Northeastern Political Science Association

Noble Lies &Justice: On Reading Plato

Author(s): John R. Kayser
Source: Polity, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Summer, 1973), pp. 489-515
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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Nobec Lies & Justice:
On Reading Plato

JOHN R. KAYSER
University of New Hampshire

Pity the student of politics who has never loved Plato. Professor
Kayser, a careful student of Plato, addresses himself in scholarly
manner to the question of how one should read the dialogues. In the
spirit of Leo Strauss, he undertakes to help the reader to see an
esoteric teaching behind the exoteric one and to understand why the
truth was not made easy.

Professor Kayser has a Ph.D. from Claremont. He has published an

article on the impact of Socratic education on political action and is
working on the problem of justice as presented by Socrates in the
Republic. He has been at the University of New Hampshire since
I969.

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490 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

confrontinga studentof the Republicis its form-

THE INITIAL DIFFICULTY
the Socraticdialogue.' This method or form of presentationis necessary
because,as Socratestells us in the Phaedrus,he has confinedhis teaching
to the spoken word. Socratescontendsthat commiting one's teachingto
writingis dangerousbecausewords,
when they have been once written down they are thrown aboutany-
where among those who may or may not understandthem, and they
know not to whom they should reply,to whom not; and if they are
ill-treatedor abusedas illegitimate,they always need their fatherto
protectthem, being quite unableto help or to protectthemselves.2
Warning Dionysius of Syracuseof the danger inherent in the written
word,Platohimselfstates:
Beware,however,lest these [teachings]are ever made known to un-
educatedmen. For there are hardlyany of these which sound more
absurdto the vulgar.... For this reasonI myselfhave neveryet writ-
ten anythingon thesesubjects[philosophyand politics], and no trea-
tise by Plato exists or will exist, but those which now bearhis name
belongto a Socratesbecomefairand young.3
In the SeventhLetter,Plato more vigorouslyrevealshis misgivingsabout
the writtenword.4There, he suggeststhat, aside from its dangers,it can-
not providean accountof the truthwhich, "doesnot at all admitof verbal
expression."5Plato furtherarguesthat such writing would not, "provea
good thing for men, exceptfor some few who areable to discoverthe truth
themselveswith but little instruction."6
Nonetheless,unlike Socrates,Plato
providedus with a writtenteaching-the Socraticdialogues.Grantedthese
objectionsto writing, we may assumethat the Socraticdialoguesare free

1 For the general differences between Platonic dialogues and

philosophical treatises
cf., Paul Friedlander, Plato: An Introduction, translated by Hans Meyerhof (New
York: 1958), pp. 108-I25, I54-170; Stanley Rosen, Plato's Symposium (New Haven
and London: I968), pp. xi-xxxviii; Jacob Klein, A Commentary on Plato's Meno
(Chapel Hill: 1965), pp. 3-35; Philip Merlan, "Form and Content in Plato's Philos-
ophy," Journal of the History of Ideas (October, 1947); Alexander Koyre, Discover-
ing Plato, translated by Leonora Cohen Rosenfield (New York and London: 1960),
pp. I-7. For an excellent commentaryon the reasons for such a literary form, cf. Leo
Strauss,Persecutionand the Art of Writing (Glencoe: 1952).
2 Phaedrus 257d. Cf. also Klein's comments, op. cit., on this passage.
3 Second Letter 3I 4a-e.
4 Seventh Letter 341c-e.
5 Ibid. On this point cf. also Merlan, op. cit.
6 Seventh Letter 341e.

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 491

of the perilsof writing alludedto by Socratesin the Phaedrusand Plato in

the Letters.7
Within this framework,Olympiodorous'assumptionthat the Phaedrus
is the first dialogue becomesintelligible,8despitethe fact that contempo-
raryscholarshipdatesit as a later writing.9It is the logical, if not chrono-
logical, introductionto the Socraticdialogues;it alone has speechesas its
explicittheme and, since all Socraticdialoguesconsistof speeches,may be
viewed as the dialogue on dialogues.10Although some of the other dia-
logues offer hints on reading the dialogues in general or on how they
specificallyshould be read, the generalprinciplesgoverningSocraticdia-
logues are containedin the Phaedrussince its primaryconcernis speeches.
In the Phaedrus,Socratesraisesthree major objectionsagainst written
speeches;he also gives one rulewhich all speeches,spokenor written,must
follow. The objectionsare: writing is a poor substitutefor a verbalteach-
ing; anyonemay reada writtenspeech;a writtenspeechis defenselesssince
its authorcannot alwaysaccompanyit. Socrates'rule for good speechesis
that they must appearas naturalentities if they are to serve as accurate
images of reality.Ironically,in orderto facilitatethis, chanceor accident
which plays such an importantrole in nature must be replacedby art
within the dialogues."1
The firstobjectiontold to Phaedrusconsistsof a tale aboutan Egyptian
god and an Egyptianking. The god, Teuth, gave lettersor the art of writ-

7 This
point does not solely depend upon the Letters, but upon the similarity be-
tween the comments on writing in the dialogues and Plato's own words in the Letters.
Compare the views expressed by Plato in the Second and Seventh Letters with those
expressed in Protagoras 343c-344b; Timaeus 28c; Laws 66oe-66id; Friedlinder, op.
cit., pp. i54ff; Klein, op. cit., pp. 3ff; Merlan, op. cit.; and Eduard Zeller, Plato and
The Older Academy, translated by S. F. Allyne and A. Goodwin (London: 1888),
pp. I54-59 offer further support for the hypothesis that a Platonic dialogue is free
from the defects of writing.
8 Olympiodorous, Bohn's Classical Library, p. 235. This assumption also character-
ized much of the nineteenth century scholarshipon the dialogues. Cf. Werner Jaeger's
comments on Schleiermacherin Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture translated by
Gilbert Highet, Vol. I (New York: I944), p. I62. According to Schleiermacher,the
Phaedrus "was a sort of introduction to his [Plato's] work."
9 Cf. W. Windelband, History of Ancient Philosophy (New York: I9Io), pp. I81-
82; Jaeger, op. cit., pp. I87-89, 330. Zeller, op. cit., offers a good general discussion
of the problem of finding the written date of the dialogues. Despite great concern
with written dates of the dialogues in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
one is tempted to agree with Perls that, "Hundertfiinfzig Jahre haben nicht geniigt,
um diese Arbeit zu beenden," Hugo Perls, Plato Seine Auflassung vom Kosmos
(Bonn: 1966), pp. 13-I6.
10 A more extended treatment than is possible here would also have to take the
Cratylusinto account.
11 Cf. Friedlinder, op. cit., chapter 8.

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492 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

ing to the king as a gift. Surprisingly,the king was not at all pleasedwith
this present.He complainedthat writing would make men lazy for they
would use the god'sgift as a substitutefor memory.12This, in turn,he con-
tendedwould serveto impedegenuinelearning.For men would now turn
to the writtenteachingabouta subjectratherthan devotetheirenergiesto
an examinationof the subjectthemselves.Their knowledgeof a given sub-
jectwould no longerresidein what Platotermed,"thatfairestregionthey
possess[their own minds],"13 but in a writing to which they could refer.
The responsibilityfor knowing a given subject could be shifted from
themselvesto the writings on that subjectand hence the writings, as
authorities,would be blamedfor what men themselvesdid not know. The
king's objectionto writing, as relatedby Socrates,is also based on the
assumptionthat a written teachingis incapableof directlyaddressingits
audiencesince it has no controlover its dissemination.For despiteall pre-
cautions,accordingto Plato, "it is not possiblethat what is writtendown
should not get divulged."'4That is, a written teaching,since its author
has no guaranteeover who his audienceshall be, cannottake into account
that with which the audienceis familiarand perhapsknows and that with
which it is unfamiliarand does not know. On the other hand, a verbal
teachingis able to base itself on knowledgeof the audienceto which it is
addressedsince a speaker,unlike a writer, can, in principle,select his
audience.Hence the unique characteristics of the listeners,their passions,
knowledge, and
interests, can
prejudices, be takeninto account.Moreover,
a verbalteaching,by virtueof its "faceto face"quality,can put questions
to the listenersthus ensuringthat the teachingis being understood;it can
also answerquestionsput by the listenersthus ensuringthat doubtsabout
the teachingreceivea reply.Consequently,a verbalteachingcan require
its audienceto participateactivelyand directlyin the processof learning.
A writtenteaching,accordingto Socrates'restatementof the king's objec-
tions,seemsa possiblehindranceto activelearning,substitutingin its stead
a passiveresponse.Finally,it appearsunlikelythat a writtenteachingcan
engenderthe passionnecessaryfor genuine learningto say nothing of re-
solving the ad hominum doubtsand answeringthe particularquestions
which standas obstaclesin the path to knowledge.
If a Socraticdialogueis to be free from these limitationsalludedto in
Socrates'tale of the genesisof writing in Egypt,it must prod the memory

12 According to Plato in the Letters, this is a flaw of

writing. In the Seventh
Letter (344d-e) he suggests that writing is, at best, an aid to memory.
13 Seventh Letter
344c; Timaeus 44d.
14 Second Letter 3 4e.

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 493

of its audience and engage the listenersas active participants.In other

words, it must imitate a Socratic conversation.15Such a conversation is not
limited by the defects of writing mentioned previously. During the course
of the conversation, if not beforehand, Socrates learns about his interlocu-
tors. This enables him to respond to their specific opinions and to take into
account their particular abilities. Socrates also prevents his companions
from allowing their memories to lapse and from passively responding to
his teaching by constantly raising questions. In turn, his willingness to un-
dergo "cross-examination" helps to resolve the various dilemmas confront-
ing the interlocutors. Socrates' very presence as gadfly and philosophic
midwife helps him perform his major task: identifying and nurturing
those souls capable of higher pursuits and leading them from opinion to
philosophy. Unfortunately, a simple transcription of Socrates' conversa-
tions would not necessarily achieve what the conversations themselves have
achieved. By writing, Plato would appear to have foreclosed this possibil-
ity. His own testimony reveals that a writer cannot control the dissemina-
tion of his work and hence cannot know his audience. Nonetheless, since
Plato did write, we might expect his work to be safeguarded from the ef-
fects of random dissemination. We might expect, in brief, that despite
random dissemination he retains control over his intended audience, which
does not differ from Socrates' intended audience: the potential philos-
ophers.16 In order to reproduce the effects Socrates' conversations had on
potential philosophers, Plato's writing would initially have to transform
the more passive activity of reading into active participation. That is, the
reader must be prompted to raise questions and issues on his own if he is
not satisfied with those raised by the other interlocutors in the dialogue;
needless to say, a response to those questions and issues should be received.
A reader of Plato's work must also be as challenged by the writing as the
companions of Socrates were challenged by his questions and answers. The

15 Friedlinder, op. cit., pp. I58ff; Klein, op. cit., pp. Io-2o; Merlan,
op. cit.; F.
J. E. Woodbridge, The Son of Apollo (New York: 1929), pp. 47-58; J. C. O'Flah-
erty's introduction to his work on Hamann, Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia (Balti-
more: I967), all indicate this point.
16Republic 527d-e. Cf. also Eva Brann, "The Music of the Republic," ArlN
The Journal of ClassicalStudies (April, 1967), pp. 23ff, iio. Moreover,as Brann also
points out, this is reflectedin the substanceof the teaching of the Republic. Aristotle's
criticism that the regime constructedin the dialogue is "not that uniting a multitude,
but rather that of each good man with every other," indicates this point. In this re-
spect, the goal of Socrates' political teaching in the dialogue does not differ from
Plato's goal in writing. Cf. also, Strauss, op. cit.; Merlan, op. cit.; John R. Kayser,
"Prologue to the Study of Justice," Western Political Quarterly (June, 1970), pp.
258-260.

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494 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

writingshouldalsobe ableto achievein the soulsof potentialphilosophers

that erotic conversionto wisdom of which Socratesspeaks in both the
Republic and Symposium.17 In brief, the reader must become an additional
interlocutorin the dialogue.18
Plato'swritten work encouragesthe readerto participateas an active
interlocutor.In the Republic,for example, Socratesfrequentlytests the
memoryof his interlocutorsin a subtle fashion.Perhapsmost notableis
the occasionwhen he discussesthe necessityfor philosophersto havegood
memories.In this contexthe sums up the points he has just made three
times and each time the enumerationis different.19Socratesalso occa-
sionallytransformsthe meaningof a Homericpassageby omittingwords
or transposingcharacters;20 Glaucon'suse of the tale of Gyges differsin
both intention and substancefrom the tale originally found in Hero-
dotus;21Socrates'referenceto Hesiod'sracesin the contextof a discussion
about the degenerateregimesservesas a useful aside only if Hesiod'sin-

17 Symposium 207d-2I2b; Republic474 ff.,

485b-d, 499b-c, 535d.
18 Koyre, op. cit., p. 5, states, "Whence it follows that in
every dialogue there
exists besides the two obvious personages-the two interlocutorswho discuss-a third,
invisible, but present and quite as important, the reader-auditor."Cf. also Klein,
op. cit.
19 Beginning at 485b, Socrateslists the qualities peculiar to "philosophic natures."
They are, "love of learning . . . of the being that is always; no taste for falsehood;
[desires] would be concerned with the pleasures of the soul . . . and forsake those
pleasures that come through the body; moderate; an understanding befitting a great
man [liberality]; [belief] that death is not something terrible [courage]; both just
and tame; a soul with memory; an understandingendowed by nature with measure
and charm . . . as to make it easily led to the idea of each thing that is." At 487a,
Socrates lists the qualities again: "by nature a rememberer,a good learner, liberal,
charming, a friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage and moderation."At 489e,
Socrates remarks: "Then, let us begin our listening and speaking by reminding our-
selves of the point at which we started our description of the kind of nature with
which the man who is to be a gentleman is necessarilyendowed. First, if it is present
to your mind, truth guided him . . . he grasps the nature itself of each thing which
is . . . he will hate it [falsehood] . . . a healthy and just disposition, which is also
accompaniedby moderation . . . courage, liberality, facility at learning and memory.
. ." In the final enumeration at 494b ff., justice is dropped as a quality of the
philosophic soul. After telling Glaucon the allegory of the cave, 535b ff., Socrates
again enumerated the qualities of the philosophic soul. In this enumeration justice is
also omitted. For a commentary on these sections, cf., Allan Bloom, The Republic of
Plato (New York: I968), pp. 392-400, cf. also his notes to Book vI.
20 Compare, for example, 405e-406a with Iliad xi, 624-641. Cf. also Bloom, op.
cit., p. 454, notes 55, 59.
21 Compare Glaucon's telling of the tale about the ring of Gyges, 359c-36Id, and
the conclusionshe draws from the tale with Herodotus'account, Histories I, pp. 8-I3.

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 495

tentionis recalled.22The foregoingare only instancesin which the written

work servesto spurmemoryratherthanact as a hindrance.23
The reader'sintelligenceis also challengedby certainargumentsin the
dialogue.Unless a philosopherof Plato's(or Socrates')abilityis assumed
incapableof distinguishingbetweena soundand unsoundargument,some
of the argumentsofferedby Socratesand acceptedby the other interlocu-
torsbearcloserexamination.24 For example,Socrates'use of the apparently
fallacious"like to like" argumentwith Thrasymachusis unchallengedby
the sophist.25ThrasymachusalsoacceptsSocrates'procedurein attempting
to provejusticeis good beforehe has definedit. Socrates'explicitevasion
of Glaucon'squestionconcerningthe possibilityof the best regime is ap-
parentlynot noticed by the other interlocutors.26The most comic argu-
ment in the Republic concerns the political equality of the sexes.27 Soc-
rates' "proof"is based on a series of argumentswhich grant inequality
with respectto strengthand martialability.From this he concludesthat
the sexes can be equal politically,asserting,among other things, that the
differencebetween the sexes is no greaterthan the differencebetween a
22 Republic 454c. According to Hesiod, the race of heroes is
superior to the races
of gold and silver which proceed it. In the Socratic scheme of the degeneration of
regimes, democracy is parallel to Hesiod's race of heroes, implying that democracy is
a better regime than timocracy or oligarchy. Socrates' comments to Adeimantus at
499e seem to prefigure this view of democracy. Cf. also 557c where Socrates calls
democracy,"perhapsthe fairest of regimes."
23 Cf. p. I6 above. In order to follow Socrates'meaning, especially when his sum-
mary of an agreement omits parts of that argument, a good memory is necessary.In
all his enumerations of the qualities required by the philosophic soul, memory is
retained.
24 Unfortunately, some of the scholars who do adopt this critical posture neglect
to ask whether such a weak argument may be intentional. Rather, they point out
Plato's "mistakes"as simple (or complex) errors. They do not inquire whether such
"mistakes" may offer clues to the teaching. Cf. for example, M. B. Foster, "A Mis-
take of Plato's in the Republic," Mind (I937); "A Mistake of Plato's in the Repub-
lic: A Rejoinder to Mr. Mabbott,"Mind (1938); David Sachs, "A Fallacy in Plato's
Republic," The Philosophical Review (1963). Further exemplifying this approach is
the manner in which the dramatic dates and other dramatic aspects of the dialogues
have been treated. Jowett implies that the date of the Republic is ambiguous, among
other reasons, because Plato's memory was poor, B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato,
Vol. 3 (Oxford: 1875), p. 6; Charles Kahn, "Plato's Funeral Oration: The Motive
of the Menexenus," Classical Philosophy (1963), p. 225 does not suggest that Plato
made grave errors, instead, he argues that Plato was careless with these nonphilo-
sophic points.
25 349d.
26 466e ff; pp. 27-28 below.
27 In the Republic, Socrates'opening remarks to Polemarchus (333e-334b) are ac-
cepted uncritically. However, these comments are marked by ambiguity and do not
necessarily lead to the conclusion accepted by Polemarchus.Cf. H. B. Joseph's com-

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496 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

bald and a long-hairedman.28While this need not invalidatehis argu-

ment,surelyfurtherexaminationis requiredbeforewe echo the acceptance
of the otherinterlocutors.Indeed,the characterof these argumentsshould
lead the readerto speak where the other interlocutorsremainsilent. For
example,the following generalquestionscan be raisedin such instances:
Why do the otherinterlocutorsacceptthe argumentwithout furtherques-
tion? Why is the argumentweak? What arethe consequencesof accepting
a strongerargument?What might an apparentlyevasiveresponsereveal?
Finally,what might we learnby "correcting"the argument?Unless Soc-
rates (or Plato) is guilty of lapsesbefittingonly a schoolboy,questionsof
this sortmust be raisedin orderto make the dialogueintelligibleto us. By
promptingthese questions,the written dialoguehas begun to transform
itself into an imitationof Socraticconversation:it has gained our critical
participation.
This participationis further ensured by Socrates'unconventionalre-
markson the subjectof lies. Contendingthatthe bestregimecan comeinto
being only on the basis of a "noblelie," and that the philosophersmust
tell this lie in the interestsof the regime, Socratesdemonstratesthe pos-
sibility that a philosophermay lie, albeit for the common good. Now a
writerwhose majorcharacterstatesthat, in principle,he is not adverseto
lying and who, furthermore,mentionsthe necessityfor lies, might himself
be expectedto lie for the properreason:
But he would defeat his purposeif he indicatedclearlywhich of his
statementsexpresseda noblelie, and which the still morenobletruth.
For philosophicreadershe would do almost more than enough by
drawingtheirattentionto the fact that he did not objectto telling lies
which were noble.29
The astutereadercannotcontinuethe dialoguewithout bearingin mind
the possibilitythat the interestsof justicemay compel the philosopherto
tell more than one "noblelie." Yet, one cannot devote such care to the
dialoguein the passiverole of reader.In orderto becomeproperlywaryof
both uncharacteristically weak argumentsand various "noble lies," the
readermust becomea participantand stand readyto challengethe Xoyos
of the dialogue.
The secondobjectionto writing raisedin the Phaedrusis not unrelated
to the first: Socratesobjectsto the likelihood that "anyone"may read a
written work. The basisfor this objectionis the aristocratic(in the sense

ments on this passage in his, Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Oxford: 1935), pp.
1-4. Cf. also Republic 357b-358b, 368b-369b, 345b-345c, 504b, 595c.
28 454c.
29 Leo Strauss,The City and Man
(Chicago: 1964), p. 35.

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 497

of aristos) notion that human capacitiesand naturesdiffer greatly. Ac-

cordingly,some men are "of the family of the lion and the tribe of the
eagle,"their naturesare simplycapableof raisingthem to greaterheights
than others.Specifically,this means that some few men are unharmedby
certain truths. Thus the philosopherswho find it necessaryto tell the
"noblelie" are not corruptedby the truthwhich it conceals.30But the ne-
cessity for the "noblelie" indicatesthat many men would be harmedor
corruptedwere they to know the truth it hides. Indeed,most men, as Soc-
rates' accusersin the Apology reveal, are enraged when their opinions
provedoubtfuland they areconfrontedwith uncomfortabletruths.Unfor-
tunately,many of them aregoadedinto angerby havingtheirtruthstested
and, as a consequence,becomeharmful. Meletus,the patrioticpoet who
cross-examinesSocratesin the Apology, exemplifiesthis possibility.Per-
haps a similarreasonanimatesPlato'swarning to Dionysius of Syracuse
in the SecondLetter.There, Plato warnsagainstrevealinghis teachingto
the uneducatedand vulgar. The context of the warning does not clarify
whether it is the teaching or the teacherwho is protectedby such reti-
cence.31Nonetheless,the fate of Socratesin The Cloudsand in the Athen-
ian Assemblytestifiesto the soundnessof Plato'swarning.For the indict-
ment againstSocratesstemmedfromthe use to which the non-philosophers
or vulgar put his teachingas well as from the substanceof the teaching.
The indictmentchargedSocrateswith "notbelievingin the gods in which
the city believesand corruptingthe youth."32Aristophanes'chargein The
Clouds is also directedagainst the content of Socrates'teachingand the
nonphilosophicadherentsof the teaching. The allegationthat Socrates'
teaching,or the revelationof certaintruths to nonphilosophicsouls may
proveharmfulis not without substance.Not only Plato,but Alcibides,the
traitor,and Critias,the tyrannicaloligarch,werecompanionsand followers
of Socrates.33That the latter did grave damageto Athens is unquestion-

30 In this case, the lie appears to conceal the fact that

citizenship is necessarilycon-
ventional but must be accepted by the citizens as natural. The truth that all men,
not merely all citizens, are brothers might be harmful for cities but not for philoso-
phers. Cf. Byrum Carter, "The Function of the Myth of the First Born in the Re-
public," The ClassicalJournal (May, I953), pp. 297-302; Bloom, op. cit., pp. 365-67.
31 The text has not dwelt on perhaps the most obvious reason for hiding one's
thoughts: self-preservation.Freedom of speech, which implies freedom from the con-
sequences of unpopular speech, is a relatively recent human development. Cf. Strauss,
Persecutionand the Art of Writing.
32 Apology 24b. Xenophon reports that the official indictment read, "Socrates is
guilty of not believing in the gods in which the city believes and of bringing in other
new daemonic things; he is also guilty of corrupting the youth," Memorabilia, I, I.
33 Allan D. Winspearand Tom Silverberg, Who Was Socrates? (New York: I939),
pp. 55 ff., make the point that the "Later Socrates" consorted with all types of
aristocraticlow lifes: traitors such as Alcibiades and men alienated from the regime

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498 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

able; that, in a Socratic sense, they did even graver damage to their own
souls is hardly less doubtful.
Socrates' second objection, then, consists in the notion that written
speeches are more likely to prove harmful to the unintended reader than
are oral speeches. Apparently, written speeches will multiply those men
who wish to imitate Critias and Alcibiades. By adhering strictly to con-
ventional truisms-to that which could assure the safety of the reader, the
writer and the city-a written speech would surmount Socrates' second
objection. But such a writing could not be philosophic. Granted the truth
of conventional wisdom, philosophy cannot accept the conventional basis
for that truth without an investigation which looks upon convention as
merely one of many alternatives.34 A philosophic speech, if it is to over-
come Socrates' objection and protect the reader, the author, and the city,
must conceal its true teaching. In other words, a conventional teaching for
the many who are not philosophic must be combined with a philosophic
teaching for the few who are capable of remaining uncorrupted by the
truth. The commonplace truism must cover the uncommon truth. In short,
a speech which surmounts Socrates' second objection must have an esoteric
as well as exoteric teaching.
The classical Greek authors, including non-philosophers, are generally
acknowledged to have combined two such teachings, either from a desire
to be playful-to amuse as with a puzzle-as W. H. S. Jones contends in
his introduction to the works of Hippocrates,35 or because they held the
written word in contempt, as Spengler argues.36 Schopenhauer maintains
that this form of writing characterizes the work of all who deserve to be
called philosophers be they ancient Greek or modern European.37 Al-
though such general statements may prove doubtful, there is little doubt

in Athens, Plato and Xenophon. Speaking of Critias, they note, "he became the most
bloodthirstyand reactionaryof even the Thirty [this] was in wide circles, and quite
naturally,attributedto the influenceof Socrates."
34 This is among the reasons that founders of
conventions, founders of regimes,
could not in antiquity inhabit the regime they founded. Cf. Machiavelli's treatment
of the great founders in Chapter 6 of The Prince. Cf. also Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of
the House Divided: An Interpretationof the Issues in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates
(Garden City, New York: 1959), pp. 186-236.
35Hippocrates, translated with an introduction by W. H. S. Jones (New York:
1923), vol. I.
36 0. Spengler, The Decline of the West (New York: 1926), pp. 230 ff.
Spengler
states that the Greeks particularlyheld the written word in contempt. One indication
of this, he contends, is that they refused to adorn books or manuscriptswith the de-
signs used so freely on other objects. Written works were deliberatelymade to appear
ugly. Cf. also Friedlander,op. cit., pp. IO9-IO.
37 A. Schopenhauer,The World as Will and Idea (London: I896), pp. 302 ff.

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 499
that the writings of Plato, imitating Socraticspeech,are as ambiguousas
that speech, since "Socratic'ignorance'must have impressedupon them
the much more powerfulimprint of the aporeticconclusion."38
Esotericwriting is writing between the lines,39the teachingis not ex-
plicitly rendered,it is not written down as such. Rather,the authorhints
at the esotericteachingby judiciouslyusing a varietyof methods.For ex-
ample, he might state that he does not object to telling lies which are
"noble";he might use unnecessarilyweak arguments.There is, thus, a
certainmethod to esotericwriting. Unfortunately,a graspof the method
alone is not sufficientto bring about an understandingof an esotericPla-
tonic writing. Knowledgeof the methodis only a necessary,but not suffi-
cient condition.Contraryto the modernview that propermethod suffices
for the understanding-indeed, that ignoranceis primarilythe fault of
impropermethod-the ancient view holds that there is a substantiveas-
pect to understandingwhich transcendsany particularmethodology.40
Added to this is Plato'scontentionthat the truthshe sees with his mind's
eye are not subjectto verbal,to say nothing of written, expression.41A
graspof Plato'smethodof writing will help to uncoverthe esotericteach-
ing, but cannotalonerevealthe teaching.
Two methodsby which Plato renderedhis work esotericand thus safe
from the "uneducatedand vulgar"readershave alreadybeen discussed:
uncharacteristically weak argumentsand the possibleuse of lies which are
"noble." The dialogues exhibit other and perhaps equally important
methods.With one exception,Plato is alwayssilent in the dialogues.42His
silencehas led to the rathercommonopinionthat the speechesof Socrates
or of the majorinterlocutorreflectPlato'sviews.43Yet, given the reticent
nature of the author of the dialogues,this opinion may prove incorrect.
Equally incorrectmay be the assumptionthat Plato'sphilosophyis com-
pletelypresentedin the dialogues.At least this assumption,so self-evident
on its face,shouldnot be acceptedon the basisof its apparentself-evidence.
The contentionof Platoin the SecondLetterthat he has "neveryet written
38 Friedlinder, op. cit., p. 158.
39Cf. Strauss, The City and Man, p. 30; Persecutionand the Art of Writing.
40
Harry Neumann's argument in "Believing Science and Unbelieving Science: Re-
flections on the Basic Conflict of Ancient and Modern Philosophiesof Science," Zygon
(December, I967), pp. 398-417 provides a good account of the limitations of me-
thodology. Neumann also gives an excellent account of the genesis of concern with
method.
41 Seventh Letter 34Ic-d.
42 Except in the titles. It is, after all, Plato and not any interlocutorwho names the
dialogues. Cf. Strauss,The City and Man.
43 Sufficienttestimony for this is to be found in the fact that so many commentators
speak of the thought of Plato rather than that of Socrates,the Athenian Stranger etc.

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500 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

anythingon thesesubjects[philosophyand politics],"cannotbe neglected

in an interpretationof the dialogues.Since many scholarshave declared
the Lettersfraudulentor corrupt,additionalevidenceis requiredto verify
the hypothesisthat Plato's thoughts are not necessarilyrevealedin the
dialogues.44
According to Diogenes Laertius and others,45 a Platonic dialogue is
more akin to a mime than a treatise. A mime, in turn, is closely related to
a play. Indeed, Koyre suggests that the Platonic dialogues are, "dramatic
works which could and even should be staged."46It would appear to follow
that a Platonic dialogue should be read more as a play than as a treatise.
Now the thought of a playwright is not necessarily identified or associated
with that of his characters; his views are not necessarily those expressed
by his major character. For example, the views of Sophocles are not neces-
sarily akin to those of Antigone or Creon; nor are Shakespeare's to those
of Cassius, Caesar, or Brutus. Similarly, the a priori assumption that the
views of Plato are those expressed by Socrates or another major interlocutor
in Socrates' absence, requires some justification. As Merlan indicates,
"Plato's writing contains at least something like a theory of ideas,"47yet
that theory is sharply assaulted in the Parmenides.4 Socrates' notion of
the "ideas" and Parmenides criticism of the "ideas" can be learned. What
cannot similarly be learned is Plato's own view of the "ideas." Needless
to add, the significant question is not whether Socrates or Parmenides acts
as Plato's spokesman in the Parmenides, but which of the two is correct;
which theory is best is at issue, not who speaks for Plato. The contention
between Socrates and Parmenides cannot be resolved adequately by an ap-
peal to authority, be it Plato, Socrates, or Parmenides, but by recourse to
our own reason. As Socrates tells Glaucon after concluding the discussion
of the divided line and the allegory of the cave in which he attempted to
bring to light the "child of the good," the good itself cannot be appre-
hended through "authority," but by individual effort.49 The soul itself
must aspire toward certain truths and cannot be led after a certain point
has been reached. Precisely because Socratic knowledge cannot be trans-
mitted as can the laws and theorems of modern science, the dialogues im-

44 Merlan, op. cit., p. 14. For a general discussion of the

authenticityof the Letters
and their value, cf. Friedlander,op. cit., pp. 236 ff.
45 Diogenes Laertius,Lives of the Eminent Philosophers,III, p. 8; Klein, op. cit.,
p. 3, notes i and 2.
46 Koyre, op. cit., p. 4.
47 Merlan,op. cit., p. 412 and notes 21-22.
48 Parmenidies I30b-i35c.
49 Republic 533a ff. Cf. especially the comments on solitary labor at
535b.

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 501

pel the philosophicalreaderto searchfor the ultimateanswersin his own

soul.50
Another facet of Platonicesotericismis the likelihoodthat answersto
questionsraised in the dialoguesare not contained,as such, within the
dialogues.In orderto evokein the readera responsesimilarto thatevoked
by the presenceof Socrates,the dialogueswould have to awaken in the
soul of the readera philosophicspirit. By simply recordingthe proper
answers,Plato would subvertthis goal. If the answersare to be found in
the dialogues,they aremorelikely to be partof the dramaitself-the deeds
-or the asidesand evasions.In any event,finding the answerto the ques-
tions posedby the dialoguesis not a matterof citing the properreference,
but of engaging in philosophy.Although the dialoguesaboundwith doc-
trinal statements,these are not as self-evidentas they first appear.51For
example,what can Socratesmean when he contendsthat he knows that
he knows nothing? Initially, this seems a modest statement,especially
coming from the sameman who tells us in the Apologythat he will speak
only the truth. Yet, in orderto know that one knows nothing, it would
appearthat one must know something: that which he does not know.
That is, knowledge of ignoranceis, after all, knowledge.52Indeed, the
conditionfor knowing thatone knows nothingwould appearto be knowl-
edge of the knowable itself. This apparentlysimple and often quoted
Socraticsentiment is not self-explanatory;in order to comprehendSoc-
rates'meaning,one mustengagein philosophy.
This recourseto the readerof the dialogueis also necessarybecausethe
interlocutorsof the dialoguesmay, as Socratescontendsin the Republic,
lack sufficientqualities.They may be corrupt,lazy, insufficientlyintelli-
gent, ill trainedin philosophy,or any combinationof these.Consequently,
agreementof the interlocutorsto any argumentdoes not warrantthe as-
sumptionthat the argumentto which they agree is sound. Moreover,in
view of the variousreasonsfor their inability,the argumentmay deliber-
ately be weak in order to strike a sympatheticresponse.Socratesis not
aboveusing ad hominemarguments.53 Thus the famousblushof Thrasy-
50 Republic 533a. Cf. also the Meno and Klein's
commentary on /tL/htOLs, op. cit.
The Socratic view that knowledge is recollection is based on the notion that unaided
reason can resolve the mysteries of the universe. On this point, Neumann, op. cit., is
very helpful.
51 Klein, op. cit., p. 9;
Koyre, op. cit., p. 6.
52 On Socrates' ignorance as ironic, cf.
Sachs, op. cit., note 4; George Anastaplo,
"Human Being and Citizen," in Joseph Cropsey, editor, Ancients and Moderns (New
York: I964), p. 2I and note 25.
53 The argument with Thrasymachus best exemplifies this. Socrates also appears
to cater to the antidemocraticbias of Adeimantus and Glaucon, but indicates that he
does not share this bias, at least on the same grounds as the brothers.Yet, he is not

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502 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

machusis broughtaboutnot by virtueof the intrinsicdefectsof his argu-

ment,which Socrateshas not pointedout, butbecausehe has beendefeated
in a rhetoricalcontest.54In a similar vein, the agreementfinally forged
betweenSocratesand Thrasymachusmay be basedupon defectivereason-
ing but is necessaryif the next stage in the dialogueis to occur.55Rather
than rely on the interlocutorsas authoritiesor for raisingthe properques-
tions, it is necessaryto come to termswith the variousstagesof the dia-
logue despite the agreementor disagreementof Socratesand the other
interlocutors.
In certaininstances,Socrates'reply to a questionappearspatentlyeva-
sive. Yet often these apparentevasionsare simply obliqueand concealed
ways of answeringthe question.Exemplifyingthis is Socrates'response
to Glauconat the end of the discussionof the first two "greatwaves of
paradox"(466d). Glauconmentionsthathe was just aboutto ask Socrates
whethera regime basedupon the first two waves-equality of the sexes
and the communityof women and children (Socraticcommunism)-is
possible.Socratesrepliesby speakingof the mannerin which such a re-
gime will wage war, "For as to war," I said, "I supposeit's plain how
they will make war."56He continuesthe discussionby setting forth the
procedureswhich will ensurethat the childrenwill be able to learnabout
war firsthand and also remainsafe. He concludesthe discussionby mak-
ing the distinctionbetweenwaging war against Greeks and barbarians.
Only once does he even allude to the first wave of paradox-equality of
sexes-and that is a depreciatoryremark.He notes that it is "illiberaland
greedyto plundera corpse,and the mark of a small, womanishmind to
hold the enemy to be the body of the dead enemy who has flown away."
This remark,which appearsto addressthe natureof woman ratherthan
any particularwoman, casts doubt on Socrates'earliercommentsabout
the potentialequalityof naturesbetweenman and women. Furthermore,
primarilyin light of war and its consequencesdoes the equality of the
sexesappearimpossible.Asidefrom speakingonly of men as warriors,and
thus indicatingone relevantpolitical activityin which the sexes are not

above using their bias in order to make his points. In his discussion with Polemarchus,
Socrates uses as examples of arts activities which he calls sham arts in the Gorgias,
compare Republic 332c with Gorgias 462d-463a. He is apparentlypermitted this be-
cause Polemarchusis not, or does not prove himself theoreticallyinclined.
54 Bloom, op. cit., pp. 335-36, commenting on Republic 35od-e.
55 They become friends later in the dialogue, 498d, testifying to the fact that the
best regime will require the services of someone with the art of Thrasymachus.Cf.
Leo Strauss, "Plato," in Leo Strauss, Joseph Cropsey, editors, History of Political
Philosophy (Chicago: i963), pp. 30-31.
56 466e.

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 503

equal, Socrates forces us to reflect on whether war prompts a regime to

treat the sexes equally or unequally. It is obvious that war renders physical
strength politically relevant, but not as obvious is the fact that for the con-
tinued life of the regime childbearing women are more important than
men.57 Given the requirements of the best regime, war clearly demon-
strates the impossibility of treating the sexes as if there were no relevant
political difference between them.58 Although Socrates has managed to
avoid a direct answer to Glaucon, his "evasion" constitutes a sufficiently
clear response.
An analysis of the dialogue also reveals that certain of the assumptions
which provide the basis for the discussion are not sufficiently justified or
warranted. Although the interlocutors accept such assumptions as proved
and thus continue the dialogue, the philosophic reader does well to ex-
amine both the assumptions and the uncritical position of the interlocutors.
For example, the construction of the best regime in the Republic proceeds
upon the hypothesis that justice is the same in a single man and a polis.
This hypothesis, in turn, is based upon the unstated assumption that the
justice possessed by a single soul whose parts are inseparable is the same
as the justice possessed by a polis the parts of which are distributed among
separated bodies. The best regime, then, is based upon the unstated premise
that there is no significant difference or no politically important difference
between the body of a single man and the body of a polis. However, Soc-
crates' later comments in the dialogue hint that this may not be the case.
Indeed, they reveal that this premise is provisional.59 To the extent to
which the premise upon which later arguments are based is provisional,
the arguments themselves appear to be provisional. Socrates, on occasion
in the Republic, tells Glaucon that they would have to take a "longer

57 The women, as bearers of future citizens, are more irreplaceablethan the men
as any farmer who has bred animals knows. This parallel, incidentally, is appropriate
in this context. Socrates speaks of breeding the guardians as if they were animals.
The allusions and examples he uses are derived from animal, not human, behavior.
Perhaps this is why in addition to declaring the breeding of the best with the best
sacred, Socrates states, "it will be a necessity for them to use many drugs," (459c).
For comparison between human and animal breeding, cf. 459a-c.
58 The patent physical difference indicates this. Also, the guardian women will be
bred more often and thus be pregnant more often. Obviously a woman does not
make a good warrior throughoutpregnancy.
59 In the dialogue, the parallel between the city and man is transformed into a
parallel between the city and the soul. The Republic disregards the body and treats
humans as disembodied souls. Among other things, this permits the easy equality
of the sexes which must disregard bodily differences or differences which stem from
bodily inequalities. Eros, the passion connected with both the body and the soul, is
also disregarded.Cf. Strauss,op. cit., pp. 22-23.

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504 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

road"if they reallywish to get to the heartof the matter.60Perhapsthat

"longerroad"consistsin re-examiningthe premiseswhich "will serveus
now"but maynot be correct.
The difficultiesraisedby the contentionthat Platohad no spokesmanin
the dialoguesmight be erased,and, instead,we might accept the more
conventionalview that Socrateswas the mouthpiecefor Plato'sthoughts,
and he presentedthesethoughtsexotericallyin the dialogues.Even if this
were granted,the task of interpretingthe dialogueswould not be appre-
ciablysimplified.For the famousironyof Plato'sSocrateswould give birth
to the same issuesgeneratedby the notionof Platonicesotericism.61 To be
ironic is to say less than one knows, it is to feign ignorance.62The inten-
tion of the ironic speaker(or writer) is disguisedfrom the casualaudi-
ence.Hence ironyis a formof dissembling,which,in plainwords,is lying.
Finally, an ironic speakerlike Socrates,with his annoying habit of pre-
tending to be ignorant while asking the most embarrassingquestions,
promptsboth censureand admiration.In the former case, those whose
cherishedopinionsare skepticallyquestionedare most probablyprevented
from silencing the ironic Socratesquickly becausethe irony affordshim
the protectionof "ignorance."In the latter case, the irony may provoke
the philosophicalnatureand lead capablemen away from conventional
opinion to the realitywhich lies behind opinion.In other words, irony is
somewhatsimilar to esotericism.It is suggestedhere that irony is to a
Socraticconversationwhat esotericismis to a Platonicdialogue.Platonic
esotericismmay be but an image or reflectionof Socraticirony.Given the
ironyof Socrates,if he is Plato'sspokesman,the teachingof the dialogues
wouldbe no easierto apprehend.
Socrates'final objectionto writtenspeechesin the Phaedrusis that they
are not guaranteeda "parent's"protection.When the authoris absentand
no equallycompetentinterpreteris at hand,a writtenspeech,Socratescon-
tends, will not be understood.The views derived from such misunder-
standingmay discreditboththe speechand its author;they may also harm
the nonphilosophicreader.A glanceat the almostcomicvarietyof opinions
aboutthe dialoguesappearsto castSocratesas a prophet.63

60 435d, this is implied in the discussion of the soul at

6IIC-6I2b; Phaedrus 247a.
Cf. also Shorey's note to 540b in The Republic, translated by Paul Shorey (Cam-
bridge: 1953), vol. 2, pp. 82-83.
61 Strauss, op. cit., p. 7; The City and Man, pp. 50-52.
62 Ibid., and The ClassicalGreek
Dictionary (Chicago: 1962).
63 Cf., for example, the issue animating the book edited
by Thomas L. Thorson,
Plato: Totalitarianor Democrat? (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: I963). Robert Hall,
"Plato's Just Man: Thoughts on Strauss' Plato," The New Scholasticism (Spring,
1968), p. 202, remarks, "Sometimes it is difficult to imagine how the same text can
give rise to such violently conflictinginterpretations."

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 505

Ironically,the esotericand aporeticcharacterof the dialoguesappearto

serveas "parents":
Moreover,the whole doctrineseemsto have been expressedin almost
enigmaticformulas,in formulaswhich can and must be memorized
at once, but cannotreallybe understoodimmediately.Understanding,
on the contrary,must be gained again and again.... Just because
these formulas are unintelligiblein themselvesthey become instru-
ments, tools.64
This "almostenigmatic"characterappearsto safeguardthe dialogues.No
matterhow they are read,the ambiguousmeaningof the doctrineand the
formulasin which it is expressedprotectsthe nonphilosophicreaderby
confusinghim. Consequently,the author,too, is protectedfrom whatever
animositythe concealedteachingmight have raisedin a nonphilosophic
audience.But the "almostenigmatic"characterof the dialoguescannot
be designedto preventmisunderstanding.Quite the contrary,it is geared
toward promotingsuch misunderstanding.The confusionwhich ensues
from the "almostenigmatic"formulas,since it protectsor concealsthe
teaching,is more benign than a misunderstandingbased upon a readily
intelligibleteaching.Among other things, this confusionmakesit difficult
to claim a clear, and hence authoritative,understanding.As the Apology
reveals,Socrates'teachingis misunderstoodeven by his accuserMeletus.
While this did not spareSocrates,it may be responsiblefor sparingphi-
losophy.65Plato, afterall, enjoyeda long and productivelife in the Acad-
emy.
Another "parent"safeguardsthe dialogues.Reflectingthis is the fact
that Plato'sspeechesin the Academywere no more explicitthan his writ-
ten work.66This, in turn,stemsfrom the propositionthatthe realitywhich
can be seen with the "eyeof the soul"(533d) cannotbe depictedin speech.
Hence SocratestellsGlauconin the Republic:
"You will no longer be able to follow my dear Glaucon,"I said,
"althoughtherewould not be any lack of eagernesson my part. But
you would no longer be seeing an image of what you are saying,but
the truthitself."67
The view that certaintruthscannotbe put into words is stressedin the
centralimageryof the Republic,the allegoryof the cave and the divided
line. In the former,Socratesrequiresan image of the idea of the good in

64 Merlan, op. cit.,

p. 427.
66 Bloom, op. cit., pp. 307 ff.
66 Merlan,op. cit.; Brann, op. cit., p.
37-38.
67 533a.

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506 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

orderto show Glauconwhat the idea of the good is like. Moreover,even

the image,as image,cannotimitatethe realityit seeksto convey.For there
is moreto the idea of the good than is symbolizedby the sun. Socratestells
Glauconthat one must furtherreflectthat the sun is the "causeof that
which is right and noble in all things" (517c). The logos of Socrates can,
at best, turn the soul towardthe right path, towardthe good, but cannot
explicatethe good in otherthan symbolicform.The good itself is a private
vision which can only be sharedto the extent to which Socratessharesit
with Glaucon-in imagesor symbols.
In the storyof the cave,Socratesdoes not indicatepreciselywhy the ac-
count of realitymust be given throughimagesor symbols.His defenseof
this positionoccursearlierin yet anotherimage,the dividedline. Here, he
separatesa line into four segments,each of which representsa level of
reality.Hierarchicallyrankedthey are: images;naturaland artificialob-
jects; hypotheses;ideas. The following equation representsthe line: A
standsfor ideas;B for hypotheses;C for naturaland artificialobjects;D
for images:
(A+B) : (C+D):: A:B:: C:D
From (A+B) : (C+D) :: C:D followsalternando(Euclid,V, 16)
1. (A+B) C:: (C+D) : D
From A:B : C:D followscompenendo(Euclid,V, 18)
2. (A+B) :B:: (C+D):D
Therefore(Euclid,V, 11)
3. (A+B) : C:: (A+B) :B
andconsequently(Euclid,V, 9)
4. C=B68
D
= Y Solving for B Solving for C
C X=X-B C
Y B Y-C
B XB XY-BY XY-XC = YC
= X B(X + Y) + XY XY = YC + XC
A B = XY XY =(Y +X) C
X+Y
XY =C
X+Y
B = C
68 This equation is worked out by Klein, op. cit., p.
119, note 27. Cf. also Brann's
analysis of the divided line, op. cit., p. 49 ff. The divided line may also be ex-
pressed algebraically:

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 507

A Platonicdialogue occupieseither the third (C) or fourth (D) seg-

ment of the line. Towardthe end of the dialogue(599a), Socratescontends
that poetry,of which the Platonicdialoguesmay be a species,69is but an
image of an image thrice removedfrom realityand therebyoccupiesthe
fourth (D) segmentof the line. But writing,unlike the poetrycondemned
by Socratesin the dialogue,can be regardedas an artificialobjectstriving
to imitate that which is, therebyoccupyingthe third (C) segmentof the
line. The Platonicdialogues,despitetheir poeticquality,would appearto
fall into this category.Sincethe thirdsegmentof the line (C) provesequal
to the second (B), the written word appearsto be able to rise to within
one removefrom being. Oral discourse,on the otherhand,may be able to
rise to the level of being itself. Yet Socrates'commentsindicatea level of
being beyond the line itself, a level beyond being. Being is contingent
upon this level (5 Ib-c). "Sincethe ideas are, the good, then is the source
of being,but beyondbeing in the sensethatit existsin a way differentfrom
the other beings."70Socrates'silence about this level indicatesthat oral
discourseis limited with respectto revealingthe sourceof being. Written
speech,then, can rise to within two stepsof the sourceof being,the spoken
word to within one step. The truthaboutbeing apparentlycannotbe con-
veyedby eitherthe writtenor spokenwordbut requiresthat solitarymove-
ment of the soul in orderto becomeintelligible.
Both the form and the contentof the dialoguesprotectthem from the
misunderstandingsof potential"stepparents." Appropriately,the form of
the dialogueis indissolublyconnectedto its content.The philosophyof the
dialogues,after all, appearsbound to the hypothesisthat finds in form
the highestreality.
Socrates'final commenton speechesin the Phaedrusis that they should
resemblenaturalentities. "Art has reachedperfectionwhen it gives the
appearanceof being nature."71Consequently,writtenor oral speechmust
be constructedas a naturalbody is constructed,differingonly in that art
can leavenothingto chance.The partsof a naturalbodyfunctionto satisfy
the requirementsof the whole body.So too, Socratessuggests,shouldit be
with a speech.As eachpartof the body is necessaryif the body is to fulfill
its naturalend, each part of a speechis necessaryif it is to fulfill its end.
The function of the whole, be it a body or a speech,dependsupon the

69 Brann, op. cit., pp. 32-37. Cf. also, Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato (New
York: I967), pp. 15-I6, note 12. Bloom's analysis of the critique of poetry in the
first half of Book o leads us to conclude that a Platonic dialogue is the only true
form of poetry. Cf. Bloom, op. cit., p. 434.
70 Bloom, op. cit., p. 402.
71 Friedlander,op. cit., p. 158.

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508 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

properworkingof its parts.72Needlessto say,all of the partsare essential.

This may be more obviousin a naturalbody, but is equallytrue with re-
spect to a speech.Indeed, perhapsmore so. For a speech is knowingly
constructed,nothing is left to chance."Perhapsit is an insolubletask-
but it must be attempted-to envisagethe works of Plato as a planetary
system from which no sourceof light or energy may be omitted."73Ac-
cording to Socrates'teaching in the Phaedrus,art must imitate nature.
Indeed,Aristotle'scritiqueof Platostemsfrom the fact that the latterap-
pearsto have subordinatednatureto art. That is, Plato is accusedof per-
fecting nature,74ratherthan simply imitating nature.While Aristotle's
critiqueis raisedwith respectto the best regime,especiallythe notion of
the communalfamily,it also appliesto Platonicwriting.For Plato seems
to have replacedboth the naturalnecessityand chancegoverningnatural
bodiesby artisticnecessityin his dialogues.The dialoguesare thus ruled
by the necessityof art and not nature.Chanceis also absentin the con-
structionof the dialogues.
Sincechancehas beendisregardedin the dialogues,understandingtheir
teachingdependsupon an analysisof the function of each part and the
relationshipbetweenthe partsand the whole. None of the parts,irrespec-
tive of theirapparentsuperfluity,can be without significance;they are all
necessaryfor the functionof the whole. Thus the externalfeaturesof the
dialoguesassumean importance,for example,beyondillustratingthe stage
of Plato'slife when they were written or, with Taylor and Burnet,the
stage of Socrates'life.75Given the necessitygoverningspeeches,the dia-
logues will remainenigmaticunlesseven the most trivialpartsare taken
seriously:the time of the dialogue;the place; the occasion;the number
and characterof the interlocutors;the reasonfor the dialogue;and the
asides in a narrateddialogue.Hence following the lead of Richardsand
disregardingthe partswhich "tendto hinder the actualflow of the dia-
logue"mayonly furtherobscurethe teaching.76
The closing passagesof the Phaedrusindicatesome generalprinciples

72 For the meaning of "proper working," cf.

Harry V. Jaffa, Equality and Liberty
(New York: I965), p. 206, note 2.
73 Friedlinder, op. cit., p. I62.
74 Although these are not Aristotle's words, the implication exists in his critique of
Plato's best regime as a convention, Politics 126Iaio-I264b25. See Harry V. Jaffa's
commentary on Aristotle's critique of Plato's Republic, "Aristotle," in History of
Political Philosophy,pp. 73, 8 -85.
75 Cf. John R. Kayser'sargument in "Ten in The Piraeus: Neglected Recipientsof
SocraticEducation," (with Kent Moors), Cithara (May, 1972).
76 Ivor A. Richards, The Republic: A Version in Simplified English (London:
1948), p. 13.

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 509

governingthe form of a Platonicdialogue.These principles,in turn,lead

to certainrulesof readingwhich, if followed,maymakethe taskof a com-
mentatoreasierthan a conventionalreadingwhich disregardsthe distinc-
tion betweena dialogueand a treatise.But the Phaedrusis not the only
dialogue in which speechesare discussed.77In the Republic,Socratesex-
pands his teaching on speeches,particularlywith respectto the role of
speechesin education.
After GlauconpersuadesSocratesto createa city of luxuryratherthan a
"cityof pigs"(calledthe"healthycity"bySocrates),theproblemof education
arises.78This, Socratesinsists,shouldconsistin gymnasticsfor the bodyand
music for the soul. Music,in the contextof the Republic,is not limited to
its contemporarymeaning.Rather,it correspondsto whatwouldbe termed
religious,moral,and intellectualinstructiontoday.79Socratesinitiatesthe
discussionaboutproper/jovawKc by consideringthe typesof speecheswhich
shall be used to educatethe guardians.Neither the thirdclassnor the phi-
lospher-kingsare mentioned in this section of the dialogue. Education
in /zovo-tKv, as discussed here, is directed toward those called guardians
(4vAae) at first and soldiers (rypaTwrrfS) later. That is, education in
JLovLtKr is directed toward that class which does not rule but implements
the commandsof the rulers.Aside from the interestingimplicationsthis
has concerningthe possibilityof the bestregime,it is clearthat this educa-
tion is not directedtowardpotentialphilosophers.80 The animatingtheme

77Protagoras 343c-344b; Timaeus 28c; Laws 66oe-66id, 899d; Phaedo 82ia-c.

78 This indicates that art (in this case education) replaces nature as a guide for
human action in the city of luxury. It appears to follow from this that the best
regime created in the dialogue, to the extent that it is a city of luxury, will be con-
ventional. The presence or necessity of education may indicate that politics, which
is absent from the healthy city, is essentially conventional. Aristotle's analysis of the
Republic is not far from the mark on this point, cf. note 74 above; compare Re-
public 372b in which Socrates speaks of the hymns sung in the healthy city with
6o7a.
79 Bloom, op. cit., p. 449, note 36.
80 Socrates says as much at 522a-b: "It [education in music] educated the guar-
dians through habits, transmitting by harmony a certain harmoniousness,not knowl-
edge, and by rhythm a certain rhythmicalness.And connected with it were certain
other habits, akin to these, conveyed by speeches, whether they were tales or
speeches of a truer sort. But as a study directed toward something of the sort you
are now seeking [knowledge of the good], there was nothing of the kind in it."
Moreover, the model for the guardians is the dog, which is called a "philosophical
beast." But the dog cannot serve as a model for the philosopher. The actions of a
dog, as described by Socrates, are not based upon knowledge but habit: the ability
of a dog to distinguish friend from enemy is really its ability to distinguish the
familiar from the unfamiliar. In this sense, the dog is a parochial beast. The dog

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510 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

of this educationis civic virtue, not philosophicaltraining.Virtues and

characteristicsbefittinggood citizensarecultivatedin the guardians:piety
(376ff); courage (38Ie, 386b); freedom (387a); moderation(39oa ff);
obedienceto conventionalauthority (39ib); liberality(39oe ff). These
virtues and characteristicsare not necessarilythose of a philosopheror
ruler,at leastas they are notedby Socrateslaterin the dialogue.81On the
exotericlevel,the "music"educatingthe guardianscommendscivicvirtue
ratherthan virtueitself, the educationalschemeof this sectionof the Re-
publicculminatesin a praiseof civic excellence.Not until he tells us he is
digressing,82does Socratesspeakof virtueitself or does he praiseunqual-
ified excellence.And, even while doing this, he praises the civic conse-
quencesof virtue.Hence the journeyoutsidethe cave is praisednot simply
becausethe wandererfinds himself on the "islesof the blessed,"but be-
cause he returnsto help guide the affairsof the cave. In the Republic
educationappearsdesignedfor politicalpurposes.83
The educationalschemedevisedby Socratesfor the guardiansis appro-
priateto theirtasksas citizens.However,sucheducationsuffersone short-
coming.Virtuesare deemedlaudatoryto the extent to which they benefit
the regime. Consequently,virtue itself, to the extent to which it may be
politicallyharmfulor irrelevant,is replacedor subsumedby civic virtue.
Indeed,even philosophyis primarilypraisedbecauseof its utility to the
city,84 and, within the dialogue, discussed as a digression.85 The preoccu-
pationwith the politicalwhich informsthe exotericlevel of the dialogue
is furtherreflectedin Socrates'treatmentof the soul. The tripartitionof
the soul in the Republicdiffersfrom the partitionof the soul in the Phae-
drus.Assertinga "development"in Plato'sthoughtis one way of coming
to termswith this difference.Anotherway consistsin examiningthe var-
ious contextsin which the soul is discussed.The discussionof the soul in
the Republicappearsto disregardas propertiesof the soul thosewhich are

may have the virtues of a good citizen, but not those of a philosopher. The philo-
sophic soul does not, according to Socrates, make the a priori assumption that the
unfamiliar ought to be treated with enmity and the familiar with some good.
81 Cf. note 19 above. Also, Apology of Socrates4xd20-22, 20d-2xa8; Laws 639b-c;
Strauss,"Plato,"pp. 53-55.
82 Compare45oa and 543c.
83 Havelock, op. cit., offers a most provocative analysis of the dialogue, which
disputes this commonplace view. Havelock contends that the work is designed as a
criticism of Greek education and a remedy for that education. Nonetheless, to the
extent to which there is a relationshipbetween what men are taught and how they
behave, the dialogue would still have to be consideredpolitically relevant.
84 Undoubtedly this explains why those who have escaped from the cave must
be compelled to return from the isles of the blessed. It may also explain why Aris-
totle does not speak of philosophy in his critique of the Republic.
85 Compare45oa with 543c.

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 5II

politicallyirrelevantor harmful.Hence the body,which is symbolizedas

a propertyof the soul in the Phaedrus,in the image of the chariot,is dis-
regardedin the Republic.86
The exotericpreoccupationwith the politicalis justified,after Book I,
by Socrates'identificationof justiceas the highest good (358a). The dia-
logue then proceedsfrom hypothesesderivedfrom this identification.No
attemptis made to demonstratewhy justiceis the highest good or, more
importantly,why the highest good must be both instrumentaland in-
trinsic.87Moreover,the end of the dialogue indicatesthat this identifica-
tion is questionableor provisional.88 For if the highestgood admitsof no
instrumentalqualities,as Aristotleargues and Socrateshints towardthe
end of the dialogue,89we should be promptedto reexaminethe exalted
position of justice within the dialogue. In the first place, we should be
proddedinto looking at the advantagesof justicefrom the vantagepoint
of someonefor whom the attractionsof politicallife arenot overwhelming.
We shouldbe induced,in Aristotle'swords,to adoptthe postureof gods or
beasts;in Socrates'words, we should adopt the pose of philosophers.By
looking at justice in this manner,we may discoverthat the exotericpre-
occupationconcealsa differentesotericpreoccupation.
The section of the Republicdevotedto speeches(educationin music)
further implies a differencebetween the exotericand esotericteaching.
Socratesmaintainsthat childrenwho are potentialguardiansmust firstbe
educatedby myths and false speeches.These speechesare not only in-
tended for children.Young men are also told lies and myths in order to
makethem bettercitizens(378e). Shortlythereafter(38ob), Socratesmen-
tions that, "anyone,youngeror older must be told lies for the benefitof
the city."Since lies and myths may be told to "anyone"in the interestof
justice,those who participatein the dialogueas interlocutorsneed not be
excluded.Socratescontendsthat rulersshould tell lies and myths to bring
about justice.Possiblyhe, as the ruler of a discussionaboutjustice,is re-
quired to lie or to misleadthe other interlocutorsin orderto achievehis
goal. These lies and mythsappearto proceedfrom the premisethat justice
is the highest good. That is, they are warrantedbecauseof the exalted
statusof justice.Socrates'defenseof lying seemsconnectedto the claimshe
makesfor justice;it may even be requiredby theseclaims.In truth,justice

86 Cf. also, Strauss, "Plato," for an extended discussion of this

point.
87
According to Aristotle, for example, the highest good is not instrumental.It is
that which a man desires for its own sake, not for that which he can get with it.
The highest good is the good for the sake of which all other goods are desired. Cf.
Harry V. Jaffa, "Aristotle,"pp. 71-72.
88 519c-520b, 619a, 504d.
89 Ibid.; Jaffa,op. cit., pp. 70ff.

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512 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

and hence civic virtuemay be of a lower orderthan Socratesis willing to

admitopenly.
No discussionof speeches(education) in the Republiccan resist the
temptationto commenton Platoniccensorship.One of the more striking
featuresof Platonic scholarshipis its almost monotonousuniformityon
the issueof censorship.Althoughmany commentatorsjoin Popperin their
harshdisapprovalof Plato for endorsingthis restrictionon the freedomof
speech,90others, like Wild,91expressapprovalof Plato while sharing a
similar interpretationof the censorshipendorsedin the Republic.The
irony of Socraticcensorshipappearsto have eluded most commentators.
When discussingthe properrules for speechesaboutthe gods and heroes,
Socratesintroducescensorship.Accordingto him, gods and heroesmust
appearworthyof admirationand veneration.They shouldnot be portrayed
as cowardly,ignoble,illiberal,lacking in virtue,and evil. In short, gods,
and to an extentheroes,shouldappearperfect.For example,Socratesmain-
tains that gods are improperlydepictedwhen they are shown as beings
who alter their form. Perfectbeings would have no desire to alter their
form since such a change necessarilyrenders them imperfect. Conse-
quently,any attemptto draw the gods as less than perfectwill be consid-
ered a gross impietyin the best regime and will not be tolerated.Having
said this, Socratesthen proceedsto offer abundantexamplesof this form
of impiety. Quoting from Homer almost exclusively,Socratesindicates
the sourceof impiety.Citing the most "improper"passages,Socratesdis-
closesthat the poet'sview of the gods is apparentlydiametricallyopposed
to that which he, Socrates,wishes to inculcatein good citizens.Now these
passagesin the Republicprovidean excellentsourcefor materialshowing
the gods to be craven,base,lustful,vain, and unjust.Needlessto say,were
the best regime to come into being, this sectionof the Republicwould it-
self have to be censored;Socratesis in the curiouspositionof being cen-
soredon accountof his examplesof that which shouldbe censored.
Socrates'"purification" of the literatureaboutthe gods also castsdoubt
on the power of the gods. If the gods cannotbe consideredthe cause of
evil, their power is lessened.Although, in the Odyssey,Zeus claims that
mortalsoverlookthe fact that fate also rulesthe gods, Socrateswould have
them subjectto a more limiting and more intelligiblenecessity:the good.
Socratesattemptsto demonstratethatthe godshavediscerniblenaturesand
are limited by those natures.92He thus questions the grander,if occa-
90 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. I
(New York: I963);
Thorson's collection, op. cit., shows both the pro and anti Plato views.
91 Cf. Wild's article in Thorson, op. cit.
92 Obviously, a god limited by his own nature cannot be the
omnipotent Lord
of the Old Testament. Hence he replies to the question, "what are you?", with,
"I shall be that I shall be." Cf. Harry V. Jaffa, Equality and Liberty, pp. 227-28.

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 513

sionallyimpious,view of the gods containedin the work of Homer. One

consequenceof Socrates'censorshipof Homer is that the gods can only be
depictedas good. It follows,then, that they are less powerfulthan Homer
indicated.Socrates'speechesabout the gods are paradoxical.On the one
hand, his censorshipleads to the notion that the gods are perfect.On the
other, it leads to the notion that they are limited beings,governedby the
necessityof their naturesand the good. Moreover,the gods, accordingto
Socrates'censorship,can no longer rule over men. For a god can neither
alterhis formnor lie. Yet rulers,Socratescontends,mustlie; this sectionof
the Republicalso shows thatlies and falsespeechesare the necessaryhand-
maidensof the art of ruling. But Socratesstatesthat the gods do not lie.
Consequently,they cannot rule. While appearingto praisethe gods and
increasetheir status, Socratesaccomplishesthe opposite.He strips them
of much of their powerand consequentdignity.Socrates'praiseappearsa
dubiouscompliment.
Socrates'final explicitcommenton speechesin the Republicis a stylistic
critique.The politicalprinciple,one man one job,holdsfor poetsas well as
otherartists(or artisans).Only the narrativestyle is permittedin the best
regime.The imitativestyle, by which the authorconcealshimself behind
charactersand players,must be censored.The principlejustifyingthe ex-
clusionof imitativepoetryis that men areableto masteronly one art well.
A writer,on that account,cannot,by using a characterwho is a sailor,for
example,know the artof seamanship;and thushe cannotportraythe sailor
withoutindicatingthat the sailoris speakingin his own name.The writer
cannotconcealeitherhimself or his art if he is to laborin the best regime.
The exclusionof imitativestyle from the best regimemay also serveas
a basis upon which to excludeauthorsof philosophicaldialogues.Aside
from the fact that philosophyis depictedin the Republicas the art of arts,
having as its scopeall the otherartsand by this token raisingthe question
of whether it is one or many arts, a Platonicdialogueis not a narrative
work. Despite the powerfulargumentof Brann,93a Platonicdialogue is
imitative.The authorof the dialoguessuccessfullyconcealshimself, and
perhapshis art as well. If the censorshipendorsedin the dialogue is in-
terpretedas straightforward, the authorof the dialoguewould be banished
from the bestregimetogetherwith the corruptpoets.Indeed,the verydia-

93 Brann, op. cit., p. 33: "For the narrator,Socrateshimself, is always present and
responsible, and he keeps himself before us with the ever recurring phrases. ...
What is more, he is not an anonymous mouthpiece whose work a reader reads, as
he does the Homeric epics, without ever learning who the poet was .... The teller
is Socrates," Brann, however, neglects to mention that the Socrates we have come
to know is a characterin other men's writing. Socratesis indeed the "teller" in the
Republic, but not the author of the dialogue which casts him as narrator; Plato is
the "poet."

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514 NOBLE LIES & JUSTICE

logue which createsthis regime must be censored.Socratessuggests,as

subtly as Machiavelli,94that a regime cannot tolerate its founder as a
citizen.
Adding to the difficultiesconfrontinga commentatoron the Republicis
the charge leveled against Socratesby Adeimantusin the midst of the
discussion:

"Socrates,no one could contradictyou in this. But here is how those

who hear what you now say are affectedon each occasion.They be-
lieve that,becauseof inexperienceat questioningand answering,they
are at each questionmisled a little by the argument;and when the
little ones are collectedat the end of the arguments,the slip turnsout
to be greatand contraryto the firstassertion."(487b)
Socratesdoes not contestthis opinion.Laterin the discussionhe even ap-
pearsto agreewith thisson of Ariston:
Soc. "The statementsmade at that time were, as it looks to me, defi-
cient in precision.If they were satisfactoryto you, only you can tell."
Ad. "They were, within measure,satisfactoryto me. And it looks as
if they were for the otherstoo." "My friend,"I said, "a measurein
such things which in any way falls shortof that which is, is no mea-
sureat all."(504b)
These statementsindicatethat Socratesis aware that he is not using the
best arguments.Instead,he seems to use the best possiblearguments.To
the chargeof misleadingand imprecisionhe remainsmute. But,according
to Socrates,lack of precisionmay renderargumentsspuriousor meaning-
less. In thesepassagesSocratesseemsto warn the attentivereaderthat the
argumentshe offersand the other interlocutorsacceptmay be defective.
Following Adeimantus,the other interlocutorsappearsatisfiedwith Soc-
rates'answers.But this satisfactionmay be groundless.It falls to the silent
interlocutor,the reader,to determinewhetherSocrates'answersare satis-
factoryor lackingin precision.
This analysisbegan by noting the difficultyin interpretinga Platonic
dialogue.One of the greatestobstaclesstems from the form of the work
itself. Anotherarisesfrom the fact that Plato not only wished to conceal
himself in his work, but also wished to concealhis teaching.The former
wish has given rise to many attemptsto distinguish Plato's philosophy
from that of some of the charactersin his dialogues.On the other hand,
manycommentatorsidentifyPlato'sthoughtas thatexpressedby his major
character.Yet, speakingon his own behalf in the SeventhLetter, Plato

94 The Prince, chapter 6.

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 JOHN R. KAYSER 5I5

expressly warns against this approach.5 The Republic contains a similar

warning. In concluding the discussion about education, Socrates makes
the following comment on imitative speeches:
Soc. "But when he gives a speech as if he were someone else, will we
not say then that he likens his style as much as possible to that of the
man he has announced as the speaker?" "Surely we will say that."
Soc. "Is not likening himself to someone else, either in voice or in
deed, the same as imitating the man he likens himself to?" (389c)
Socrates agrees with the substance of Plato's remarks in the Seventh Letter.
The writer becomes the speaker's spokesman, not the speaker the writer's.
Attempts to distinguish Plato from his characters appear, in the light of
this, time consuming and misleading. For they only serve to avert one's
glance from the important issues of the dialogues. The issues presented
in the Republic are not who reveals the thought of Plato, but the nature
and possibility of the best political order. There is no formula which will
help us uncover this teaching easily. Guided by Socrates' comments on
speeches in the Phaedrus and Republic, we should approach the dialogue
as potential participants, taking nothing for granted. Above all, we should
imitate the humility of Socrates and try to work our own way through the
logos of the dialogue before condemning as errors and superficialities those
parts which do not immediately make sense to us. In short, we should give
Plato the courtesy of a reading which takes into account the unique form
of the dialogue.

95 Seventh Letter 314a-315b.

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