Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chapter 15
Exercise 1: 3 Points
Consider the following extensive-form games. Solve the game by using backward induction.
a)
b)
c)
1/6
SI 563 Homework 4 Oct 20, 2016
3
X Y
2
A (2,1) (0,0)
B (2,6) (5,5)
C (3,1) (3,1)
Exercise 2: 3 Points
Compute the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria for the following games. Do so
by writing the normal-form matrices for each game and its subgames. Which Nash equilibria
are not subgame perfect?
a)
2/6
SI 563 Homework 4 Oct 20, 2016
2
AC AD BC BD
1
X (3,0) (4,6)
Y (8,5) (2,1)
The Nash Equilibrium are (X, B) and (Y, A)
2
C D
1
(6,4) (3,2)
The Nash Equilibria is (, C)
Only the restriction of (ZX, BC) and (WY, AC) can create NE in every subgame so only (ZX, BC) and
(WY, AC) are subgame perfect and (WX, BD), (WY, AD), (ZY, BC) are not subgame perfect.
b)
3/6
SI 563 Homework 4 Oct 20, 2016
2
AC AD BC BD
1
(2,3) (5,4)
The Nash Equilibria is (, B)
2
1
E (6,2)
F (2,6)
The Nash Equilibria is (E, )
2
C D
1
E (6,2) (0,2)
F (2,6) (0,2)
The Nash Equilibrium are (E, C) and (E, D)
Only the restriction of (UE, BD) and (DE, BC) can create NE in every subgame so only (UE, BD) and
(DE, BC) are subgame perfect and (UF, BD), (DE, AC) are not subgame perfect.
Exercise 3: 2 Points
5/6
SI 563 Homework 4 Oct 20, 2016
a)
There are 6 proper subgames in this game.
b)
A single sequentially rational strategy profile: (BHJKM, DE), and the payoff is (6, 5)
6/6