Complaint for Unlawful Detainer Sample

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
City of Manila
Branch 1

KRUL ACOSTA,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL CASE No. 98765
-versus- FOR: Unlawful Detainer

MEGAN VITUG,
Defendant.

x-----------------------------------x

COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, the plaintiff, through the undersigned counsel and unto this
Honorable Court, most respectfully avers:
1. That the plaintiff, KRUL ACOSTA, is of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with residence
and postal address at 123 Benitez Street, Manila;
2. That the defendant, MEGAN VITUG, is of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with
residence and postal address at 456 Modesto Street, Manila, where they may be served
with summons and other court processes;
3. The plaintiff is the owner of a land over which an apartment had been constructed
located 654 San Pedro Street, Manila;
4. By virtue of a contract of lease, the plaintiff leased unto the defendant the aforesaid
apartment for a consideration of P5,000.00 a month as rental to be paid within the first
ten (10) days of each month starting November 3, 2011;
5. The defendant failed to pay the agreed rental for several months starting February 19,
2012 up to the present;
6. On May 3, 2012, the plaintiff sent a letter of demand to vacate the apartment which was
received by the defendant as shown in the registry return receipt hereto attached as
Annex “A”;
7. Despite said letter of demand which was repeated by oral demands, the defendant
failed and still refused to pay the agreed amount of rentals and to vacated the
apartment;
8. By reason of failure of the defendant to vacate the premises and to pay the unpaid
rentals, the plaintiff was compelled to file this complaint engaging the services of
counsel in the amount of P10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed unto this
Honorable Court that, after hearing, judgment be rendered ordering the defendant:

1. To vacate the subject premises;

2. To pay the amount of P5,000.00 per month as compensation for the reasonable use of
the subject premises until they finally vacate the said premises;
3. To pay the plaintiff the cost of the suit.
City of Manila, September 24, 2012.

REYES, TOLENTINO AND CRUZ LAW OFFICE

Counsel for the Plaintiff
Unit 123, Victoria Tower I
Taft Avenue, Manila
 By:
Louise Reyes
Roll of Attorney No. 98765
IBP No. 12345/2-5-12/Manila
PTR No. 87654/12-22-11/Manila

VERIFICATION/CERTIFICATION OF FORUM SHOPPING

Republic of the Philippines )

City of Manila ) S.S.

I, KRUL ACOSTA, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single and resident of 123 Benitez
Street, Manila, after having been duly sworn to in accord Nance with law do hereby
depose and say:
1. That I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case;
2. That I have caused the preparation of the foregoing complaint and have read the
allegations contained therein;
3. The allegations in the said complaint are true and correct of my own knowledge and
authentic records;
4. I hereby certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of my
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
5. That if I should learn thereafter that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending, I hereby undertake to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
or agency where the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have
been filed;
6. I executed this verification/certification to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and to
comply with the provisions of Adm. Circular No. 04-94 of the Honorable Supreme Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 24th of
September 2012, in the City of Manila.

KRUL ACOSTA

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _______ day of September, 2012,

in the City of Manila, affiant exhibiting to me his Driver’s License No. 12345 issued by
the Land Transportation Office on April 8, 2012 at the City of Manila.

ATTY. NO CASE
Notary Public
My Commission Expires Dec. 31, 2012
Roll of Attorney No. 34567
IBP No. 12345/2-5-12/Manila
PTR No. 87654/12-22-11/Manila

Doc. No. ________

Page No. _______
Book No. _______
Series of 2012.
 Republic of the Philippines
City of Tagbilaran
Province of Bohol S.S

COUNTER AFFIDAVIT

I, EDGARDO PUSLIK SR. Filipino, of legal age, married to Lorena G. Puslik, the father
of the said victim, and resident of Guinsularan, Duero, Bohol, after having been duly
sworn to in accordance with the law do hereby depose and says:

1.That I am accused for the crime of Parricide, now pending before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Bohol;

2.That I vehemently deny the allegations in the complaint filed against me for being
false, fabricated and malicious, the truth being that;

a.That in the morning of November 22, 2007 my friend Juan Manuel Marques and I
went to Barangay Langkis. Because we was invited by our friend’s birthday party.
b.That morning of the same date, my son Edgardo Puslik Jr. want to come with us in
Barangay Langkis. And
c.That I told my son to go home because his younger brother is waiting for him and I
don’t want him to go with us.
d.But instead his not listening to me and I am force to get a stick and when he saw im
holding a stick in my hand he immediately run home and crying.
e.That on the whole afternoon until evening of November 22, 2007. were having fun
with Juan Manuel Marques and Manny Pacquaio then we got drunk and decided to
sleep their until morning.

3.That I was extremely surprised when I received a subpoena

4.That the case filed against me is motivated by bad faith.

5.That I am executing this counter affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing
statement and to support for the dismissal of the case filed against me.

I WITNESS WHEREOF, I herby affix my signature this 7th day of January 2007 in the
City of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Philippines.

EDGARDO PUSLIK SR
Affiant
 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 7th day of January 2007, in the City of
Tagbilaran, Bohol, Philippines and I further certify that I have personally examined the
affiant and I convinced and satisfied that he voluntarily executed the foregoing Counter
Affidavit and understood all the contents hereof and that they are true and correct as to
his own personal knowledge.

JET JUMBO ESPEJO

Notary Public

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
City of Manila
Branch 1
MICHAEL BADIRRI,
Plaintiff,

-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. 12345

EDIL FRANCISCO,
Defendant.
x--------------------------------------------x

ANSWER

COMES NOW, the defendant, through the undersigned counsel and unto this
Honorable Court, most respectfully avers:
1. That he ADMITS the contents of paragraph 2 only insofar as his personal
circumstances are concerned;
2. That he ADMITS his obligation of paying the monthly installments cited in paragraph 3
of the complaint, but DENY the rest of the allegations therein as said defendant’s
obligation to plaintiff is not for the exercise of a right to repurchase but for the
amortization of a loan that he acquired from the plaintiff at an interest of 12% per
annum;
3. That defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
veracity of the averments in paragraph 4 of the complaint;
4. That defendant does not, at the moment, have all the records of payments he made to
plaintiff, so that he also does not have information sufficient to form a belief as the truth
of the allegations in paragraph 5 of the complaint and, therefore, DENY them.
WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully prays that the complaint be dismissed
with costs against the plaintiff.

Other relief and remedies as may be deemed just and equitable under the
premises are likewise prayed for.

City of Manila, September 27, 2012.

 GACUTAN AND SALAZAR LAW OFFICE
Counsel for the Defendant
Suite 258 The Tower
Malate, Manila

By:
ARVIN GACUTAN
Roll No. 98765
IBP No, 12345/1-3-2012/Manila
PTR No. 34567/1-3-2012/Manila

Copy furnished:
ATTY. FRETTI LAUREL
Counsel for the Plaintiff
Unit 1234 Laurel Building
Sampaloc, Manila

EXPLANATION

Copy of the foregoing ANSWER was served to plaintiff’s counsel by registered

mail due to time and distance constraints and for lack of the undersigned’s staff who
can serve the same in person.

ARVIN GACUTAN

249 Phil. 406

MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY Y BALCITA and
BENJAMIN SAMSON Y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in
Criminal Case No. 175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Cavite, under an information which reads as follows:

"That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and assisting
one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their
superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible
liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused
his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed
Bayani Miranda.

"That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the
means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of
the body of Bayani Miranda.
"CONTRARY TO LAW" (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After
trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty of the crime of
murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y

Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating
the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison
term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The accused are
solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00,
plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.

"Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.

"Costs against both accused.

"SO ORDERED" (p. 248, Records).

Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and
assigned the following errors committed by the court a quo:

1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION
THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL
DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY

THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.

3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE

TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY
SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p.
48, Rollo).

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends.
Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together.

On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of
Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.

Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris
wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and
Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they
were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started
making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.

Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly
took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its contents
on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in
the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire
making a human torch out of him.

The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the
deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others
wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.

The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and
other police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident.
Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around
spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.

The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime,
the police officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the
Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the
written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released.
The two accused remained in custody.

After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-
appellants for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.

It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave
their written statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement,
Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents
thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused
Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline
on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact
that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the
commission of the offense.

While testifying on their defense, the accused?appellants repudiated their written

statements alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police
maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a
concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.

Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were
mentioned and discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were
not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said
court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's
straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the
uncorroborated, self-serving and unreliable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p.
247, Records).

Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of

other eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other
persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during
the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate non-presentation of these persons
raises the presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.

There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the
crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of
one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing
the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the
accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as
prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies would
be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption
that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does
not apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil.
797). Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to
decide.

Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not
only was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the
prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony
that he was reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human
behavior and experience.

Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him
to testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise
testified that she never talked to Gabion and that he saw the latter for the first time when
the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his
friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no
previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely
against them.

In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay
pour gasoline on he deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the
accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling
Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and
that it was only when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.

However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:

Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics
"Q. when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson.
How could you possibly see that incident while you were reading comics?

"A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.

According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and
"Q.
burned later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?

When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from
"A.
doing so.

We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a
"Q. matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from
you, if that is true?

"A. Yes, sir.

Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you
"Q.
come to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?

"A. I do not know that would be that incident.

Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that
"Q.
actually?

"A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.

When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to
"Q. you to ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did
Pugay tell you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
"A. I was not told, sir.

Did you come to know . . . . . how did you come to know he was going to pour
"Q.
gasoline that is why you prevent him?

Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it

"A.
was gasoline.

It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got
"Q.
hold of a can of gasoline, is that correct?

"A. Yes, sir.

And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour
"Q.
gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.

"A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.

So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the
"Q.
process of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?

"A. Yes, sir" (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).

It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book;
that Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the
deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the
ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the
body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw
Samson set the deceased on fire.

However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or
unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately
before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and
the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was
accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make
fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective,
and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et.
al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).

The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay.
Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before
pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can
contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped
his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence
necessary to avoid every undersirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We
agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:

"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty
to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts
which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his
own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed
to all manner of danger and injury."
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging
from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.

With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his
conviction of murder is proper considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire
knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the
victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such an
outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.

There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some
reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate
evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For
the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit
employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured
on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not
have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the
benefit of doubt, it can be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended
to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind
of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act
resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held
responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying

circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and
penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to
credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such
conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and
Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp.
16-17).

The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one
ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

The lower court held the accused solidarity liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by
Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is
P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to
P43,940.00.

Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the
P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the
court a quo.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs

against the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.