This,
Goldthorpe argues, means that sociologists are far better placed to make
and, importantly, to test theoretical generalisations about contemporary
societies. Goldthorpe is particularly critical of what he calls ‘grand
historical sociologists’ who make use of secondary sources and have
therefore failed (for the reasons that we have seen) to ‘provide a coherent
methodology for their work’.
Activity
Read ‘In Praise of Macro-Sociology: A Reply to Goldthorpe’, British Journal of Sociology,
45(1) 1994, pp.37–54.
NB: Part (b) of the last section of this article (‘Three warnings for Empiricists’) is
less relevant to the overall argument of the article. It contains a lengthy critique of
Goldthorpe’s arguments about the use of data and some very detailed examples to back
this up! You may choose not to read this.
38
Chapter 3: History and historical sociology
Activity
Mann goes on (in the first paragraph on page 38) to qualify Goldthorpe’s argument about
the ‘better’ and ‘fuller’ evidence available to sociologists in two ways. What are they? Do
you find this convincing?
Mann argues that neither he nor other ‘grand historical sociologists’ are
interested in attempts to create context-free theoretical models. He does
state, however, that sociology can and should make some generalisations
about what he calls ‘macro’ contexts (such as the ‘nation state’, or
the ‘nuclear family’, for example). After all, sociology emerged out of
attempts to understand the ‘appearance and development of capitalism
and industrialism in the west’ (what we have referred to as ‘modernity’).
In this sense, the discipline has always been ‘rooted’ in ‘grand historical
sociology’. Attempts to understand the specific features of ‘modernity’ will
inevitably therefore include a historical dimension. This is particularly
the case if we argue, as Mann does, that historical processes do not follow
general, ‘evolutionary’ or ‘developmental’ logics. Sensitivity to the specific,
context-laden factors in the emergence of ‘modernity’ require sociologists
to develop historical insights.
Mann goes on to argue that what he calls ‘macro-sociologists’ use the past
in three main ways.
Activity
What are the three main ways that macro-sociologists ‘use the past’? Why does Mann
argue that this is important?
Mann goes on to state (at the end of part (b) at the top of page 40) that he has so far
laid out a ‘defensive position’ against the arguments that Goldthorpe makes. What do
you think he means by this?
Can you summarise Mann’s arguments against Goldthorpe in about 200 words?
39
144 Historical sociology
Activity
Read part (c) (pages 40–42) carefully. Summarise Mann’s main points about the differences
between historians’ and macro-sociologists’ use of primary and secondary data (remember,
Mann often refers to ‘grand historical sociologists’ as ‘macro-sociologists’). According to
Mann, who has a better grasp of data (both primary and secondary)? Why?
Now read the section ‘Epistemology and Method’.
Activity
How exactly does Mann refute Goldthorpe’s arguments about evidence? Briefly describe
in your own words Mann’s outline of sociological methodology.
Now read the section ‘Macro-Sociological Practice’.
Activity
Mann states that it is perfectly possible ‘to derive original data from “secondary
sources”’.
Read this section of the article carefully and find examples of how this is possible and
how historical sociologists have done it. Make some notes.
Why is this sometimes more useful and productive than sticking rigidly to ‘primary’ data?
40
Chapter 3: History and historical sociology
Activity
Read the section ‘Three Warnings for Empiricists’. (You may omit section (b) as this is very
detailed and not as relevant to the overall argument.)
We are now in a position to think about the arguments about history and sociology as
they have been presented by two sociologists who take very different positions.
You should now attempt to outline the major differences between Goldthorpe and Mann
on such questions as:
a. the use of evidence in historical sociology
b. the relative importance of primary and secondary sources
c. the importance of history for sociology.
Conclusion
This chapter has covered a number of key areas in historical sociological
work. In particular, we have focused on a specific debate about the
differences and similarities between history and sociology. In the next
chapters we will look in more detail at how historical sociologists have
approached one highly important aspect of the emergence of the modern
world: the rise of the modern state.
41
144 Historical sociology
Notes
42
Chapter 4: Power, legitimacy and rule: the emergence of the modern state
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
• describe and critically assess the classic sociological accounts of the
‘modern’ state
• locate the ‘modern’ state in a historical context
• critically assess theories of social and historical change as these relate
to the emergence of the modern state.
Essential reading
Held, D. ‘The Development of the Modern State’ in Hall, S., and B. Gieben
Formations of Modernity.
Further reading
KEY **= particularly recommended for this chapter.
Abrams, P. Historical Sociology. (Shepton Mallet: Open Book Publishing, 1980)
[ISBN 9780801492433].
Adams, J., E.S. Clemens and A.S. Orloff Remaking Modernity: Politics,
History and Sociology. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005)
[ISBN 9780822333630].
Anderson, P. Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. (London: Verso, 1973)
[ISBN 9781859841075].
Anderson, P. Lineages of the Absolutist State. (London: Verso, 1979)
[ISBN 9780805270259].
Corrigan, P. and D. Sayer The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural
Revolution. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) [ISBN 9780631140559].
Dean, M. Critical and Effective Histories. (London: Routledge, 1994)
[ISBN 9780415064958] Chapter on ‘Thematics of State and Power’.
Delanty and Isin (eds) The Handbook of Historical Sociology. (London: Sage
Publications, 2003) [ISBN 9780761971733]. Introduction.
Giddens, A. A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. (Houndsmills:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1995) second edition [ISBN 9780804725194].
**Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity, 1985)
[ISBN 9780520060395] Introduction and Chapter 1.
Hall, J. (ed) States in History. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986)
[ISBN 9780631171362].
Hay, C . ‘(What’s Marxist about) Marxist State Theory’ in Hay, C., M. Lister
and D. Marsh The State: Theories and Issues. (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2006) [ISBN 9781403934260].
43
144 Historical sociology
Hay, C., M. Lister and D. Marsh The State: Theories and Issues. (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)[ISBN 9781403934260].
** Mann, M. ‘Societies as Organised Power Networks’ in The Sources of Social
Power, Volume 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
[ISBN 9780521313490].
McLennan, G., D. Held and D. Hall (ed.) The Idea of the Modern State. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1984) [ISBN 9780335105977] Chapters 1 and 2.
Moore, B. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. (Cambridge, Mass.:
Beacon Press, 1993) reprint edition [ISBN 9780807050736].
Morrison, K. Marx, Durkheim and Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought.
(London, Sage, 2006) second edition [ISBN 9780761970552].
Poggi, G. The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction.
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978) [ISBN 9780804709590].
Poggi, G. The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects. (Oxford: Polity Press,
1990) [ISBN 9780804718776].
Poggi, G. ‘The Formation of the Modern State and the Institutionalisation
of Rule’ in Delanty and Isin (eds) The Handbook of Historical Sociology.
(London: Sage Publications, 2003) [ISBN 9780761971733].
Polanyi, K. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our
Time. (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1957) [ISBN 9780807056790].
Rose, N. and P. Miller ‘Political power beyond the state’, British Journal of
Sociology, 43 1991, pp.173–205.
** Tilly, C. Coercion, Capital, and the European State. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
[ISBN 9781557863683] Chapter 1.
Works cited
Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity, 1985)
[ISBN 9780520060395] Introduction and Chapter 1.
Mann, M. ‘Societies as Organised Power Networks’ in The Sources of Social
Power, Volume 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
[ISBN 9780521313490].
Morrison, K. Marx, Durkheim and Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought.
(London: Sage, 2006) second edition [ISBN 9780761970552].
Poggi, G. The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction.
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978) [ISBN 9780804709590].
Poggi, G. The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects. (Oxford: Polity Press,
1990) [ISBN 9780804718776].
Poggi, G. ‘The Formation of the Modern State and the Institutionalisation
of Rule’ in Delanty and Isin (eds) The Handbook of Historical Sociology.
(London: Sage Publications, 2003) [ISBN 9780761971733].
Spillman and Faeges ‘The state’ in Adams, J., E.S. Clemens and A.S. Orloff
Remaking Modernity: Politics, History and Sociology. (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2005) [ISBN 9780822333630].
Tilly, C. Coercion, Capital, and the European State. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
[ISBN 9781557863683] Chapter 1.
44
Chapter 4: Power, legitimacy and rule: the emergence of the modern state
Introduction
This chapter looks at what we will call the classical sociological accounts
of the modern state, its emergence and development. In the contemporary
world, almost all of us live in recognisably modern states, sometimes
referred to as ‘nation-states’ or ‘national states’. Indeed, it has often been
said that these political, territorial and social formations can seem as if
they are natural phenomena, so predominant and widespread have they
become in the contemporary world. The states that all of us live in may
not be of exactly the same type, but almost all of them share a broadly
similar set of recognisable features. However, states in the sense that
we understand them emerged relatively recently in historical terms. In
this chapter we will look at some of the important sociological traditions
that have attempted to account for the emergence and development of
specifically modern states.
One of the reasons for focusing on the modern state in this chapter
is to introduce competing accounts of its emergence. As we will
see, accounts of the rise of the modern state can tell us a lot about
broader conceptions of social, political and economic change with which
sociologists work. This chapter is linked closely to Chapters 5, 6 and 7, in
which we will go on to look at different forms that the state has taken over
time and at the specific reasons for the emergence and predominance of
the modern state form in the contemporary world. In Chapters 5, 6 and
7 we will see how some of the theoretical ideas that we encounter in this
chapter have been put to use in analyses of various state forms in history
and of the ultimate emergence of the modern state. We will see how the
historical sociology of the state has made creative use of important aspects
of sociological theory in order to produce ‘macro-sociological’ accounts of
systems of rule and the ways in which they have changed over time.
You will notice that we are using the word ‘modern’ again, this time in
conjunction with the state. There is a good reason for this. As we have
seen in the previous two chapters, ‘modernity’ is a key sociological concept
that is used to describe the specific features of societies that developed
initially in Europe from about the sixteenth and seventeenth century
onwards. One of the most important features of these societies has been
their organisation into recognisably ‘modern’ or ‘nation-states’.
Sociologists and historical sociologists have always been interested in the
historical development of the modern state as they have tended to see
its emergence as an integral part of wider processes of social, economic
and political transformation and as an important marker of ‘modernity’
itself. Remember, in Chapter 2, we saw that for the sociologists and social
theorists of the nineteenth century, ‘modern’ social, political and economic
conditions were contrasted with those of the ‘traditional’ societies from
which they were thought to have emerged, and with less ‘advanced’
societies in less ‘developed’ parts of the world.
In making this contrast, however, sociologists often assumed that
modern societies represented the culmination of particular socio-
economic processes that occurred over time. These processes were usually
thought of in progressive, evolutionary or developmental terms.
Similarly, when approaching the history of the state, an evolutionary
or developmental logic has often been used to describe its emergence
alongside other key aspects of ‘modernity’, notably the rise of capitalism
(Poggi, 1990: 96). However, as we will see, recent historical sociology of
the state challenges such views and attempts to develop different models
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144 Historical sociology
for thinking about change over time. This chapter will explore classic
approaches to the state developed by the founders of the discipline. It
will go on to look at recent accounts of the state that both develop and
challenge these earlier ideas.
46
Chapter 4: Power, legitimacy and rule: the emergence of the modern state
Activity
Read pages 72–74 of ‘The Development of the Modern State’ by David Held. You will find
the following table there:
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144 Historical sociology
Firstly, Marx had no fully developed theory of the state. As we know,1 Marx 1
You will have studied
was primarily interested in the way that the economic ‘base’ of society aspects of Marx’s theory
in 21 Principles of
determines the ‘superstructure’ of social, legal and political arrangements.
sociology.
Marx argued that the history of all societies was the history of the
struggles between classes within particular modes of production.
Marx also argued that these modes of production were themselves subject
to dynamic processes of change. In particular, the transition from the
feudal to the capitalist mode of production was responsible not just for
the re-shaping of the economic order, but the entire social and political
landscape. The emergence of the ‘modern’ state was therefore seen
by Marx as linked dynamically to the transformation of the economic
organisation of society and to the emergence of a new, dominant class.
Marx argues that throughout human history all societies have been
fundamentally divided into (small) groups who own the ‘means of
production’ (the means by which essential and other goods are produced)
and a majority who obtain access to these essential means of production
only under the control of the minority of owners, and usually on terms
highly beneficial to this minority. In feudal societies, which are largely
based on agricultural production, for example, the majority of the
population work on the land for the benefit of a few landowners and in
return are allowed to keep a small amount of surplus produce to meet
their own needs.
Marx argues that ‘all of human history is the history of class struggle’, by
which he means that the interests of the classes in society are directly
opposed to one another. Political institutions are therefore ‘devices’ that
allow the minority who control the means of production to retain their
control, and the advantages it brings, by containing potential conflict
and suppressing open revolt. ‘These institutions organise and deploy
the ultimate social resource, organised coercion, in order to secure the
minority’s position, often enshrined into legal right, and as such dependent
on enforcement’ (Poggi, 1990: 94–95).
Political institutions therefore change as the mode of production changes
and as new needs and new interests need to be protected.
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Chapter 4: Power, legitimacy and rule: the emergence of the modern state
Activity
Read the following short passage from Marx:
…the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry
and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative
state, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern state is but a
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie…
political power, properly called, is merely the instrument of one class for
oppressing another…The modern state is nothing more than the form of
organisation which the bourgeoisie necessarily adopt, both for internal and
external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interest’.
(Marx and Engels The Communist Manifesto)
Here Marx and Engels sketch out what is usually referred to as an ‘instrumentalist’
position in which the state is seen as serving a specific class interest. In other words, the
state as a system of administration, and the coercive enforcement of the law, is seen
as primarily functioning in order to protect the economic and property interests of the
dominant class.
• How valid do you think this way of looking at the state is?
• Are states ever simply ‘instrumental’ in this way?
Despite the lack of a full and clear theory of the state, some writers
(Hay, 2006; Nash, 2000) have argued that it is possible to classify Marx’s
scattered reflections on the state into two or three distinctive positions or
models. Firstly, in the ‘instrumental model’, the state is seen as primarily
coercive. As Marx argued in The Communist Manifesto of 1848, ‘the
executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the affairs of
the whole bourgeoisie’. In other words, the modern state was seen by Marx
as reflecting the dominant economic power of the bourgeoisie and acts as
an instrument of that power. The state is therefore, according to this model,
directly repressive of activity that threatens or challenges the power and
interests of the dominant class. Accordingly, all previous state forms were
also ‘instrumental’ in the same sense. That is, they expressed in political
terms the interests of a dominant class or classes, protecting and enforcing
property rights and so forth. The main point here is that the state itself is
expressive of the economic organisation of society and it is this economic
organisation which forms the most important area of investigation.
In the second model, which was based on more nuanced and empirically
focused work, Marx argued that the modern state had developed powers
and capacities of its own. This meant that it was not strictly or exclusively
an instrument of the power of one class.
Activity
In his book The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, Marx describes and analyses the
situation whereby in 1851 Louis Napoleon, the nephew of the French Emperor Napoleon
Bonaparte (who had ruled France between 1798 and 1815), had seized power. At the
time of his seizure of power France was a republic, having overthrown its monarchy in the
revolution of 1848. Read the following extract, in which Marx describes the character of
the French state at this point in the mid-nineteenth century:
The executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military
organization, with its wide-ranging and ingenious state machinery, with
a host of officials numbering half a million, besides an army of another
half million — this terrifying parasitic body which enmeshes the body
of French society and chokes all its pores sprang up in the time of the
absolute monarchy, with the decay of the feudal system which it had
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144 Historical sociology
As we have seen, Marx argued that the modern state may be relatively
autonomous from simple class interest and might therefore act
independently of the bourgeoisie class. In certain circumstances this might
mean limiting the power of the bourgeoisie or legislating against it (in
Marx’s time a number of Factory Acts in England limited the length of the
working day, for example). Nonetheless, ultimately it is class interest
that is represented at the level of the state (the warring ‘parties’ that
Marx speaks of represent different class interests) and this means that the
dominant class will be able to control state power broadly in line with its
interests. In The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State, Engels
(Marx’s collaborator) argued that:
In order that…classes with conflicting economic interests shall
not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it
became necessary to have a power seemingly standing above
society that would moderate the conflict and keep it within
bounds of ‘order’; and this power, arisen out of society but
placing itself above it and alienating itself more and more from
it, is the state.
50
Chapter 4: Power, legitimacy and rule: the emergence of the modern state
Activity
Read page 113 of the Held chapter again.
Write about 500 words in answer to the following question:
“According to Marx and Engels, why is not possible for the state in class societies to
become the vehicle for the pursuit of the common good or public interest?”
51
144 Historical sociology
Activity
In recent years, scientists have largely reached a consensus about the existence of
‘global warming’ and about the probable consequences of the continuing rise in global
temperatures. It is now widely believed that action is needed in order to curb emissions
of CO2, which is largely held responsible for the problem. However, this would almost
certainly mean that members of many societies around the world would have to make
some sacrifices in order to achieve this.
Is the state the only social institution capable of determining how best to act in this situation?
Can you think of any specific examples from your own society of ways in which the
state sets norms and values? Are these ‘reflections’ of the norms and values that exist in
society itself, or are they imposed by the state?
52
Chapter 4: Power, legitimacy and rule: the emergence of the modern state
Activity
Read section 3.2 ‘Primitive Classification’ pages 241–46) in Chapter 5 ‘The Cultural
Formations of Modern Society’ in Formations of Modernity. Think about the following
questions:
What do you think Durkheim’s ideas about the structure of ‘primitive myths’ have to tell
us about modern national rituals?
If ‘national’ rituals and symbols now function in similar ways to religious myths in order to
promote national identity, is there any reason to believe that nation-states will disappear
into larger supra-national or even global forms of social order?
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144 Historical sociology
Activity
Read pages 114–15 of Held and answer the following questions:
• What are the three distinctive elements in Weber’s definition of the state?
• What is ‘territoriality’? What territory does your own state control? Is any of that
territory disputed? How?
• What exactly is meant by the monopoly over the use of violence?
• In what ways do you think that ‘legitimacy’ and the monopoly over the use of
violence are linked?
54
Chapter 4: Power, legitimacy and rule: the emergence of the modern state
55
144 Historical sociology
56
Chapter 4: Power, legitimacy and rule: the emergence of the modern state
As we have seen, the ‘sources’ of power that Mann analyses historically are:
• Ideological: this has two specific and highly important aspects. The
first is transcendent power. This ‘unites human beings by claiming
that they possess ultimately meaningful, often divinely granted, common
qualities’ (Mann, 1986: 519). For example, Christianity, as we will see,
functioned as a transcendent form of ideological power during the
medieval period in Europe. In other words, it provided a concrete social
identity for the mass of the population that transcended their regional
or local affiliations. In doing so, both its values and its production of a
common, shared culture allowed for ‘translocal’ (beyond the immediate
locality) forms of extensive cooperation (through trade and commerce
and so on). The second form of ideological power is immanent. This
operates by ‘the strengthening of the internal morale of some existing
social groups by giving it a sense of ultimate significance and meaning…
by reinforcing its normative solidarity, and by giving it common ritual
and aesthetic practices’ (519). In other words, such groups become
self-conscious of a shared ‘superiority’ or a shared ‘purpose’. As we will
see (in Chapter 5), imperial ruling classes tend to have such a sense of
morale and ‘destiny’.
• Economic: this integrates two important spheres of social activity.
Praxis, or the ‘active intervention of human beings in nature through
labour’ (520), involves the daily activity of work and of production.
Power usually operates here at an intensive level. The second sphere is
that of the circuits of transportation and exchange of raw materials
and manufactured goods. These circuits are extensive (more so than
ever in and between ‘advanced’ societies). Economic power involves
the capacity to act upon the everyday life of the mass of the population
in their daily (necessary) labour and in the communication networks
through which the extensive exchange of goods and materials operates.
It is therefore a key form of power. However, Mann also argues that is
not the primary form of power (‘the motor of history’, as Marxists would
claim). Rather, it is possible to see that at many times throughout history
economic power has been shaped and reshaped by other sources of
power. Indeed, economic power has often been dependent on sources
of power to establish the norms governing the possession of property
and the forms of cooperation. For example, military power has often
been required to pacify extensive territories and to establish regimes of
compulsory cooperation (see Chapter 5). Similarly, ideological power
has (as we will see) provided forms of normative pacification through
the establishment of transcendent value systems within which, for
example, trade and exchange of property can function effectively.
• Military: this is both extensive (aggressive invasion and
administration of conquered territory) and intensive (mainly when
organising defence of existing territory). Both of these aspects of
military power rely on concentrated coercion (the concentration
of force) which operates through compulsory cooperation
(conscripting men into armies, organising the population for the
defence of a city). Mann makes the point that military power is not
always ‘negative’ or ‘destructive’. Military power is often used during
peacetime to reorganise societies and to enforce forms of compulsory
cooperation that can intensify the exploitation of ‘concentrated pockets
of labour’ producing higher economic yields (Mann, 1986: 521). These
‘pockets’ of intensified compulsory cooperation could be linked by
extensive, military-dominated communications infrastructures (see
Chapter 5 on the Roman Empire, for example).
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144 Historical sociology
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Chapter 4: Power, legitimacy and rule: the emergence of the modern state
59
144 Historical sociology
Activity
Read the following short text:
Let me distinguish several different pictures of human ‘history’…one
is the version of evolutionism that regards history – here understood
as social change – as mainly governed by incremental processes of
development. In this view there are no fundamental discontinuities in
social change. All phases of change that look like ‘revolutions’ of one
kind or another turn out to involve less turbulent, underlying processes
of change. This is the position taken by Durkheim; it has also been held
by many others from Comte through to the present day. Another view
sees history as being driven by processes of struggle, in which substantial
disjunctures occur between different developmental stages. Historical
materialism is one conception of this sort, but social Darwinism can also
be put in this category. Here history is also understood as social change
and has, as it were, a curving upward form, but punctuated by phases
of rapid transmutation. The view I want to defend is quite different from
either of these others. The equation of history with social change must be
resisted, as both logically mistaken and empirically wanting. If history is
temporality – the temporal constitution of social events – it is clearly false
to identify it with change…In speaking of a discontinuist conception of
modern history…I do not want to deny the importance of transitions or
ruptures in previous eras. I do however want to claim that, originating in
the West but becoming more and more global in their impact, there has
occurred a series of changes of extraordinary magnitude when compared
with any other phases of human history. What separates those living
in the modern world from all previous types of society, and all previous
epochs of history, is more profound than the continuities which connect
them to the longer spans of the past.
(Giddens The Nation State and Violence)
What does Giddens mean by a ‘discontinuist’ conception of modern history?
Answer this question, in your own words. Try and write about 500 words. You might find
it helpful to look again at David Held’s chapter, in particular the discussion about the
factors that gave rise to the modern state on page 74.
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Chapter 5: Before the ‘modern’ state: ‘traditional’ systems of rule
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
• describe important aspects of the systems of rule that operated in
traditional states
• critically assess different theoretical accounts of the emergence and
development of systems of rule in traditional states
• critically assess theoretical approaches to systems of rule in traditional
states.
Essential reading
Held, D. ‘The Development of the Modern State’ in Hall, S., and B. Gieben
Formations of Modernity.
Further reading
KEY **= particularly recommended for this chapter.
Abrams, P. Historical Sociology. (Shepton Mallet: Open Book Publishing, 1980)
[ISBN 9780801492433].
Adams, J., E.S. Clemens and A.S. Orloff Remaking Modernity: Politics, History
and Sociology. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005)
[ISBN 9780822333630].
Anderson, P. Lineages of the Absolutist State. (London: Verso, 1979)
[ISBN 9780805270259].
Anderson, P. Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. (London: Verso, 1973)
[ISBN 9781859841075].
Eisenstadt, S.N. The Political Systems of Empires. (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1993) [ISBN 9781560006411].
**Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity, 1985)
[ISBN 9780520060395] Chapters 1, 2 and 3.
Giddens, A. A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. (Houndsmills:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1995) second edition [ISBN 9780804725194].
Le Goff, J. Medieval Civilisation. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988)
[ISBN 9780631175667].
Heather, P. The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the
Barbarians. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)
[ISBN 9780195325416].
**Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986) [ISBN 9780521313490] Chapters 5 and 9.
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144 Historical sociology
McLennan, G., D. Held and D. Hall (eds.) The Idea of the Modern State. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1984) [ISBN 9780335105977] Chapters 1 and 2.
Poggi, G. The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction.
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978) [ISBN 9780804709590].
Poggi, G. The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects. (Oxford: Polity Press,
1990) [ISBN 9780804718776].
Polanyi, K. The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of our
Time. (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1957) [ISBN 9780807056790].
Smith, D. The Rise of Historical Sociology. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991)
[ISBN 9780877229209].
** Tilly, C. Coercion, Capital, and the European State. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
[ISBN 9781557863683].
Works cited
Anderson, P. Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. (London: Verso, 1973)
[ISBN 9781859841075].
Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985)
[ISBN 9780520060395].
Heather, P. The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the
Barbarians. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)
[ISBN 9780195325416].
Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986) [ISBN 9780521313490].
Poggi, G. The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction.
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978) [ISBN 9780804709590].
Potter, D.S. The Roman Empire at Bay: AD 180–395. (London: Routledge, 2004)
[ISBN 9780415100588].
Introduction
In the last chapter, we looked at a number of approaches to thinking about
the emergence of modern state forms, and at sociological approaches to
the state and its history. In this chapter and the one that follows it, we look
more closely at some specific examples of state forms and their history. We
will also look at the work of historical sociologists who have attempted to
give theoretical accounts of key aspects of those states.
The chapter will focus on important examples of pre-modern or
‘traditional’ states and at how sociologists have accounted for the systems
of rule that operated there. We will begin with a look at imperial systems
of rule in the ancient empires. These were often very long-lived state
forms. In particular, in a case study of the Roman Empire, which lasted for
many hundreds of years, we will explore how its systems of rule developed
and we will look at how some aspects of the Roman imperial state might
be said to compare with systems of rule that developed in the modern
state. We will then look briefly at the work of an important historical
sociological account of imperial systems of rule and assess its relevance.
The chapter then goes on to consider the feudal state, or the system
of divided rule as it is sometimes referred to. We will then look at the
emergence of the early modern state and, in particular, the rise of
‘absolutist’ states. This leads into a discussion of how the modern state
forms that we are familiar with are closely linked to the development of
systems of rule that were formed in this period.
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how historical sociologies of
the state draw on and utilise aspects of sociological theory to explain and
account for the diversity of state forms over time.
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Chapter 5: Before the ‘modern’ state: ‘traditional’ systems of rule
Activity
Now read the sections 2 and 2.1 of the Held chapter (pp.74–79).
Empires
Held argues that, over the centuries, the history of states has been
dominated by empires or imperial systems of rule. That is, if we look at
the history of human societies, we see that these systems were in existence
for by far the longest period of time. These imperial states were primarily
based on military power and, financially, on tribute paid by conquered
peoples to an emperor or his officials. Most empires began as smaller
states or even as single cities (Rome is an excellent example of the latter)
and grew through conquest and absorption of territory. As Held notes,
empires required ‘an accumulation and concentration of coercive means
– above all war-making ability – to sustain themselves’. Some of these
systems of rule lasted for very long periods. The Roman imperial system,
for example, lasted for many centuries, as did that of China.
However, no matter how vast and how powerful these empires became
relative to their rivals, Held argues that they could ‘sustain only limited
administrative authority’ over the territory that they ruled. In the next
sections of the chapter, we will explore in more detail what this means.
Remember, one of the most important aspects of the ‘modern’ state is
the fact that it is a ‘territorial’ state. That is, it governs uniformly across a
clearly demarcated territory through complex and unified administrative
systems. However, in the history of states this is ‘highly exceptional’ and
‘not the type-case against which others should be measured’ (Giddens,
1986: 53). The traditional states that will be considered in this chapter are
far more typical of state forms as they have existed historically.
Empires of domination
Held argues that most empires began as much smaller states and grew
(often rapidly) through the military conquest of adjoining territory. The
exercise of power in these states was primarily ‘extensive’ rather than
‘intensive’. That is, in empires of domination, power was exercised over a
wide territorial area (it was ‘extensive’) but it was not able to ‘command
a high level of mobilisation or commitment’ from the population in those
territories (it was not ‘intensive’) (Mann, 1986: 7). The principal problem
faced by such states was that the area that could be practically governed
was much smaller than the area that had been conquered by military
force. Empires of domination could cover very large areas but could not
usually effectively govern those areas. This is because an army conquers by
‘concentrating its forces’ and forcing rulers and populations of territories to
submit. But as Mann states, ‘ruling over those who had submitted involved
dispersing force’ and this would mean losing one’s military advantage
(Mann, 1986: 142).
As we can see, this means that there is a key contradiction between the
ability to conquer and the capacity to rule. Mann outlines four main
strategies which were developed in order to overcome this contradiction
(143). These were:
• rule through clients
• direct military rule
• enforced or compulsory cooperation
• the development of a common elite culture.
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The first two of these strategies were widely used in imperial systems from
approximately 2000 BCE through to the emergence of the first of the major
‘territorial’ empires during the first century BCE. The latter two, although
present to some extent in ‘empires of domination’, only became possible
with the development of complex infrastructures. These were far more
effective and allowed rulers to develop more intensive forms of rule. In
this section, we will consider the first two of these strategies and outline
key features of the empires of domination. We will then move on to look
at the case of the Roman Empire, in which the latter two strategies that
Mann identifies can be more clearly seen at work.
The first strategy involved ruling through clients. Elite groups in
conquered territories were allowed to continue as rulers in exchange for
formal submission to the conquerors and payment of tribute. Disobedience
or rebellion was usually punished with further military raids and the
replacement of troublesome rulers or ruling groups with ones more willing
to cooperate.
The main problem with this is that military conquest could only be imposed
erratically. One possible solution was to educate the conquered elite into the
culture of the conquerors, thus ensuring greater loyalty through identification
with a common culture. This, however, required resources and an
infrastructure capable of maintaining and extending such a culture. The most
common (and symbolically important) means of demonstrating the power of
the conquerors and the loyalty of the conquered was through the ‘personal
humiliation of rebels and the ritual prostration of client rulers before their
masters’ (143). Many pictorial representations of this process can be found in
engravings and other forms of ceremonial art from the ancient world.
The important thing to bear in mind here is that there was almost no
uniform or continuous form of rule across a clearly defined territory.
Empires of domination were not ‘states’ in the way that we understand
the term (see Chapter 4); they were unstable federations of rulers who
were subordinated (more or less successfully) to a more powerful central
ruler. This was a cheap and relatively easy form of domination, but it was
achieved at the cost of very considerable local or regional autonomy. This
strategy and system of rule was also extremely unstable and could rapidly
break down. The largely autonomous local elites were easily and quickly
able to gather sufficient resources to revolt against the central authority.
They were also able to place their resources at the service of rivals to their
rulers in the hope of gaining advantageous terms in the event of a victory.
The second strategy used to dominate an extended area was that of direct
military rule through armies of conquest. Here commanders and troops
were dispersed across conquered territories in strategically important
fortresses and towns. This was problematic as it required the appropriation
of large amounts of agricultural surplus from the conquered territories
in order to supply the troops. This in turn required an ‘infrastructure of
fortresses, communication routes, and supplies’ (Mann, 1986: 143).
Another key problem that emerged with direct military rule was more
complex. This involved the maintenance of loyalty to the central authority
during periods of pacification following conquest. In the immediate
aftermath of conquest, of course, the ruler could ensure continuing loyalty
by rewarding commanders and troops through the distribution of land and
the right to gather taxes or tribute. However, in the long term this tended to
have the effect of decentralising power. Soldiers and commanders with the
resources of land ownership were no longer reliant on the central authority
of the state for their livelihood. Independent classes of a landowning
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Chapter 5: Before the ‘modern’ state: ‘traditional’ systems of rule
Activity
David Held argues that:
[E]mpires were ruled, but they were not governed; that is to say,
emperors dominated a limited social and geographical space but lacked
the administrative means – the institutions, organisations, information,
personnel and so on – to provide regularised administration over the
territories they claimed as their own.
Think carefully about the following questions. Jot down some of your answers. You will
need to make sure of these later when you will be asked to write a short essay.
What do you think Held means by this? From what you have read so far, what do you think
the difference is between being ‘ruled’ and being ‘governed’? What sort of administrative
means do states require in order to be successfully and effectively governed rather than
simply ‘ruled’? How easy do you think it would have been to successfully govern a state as
large as the Roman Empire – especially without contemporary communications technologies
or transportation. Could this have done by military means alone?
The map above shows the Roman Empire at its height in 117 CE. As you
can see, the Empire covers a very large geographical area, including
Britain in the north, Egypt and northern Africa in the south, as well as
most of western and southern Europe, Asia Minor and the Middle East.
Then, as now, this area was populated with diverse peoples and cultures.
In order to look more closely at Held’s argument about imperial states, we
will examine the case of the Roman Empire. In doing so, we will consider
the arguments and ideas of the historical sociologists Michael Mann and
S.N. Eisenstadt.
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144 Historical sociology
The Roman Empire survived for many centuries. As Michael Mann argues:
The history of Rome is the most fascinating historical laboratory
available to sociologists. It provides a 700-year stretch of written
records and archaeological remains. They show a society with
recognisably the same core identity over that period of time, yet
adapting continuously to the forces created by its own, and its
neighbours’, actions.
(Mann, 1986: 250)
Clearly, a state which lasted for such a long period of time and over such
a large territory must have developed administrative means capable of
perpetuating its rule. According to Mann, Roman power was a refinement
and extension of forms of power that had existed in previous ‘agrarian
empires’. Indeed, Mann argues that the Roman Empire developed into
what he calls a ‘territorial empire’. By this he means that in the Roman
state rule was ‘territorially continuous and resources, economic and other,
diffused evenly across its enormous extent’.
Mann argues that there were two main aspects of Roman power. The first was
based on the military and social power of the legions, which were responsible
for the extensive territorial conquests. The legions were highly professional,
disciplined units with roots deep in Roman society. The legion was, as Mann
argues, the ‘core Roman institution’ (Mann, 1986: 295) and its ‘unparalleled
success’ was based on its economic, political and ideological significance as
well as its military prowess. Legions achieved an unprecedented degree of both
internal and external pacification within the conquered territories and beyond.
This provided a stable and secure environment for ‘rational economic activity’.
The legions were also important sites of economic activity in their own
right, and important market towns and trading centres developed around
the headquarters of the legions across the provinces of the Empire.
Conquering legions brought with them trade and communications
infrastructures (roads, for example) and this led to the development of
economies based on the widespread use of coinage rather than barter.
They also provided access to a massively expanded trade network for local
traders, farmers and manufacturers. Both the institutions of the state and
a powerful and wealthy private economic sector became intertwined in a
‘gigantic common market, penetrating every corner of the empire’ (278).
The necessity of feeding and equipping the soldiers and other military
personnel meant that there were substantial innovations in manufacturing
and agricultural processes with the aim of increasing productivity. This led
to an intensification of the labour process and a forced diffusion of these
innovations across the empire. Above all, the legions were not simply the
agents of conquest; they were also highly productive. The combination of
these factors produced what Mann refers to as a ‘legionary economy’, an
economy based around the powerful and extensive military organisation
that maintained order over conquered provinces and territories.
Mann argues that this legionary economy operated across the entire empire
and brought with it ‘interdependent flows of labour, economic exchange,
coinage, law, literacy’ and other aspects of Roman ‘civilisation’. This was in
many respects a straightforwardly hierarchical or vertical form of power
operating from the top down through the use of military force and highly
disciplined and militarised forms of organisation. Domination therefore became
‘territorialised’, which means that it operated continuously and uniformly
across the whole territory of the state, much as it does in the modern nation-
state. The Roman state, he argues (in an echo of Marx), ‘was little more than a
committee for managing the common affairs of the rulers of the legions’ (279).
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Activity
The Roman Empire was formed during a lengthy period of military conquest and the
Roman legions were integral to the social and economic order of the Empire. Military
power was central to the success and functioning of the state. Below is a short passage
from the writings of the author Hippolytus (date of birth unknown, date of death 235 CE).
Hippolytus is describing the empire based on his own experience of its power…
No other [empire] will be raised up except that which possesses the
domination in our own day and is solidly established: this is a fact
evident to all. It has teeth of iron, because it kills and tears to pieces the
entire world by its own force, just like iron…It is not one nation, but
an assemblage of all languages and all the races of man, it is a levy of
recruits with a view to war.
(Quoted in Potter, 2004: 3)
• What impression does the author give us of the empire and its power?
• Is this a positive or a negative assessment of it?
• Why do you think that he uses the language that he does in order to describe its
power?
The author, Hippolytus, was a Christian. At the time that he was writing (at the beginning
of the third century CE, at the height of the Empire’s power) Christians were regularly
persecuted. Hippolytus himself was eventually imprisoned and executed by being dragged
to death by wild horses.
• Does this fact change the way that we think about what the author has written?
• How and in what ways might it change this?
• How useful is this as a piece of historical (or sociological) evidence?
• What can it tell us about the subjective experience of some of the people who
lived in the Empire?
• Would everybody have felt like this about it or described it in this way?
The second important aspect of Roman power was based on the extensive
and authorative power of the class culture of the Roman elite. This
culture was adopted by the elite groups of conquered territories and it
formed the basis of a common culture practised across the empire. A fully
‘Romanised’ elite developed in each of the separate provinces and was
largely indistinguishable from other such elites across the empire. So,
despite considerable differences in terms of local languages and cultures
across the empire, there was also a significant degree of social and cultural
homogenisation, at least for the upper classes. Indeed, over the course
of its history rulers of the empire came from almost every province.
Mann therefore claims that what had originally been a reasonably loose
‘federation of allies’ (governed from Rome) ‘became more of a society in
our modern sense’ (Mann, 1986: 296).
This is an interesting point. We have already noted that the Roman Empire
lasted for many hundreds of years and that, over that time, it retained
a ‘core identity’. As in most empires that had existed before it, emperors
ruled by making use of the local native elites of the area that it had
conquered. These were backed up by the Roman governors and the power
of the Roman legionary armies in their permanent garrisons and camps. In
return for sharing in the rule of their native provinces, local elites became
fully ‘Romanised’ in their culture, adopting not just the language of the
Romans (Latin) but also their literature and their value systems. There was
therefore a very high degree of cultural integration and cultural solidarity
amongst the elite groups of the empire.
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Activity
As we have seen, Michael Mann characterises the Roman Empire as having developed
a common (elite) culture. Mann argues that this was one of the reasons that the empire
was able to become a ‘territorial’ state and to become more of a ‘society’ in the modern
sense of the term. The extensive spread of a common culture was achieved through
specific means and had particular effects. One important aspect that was crucial to this
process was the development of literacy and a common literary culture. Below is a short
passage from a recent study of the later empire describing the process of ‘Romanisation’.
The bedrock of the system was the intense study of a small number of
literary texts under the guidance of an expert in language and literary
interpretation, the grammarian. This occupied the individual for seven or
more years from about the age of eight, and concentrated on just four
authors…You then graduated to a rhetor, with whom a wider range
of texts was studied…Texts were read line by line, and every twist of
language dutifully identified and discussed…[This] had the effect of
allowing instant identification. As soon as a member of the Roman elite
opened his mouth, it was obvious that he had learned ‘correct’ Latin.
But talking the talk was only part of the story. Aside from the language of
these texts, [the Roman elite] also claimed that absorbing their content
made them human beings of a calibre unmatched by anyone else.
(Heather, 2006: 17/18)
• What aspects of this system do you think would help to create a sense of ‘cultural
solidarity’ between members of the ruling elite?
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Chapter 5: Before the ‘modern’ state: ‘traditional’ systems of rule
• Think about the education system in your society. What values and ideals are
promoted through the system? How do these relate to the development of a
common culture between members of the society? Is there a specifically ‘elite’
culture in your society? What are its characteristics?
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Their importance, according to Eisenstadt, lies in the fact that they ‘stand
between what may be called the “traditional” and the “modern” political
systems and regimes’ (4). In other words, the political systems of empires
contain some features that resemble those of ‘modern’ states and these
co-exist alongside features that are commonly found in ‘traditional’
states. Eisenstadt argues that these particular imperial systems developed
mechanisms of rule that anticipate some aspects of the modern state. In
particular, some rulers saw the need to develop mechanisms of rule that
could ensure that extensive territorial possessions could be held together
in the present and into the future.
Remember, we noted in Chapter 4 that the main characteristics of the
modern state are its autonomy from other aspects of the social world, its
monopoly over the use of force, and its capacity to mobilise resources and
run complex administrative systems or bureaucracies. In other words, the
state is a power in its own right which can pursue goals. We have seen that
‘traditional’ states in the form of empires of domination did not possess
such powers or the administrative capacities necessary to govern extensive
territories and populations in an intensive way. They ruled through clients
or through military force, either of which was efficient or effective. Even
the Roman Empire, which we used as an example of a state that achieved
relatively intensive forms of administrative control over an entire territory,
had only 6,000 professional bureaucrats by the late fourth century CE
(Heather, 2006: 33).
Eisenstadt argues that the political systems of the empires that he analyses
in his study were characterised by attempts by their rulers to develop what
he calls ‘free resources’. By this he means that rulers attempted to develop
‘resources’ that were independent of any commitment to traditional groups
(the aristocracy, for example) as these tended to stand in the way of any
extension of state power. Thus, rulers were interested in the development
of a free peasantry, for example, that was not tied up in obligations to
a large landowning class. In creating this independent ‘resource’, the
ruler benefited as he was able to use it as a source of military manpower
specifically for the state. Similar strategies were used in order to develop
other social groupings (merchants, professionals and so on) that would be
free of dependence on traditional authority and thus available as resources
for the state to utilise in the pursuit of its specific goals. The overall goal of
rulers was therefore the creation and development of resources that could
be used to fund or staff state institutions loyal solely to the ruler that could
in turn be used to wield power more effectively.
However, in developing these ‘free resources’, conflict and contradictions
arose. Social groupings developed as ‘resources’ to be used by the state
existed alongside substantial sectors of the population that were tied to
alternative, traditional centres of power (the aristocracy, for example)
that used them in pursuit of their own interests. Conflicts therefore arose
between traditional aristocracies and rulers determined to develop ‘free
resources’. Rulers could not, however, go too far in attempting to limit the
traditional powers and rights of the aristocracy precisely because their own
power was similarly based on traditional forms of legitimation (hereditary
rights, for example).
Another problem that Eisenstadt notes is that the pursuit by rulers of their
goals – such as military expansion or large-scale public works – could be
costly in terms of the strain it put on existing resources. This put pressure
on those independent sectors of the population that rulers relied on for
direct taxation or manpower. Such resources could often be seriously
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Chapter 5: Before the ‘modern’ state: ‘traditional’ systems of rule
depleted as a result. This could lead to rulers having to rely more heavily
on traditional groups who would then demand further rights placing them
and their resources beyond the power of the ruler.
According to Eisenstadt, all of these factors result in ‘internal contradictions’
within societies which generate ‘struggle, change, and the eventual demise –
or transformation – of these systems’ (Eisenstadt, 1993: xvii).
However, Eisenstadt also argues against the idea of a general historical
‘evolution’ of state forms from simple to complex, or ‘traditional’ to
‘modern’. Change does not follow predictable patterns and the emergence
of these systems ‘was not assured by some overall trend’ (xvii).
As we have seen, Eisenstadt argues that the rulers of empires required
independent resources that could be used to create powerful state
institutions through which they could pursue their goals. We have also
seen that this strategy was risky and prone to failure. Indeed, Eisenstadt
argues that:
The ruler of the centralised bureaucratic polity could realise his
political objectives only in so far as there existed in society power
and resources that were neither entirely dependent on other
groups, not committed to their use, nor obtainable only through
their good will. Although the rulers occasionally might have
utilised such embedded and committed resources, continued
reliance on them would necessarily have entailed the loss of
the ruler’s independence, and of their ability to formulate freely
their aims and goals and to pursue their policies. Unlike rulers of
many primitive patrimonial or feudal systems, the rulers of the
bureaucratic polities were not willing to be merely the strongest
and ‘first’ among rulers or owners of similar clan or patrimonial
units. Instead these rulers strove to concentrate, in their own
hands, the main centres of power and control in society.
(Eisenstadt, 1993: 118)
Feudalism
Activity
Now read sections 2.2 and 2.3 of the Held chapter.
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Michael Mann argues that ‘it is impossible for the historical sociologist to
contemplate medieval European history “on its own terms” without being
influenced by premonitions of the Leviathan that was to loom up behind it
– industrial capitalism’ (Mann, 1986: 373). Special attention has therefore
been paid to those aspects of feudal societies that predisposed it to the
formation and development of the ‘modern’ world.
Activity
Read section 2.3 of the Held chapter. Use the following questions to help you work
through the reading. Jot down a few notes. This will help you to grasp the main outline
of feudalism. We will go on to look at how the system worked in more depth in the
next section of the chapter, but this should give you a basic idea of the most important
elements at work in the system.
• How were leaders or kings appointed in the early years of feudalism?
• In what ways was the relationship between a lord and his warriors a reciprocal
one?
• How did these military relationships (of the vassalic bond) stretch into ideas about
governing territory?
• In what way was this system not based on a simple hierarchical relationship
between lord and vassal?
• What does it mean to describe feudal kings as ‘primus inter pares’?
• How did this affect their capacity to rule?
• Why did this make it impossible for kings to rule effectively over a territory?
• In what way was the system inherently unstable?
• What was the most important economic element within the feudal system?
• How was this organised? How did it relate to political power?
• What were the alternative centres of economic activity and political power?
• What gave ‘Europe’ its sense of identity during this period?
• What was the ‘Holy Roman Empire’?
• Why did the ‘Holy Roman Empire’ not become a powerful, unified state?
• In what way was the Catholic Church important in the political affairs of Europe?
• In what ways do you think that the power of the Church acted against the
ambitions of rulers to develop the power of the state?
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Chapter 5: Before the ‘modern’ state: ‘traditional’ systems of rule
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144 Historical sociology
Activity
Think about the sort of relationships in contemporary societies and compare these to
what you have read about. How ‘emotional’ or ‘personal’ are the relationships between
people in the modern world of work?
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Chapter 5: Before the ‘modern’ state: ‘traditional’ systems of rule
Secondly, during the feudal period the beneficium or the fief became
tied to the commendatio. Remember, a fief (land and its inhabitants
etc) was granted by a lord to a vassal. In the feudal period, warfare was
expensive and warriors needed to equip themselves with expensive armour
and so on. The vassal used the economic resources made available by
exploiting the land to equip himself with horses, armour and weapons
and so forth to aid his lord in battle. Remember, there was no state to
supply an armed force! Also, as the lord and vassal were often near social
equals, the vassal needed to maintain a household that reflected his status
and which was suitable for his lord to stay in as his guest. The fief was
therefore granted in order to allow the vassal to look after himself and his
dependents and in order for him to have sufficient resources to help the
lord (militarily or otherwise).
Finally, the immunitas was also transformed within feudal relationships.
In the Roman period this meant households or estates that were immune
from the ordinary laws that operated across a territory. However, in the
feudal period, this became a crucial part of the system of rule rather than a
‘gap’ in it. What is meant by this is that the vassal was not simply permitted
but expected to exercise his own rule over his fief. He was expected to
defend and police his lands and (as we have seen) to extract resources from
the land in order to equip himself and his followers for battle with his lord.
In this way, the system of rule was highly decentralised.
Thus, the fief became an essential part of the commendatio. The lord was
obliged (through the immuntas) to allow the vassal ‘to remain undisturbed
in his possession of governance’ over his own lands (his fiefdom) in return
for the vassal’s obligation to aid the lord and to ‘extend and mediate his
[the lord’s] powers at the local level’ (22).
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Chapter 5: Before the ‘modern’ state: ‘traditional’ systems of rule
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144 Historical sociology
Notes
78
Chapter 6: The absolutist state
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
• describe the chief characteristics of ‘absolutist’ states
• explain how and why the institutions and systems of rule of absolutist
states developed in the ways that they did and how they are related to
other dynamic processes of change
• explain the historical relationship between absolutist systems of rule
and different types of modern state
• explain competing interpretations of the historical processes involved
in the development of absolutist and modern systems of rule.
Essential reading
In your course pack:
Dean, M. ‘Bio-Politics and Sovereignty’ from Governmentality: Power and Rule
in Modern Societies. (London: Sage Publications, 1999). Note: this can be
found at the back of this subject guide.
Held, D. ‘The Development of the Modern State’ in Hall, S., and B. Gieben
Formations of Modernity.
Further reading
KEY **= particularly recommended for this chapter.
**Anderson, P. Lineages of the Absolutist State. (London: Verso, 1979)
[ISBN 9780805270259] Chapters 1 and 2 and Part III: Conclusion.
Dean, M. Critical and Effective Histories. (London: Routledge, 1994)
[ISBN 9780415064958].
Dreyfuss, H., and P. Rabinow Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) second edition
[ISBN 9780226163123] Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Foucault, M. ‘Right of Death and Power over Life’ in The Will to Knowledge:
The History of Sexuality Volume 1 (Penguin Books: Harmondsworth, 1998)
[ISBN 9780140268683].
Foucault, M. ‘Governmentality’ in Power: the Essential Works Volume 3. Edited by
J.D. Faubion (Allen Lane: Harmondsworth, 2000) [ISBN 9780140259575].
Foucault, M. ‘The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century’ in Power: the
Essential Works Volume 3. Edited by J.D. Faubion
(Allen Lane: Harmondsworth, 2000) [ISBN 9780140259575].
** Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity, 1985)
[ISBN 9780520060395] Chapters 4, 6 and 7.
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144 Historical sociology
Works cited
Anderson, P. Lineages of the Absolutist State. (London: Verso, 1979)
[ISBN 9780805270259].
Dreyfuss, H., and P. Rabinow Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and
Hermeneutics. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) second edition
[ISBN 9780226163123].
Foucault, M. The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1.
(Penguin Books: Harmondsworth, 1998) [ISBN 9780140268683].
Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity, 1985)
[ISBN 9780520060395].
Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986) [ISBN 9780521313490].
Poggi, G. The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction.
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978) [ISBN 9780804709590].
Tilly, C. Coercion, Capital, and the European State. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
[ISBN 9781557863683].
Activity
Before beginning this chapter, read from section 2.3 of the Held chapter to the end.
Introduction
What were the specific conditions that gave rise to the modern nation-state?
In this chapter we will explore in detail some of the major characteristics of
new systems of rule that emerged in Europe during the sixteenth, seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. These systems are usually referred to as ‘absolutist’
monarchies and they became particularly powerful in states such as France,
Prussia, Sweden, Austria and Spain during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Other powerful European states of the period (England and Holland,
for example) are sometimes referred to as ‘constitutional states’. ‘Absolutist’
and ‘constitutional’ states are often thought of as being quite different from
one another in the ways that they wielded power and the ways in which the
exercise of power was justified. However, there are also great similarities
between these new types of state. Both types of state are usually thought of
as providing the preconditions for the development of ‘modern’ nation-states.
The difference between absolutist and constitutional states will be explored in
more depth in Chapter 7. The focus in this chapter will be on ‘absolutist’ states.
These systems of rule stand at the threshold of the ‘modern’ period and, as
such, sociologists have been especially interested in the conditions under
which they developed as they did. Remember, sociologists have always been
particularly interested in the processes through which the ‘modern’ world
came into being. Many of the political institutions of the modern state have
their origins in the systems of rule that we will examine in this chapter, as
do expectations about the scope and range of the state’s powers. Equally,
and importantly, expectations about the responsibilities of the state and
about the sort of activity that the state can effectively (and legitimately)
involve itself in were formed during this period.
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Chapter 6: The absolutist state
Thinking back to what you have read in the last two chapters, you will
remember that sociologists have had many different and often competing
theories about how and why the modern nation-state developed.
Such theories are generally part of broader theoretical accounts of the
development of ‘modernity’ itself or of the trajectory of social change in
general. In looking at the way in which the modern state emerges out of
and is related to elements of absolutist systems of rule, we will be able to
further explore debates about social and historical processes and accounts
of social change that we have encountered in previous chapters.
In particular, we will look in detail at two accounts of the social, economic,
and political tendencies of absolutism. The first is Perry Anderson’s Lineages of
the Absolutist State, which offers a neo-Marxist account of absolutism. This
is an excellent example of a neo-Marxist account of changes to the form of
the state and methods of governance. In Anderson’s account, as we will see,
the absolutist state operates as an instrument of class power (the power of the
aristocracy, or nobility). Paradoxically, according to Anderson, the specifically
‘modern’ features of the state were developed in order to help maintain the
power of a class that we normally associate with feudal forms of rule.
The second account is that of the French historian and philosopher
Michel Foucault. We will look in some detail at the rise of what he refers
to as disciplinary power and ‘bio-politics’. We will also look at
another important concept developed by Foucault: governmentality.
Governmentality describes the new form of governing that arose
over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the absolutist states
that was closely allied with the creation and growth of the modern
bureaucracies. Quoting the sociologists of law Hunt and Wickham,
Mitchell Dean states that: ‘Governmentality is the dramatic expansion in the
scope of government, featuring an increase in the number and size of the
governmental calculation mechanisms’ (1994: 76). In other words, in giving
this definition, Hunt and Wickham conceive of the term as consisting of two
parts – ‘governmental’ and ‘–ity’: governmental meaning ‘pertaining to the
government of a country’ and the suffix –ity meaning ‘the study of’. They
acknowledge that this definition lacks some of Foucault’s finer nuances and
try to redress this by explaining some more of Foucault’s ideas, including
‘reason of state, the problem of population, modern political economy,
liberal securitisation, and the emergence of the human sciences’ (1994: 77).
Activity
Read sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 in Held.
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Activity
Now, go back and carefully re-read section 2.4 of the Held chapter. Make notes on what
you read in answer to the following questions:
• What was the absolutist form of the state based upon?
• Make a list of the factors that Held says are important.
Look at the statement by the French monarch Louis XIV which is quoted at the bottom of
page 83.
• What does this tell us about the role of the monarch in the absolutist state? How
does this vision of monarchical power appear to differ from that current during
the feudal period?
Borders
Look at the list of characteristics of absolutist states at the bottom of page
84 of the Held chapter. The first of these is the ‘coincidence of territorial
boundaries with a uniform system of rule’. As we have seen, territorial
boundaries in ‘traditional’ states were very much looser than those which
divide modern states from one another. Thinking back to Chapter 5, you
will remember that traditional states had ‘frontiers’ rather than borders in
the modern sense. This is an important distinction. A ‘frontier’ is an area
in the peripheral regions of a state, usually sparsely populated and where
the political authority of the centre is relatively weak and thinly spread.
‘Frontiers’ do not necessarily mark a boundary between states. Beyond
the frontier there may have been tribal groups or unpopulated lands. A
‘border’ however is ‘a known and geographically drawn line separating
and joining two or more states…[B]orders are nothing other than lines
drawn to demarcate states’ sovereignty. As such, it is irrelevant to their
nature what type of terrain (or sea) that they pass over’ (Giddens, 1985:
50). Within a border, the laws of one state apply; across the border, those
of another are enforced. Borders are often very strictly policed.
This is an important point. Giddens argues that borders only came
into existence with the emergence of nation-states. Attempts by
absolutist states to consolidate and intensify their control over their
territory marked an important step towards the establishment of
meaningful borders between states. You will notice that point five on
Held’s list of developments in the absolutist state is ‘the formalisation
of relations among states through the development of diplomacy and
diplomatic institutions’. In other words, during this period, a system
of states developed. Giddens argues that this state system was, by
the seventeenth century, becoming both ‘integrated’ and that it was
‘reflexively monitored’. This means that states could not act purely
independently of one another as they had to take into consideration
the territorial ambitions of other states and make calculations about what
the consequences of their actions would be in terms of potential military
reprisals. They also had to ‘talk’ to one another through elaborate new
channels of diplomacy.
We will look more closely at the state system, and in particular at the role
of competition and warfare between states in Chapter 7. For now it is
important to bear in mind that the modern state emerged out of a complex
set of interactions between internal and external factors.
Activity
Think about what is inside and what is outside the border of a modern state. If you cross
the border into another state you are immediately subject to a different set of laws.
Membership (or citizenship) of a state usually brings with it certain benefits as well as
certain duties. However, if you are not a citizen of a state you will almost certainly have
few or no rights. Think about the status of refugees.
The remaining points on Held’s list of key developments all relate to the
internal factors involved in reordering the state undertaken by absolutist
monarchs, although, as we will see, several of these relate at least partly
to needs caused by largely external factors (in particular, the necessity to
wage war).
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Law
Held’s second point relates to the development of new mechanisms of law-
making and law enforcement. Most of us now live in states in which the
law applies equally in all areas within the territory of the state and to all of
the state’s citizens. As we saw with feudalism, laws tended to be based on
custom and tradition, and different geographical regions, different towns
or cities and different classes of people were often governed by quite
separate laws. This clearly made it very difficult for central authorities
to govern in anything like the way that we are now used to, that is,
evenly and uniformly across an entire territory and its entire population.
However, a number of factors began to significantly change this situation.
As Poggi argues, in the hand of absolute monarchs law is changed from a
‘framework for into an instrument of rule’ (1978: 73).
The second is related to the ‘rediscovery’ during the later medieval period
of Roman Law. The Roman legal system was made up of two distinct
areas, the civil law (or jus) which regulated economic transactions
between citizens (contracts, for example) and public law (or lex) which
governed the political relations between the state and its subjects. The
latter had, during the Roman imperial period, provided the legal basis
for the absolute sovereign power of the emperors. The Roman maxim
quod principi placuit legis habet vicem (‘the ruler’s will has force of law’) is
the essence of this form of sovereign power. The theoretical principles of
absolute sovereignty ‘exercised a profound influence and attraction on the
new monarchies’ (Anderson, 1974: 27). In other words, the rediscovery of
Roman Law helped to legitimise the concentration of power in the hands
of the new ‘absolute’ monarchs and was the ‘most powerful intellectual
weapon available for their typical programme of territorial integration and
administrative centralism’ (28).
Activity
In what way does the legal principle that monarchs are free from all legal constraints and
the ‘source’ of law undermine feudal principles of rule?
Roman civil law (or jus) had sanctioned the private ownership of
property. The re-introduction of various aspects of Roman civil law in a
number of states over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries provided
the means to separate private from public (or communal) property. This
was something that had been impossible during the Feudal period, during
which there was a much less clear distinction between public and private
property (Giddens, 1985: 100). On an economic level, private ownership
of property (of land and goods, for example) is one of the important
preconditions for the development of an economy based on commodity
exchange. The effects of the introduction of principles from Roman Law
therefore had the effect of enhancing the right to private property whilst
simultaneously increasing the public authority of the state, which was
embodied in the absolute ruler.
The adoption of legal principles that sanction both absolute power for
the monarch and the unconditional ownership of private property might
seem paradoxical. However, as we will see, from a Marxist perspective,
securing private property worked for both the nobility (in whose interest
the absolutist state continued to operate) and the rising bourgeois class
also.
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Chapter 6: The absolutist state
The second aspect of law that we need to consider is that of the question
of sovereignty itself. We have seen that absolutist monarchs ‘claimed
to be the ultimate source of human law’ and that their legitimacy was
‘understood to derive from the law of God’ (Held, 1992: 83/4). However,
as we have seen, this is an old idea that long predates absolutism itself.
Ancient empires had their God-Emperors and their despots. The difference
between the exercise of absolute power by a monarch in traditional
states and those in the absolutist states of seventeenth and eighteenth
century Europe lies in the way that the monarch became a personalised
expression of a ‘secularised administrative entity’ (Giddens,
1992: 94). In other words, the monarch in the absolutist system represents
not just him or herself but also the power of the state (the ‘secularised
administrative entity’), which begins to be seen as a social actor in its own
right. This is a very important point. As Giddens argues, it marks the point
at which ‘government in the modern sense’ begins to develop because the
state itself begins to be seen as something that the monarch represents
and therefore as having powers and capacities of its own.
Thirdly, and related strongly to the issue of sovereignty and the
development of a more abstract concept of state power, impersonal codes
of law meant to apply to the whole population of the state were drawn
up across many European states. These did not include exclusions
according to ‘rank’ (that is, the nobility were not excluded on the grounds
of custom, for example). They were universal in that they applied
equally to all. The law then became part of a generalised apparatus
of power, rather than the personal ‘tool’ of an individual monarch.
Monarchs may have wielded enormous power but this was done through
administrative channels and legal mechanisms that began to be associated
with the state as an entity in itself which individual monarchs served.
Finally, law enforcement also began to change significantly during this
period. Along with new theories of sovereignty that were developed over
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was a new concern with
questions of social order and social discipline. As we have seen,
internal pacification is a vital factor in the development of a state’s
ability to govern its own territory evenly and uniformly. States have highly
developed capacities to ‘monitor, control and monopolise the effective
means of violence’ (Tilly, 1992: 68).
However, this has by no means always been the case. Throughout most of
human history ordinary members of the population were heavily armed
and local and regional power-holders had control of concentrated means
of force which could on occasion overwhelm the power of the centralised
state (see Chapter 5). Duels were fought as a right in order to settle
personal disputes and members of the nobility often had the right to
wage private wars. States by no means had a monopoly over the use of
legitimised violence.
However, since the seventeenth century, states began to decisively act
against the use of violence by individuals within the population and by
rival centres of power. The civilian populations of states were gradually
disarmed: weapons were seized or confiscated, duels prohibited, the
holders of weapons were made to require licences and ownership of
weapons was seriously restricted. At the same time, the state’s own
expansion of its armed forces (both military and police) began to
overshadow those of any rival centre of power within the territory. As
states themselves became more and more warlike, their populations
became more ‘docile’ and more intensively disciplined.
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Activity
Read the short extract below:
…the idea that the ruler could, by an act of his sovereign will, produce new
law and have it enforced by his own increasingly pervasive and effective
system of courts was wholly revolutionary. It transformed law from a
framework of into an instrument for rule. Furthermore, since such law was
designed to apply uniformly over the territory, the provincial and regional
[authorities] lost the ability to adapt it to local conditions. Through such new
law, the ruler addressed himself ever more clearly and compellingly to the
whole population of the territory. He disciplined relations in increasingly
general and abstract terms, applicable ‘wherever and whenever’.
(Poggi, 1978: 73)
• In what way is the law in modern states ‘an instrument of rule’?
• Why is it important that the law applies equally to everyone?
Thinking about these questions, write about 500 words on the way that the legal changes
under absolutism made rule more intensive and more effective.
Centralisation
If you now go back to Held’s list of important developments in
the absolutist state, you will notice that the third on the list is the
‘centralisation of administrative power’. This is obviously a highly
important development if we think about the highly diffuse forms of
power that operated in ‘traditional’ states. As we have seen, even in
cases where power was relatively centralised (in some ancient empires,
for example), it was extremely difficult for rulers to exert authority over
widespread geographical areas and across their populations in a uniform
manner. We have said that the absolutist state is ‘transitional’. This means
that in many respects it is closer to the traditional states that we have
looked at in previous chapters than to the modern nation-state. However,
as we have also seen, it also contains a number of dynamic features that
will develop into key institutional features of the modern state. One of the
most important of these is the centralisation of administrative power.
One of the key means by which states were able to strengthen their capacity
to govern their territories was through the development of powerful and
efficient centralised systems of administration. We saw in Chapter 4 how
rulers of what Eisenstadt calls ‘centralised bureaucratic empires’ had
attempted to take power away from social groups within their states. This
was in some cases partly achieved by placing the administration of the state in
the hands of a non-hereditary class of bureaucrats. Within absolutist systems
of rule, especially as these developed over the eighteenth century, monarchs
were able to rule through a ‘large and elaborately constructed and regulated
body of public organs engaged in administrative activities that were…
continuous, systematic, pervasive, visible, and effective’ (Poggi, 1978:74).
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Chapter 6: The absolutist state
Activity
Read the following short passage by the sociologist Gianfranco Poggi. The ‘state’ that
Poggi is discussing here is the absolutist state.
the state was intended to operate as the instrument of its own enacted
laws, thereby making its activities systematised, coordinated, predictable,
machinelike, and impersonal…[T]he state was made transcendent
over the physical person of its head through the depersonalisation and
objectification of its power. Public law shaped the state as an artificial,
organisational entity operating through individuals who in principle were
interchangeable and who in their official activities were expected to
employ their certified abilities in…loyalty to the state and commitment to
its interests.
(Poggi, 1978: 76)
• What does Poggi mean when he argues that the state is ‘impersonal’?
• What is meant by: ‘the state was made transcendent over the physical person of
its head’?
• In what way is this different to ‘patrimonial’ state power?
• What do you think Poggi means when he argues that the state was an ‘artificial,
organisational entity operating through individuals who in principle were
interchangeable…’? Describe in your own words what he means by this.
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144 Historical sociology
Taxation
Returning to Held’s list, the fourth item there is the ‘alteration and
extension of fiscal management’. One of the key features of absolutist
rule involved the introduction of new systems of taxation. As we have
seen, rulers of traditional states relied on forms of tribute or on a strictly
limited capacity to extract money and resources from the territories
and populations that they ruled. During the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries warfare between European states (see Chapter 7) became
costlier and more widespread. States found it necessary to spend vast sums
of money on maintaining and equipping large armies and navies. In order
to compete successfully for territory or for influence and power against
other states it became necessary to raise larger and larger amounts of
revenue. We will see in Chapter 7 how this necessity led directly to many
radical changes in the ways that states were organised.
We have now considered a number of features of ‘absolutism’ in terms
of the reorganisation of key aspects of the state and the development
of a distinctly ‘modern’ series of institutions and frameworks for rule.
In Chapter 7 we will examine in more detail two remaining features of
absolutist systems of rule (the growth of ‘standing armies’ and diplomatic
relations between states). We will examine these developments (and
consider the developments that we have already discussed) in relation to
the necessities imposed on states by almost continuous warfare.
In the next sections of this chapter, we will look in detail at two accounts
that attempt to explain the emergence of these systems of absolutist rule in
wider context.
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144 Historical sociology
above all the bourgeois or capitalist class, this was not necessarily the case.
Rather, the absolutist state enforced rights to property primarily on behalf
of the nobility, and the fact that the rising bourgeois class benefited from
this was peripheral to the state’s intention.
In the activity below you will find a passage from Anderson’s book. Here
he summarises many of the arguments that he makes in the book as a
whole.
Activity
Read the following passage from Anderson’s Lineages of the Absolutist State.
…the apparent paradox of Absolutism in Western Europe was that it
fundamentally represented an apparatus for the protection of aristocratic
property and privileges, yet at the same time the means by which
this protection was promoted could simultaneously ensure the basic
interests of the mercantile and manufacturing classes. The Absolutist
State increasingly centralised political power and worked towards more
uniform legal systems…It did away with a large number of internal
barriers to trade, and sponsored external barriers against foreign
competitors…It provided lucrative if risky investment in public finance for
capital…It mobilised rural property by seizure of ecclesiastical lands…
It ordered rentier sinecures in the bureaucracy. It sponsored colonial
enterprises and trading companies…In other words, it accomplished
certain partial functions in the primitive accumulation necessary for the
eventual triumph of the capitalist mode of production itself. The reasons
why it could perform this ‘dual’ role lie in the specific nature of merchant
or manufacturing capital: since neither rested on the mass production
characteristic of machine industry proper, neither in themselves
demanded a radical rupture with the feudal agrarian order which still
enclosed the vast majority of the population (the future wage-labourer
and consumer market of industrial capitalism). In other words, they could
develop within the limits set by the reorganised feudal framework. This
is not to say that everywhere did so: political, religious or economic
conflicts could well fuse into revolutionary explosions against Absolutism
after a certain period of maturation, in specific conjectures. There was,
however, always a field of compatibility at this stage between the nature
and programme of the Absolutist State and the operations of mercantile
and manufacturing capital. For in the international competition between
noble classes that produced the endemic warfare of the age, the size
of the commodity sector within each ‘national’ patrimony was always
of critical importance to its relative political and military strength.
Every monarchy thus had a stake in gathering treasure and promoting
trade under its own banners, in the struggle against its rivals. Hence
the ‘progressive’ character those subsequent historians have so often
conferred on the official policies of Absolutism. Economic centralisation,
protectionism and overseas expansion aggrandised the late feudal state
while they profited the early bourgeoisie. They increased the taxable
revenues of the one by providing business opportunities of the other. The
circular maxims of mercantilism, proclaimed by the Absolutist State, gave
eloquent expression to this provisional coincidence of interests. It was
appropriately the Duc de Coiseul, in the last decades of the aristocratic
ancien regime in the West who declared: ‘Upon the navy depend the
colonies, upon the colonies commerce, upon commerce the capacity of
the State to maintain numerous armies, to increase its population and to
make possible the most glorious and useful enterprises.’
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Chapter 6: The absolutist state
Yet, as the final cadence of ‘glorious and useful’ implied, the irreducible
feudal character of Absolutism remained. It was state founded on the social
supremacy of the aristocracy and confined to the imperatives of landed
property. The nobility could deposit power with the monarchy, and permit
the enrichment of the bourgeoisie: the masses were still at its mercy. No
‘political’ derogation of the noble class ever took place in the Absolutist State.
Its feudal character constantly ended up frustrating and falsifying its promises
for capital…Army, bureaucracy, diplomacy and dynasty remained a hardened
feudal complex which governed the whole State machine and guided its
destinies. The rule of the Absolutist State was that of the feudal nobility in
the epoch of the transition to capitalism. Its end would signal the crisis of the
power of its class: the advent of the bourgeois revolutions, and the emergence
of the capitalist State.
(Anderson, 1974: 40–42)
Think about the following questions:
• In what ways does Anderson argue that the absolutist state was one in which the
power of the nobility was enhanced?
• How did this also partially aid the new bourgeois class?
Now write about 500 words outlining how Anderson argues that the absolutist state was
an instrument of class power.
Foucault’s work
Foucault’s work was concerned with the operation of power within
modern societies. His work attempted to show how the systems of power
and governance at work in contemporary societies has a particular history
that can be traced by looking in what might often be thought of as rather
unlikely places (prisons, asylums, hospitals, for example). He does not
argue that particular groups in society (‘classes’, for example) or states
themselves held power or that power worked downwards from the state
and through institutions. Rather, he suggests that the state was one power
centre amongst others and that its powers were enhanced over time
through the adoption of forms of governance and control that had their
origins in an array of different institutional settings.
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144 Historical sociology
Activity
What do you think that Foucault means when he refers to power as a ‘means of
deduction, a subtraction mechanism’?
Think about what we have said so far about the state.
Have all the states that we have considered so far exercised power in this way?
Discipline
This new power over life, Foucault argues, has two specific dimensions.
The first is as an ‘anatamo-politics’ of the human body. This refers to the
disciplinary control and creation of ‘docile bodies’. This was achieved
through a number of means. We have already seen that one of the features
of the absolutist state was its extension of forms of disciplinary control.
Foucault argues that from the seventeenth century onwards new ‘political
technologies of the body’ have emerged that have produced individuals
who are simultaneously more docile and more productive. These
technologies emerge initially within an array of institutions of confinement
– asylums, hospitals, poorhouses and workhouses, factories and schools
– in which inmates are subject to strict forms of bodily discipline,
surveillance and control.
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Chapter 6: The absolutist state
Ultimately, Foucault argues, the model for this form of power is the
Panopticon, a type of prison. It is an ‘exemplary technology’ and the
techniques it employed have since become widespread across social
institutions. Its chief characteristics are:
• its ability to make the spread of power efficient
• its ability to discipline individuals with the least exertion of force
• its ability to increase to a maximum the visibility of those subjected
• the intimate link it creates between bodies, space, power and
knowledge.
The Panopticon allows ‘seeing without being seen’. This asymmetry
between observer and observed, the capacity to see without being seen,
is, in fact, the very essence of power for Foucault because ultimately the
power to dominate rests on the differential possession of knowledge
that is exemplified in this unequal relationship.
Foucault goes on to argue that this is a new form of power that targets
both the body and the mind, and that is designed to ‘train’ and recompose
the body and its forces, to render them docile and productive. This new
form of power is not confined to the prison – it is a form of power that has
become generalised across society. It is a form of power that is ‘capable of
operating everywhere in a continuous way down to the finest grain of the
social body…’ (Foucault, 1975: 79).
Disciplinary power operates through the establishment and policing
of ‘norms’ and through ‘technologies of normalisation’ which seek out
‘abnormalities’ that they must then treat and reform. Foucault argues
that these ‘abnormalities’ are produced by the very systems of power,
knowledge and surveillance that are set up to seek out and ‘cure’ them.
Bio-politics
The second aspect of this new form of power targets the population as
a whole, which now begins to be thought of in more ‘biological’ terms.
For the first time in history, scientific categories such as ‘species’ and
‘population’ became the object of government (Dreyfuss and Rabinow,
1983: 134). In other words, they began to be seen as ‘problematic’
categories that could not be taken for granted but which needed to be
investigated and governed in new ways. The aim of government became
the supervision of the processes that maximised the vitality of the
population. This is referred to as ‘bio-politics’ or ‘bio-power’.
Foucault argues that there are two main aspects of ‘bio-power’ and that
both emerge separately in the seventeenth century and come together in a
single new ‘logic’ of power at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The first pole concerns the ‘human species’ (or at least that portion of it
living in a specific state). For the first time in history, scientific categories
such as ‘species’ and ‘population’ became the objects of political attention
in a serious and consistent manner. They were investigated through
a new array of scientific institutions which were themselves linked to
governmental institutions for the control and administration of the
population through health and welfare services.
The second pole was concerned with the body as an object to be
manipulated. We have already seen how disciplinary power works to
create docile, productive and self-regulated populations ruled by notions
of the ‘norm’. Both of these forms of power work through a diverse range
of institutions which are often not under the direct control of the state.
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144 Historical sociology
Activity
Read the following short extract form Foucault’s The Will to Knowledge:
Another consequence of this deployment of bio-power was the growing
importance assumed by the action of the norm, at the expense of the
juridical system of the law. Law cannot help but be armed and its arm par
excellence is death; to those who transgress it, it replies, at least at last
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Chapter 6: The absolutist state
resort, with that absolute menace. The law always refers to the sword. But
a power whose task is to take charge of life needs continuous regulatory
and corrective mechanisms. It is no longer a matter of bringing death
into play in the field of sovereignty but of bringing the living into play in
the domain of value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure,
appraise, and hierarchise, rather than display itself in its murderous
splendour…it effects distribution round the norm. I do not mean to say
that the law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice
tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a
norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into
a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative and so on) whose
functions are for the most part regulatory. A normalising society is the
historical outcome of a technology of power centred on life.
• What does Foucault mean by a ‘norm’?
• What are the implications for the new operation of the law as a norm that
Foucault talks about?
• Can you think of any examples of how contemporary societies are governed
through ‘norms’?
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Chapter 7: War, capitalism and the emergence of the modern state
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
• assess the impact of war and foreign relations on the development of
the modern state
• explain how and why specifically capitalist economic and social
relationships were involved in the development of state forms
• explain the historical relationship between capitalism, war and the
modern state
• describe competing interpretations of the historical processes involved
in the emergence of the modern state
• explain some of the similarities and differences between modern states
of different types.
Essential reading
Held, D ‘The Development of the Modern State’ in Hall, S., and B. Gieben
Formations of Modernity.
Further reading
KEY **= particularly recommended for this chapter.
Anderson, P. Lineages of the Absolutist State. (London: Verso, 1979)
[ISBN 9780805270259] Part I: Chapters 1 and 2 and Part III: Conclusion.
Bayly, C.A. The Birth of the Modern World: 1780–1914. (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2004) [ISBN 9780631236160].
Brown, V. ‘The Emergence of the Economy’ in Hall and Gieben (eds) Formations
of Modernity. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) [ISBN 9780745609607].
**Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity, 1985)
[ISBN 9780520060395] Chapters 5, 7 and 9.
Hobsbawn, E. The Age of Capital. (London: Abacus, 1988)
[ISBN 9781842120156].
** Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986) [ISBN 9780521313490] Chapters 3 and 15.
Poggi, G. The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction.
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978) [ISBN 9780804709590]
Chapter 5.
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144 Historical sociology
Works cited
Bayly, C.A. The Birth of the Modern World: 1780–1914. (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2004) [ISBN 9780631236160].
Brown, V. ‘The Emergence of the Economy’ in Hall and Gieben (eds) Formations
of Modernity. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) [ISBN 9780745609607].
Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985)
[ISBN 9780520060395].
Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986) [ISBN 9780521313490].
Poggi, G. The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction.
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978) [ISBN 9780804709590].
Tilly, C. Coercion, Capital, and the European State. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
[ISBN 9781557863683].
Winter, J.M. ‘Military Fitness and Civilian Health in Britain during the First
World War’ in Journal of Contemporary History, 15, 1980, pp. 211–44.
Activity
Before beginning this chapter, read from section 2.3 of the Held chapter to the end.
Introduction
This chapter follows on from the discussion of ‘absolutism’ in Chapter 6.
There we saw that absolutist systems significantly changed the ways that
states were organised. We also looked at competing interpretations of the
social, political and economic factors that led to the development of the
absolutist state in neo-Marxist and Foucauldian analyses of class, power and
‘bio-political’ processes. In this chapter we will consider several important
factors that contributed to the emergence of modern states. Remember, the
absolutist state has often been referred to as a ‘transitional’ state, that is, a
state form that bridges the gap between traditional and modern states. The
questions that we need to ask are how and why the modern state form itself
emerged as a consequence of the processes that produced absolutism. In
doing so, we will also consider the types of modern state that have emerged.
This chapter will look in particular at three specific areas that link the state
forms that emerged in the later eighteenth and the nineteenth century
(the ‘modern’ state) with other processes that sociologists identified as
giving shape to ‘modernity’. We will therefore look at the role that war and
capitalism have played in the development of modern state forms. We will,
however, bear in mind that it is not possible to locate a single factor at
work in the emergence of modern state forms, or modernity in general.
There is, as David Held argues, no mono-causal explanation for the way
that the modern state developed nor for the way it became the ‘supreme’
state form in the contemporary world. Remember, in Chapter 4 we saw
how Giddens argued that:
The social order…initiated by the advent of modernity is not just
an accentuation of previous trends of development. In a number
of specifiable and quite fundamental respects, it is something new.
We need to understand, therefore, how and why the factors involved in
the development of the modern world came together in the ways that they
did and created something that was new and unprecedented.
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Chapter 7: War, capitalism and the emergence of the modern state
Activity
In the Held chapter, read from the beginning of the last paragraph on page 85 (‘By the
end of the seventeenth century…’) down to the end of section 2.5 on page 87 and
answer the following questions:
• What is the ‘model of Westphalia’?
• Describe the system and how and why it came into being, in about 500 words.
David Held states that the model of ‘Westphalia’ existed from the mid-seventeenth
century until the mid-twentieth century. Look at each of the numbered points he uses to
describe the system. Go through them and think carefully about whether each of them
still describes the world that we live in today. If not, what has changed? How effective
have these changes been?
Activity
Now read section 3 (pp.90–103).
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Chapter 7: War, capitalism and the emergence of the modern state
The creation and maintenance of armies and navies created lasting state
structures. We often think of war as something that happens during
limited periods of time (the First World War lasted from 1914 to 1918,
for example). However, preparation for war and defence against attack
require permanent and strategic planning and of course permanent
expenditure with which to maintain and develop arms and armies. The
army (and of course the navy too) became a significant organisation
within the state and its construction and maintenance required permanent
organisations to fund it and administer it – treasuries, supply services,
mechanisms for conscription, tax bureaux and much more.
Mann argues that simply from an analysis of state finances, ‘the functions
of the state appear overwhelmingly military and overwhelmingly
geopolitical rather than economic or domestic’. For about 700 years
(and until very recently), somewhere between 70 and 90 per cent of the
financial resources of European states were spent on acquiring and using
military resources.
As Mann also argues, ‘for several centuries the state grew only fitfully
and small degrees, though each real growth was the result of war
developments’ (1986: 513). With the arrival of widespread and costly wars
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, states were forced to grow
much more quickly. Those that could do so survived; those that could not,
disappeared.
Equally important were the far-reaching changes in military technology
and organisation that began to occur from about the fifteenth century
onwards.
Giddens notes three important sets of military developments that
transformed the capacity of states to wage war and which also significantly
changed the nature of war itself. Firstly, a series of linked technological
changes in armaments, including the introduction of gunpowder, changed
the way that wars were fought on land:
The gun had some very profound consequences for the shaping
of modern civilisation because, in the shape of modern artillery,
it helped sharply reduce the significance of the castle and the
city as containers of military power.
(Giddens, 1986: 107)
Armies had to be much more mobile and had to engage one another
in open combat. This required better equipment and, perhaps more
importantly, better discipline and better strategic planning. In ‘traditional’
warfare, rulers and their defenders had retreated into heavily fortified
garrisons or walled cities. However, with the introduction of gunpowder
and heavy artillery, walled cities, castles and garrisons no longer provided
protection as their defences could now be easily demolished. A whole
new science of military logistics and strategy had to be developed as well
as new systems of finance and administration to create and maintain the
much larger armies required for open warfare.
The second major development was initiated by the need for greatly
increased administrative power in the armed forces. Armies became larger
and better equipped and they also developed new techniques of discipline.
As we have seen (in Chapter 6), in his book Discipline and Punish Michel
Foucault argues that different institutional techniques were developed over
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One of the most important of
these specifically related to the deployment of the military:
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Activity
Carefully read pp.90–98 in Held.
We can see that the growth of the state is directly linked to the necessity
of financing foreign wars. We have already seen that warfare was
significantly changed by technological innovations that made it more
expensive. The territorial ambitions of states outside Europe also played
a significant role as warfare became ‘global’ and was tied to the ability
to plan, communicate and coordinate the activities of armies and navies
over vast distances. The figures on state expenditure in Held show that the
development and maintenance of a coercive capability was central to the
development of the state: if states wished to survive, they had to fund this
capability for war-making and to ensure the continuing effectiveness of
their fund-raising capacities. We have already seen how the administrative
apparatuses of the absolutist states were significantly transformed,
strengthened and made more ‘impersonal’ and bureaucratic. This was
largely in response to the financial burden imposed by warfare.
State-making required the capacity to effectively manage and mobilise
societal resources. This capacity required forms of internal pacification
of opposition within the state (see Chapter 6), but it also required the
capacity to defeat external enemies. The most successful state-makers
were therefore the ones that were capable of mobilising capacities and
resources within states in order to wage war against their competitors. We
have already seen that some states turned increasingly to the ‘bio-political’
management of their populations and that these processes also led to new
ways of conceiving the state’s resources and new ways of managing and
exploiting them.
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Chapter 7: War, capitalism and the emergence of the modern state
As Held notes, competition among states was driven not just by the
ambitions of individual rulers but by ‘the very structure of the state
system’. We have seen that the state system was, in Giddens’ terms,
‘reflexively monitored’. One of the features of the system was an increasing
concern with security. Individual states had to be prepared for war (in
case they were attacked). This generated insecurity in other states, which
responded by building up their own military capacities. Systems of covert
surveillance using networks of spies monitored rival states’ readiness for
war. Through the use of such systems, states attempted to uncover military
secrets, technological advances in military hardware, or developments
in strategic thinking that might give their rivals the edge in any future
conflict. This led to a vicious circle in which states became mutually
suspicious of one another and therefore armed themselves against any
possible threat. This armament itself led to further insecurity in other
states. In short, states were now part of a system in which action by one
had consequences for all of the others. We can see this clearly in arms
races today.
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Chapter 7: War, capitalism and the emergence of the modern state
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However, the increased necessity to maintain, train and supply armies (even
during peacetime), the imposition of taxes and the management of debt
always multiplied the number of the state’s civilian servants. A
major war effort generally produced a permanent expansion of the state’s
central apparatus – the number of its full-time personnel, the scope of its
institutions and the scale of its debt. Some historians speak of a ‘ratchet
effect’ in terms of state budgets and apparatuses. What they mean by this is
that after major wars the state’s budget (which has inevitably been inflated
by the war) does not fall back to its pre-war levels. Tilly argues that this
is because ‘wartime increases in state power give officials a new capacity
to extract resources, take on new activities, and defend themselves against
cost-cutting; wars cause or reveal new problems that the state decides it
must attend to’ (1992: 89). For example, during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries in Britain the poor health and fitness of men
presenting themselves at army recruitment centres during one of the
colonial wars of the period was noted with alarm. This was felt to be a
serious problem that had developed due to poor housing and sanitation
and due to the bad diets of the populations in the new urban and industrial
cities. Part of the impetus for the state’s increased involvement in the day-to-
day health of the population came from just such ‘discoveries’ and they were
linked initially to general social fears about the decline of the health and
vitality of populations and therefore their fitness for battle and for war.
Activity
Read the following extract from an article in a journal of history about health, fitness and
war during the early twentieth century.
No observer of political debate in early twentieth-century Britain could have
failed to notice the frequency with which the theme of the relationship
between Imperial power and public health was discussed. In the aftermath
of the Boer War, there was an avalanche of speculation and gloomy
prognostication about the causes and likely outcome for the British nation
and Empire of the supposed physical deterioration of the British male
population. What exercised many politicians and military men was the fact
that between forty and sixty percent of the recruits for the British Army
were turned down as physically unfit for service…[A]n interdepartmental
committee was charged with the investigation of the allegations of a
decline in standards of fitness…The best example of the way in which
wartime discussions of public health were intimately related to the problem
of military preparedness is the debate over the results and significance of
the medical examinations of men conscripted for service in the British army
in 1916–1918. Some historians have stated that the report of the Ministry
of National Service Medical Boards’ inspection of the 2,500,000 men called
up in 1917–18 revealed accurately the poor state of health and physical
condition of the population. There is support for this view in a major speech
which Lloyd George [the British Prime Minister] delivered in Manchester
in September 1918. ‘We have done great things in this war’, Lloyd George
told his audience; but he went on…‘We could have accomplished greater
if this country had been in condition; and a war, like sickness, lays bare the
weakness of a constitution. What has been our weakness? Let us talk quite
frankly. We have had a Ministry of National Service and carefully compiled
statistics of the health of the people between the ages of 18 and 42. Now
that is the age of fitness, the age of strength. You have these grades I, II and
III, and all I can tell you is the results of these examinations are startling,
and I do not mind to use the word appalling. I hardly dare tell you the
results. The number of Grade II and Grade III men throughout the country is
prodigious…What does it mean? It means that we have used our human
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Chapter 7: War, capitalism and the emergence of the modern state
Empire
There will be much more discussion of the ways that Europe interacted
with the rest of the world in Chapter 8. However, it is worth noting here
that the early expansion of Europe into other parts of the world also had
profound consequences for the development of systems of governance
within European states.
Tilly argues that the connection between the state and overseas trade and,
later, empire building, ‘ran in both directions’ (1992: 94). What he means
by this is that capital-intensive states (typically, city states such as Venice
or the Dutch republic with highly developed commercial and trading
networks and markets) pursued interests overseas in pursuit of trading
monopolies, and they did not typically pursue military conquest or
colonisation. Coercion-intensive states, on the other hand, tended to
devote more energy to settlement and to the enslavement of indigenous
(and imported) populations as labour forces. They were also much more
concerned with the exaction of tribute from conquered territories and
peoples. ‘Mixed states’, which were both capital and coercive intensive,
such as Britain and France, combined both strategies.
The capitalist strategy added little overall size to the central state,
especially when it was conducted through private organisations such
as the Dutch or the British East India Companies (you can find useful
information about the British East India Company at
www.theeastindiacompany.com).1 However, both of these companies 1
Last accessed October
became political organisations in their own right as they expanded. 2011.
The British East India Company had its own fleet, its own army and
its own civil servants who administered the territories that it acquired.
Eventually the state absorbed the Company and ended up taking over its
responsibilities. 107
144 Historical sociology
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144 Historical sociology
Activity
Read the following extract from The Manifesto of the Communist Party by Marx and
Engels:
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.
To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet
of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established
national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They
are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and
death question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work
up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest
zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but
in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by
the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their
satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old
local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in
every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material,
so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual
nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-
mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous
national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.
What sort of assumptions do Marx and Engels make about the ways that capitalism will
develop? Do they imagine that this development will include a division of the world into
separate states? If not, why not?
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Chapter 7: War, capitalism and the emergence of the modern state
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144 Historical sociology
Activity
Read section 2.5 of Held (pp.87–90).
Held outlines a number of different state forms. Make a list of these and write down in
your own words the most important characteristics of each form.
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Chapter 7: War, capitalism and the emergence of the modern state
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144 Historical sociology
114
Chapter 8: The nation-state and nationalism
Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
• offer explanations of nationalism as a form of collective political
mobilisation and as a social identity
• explain how and why nationalism emerged as a form of social and
political identity in historical modernity
• explain the historical relationship between nationalism and the
nation-state
• describe competing interpretations of the social and historical processes
involved in the emergence of nationalism.
Essential reading
Smith, A.D. Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of
Nations and Nationalism. (London: Routledge, 1998) [ISBN 9780415063401]
Chapter 6. Note: this can be found at the back of this subject guide.
Further reading
KEY ** = particularly recommended for this chapter
**Anderson, B. Imagined Communities. (London: Verso, 2006) revised edition
[ISBN 9781844670864].
Billig, M. Banal Nationalism. (London: Sage, 1995) [ISBN 9780803975255].
Calhoun, C. Nationalism. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997)
[ISBN 9780816631216].
**Hearn, J. Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. (Houndsmills:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) [ISBN 9781403918987].
Hobsbawm, E. The Age of Revolution 1789–1848. (London: Abacus Books,
1988) [ISBN 9780844669922].
Hobsbawn, E. The Age of Capital. (London: Abacus, 1988)
[ISBN 9781842120156].
Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) second revised
edition [ISBN 9781405134422].
Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity, 1985)
[ISBN 9780520060395] Chapter 8.
Greenfeld, L. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2007) reprint edition [ISBN 9780674603196].
Hutchinson, J., and A.D. Smith (eds) Nationalism. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994) [ISBN 9780192892607].
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144 Historical sociology
Works cited
Anderson, B. Imagined Communities. (London: Verso, 2006) revised edition
[ISBN 9781844670864].
Calhoun, C. Nationalism. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997)
[ISBN 9780816631216].
Gellner, E. Nations and Nationalism. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) second revised
edition [ISBN 9781405134422].
Giddens, A. The Nation-State and Violence. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985)
[ISBN 9780520060395].
Greenfeld, L. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2007) reprint edition [ISBN 9780674603196].
Hearn, J. Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (Houndsmills: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006) [ISBN 9781403918987].
Smith, A.D. Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical survey of Recent Theories of
Nations and Nationalism. (London: Routledge, 1998) [ISBN 9780415063418].
Spillman, L., and R. Faeges ‘Nations’ in Adams, J., E.S. Clemens and A.S.
Orloff Remaking Modernity: Politics, History and Sociology. (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2005) [ISBN 9780822333630].
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Chapter 8: The nation-state and nationalism
Introduction
This chapter looks at a key phenomenon that has had an enormous impact
on the development of the modern world: nationalism. So far we have seen
that recognisably ‘modern’ states developed in Europe over the course of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We have seen how military and
economic factors contributed to the development of ‘modern’ state institutions
and systems of rule; in particular, we considered how the emergence of
modern state forms was related in complex ways to economic, military and
‘bio-political’ factors. In this chapter we will look at another important factor
that has been of major historical significance in the emergence of distinctively
‘modern’ states and which sociologists and historians have attempted to
explain in a number of different ways. This is nationalism.
As we noted in Chapter 4, in the contemporary world we tend to take the
idea of the nation (or the nation-state) as a ‘given’. The maps that we use
all give us an image of the world as divided into different ‘peoples’, each of
which has its own cultural identity and state. Spanish people live in Spain,
Thais in Thailand, Australians in Australia. We know, of course, that some
people live outside their native or ‘natural’ countries, either as immigrants
or refugees or just as ‘expatriates’, but these are commonly seen as unusual
or exceptional cases. Most of us, most of the time, live in our ‘native’
country. When we travel, we tend to refer to the prospect of return as
‘going home’. Importantly, this does not simply mean going back to family,
friends, or the immediate place or community in which we live. Rather, it
refers to the idea that the country of our birth itself is ‘home’; it is a place
with which we identify and to which we ‘feel’ instinctively that we belong.
This sense of belonging to a particular nation is very important to what
sociologists refer to as our ‘identity’. In this chapter we will explore ideas and
arguments about how and why this form of identification (most commonly
referred to as ‘nationalism’) has been such an important component of
‘modernity’. In doing so, we will also ask questions about the ways that
nationalism is linked to the emergence of the modern nation-state.
One of the most significant arguments that we will encounter in the chapter
is that nationalism is modern. By this we mean (in line with the meaning
of ‘modern’ that we have been using throughout this subject guide) that
it is not just recent; it is one of the definitive features of the ‘modern’ era.
During this period, nationalist ideas and political projects have become global
phenomena, accepted in almost all parts of the world. They are linked closely
to the practical power and administrative capacities of states. But nationalism
is not simply a political project. Indeed, it is crucial that we recognise that
despite its ‘modernity’, nationalism is (and has been) such a powerful force
because national identities and the ways that we talk and think about and
experience nationalism make it appear to people as though it were a natural
phenomena with a very long history, as if it was ancient rather than ‘modern’.
In this chapter we will be exploring how and why this is the case.
What is a nation?
According to Anthony Giddens, ‘the terms “nation-state”, “nation”’ and
“nationalism” are often, even characteristically, used in the literature of the
social sciences and history as if they were synonymous’. Giddens distinguishes
between these terms, arguing that a ‘nation’ is a ‘collectivity existing within a
clearly demarcated territory’ (Giddens, 1985: 116). Nations have a ‘unitary
administration’, which (as we have seen) is reflexively monitored both
by the internal state apparatus and by those of other states. The nation is
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a distinctive property of the modern state and without the political and
administrative apparatuses of the modern states, nations as we understand
them would not exist. The two are intimately connected and it is no surprise
that they emerged at approximately the same time.
According to Anthony Smith, theorists of nation-building argue that:
Nations are territorial political communities. They are sovereign,
limited, and cohesive communities of legally equal citizens. They
are ‘conjoined’ with ‘modern states’ to form ‘nation-states’.
Nations constitute the primary political bond and the chief loyalty of
their members. Other ties (gender, family, religion, class and so on) must
be subordinated to the overriding allegiance of the citizen to his or her
nation-state. This is desirable because it gives form and substance to ideals
of democratic civic participation.
Nations are the main political actors in the international arena. They are
the sole legitimating and coordinating principle of interstate relations and
activities.
Nations are the constructs of their citizens – notably their leaders
and elites. They are built up through a variety of processes and
institutions. Key to national success is the balanced and comprehensive
institutionalisation of roles, expectations and values and the creation of
an infrastructure of social communications: transport, education, media,
language, political parties and so on.
Nations are the only framework, vehicle and beneficiary of social and
political development, the only instrument for assuring the needs of all
citizens in the production and distribution of resources and the only means
of assuring sustainable development. This is because only national loyalty
and nationalist ideology can mobilise the masses for the commitment,
dedication and self-sacrifice required by modernisation with all its strains
and dislocations.
What is nationalism?
Defining nationalism is a particularly problematic task. There are many
definitions of nationalism and they tend to reflect profoundly different
assumptions about the nature of identity, communication, community,
forms of social solidarity and the state. In this section of the chapter we
will explore some of these definitions.
Activity
To begin with, here are two definitions of nationalism
Nationalism is the making of combined claims, on behalf of a population,
to identity, to jurisdiction and to territory.
(Hearn, 2006: 11)
Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination
of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively
its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the
right organisation of a society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that
humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by
certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only
legitimate type of government is national self-government.
(Kedourie, 1994: 1)
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Chapter 8: The nation-state and nationalism
Read both of these definitions carefully. Look up any words that you are unfamiliar with.
Think about what we have learned so far about the emergence of modern states and,
in particular (see the Held chapter in Formations of Modernity), about the ways that the
‘nation-state’ has emerged as the dominant state form in ‘modern’ times.
Now, again thinking carefully, can you distinguish which of these definitions is a rather
neutral description of a phenomenon and which has a strong point of view?
How do we know that one of these pieces has a point of view? What is it about the way
that the piece is written that lets us know about the writer’s attitude to the subject?
The sociologist Jonathan Hearn argues that behind the various definitions
of nationalism there are a key set of assumptions about what the
phenomenon actually is. It is important to explore these assumptions
as they provide a comprehensive list of the different ways in which
nationalism has been characterised by sociologists and historians.
• Nationalism is a feeling: those subscribing to this view regard
nationalism as a combination of ‘passions, emotions and sentiments’
(Hearn, 2006: 6). It is primarily concerned with ‘the subjective
experiences of those who consider themselves to be nationalists and
patterns of sympathy among those with similar feelings’ (6). In this
sense, this is ultimately an irrational or at least a non-rational
phenomenon based on a purely emotional and subjective experience.
The emotional (and often irrational) aspects of nationalism can be
regularly witnessed at national sporting events.
• Nationalism is an identity: those holding this view tend to regard
the possession of an ‘identity’ as a fundamental human ‘need’. So,
whilst the actual content of identities can be regarded as the product
of contingent social and historical circumstances, the ‘need to anchor
oneself in relation to others’ is a necessity.
• Nationalism is an ideology: that is, it is an organised system of
beliefs about the world. Nationalist ideology tends to see the world as
‘naturally’ divided into separate ‘nations’, each of which has a ‘natural’
right to self-determination (that is, to pursue political independence
or autonomy). This ideology ‘can seize the minds of key thinkers’ and
from them spread to entire populations, where it becomes a source of
collective action and political mobilisation.
• Nationalism is a social movement: according to this view all
of the previous definitions or assumptions are too vague. In other
words, nationalist feelings, identities or ideas can only be seen (both
historically and in the present) in actual practices that members of
societies engage in. Therefore the only way to actually understand
nationalism is through the study of social action (for example the
social, political or cultural movements that people form and/or
participate in).
• Nationalism is a historical process: in this view, nationalism is
regarded as a ‘word historical trend’. Whilst the origins of nationalism
can be traced to Europe and (broadly) be linked to the emergence of
‘modern’ states (see the previous chapters of this subject guide), it has
now spread to the rest of the world. Nationalist social identities, social
movements and ideologies are closely linked with historical modernity.
Modern nationalism, these approaches argue, was first established
in Europe (and the Americas). This provided a model which was
subsequently adopted across the world, especially in the post-colonial
context of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa.
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144 Historical sociology
Activity
When you think about nationalism, what comes to mind? Write down ways in which you
have experienced nationalism yourself as:
• An identity (think about how you describe yourself to others, or about how you
feel in relation to your nationality).
• An ideology (are there any ‘official’ ways in which your nation is talked about and
described? How does it represent itself, its place in the world, its ‘mission’ and so
forth).
• A social movement (are there any movements in your society that are based
on nationalist ideas? These can be official movements supportive of national
governments or breakaway movements of people attempting to set up their own
nation).
• A historical process (when did your nation come into being? How does it
represent its history?).
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Chapter 8: The nation-state and nationalism
We can see therefore that the question of history is very important to the
way that we think about nations and nationalism. The first of the positions
outlined above stresses the ‘continuities’ that exist between modern
nation-states and their ‘origins’ in much older (but continuously existing)
groups. Identity (between past and present) and an emotional connection
between members of the present (national) group and its past are stressed.
In the second position, the apparent ‘history’ of nations is itself produced
by nationalist discourses and ideologies and these are seen as part of
the same specifically ‘modern’ processes that formed modern states and
economies. In this sense it follows a more ‘discontinuist’ approach to
history1 by stressing its modernity. 1
For a reminder of
this see Chapter 4
and the discussion
A brief history of nationalism about discontinuity
and continuity in
Whether nations are ancient or modern phenomena, nationalism is approaches to the past.
usually thought of as having a specific history that begins in about the Remember, discontinuist
fourteenth century CE in Europe. The emergence of nationalism is usually approaches stress
attributed to two processes. First, the Renaissance (see Chapter 2) which the radical difference
occurred in Europe in the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries provided between the social
formations instituted
an intellectual and cultural framework within which nationalist ideas
with modernity and pre-
developed. As we have seen, during the Renaissance there was a revival modern formations.
of classical (Greek and Roman) learning. In particular, there was a turn
towards forms of ‘humanist’ thought which stressed the importance of
human affairs, both cultural and political. Greek and Roman ideas about
republican or democratic forms of government were translated and
discussed in relation to a contemporary context. These ideas informed
new ways of thinking about the organisation of political institutions and
emergent states.
Secondly, there was the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century,
in which certain regions of Europe saw a widespread break with the
previously all-powerful Catholic Church. During the Reformation literacy
expanded as the bible was translated into vernacular languages (the
official language of the Catholic Church was Latin, the language of the
old Roman Empire, and very few people could actually understand it).
National churches were also founded and, as in the case of the Church of
England, founded by the monarch Henry VIII in the sixteenth century, the
national ruler replaced the Pope as the head of the Church. Importantly,
the Reformation also promoted the idea of a horizontal community
of individuals each having a direct relationship with God. By contrast,
Catholicism, which as you will remember had dominated European
societies throughout the medieval period, was entirely hierarchical.
The more horizontal Protestant communities that emerged out of the
Reformation also helped to establish the ‘ideological groundwork for
the idea of a mass society of equals’, as too did revived ideas of ‘chosen
peoples’ (‘nations’ or ‘peoples’ chosen by God) (Hearn, 2006: 14).
In the hundred or so years following the Reformation there were a series
of devastating wars between Catholic and Protestant forces. The most
widespread and the longest-lasting of these, the Thirty Years War of 1618
to 1648, ended with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. As we have seen
(Chapter 7), the Treaty of Westphalia is usually seen as marking the point
at which a distinctive ‘state system’ emerged in Europe. Although these
may not have been nation-states in the ways that we understand that term,
the important factor here was that the Treaty formalised a system that
recognised relations between fully independent and autonomous states as
legitimate and state sovereignty as paramount.
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144 Historical sociology
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Chapter 8: The nation-state and nationalism
Activity
What is a ‘national interest’? How is this different from a ‘class’ or other form of group
interest? Who decides what the ‘national interest’ is? Are ‘national interests’ always
genuinely in the interest of all of the people? If not, why not?
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Approaches to nationalism
In the remainder of this chapter, we will explore sociological approaches
to nationalism, and in particular we will focus (through the essential 2
Something which
reading) on approaches that stress the ‘modernity’ of nations and is described as
nationalism. Anthony Smith labels these theories ‘modernist’ and he ‘perennial’ is thought
contrasts them with what he describes as ‘perennialist’2 theories. This to be ‘everlasting or
perpetual’.
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Chapter 8: The nation-state and nationalism
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144 Historical sociology
Activity
Now read the chapter by Anthony Smith, ‘Invention and Imagination’.
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Chapter 8: The nation-state and nationalism
Activity
Think about your own country. What comes to mind when you think about a ‘national
culture’? How does your country advertise itself as a tourist destination? What sort of
souvenirs do tourists take home from your country when they visit? How representative
are these things?
Perennialism Modernism
Cultural community Political community
Ancient Modern
Rooted Created
Organic Mechanical
Unified Divided
Popular Elite construct
Ancestrally-based Communication-based
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144 Historical sociology
For the modernists, nations are wholly modern. They are one of the
products of the revolutionary changes that have formed the modern world
and are not therefore deeply rooted in history. More importantly, nations
and nationalism are ‘social constructs and cultural creations of modernity’.
They are ‘designed for an age of revolutions and mass mobilisation, and
central to the attempts to control these processes of rapid social change’
(1998: 23).
We have looked at the two approaches to the question of nationalism
and national identity that Smith outlines. As we have seen, the first of
these assumes that nations have always existed, the second is related to
the process of modern state-building and the principal argument in this
approach is that nations are largely ‘constructed’ by elites in the service of
their interests.
One of the key factors in the process of ‘nation-building’ is the capacity to
mobilise populations through the use of nationalism. In the next section,
we will look at how different arguments and ideas about nationalism,
what it is and how it works, have been presented. In particular we will
focus on the idea that nations are ‘invented’ or ‘constructed’ and that
nationalism plays a crucial role in this process.
Activity
Re-read pages 117–121 of the chapter by Smith.
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Chapter 8: The nation-state and nationalism
Activity
What do you understand by the term ‘invented tradition’? Explain in your own words
what Hobsbawm means by this. Write about 350 words.
Activity
Re-read from the top of page 121 (beginning with the section headed ‘Two stages of
nationalism’) to mid way down page 131 (to the section headed ‘Imagining the nation’).
130
Chapter 8: The nation-state and nationalism
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144 Historical sociology
Activity
What do you think Hobsbawm means by nationalism being a ‘politics of fear’? Does all
nationalism in the contemporary world involve a fear and hatred of ‘others’?
In the sections of the chapter that we have read so far, Smith has outlined
Hobsbawm’s arguments about the modernity of nations and nationalism,
about the ‘invention of tradition’, and about the ‘backward-looking’ nature
of the ethnic nationalisms that have re-emerged in the contemporary
world. Smith now moves on (beginning with the section ‘Ethnic and
civic nationalisms’ on page 125) to discuss the arguments and ideas that
Hobsbawm has proposed.
Activity
Read from the beginning of the section ‘Ethnic and civic nationalisms’ at the top of page
125 down to the middle of page 131.
Think carefully about what Smith is saying about Hobsbawm’s arguments about the
‘modernity’ of nations and nationalism. Use the questions below to help you through the
reading:
• In what way was the French Revolution (page 126) a ‘nationalist’ revolution?
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Chapter 8: The nation-state and nationalism
• How important were these nationalist ideas outside of France itself? In what way
does this complicate Hobsbawm’s account of nationalism?
• Which important ‘functions and dimensions of nationalism’ (page 126) does
Smith claim that Hobsbawm has omitted from his account?
• Why does Smith claim (126/127) that it is not possible to distinguish so easily
between the two types of nationalism (civic and ethnic) that Hobsbawm outlines?
What evidence does he give for his assertion?
In the section headed ‘Proto-national bonds’ Smith makes a number of very important
points about the role of the ‘masses’ and the ‘elites’ in the formation of national
consciousness and of nations. Smith argues that the elite modernist or constructionist
argument ignores crucial factors.
• What does Smith mean when he claims that Hobsbawm ‘can accord no role for
the masses…they are passive, acted upon’?
• What evidence does Smith use to show that ‘popular’ ideas were important in
building nations?
• Do you find Smith’s argument convincing?
• What does Smith mean (page 128) when he argues that the most serious
implication of Hobsbawm’s argument about the ‘passivity of the masses’ has its
‘counterpart in the manipulation of the elites’? What implication does this have?
• What does ‘social engineering’ mean in this context?
• Why does Smith think that Hobsbawm’s account is wrong?
• What evidence does he give for this?
• On what basis does Smith claim that ‘ethnicity is such a powerful force in the
modern world, and why so many nations are, or seek to be formed on the basis of
a dominant ethnie’?
• According to Smith, why is Hobsbawm ‘unable to give a convincing account of
the involvement of “the masses” in nation and nationalism’?
Now re-read the section ‘The nation as construct?’ from the top of page 129 down to the
middle of page 131.
• What are Smith’s main objections to the argument that nations are ‘social
constructions’?
• Why does he argue that ‘Hobsbawm provides no clue as to why nationalism has
been so successful’?
• What does Smith mean (page 129) by ‘the complex interweaving of relationships
between old and new cultural traditions’?
• Why does he think that this ‘complex interweaving’ undermines Hobsbawm’s
argument about the relationship between elites and masses and about invented
traditions’?
• What does Smith mean when he argues (page 130) that ‘to see nations as
composed largely of “invented traditions” designed to organise and channel the
energies of the masses, places too much weight on artifice and assigns too large
a role to the fabricators’?
• How does Smith argue against this proposition?
• Do you find these arguments convincing?
• What does Smith mean when he claims that he is arguing against ‘social
constructionism and invention’ as valid categories?
• Why does he think that these are not valid categories? What reasons does he give
for this?
• What evidence does he use to support his argument?
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144 Historical sociology
Imagined communities
Activity
Now read from the section ‘Imagining the nation’ on page 131 to the end of the chapter
on page 142.
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Chapter 8: The nation-state and nationalism
Activity
Re-read from page 135 through to the end of Smith’s chapter.
Once you have read through to the end of the chapter write about 500 words (or more)
in answer to this question:
• What is the relationship between the development of ‘print capitalism’ and
nationalism?
Use the questions below to help you to make sense of what Smith is saying:
• Anderson claims that new ‘national’ communities became ‘imaginable’ because
of:
…a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of
production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of
communications (print) and the fatality of human linguistic diversity…
• What does Anderson mean by this? Can you trace the steps of his argument that
Smith outlines on pages 135–136?
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Learning outcomes
By the end of this chapter, and having completed the Essential reading and
activities, you should be able to:
• describe differing accounts of European expansion
• explain how and why this expansion took place when it did and what
its consequences were
• demonstrate an understanding of the operation of the ‘discourses’ that
shaped European and Western encounters with others
• explain how and why the European powers were able to divide large
parts of the world between themselves in the late nineteenth century
• describe competing theories of imperialism.
Essential reading
Hall, S. ‘The West and the Rest’ Chapter 6 in Hall, S., and B. Gieben, (eds)
Formations of Modernity.
Hobsbawm, E. The Age of Empire 1875–1914 (New York: Vintage Books, 1989)
[ISBN 9780679721758]. Chapter 3. Note: this can be found at the back of
this subject guide.
Further reading
KEY **= particularly recommended for this chapter.
Bartlett, R. The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change
950–1350. (London: Penguin Books, 1993) [ISBN 9780140154092].
Biel, R. The New Imperialism: Crisis and Contradictions in North/South Relations.
(London: Zed Books, 2000) [ISBN 9781856497473].
Brewer, A. Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey. (London:
Routledge, 1990) [ISBN 9780415044691].
Burke, P. History and Social Theory. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005) second
edition [ISBN 9780801472855] Chapter 6.
Calhoun, C. Nationalism. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997)
[ISBN 9780816631216] Chapter 6.
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144 Historical sociology
Fanon, F. The Wretched of the Earth. (London: Grove, 2005) reprint edition
[ISBN 9780802141323].
Hardt, M., and A. Negri Empire. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2000) [ISBN 9780674006713].
Harvey, D. The New Imperialism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
[ISBN 9780199278084].
Hobsbawn, E. The Age of Capital. (London: Abacus, 1988)
[ISBN 9781842120156].
Hobson, J.A. Imperialism: A Study. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988 [1905])
[ISBN 9781596059481].
Hoogvelt, A.M.M. Globalisation and the Postcolonial World: The New Political
Economy of Development. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997)
[ISBN 9780333461068].
Kiernan, V.G. America, the New Imperialism: From White Settlement to World
Hegemony. (London: Verso, 2005) [ISBN 9781844675227].
Mann, M. The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993) [ISBN 9780521445856]. Pages 578–583.
Mann, M. Incoherent Empire. (London: Verso, 2005) [ISBN 9781844675289].
Mommsen W.J. Theories of Imperialism. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1981) [ISBN 9780226533964].
Said, E. Culture and Imperialism. (New York: Vintage, 1994)
[ISBN 9780679750543].
** Said, E. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. (London: Penguin
Books, 2003) twenty-fifth anniversary edition [ISBN 9780141187426]
Tonkiss, F. Contemporary Economic Sociology. (London: Routledge, 2006)
[ISBN 9780415300940] Chapter 1.
Wolf, E. Europe and the People Without History. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1997) second edition [ISBN 9780520048980].
Works cited
Bartlett, R. The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change
950–1350. (London: Penguin Books, 1993) [ISBN 9780140154092].
Brewer, A. Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey. (London:
Routledge, 1990) [ISBN 9780415044691].
Burke, P. History and Social Theory. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005)
second edition [ISBN 9780801472855] Chapter 6.
Harvey, D. The New Imperialism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
[ISBN 9780199278084].
Marx and Engels ‘The Communist Manifesto’ in D. McLellan (ed.)
Karl Marx: Selected Writings. (Oxford: OUP, 1977 [1848]).
Said, E. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. (London: Penguin
Books, 2003) twenty-fifth anniversary edition [ISBN 9780141187426]
Tonkiss, F. Contemporary Economic Sociology. (London: Routledge, 2006)
[ISBN 9780415300940] Chapter 1.
Wallerstein, I ‘Culture as the ideological battleground of the world system’ in
Featherstone, M. (ed.) Global Culture. (London: Sage, 1990)
[ISBN 9780803983229].
Introduction
So far in this course we have looked at the different factors that gave
rise to key aspects of the modern world. In particular, we have looked
at the emergence of modern states and, in Chapter 8, at the emergence
of nationalism. In this chapter we will look at the expansion of Europe
into the rest of the world. In particular, we will focus on how and why
European expansion occurred and at its consequences. The focus here will
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be on ‘the age of empire’ in the later nineteenth and the early twentieth
centuries. The chapter will look at some of the important sociological
theories of imperialism that have sought to explain and assess the reasons
for European expansion and its impact. In doing so we will assess some
of the ways that sociologists and historians of European expansion and of
imperialism have attempted to explain the apparent dynamism of Europe
during this period in contrast to other parts of the world.
This idea of European (or, more generally, ‘Western’) dominance over the
past 500 or 600 years has been something that sociologists and historians
have puzzled over. Why did Europe gain such predominance economically
and militarily? We have already seen that the reasons for the emergence of
the modern state form were complex and involved a combination of many
different factors working together. Problems faced by attempts to explain
the emergence of ‘Western’ dominance have included both the tendency
toward teleological forms of explanation and the ‘Eurocentrism’ of
these accounts (see Chapter 2). In other words, when sociologists and
historians have attempted to explain Western dominance, they have done
so in terms that assumed that this was inevitable and that have assumed
the superiority of Western culture and of Western institutions. The story
has also been told very much from a ‘Western’ perspective, with the rest of
the world being seen as something that Europeans ‘discovered’, ‘developed’
or ‘modernised’.
The second aim of this chapter, therefore, is to look at the way in which
ideas about ‘the West’ and Western ‘modernity’ were formed in relation
to European encounters with the ‘rest’ of the world. We will explore the
importance of these ideas for colonial and imperial projects, but also for
the development of the social sciences themselves with their teleological
and Eurocentric perspectives that have tended to ‘naturalise’ European
predominance. The approach taken by Hall in the chapter ‘The West and
the Rest’ will also be explained and examined. This is a good example of
a rather different type of historical approach from the ones that we have
encountered so far on the course.
This is an approach that has been much influenced by theoretical
developments in the social and human sciences over the last 30 years
which are often referred to as ‘post-structuralist’ or ‘post-modernist’. The
emphasis in these accounts is on ‘destabilising’ and ‘decentring’ accepted
categories and ideas. In particular, these approaches have insisted on
the socially and culturally ‘constructed’ nature of social categories (such
as nation, class and so on) and they have thus ‘destabilised’ notions of
fixity and of ‘essence’ (the idea that phenomena have an unchanging core
essence). These approaches have simultaneously thrown into question
established ‘grand narratives’ (accepted ways of ordering and of relating
events) about social and historical phenomena. One such ‘grand narrative’
(perhaps the ‘grandest’ narrative of all) is that of the ‘rise of the West’.
Such a narrative is ‘centred’ on the dominant role of Europe in world
affairs since the sixteenth century and of its inevitable rise to dominance
based on factors entirely internal to Europe itself (its special dynamism
in comparison with the ‘stagnation’ of other areas, for example).
Attempts have therefore been made to ‘decentre’ this ‘grand narrative’ by
emphasising the role of other cultures, of cultural interaction and of the
‘constructed’ nature of ideas of Western superiority. Europe and the West
thus lose their central place in the narrative (they are ‘decentred’) and
they are made relative to other processes (Burke, 2005: 181).
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Hall argues that ‘“the West” is as much an idea as a fact of geography’ and
that it is ‘a historical, not a geographic construct’. He goes on to argue that
the by ‘Western’ he is referring to ‘developed, industrialised, urbanised,
capitalist, secular’ societies. Such societies exist in all parts of the world
(hence ‘the West’ cannot be confined to a particular geographic space).
Rather, Hall claims, the meaning of the term ‘the West’ is now ‘virtually
identical to that of the word “modern”’. The basis of Hall’s argument in
this chapter is that ‘the West’ functions as an idea or a concept against
which we measure other societies, different ‘stages’ of development and
other value systems.
According to Hall, this idea or concept of ‘the West’ functions in a number
of different ways.
Firstly, it has a classificatory function: if we describe something as
‘Western’ or as ‘non-Western’, this immediately classifies it in a particular
way. Such classifications allow us to see the world in particular ways – as
divided into different categories. As we will see, this division is seldom
neutral and classification usually implies a hierarchy in which one thing
is ‘better’ than another. In the example of ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’,
there is an implicit assumption that ‘Western’ is more ‘developed’ and more
‘advanced’.
Secondly, it functions as an ‘image, or set of images’. Specific ideas,
associations and even visual images come to mind when we talk about
‘the West’. It is part of what Hall describes as a ‘system of representation’.
This means that any representation, any image or idea, only has meaning
when it is related to another image or idea. So, for example, ‘West’
is automatically associated with specific characteristics (‘urban’ and
‘developed’ for example). However, these associations are meaningful
in the way that they are only because they are also contrasted with what
are assumed to be their opposite. Thus ‘non-Western’ is automatically
associated with, for example, the ‘rural’ and the ‘under-developed’.
Thirdly, it functions in such a way as to explain difference because it
becomes a standard against which we compare other societies (are they
‘Western’ or ‘non-Western’? is this society more or less ‘Western’ than this
one? and so on).
Finally, as we have said, none of these comparisons is neutral. ‘The West’
is an idea that in its own terms is always associated with positive (and
supposedly desirable) notions of ‘development’, ‘modernity’ and ‘freedom’.
‘Non-Western’, on the other hand, tends (mostly) to have far less positive
connotations, and very often negative ones. Therefore, Hall argues, we
can say that the idea or concept of ‘the West’ functions as an ideology. In
other words, it structures the way that we think about the world, and what
we believe that we ‘know’ about the world.
However, an ideology is not simply a set of ideas about something. It is
‘productive’ (it makes things happen) and it has ‘real effects’. Hall argues
that specifically ‘modern’ societies (which originated, geographically, in the
west of Europe from about the sixteenth century onwards) were produced
by a number of factors working together at a particular point in history.
The idea of ‘the West’ (or of ‘modernity’) as something that is distinctive
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This should give you a clearer idea about the basis for the argument in
the set reading. Hall argues that the ‘idea’ of ‘the West’ and its relationship
to what he calls ‘the Rest’ (the rest of the world, in other words) is an
important factor in determining both the West’s own ‘identity’ and the
way that this means that it deals with other societies and civilisations that
it encounters. Hall calls this relationship the discourse of the West and
the Rest and he argues that this has been fundamental to the way that
the West came to speak of and represent other cultures. In this sense we
can see that one of the historical processes that has shaped the ways that
Western societies operate in relation to others is through this discourse.
We will explore how this emerged and how it works in practice in the next
section. We will also look in more detail at what Hall means by ‘discourse’.
European expansion
Activity
Read Section 2 of the chapter by Hall (pages 280–91).
There have been many theories that have attempted to explain the sudden
and dynamic ‘expansion’ of European conquest and colonisation that began
in the fifteenth century and culminated in the latter part of the nineteenth
century in what Hobsbawm refers to as ‘the age of Empire’. By this point
a handful of European states could claim to rule almost all of Africa, the
Caribbean, large parts of Asia, Australasia, North and South America.
Hall argues that it is never possible to know precisely when a particular
historical process might have begun. However, it is possible broadly to
claim that the period of European expansion began with the end of the
medieval period (see Chapter 4). Hall argues that there were five main
phases of European expansion.
Activity
Look at the maps on pages 284 and 285 and read the accompanying text. This will help
you to get a sense of the global scale of the European explorations and colonial ventures.
The first of these came at the close of the medieval period. Voyages
of exploration and ‘discovery’ (largely from Spain and Portugal) were
launched. Probably the most famous of these was that of Christopher
Columbus to what Europeans came to regard as the ‘New World’ of the
Americas during the period 1492–1502. Prior to this, Portuguese traders
and explorers had begun to make extensive voyages down the western
coast of Africa, rounding the Cape of Good Hope, crossing the Indian
Ocean and reaching India in 1498.
Activity
Read pages 282 and 283 carefully.
There are a number of important historical reasons why these voyages took place and
why they did so at this time in history. However, there is no simple or single explanation
for precisely why they happened when they did. Prior to this, Europeans had not ventured
so far by sea. Hall outlines a number of what he calls ‘complex factors – economic,
political and spiritual’ for the voyages.
Use the following questions to help you think about these factors:
• What were the Portuguese explorers looking for? Why?
• In what ways were the reasons for these voyages economic?
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Activity
One argument that attempts to explain the relative ease with which Europeans took to
the business of overseas conquest and colonisation is provided by the historian Robert
Bartlett. Bartlett argues that from the tenth century onwards, ‘Latin’ (that is, Western
European Catholic) Christian societies had been engaged in a protracted period of
expansion through conquest and colonisation within what is now regarded as Europe.
In Eastern Europe, pagan tribes were conquered and their lands settled. In the Iberian
peninsular (what is now Spain and Portugal), the Muslim caliphates which had been
established there were gradually pushed back and a similar process of colonisation of
the conquered land was undertaken. This process of conquest was undertaken from
what was a culturally homogenous core of territories in the West of Europe. It involved
the colonisation and domination of territories that were on the ‘periphery’ of this ‘core’.
Bartlett argues that this ‘fringe’ zone ‘was characterised by a mixture, and often a conflict
between, languages, cultures, and sometimes religions’ as the colonisers dominated the
‘native’ populations. He goes on to argue that out of this experience of conquest and
domination ‘the mental habits of European racism and colonialism were born’ (Bartlett,
1993: 313)
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‘Imperialism’
One of the consequences of increasing rivalry between the newly
centralised states of Europe was an intensification of the rivalry for
overseas territories. This led to a fourth phase of expansion. Later in this
chapter we will explore in more detail how the capitalist nation-states
(see Chapters 7 and 8) of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
increasingly fought one another for control of overseas territory, colonies,
raw materials and markets. States became more aggressively ‘imperial’
in their ambitions and ‘private’ trading organisations such as the Dutch
and the English East India companies were taken over directly by the
state (see Tilly, 1992: 95) and the territories that they had administered
became ‘imperial’ possessions (particularly in British India). This phase of
European expansion lasted up to and beyond the Second World War in the
middle of the twentieth century.
Activity
In section 2.4 ‘Breaking the frame’, Hall outlines a number of reasons for the sudden
expansion of Europe. These are political, economic and cultural.
What were the key ‘physical barriers’ that Hall outlines? What important factors
contributed to the breaking down of these barriers?
What were the key ‘barriers in the mind’ that Hall notes? Why do you think that these
mental barriers were also important?
Activity
Now read the extract from Michael Mann’s article ‘European development: approaching a
historical explanation’. This is Reading A on page 321.
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Activity
Try and write about 200 words in answer to each of the following questions:
• What does Mann mean when he argues that the ‘essence of medieval culture’
was its restlessness?
• What does Mann mean when he argues that this restlessness might have led not
to ‘social development’ but to ‘anarchy’ or ‘anomie’?
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Activity
Read to the end of the Mann article.
Mann argues (page 324) that ‘the most powerful and extensive sense of social identity
was Christian, though this was both a unifying transcendent identity and an identity
divided by the overlapping barriers of class and literacy’.
What do you think Mann means by this? In order to answer this question, read carefully
from the paragraph in the middle of page 323 that begins ‘Let us try a little hypothetical
reconstruction…’ to the end of the article on page 325.
Mann also states that ‘European development was a possible consequence of [the]
creative interchange’ of the Mediterranean lands and those of north-western Europe.
What do you think he means by this?
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Activity
Now read the extract from the book The Triumph of the West by John Roberts on pages
325–28.
Activity
In the first three paragraphs of the Roberts extract (pages 325 and 326), he discusses the
‘new view’ that Europeans began to have of themselves in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. According to Roberts, this significant change can be noted in the way that maps
depict Europe. Read these three paragraphs.
Roberts argues that maps are ‘always more than mere factual statements’ and that they
are ‘translations of reality into forms we can master’.
Roberts goes on to suggest that ‘the world is not only what exists “out there”; it is
also the picture we have of it in our minds which enables us to take a grip on material
actuality.’
Try and describe in your own words exactly what Roberts means by this. Use the examples
that Roberts gives of the relationship between maps and the ideas that Europeans had of
themselves in order to illustrate your answer. Can you see any connections here between
the processes that Roberts is describing and Hall’s arguments about the role of the ‘idea’
of Europe?
Write about 400 words.
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Activity
Roberts uses two examples to illustrate his arguments about this growing sense of self-
consciousness and superiority. The first is short quotation from a seventeenth-century
English writer, the second a discussion of Bossuet’s Discourse on Universal History, also
from the seventeenth century.
What do these writers say about the relationship between Europe and Christianity? How
are other cultures and civilisations regarded by these writers?
Write some notes in answer to these questions summarising Roberts’ arguments.
Finally, Roberts claims that the word ‘Eurocentrism’, which means the
placing of Europe at the centre of the world, is an accurate description
of much of the history of the last 500 years. Europe, and then more
generally ‘the West’, has indeed been at the centre of modern history as
conquest and colonisation moved outward from there and, more recently,
economic and political power and influence have been centred there.
However, Roberts argues that ‘Eurocentrism’ is not simply the factual
acknowledgement of European and Western power and influence. It also
usually refers to the fact that both Europe and ‘the West’ more generally
have tended to think of themselves as ‘qualitatively superior’, which means
that they have thought of themselves as possessing qualities that are
inherently superior to those possessed by other civilisations and cultures.
Activity
Now read section 3 of Hall’s chapter, from page 291 to the end of page 295.
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Activity
On pages 291–92 Hall provides a definition of ‘discourse’. This concept has become
increasingly important in social scientific thought. It is worth looking carefully at Hall’s
definition, which he bases on the work of the historian and social theorist Michel Foucault
(see Chapter 6).
Read these pages carefully and use the following questions to help you get a clear sense
of Hall’s argument:
• In paragraph one of section 3.1 how does Hall describe a discourse?
• What is a ‘discursive formation’? (paragraph two)
• In what way is the idea of discourse not based on ‘the distinction between
thought and language’?
Now read sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 carefully (pages 292–95). You should, in particular,
look carefully at the summary (section 3.4). Do you understand the points that Hall makes
here? If not, read over the preceding sections again and see if they begin to make more
sense. We will look now at the examples that Hall uses of the discourse of ‘the West and
the Rest’ in practice. This should help you to see how discourses work both as forms of
representation, ways of organising knowledge and as practices (remember, discourses
make things happen!).
Now read section 4.1 of Hall’s chapter (page 296) and Reading C (‘”Orientalism”:
Representing the Other’).
One highly influential book that illustrates very well the concept of
‘discourse’ is the Palestinian academic Edward Said’s Orientalism:
Western Conceptions of the Orient. In this book Said examines a particular
‘discourse’ which he refers to as ‘Orientalism’. Said argues that the way
that Europeans think about, write about and represent the Orient (by
which he means what we would now usually think of as the Middle East)
is governed by a particular kind of discourse.
Said argues that ‘Orientalism’ as a discourse is ‘never far from…the idea
of Europe.’ We have already seen that the idea of Europe involved the
construction of a particular notion of European identity that regarded it
as superior in comparison with ‘non-European peoples and cultures’. He
goes on to argue that the discourse of Orientalism ‘depends for its strategy’
on ‘a positional superiority’ that always maintained Western ‘superiority’.
Remember, we have seen that discourses are not simply passive or neutral
forms of representation; they make things happen (hence the reference to
‘strategy’).
Said argues that this automatic position of superiority was achieved by
the production of a particular kind of ‘intellectual power’. This involved
the construction of various ‘knowledges’ (or ‘discourses’) of the Orient
that were ‘suitable for study in academy, for display in the museum,
for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in
anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about
mankind and the universe, for instances of economic and sociological
theories of development, revolution, cultural personality, national or
religious character.’ This is an important point. If you think back to
the beginning of the course, we saw in Chapter 2 that conceptions of
‘modernity’ have usually involved the assumption of the superiority
of ‘modern’, ‘advanced’ societies. This was achieved by the ‘positioning’
of other parts of the world (and societies of the past) as less advanced
(remember the passage we looked from Hegel’s Philosophy of History on
Africa).
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Activity
Read section 4 (pages 296–308).
Here, Hall uses Said’s ideas about the ‘discourse’ of Orientalism and applies them to
another context: the European encounter with the Americas in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries.
Answer the following questions. Try and write short and concise answers that sum up the
key argument in response to each question.
• What does Hall mean by the ‘archive’? What was this ‘archive’ composed of?
(Section 4.2)
• What does Hall mean by a ‘regime of truth’? (Section 4.3)
• What is idealisation? (Section 4.4)
• What is the role of ‘sexual fantasy’ in the discourse of ‘the West and the Rest’?
(Section 4.5)
Look closely at the engraving by van der Straet on page 303. Answer the questions set by
Hall in Activity 4 on page 302.
• In what ways did Europeans ‘misrecognise’ the different cultures and civilisations
that they encountered in the Americas? (Section 4.6)
• What does Hall mean when he argues that the New World was seen as both
‘paradise’ and also as a ‘barbaric’ place? (Section 4.7)
• What is a ‘stereotype’? In what way was ‘splitting’ a feature of the discourse of
‘the West and the Rest’? (Section 4.8)
Activity part 2
Now read section 5 (pages 309–16).
Here Hall discusses the enduring legacy and continued operation of the discourse of ‘the
West and the Rest’ in contemporary social science.
Summarise Hall’s argument in about 500 of your own words.
the social sciences. In this case, it allows us to think about the ways that
particular forms of social and cultural superiority were constructed over
time using a number of different resources. It demonstrates how these
ideas had direct and profound impacts on how ‘the West’ has acted.
Remember, Hall argues that discourses (or ‘discursive practices’) are not
merely forms of ‘representation’ or descriptions of an ‘empirical’ world;
they organise knowledge into specific fields and determine how we act in
relation to that knowledge. In this sense, the idea of ‘discourse’ presents
an interesting problem for historical sociologists. If we think about the
ways that knowledge is organised discursively, we can see that all
claims to the truthfulness of particular knowledges can automatically
be discounted. For example, we have seen that the discourse of ‘the West
and the Rest’ is based on a number of claims that it represents a form of
universal knowledge about the direction of historical development and
about relative levels of ‘development’ (amongst other things). However,
Hall demonstrates that this ‘discourse’ has its own history and a particular
relationship with regimes of power.
In the next section of the chapter we will look briefly at various theories
of imperialism that attempt to account for the enormous expansion of
imperial and colonial domination in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries and at the persistence of imperialism (or ‘neo-imperialism’) in
the contemporary world.
Imperialism
Activity
Read the chapter ‘The Age of Empire’ by Hobsbawm in Appendix 3.
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144 Historical sociology
need for capital to be ‘exported’ (for investment in areas where labour and
resources are cheaper and where large profits can be made). This in turn
leads to a demand for the protection or stabilisation of market conditions
within the territories where capital has been invested. This ultimately
leads to the annexation of these territories and the division of the world’s
resources by armed force, particularly under conditions in which various
national economies were competing for market opportunities and for these
resources.
All of the ‘classical’ Marxist theorists of imperialism (and particularly
Lenin) draw on Hobson’s work. In particular, the growing importance of
finance capital as a motor for imperial expansion was stressed. However,
a key problem with unlimited expansion was noted by Rosa Luxemburg
(1870–1919). She argued that capitalism exists and must exist alongside
other non-capitalist modes of production as its profitability requires it to
absorb these non-capitalist regions (for their markets, resources, labour and
so on). However, without their continued existence (as spaces of hyper-
exploitation) capitalism’s profitability would exhaust itself. Remember,
Marx had predicted that capitalism would reach a point of crisis and
collapse as profitability declined and wages were forced down. The theory
of imperialism advanced by Luxemburg and other Marxists suggested that
this collapse had not occurred because capitalism was able to retain its
profitability by the exploitation of pre-capitalist social formations.
All of these theories tend to regard imperialism as a ‘stage’ of capitalist
development and therefore as something entirely endogenous to that
process. In other words, the political relations within capitalist states or
the relations between states were seen as far less important (or irrelevant)
to a process driven by the necessary laws of capitalist development.
However, if we go back and look at the chapter by Hobsbawm, we can see
that there were clearly other factors at work in the aggressive acceleration
of imperial competition. Hobsbawm is critical of approaches other than the
economic one, but he nonetheless outlines various alternatives.
Firstly, a much more strident European nationalism can be linked to the
scramble for territories. More virulent strains of nationalism and increased
conflict in Europe made states much more aware of the actions of their
competitors abroad (remember, all of the European states were locked
into a ‘state system’ and obsessively monitored each other’s activities).
The rapid division of Africa between European powers at the end of the
nineteenth century can be argued to be a ‘pre-emptive’ exercise in which
national governments attempted to gain advantage over their rivals ‘by
claiming tracts of territory which might at some time in the future become
economically or strategically important’ (Bayly, 2004: 230). This type
of argument locates the dynamic for imperialism in the political rivalry
between states.
Secondly, all of the key states engaged in the scramble for territory
had new internal political considerations to take into account. The
introduction of democracy (albeit on a limited scale in some states) meant
that elites within states were inclined to use imperial expansion as a
means of stifling domestic discontent through the promotion of imperial
power. As we have seen, nationalist sentiment increased across the
nineteenth century and competition for territory abroad with major rivals
was seen as a way of increasing national ‘glory’. Nonetheless, Hobsbawm
argues that in spite of considerable effort spent in promoting imperial
projects and their benefits, this remained popular only amongst limited
classes within national populations.
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Activity
Read pages 69 (from the paragraph beginning ‘In fact, the rise of labour movements…’)
to the end of Section I on page 73, in Hobsbawm.
What explanations for the ‘new imperialism’ does Hobsbawm give? How far were
nationalism and other political factors responsible for imperial expansion?
Write about 500 words in answer to these questions.
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Appendix 1: Sample examination paper
END OF PAPER
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Notes
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Appendix 2: Guidance on answering the Sample examination paper
General remarks
This course explores in depth some of the important historical processes
that led to the emergence of contemporary social, economic and political
conditions. The course looks in depth at the historical context of social
institutions and political systems. In particular, it focuses on the complex
range of factors that were at work in the rise of the modern state. At its
core this course looks at these sociological problems theoretically and you
will be examined on the sociological literature relating to the differences
(if any) between sociology and history as well as other methodological
concerns. The examination will test your knowledge of specific topics and
also your ability to relate topics and ideas to one another.
The examination paper for this course is three hours in duration and you
are expected to answer three questions from a choice of 12. The Examiners
will attempt to ensure that all of the topics covered in the syllabus and
subject guide are examined. Some questions could cover more than one
topic from the syllabus since the different topics are not self-contained.
In this section we demonstrate how you should approach the questions
in the Sample examination paper. We do not provide sample or model
answers to the questions, but instead point out what each question would
require.
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Question 2
‘Sociologists and historians differ in their approach and in
their subject matter.’ Explain and discuss.
This question asks you to both explain and discuss the assertion
that sociologists and historians study different things using different
approaches – in other words that the two disciplines are very different
from one another. A good answer will outline important differences
between the work of historians and sociologists and their similarities. It
will address the issue of the apparently ‘nomothetic’ and ‘ideographic’
nature of sociology and history respectively. A good answer will
demonstrate the meaning of these terms and how they have related to
different approaches adopted by historians and sociologists. It should also
be able to look in detail at how some sociologists have affirmed this
disciplinary division and how and why others have challenged it. In
particular, it should be able to explain how historical sociologists have
defined their work and to discuss in more depth whether it is possible to
have a sociology that is ‘historical’.
An excellent answer will be able to discuss the epistemological basis
of disputes between sociologists and historians about their respective
approaches and the objects that they study. It will be able to demonstrate
how and why sociologists make use of history and how and why historians
make use of sociology. The answer will thereby be able to discuss whether
the division between these two disciplines is an artificial one.
Question 3
How have any two sociologists accounted for the emergence
of the ‘modern’ state?
You should briefly define the key characteristics of a ‘modern’ state and
demonstrate that you are aware of when and where specifically ‘modern’
states first arose. You should demonstrate an awareness of differing
theories of how and why ‘modern’ states emerged and focus on the work
of two sociologists. A good answer will outline concisely and accurately
the specific theories of the two chosen sociologists. Your answer should
demonstrate an awareness of important similarities in and differences
between their accounts. An excellent answer will be able to demonstrate
how these different accounts highlight important differences in their
approaches to social and historical processes more generally. For example,
should you choose to discuss Marx and Weber, you should be able to
demonstrate how Marx’s account is related to ideas about the primacy
of economic development. You should be able to discuss the strengths
and weaknesses of this approach and their implications. When discussing
Weber, you should be able to outline his theoretical contribution to debates
about the emergence of the state, but also to show how this relates to
broader concerns about the historical process of ‘rationalisation’. Again,
the strengths and weaknesses of this approach should be highlighted.
Remember, you may choose any two relevant sociologists who have
considered the emergence of the ‘modern’ state!
Question 4
‘Ancient empires were ruled but not governed.’ Discuss.
This question asks you to consider the systems of rule specific to ‘ancient
empires’. You should be able to outline key features of these systems and
the emphasis given to certain features by various sociologists. You should
demonstrate that you understand the difference between being ‘governed’
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and being ‘ruled’. Good answers will provide detailed and accurate
accounts of these systems of rule and use actual historical examples as
illustration. You should be able to demonstrate that you understand how
and why these systems of rule operated in the ways that they did and
to demonstrate an awareness of how such systems differ from ‘modern’
systems of rule. In particular, issues such as the extension of military and
coercive power, ‘coercive cooperation’ and ideological cooption of elites
should be considered. Excellent answers will be able to demonstrate
differing theoretical ideas about how these systems operated and highlight
complex tendencies at work within these systems.
Question 5
Outline and discuss key features and developmental
tendencies in feudal systems of rule.
This question asks you to provide an outline and discuss key features of
‘feudal’ systems of rule. Answers should set out in detail the basis of these
systems and how they operated. A good answer will consider the historical
emergence of the system out of Roman and Germanic social and political
arrangements. It will demonstrate an understanding of the key features of
the system and how the system developed over time. In particular, it will
demonstrate an understanding of the key feudal relationship of vassalage
and how this relationship determined forms of rule within societies. An
excellent answer will demonstrate an awareness of arguments about how
and why feudalism ‘developed’ rather than ‘collapsed’ in spite of its overall
tendency toward fragmentation. In particular, consideration should be given
to ‘ideological’ aspects of social power and the role that Christianity played in
providing an ethical framework and a social identity. An excellent answer will
also explain how and why feudal states remained weak and underdeveloped.
Question 6
Assess the claim that ‘absolutist’ states were only superficially
‘modern’.
This question asks you to consider the specific features of the ‘absolutist state’
and asks to what extent these states were ‘modern’. A good answer will be
able to outline the key features of ‘absolutist’ systems of rule and demonstrate
an understanding of how and under what circumstances they emerged. It will
discuss how these features relate to ‘modern’ systems of rule. Your answer
should compare and contrast absolutist with modern systems of rule and
highlight those aspects of absolutist systems that are ‘modern’ and those that
are ‘traditional’. A good answer will also be able to outline and demonstrate
an understanding of key historical sociological accounts of the absolutist
state. An excellent answer will additionally be able to highlight the basis on
which arguments about the ‘modernity’ (or not) of the absolutist are made.
For example, they will point out how Anderson’s neo-Marxism is based on
an analysis of the class basis of absolutist rule. Excellent answers will also be
able to highlight the developmental tendencies at work in the system and in
societies at large and what their consequences were.
Question 7
How and with what consequences did states begin to consider
their populations as a ‘resource’?
This question asks you to consider arguments about important developments
in the way states thought about and managed their populations from the
period of ‘absolutism’ onwards. The question asks you in particular to
consider the arguments about ‘bio-politics’ and the ‘disciplinary society’ made
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by Foucault. A good answer will be able to outline what these concepts are
and to demonstrate an understanding of how and under what circumstances
they emerged. A good answer will also show how these processes were
related to the development of state power and new forms of governance. It
will be able to demonstrate an understanding of the complex relationship
between the development of ‘bio-political’ practices and power relationships
within societies. An excellent answer will, additionally, link these processes
(of bio-politics and discipline) to broader processes of ‘internal pacification’,
monopolisation of violence and the intensification of state power in numerous
domains within societies. It will also discuss the consequences of the
emergence of these new forms of governance.
Question 8
‘States make war and war makes states.’ Discuss.
This question asks you to consider to what extent war between states and
the military preparation necessary to fight wars was responsible for the
development of states. A good answer will outline how the early modern
state in Europe was part of a system of states that monitored each other’s
activities and competed for territories in Europe itself and, increasingly
from the sixteenth century, overseas. It will be able to demonstrate how
the ‘Westphalian’ model of state sovereignty contributed to competition
amongst states and how the cost of fighting wars expanded dramatically as
a consequence of specific developments in military technologies. It will also
outline how the need to finance wars led states to adopt new strategies and
tactics to raise revenues and how this impacted on alliances between the
state and the emergent capitalist class in some regions, and how it cemented
relations between state and nobility in others. It will also demonstrate an
awareness of how state demands for revenue and other resources (including
men) impacted on the political governance of the state and the demand
for ‘representative’ government. An excellent answer will consider whether
the statement in the question implies a mono-causal approach to state
development, and will discuss the complex interaction between military,
political and economic factors in the development of states.
Question 9
‘The capitalist mode of production needed the intervention of
ideological, military and political organisations to establish
itself.’ Discuss.
This question asks you to consider the circumstances under which
capitalism developed as the dominant mode of production alongside the
emergence of the military and political power of the modern state. A good
answer will outline the key factors that were involved in the emergence of
capitalism as the dominant economic system. It will demonstrate how this
process was linked to military, ideological and political factors. It will also
demonstrate an awareness of the role that state formation played in the
structuring and policing of markets and in the development of classes.
An outline of key features of a ‘capitalist state’ would be useful. An
excellent answer will be able to discuss competing accounts of capitalist
development and its relationship to the state. For example, Marxist and
neo-Marxist accounts of the ‘primacy’ of economic relationships and
accounts which emphasise the complex and dynamic relations between
different power ‘sources’ should be discussed. Consideration of whether
a single factor can be said to hold ‘primacy’ should be considered. An
excellent answer will also ask how and why nation-states and capitalism
have been historically linked to the extent that they have.
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Question 10
What does it mean to say that nations are ‘invented’ by
nationalism?
This question asks you to consider the extent to which nations are
‘invented’ by nationalism. Your answer should include definitions of
‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ and indicate the different approaches to an
understanding of their emergence. Good answers will distinguish between
those thinkers who argue that nations are ‘primordial’ or ‘perennial’ social
and political arrangements which have long histories and those who argue
that nations are products of ‘modernity’ and are therefore very recent
phenomena. An account of the different ‘waves’ of nation formation
should be given. The role of nationalism in fostering national awareness
should be discussed. In particular, the question of how and under what
circumstances nationalism emerged in the ‘modern’ period needs to be
discussed in relation to one or more theorist. Different types of nationalism
should be addressed (both civic and ethnic-linguistic, in particular). The
question of ‘invention’ should be addressed and you should outline at least
one theory of how nationalism emerged and how it has been used. You
should also account for its power in the contemporary world. An excellent
answer will ask how far the notion of ‘invention’ can account for the
persistence and the power of nationalism and will compare and contrast
theories of ‘invention’.
Question 11
‘Imperialist practices between 1870 and 1914 can best be
explained as a by-product of nationalist politics.’ Discuss.
This question asks you to consider competing explanations for the
European ‘age of Empire’. You should demonstrate an understanding of
the key developments during this period and show how the intensification
of competition for imperial possessions led to a ‘scramble’ for territory
in Africa and Asia. A definition of imperialism, in this context, and
a demonstration of how it differed from other periods of European
expansion is necessary. A good answer will recognise that the question
asks you to consider one possible explanation for this intensification for
colonial and imperial territory (the rise of nationalism) and to compare
its adequacy with other competing explanations. An outline of this and
competing explanations should therefore be given. In particular, you
should focus on economic arguments for the intensification of imperialist
competition between European powers and ask how adequate these are
as forms of explanation. These should be contrasted with the political
explanation that highlights nationalism as the most important factor. An
excellent answer will also ask how far domestic political considerations
such as the rise of democracy and labour militancy were contributory
factors in states’ increasing emphasis on nationalism and imperialism
during the period in question.
Question 12
Critically assess the claim that the discourse of ‘the West and
the Rest’ continues to shape the ways that ‘the West’ relates to
‘others’.
This question asks you to consider whether the discourse of ‘the West and
the rest’ continues to operate as an important aspect of global relations of
power. You should outline precisely the key elements of this ‘discourse’ and
explain how the term ‘discourse’ is being used within this specific context.
You should also demonstrate an awareness of how and under what
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Appendix 3: Supplementary readings
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Notes
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