Providence of God by St. Thomas

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htm
CONTRA GENTILES
BOOK THREE: PROVIDENCE
Q. 183
translated by
Vernon J. Bourke

CONTENTS
1. Prologue 45. That in this life we cannot
2. How every agent acts for an end understand separate substances
3. That every agent acts for a good 46. That the soul does not
4. That evil in things is not intended understand itself through itself in
5. Arguments which seem to prove that this life
evil is not apart from intention 47. That in this life we cannot see
6. Answers to these arguments God through His essence
7. That evil is not an essence 48. That man’s ultimate felicity does
8. Arguments which seem to prove that not come in this life
evil is a nature or some real thing 49. That separate substances do not
9. Answers to these arguments see God in His essence by
10. That good is the cause of evil knowing Him through their
11. That evil is based on the good essence
12. That evil does not wholly destroy 50. That the natural desire of
good separate substances does not
13. That evil has a cause of some sort come to rest in the natural
14. That evil is an accidental cause knowledge which they have of
15. That there is no highest evil God
16. That the end of everything is a good 51. How God may be seen in His
17. That all things are ordered to one essence
end Who is God 52. That no created substance can,
18. How God is the end of all things by its own natural power, attain
19. That all things tend to become like the vision of God in His essence
God 53. That the created intellect needs
20. How things imitate divine goodness an influx of divine light in order to
21. That things naturally tend to become see God through His essence
like God inasmuch as He is a cause 54. Arguments by which it seems to
22. How things are ordered to their ends be proved that God cannot be
in various ways seen in His essence, and the
23. That the motion of the heavens answers to them
comes from an intellectual principle 55. That the created intellect does
24. How even beings devoid of not comprehend the divine
knowledge seek the good substance
25. That to understand God is the end of 56. That no created intellect while
every intellectual substance seeing God sees all that can be
26. Whether felicity consists in a will act seen in Him
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27. That human felicity does not consist 57. That every intellect, whatever its
in pleasures of the flesh level, can be a participant in the
28. That felicity does not consist in divine vision
honors 58. That one being is able to see God
29. That man’s felicity does not consist in more perfectly than another
glory 59. How those who see the divine
30. That man’s felicity does not consist in substance may see all things
riches 60. That those who see God see all
31. That felicity does not consist in things in Him at once
worldly power 61. That through the vision of God
32. That felicity does not consist in goods one becomes a partaker of
of the body eternal life
33. That human felicity does not lie in the 62. That those who see God will see
senses 119 Him perpetually
34. That man’s ultimate felicity does not 63. How man’s every desire is fulfilled
lie in acts of the moral virtues in that ultimate felicity
35. That ultimate felicity does not lie in 64. That God governs things by His
the act of prudence providence
36. That felicity does not consist in the 65. That God preserves things in
operation of art being
37. That the ultimate felicity of man 66. That nothing gives being except
consists in the contemplation of God in so far as it
38. That human felicity does not consist 67. That God is the cause of
in the knowledge of God which is operation for all things that
generally possessed by most men operate
39. That human felicity does not consist 68. That God is everywhere
in the knowledge of God gained 69. The opinion of those who take
through demonstration away proper actions from natural
40. Human felicity does not consist in the things
knowledge of God which is through 70. How the same effect is from God
faith and from a natural agent
41. Whether in this life man is able to 71. That divine providence does not
understand separate substances entirely exclude evil from things
through the study and investigation of 72. That divine providence does not
the speculative sciences exclude contingency from things
42. That we cannot in this life understand 73. That divine providence does not
separate substances in the way that exclude freedom of choice
Alexander claimed 74. That divine providence does not
43. That we cannot in this life understand exclude fortune and chance
separate substances in the way that 75. That God’s providence applies to
Averroes claimed contingent singulars
44. That man’s ultimate felicity does not 76. That God’s providence applies
consist in the kind of knowledge of immediately to all singulars
separate substances that the 77. That the execution of divine
foregoing opinions assume providence is accomplished by
means of secondary causes
78. That other creatures are ruled by
God by means of intellectual
creatures
79. That lower intellectual substances
are ruled by higher ones
80. On the ordering of the angels
among themselves
81. On the ordering of men among
themselves and to other things
82. That lower bodies are ruled by
God through celestial bodies
83. Epilogue to the preceding
chapters
Chapter 1
Caput 1
Prologue
Deus magnus dominus et rex “The Lord is a great God and a great King

magnus super omnes deos. above all gods” (Ps 94:3) . “For the Lord
Quoniam non repellet dominus will not cast off His people” (Ps. 93:14)”For
plebem suam. Quia in manu eius in His hand are all the ends of the earth,
sunt omnes fines terrae, et and the heights of the mountains are His.
altitudines montium ipsius sunt. For the sea is His and He made it, and His
Quoniam ipsius est mare et ipse hands formed dry land” (Ps. 94:45)
fecit illud, et siccam manus eius
formaverunt. Psalm. XCIV.
Unum esse primum entium, totius [1] That there is one First Being,

esse perfectionem plenam possessing the full perfection of the whole
possidens, quod Deum dicimus, of being, and that we call Him God, has
in superioribus est ostensum, qui been shown in the preceding Books. From
ex sui perfectionis abundantia the abundance of His perfection, He
omnibus existentibus esse endows all existing things with being, so
largitur, ut non solum primum that He is fully established not only as the
entium, sed et principium omnium First Being but also as the original source
esse comprobetur. Esse autem of all existing things. Moreover, He has
aliis tribuit non necessitate granted being to other things, not by a
naturae, sed secundum suae necessity of His nature but according to
arbitrium voluntatis, ut ex the choice of His will, as has been made
superioribus est manifestum. clear in our earlier explanations. From this
Unde consequens est ut factorum it follows that He is the Lord of the things
suorum sit dominus: nam super that He has made, for we are masters of
ea quae nostrae voluntati the things that are subject to our will. In
subduntur, dominamur. Hoc fact, He holds perfect dominion over
autem dominium super res a se things produced by Himself, since to
productas perfectum habet, produce them He is in need neither of the
utpote qui ad eas producendas assistance of an external agent nor of the
nec exterioris agentis adminiculo underlying presence of matter, for He is
indiget, nec materiae the universal maker of the whole of being.
fundamento: cum sit totius esse
universalis effector.
Eorum autem quae per [2] Now, each of the things produced
voluntatem producuntur agentis, through the will of an agent is directed to
unumquodque ab agente in finem an end by the agent. For the proper object
aliquem ordinatur: bonum enim et of the will is the good and the end. As a
finis est obiectum proprium result, things which proceed from will must
voluntatis, unde necesse est ut be directed to some end. Moreover, each
quae ex voluntate procedunt, ad thing achieves its ultimate end through its
finem aliquem ordinentur. Finem own action which must be directed to the
autem ultimum unaquaeque res end by Him Who gives things the
per suam consequitur actionem, principles through which they act.
quam oportet in finem dirigi ab eo
qui principia rebus dedit per quae
agunt.
Necesse est igitur ut Deus, qui [3] So, it must be that God, Who is in all
est in se universaliter perfectus et ways perfect in Himself, and Who endows
omnibus entibus ex sua potestate all things with being from His own power,
esse largitur, omnium entium exists as the Ruler of all beings, and is
rector existat, a nullo utique ruled by none other. Nor is there anything
directus: nec est aliquid quod ab that escapes His rule, just as there is
eius regimine excusetur, sicut nothing that does not receive its being
nec est aliquid quod ab ipso esse from Him. As He is perfect in being and
non sortiatur. Est igitur, sicut causing, so also is He perfect in ruling.
perfectus in essendo et
causando, ita etiam et in regendo
perfectus.
Huius vero regiminis effectus in [4] Of course, the result of this rule is
diversis apparet diversimode, manifested differently in different beings,
secundum differentiam depending on the diversity of their natures.
naturarum. Quaedam namque sic For some beings so exist as God’s
a Deo producta sunt ut, products that, possessing understanding,
intellectum habentia, eius they bear His likeness and reflect His
similitudinem gerant et imaginem image. Consequently, they are not only
repraesentent: unde et ipsa non ruled but are also rulers of themselves,
solum sunt directa, sed et seipsa inasmuch as their own actions are
dirigentia secundum proprias directed to a fitting end. If these beings
actiones in debitum finem. Quae submit to the divine rule in their own
si in sua directione divino ruling, then by virtue of the divine rule they
subdantur regimini, ad ultimum are admitted to the achievement of their
finem consequendum ex divino ultimate end; but, if they proceed
regimine admittuntur: repelluntur otherwise in their own ruling, they are
autem si secus in sua directione rejected.
processerint.
Alia vero, intellectu carentia, [5] Still other beings, devoid of

seipsa in suum finem non understanding, do not direct themselves to
dirigunt, sed ab alio diriguntur. their end, but are directed by another
Quorum quaedam, incorruptibilia being. Some of these are incorruptible
existentia, sicut in esse naturali and, as they can suffer no defect in their
pati non possunt defectum, ita in natural being, so in their own actions they
propriis actionibus ab ordine in never fail to follow the order to the end
finem eis praestitutum which is prearranged for them. They are
nequaquam exorbitant, sed unfailingly subject to the rule of the First
indeficienter regimini primi Ruler. Such are the celestial bodies whose
regentis subduntur: sicut sunt motions occur in ever the same way.
corpora caelestia, quorum motus
semper uniformiter procedunt.
Alia vero, corruptibilia existentia, [6] Other beings, however, are corruptible.

naturalis esse pati possunt They can suffer a defect in their natural
defectum, qui tamen per alterius being, yet such a defect works to the
profectum suppletur: nam, uno advantage of another being. For, when
corrupto, aliud generatur. Et one thing is corrupted, another comes into
similiter in actionibus propriis a being. Likewise, in their proper actions
naturali ordine deficiunt, qui they may fall short of the natural order, yet
tamen defectus per aliquod such a failure is balanced by the good
bonum inde proveniens which comes from it. Thus, it is evident
compensatur. Ex quo apparet that not even those things which appear to
quod nec illa quae ab ordine depart from the order of the primary rule
primi regiminis exorbitare do actually escape the power of the First
videntur, potestatem primi Ruler. Even these corruptible bodies are
regentis evadunt: nam et haec perfectly subject to His power, just as they
corruptibilia corpora, sicut ab ipso are created by God Himself.
Deo condita sunt, ita potestati
eius perfecte subduntur.
Hoc igitur, divino repletus spiritu, [7] Contemplating this fact, the Psalmist,
Psalmista considerans, ut nobis being filled with the Holy Spirit, first
divinum regimen demonstraret, describes for us the perfection of the First
primo describit nobis primi Ruler, in order to point out the divine rule
regentis perfectionem: naturae to us: as a perfection of nature, by the use
quidem, in hoc quod dicit Deus, of the term “God”; as a perfection of
potestatis, in hoc quod dicit power, by the use of the words, “great
magnus dominus, quasi nullo Lord” (suggesting that He has need of no
indigens ad suae potestatis other being for His power to produce His
effectum producendum; effect); and as a perfection of authority, by
auctoritatis, in hoc quod dicit rex the use of the phrase, “a great King above
magnus super omnes deos, quia, all gods” (for even if there be many rulers,
etsi sint multi regentes, omnes they are all nonetheless subject to His
tamen eius regimini subduntur. rule).
Secundo autem nobis describit [8] In the second place, he describes for
regiminis modum. Et quidem us the manner of this rule. First, as
quantum ad intellectualia, quae, regards those intellectual beings who are
eius regimen sequentia, ab ipso led by Him to their ultimate end, which is
consequuntur ultimum finem, qui Himself, he uses this expression: “For the
est ipse: et ideo dicit, quia non Lord will not cast off His people.” Next, in
repellet dominus plebem suam. regard to corruptible beings which are not
Quantum vero ad corruptibilia, removed from the power of the First Ruler,
quae, etiam si exorbitent even if they go astray sometimes in their
interdum a propriis actionibus, a own actions, he says: “For in His hands
potestate tamen primi regentis are all the ends of the earth.” Then, in
non excluduntur, dicit, quia in regard to celestial bodies which exist
manu eius sunt omnes fines above all the highest parts of the earth
terrae. Quantum vero ad (that is, of corruptible bodies) and which
caelestia corpora, quae omnem always observe the right order of the
altitudinem terrae excedunt, idest divine rule, he says: “and the heights of
corruptibilium corporum, et the mountains are His.”
semper rectum ordinem divini
regiminis servant, dicit, et
altitudines montium ipsius sunt.
Tertio vero ipsius universalis [9] In the third place, he indicates the
regiminis rationem assignat: quia reason for this universal rule: the things
necesse est ut ea quae a Deo created by God must also be ruled by
sunt condita, ab ipso etiam Him. Thus it is that he says: “For the sea
regantur. Et hoc est quod dicit, is His,” and so on.
quoniam ipsius est mare et
cetera.
Quia ergo in primo libro de [10] Therefore, since we have treated of
perfectione divinae naturae the perfection of the divine nature in Book
prosecuti sumus; in secundo One, and of the perfection of His power
autem de perfectione potestatis inasmuch as He is the Maker and Lord of
ipsius, secundum quod est rerum all things in Book Two, there remains to be
omnium productor et dominus: treated in this third Book His perfect
restat in hoc tertio libro prosequi authority or dignity, inasmuch as He is the
de perfecta auctoritate sive End and Ruler of all things. So, this will be
dignitate ipsius, secundum quod our order of procedure: first, we shall treat
est rerum omnium finis et rector. of Himself, according as He is the end of
Erit ergo hoc ordine all things; second, of His universal rule,
procedendum: ut primo agatur de according as He governs every creature
ipso secundum quod est rerum [64110]; third, of His particular rule,
omnium finis. Secundo, de according as He governs creatures
regimine universali ipsius, possessed of understanding [111163.
secundum quod omnem
creaturam gubernat. Tertio, de
speciali regimine, prout gubernat
creaturas intellectum habentes.
Caput 2 Chapter 2
Quod omne agens agit propter HOW EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN
finem END
Ostendendum est igitur primo, [1] The first thing that we must show, then,

quod omne agens in agendo is that in acting every agent intends an
intendit aliquem finem. end.
In his enim quae manifeste [2] In the case of things which obviously
propter finem agunt, hoc dicimus act for an end we call that toward which
esse finem in quod tendit impetus the inclination of the agent tend the end.
agentis: hoc enim adipiscens For, if it attain this, it is said to attain its
dicitur adipisci finem, deficiens end; but if it fail in regard to this, it fails in
autem ab hoc dicitur deficere a regard to the end in tended, as is evident
fine intento; sicut patet in medico in the case of the physician working for
agente ad sanitatem, et homine the sake of health, and of the man who is
currente ad certum terminum. running toward a set objective. As far as
Nec differt, quantum ad hoc, this point is concerned, it makes n
utrum quod tendit in finem sit difference whether the being tending to an
cognoscens, vel non: sicut enim end is a knowing being or not. For, just as
signum est finis sagittantis, ita est the target is the end for the archer, so is it
finis motus sagittae. Omnis autem the end for the motion of the arrow. Now
agentis impetus ad aliquid certum every inclination of an agent tends toward
tendit: non enim ex quacumque something definite. A given action does
virtute quaevis actio procedit, sed not stem from merely any power but
a calore quidem calefactio, a heating comes from heat, cooling from
frigore autem infrigidatio; unde et cold. Thus it is that, actions are
actiones secundum diversitatem specifically distinguished by virtue of
activorum specie differunt. Actio diversity of active powers. In fact, an
vero quandoque quidem action may sometime terminate in
terminatur ad aliquod factum, something which is made, as building
sicut aedificatio ad domum, does in a house, and as healing does in
sanatio ad sanitatem: quandoque health. Sometimes, however, it does not,
autem non, sicut intelligere et as in the cases of understanding an
sentire. Et si quidem actio sensing. Now, if an action does in fact
terminatur ad aliquod factum, terminate in some thing that is made, the
impetus agentis tendit per inclination of the agent tend through the
actionem in illud factum: si autem action toward the thing that is produced.
non terminatur ad aliquod factum, But if it does not terminate in a product,
impetus agentis tendit in ipsam then the inclination of the agent tends
actionem. Oportet igitur quod toward the action itself. So, it must be that
omne agens in agendo intendat every agent in acting intends an end,
finem: quandoque quidem sometimes the action itself, sometimes a
actionem ipsam; quandoque thing produced by the action.
aliquid per actionem factum.
Adhuc. In omnibus agentibus [3] Again, with reference to all things that
propter finem, hoc esse ultimum act for an end, we say that the ultimate
finem dicimus, ultra quod agens end is that beyond which the agent seeks
non quaerit aliquid: sicut actio nothing else; thus, the action of a
medici est usque ad sanitatem, physician goes as far as health, but when
ea vero consecuta, non conatur it is attained there is no desire for anything
ad aliquid ulterius. Sed in actione further. Now, in the action of all agents,

cuiuslibet agentis est invenire one may find something beyond which the
aliquid ultra quod agens non agent seeks nothing further. Otherwise,
quaerit aliquid: alias enim actions would tend to infinity, which is
actiones in infinitum tenderent; impossible. Since “it is impossible to
quod quidem est impossibile, proceed to infinity,” the agent could not
quia, cum infinita non sit begin to act, because nothing is moved
pertransire, agens agere non toward what cannot be reached.
inciperet; nihil enim movetur ad id Therefore, every agent acts for an end.
ad quod impossibile est
pervenire. Omne igitur agens agit
propter finem.
Amplius. Si actiones agentis [4] Besides, if the actions of an agent are

procedant in infinitum, oportet supposed to proceed to infinity, then there
quod vel ex istis actionibus must be as a consequence to these
sequatur aliquod factum, vel non. actions either something that is produced,
Si quidem sequatur aliquod or nothing. Supposing that there is
factum, esse illius facti sequetur something that results, then the existence
post infinitas actiones. Quod of this thing would come about after an
autem praeexigit infinita, infinite number of actions. But that which
impossibile est esse: cum non sit presupposes an infinite number of things
infinita pertransire. Quod autem cannot come into existence, since it is
impossibile est esse, impossibile impossible to proceed to infinity. Now, that
est fieri: et quod impossibile est which is impossible in regard to being is
fieri, impossibile est facere. impossible in regard to coming into being.
Impossibile est igitur quod agens And it is impossible to produce that which
incipiat facere aliquod factum ad cannot come into being. Therefore, it is
quod praeexiguntur actiones impossible for an agent to begin to
infinitae. produce something that presupposes an
infinite number of actions.
Si autem ex illis actionibus non Supposing, on the other hand, that
sequitur aliquod factum, oportet nothing follows as a product of these
ordinem huiusmodi actionum actions, then the order of such actions
esse vel secundum ordinem must either depend on the ordering of the
virtutum activarum, sicut si homo active powers (as in the case of a man
sentit ut imaginetur, imaginatur who senses so that he may imagine,
autem ut intelligat, intelligit autem imagines so that he may understand, and
ut velit: vel secundum ordinem then understands so that he may will); or it
obiectorum, sicut considero depends on the ordering of objects (thus, I
corpus ut considerem animam, think of body so that I may be able to think
quam considero ut considerem of soul, which latter I think so that I may
substantiam separatam, quam be able to think of immaterial substance,
considero ut considerem Deum. which in turn I think so that I may be able
Non autem est possibile to think about God). Indeed, it is
procedere in infinitum neque in impossible to proceed to infinity, either
virtutibus activis, sicut neque in through a series of active powers (for
formis rerum, ut probatur in II instance, through the forms of things, as is
Metaph., forma enim est agendi proved in Metaphysics [Ia, 2: 994a 1–b6],

principium: neque in obiectis, for the form is the principle of action) or
sicut neque in entibus, cum sit through a series of objects (for there is not
unum primum ens, ut supra an infinite number of beings, because
probatum est. Non est igitur there is one First Being, as we
possibile quod actiones in demonstrated earlier [I:42]). So, it is not
infinitum procedant. Oportet igitur possible for actions to proceed to infinity.
esse aliquid quo habito conatus There must, then, be something which
agentis quiescat. Omne igitur satisfies the agent’s desire when it is
agens agit propter finem. attained. Therefore, every agent acts for
an end.
Item. In his quae agunt propter [5] Moreover, for things which act for an
finem, omnia intermedia inter end, all things intermediate between the
primum agens et ultimum finem first agent and the ultimate end are as
sunt fines respectu priorum et ends in regard to things prior, and as
principia activa respectu active principles with regard to things
sequentium. Si igitur conatus consequent. So, if the agent’s desire is not
agentis non est ad aliquid directed to some definite thing, but, rather,
determinatum, sed actiones, sicut the actions are multiplied to infinity, as
dictum est, procedunt in infinitum, was said, then the active principles must
oportet principia activa in infinitum be multiplied to infinity. This is impossible,
procedere. Quod est impossibile, as we showed above. Therefore, the
ut supra ostensum est. Necesse agent’s desire must be directed to some
est igitur quod conatus agentis sit definite thing.
ad aliquid determinatum.
Adhuc. Omne agens vel agit per [6] Furthermore, for every agent the
naturam, vel per intellectum. De principle of its action is either its nature or
agentibus autem per intellectum its intellect. Now, there is no question that
non est dubium quin agant intellectual agents act for the sake of an
propter finem: agunt enim end, because they think ahead of time in
praeconcipientes in intellectu id their intellects of the things which they
quod per actionem consequuntur, achieve through action; and their action
et ex tali praeconceptione agunt; stems from such preconception. This is
hoc enim est agere per what it means for intellect to be the
intellectum. Sicut autem in principle of action. just as the entire
intellectu praeconcipiente existit likeness of the result achieved by the
tota similitudo effectus ad quem actions of an intelligent agent exists in the
per actiones intelligentis intellect that preconceives it, so, too, does
pervenitur, ita in agente naturali the likeness of a natural resultant preexist
praeexistit similitudo naturalis in the natural agent; and as a
effectus, ex qua actio ad hunc consequence of this, the action is
effectum determinatur: nam ignis determined to a definite result. For fire
generat ignem, et oliva olivam. gives rise to fire, and an olive to an olive.
Sicut igitur agens per intellectum Therefore, the agent that acts with nature
tendit in finem determinatum per as its principle is just as much directed to
suam actionem, ita agens per a definite end, in its action, as is the agent
naturam. Omne igitur agens agit that acts through intellect as its principle.
propter finem. Therefore, every agent acts for an end.
Amplius. Peccatum non invenitur [7] Again, there is no fault to be found,
nisi in his quae sunt propter except in the case of things that are for
finem: nec enim imputatur alicui the sake of an end. A fault is never
ad peccatum si deficiat ab eo ad attributed to an agent, if the failure is
quod non est; medico enim related to something that is not the agent’s
imputatur ad peccatum si deficiat end. Thus, the fault of failing to heal is
a sanando, non autem imputed to the physician, but not to the
aedificatori aut grammatico. Sed builder or the grammarian. We do find
peccatum invenimus in his quae fault with things done according to art, for
fiunt secundum artem, sicut cum instance, when the grammarian does not
grammaticus non recte loquitur; speak correctly, and also in things done
et in his quae sunt secundum according to nature, as is evident in the
naturam, sicut patet in partubus case of the birth of monsters. Therefore, it
monstruosis. Ergo tam agens is just as true of the agent that acts in
secundum naturam, quam agens accord with nature as of the agent who
secundum artem et a proposito, acts in accord with art and as a result of
agit propter finem. previous planning that action is for the
sake of an end.
Item. Si agens non tenderet ad [8] Besides, if an agent did not incline
aliquem effectum determinatum, toward some definite effect, all results
omnes effectus essent ei would be a matter of indifference for him.
indifferentes. Quod autem Now, he who looks upon a manifold
indifferenter se habet ad multa, number of things with indifference no
non magis unum eorum operatur more succeeds in doing one of them than
quam aliud: unde a contingente another. Hence, from an agent
ad utrumque non sequitur aliquis contingently indifferent to alternatives no
effectus nisi per aliquid effect follows, unless he be determined to
determinetur ad unum. one effect by something. So, it would be
Impossibile igitur esset quod impossible for him to act. Therefore, every
ageret. Omne igitur agens tendit agent tends toward some determinate
ad aliquem determinatum effect, and this is called his end.
effectum, quod dicitur finis eius.
Sunt autem aliquae actiones [9] Of course, there are some actions that

quae non videntur esse propter do not seem to be for an end. Examples
finem, sicut actiones ludicrae et are playful and contemplative actions, and
contemplatoriae, et actiones quae those that are done without attention, like
absque attentione fiunt, sicut rubbing one’s beard and the like. These
confricatio barbae et huiusmodi: examples could make a person think that
ex quibus aliquis opinari potest there are some cases of acting without an
quod sit aliquod agens non end. However, we must understand that
propter finem. Sed sciendum contemplative actions are not for another
quod actiones contemplativae end, but are themselves ends. On the
non sunt propter alium finem, sed other hand, acts of play are sometimes
ipsae sunt finis. Actiones autem ends, as in the case of a man who plays
ludicrae interdum sunt finis, cum solely for the pleasure attaching to play; at
quis solum ludit propter other times they are for an end, for
delectationem quae in ludo est: instance, when we play so that we can
quandoque autem sunt propter study better afterward. Actions that are
finem, ut cum ludimus ut done without attention do not stem from
postmodum melius studeamus. the intellect but from some sudden act of
Actiones autem quae fiunt sine imagination or from a natural source.
attentione, non sunt ab intellectu, Thus, a disorder of the .humors produces
sed ab aliqua subita imaginatione an itch and is the cause of rubbing the
vel naturali principio: sicut beard, and this is done without intellectual
inordinatio humoris pruritum attention. So, these actions do tend to
excitantis est causa confricationis some end, though quite apart from the
barbae, quae fit sine attentione order of the intellect.
intellectus. Et haec ad aliquem
finem tendunt, licet praeter
ordinem intellectus.
Per hoc autem excluditur [10] Through this consideration the error
antiquorum naturalium error; qui of the ancient natural philosophers is
ponebant omnia fieri ex refuted; they claimed that all things come
necessitate materiae, causam about as a result of material necessity, for
finalem a rebus penitus they completely excluded final cause from
subtrahentes. things.
Caput 3 Chapter 3
Quod omne agens agit propter THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR A
bonum GOOD
Ex hoc autem ulterius [1] Next after this we must show that every

ostendendum est quod omne agent acts for a good.
agens agit propter bonum.
Inde enim manifestum est omne [2] That every agent acts for an end has
agens agere propter finem, quia been made clear from the fact that every
quodlibet agens tendit ad agent tends toward something definite.
aliquod determinatum. Id autem Now, that toward which an agent tends in a
ad quod agens determinate definite way must be appropriate to it,
tendit, oportet esse conveniens because the agent would not be inclined to
ei: non enim tenderet in ipsum it except by virtue of some agreement with
nisi propter aliquam it. But, what is appropriate to something is
convenientiam ad ipsum. Quod good for it. So, every agent acts for a good.
autem est conveniens alicui, est
ei bonum. Ergo omne agens agit
propter bonum.
Praeterea. Finis est in quo [3] Again, the end is that in which the
quiescit appetitus agentis vel appetitive inclination of an agent or mover,
moventis, et eius quod movetur. and of the thing moved, finds its rest. Now,
Hoc autem est de ratione boni, the essential meaning of the good is that it

ut terminet appetitum: nam provides a terminus for appetite, since “the
bonum est quod omnia good is that which all desire.” Therefore,
appetunt. Omnis ergo actio et every action and motion are for the sake of
motus est propter bonum. a good.
Adhuc. Omnis actio et motus ad [4] Besides, every action and movement

esse aliquo modo ordinari are seen to be ordered in some way toward
videtur: vel ut conservetur being, either that it may be preserved in the
secundum speciem vel species or in the individual, or that it may
individuum; vel ut de novo be newly acquired. Now, the very fact of
acquiratur. Hoc autem ipsum being is a good, and so all things desire to
quod est esse, bonum est. Et be. Therefore, every action and movement
ideo omnia appetunt esse. are for the sake of a good.
Omnis igitur actio et motus est
propter bonum.
Amplius. Omnis actio et motus [5] Moreover, every action and movement
est propter aliquam are for the sake of some perfection. Even if
perfectionem. Si enim ipsa actio the action itself be the end, it is clear that it
sit finis, manifestum est quod est is a secondary perfection of the agent. But,
perfectio secunda agentis. Si if the action be a changing of external
autem actio sit transmutatio matter, it is obvious that the mover intends
exterioris materiae, manifestum to bring about some perfection in the thing
est quod movens intendit that is moved. Even the thing that is moved
aliquam perfectionem inducere also tends toward this, if it be a case of
in re mota; in quam etiam tendit natural movement. Now, we call what is
mobile, si sit motus naturalis. perfect a good. So, every action and
Hoc autem dicimus esse bonum movement are for the sake of a good.
quod est esse perfectum. Omnis
igitur actio et motus est propter
bonum.
Item. Omne agens agit [6] Furthermore, every agent acts in so far
secundum quod est actu. as it is in act, and in acting it tends to
Agendo autem tendit in sibi produce something like itself. So, it tends
simile. Igitur tendit in actum toward some act. But every act has
aliquem. Actus autem omnis something of good in its essential
habet rationem boni: nam character, for there is no evil thing that is
malum non invenitur nisi in not in a condition of potency falling short of
potentia deficiente ab actu. its act. Therefore, every action is for the
Omnis igitur actio est propter sake of a good.
bonum.
Adhuc. Agens per intellectum [7] Again, an intelligent agent acts for the
agit propter finem sicut sake of an end, in the sense that it
determinans sibi finem: agens determines the end for itself. On the other
autem per naturam, licet agat hand, an agent that acts from a natural
propter finem, ut probatum est, impulse, though acting for an end, as we
non tamen determinat sibi finem, showed in the preceding chapter, does not
cum non cognoscat rationem determine the end for itself, since it does
finis, sed movetur in finem not know the meaning of an end, but,
determinatum sibi ab alio. Agens rather, is moved toward an end determined
autem per intellectum non for it by another being. Now, the intelligent
determinat sibi finem nisi sub agent does not determine the end for itself,
ratione boni: intelligibile enim unless it do so by considering the rational
non movet nisi sub ratione boni, character of the good, for an object of the
quod est obiectum voluntatis. intellect is only motivating by virtue of the
Ergo et agens per naturam non rational meaning of the good, which is the
movetur neque agit propter object of the will. Therefore, even the
aliquem finem nisi secundum natural agent is neither moved, nor does it
quod est bonum: cum agenti per move, for the sake of an end, except in so
naturam determinetur finis ab far as the end is a good; for the end is
aliquo appetitu. Omne igitur determined for the natural agent by some
agens propter bonum agit. appetite. Therefore, every agent acts for
the sake of a good.
Item. Eiusdem rationis est [8] Besides, there is the same general
fugere malum et appetere reason for avoiding evil that there is for
bonum: sicut eiusdem rationis seeking the good, just as there is the same
est moveri a deorsum et moveri general reason for moving downward and
sursum. Omnia autem for moving upward. But all things are
inveniuntur malum fugere: nam known to flee from evil; in fact, intelligent
agentia per intellectum hac agents avoid a thing for this reason: they
ratione aliquid fugiunt, quia recognize it as an evil thing. Now, all
apprehendunt illud ut malum; natural agents resist corruption, which is an
omnia autem agentia naturalia, evil for each individual, to the full extent of
quantum habent de virtute, their power. Therefore, all things act for the
tantum resistunt corruptioni, sake of a good.
quae est malum uniuscuiusque.
Omnia igitur agunt propter
bonum.
Adhuc. Quod provenit ex [9] Moreover, that which results from the
alicuius agentis actione praeter action of an agent, but apart from the
intentionem ipsius, dicitur a casu intention of the agent, is said to happen by
vel fortuna accidere. Videmus chance or by luck. But we observe that
autem in operibus naturae what happens in the workings of nature is
accidere vel semper vel either always, or mostly, for the better.
frequentius quod melius est: Thus, in the plant world leaves are
sicut in plantis folia sic esse arranged so as to protect the fruit, and
disposita ut protegant fructus; et among animals the bodily organs are
partes animalium sic disponi ut disposed in such a way that the animal can
animal salvari possit. Si igitur be protected. So, if this came about apart
hoc evenit praeter intentionem from the intention of the natural agent, it
naturalis agentis, hoc erit a casu would be by chance or by luck. But this is
vel fortuna. Sed hoc est impossible, for things which occur always,
impossibile: nam ea quae or for the most part, are neither chance nor
accidunt semper vel frequenter, fortuitous events, but only those which
non sunt casualia neque fortuita, occur in few instances. Therefore, the
sed quae accidunt in natural agent tends toward what is better,
paucioribus. Naturale igitur and it is much more evident that the
agens intendit ad id quod melius intelligent agent does so. Hence, every
est. Et multo manifestius quod agent intends the good when it acts.
agit per intellectum. Omne igitur
agens intendit bonum in agendo.
Item. Omne quod movetur [10] Furthermore, everything that is moved

ducitur ad terminum motus a is brought to the terminus of the movement
movente et agente. Oportet by the mover and agent. So, the mover and
igitur movens et motum ad idem the object moved must tend toward the
tendere. Quod autem movetur, same thing. Now, the object moved, since it
cum sit in potentia, tendit ad is in potency, tends toward act, and so
actum, et ita ad perfectum et toward the perfect and the good, for it goes
bonum: per motum enim exit de from potency to act through movement.
potentia in actum. Ergo et Therefore, both the mover and the agent
movens et agens semper in always intend the good in their movement
movendo et agendo intendit and action.
bonum.
Hinc est quod philosophi [11] This is the reason why the
definientes bonum dixerunt: philosophers, in defining the good, have
bonum est quod omnia said: “the good is what all desire. And
appetunt. Et Dionysius, IV cap., Dionysius states that “all crave the good
de divinis nominibus, dicit quod and the best [De div. nom. IV, 4].”
omnia bonum et optimum
concupiscunt.
Caput 4 Chapter 4
Quod malum est praeter THAT EVIL IN THINGS IS NOT
intentionem in rebus INTENDED
Ex hoc autem apparet quod malum [1] From this it is clear that evil occurs in
in rebus incidit praeter intentionem things apart from the intention of the
agentium. agents.
Quod enim ex actione consequitur [2] For that which follows from an action,

diversum ab eo quod erat intentum as a different result from that intended
ab agente, manifestum est praeter by the agent, clearly happens apart from
intentionem accidere. Malum autem intention. Now, evil is different from the
diversum est a bono, quod intendit good which every agent intends.
omne agens. Est igitur malum Therefore, evil is a result apart from
praeter intentionem eveniens. intention.
Item. Defectus in effectu et actione [3] Again, a defect in an effect and in an
consequitur aliquem defectum in action results from some defect in the
principiis actionis: sicut ex aliqua principles of the action; for instance, the
corruptione seminis sequitur partus birth of a monstrosity results from some
monstruosus, et ex curvitate cruris corruption of the semen, and lameness
sequitur claudicatio. Agens autem results from a bending of the leg bone.
agit secundum quod habet de Now, an agent acts in keeping with the
virtute activa, non secundum id active power that it has, not in accord
quod defectum virtutis patitur. with the defect of power to which it is
Secundum autem quod agit, sic subject. According as it acts, so does it
intendit finem. Intendit igitur finem intend the end. Therefore, it intends an
correspondentem virtuti. Quod end corresponding to its power. So, that
igitur sequitur respondens defectui which results as an effect of the defect
virtutis, erit praeter intentionem of power will be apart from the intention
agentis. Hoc autem est malum. of the agent. Now, this is evil. Hence,
Accidit igitur malum praeter evil occurs apart from intention.
intentionem.
Adhuc. Ad idem tendit motus [4] Besides, the movement of a mobile
mobilis et motio moventis. Mobile thing and the motion of its mover tend
autem tendit per se ad bonum: ad toward the same objective. Of itself, the
malum autem per accidens et mobile thing tends toward the good, but
praeter intentionem. Quod quidem it may tend toward evil accidentally and
maxime in generatione et apart from intention. This is best seen in
corruptione apparet. Materia enim, generation and corruption. When it is
cum est sub una forma, est in under one form, matter is in potency to
potentia ad formam aliam et another form and to the privation of the
privationem formae iam habitae: form it already has. Thus, when it is
sicut, cum est sub forma aeris, est under the form of air, it is in potency to
in potentia ad formam ignis et the form of fire and to the privation of the
privationem formae aeris. Et ad form of air. Change in the matter
utrumque transmutatio materiae terminates in both at the same time; in
terminatur simul: ad formam the form of fire, in so far as fire is
quidem ignis secundum quod generated; in the privation of the form of
generatur ignis, ad privationem air, inasmuch as air is corrupted. Now,
autem formae aeris secundum the intention and appetite of matter are
quod corrumpitur aer. Non autem not toward privation but toward form, for
intentio et appetitus materiae est ad it does not tend toward the impossible.
privationem, sed ad formam: non Now, it is impossible for matter to exist
enim tendit ad impossibile; est under privation alone, but for it to exist
autem impossibile materiam tantum under a form is possible. Therefore, that
sub privatione esse, esse vero eam which terminates in a privation is apart
sub forma est possibile. Igitur quod from intention. It terminates in a
terminetur ad privationem est privation inasmuch as it attains the form
praeter intentionem; terminatur which it intends, and the privation of
autem ad eam inquantum pervenit another form is a necessary result of this
ad formam quam intendit, quam attainment. So, the changing of matter in
privatio alterius formae de generation and corruption is essentially
necessitate consequitur. ordered to the form, but the privation is a
Transmutatio igitur materiae in consequence apart from the intention.
generatione et corruptione per se The same should be true for all cases of
ordinatur ad formam, privatio vero change. Therefore, in every change
consequitur praeter intentionem. Et there is a generation and a corruption, in
similiter oportet esse in omnibus some sense; for instance, when a thing
motibus. Et ideo in quolibet motu changes from white to black, the white is
est generatio et corruptio corrupted and the black comes into
secundum quid: sicut, cum aliquid being. Now, it is a good thing for matter
alteratur de albo in nigrum, to be perfected through form, and for
corrumpitur album et fit nigrum. potency to be perfected through its
Bonum autem est secundum quod proper act, but it is a bad thing for it to
materia est perfecta per formam, et be deprived of its due act. So,
potentia per actum proprium: everything that is moved tends in its
malum autem secundum quod est movement to reach a good, but it
privata actu debito. Omne igitur reaches an evil apart from such a
quod movetur intendit in suo motu tendency. Therefore, since every agent
pervenire ad bonum, pervenit and mover tends to the good, evil arises
autem ad malum praeter apart from the intention of the agent.
intentionem. Igitur, cum omne
agens et movens intendat ad
bonum, malum provenit praeter
intentionem agentis.
Amplius. In agentibus per [5] Moreover, in the case of beings that
intellectum et aestimationem act as a result of understanding or of
quamcumque, intentio sequitur some sort of sense judgment, intention
apprehensionem: in illud enim is a consequence of apprehension, for
tendit intentio quod apprehenditur the intention tends to what is
ut finis. Si igitur perveniatur ad apprehended as an end. If it actually
aliquid quod non habet speciem attains something which does not
apprehensam, erit praeter possess the specific nature of what was
intentionem: sicut, si aliquis apprehended, then this will be apart
intendat comedere mel, et comedat from the intention. For example, if
fel credens illud esse mel, hoc erit someone intends to eat honey, but he
praeter intentionem. Sed omne cats poison, in the belief that it is honey,
agens per intellectum tendit ad then this will be apart from the intention.
aliquid secundum quod accipit illud But every intelligent agent tends toward
sub ratione boni, sicut ex something in so far as he considers the
superioribus patet. Si ergo illud non object under the rational character of a
sit bonum, sed malum, hoc erit good, as was evident in the preceding
praeter intentionem. Agens igitur chapter. So, if this object is not good but
per intellectum non operatur malum bad, this will be apart from his intention.
nisi praeter intentionem. Cum igitur Therefore, an intelligent agent does not
tendere ad bonum sit commune produce an evil result, unless it be apart
agenti per intellectum et per from his intention. Since to tend to the
naturam, malum non consequitur good is common to the intelligent agent
ex intentione alicuius agentis nisi and to the agent that acts by natural
praeter intentionem. instinct, evil does not result from the
intention of any agent, except apart from
the intention.
Hinc est quod Dionysius dicit, IV Hence, Dionysius says, in the fourth
cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum est chapter of On the Divine names: “Evil is
praeter intentionem et voluntatem. apart from intention and will.”
Caput 5
Chapter 5
Rationes quibus videtur probari
ARGUMENTS WHICH SEEM TO
quod malum non sit praeter
PROVE THAT EVIL IS NOT APART
intentionem
FROM INTENTION
(et solutio ipsarum)
Sunt autem quaedam quae huic [1] Now, there are certain points which
sententiae adversarii videntur. seem to run counter to this view.
Quod enim accidit praeter [2] That which happens apart from the
intentionem agentis, dicitur esse intention of the agent is called fortuitous,
fortuitum et casuale et in a matter of chance, something which
paucioribus accidens. Malum rarely happens. But the occurrence of
autem fieri non dicitur fortuitum et evil is not called fortuitous, a matter of
casuale, neque ut in paucioribus chance, nor does it happen rarely, but
accidens, sed semper vel in always or in most cases. For corruption
pluribus. In naturalibus enim always accompanies generation in the
semper generationi corruptio things of nature. Even in the case of
adiungitur. In agentibus etiam per volitional agents sin occurs in most
voluntatem in pluribus peccatum cases, since “it is as difficult to act in
accidit: cum difficile sit secundum accord with virtue as to find the center of
virtutem agere, sicut attingere a circle,” as Aristotle says in the
centrum in circulo, ut dicit Nicomachean Ethics [II, 9: 1109a 24].
Aristoteles, in II Ethicorum. Non So, evil does not seem to happen apart
igitur videtur malum esse from intention.
proveniens praeter intentionem.
Item. Aristoteles in III Eth., [3] Again, in Ethics III [5: 1113b 16]
expresse dicit quod malitia est Aristotle expressly states that
voluntarium. Et hoc probat per hoc “wickedness is voluntary.” He proves this
quod aliquis voluntarie operatur by the fact that a person voluntarily
iniusta, irrationabile autem est performs unjust acts: “now it is
operantem voluntarie iniusta non unreasonable for the agent of voluntarily
velle iniustum esse, et voluntarie unjust actions not to will to be unjust,
stuprantem non velle and for the selfindulgent man not to
incontinentem esse; et per hoc wish to be incontinent” [1114a 11]; and
quod legislatores puniunt malos he proves it also by the fact that
quasi voluntarie operantes mala. legislators punish evil men as doers of
Non videtur igitur malum praeter evil in a voluntary way [1113b 22]. So, it
voluntatem vel intentionem esse. does not seem that evil occurs apart
from the will or the intention.
Praeterea. Omnis motus naturalis [4] Besides, every natural change has an

habet finem intentum a natura. end intended by nature. Now, corruption

Corruptio autem est mutatio is a natural change, just as generation is.
naturalis, sicut et generatio. Finis Therefore, its end, which is a privation
igitur eius, qui est privatio habens having the rational character of evil, is
rationem mali, est intentus a intended by nature: just as are form and
natura: sicut etiam forma et bonum, the good, which are the ends of
quae sunt generationis finis. generation.
Chapter 6
Caput 6
ANSWERS TO THESE ARGUMENTS
Ut autem positarum rationum [1] So that the solution of these alleged
solutio manifestior fiat, arguments maybe made more evident we
considerandum est quod malum should notice that evil may be considered
considerari potest vel in either in a substance or in its action. Now,
substantia aliqua, vel in actione evil is in a substance because something
ipsius. Malum quidem in which it was originally to have, and which it
substantia aliqua est ex eo quod ought to have, is lacking in it. Thus, if a man
deficit ei aliquid quod natum est has no wings, that is not an evil for him,
et debet habere: si enim homo because he was not born to have them;
non habet alas, non est ei even if a man does not have blond hair, that
malum, quia non est natus eas is not an evil, for, though he may have such
habere; si etiam homo capillos hair, it is not something that is necessarily
flavos non habet, non est due him. But it is an evil if he has no hands,
malum, quia etsi natus sit for these he is born to, and should, have—if
habere, non tamen est debitum he is to be perfect. Yet this defect is not an
ut habeat; est tamen malum si evil for a bird. Every privation, if taken
non habeat manus, quas natus properly and strictly, is of that which one is
est et debet habere, si sit born to have, and should have. So, in this
perfectus, quod tamen non est strict meaning of privation, there is always
malum avi. Omnis autem the rational character of evil.
privatio, si proprie et stricte
accipiatur, est eius quod quis
natus est habere et debet
habere. In privatione igitur sic
accepta semper est ratio mali.
Materia autem, cum sit potentia [2] Now, since it is in potency toward all
ad omnes formas, omnes forms, matter is indeed originated to have
quidem nata est habere, nulla all of them; however, a certain one of them
tamen est ei debita: cum sine is not necessarily due it, since without this
quavis una earum possit esse certain one it can be actually perfect. Of
perfecta in actu. Quaelibet course, to each thing composed of matter
tamen earum est debita alicui some sort of form is due, for water cannot
eorum quae ex materia exist unless it have the form of water, nor
constituuntur: nam non potest can fire be unless it possess the form of
esse aqua nisi habeat formam fire. So, the privation of such forms in
aquae, nec potest esse ignis relation to matter is not an evil for the
nisi habeat formam ignis. matter, but in relation to the thing whose
Privatio igitur formae huiusmodi, form it is, it is an evil for it; just as the
comparata ad materiam, non privation of the form of fire is an evil for fire.
est malum materiae: sed
comparata ad id cuius est
forma, est malum eius, sicut
privatio formae ignis est malum
ignis.
Et quia tam privationes quam And since privations, just as much as habits

habitus et formae non dicuntur and forms, are not said to exist, except in
esse nisi secundum quod sunt the sense that they are in a subject, then if
in subiecto, si quidem privatio a privation be an evil in relation to the
sit malum per comparationem subject in which it is, this will be evil in the
ad subiectum in quo est, erit unqualified sense. But, otherwise, it will be
malum simpliciter: sin autem, an evil relative to something, and not in the
erit malum alicuius, et non unqualified sense. Thus, for a man to be
simpliciter. Hominem igitur deprived of a hand is an unqualified evil, but
privari manu, est malum for matter to be deprived of the form of air is
simpliciter: materia autem not an unqualified evil, though it is an evil
privari forma aeris, non est for the air.
malum simpliciter, sed est
malum aeris.
Privatio autem ordinis aut [3] Now, a privation of order, or due
commensurationis debitae in harmony, in action is an evil for action. And
actione, est malum actionis. Et because there is some due order and
quia cuilibet actioni est debitus harmony for every action, such privation in
aliquis ordo et aliqua an action must stand as evil in the
commensuratio, necesse est ut unqualified sense.
talis privatio in actione
simpliciter malum existat.
His igitur visis, sciendum est [4] Having observed these points, we
quod non omne quod est should understand that not everything that
praeter intentionem, oportet is apart from intention is necessarily
esse fortuitum vel casuale, ut fortuitous or a matter of chance, as the first
prima ratio proponebat. Si enim argument claimed. For, if that which is apart
quod est praeter intentionem, sit from intention be either an invariable or a
consequens ad id quod est frequent consequence of what is intended,
intentum vel semper vel then it does not occur fortuitously or by
frequenter, non eveniet fortuito chance. Take, for example, a man who
vel casualiter: sicut in eo qui directs his intention to the enjoyment of the
intendit dulcedine vini frui, si ex sweetness of wine: if intoxication is the
potatione vini sequatur ebrietas, result of drinking the wine, this is neither
non erit fortuitum nec casuale; fortuitous nor a matter of chance. Of
esset autem casuale si course, it would be a matter of chance if this
sequeretur ut in paucioribus. result followed in but few cases.
Malum ergo corruptionis [5] So the evil of natural corruption, though

naturalis, etsi sequatur praeter a result which is apart from the intention of
intentionem generantis, the agent of generation, is nevertheless an
consequitur tamen semper: nam invariable consequence, for the acquisition
semper formae unius est of one form is always accompanied by the
adiuncta privatio alterius. Unde privation of another form. Hence, corruption
corruptio non evenit casualiter does not occur by chance, nor as
neque ut in paucioribus: licet something that happens in few cases; even
privatio quandoque non sit though privation at times is not an
malum simpliciter, sed alicuius, unqualified evil, but is only so in relation to
ut dictum est. Si autem sit talis some definite thing, as has been said.
privatio quae privet id quod est However, if it be the kind of privation which
debitum generato, erit casuale takes away what is due to the thing
et simpliciter malum, sicut cum generated, this will be by chance and
nascuntur partus monstruosi: unqualifiedly evil, as in the case of the birth
hoc enim non consequitur de of monsters. For, such a thing is not the
necessitate ad id quod est necessary result of what is intended; rather,
intentum, sed est ei repugnans; it is repugnant to what is intended, since the
cum agens intendat agent intends a perfect product of
perfectionem generati. generation.
Malum autem actionis accidit in [6] Now, evil in relation to action occurs in
naturalibus agentibus ex the case of natural agents as a result of the
defectu virtutis activae. Unde si defect of an active power. Hence, if the
agens habet virtutem agent has a defective power, the evil is a
defectivam, hoc malum result apart from the intention, but it will not
consequitur praeter intentionem, be a chance result because it follows
sed non erit casuale, quia de necessarily from this kind of agent, provided
necessitate est consequens ad this kind of agent is subject to this defect of
talem agentem: si tamen tale power, either always or frequently. However,
agens vel semper vel frequenter it will be a matter of chance if this defect is
patitur hunc virtutis defectum. rarely associated with this kind of agent.
Erit autem casuale si hic
defectus raro talem comitatur
agentem.
In agentibus autem voluntariis [7] In the case of voluntary agents, the
intentio est ad bonum aliquod intention is directed to some particular
particulare, si debet sequi actio: good, if action is to result, for universals
nam universalia non movent, cause no movement, but particular things
sed particularia, in quibus est do, since actions go on in their area.
actus. Si igitur illud bonum quod Therefore, if a particular good that is
intenditur, habeat coniunctam intended has attached to it, either always or
privationem boni secundum frequently, a privation of good according to
rationem vel semper vel reason, then the result is a moral evil; and
frequenter, sequitur malum not by chance, but either invariably or for
morale non casualiter, sed vel the most part. This is clearly the case with a
semper vel frequenter: sicut man who wills to enjoy a woman for the
patet in eo qui vult uti femina sake of pleasure, to which pleasure there is

propter delectationem, cui attached the disorder of adultery. Hence,
delectationi adiuncta est the evil of adultery is not something which
inordinatio adulterii; unde results by chance. However, it would be an
malum adulterii non sequitur instance of chance evil if some wrong
casualiter. Esset autem casuale resulted in a few cases from the object
malum si ad id quod intendit, intended: for example, in the case of a
sequeretur aliquod peccatum ut person who kills a man while shooting at a
in paucioribus: sicut cum quis, bird.
proiiciens ad avem, interficit
hominem.
Quod autem huiusmodi bona [8] That a person may frequently direct his
aliquis intendat ut in pluribus intention to goods of this kind, to which
quibus privationes boni privations of good according to reason are
secundum rationem consequent, results from the fact that most
consequuntur, ex hoc provenit men live on the sense level, because
quod plures vivunt secundum sensory objects are better known to us, and
sensum, eo quod sensibilia sunt they are more effective motives in the
nobis manifesta, et magis domain of particular things where action
efficaciter moventia in goes on. Now, the privation of good
particularibus, in quibus est according to reason is the consequence of
operatio: ad plura autem talium most goods of this kind.
bonorum sequitur privatio boni
secundum rationem.
Ex quo patet quod, licet malum [9] From this it is evident that, though evil
praeter intentionem sit, est be apart from intention, it is nonetheless
tamen voluntarium, ut secunda voluntary, as the second argument
ratio proponit, licet non per se, suggests, though not essentially but
sed per accidens. Intentio enim accidentally so. For intention is directed to
est ultimi finis, quem quis an ultimate end which a person wills for its
propter se vult: voluntas autem own sake, but the will may also be directed
est eius etiam quod quis vult to that which a person wills for the sake of
propter aliud, etiam si simpliciter something else, even if he would not will it
non vellet; sicut qui proiicit simply for itself. In the example of the man
merces in mari causa salutis, who throws his merchandise into the sea in
non intendit proiectionem order to save himself [cf. Ethics III, 1: 1110a
mercium, sed salutem, 829], he does not intend the throwing away
proiectionem autem vult non of the merchandise but his own safety; yet
simpliciter, sed causa salutis. he wills the throwing not for itself but for the
Similiter propter aliquod bonum sake of safety. Likewise, a person wills to
sensibile consequendum aliquis do a disorderly action for the sake of some
vult facere inordinatam sensory good to be attained; he does not
actionem, non intendens intend the disorder, nor does he will it
inordinationem, neque volens simply for itself, but for the sake of this
eam simpliciter, sed propter result. And so, evil consequences and sins
hoc. Et ideo hoc modo malitia et are called voluntary in this way, just as is
peccatum dicuntur esse the casting of merchandise into the sea.
voluntaria, sicut proiectio
mercium in mari.
Eodem autem modo patet [10] The answer to the third difficulty is
solutio ad tertiam obiectionem. similarly evident. Indeed, the change of
Nunquam enim invenitur corruption is never found without the
mutatio corruptionis sine change of generation; neither, as a
mutatione generationis: et per consequence, is the end of corruption found
consequens nec finis without the end of generation. So, nature
corruptionis sine fine does not intend the end of corruption as
generationis. Natura ergo non separated from the end of generation, but
intendit finem corruptionis both at once. It is not the unqualified
seorsum a fine generationis, intention of nature that water should not
sed simul utrumque. Non enim exist, but that there should be air, and while
est de intentione naturae a thing is so existing it is not water. So,
absoluta quod non sit aqua, sed nature directly intends that this existing
quod sit aer, quo existente non thing be air; it does not intend that this thing
est aqua. Hoc ergo quod est should not exist as water, except as a
esse aerem, intendit natura concomitant of the fact that it is to be air.
secundum se: quod vero est Thus, privations are not intended by nature
non esse aquam, non intendit in themselves, but only accidentally; forms,
nisi inquantum est coniunctum however, are intended in themselves.
ei quod est esse aerem. Sic
igitur privationes a natura non
sunt secundum se intentae, sed
secundum accidens: formae
vero secundum se.
Patet ergo ex praemissis quod [11] It is clear, then, from the foregoing that

illud quod est simpliciter malum, what is evil in an unqualified sense is
omnino est praeter intentionem completely apart from intention in the
in operibus naturae, sicut partus workings of nature, as in the birth of
monstruosi: quod vero non est monsters; on the other hand, that which is
simpliciter, sed alicui malum, not evil in the unqualified sense, but evil in
non est intentum a natura relation to some definite thing, is not directly
secundum se, sed secundum intended by nature but only accidentally.
accidens.
Caput 7
Chapter 7
Quod malum non est aliqua
THAT EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE
essentia
Ex his autem apparet quod nulla [1] From these considerations it becomes
essentia est secundum se mala. evident that no essence is evil in itself.
Malum enim, ut dictum est, nihil [2] In fact, evil is simply a privation of
est aliud quam privatio eius quod something which a subject is entitled by its
quis natus est et debet habere: origin to possess and which it ought to
sic enim apud omnes est usus have, as we have said. Such is the
huius nominis malum. Privatio meaning of the word “evil” among all men.
autem non est aliqua essentia, Now, privation is not an essence; it is,
sed est negatio in substantia. rather, a negation in a substance.
Malum igitur non est aliqua Therefore, evil is not an essence in things.
essentia in rebus.
Adhuc. Unumquodque secundum [3] Again, each thing has actual being in

suam essentiam habet esse. accord with its essence. To the extent that
Inquantum autem habet esse, it possesses being, it has something good;
habet aliquid boni: nam, si for, if good is that which all desire, then
bonum est quod omnia appetunt, being itself must be called a good,
oportet ipsum esse bonum because all desire to be. As a
dicere, cum omnia esse consequence, then, each thing is good
appetant. Secundum hoc igitur because it possesses actual being. Now,
unumquodque bonum est quod good and evil are contraries. So, nothing is
essentiam habet. Bonum autem evil by virtue of the fact that it has
et malum opponuntur. Nihil igitur essence. Therefore, no essence is evil.
est malum secundum quod
essentiam habet. Nulla igitur
essentia mala est.
Amplius. Omnis res vel est [4] Besides, everything is either an agent
agens, vel est facta. Malum or a thing that is made. Now, evil cannot
autem non potest esse agens: be an agent, because whatever acts does
quia quicquid agit, agit inquantum so inasmuch as it is actually existent and
est actu existens et perfectum. Et perfect. Similarly, it cannot be a thing that
similiter non potest esse factum: is made, for the termination of every
nam cuiuslibet generationis process of generation is a form, and a
terminus est forma et bonum. good thing. Therefore, nothing is evil by
Nulla igitur res secundum suam virtue of its essence.
essentiam est mala.
Item. Nihil tendit ad suum [5] Moreover, nothing tends toward its
contrarium: unumquodque enim contrary, for each thing inclines to what is
appetit quod est sibi simile et like and suitable to itself. Now, every being
conveniens. Omne autem ens intends a good, when it is acting, as has
agendo intendit bonum, ut been proved. Therefore, no being, as
ostensum est. Nullum igitur ens, being, is evil.
inquantum huiusmodi, est
malum.
Adhuc. Omnis essentia est alicui [6] Furthermore, every essence belongs to

rei naturalis. Si enim est in some definite thing in nature. Indeed, if it
genere substantiae, est ipsa falls in the genus of substance, it is the
natura rei. Si vero sit in genere very nature of the thing. However, if it is in
accidentis, oportet quod ex the genus of accident, it must be caused
principiis alicuius substantiae by the principles of some substance, and
causetur, et sic illi substantiae erit thus it will be natural to this substance,
naturalis: licet forte alteri though perhaps it may not be natural to
substantiae non sit naturalis, another substance. For example, heat is
sicut caliditas est naturalis igni, natural to fire, though it may not be natural
licet sit innaturalis aquae. Quod to water. Now, what is evil in itself can not
autem est secundum se malum, be natural to anything. For it is of the very
non potest esse alicui naturale. definition of evil that it be a privation of that
De ratione enim mali est privatio which is to be in a subject by virtue of its
eius quod est alicui natum inesse natural origin, and which should be in it.
et debitum ei. Malum igitur, cum So, evil cannot be natural to any subject,
sit eius quod est naturale privatio, since it is a privation of what is natural.
non potest esse alicui naturale. Consequently, whatever is present
Unde et quicquid naturaliter inest naturally in something is a good for it, and
alicui, est ei bonum, et malum si it is evil if the thing lacks it. Therefore, no
ei desit. Nulla igitur essentia est essence is evil in itself.
secundum se mala.
Amplius. Quicquid habet [7] Again, whatever possesses an essence

essentiam aliquam, aut ipsummet is either a form itself, or has a form. In fact,
est forma, aut habet formam every being is placed in a genus or
aliquam: per formam enim species through a form. Now, a form, as
collocatur unumquodque in such, has the essential character of
genere vel specie. Forma autem, goodness, because a form is a principle of
inquantum huiusmodi, habet action; so, too, does the end to which
rationem bonitatis: cum sit every agent looks; and so also does the
principium actionis; et finis quem action whereby each thing having a form is
intendit omne faciens; et actus perfected. Hence, everything that has an
quo unumquodque habens essence is, by virtue of that fact, a good
formam perfectum est. Quicquid thing. Therefore, evil has no essence.
igitur habet essentiam aliquam,
inquantum huiusmodi, est
bonum. Malum igitur non habet
essentiam aliquam.
Item. Ens per actum et potentiam [8] Besides, being is divided by act and

dividitur. Actus autem, inquantum potency. Now, act, as such, is good, for
huiusmodi, bonum est: quia something is perfect to the extent that it is
secundum quod aliquid est actu, in act. Potency, too, is a good thing, for
secundum hoc est perfectum. potency tends toward act, as appears in
Potentia etiam bonum aliquid est: every instance of change. Moreover,
tendit enim potentia ad actum, ut potency is also proportionate to act and
in quolibet motu apparet; et est not contrary to it. It belongs in the same
etiam actui proportionata, non ei genus with act; privation does not belong
contraria; et est in eodem genere to it, except accidentally. So, everything
cum actu; et privatio non that exists, whatever the mode of its
competit ei nisi per accidens. existence, is a good thing to the extent
Omne igitur quod est, that it is a being. Therefore, evil does not
quocumque modo sit, inquantum possess any essence.
est ens, bonum est. Malum igitur
non habet aliquam essentiam.
Amplius. Probatum est in [9] Moreover, we have proved in Book Two

secundo huius, quod omne esse, of this work [15] that every act of being,
quocumque modo sit, est a Deo. whatever its type may be, comes from
Deum autem esse perfectam God. And we have shown in Book One
bonitatem, in primo ostendimus. [28, 41] that God is perfect goodness.
Cum igitur boni effectus malum Now, since evil could not be the product of
esse non possit, impossibile est a good thing, it is impossible for any being,
aliquod ens, inquantum est ens, as a being, to be evil.
esse malum.
Hinc est quod Gen. 131 dicitur: [10] This is why Genesis (1:31) states:
vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et “God saw all the things that He had made,
erant valde bona; et Eccle. 311: and they were very good”; and
cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo; Ecclesiastes (3:11): “He hath made all
et I Tim. 44: omnis creatura Dei things good in their time”; and also I
bona. Timothy (4:4): “Every creature of God is
good.”
Et Dionysius, cap. IV de Div. [11] And Dionysius, in chapter four of On
Nom., dicit quod malum non est the Divine Names says that “evil is not an
existens, scilicet per se, nec existing thing,” that is, in itself; “nor is it
aliquid in existentibus, quasi something among things that have
accidens, sicut albedo vel existence,” but it is a sort of accident,
nigredo. something like whiteness or blackness.
Per hoc autem excluditur error [12] Through this consideration, the error
Manichaeorum, ponentium of the Manicheans is refuted, for they
aliquas res secundum suas claimed that some things are evil in their
naturas esse malas. very natures.
Caput 8 Chapter 8
Rationes quibus videtur probari ARGUMENTS WHICH SEEM TO
quod malum sit natura vel res aliqua PROVE THAT EVIL IS A NATURE
(et solutio ipsarum) OR SOME REAL THING
Videtur autem quibusdam rationibus [1] Now, it appears that the
praedictae sententiae posse obviari. preceding view may be opposed by
certain arguments.
Ex propria enim differentia specifica [2] Each thing is specified by its own

unumquodque speciem sortitur. Malum specific difference. But evil is a
autem est differentia specifica in specific difference in some genera;
aliquibus generibus, scilicet in for instance, among habits and acts
habitibus et actibus moralibus: sicut in the moral order. just as virtue is
enim virtus secundum suam speciem specifically a good habit, so is the
est bonus habitus, ita contrarium vitium contrary vice specifically a bad habit.
est malus habitus secundum suam The same may be said of virtuous
speciem; et similiter de actibus virtutum and vicious acts. Therefore, evil is
et vitiorum. Malum igitur est dans that which gives specificity to some
speciem aliquibus rebus. Est igitur things, and thus it is an essence and
aliqua essentia, et aliquibus rebus is natural to certain things.
naturalis.
Praeterea. Utrumque contrariorum est [3] Again, of two contraries, each is a

natura quaedam: si enim nihil poneret, definite nature, for, if one contrary
alterum contrariorum esset privatio vel were supposed to be nothing, then it
negatio pura. Sed bonum et malum would be either a privation or a pure
dicuntur esse contraria. Malum igitur negation. But good and evil are said
est natura aliqua. to be contraries. Therefore, evil is a
nature of some sort.
Item. Bonum et malum dicuntur esse [4] Besides, good and evil are
genera contrariorum ab Aristotele, in spoken of by Aristotle in the
praedicamentis. Cuiuslibet autem Categories [8: 14a 24] as “genera of
generis est essentia et natura aliqua: contraries.” Now, there is an
nam non entis non sunt species neque essence and a definite nature for
differentiae, et ita quod non est, non each kind of genus. There are no
potest esse genus. Malum igitur est species or differences for nonbeing;
aliqua essentia et natura. so, that which does not exist cannot
be a genus. Therefore, evil is a
definite essence and nature.
Adhuc. Omne quod agit, est res aliqua. [5] Moreover, everything that acts is

Malum autem agit inquantum malum: a real thing. Now, evil does act
repugnat enim bono et corrumpit precisely as evil, for it attacks the
ipsum. Malum igitur, inquantum malum, good and corrupts it. So, evil
est res aliqua. precisely as evil is a real thing.
Amplius. In quibuscumque invenitur [6] Furthermore, wherever the

magis et minus, oportet quod sint res distinction of more or less is found,
aliquae habentes ordinem: negationes there must be certain things
enim et privationes non suscipiunt arranged in hierarchic order, since
magis et minus. Invenitur autem inter neither negations nor privations
mala unum altero peius. Oportet igitur, admit of more or less. But among
ut videtur, quod malum sit res aliqua. evils, one may be worse than
another. It would seem, then, that
evil must be a real thing.
Praeterea. Res et ens convertuntur. [7] Again, thing and being are
Est autem malum in mundo. Ergo est convertible. There is evil in the
res aliqua et natura. world. Therefore, it is a real thing
and a nature.
Chapter 9
Caput 9
ANSWERS TO THESE ARGUMENTS
Has autem rationes non difficile est [1] It is not difficult to answer these

solvere. Malum enim et bonum in arguments. Evil and good are assigned
moralibus specificae differentiae as specific differences in moral matters,
ponuntur, ut prima ratio proponebat, as the first argument asserted, because
quia moralia a voluntate dependent: moral matters depend on the will. For
secundum hoc enim aliquid ad this reason, anything that is voluntary
genus moris pertinet, quod est belongs in the class of moral matters.
voluntarium. Voluntatis autem Now, the object of the will is the end and
obiectum est finis et bonum. Unde the good. Hence, moral matters get their
a fine speciem moralia sortiuntur: species from the end, just as natural
sicut et naturales actiones a forma actions are specified by the form of the
principii activi, ut calefactio a active principle; for instance, the act of
calore. Quia igitur bonum et malum heating is specified by heat. Hence,
dicuntur secundum universalem because good and evil are so termed by
ordinem ad finem, vel privationem virtue of a universal order, or privation of
ordinis, oportet quod in moralibus order, to the end, it is necessary in
primae differentiae sint bonum et moral matters for the primary distinction
malum. Unius autem generis to be between good and evil. Now, there
oportet esse unam mensuram must be but one primary standard in any
primam. Moralium autem mensura one genus. The standard in moral
est ratio. Oportet igitur quod a fine matters is reason. Therefore, it must be
rationis dicantur aliqua in moralibus from a rational end that things in the
bona vel mala. Quod igitur in moral area are termed good or evil. So,
moralibus sortitur speciem a fine in moral matters, that which is specified
qui est secundum rationem, dicitur by an end that is in accord with reason
secundum speciem suam bonum: is called good specifically; and that
quod vero sortitur speciem a fine which is specified by an end contrary to
contrario fini rationis, dicitur the rational end is termed evil
secundum speciem suam malum. specifically. Yet that contrary end, even
Finis autem ille, etsi tollat finem though it runs counter to the rational
rationis, est tamen aliquod bonum: end, is nevertheless some sort of good:
sicut delectabile secundum for instance, something that delights on
sensum, vel aliquid huiusmodi. the sense level, or anything like that.
Unde et in aliquibus animalibus Thus, these are goods for certain
sunt bona; et homini etiam cum animals, and even for man, when they
sunt secundum rationem moderata; are moderated by reason. It also
et contingit quod est malum uni, happens that what is evil for one being
esse bonum alteri. Et ideo nec is good for another. So, evil, as a
malum, secundum quod est specific difference in the genus of moral
differentia specifica in genere matters, does not imply something that
moralium, importat aliquid quod sit is evil in its own essence, but something
secundum essentiam suam malum: that is good in itself, though evil for man,
sed aliquid quod secundum se est inasmuch as it takes away the order of
bonum, malum autem homini, reason which is the good for man.

inquantum privat ordinem rationis,
quod est hominis bonum.
Ex quo etiam patet quod malum et [2] From this it is also clear that evil and

bonum sunt contraria secundum good are contraries according to the
quod in genere moralium way they are understood in the area of
accipiuntur: non autem simpliciter moral matters, but they are not when
accepta, sicut secunda ratio taken without qualification, as the
proponebat, sed malum privatio est second argument suggested. Rather, in
boni, inquantum est malum. so far as it is evil, evil is the privation of
good.
Eodem etiam modo potest accipi [3] In the same way, too, one may
dictum quod malum et bonum, understand the statement that evil and
prout sunt in moralibus, sunt good, as found in the moral area, are
genera contrariorum, ex quo tertia “genera of contraries”—from which
ratio procedebat. Omnium enim phrase the third argument begins.
contrariorum moralium vel Indeed, in all moral contraries, either
utrumque est malum, sicut both contraries are evil, as in the case of
prodigalitas et illiberalitas; vel unum prodigality and illiberality, or one is good
bonum et alterum malum, sicut and the other evil, as in the case of
liberalitas et illiberalitas. Est igitur liberality and illiberality. Therefore, moral
malum morale et genus et evil is both a genus and a difference, not
differentia, non secundum quod est by the fact that it is a privation of the
privatio boni rationis, ex quo dicitur rational good whence it is termed evil,
malum; sed ex natura actionis vel but by the nature of the action or habit
habitus ordinati ad aliquem finem ordered to some end that is opposed to
qui repugnat debito fini rationis; the proper rational end. Thus, a blind
sicut homo caecus est hominis man is an individual man, not inasmuch
individuum non inquantum est as he is blind but in so far as he is this
caecus, sed inquantum est hic man. So, also, irrational is an animal
homo; et irrationale est differentia difference, not because of the privation
animalis non propter privationem of reason but by virtue of a certain kind
rationis, sed ratione talis naturae ad of nature, to which the absence of
quam sequitur remotio rationis. reason follows as a consequence.
Potest etiam dici quod Aristoteles One can also say that Aristotle calls
dicit malum et bonum esse genera, good and evil genera, not according to
non secundum propriam his own opinion (for he does not number
opinionem, cum inter prima decem them among the primary ten genera in
genera, in quorum quolibet which every kind of contrariety is found)
invenitur aliqua contrarietas, ea non but according to the opinion of
connumeret; sed secundum Pythagoras, who supposed that good
opinionem Pythagorae, qui posuit and evil are the first genera and first
bonum et malum esse prima principles, and who placed ten prime
genera et prima principia, et in contraries under each of them: under
utroque eorum posuit esse decem the good were, “limit, even, one, right,
prima contraria: sub bono quidem male, rest, straight, light, square, and
finitum, par, unum, dextrum, finally good”; and under evil were, “the
masculinum, quiescens, rectum, unlimited, odd, multitude, left, female,
lucem, quadratum, et ultimo motion, curved, darkness, oblong, and
bonum; sub malo autem, infinitum, finally evil [cf. Met. I, 5: 986a 24
impar, plurale, sinistrum, 27].Thus, here and in several places in
femininum, motum, curvum, the treatises on logic, he uses examples
tenebras, altera parte longius, et in accord with the views of other
ultimo malum. Sic autem et in philosophers, as if they were more
pluribus librorum logicorum locis acceptable in his time.
utitur exemplis, secundum
sententiam aliorum philosophorum,
quasi probabilibus secundum illud
tempus.
Habet tamen et hoc dictum aliquam In fact, this statement has some truth,

veritatem: nam impossibile est since it is impossible for a probable
quod probabiliter dicitur, secundum statement to be entirely false. In the
totum esse falsum. Omnium enim case of all contraries, one is perfect and
contrariorum unum est perfectum, the other is a diminished perfection,
et alterum diminutum, quasi having, as it were, some privation mixed
privationem quandam habens with it. For instance, white and hot are
admixtam: sicut album et calidum perfect conditions, but cold and black
sunt perfecta, frigidum vero et are imperfect, connoting something of
nigrum sunt imperfecta, quasi cum privation. Therefore, since every
privatione significata. Quia igitur diminution and privation pertains to the
omnis diminutio et privatio ad formal character of evil, and every
rationem mali pertinet; omnis autem perfection and fulfillment to the formal
perfectio et complementum ad character of good, it appears to be
rationem boni: semper in contrariis always so between contraries, that one
alterum sub bono videtur is included under the good and the other
comprehendi, alterum ad rationem approaches the notion of evil. From this
mali accedere. Et secundum hoc point of view, good and evil seem to be
bonum et malum genera genera of all contraries.
contrariorum omnium esse videntur.
Per hoc etiam patet qualiter malum [4] In this way it also becomes apparent
repugnat bono, ex quo quarta ratio how evil is opposed to the good, which
procedebat. Secundum enim quod is the starting point of the fourth
formae et fini, quae habent argument. According as there is added
rationem boni, et sunt agendi vera a privation of a contrary form, and a
principia, est adiuncta privatio contrary end, to a form and an end
contrariae formae et finis contrarii, (which have the rational character of
actio quae sequitur ex tali forma et good and are true principles of action)
tali fine, attribuitur privationi et the action that results from such a form
malo: per accidens quidem, nam and end is attributed to the privation and
privatio, secundum quod the evil. Yet, this attribution is accidental,
huiusmodi, non est alicuius actionis for privation, as such, is not the principle
principium. Propter quod bene in IV of any action. Hence, Dionysius says,
cap. de Div. Nom., dicit Dyonisius, quite properly, in the fourth chapter of
quod malum non pugnat contra On the Divine Names, that “evil does not
bonum nisi virtute boni, secundum fight against good, except through the
se vero est impotens et infirmum, power of the good; in itself, indeed, it is
quasi nullius actionis principium. powerless and weak,” the principle of no
Malum tamen corrumpere dicitur action, as it were. However, we say that
bonum non solum agendo virtute evil corrupts the good, not only when it
boni, sicut expositum est: sed acts in virtue of the good, as has been
formaliter secundum se, sicut explained, but also formally of itself.
dicitur caecitas corrumpere visum Thus, blindness is said to corrupt sight,
quia est ipsa visus corruptio; per for it is itself the corruption of sight;
quem modum dicitur albedo similarly, whiteness is said to color a
parietem colorare quia est ipse wall, when it is the actual color of the
parietis color. wall.
Dicitur autem aliquid altero magis et [5] We do indeed say that something is

minus malum, per recessum a more or less evil than another thing, in
bono. Sic enim quae privationem reference to the good that it lacks. Thus,
important, intenduntur et things which imply a privation admit of
remittuntur, sicut inaequale et increase or decrease in degree, as do
dissimile: dicitur enim inaequalius the unequal and the dissimilar. For we
quod est ab aequalitate magis say that something is more unequal
distans; et similiter dissimilius when it is more removed from equality
magis a similitudine recedens. and, likewise, that something is more
Unde et magis malum dicitur quod dissimilar when it is farther away from
est magis privatum bono, quasi similitude. Consequently, a thing that is
magis a bono distans. Privationes more deprived of goodness is said to be
autem intenduntur non quasi more evil, as it were, more distant from
aliquam essentiam habentes, sicut the good. However, privations do not
qualitates et formae, ut quinta ratio increase as do things that have an
procedebat, sed per augmentum essence, such as qualities and forms,
causae privantis: sicut aer as the fifth argument assumes, but
tenebrosior est quanto plura fuerint through increase of the depriving cause.
interposita obstacula lucis, sic enim Thus, just as the air is darker when
longius a lucis participatione distat. more obstacles have been placed
before the light, so does a thing become
farther removed from participation in the
light.
Dicitur etiam malum esse in mundo, [6] We also say that evil is in the world,
non quasi essentiam aliquam not as possessing some essence, nor
habeat, vel res quaedam existat, ut as a definitely existing thing, as the sixth
sexta ratio procedebat: sed ea argument suggested, but for the same
ratione qua dicitur quod res aliqua reason that we may call something evil
mala est ipso malo; sicut caecitas by virtue of its evil. For instance,
et quaelibet privatio esse dicitur blindness, or any other sort of privation,
quia animal caecitate est caecum. is said to exist because an animal is
Ens enim dupliciter dicitur, ut blinded by its blindness. Indeed, there
philosophus in metaphysica docet. are two ways of talking about being, as
Uno modo, secundum quod the Philosopher teaches in his
significat essentiam rei, et dividitur Metaphysics [IV, 7: 1017a 8]. In one
per decem praedicamenta: et sic way, being means the essence of a
nulla privatio potest dici ens. Alio thing, and thus it falls into the ten
modo, secundum quod significat categories; so taken, no privation can be
veritatem compositionis: et sic called a being. In another way, being
malum et privatio dicitur ens, means the truth in a judgment; in this
inquantum privatione dicitur aliquid meaning, privation is called a being,
esse privatum. inasmuch as something is said to be
deprived by virtue of a privation.
Caput 10 Chapter 10
Quod causa mali est bonum THAT GOOD IS THE CAUSE OF EVIL
Ex praemissis autem concludi [1] The foregoing arguments enable us to

potest quod malum non causatur conclude that evil is caused only by the
nisi a bono. good.
Si enim alicuius mali est causa [2] For, if an evil thing were the cause of a

malum; malum autem non agit nisi certain evil, then the evil thing would not
virtute boni, ut probatum est: act, except by virtue of the good, as has
oportet ipsum bonum esse been proved. So, this good must be the
causam primariam mali. primary cause of the evil.
Adhuc. Quod non est, nullius est [3] Again, what does not exist is not the
causa. Omnem igitur causam cause of anything. So, every cause must
oportet esse ens aliquod. Malum be a definite thing. But evil is not a
autem non est ens aliquod, ut definite being, as has been proved.
probatum est. Malum igitur non Therefore, evil cannot be the cause of
potest esse alicuius causa. anything. if, then, evil be caused by
Oportet igitur si ab aliquo causetur anything, this cause must be the good.
malum, quod illud sit bonum.
Item. Quicquid est proprie et per [4] Besides, whatever is properly and of
se alicuius causa, tendit in itself the cause of something tends
proprium effectum. Si igitur malum toward a proper effect. So, if evil were of
esset per se alicuius causa, itself the cause of anything, it would tend
tenderet in proprium effectum, toward an effect proper to it; namely, evil.
scilicet malum. Hoc autem est But this is false, for it has been shown
falsum: nam ostensum est quod that every agent tends toward the good.
omne agens intendit bonum. Therefore, evil is not the cause of
Malum igitur per se non est causa anything through evil itself, but only
alicuius, sed solum per accidens. accidentally. Now, every accidental cause
Omnis autem causa per accidens reduces to a cause that works through
reducitur ad causam per se. itself. And only the good can be a cause
Solum autem bonum potest esse through itself, for evil cannot be a cause
per se causa, sed malum non through itself. Therefore, evil is caused by
potest esse per se causa. Malum the good.
igitur causatum est a bono.
Praeterea. Omnis causa vel est [5] Moreover, every cause is either matter,

materia, vel forma, vel agens, vel or form, or agent, or end. Now, evil cannot
finis. Malum autem non potest be either matter or form, for it has been
esse neque materia neque forma: shown that both being in act and being in
ostensum est enim supra quod potency are good. Similarly, evil cannot
tam ens actu, quam ens in be the agent, since anything that acts
potentia, est bonum. Similiter non does so according as it is in act and has
potest esse agens: cum form. Nor, indeed, can it be an end, for it
unumquodque agat secundum is apart from intention, as we have
quod est actu et formam habet. proved. So. evil cannot be the cause of
Neque etiam potest esse finis: anything. Therefore, if anything is the
cum sit praeter intentionem, ut cause of evil, it must be caused by the
probatum est. Malum igitur non good.
potest esse alicuius causa. Si
igitur aliquid sit causa mali,
oportet quod sit a bono causatum.
Cum autem malum et bonum sint [6] In fact, since evil and good are
opposita; unum autem contraries, one of these contraries cannot
oppositorum non potest esse be the cause of the other unless it be
causa alterius nisi per accidens, accidentally; as the cold heats, as is said
sicut frigidum calefacit, ut dicitur in in Physics VIII [1: 251a 33].
VIII physicorum: sequitur quod Consequently, the good could not be the
bonum non possit esse causa active cause of evil, except accidentally.
activa mali nisi per accidens.
Hoc autem accidens in naturalibus [7] Now, in the order of nature, this

potest esse et ex parte agentis; et accidental aspect can be found either on
ex parte effectus. Ex parte quidem the side of the agent or of the effect. It will
agentis, sicut cum agens patitur be on the side of the agent when the
defectum virtutis, ex quo sequitur agent suffers a defect in its power, the
quod actio sit defectiva et effectus consequence of which is a defective
deficiens: ut, cum virtus membri action and a defective effect. Thus, when
digerentis est debilis, sequitur the power of an organ of digestion is
imperfecta decoctio et humor weak, imperfect digestive functioning and
indigestus, quae sunt quaedam undigested humor result; these are evils
mala naturae. Accidit autem of nature. Now, it is accidental to the
agenti, inquantum est agens, agent, as agent, for it to suffer a defect in
quod virtutis defectum patiatur: its power; for it is not an agent by virtue of
non enim agit secundum quod the fact that its power is deficient, but
deficit ei virtus, sed secundum because it possesses some power. If it
quod habet aliquid de virtute; si were completely lacking in power, it would
enim penitus virtute careret, not act at all. Thus, evil is caused
omnino non ageret. Sic igitur accidentally on the part of the agent in so
malum causatur per accidens ex far as the agent is defective in its power.
parte agentis, inquantum agens This is why we say that “evil has no
est deficientis virtutis. Propter efficient, but only a deficient, cause,” for
quod dicitur quod malum non evil does not result from an agent cause,
habet causam efficientem, sed unless because it is deficient in power,
deficientem: quia malum non and to that extent it is not efficient.—And
sequitur ex causa agente nisi it reduces to the same thing if the defect
inquantum est deficientis virtutis, in the action and in the effect arise from a
et secundum hoc non est defect of the instrument or of anything
efficiens. In idem autem redit si else required for the agent’s action; for
defectus actionis et effectus example, when the motor capacity
proveniat ex defectu instrumenti, produces lameness because of a
vel cuiuscumque alterius quod curvature of the tibia. For the agent acts
requiritur ad actionem agentis, both by means of its power and of its
sicut cum virtus motiva producit instrument.
claudicationem propter tibiae
curvitatem: utroque enim agens
agit, et virtute et instrumento.
Ex parte vero effectus, malum ex [8] On the side of the effect, evil is
bono causatur per accidens, tum accidentally caused by the good, either by
ex parte materiae effectus; tum ex virtue of the matter of the effect, or by
parte formae ipsius. Si enim virtue of its form. For, if the matter is not
materia sit indisposita ad well disposed to the reception of the
recipiendam impressionem agent’s action on it, there must result a
agentis, necesse est defectum defect in the product. Thus, the births of
sequi in effectu: sicut cum monsters are the result of lack of
monstruosi partus sequuntur assimilation on the part of the matter. Nor
propter materiae indigestionem. may this be attributed to some defect in
Nec hoc imputatur ad aliquem the agent, if it fail to convert poorly
defectum agentis, si materiam disposed matter into perfect act. There is
indispositam non transmutat ad a determinate power for each natural
actum perfectum: unicuique enim agent, in accord with its type of nature,
agenti naturali est virtus and failure to go beyond this power will
determinata secundum modum not be a deficiency in power; such
suae naturae, quam si non deficiency is found only when it falls short
excedat, non propter hoc erit of the measure of power naturally due it.
deficiens in virtute, sed tunc solum
quando deficit a mensura virtutis
sibi debitae per naturam.
Ex parte autem formae effectus, [9] From the point of view of the form of
per accidens malum incidit the effect, evil occurs accidentally
inquantum formae alicui de because the privation of another form is
necessitate adiungitur privatio the necessary concomitant of the
alterius formae, unde simul cum presence of a given form. Thus,
generatione unius rei, necesse est simultaneously with the generation of one
alterius rei sequi corruptionem. thing there necessarily results the
Sed hoc malum non est malum corruption of another thing. But this evil is
effectus intenti ab agente, sicut in not an evil of the product intended by the
praecedentibus patet, sed alterius agent, but of another thing, as was
rei. apparent in the preceding discussion.
Sic igitur in naturalibus patet quod [10] Thus it is clear that, in the natural
malum per accidens tantum order, evil is only accidentally caused by
causatur a bono. Eodem autem the good. Now, it works in the same way
modo et in artificialibus accidit. in the realm of artifacts. “For art in its
Ars enim in sua operatione working imitates nature,” and bad results
imitatur naturam, et similiter occur in both in the same way.
peccatum in utraque invenitur.
In moralibus autem videtur aliter [11] However, in the moral order, the
se habere. Non enim ex defectu situation seems to be different. It does not
virtutis sequi videtur morale appear that moral vice results from a
vitium: cum infirmitas virtutis defect of power, since weakness either
morale vitium vel totaliter tollat, vel completely removes moral fault, or at
saltem diminuat; infirmitas enim least diminishes it. Indeed, weakness
non meretur poenam, quae culpae does not merit moral punishment that is
debetur, sed magis misericordiam proper to guilt, but, rather, mercy and
et ignoscentiam; voluntarium enim forgiveness. A moral fault must be
oportet esse moris vitium, non voluntary, not necessitated. Yet, if we
necessarium. Si tamen diligenter consider the matter carefully, we shall find
consideretur, invenitur quantum the two orders similar from one point of
ad aliquid simile, quantum vero ad view, and dissimilar from another. There
aliquid dissimile. Dissimile quidem is dissimilarity on this point: moral fault is
quantum ad hoc, quod vitium noticed in action only, and not in any
morale in sola actione effect that is produced; for the moral
consideratur, non autem in aliquo virtues are not concerned with making but
effectu producto: nam virtutes with doing. The arts are concerned with
morales non sunt factivae, sed making, and so it has been said that in
activae. Artes autem factivae sunt: their sphere a bad result happens just as
et ideo dictum est quod in eis it does in nature Therefore, moral evil is
similiter peccatum accidit sicut in not considered in relation to the matter or
natura. Malum igitur morale non form of the effect, but only as a resultant
consideratur ex materia vel forma from the agent.
effectus, sed solum consequitur
ex agente.
In actionibus autem moralibus [12] Now, in moral actions we find four
inveniuntur per ordinem quatuor principles arranged in a definite order.
activa principia. Quorum unum est One of these is the executive power, the
virtus executiva, scilicet vis moving force, whereby the parts of the
motiva, qua moventur membra ad body are moved to carry out the
exequendum imperium voluntatis. command of the will. Then this power is
Unde haec vis a voluntate moved by the will, which is a second
movetur, quae est aliud principle. Next, the will is moved by the
principium. Voluntas vero movetur judgment of the apprehensive power
ex iudicio virtutis apprehensivae, which judges that this object is good or
quae iudicat hoc esse bonum vel bad, for the objects of the will are such
malum, quae sunt voluntatis that one moves toward attainment,
obiecta, unum ad prosequendum another moves toward avoidance. This
movens, aliud ad fugiendum. Ipsa apprehensive power is moved, in turn, by
autem vis apprehensiva movetur a the thing apprehended. So, the first active
re apprehensa. Primum igitur principle in moral actions is the thing that

activum principium in actionibus is cognitively apprehended, the second is
moralibus est res apprehensa; the apprehensive power, the third is the
secundum vis apprehensiva; will, and the fourth is the motive power
tertium voluntas; quartum vis which carries out the command of reason.
motiva, quae exequitur imperium
rationis.
Actus autem virtutis exequentis [13] Now, the act of the power that carries

iam praesupponit bonum vel out the action already presupposes the
malum morale. Non enim ad distinction of moral good or evil. For
mores huiusmodi actus exteriores external acts of this kind do not belong in
pertinent nisi secundum quod sunt the moral area, unless they are voluntary.
voluntarii. Unde, si voluntatis sit Hence, if the act of the will be good, then
actus bonus, et actus exterior the external act is also deemed good, but
bonus dicetur: malus autem, si ille if it be bad, the external act is bad. It
sit malus. Nihil autem ad malitiam would have nothing to do with moral evil if
moralem pertineret si actus the external act were defective by virtue
exterior deficiens esset defectu ad of a defect having no reference to the will.
voluntatem non pertinente: Lameness, for instance, is not a fault in
claudicatio enim non est vitium the moral order, but in the natural order.
moris, sed naturae. Huiusmodi Therefore, a defect of this type in the
igitur virtutis exequentis defectus executive power either completely
moris vitium vel totaliter excusat, excludes moral fault, or diminishes it. So,
vel minuit. Actus vero quo res too, the act whereby a thing moves the
movet apprehensivam virtutem, apprehensive power is free from moral
immunis est a vitio moris: movet fault, for the visible thing moves the
enim secundum ordinem power of sight in the natural order, and
naturalem visibile visum, et so, also, does any object move a passive
quodlibet obiectum potentiam potency. Then, too, this act of the
passivam. Ipse etiam actus apprehensive power, considered in itself,
apprehensivae virtutis, in se is without moral fault, for a defect in it
consideratus, morali vitio caret: either removes or diminishes moral fault,
cum eius defectus vitium morale as is the case in a defect of the executive
vel excuset vel minuat, sicut et power. Likewise, weakness and
defectus exequentis virtutis; ignorance excuse wrongdoing, or
pariter enim infirmitas et diminish it. The conclusion follows, then,
ignorantia excusant peccatum vel that moral fault is found primarily and
minuunt. Relinquitur igitur quod principally in the act of the will only, and
morale vitium in solo actu so it is quite reasonable to say, as a
voluntatis primo et principaliter result, that an act is moral because it is
inveniatur: et rationabiliter etiam voluntary. Therefore the root and source
ex hoc actus moralis dicatur, quia of moral wrongdoing is to be sought in the
voluntarius est. In actu igitur act of the will.
voluntatis quaerenda est radix et
origo peccati moralis.
Videtur autem hanc inquisitionem [14] However, a difficulty seems to result
consequi difficultas. Cum enim from this investigation. Since a defective
actus deficiens proveniat propter act stems from a defect in the active
defectum activi principii, oportet principle, we must understand that there
praeintelligere defectum in is a defect in the will preceding the moral
voluntate ante peccatum morale. fault. Of course, if this defect be natural,
Qui quidem defectus si sit then it is always attached to the will, and
naturalis, semper inhaeret so the will would always commit a morally
voluntati: semper igitur voluntas in bad action when it acts. But virtuous acts
agendo moraliter peccabit; quod show that this conclusion is false. On the
actus virtutum falsum esse other hand, if the defect be voluntary, it is
ostendunt. Si autem defectus sit already a morally bad act, and we will
voluntarius, iam est peccatum have to look in turn for its cause. Thus,
morale, cuius causa iterum our rational investigation will never come
inquirenda restabit: et sic ratio in to an end. Therefore, we must say that
infinitum deducet. Oportet ergo the defect preexisting in the will is not
dicere quod defectus in voluntate natural, to avoid the conclusion that the
praeexistens non sit naturalis, ne will sins in everyone of its acts. Nor can
sequatur voluntatem in quolibet we attribute the defect to chance or
actu peccare; neque etiam accident, for then there would be no
casualis et fortuitus, non enim moral fault in us, since chance events are
esset in nobis morale peccatum, not premeditated and are beyond the
casualia enim sunt control of reason. So, the defect is
impraemeditata et extra rationem. voluntary. Yet, it is not a moral fault;
Est igitur voluntarius. Non tamen otherwise, we should go on to infinity.
peccatum morale: ne cogamur in How this is possible we must now explain.
infinitum procedere. Quod quidem
qualiter esse possit,
considerandum est.
Cuiuslibet siquidem activi principii [15] As a matter of fact, the perfection of
perfectio virtutis ex superiori the power of every active principle
activo dependet: agens enim depends on a higher active principle,
secundum agit per virtutem primi since a secondary agent acts through the
agentis. Cum igitur secundum power of a primary agent. While,
agens manet sub ordine primi therefore, a secondary agent remains in a
agentis, indeficienter agit: deficit position of subordination to the first agent,
autem in agendo si contingat it acts without any defect, but it becomes
ipsum ab ordine primi agentis defective in its action if it happens to turn
deflecti; sicut patet in instrumento away from its subordination to the primary
cum deficit a motu agentis. Dictum agent, as is illustrated in the case of an
est autem quod in ordine instrument, when it falls short of the
actionum moralium duo principia motion of the agent. Now, it has been said
voluntatem praecedunt: scilicet vis that two principles precede the will in the
apprehensiva; et obiectum order of moral actions: namely, the
apprehensum, quod est finis. Cum apprehensive power, and the object
autem unicuique mobili apprehended, which is the end. Since to
respondeat proprium motivum, each movable there corresponds a proper
non quaelibet vis apprehensiva motive power, not merely any
est debitum motivum cuiuslibet apprehensive power is the suitable motive
appetitus, sed huius haec, et illius power for any and every appetite; rather,
alia. Sicut igitur appetitus sensitivi one pertains to this appetite and another
proprium motivum est vis to a second appetite. Thus, just as the
apprehensiva sensualis, ita proper motive power for the sensory
voluntatis proprium motivum est appetite is the sensory apprehensive
ratio ipsa. power, so the reason itself is the proper
motivator for the will.
Rursus, cum ratio multa bona et [16] Again, since reason is able to
multos fines apprehendere possit; apprehend many goods and a multiplicity
cuiuslibet autem sit proprius finis: of ends, and since for each thing there is
et voluntatis erit finis et primum a proper end, there will be, then, for the
motivum, non bonum quodlibet, will an end and a first motivating object
sed bonum quoddam which is not merely any good, but some
determinatum. Cum igitur voluntas determinate good. Hence, when the will
tendit in actum mota ex inclines to act as moved by the
apprehensione rationis apprehension of reason, presenting a
repraesentantis sibi proprium proper good to it, the result is a fitting
bonum, sequitur debita actio. Cum action. But when the will breaks forth into
autem voluntas in actionem action, at the apprehension of sense
prorumpit ad apprehensionem cognition, or of reason itself presenting
apprehensivae sensualis; vel some other good at variance with its
ipsius rationis aliquod aliud bonum proper good, the result in the action of the
repraesentantis a proprio bono will is a moral fault.
diversum; sequitur in actione
voluntatis peccatum morale.
Praecedit igitur in voluntate [17] Hence, a defect of ordering to reason

peccatum actionis defectus ordinis and to a proper end precedes a fault of
ad rationem; et ad proprium finem. action in the will: in regard to reason, in
Ad rationem quidem, sicut cum, the case of the will inclining, on the
ad subitam apprehensionem occasion of a sudden sense
sensus, voluntas in bonum apprehension, toward a good that is on
delectabile secundum sensum the level of sensory pleasure; and in
tendit. Ad finem vero debitum, regard to a proper end, in the case when
sicut cum ratio in aliquod bonum reason encounters in its deliberation
ratiocinando devenit quod non est, some good which is not, at this time or
vel nunc vel hoc modo, bonum, et under these conditions, really good, and
tamen voluntas in illud tendit quasi yet the will inclines toward it, as if it were
in proprium bonum. Hic autem a proper good. Now, this defect in
ordinis defectus voluntarius est: ordering is voluntary, for to will and not to
nam in potestate ipsius voluntatis will lie within the power of the will itself.
est velle et non velle. Itemque est And it is also within its power for reason
in potestate ipsius quod ratio actu to make an actual consideration, or to
consideret, vel a consideratione abstain from such a consideration, or
desistat; aut quod hoc vel illud further to consider this or that alternative.
consideret. Nec tamen iste Yet, such a defect of ordering is not a
defectus est malum morale: si moral evil, for, if reason considers
enim ratio nihil consideret, vel nothing, or considers any good whatever,
consideret bonum quodcumque, that is still not a sin until the will inclines to
nondum est peccatum, quousque an unsuitable end. At this point, the act of
voluntas in finem indebitum will occurs.

tendat. Quod iam est voluntatis
actus.
Sic igitur tam in naturalibus quam [18] Thus, it is ,car, both in the natural
in moralibus patet quod malum a order and in the moral order, that evil is
bono non causatur nisi per only caused by good accidentally.
accidens.
Caput 11 Chapter 11
Quod malum fundatur in bono THAT EVIL IS BASED ON THE GOOD
Ex praemissis etiam ostendi potest [1] It can also be shown from the

quod omne malum est in aliquo preceding considerations that every evil
bono fundatum. is based on some good.
Malum enim non potest esse per [2] Indeed, evil cannot exist by itself,
se existens: cum non sit essentiam since it has no essence, as we have
habens, ut supra ostensum est. demonstrated. Therefore, evil must be in
Oportet igitur quod malum sit in some subject. Now, every subject,
aliquo subiecto. Omne autem because it is some sort of substance, is
subiectum, cum sit substantia a good of some kind, as is clear from the
quaedam, bonum quoddam est, ut foregoing. So, every evil is in a good
ex praemissis patet. Omne igitur thing.
malum in bono aliquo est.
Adhuc. Malum privatio quaedam [3] Again, evil is a certain privation, as is

est, ut ex praemissis patet. Privatio evident from the foregoing. Now,
autem et forma privata in eodem privation and the form that is deprived
subiecto sunt. Subiectum autem are in the same subject. But the subject
formae est ens in potentia ad of form is being in potency to form, and
formam, quod bonum est: nam in such being is good, because potency
eodem genere sunt potentia et and act belong in the same genus.
actus. Privatio igitur, quae malum Therefore, the privation which is evil is
est, est in bono aliquo sicut in present in a good thing, as in a subject.
subiecto.
Amplius. Ex hoc dicitur aliquid [4] Besides, something is called evil due

malum, quia nocet. Non autem nisi to the fact that it causes injury. But this is
quia nocet bono: nocere enim malo only so because it injures the good, for
bonum est, cum corruptio mali sit to injure the evil is a good thing, since
bona. Non autem noceret, the corruption of evil is good. Now,
formaliter loquendo, bono, nisi formally speaking, it would not injure the
esset in bono: sic enim caecitas good unless it were in the good; thus,
homini nocet inquantum in ipso est. blindness injures a man to the extent
Oportet igitur quod malum sit in that it is in him. So, evil must be in the
bono. good.
Item. Malum non causatur nisi a [5] Moreover, evil is not caused, except
bono, et per accidens tantum. by the good, and then only accidentally.
Omne autem quod est per But everything that occurs accidentally is
accidens, reducitur ad id quod est reducible to that which is by itself. So,
per se. Oportet igitur semper cum with a caused evil which is the accidental
malo causato, quod est effectus effect of the good, there must always be
boni per accidens, esse bonum some good which is the direct effect of
aliquod quod est effectus boni per the good as such, and thus this good
se, ita quod sit fundamentum eius: effect is the foundation of the evil. For
nam quod est per accidens, what exists accidentally is based on that
fundatur supra id quod est per se. which exists by itself.
Sed cum bonum et malum sint [6] However, since good and evil are
opposita; unum autem oppositorum contraries, one of these contraries
non possit esse alterius subiectum, cannot be the subject for the other;
sed expellat ipsum: videbitur alicui rather, it excludes the other. It will seem
primo aspectu esse inconveniens to someone, at first glance, that it is
si bonum subiectum mali esse improper to say that good is the subject
dicatur. of evil.
Non est autem inconveniens, si [7] Yet it is not improper, provided the
veritas perquiratur. Nam bonum truth be investigated to its limit. Good is
communiter dicitur sicut et ens: spoken of in just as general a way as
cum omne ens, inquantum being, since every being, as such, is
huiusmodi, sit bonum, ut probatum good, as we have proved. Now, it is not
est. Non est autem inconveniens ut improper for nonbeing to be present in
non ens sit in ente sicut in being, as in a subject. Indeed, any
subiecto: privatio enim quaelibet instance of privation is a nonbeing, yet
est non ens, et tamen subiectum its subject is a substance which is a
eius est substantia, quae est ens being. However, nonbeing is not present
aliquod. Non tamen non ens est in in a being contrary to it, as in a subject.
ente sibi opposito sicut in subiecto. For blindness is not universal nonbeing,
Caecitas enim non est non ens but, rather, this particular nonbeing
universale, sed non ens hoc, quo whereby sight is taken away. So, it is not
scilicet tollitur visus: non est igitur present in the power of sight as its
in visu sicut in subiecto, sed in subject, but, rather, in the animal.
animali. Similiter autem malum non Likewise, evil is not present in a good
est sicut in subiecto in bono sibi contrary to it, as in its subject; rather, this
opposito, sed hoc per malum contrary good is taken away by the evil.
tollitur: sed in aliquo alio bono; For instance, moral evil is present in a
sicut malum moris est in bono natural good, while a natural evil, which
naturae; malum autem naturae, is a privation of form, is present in matter
quod est privatio formae, est in which is a good, in the sense of a being
materia, quae est bonum sicut ens in potency.
in potentia.
Caput 12 Chapter 12

Quod malum non totaliter
THAT EVIL DOES NOT WHOLLY
consumit bonum DESTROY GOOD
Patet autem ex praedictis quod, [1] It is evident from the foregoing
quantumcumque multiplicetur explanation that, no matter how much
malum, nunquam potest totum evil be multiplied, it can never destroy the
bonum consumere. good wholly.
Semper enim oportet quod [2] In fact, there must always continue to

remaneat mali subiectum, si be a subject for evil, if evil is to endure.
malum remanet. Subiectum autem Of course, the subject of evil is the good,
mali est bonum. Manet igitur and so the good will always endure.
semper bonum.
Sed cum contingat malum in [3] Yet, because it is possible for evil to
infinitum intendi; semper autem increase without limit, and because good
per intensionem mali minuatur is always decreased as evil increases, it
bonum: videtur in infinitum per appears that the good may be infinitely
malum diminui bonum. Bonum decreased by evil. Now, the good that
autem quod per malum diminui can be decreased by evil must be finite,
potest, oportet esse finitum: nam for the infinite good does not admit of
infinitum bonum non est capax evil, as we showed in Book One [39]. So,
mali, ut in primo libro ostensum it seems that eventually the good would
est. Videtur igitur quod quandoque be wholly destroyed by evil, for, if
totum tollatur bonum per malum: something be subtracted an infinite
nam si ex finito aliquid infinities number of times from a finite thing, the
tollatur, oportet illud quandoque latter must be destroyed eventually by
per ablationem consumi. the subtraction.
Non autem potest dici, ut dicunt [4] Now, it cannot be answered, as some

quidam, quod sequens ablatio, people say, that if the subsequent
secundum eandem proportionem subtraction be made in the same
facta qua et prior, in infinitum proportion as the preceding one, going
procedens, bonum non possit on to infinity, it is not possible to destroy
consumere, sicut in continui the good, as happens in the division of a
divisione contingit: nam si ex continuum. For, if you subtract half of a
bicubitali linea dimidium line two cubits long, and then half of the
subtraxeris, itemque ex residuo remainder, and if you go on in this way to
dimidium, et sic in infinitum infinity, something will always remain to
procedas, semper aliquid adhuc be divided. But, in this process of
dividendum remanebit. Sed tamen division, that which is subtracted later
in hoc divisionis processu semper must always be quantitatively diminished.
posterius subtractum oportet esse In fact, the half of the whole is
minus secundum quantitatem: quantitatively greater than half of the half,
dimidium enim totius, quod prius though the same proportion continues.
subtrahebatur, maius est This, however, cannot in any sense
secundum quantitatem absolutam happen in the decreasing of good by evil,
quam dimidium dimidii, licet eadem for the more the good would be
proportio maneat. Hoc autem in decreased by evil the weaker would it
diminutione qua bonum per malum become, and so, more open to
diminuitur, nequaquam potest diminution by subsequent evil. On the
accidere. Nam quanto bonum contrary, the later evil could be equal to,
magis per malum fuerit diminutum, or greater than, the earlier evil; hence a
erit infirmius: et sic per secundum proportionately smaller quantity of good
malum magis diminui poterit. would not always be subtracted by evil
Rursusque malum sequens from the good in subsequent cases.
contingit esse aequale, vel maius
priore: unde non semper secundo
subtrahetur a bono per malum
minor boni quantitas, proportione
servata eadem.
Est igitur aliter dicendum. Ex [5] So, another sort of answer must be
praemissis enim manifestum est given. It is evident from what has been
quod malum totaliter bonum cui said that evil does take away completely
oppositum est tollit, sicut caecitas the good which is its contrary, as
visum: oportet autem quod blindness does with sight. Yet there must
remaneat bonum quod est mali remain the good which is the subject of
subiectum. Quod quidem, evil. This, in fact, inasmuch as it is a
inquantum subiectum est, habet subject, has the essential character of
rationem boni, secundum quod est goodness, in the sense that it is in
potentia ad actum boni quod potency to the act of goodness which is
privatur per malum. Quanto igitur lacking due to the evil. So, the less it is in
minus fuerit in potentia ad illud potency to this good, the less will it be a
bonum, tanto minus erit bonum. good. Now, a subject becomes less
Subiectum autem fit minus potential to a form, not simply by the
potentia ad formam, non quidem subtraction of any of its parts, nor by the
per solam subtractionem alicuius fact that any part of the potency is
partis subiecti; neque per hoc subtracted, but by the fact that the
quod aliqua pars potentiae potency is impeded by a contrary act
subtrahatur; sed per hoc quod from being able to proceed to he actuality
potentia impeditur per contrarium of the form. For example, a subject is
actum ne in actum formae exire less potential in regard to cold to the
possit, sicut subiectum tanto est extent that heat is increased in it.
minus potentia frigidum, quanto in Therefore, the good is diminished by evil
eo magis calor augetur. Diminuitur more as a result of the addition of its
igitur bonum per malum magis contrary than by the subtraction of some
apponendo contrarium quam de of its goodness. This is also in
bono aliquid subtrahendo: quod agreement with the things that have been
etiam convenit his quae sunt dicta said about evil. Indeed, we said that evil
de malo. Diximus enim quod occurs apart from the intention of the
malum incidit praeter intentionem agent, and that he always intends a
agentis, quod semper intendit definite good, and that it consequently
aliquod bonum, ad quod sequitur implies the exclusion of another good
exclusio alterius boni, quod est ei which is contrary to it. So, the more this
oppositum. Quanto igitur illud intended good (which apart from the
bonum intentum ad quod praeter agent’s intention results in evil) is
intentionem agentis sequitur multiplied, the more is the potency to the
malum, magis multiplicatur, tanto contrary good diminished. And this is

potentia ad bonum contrarium rather the way in which the good is said
diminuitur magis: et sic magis per to be diminished by evil.
malum dicitur diminui bonum.
Haec autem diminutio boni per [6] Now, in the natural order, this
malum non potest in naturalibus in diminution of the good by evil cannot
infinitum procedere. Nam formae proceed to infinity. All natural forms and
naturales et virtutes omnes powers are limited, and they reach some
terminatae sunt, et perveniunt ad limit beyond which they cannot extend.
aliquem terminum ultra quem So, it is not possible for any contrary
porrigi non possunt. Non potest form, or any power of a contrary agent, to
igitur neque forma aliqua contraria, be increased to infinity, in such a way
neque virtus contrarii agentis in that the result would be an infinite
infinitum augeri, ut ex hoc diminution of good by evil.
sequatur in infinitum diminutio boni
per malum.
In moralibus autem potest ista [7] However, in the moral order, this
diminutio in infinitum procedere. diminution can proceed to infinity. For the
Nam intellectus et voluntas in suis intellect and the will have no limits to
actibus terminos non habent. their acts. The intellect is able to go on to
Potest enim intellectus intelligendo infinity in its act of understanding; this is
in infinitum procedere: unde why the mathematical species of
mathematicae numerorum species numbers and figures are called infinite.
et figurarum infinitae dicuntur. Et Likewise, the will proceeds to infinity in
similiter voluntas in volendo in its act of willing: a man who wills to
infinitum procedit: qui enim vult commit a theft can will again to commit it,
furtum committere, potest iterum and so on to infinity. Indeed, the more the
velle illud committere, et sic in will tends toward unworthy ends, the
infinitum. Quanto autem voluntas greater is its difficulty in returning to a
magis in fines indebitos tendit, proper and worthy end. This is evident in
tanto difficilius redit ad proprium et he case of people in whom vicious habits
debitum finem: quod patet in his in have developed already, as a result of
quibus per peccandi their growing accustomed to sinning.
consuetudinem iam est habitus Therefore, the good of natural aptitude
vitiorum inductus. In infinitum igitur can be infinitely decreased by moral evil.
per malum moris bonum naturalis Yet, it will never be wholly destroyed;
aptitudinis diminui potest. rather, it will always accompany the
Nunquam tamen totaliter tolletur, nature that endures.
sed semper naturam remanentem
comitatur.
Caput 13 Chapter 13
Quod malum habet aliquo THAT EVIL HAS A CAUSE OF SOME
modo causam SORT
Ex praedictis autem ostendi [1] From what has been said above it can
potest quod, etsi malum non be shown that, though evil has no direct
habeat causam per se, cause of itself, still there must be an
cuiuslibet tamen mali oportet accidental cause for every evil.
esse causam per accidens.
Quicquid enim est in aliquo ut in [2] Whatever exists in another thing as in its
subiecto, oportet quod habeat subject must have some cause, for it is
aliquam causam: causatur enim caused either by the principles of the
vel ex subiecti principiis, vel ex subject or by some extrinsic cause. Now,
aliqua extrinseca causa. Malum evil is in the good as in a subject, as has
autem est in bono sicut in been indicated, and so it is necessary for
subiecto, ut ostensum est. evil to have a cause.
Oportet igitur quod malum
habeat causam.
Item. Quod est in potentia ad [3] Again, that which is in potency to either

utrumque oppositorum, non of two contraries is not advanced to
constituitur in actu alicuius actuality under one of them unless through
eorum nisi per aliquam causam: some cause, for no potency makes itself be
nulla enim potentia facit se esse in act. Now, evil is a privation of something
in actu. Malum autem est that is natural to a man, and which he
privatio eius quod quis natus est ought to have. This is why anything
et debet habere: ex hoc enim whatever is called evil. So, evil is present in
unumquodque dicitur malum a subject that is in potency to evil and to its
esse. Est igitur malum in contrary. Therefore, it is necessary for evil
subiecto quod est in potentia ad to have some cause.
ipsum et ad suum oppositum.
Oportet igitur quod malum
habeat aliquam causam.
Adhuc. Quicquid inest alicui [4] Besides, whatever is present in

praeter suam naturam, advenit something and is not due to it from its
ei ex aliqua alia causa: omnia nature comes to it from some other cause,
enim in his quae sunt sibi for all things present in existing beings as
naturalia permanent nisi aliquid natural components remain there unless
aliud impediat; unde lapis non something else prevents them. Thus, a
fertur sursum nisi ab aliquo stone is not moved upward unless by
proiiciente, nec aqua calefit nisi something else that impels it, nor is water
ab aliquo calefaciente. Malum heated unless by some heating agent.
autem semper inest praeter Now, evil is always present as something
naturam eius cui inest: cum sit foreign to the nature of that in which it is,
privatio eius quod natum est since it is a privation of what a thing has
aliquid et debet habere. Igitur from its natural origin, and ought to have.
oportet quod malum semper Therefore evil must always have some
habeat aliquam causam, vel per cause, either directly of itself, or
se vel per accidens. accidentally.
Amplius. Omne malum [5] Moreover, every evil is the consequence

consequitur ad aliquod bonum: of a good, as corruption is the result of an
sicut corruptio sequitur ad act of generation. But every good has a
aliquam generationem. Sed cause, other than the first good in which
omne bonum habet aliquam there is no evil, as has been shown in Book
causam, praeter primum bonum, One [39]. Therefore, every evil has a
in quo non est aliquod malum, ut cause, in regard to which it is an accidental
in primo libro ostensum est. result.
Omne igitur malum habet
aliquam causam, ad quam
sequitur per accidens.
Caput 14
Chapter 14
Quod malum est causa per
THAT EVIL IS AN ACCIDENTAL CAUSE
accidens
Ex eisdem etiam patet quod [1] It is plain, from the same consideration,

malum, etsi non sit causa per se, that evil, though not a direct cause of
est tamen causa per accidens. anything by itself, is, however, an
accidental cause.
Si enim aliquid est causa alicuius [2] For, if a thing is the direct cause of

per se, id quod accidit ei, est something, then that which is an accidental
causa illius per accidens: sicut concomitant of this direct cause is the
album quod accidit aedificatori, accidental cause of the resultant. Take, for
est causa domus per accidens. instance, the fact that a builder happens to
Omne autem malum est in aliquo be white, then whiteness is the accidental
bono. Bonum autem omne est cause of the house. Now, every evil is
alicuius aliquo modo causa: present in something good. And every
materia enim est quodammodo good thing is the cause of something in
causa formae, et quodammodo e some way, for matter is in one way the
converso; et similiter est de cause of form; in another way the converse
agente et fine. Unde non is so. The same is true of the agent and
sequitur processus in infinitum in the end. Hence, the result is not a process
causis, si quodlibet est alicuius to infinity in causes if each thing is the
causa, propter circulum inventum cause of another thing, for there is a circle
in causis et causatis secundum involved in causes and effects, depending
species diversas causarum. on the different types of cause. So, evil is
Malum igitur est per accidens an accidental cause.
causa.
Adhuc. Malum est privatio [3] Again, evil is a privation, as we have
quaedam, ut ex praedictis patet. seen before. Now, privation is an
Privatio autem est principium per accidental principle in beings subject to
accidens in rebus mobilibus, motion, just as matter and form are
sicut materia et forma per se. essential principles. Therefore, evil is the
Malum igitur est alicuius causa accidental cause of something else.
per accidens.
Praeterea. Ex defectu causae [4] Besides, from a defect in a cause there

sequitur defectus in effectu. follows a defect in the effect. Now a defect
Defectus autem in causa est in a cause is an evil. Yet, it cannot be a
aliquod malum. Non tamen direct cause in itself, for a thing is not a
potest esse causa per se: quia cause by the fact that it is defective but
res non est causa per hoc quod rather by the fact that it is a being. Indeed,
est deficiens, sed per hoc quod if it were entirely defective, it would not
est ens; si enim tota deficeret, cause anything. So, evil is the cause of
nullius esset causa. Malum igitur something, not as a direct cause by itself,
est alicuius causa non per se, but accidentally.
sed per accidens.
Item. Secundum omnes species [5] Moreover, evil is found to be an
causarum discurrendo, invenitur accidental cause in a discursive
malum esse per accidens causa. examination of all types of cause. This is
In specie quidem causae so, in the kind of cause which is efficient,
efficientis quia propter causae since a defect in the effect and in action
agentis deficientem virtutem results from a deficiency of power in the
sequitur defectus in effectu et acting cause. Then, in the type of cause
actione. In specie vero causae that is material, a defect in the effect is
materialis, quia ex materiae caused by the unsuitable character of the
indispositione causatur in effectu matter. Again, in the kind of cause which is
defectus. In specie vero causae formal, there is the fact that a privation of
formalis, quia uni formae semper another form is always the adjunct of the
adiungitur alterius formae presence of a given form. And, in the type
privatio. In specie vero causae of cause that is final, evil is connected with
finalis, quia indebito fini an improper end, inasmuch as the proper
adiungitur malum, inquantum per end is hindered by it.
ipsum finis debitus impeditur.
Patet igitur quod malum est [6] Therefore, it is clear that evil is an
causa per accidens, et non accidental cause and cannot be a direct
potest esse causa per se. cause by itself.
Chapter 15
Caput 15
THAT THERE IS NO HIGHEST
Quod non est summum malum
EVIL
Ex hoc autem patet quod non potest [1] As a consequence, it is evident
esse aliquod summum malum, quod sit that there cannot be any highest
omnium malorum principium. evil which would be the first source
of all evils.
Summum enim malum oportet esse [2] The highest evil ought to be
absque consortio omnis boni: sicut et quite dissociated from any good;
summum bonum est quod est omnino just as the highest good is that
separatum a malo. Non potest autem which is completely separate from
esse aliquod malum omnino separatum evil. Now, no evil can exist in
a bono: cum ostensum sit quod malum complete separation from the good,
fundatur in bono. Ergo nihil est summe for we have shown that evil is
malum. based upon the good. Therefore,
the highest evil is nothing.
Adhuc. Si aliquid est summe malum, [3] Again, if the highest evil be
oportet quod per essentiam suam sit anything, it must be evil in its own
malum: sicut et summe bonum est quod essence, just as the highest good is
per suam essentiam bonum est. Hoc what is good in its own essence.
autem est impossibile: cum malum non Now, this is impossible, because
habeat aliquam essentiam, ut supra evil has no essence, as we proved
probatum est. Impossibile est igitur above. So, it is impossible to posit a
ponere summum malum, quod sit highest evil which would be the
malorum principium. source of evils.
Item. Illud quod est primum principium, [4] Besides, that which is a first
non est ab aliquo causatum. Omne principle is not caused by anything.
autem malum causatur a bono, ut But every evil is caused by a good,
ostensum est. Non est igitur malum as we have shown. Therefore, evil
primum principium. is not a first principle.
Amplius. Malum non agit nisi virtute [5] Moreover, evil acts only through

boni, ut ex praemissis patet. Primum the power of the good, as is clear
autem principium agit virtute propria. from what has been established
Malum igitur non potest esse primum previously. But a first principle acts
principium. through its own power. Therefore,
evil cannot be a first principle.
Praeterea. Cum id quod est per [6] Furthermore, since “that which is

accidens, sit posterius eo quod est per accidental is posterior to that which
se, impossibile est quod sit primum id is per se,” it is impossible for that
quod est per accidens. Malum autem which is first to be accidental. Now,
non evenit nisi per accidens et praeter evil arises only accidentally, and
intentionem, ut probatum est. apart from intention, as has been
Impossibile est igitur quod malum sit demonstrated. So, it is impossible
primum principium. for evil to be a first principle.
Adhuc. Omne malum habet causam per [7] Again, every evil has an

accidens, ut probatum est. Primum accidental cause, as we have
autem principium non habet causam proved. Now, a first principle has no
neque per se neque per accidens. cause, whether direct or accidental.
Malum igitur non potest esse primum Therefore, evil cannot be a first
principium in aliquo genere. principle in any genus.
Item. Causa per se prior est ea quae [8] Besides, a per sc cause is prior
per accidens. Sed malum non est causa to one which is accidental. But evil

nisi per accidens, ut ostensum est. is not a cause, except in the
Malum igitur non potest esse primum accidental sense, as we have
principium. shown.” So, evil cannot be a first
principle.
Per hoc autem excluditur error [9] By means of this conclusion, the

Manichaeorum, ponentium aliquod error of the Manicheans is refuted,
summum malum, quod est principium for they claimed that there is a
primum omnium malorum. highest evil which is the first
principle of all evils.
Caput 16 Chapter 16
Quod finis cuiuslibet rei est THAT THE END OF EVERYTHING IS A
bonum GOOD
Si autem omne agens agit propter [1] If every agent acts for the sake of a
bonum, ut supra probatum est, good, as was proved above, it follows
sequitur ulterius quod cuiuslibet further that the end of every being is a
entis bonum sit finis. Omne enim good. For every being is ordered to its
ens ordinatur in finem per suam end through its action. It must be, then,
actionem: oportet enim quod vel that the action itself is the end, or that the
ipsa actio sit finis; vel actionis finis end of the action is also the end of the
est etiam finis agentis. Quod est agent. And this is its good.
eius bonum.
Amplius. Finis rei cuiuslibet est in [2] Again, the end of anything is that in
quod terminatur appetitus eius. which its appetite terminates. Now, the
Appetitus autem cuiuslibet rei appetite of anything terminates in a good;
terminatur ad bonum: sic enim this is how the philosophers define the
philosophi diffiniunt bonum, quod good: “that which all things desire.”
omnia appetunt. Cuiuslibet igitur Therefore, the end for everything is a
rei finis est aliquod bonum. good.
Item. Illud ad quod aliquid tendit [3] Besides, that toward which a thing
cum extra ipsum fuerit, et in quo tends, while it is beyond the thing, and in
quiescit cum ipsum habuerit, est which it rests, when it is possessed, is the
finis eius. Unumquodque autem, end for the thing. Now, if anything lacks a
si perfectione propria careat, in proper perfection, it is moved toward it, in
ipsam movetur, quantum in se est: so far as lies within its capacity, but if it
si vero eam habeat, in ipsa possess it the thing rests in it. Therefore,
quiescit. Finis igitur uniuscuiusque the end of each thing is its perfection.
rei est eius perfectio. Perfectio Now, the perfection of anything is its
autem cuiuslibet est bonum good. So, each thing is ordered to a good
ipsius. Unumquodque igitur as an end.
ordinatur in bonum sicut in finem.
Praeterea. Eodem modo [4] Moreover, things that know their end
ordinantur in finem ea quae are ordered to the end in the same way
cognoscunt finem, et ea quae as things which do not know it, though the
finem non cognoscunt: licet quae ones that do know their end are moved
cognoscunt finem, per se toward it through themselves, while those
moveantur in finem; quae autem that do not know it incline to their end, as
non cognoscunt, tendunt in finem directed by another being. The example
quasi ab alio directa, sicut patet of the archer and the arrow shows this
de sagittante et sagitta. Sed ea clearly. However, things that know their
quae cognoscunt finem, semper end are always ordered to the good as an
ordinantur in bonum sicut in end, for the will, which is the appetite for a
finem: nam voluntas, quae est foreknown end, inclines toward something
appetitus finis praecogniti, non only if it has the rational character of a
tendit in aliquid nisi sub ratione good, which is its object. So, also, the
boni, quod est eius obiectum. things which do not know their end are
Ergo et ea quae finem non ordered to a good as an end. Therefore,
cognoscunt, ordinantur in bonum the end of all things is a good.
sicut in finem. Finis igitur omnium
est bonum.
Caput 17 Chapter 17
Quod omnia ordinantur in unum THAT ALL THINGS ARE ORDERED
finem, qui est Deus TO ONE END WHO IS GOD
Ex hoc autem apparet quod omnia [1] It is, consequently, apparent that all

ordinantur in unum bonum sicut in things are ordered to one good, as to
ultimum finem. their ultimate end.
Si enim nihil tendit in aliquid sicut in [2] If, in fact, nothing tends toward a
finem nisi inquantum ipsum est thing as an end, unless this thing is a
bonum, ergo oportet quod bonum good, it is therefore necessary that the
inquantum bonum sit finis. Quod good, as good, be the end. Therefore,
igitur est summum bonum, est that which is the highest good is, from
maxime omnium finis. Sed summum the highest point of view, the end of all
bonum est unum tantum, quod est things. But there is only one highest
Deus: ut in primo libro probatum est. good, and this is God, as has been
Omnia igitur ordinantur sicut in finem demonstrated in Book One [42]. So, all
in unum bonum quod est Deus. things are ordered to one good, as
their end, and this is God.
Item. Quod est maximum in [3] Again, that which is supreme in any

unoquoque genere, est causa genus is the cause of all the members
omnium illorum quae sunt illius that belong in that genus; thus, fire,
generis; sicut ignis, qui est which is the hottest of corporeal things,
calidissimus, est causa caliditatis in is the cause of the heat of other things.
aliis corporibus. Summum igitur Therefore, the highest good which is
bonum, quod est Deus, est causa God is the cause of the goodness in all
bonitatis in omnibus bonis. Ergo et good things. So, also, is He the cause

est causa cuiuslibet finis quod sit of every end that is an end, since
finis: cum quicquid est finis, sit whatever is an end is such because it
huiusmodi inquantum est bonum. is a good. Now, “the cause of an
Propter quod autem est attribute’s inherence in a subject
unumquodque, et illud magis. Deus always itself inheres in the subject
igitur maxime est omnium rerum finis. more firmly than does the attribute.”
Therefore, God is obviously the end of
all things.
Adhuc. In quolibet genere causarum [4] Besides, in any kind of causes, the

causa prima est magis causa quam first cause is more a cause than is the
causa secunda: nam causa secunda secondary cause, for a secondary
non est causa nisi per causam cause is only a cause through the
primam. Illud igitur quod est causa primary cause. Therefore, that which is
prima in ordine causarum finalium, the first cause in the order of final
oportet quod sit magis causa finalis causes must be more the final cause
cuiuslibet quam causa finalis of anything than is its proximate final
proxima. Sed Deus est prima causa cause. But God is the first cause in the
in ordine causarum finalium: cum sit order of final causes, since He is the
summum in ordine bonorum. Est highest in the order of goods.
igitur magis finis uniuscuiusque rei Therefore, He is more the end of
quam aliquis finis proximus. everything than is any proximate end.
Amplius. In omnibus finibus ordinatis [5] Moreover, in every ordered series

oportet quod ultimus finis sit finis of ends the ultimate end must be the
omnium praecedentium finium: sicut, end of all preceding ends. For
si potio conficitur ut detur aegroto, instance, if a potion is mixed to be
datur autem ut purgetur, purgatur given a sick man, and it is given in
autem ut extenuetur, extenuatur order to purge him, and he is purged in
autem ut sanetur; oportet quod order to make him thinner, and he is
sanitas sit finis et extenuationis et thinned down so that he may become
purgationis et aliorum healthy.—then health must be the end
praecedentium. Sed omnia of the thinning process, and of the
inveniuntur in diversis gradibus purging, and of the other actions which
bonitatis ordinata sub uno summo precede it. But all things are found, in
bono, quod est causa omnis their various degrees of goodness, to
bonitatis: ac per hoc, cum bonum be subordinated to one highest good
habeat rationem finis, omnia which is the cause of all goodness.
ordinantur sub Deo sicut fines Consequently, since the good has the
praecedentes sub fine ultimo. essential character of an end, all
Oportet igitur quod omnium finis sit things are subordinated to God, as
Deus. preceding ends under an ultimate end.
Therefore, God must be the end of all
things.
Praeterea. Bonum particulare [6] Furthermore, a particular good is

ordinatur in bonum commune sicut in ordered to the common good as to an
finem: esse enim partis est propter end; indeed, the being of a part
esse totius; unde et bonum gentis est depends on the being of the whole.
divinius quam bonum unius hominis. So, also, the good of a nation is more
Bonum autem summum, quod est godlike than the good of one man.
Deus, est bonum commune, cum ex Now, the highest good which is God is
eo universorum bonum dependeat: the common good, since the good of
bonum autem quo quaelibet res bona all things taken together depends on
est, est bonum particulare ipsius et Him; and the good whereby each thing
aliorum quae ab ipso dependent. is good is its own particular good, and
Omnes igitur res ordinantur sicut in also is the good of the other things that
finem in unum bonum, quod est depend on this thing. Therefore, all
Deus. things are ordered to one good as their
end, and that is God.
Item. Ad ordinem agentium sequitur [7] Again, order among ends is a
ordo in finibus: nam sicut supremum consequence of order among agents,
agens movet omnia secunda agentia, for, just as the supreme agent moves
ita ad finem supremi agentis oportet all secondary agents, so must all the
quod ordinentur omnes fines ends of secondary agents be ordered
secundorum agentium: quidquid to the end of the supreme agent, since
enim agit supremum agens, agit whatever the supreme agent does, He
propter finem suum. Agit autem does for the sake of His end. Now, the
supremum actiones omnium supreme agent does the actions of all
inferiorum agentium, movendo inferior agents by moving them all to
omnes ad suas actiones, et per their actions and, consequently, to
consequens ad suos fines. Unde their ends. Hence, it follows that all the
sequitur quod omnes fines ends of secondary agents are ordered
secundorum agentium ordinentur a by the first agent to His own proper
primo agente in finem suum end. Of course, the first agent of all
proprium. Agens autem primum things is God, as we proved in Book
rerum omnium est Deus, ut in Two [15]. There is no other end for His
secundo probatum est. Voluntatis will than His goodness, which is
autem ipsius nihil aliud finis est quam Himself, as we proved in Book One
sua bonitas, quae est ipsemet, ut in [74]. Therefore, all things, whether
primo probatum est. Omnia igitur made by Him. immediately, or by
quaecumque sunt facta vel ab ipso means of secondary causes, are
immediate, vel mediantibus causis ordered to God as to their end. Now,
secundis, in Deum ordinantur sicut in all things are of this kind, for, as we
finem. Omnia autem entia sunt proved in Book Two [15], there can be
huiusmodi: nam, sicut in secundo nothing that does not take its being
probatur, nihil esse potest quod ab from Him. So, all things are ordered to
ipso non habeat esse. Omnia igitur God as an end.
ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem.
Adhuc. Finis ultimus cuiuslibet [8] Besides, the ultimate end of any
facientis, inquantum est faciens, est maker, as a maker, is himself; we use
ipsemet: utimur enim factis a nobis things made by us for our own sakes,
propter nos; et si aliquid aliquando and, if sometimes a man makes a
propter aliud homo faciat, hoc thing for some other purpose, this has
refertur in bonum suum vel utile vel reference to his own good, either as
delectabile vel honestum. Deus useful, delectable, or as a good for its
autem est causa factiva rerum own sake. Now, God is the productive
omnium, quorundam quidem cause of all things, of some
immediate, quorundam autem immediately, of others by means of
mediantibus aliis causis, ut ex other causes, as is shown in the
praemissis est manifestum. Est igitur foregoing. Therefore, He Himself is the
ipsemet finis rerum omnium. end of all things.
Praeterea. Finis inter alias causas [9] Moreover, the end holds first place
primatum obtinet, et ab ipso omnes over other types of cause, and to it all
aliae causae habent quod sint other causes owe the fact that they are
causae in actu: agens enim non agit causes in act: for the agent acts only
nisi propter finem, ut ostensum est. for the sake of the end, as was pointed
Ex agente autem materia in actum out.” Matter is brought to formal act by
formae reducitur: unde materia fit the agent, and thus matter actually
actu huius rei materia, et similiter becomes the matter of this particular
forma huius rei forma, per actionem thing, as form becomes the form of this
agentis, et per consequens per thing: through the action of the agent,
finem. Finis etiam posterior est causa and consequently through the end. So,
quod praecedens finis intendatur ut too, the posterior end is the cause of
finis: non enim movetur aliquid in the preceding end being intended as
finem proximum nisi propter finem an end, for a thing is not moved toward
postremum. Est igitur finis ultimus a proximate end unless for the sake of
prima omnium causa. Esse autem a last end. Therefore, the ultimate end
primam omnium causam necesse est is the first cause of all. Now, to be the
primo enti convenire, quod Deus est, first cause of all must be appropriate to
ut supra ostensum est. Deus igitur the first being, that is, to God, as was
est ultimus omnium finis. shown above. So, God is the ultimate
end of all things.
Hinc est quod dicitur Proverb. 164: [10] Thus it is said in Proverbs (16:4):
universa propter semetipsum “God made all things for Himself”; and
operatus est Deus. Et Apoc. ult.: ego in the Apocalypse (22:13): “I am Alpha
sum alpha et omega, primus et and Omega, the First and the Last.”
novissimus.
Chapter 18
Caput 18
HOW GOD IS THE END OF ALL
Quomodo Deus sit finis rerum
THINGS
Restat igitur inquirendum quomodo [1] We must further investigate how God
Deus sit omnium finis. Quod is the end of all. This will be made clear
quidem ex praemissis fiet from the foregoing.
manifestum.
Sic enim est ultimus finis omnium [2] The ultimate end of all is such that
rerum quod tamen est prius He is, nonetheless, prior to all things in
omnibus in essendo. Finis autem existing being. Now, there is a sort of
aliquis invenitur qui, etiam si end which, though it holds first place
primatum obtineat in causando causally in the order of intention, is
secundum quod est in intentione, posterior in existing. This is the situation
est tamen in essendo posterius. with an end which the agent sets up by
Quod quidem contingit in quolibet his own action, as a physician sets up
fine quem agens sua actione health in a sick man by his own action;
constituit: sicut medicus constituit this is, of course, the physician’s end.
sanitatem per suam actionem in And then there is an end which takes
infirmo, quae tamen est finis eius. precedence in existing being, just as it
Aliquis autem finis invenitur qui, precedes in the causal order. For
sicut est praecedens in causando, instance, we call that an end which one
ita etiam in essendo praecedit: intends to obtain by his action or motion,
sicut dicitur finis id quod aliquid sua as fire inclines upward by its motion, and
actione vel motu acquirere intendit, a king intends to establish a city by
ut locum sursum ignis per suum fighting. Therefore, God is not the end of
motum, et civitatem rex per things in the sense of being something
pugnam. Deus igitur sic est finis set up as an ideal, but as a preexisting
rerum sicut aliquid ab unaquaque being Who is to be attained.
re suo modo obtinendum.
Adhuc. Deus est simul ultimus [3] Again, God is at once the ultimate
rerum finis, et primum agens, ut end of things and the first agent, as we
ostensum est. Finis autem per have shown. But the end that is
actionem agentis constitutus, non produced by the action of the agent
potest esse primum agens, sed est cannot be the first agent; it is, rather, the
magis effectus agentis. Non potest effect of the agent. Therefore, God
igitur Deus sic esse finis rerum cannot be the end of things in this way,
quasi aliquid constitutum, sed as something produced, but only as
solum quasi aliquid praeexistens something preexisting that is to be
obtinendum. attained.
Amplius. Si aliquid agat propter rem [4] Besides, if something act for the sake
aliquam iam existentem, et per eius of an already existing thing, and should
actionem aliquid constituatur, then set up something by its action, then
oportet quod rei propter quam agit this something must be added by the
aliquid acquiratur ex actione action of the agent to the thing for the
agentis: sicut si milites pugnant sake of which the action is done: thus, if
propter ducem, cui acquiritur soldiers fight for the sake of their leader,
victoria, quam milites suis victory will come to the leader, and this
actionibus causant. Deo autem non is what the soldiers cause by their
potest aliquid acquiri ex actione actions. Now, something cannot be
cuiuslibet rei: est enim sua bonitas added to God by the action of a thing,
omnino perfecta, ut in primo libro for His goodness is completely perfect,
ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur as we showed in Book One [37ff]. The
quod Deus sit finis rerum, non sicut conclusion stands, then, that God is the
aliquid constitutum aut effectum a end of things, not in the sense of
rebus, neque ita quod aliquid ei a something set up, or produced, by
rebus acquiratur, sed hoc solo things, nor in the sense that something
modo, quia ipse rebus acquiritur. is added to Him by things, but in this
sense only, that He is attained by things.
Item. Oportet quod eo modo [5] Moreover, the effect must tend
effectus tendat in finem quo agens toward the end in the same way that the
propter finem agit. Deus autem qui agent works for the end. Now, God, Who
est primum agens omnium rerum, is the first agent of all things, does not
non sic agit quasi sua actione act in such a way that something is
aliquid acquirat, sed quasi sua attained by His action, but in such a way
actione aliquid largiatur: quia non that something is enriched by His action.
est in potentia ut aliquid acquirere For He is not in potency to the possibility
possit, sed solum in actu perfecto, of obtaining something; rather, He is in
ex quo potest elargiri. Res igitur perfect act simply, and as a result He is
non ordinantur in Deum sicut in a source of enrichment. So, things are
finem cui aliquid acquiratur, sed ut not ordered to God as to an end for
ab ipso ipsummet suo modo which something may be obtained, but
consequantur, cum ipsemet sit finis. rather so that they may attain Himself
from Himself, according to their
measure, since He is their end.
Caput 19 Chapter 19
Quod omnia intendunt THAT ALL THINGS TEND TO BECOME
assimilari Deo LIKE GOD
Ex hoc autem quod acquirunt [1] Created things are made like unto God

divinam bonitatem, res creatae by the fact that they attain to divine
similes Deo constituuntur. Si igitur goodness. If then, all things tend toward
res omnes in Deum sicut in God as an ultimate end, so that they may
ultimum finem tendunt ut ipsius attain His goodness, it follows that the
bonitatem consequantur, sequitur ultimate end of things is to become like
quod ultimus rerum finis sit Deo God.
assimilari.
Amplius. Agens dicitur esse finis [2] Again, the agent is said to be the end

effectus inquantum effectus tendit of the effect because the effect tends to
in similitudinem agentis: unde become like the agent; hence, “the form
forma generantis est finis of the generator is the end of the
generationis. Sed Deus ita est generating action.” But God is the end of
finis rerum quod est etiam primum things in such a way that He is also their
agens earum. Omnia igitur first agent. Therefore, all things tend to
intendunt, sicut ultimum finem, become like God as to their ultimate end.
Deo assimilari.
Item. In rebus evidenter apparet [3] Besides, it is quite evident that things
quod esse appetunt naturaliter: “naturally desire to be,” and if they can be
unde et si qua corrumpi possunt, corrupted by anything they naturally resist
naturaliter corrumpentibus corrupting agents and tend toward a

resistunt, et tendunt illuc ubi place where they may be preserved, as
conserventur, sicut ignis sursum fire inclines upward and earth downward.
et terra deorsum. Secundum hoc Now, all things get their being from the
autem esse habent omnia quod fact that they are made like unto God,
Deo assimilantur, qui est ipsum Who is subsisting being itself, for all
esse subsistens: cum omnia sint things exist merely as participants in
solum quasi esse participantia. existing being. Therefore, all things desire
Omnia igitur appetunt quasi as their ultimate end to be made like unto
ultimum finem Deo assimilari. God.
Praeterea. Res omnes creatae [4] Moreover, all created things are, in a
sunt quaedam imagines primi sense, images of the first agent, that is, of
agentis, scilicet Dei: agens enim God, “for the agent makes a product to
agit sibi simile. Perfectio autem his own likeness. Now, the function of a
imaginis est ut repraesentet suum perfect image is to represent its prototype
exemplar per similitudinem ad by likeness to it; this is why an image is
ipsum: ad hoc enim imago made. Therefore, all things exist in order
constituitur. Sunt igitur res omnes to attain to the divine likeness, as to their
propter divinam similitudinem ultimate end.
consequendam sicut propter
ultimum finem.
Adhuc. Omnis res per suum [5] Furthermore, everything tends through

motum vel actionem tendit in its motion or action toward a good, as its
aliquod bonum sicut in finem, ut end, which we showed above. Now, a
supra ostensum est. In tantum thing participates in the good precisely to
autem aliquid de bono participat, the same extent that it becomes like the
in quantum assimilatur primae first goodness, which is God. So, all
bonitati, quae Deus est. Omnia things tend through their movements and
igitur per motus suos et actiones actions toward the divine likeness, as
tendunt in divinam similitudinem toward their ultimate end.
sicut in finem ultimum.
Caput 20 Chapter 20
Quomodo res imitentur divinam HOW THINGS IMITATE DIVINE
bonitatem GOODNESS
Patet ergo ex his quae dicta sunt [1] From what has been said, then, it is
quod assimilari ad Deum est clear that to become like God is the
ultimus omnium finis. Id autem ultimate end of all. Now, that which
quod proprie habet rationem finis, possesses the formal character of an
est bonum. Tendunt igitur res in end, in the proper sense, is the good.
hoc quod assimilentur Deo proprie Therefore, things tend toward this
inquantum est bonus. objective, of becoming like God,
inasmuch as He is good.
Bonitatem autem creaturae non [2] Creatures do not attain goodness in
assequuntur eo modo sicut in Deo the same measure that it is in God,
est, licet divinam bonitatem though each thing imitates divine
unaquaeque res imitetur goodness according to its measure. For,
secundum suum modum. Divina divine goodness is simple, entirely
enim bonitas simplex est, quasi gathered together, as it were, into one
tota in uno consistens. Ipsum enim being. Indeed, this divine existing being
divinum esse omnem plenitudinem includes the entire fullness of perfection,
perfectionis obtinet, ut in primo as we proved in Book One [28]. As a
libro probatum est. Unde, cum result, since anything is perfect to the
unumquodque in tantum sit bonum extent that it is good, this divine being is
in quantum est perfectum, ipsum His perfect goodness. In fact, for God it is
divinum esse est eius perfecta the same thing to be, to live, to be wise,
bonitas: idem enim est Deo esse, to be blessed, and to be whatever else
vivere, sapientem esse, beatum seems to belong to perfection and
esse, et quicquid aliud ad goodness; the whole divine goodness is,
perfectionem et bonitatem as it were, His divine existing being.
pertinere videtur, quasi tota divina Again, this divine being is the substance
bonitas sit ipsum divinum esse. of the existing God. Now, this cannot
Rursumque ipsum divinum esse obtain in the case of other things. We
est ipsius Dei existentis have pointed out in Book Two [15] that no
substantia. In aliis autem rebus created substance is its own act of being.
hoc accidere non potest. Hence, if anything is good by virtue of the
Ostensum est enim in secundo fact that it exists, none of them is its own
quod nulla substantia creata est act of being; none of them is its own
ipsum suum esse. Unde, si goodness. Rather, each of them is good
secundum quod res quaelibet est, by participation in goodness, just as it is
bona est; non est autem earum being by participation in existing being
aliqua suum esse: nulla earum est itself.
sua bonitas, sed earum quaelibet
bonitatis participatione bona est,
sicut et ipsius esse participatione
est ens.
Rursus. Non omnes creaturae in [3] Again, not all creatures are
uno gradu bonitatis constituuntur. established on one level of goodness.
Nam quorundam substantia forma For some of them, substance is their form
et actus est: scilicet cui secundum and their act: this is so for the creature to
id quod est, competit esse actu et whom, because of what it is essentially, it
bonum esse. Quorundam vero is appropriate to be, and to be good. For
substantia ex materia et forma others, indeed, substance is composed of
composita est: cui competit actu matter and form: to such a being it is
esse et bonum esse, sed appropriate to be, and to be good—but
secundum aliquid sui, scilicet by virtue of some part of it, that is to say,
secundum formam. Divina igitur by virtue of its form. Therefore, divine
substantia sua bonitas est; substance is its own goodness, but a
substantia vero simplex bonitatem simple substance participates goodness
participat secundum id quod est; by virtue of what it is essentially, while
substantia autem composita composite substance does so by virtue of
secundum aliquid sui. something that belongs to it as a part.
In hoc autem tertio gradu [4] In this third grade of substance, in
substantiarum iterum diversitas turn, there is found a diversity in regard to
invenitur quantum ad ipsum esse. being itself. For some of them that are
Nam quorundam ex materia et composed of matter and form, the form
forma compositorum totam fulfills the entire potentiality of the matter,
materiae potentiam forma so that there remains in their matter no
adimplet, ita quod non remanet in potentiality for another form. And
materia potentia ad aliam formam: consequently, there is no potentiality in
et per consequens nec in aliqua other matter for the form of this type of
alia materia potentia ad hanc substance. Beings of this type are
formam. Et huiusmodi sunt celestial bodies, which actuate their
corpora caelestia, quae ex tota entire matter when they exist. For other
materia sua constant. Quorundam substances, the form does not exhaust
vero forma non replet totam the entire potentiality of their matter;
materiae potentiam: unde adhuc in consequently, there still remains a
materia remanet potentia ad aliam potentiality for another form, and in some
formam; et in alia materiae parte other portion of matter there remains a
remanet potentia ad hanc formam; potentiality for this sort of form, as is the
sicut patet in elementis et case in the elements and in things
elementatis. Quia vero privatio est composed of the elements. In fact, since
negatio in substantia eius quod privation is the negation in a substance of
substantiae potest inesse, something which can be present in that
manifestum est quod cum hac substance, it is clear that the privation of
forma quae non implet totam a form is found combined with the type of
materiae potentiam, adiungitur form that does not exhaust the entire
privatio formae: quae quidem potentiality of matter. Indeed, privation
adiungi non potest substantiae cannot be associated with a substance
cuius forma implet totam materiae whose form exhausts the entire
potentiam; neque illi quae est potentiality of its matter; nor with one
forma per suam essentiam; et which is a form in its essence; still less
multo minus illi cuius essentia est with one whose essence is its very act of
ipsum suum esse. Cum autem being. Now, since it is obvious that
manifestum sit quod motus non change cannot take place where there is
potest esse ubi non est potentia no potentiality to something else, for
ad aliud, quia motus est actus motion is the “act of that which exists
existentis in potentia; itemque potentially,” and since it is also clear that
manifestum sit quod malum est evil is the very privation of the good, it is
ipsa privatio boni: planum est plain that, in this lowest order of
quod in hoc ultimo substantiarum substances, the good is mutable and
ordine est bonum mutabile et mixed with its contrary evil. This cannot
permixtionem mali oppositi occur in the higher orders of substances.
habens; quod in superioribus Therefore, this substance which we have
substantiarum ordinibus accidere said is on the lowest level holds the
non potest. Possidet igitur haec lowest rank in goodness, just as it has
substantia ultimo modo dicta, sicut the lowest grade in being.
ultimum gradum in esse, ita
ultimum gradum in bonitate.
Inter partes etiam huius [5] Still, among the parts of this sort of
substantiae ex materia et forma substance composed of matter and form,
compositae, bonitatis ordo an order of goodness is found. In fact,
invenitur. Cum enim materia sit since matter, considered in itself, is
ens in potentia secundum se potential being and form is its act, and
considerata, forma vero sit actus since composite substance is actually
eius; substantia vero composita sit existent through form, the form will be
actu existens per formam: forma good in itself; while the composite
quidem erit secundum se bona, substance is so in so far as it actually
substantia vero composita prout possesses form; and the matter is good
actu habet formam; materia vero inasmuch as it is in potentiality to form.
secundum quod est in potentia ad Besides, though anything is good in so
formam. Et licet unumquodque sit far as it is a being, it is not, however,
bonum inquantum est ens, non necessary for matter which is merely
tamen oportet quod materia, quae potential being to be good only in
est ens solum in potentia, sit bona potency. For being is a term used
solum in potentia. Ens enim absolutely, while good also includes a
absolute dicitur, bonum autem relation. In fact, a thing is not called good
etiam in ordine consistit: non enim simply because it is an end, or because it
solum aliquid bonum dicitur quia has achieved the end; provided it be
est finis, vel quia est obtinens ordered to the end, it may be called good
finem; sed, etiam si nondum ad because of this relation. So, matter
finem pervenerit, dummodo sit cannot be called a being without
ordinatum in finem, ex hoc ipso qualification, because it is potential being,
dicitur bonum. Materia ergo non in which a relation to existing being is
potest simpliciter dici ens ex hoc implied, but it can be called good, without
quod est potentia ens, in quo qualification, precisely because of this
importatur ordo ad esse: potest relation. It is apparent in this conclusion
autem ex hoc simpliciter dici bona, that good is, in a way, of wider scope
propter ordinem ipsum. In quo than being. For this reason, Dionysius
apparet quod bonum says, in the fourth chapter of On the
quodammodo amplioris est Divine Names: “the good extends to
ambitus quam ens: propter quod existent beings and also to nonexistent
Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. ones.” For, this nonexistent thing—
Nom., quod bonum se extendit ad namely matter understood as subject to
existentia et non existentia. Nam privation—desires a good, that is, to be. It
et ipsa non existentia, scilicet is, consequently, evident that it is also
materia secundum quod intelligitur good, for nothing except a good thing
privationi subiecta, appetit bonum, desires the good.
scilicet esse. Ex quo patet quod
etiam sit bona: nihil enim appetit
bonum nisi bonum.
Est et alio modo creaturae bonitas [6] There is still another way in which the
a bonitate divina deficiens. Nam, goodness of a creature is defective in
sicut dictum est, Deus in ipso suo comparison with divine goodness. For, as
esse summam perfectionem we said, God in His very act of being
obtinet bonitatis. Res autem holds the highest perfection of goodness.
creata suam perfectionem non On the other hand, a created thing does
possidet in uno, sed in multis: not possess its perfection in unity, but in
quod enim est in supremo unitum, many items, for what is unified in the

multiplex in infimis invenitur. Unde highest instance is found to be manifold
Deus secundum idem dicitur esse in the lowest things. Consequently, God
virtuosus, sapiens et operans, is said to be virtuous, wise, and operative
creatura vero secundum diversa: with reference to the same thing, but
tantoque perfecta bonitas alicuius creatures are so described with reference
creaturae maiorem multiplicitatem to a diversity of things. And so, the more
requirit, quanto magis a prima multiplicity the perfect goodness of any
bonitate distans invenitur. Si vero creature requires, the more removed is it
perfectam bonitatem non potest from the first goodness. If it cannot attain
attingere, imperfectam retinebit in perfect goodness, it will keep imperfect
paucis. Et inde est quod, licet goodness in a few items. Hence it is that,
primum et summum bonum sit though the first and highest good is
omnino simplex; substantiaeque ei altogether simple, and the substances
in bonitate propinquae, sint pariter that are nearer to it in goodness are
et quantum ad simplicitatem likewise close to it in regard to simplicity,
vicinae: infimae tamen substantiae we find some among the lowest
inveniuntur simpliciores substances to be simpler than some of
quibusdam superioribus eis, sicut their superiors, as is the case with
elementa animalibus et hominibus, elements in relation to animals and men;
quia non possunt pertingere ad yet these lower simple beings cannot
perfectionem cognitionis et achieve the perfection of knowledge and
intellectus, quam consequuntur understanding which animals and men do
animalia et homines. attain.
Manifestum est ergo ex dictis [7] So, it is evident from what has been
quod, licet Deus secundum suum said that, though God has His own
simplex esse perfectam et totam perfect and complete goodness, in
suam bonitatem habeat, creaturae accord with His simple existing being,
tamen ad perfectionem suae creatures do not attain the perfection of
bonitatis non pertingunt per solum their goodness through their being alone,
suum esse, sed per plura. Unde, but through many things. Hence,
licet quaelibet earum sit bona although any one of them is good in so
inquantum est, non tamen potest far as it exists, it cannot be called good,
simpliciter bona dici si aliis careat without qualification, if it lack any other
quae ad ipsius bonitatem things required for its goodness. Thus, a
requiruntur: sicut homo qui, virtute man who is destitute of virtue and host to
spoliatus, vitiis est subiectus, vices is indeed called good, relatively
dicitur quidem bonus secundum speaking; that is, to the extent that be is a
quid, scilicet inquantum est ens et being, and a man. However, in the
inquantum est homo, non tamen absolute sense, he is not good, but evil.
bonus simpliciter, sed magis So, it is not the same thing for any
malus. Non igitur cuilibet creature to be and to be good without
creaturarum idem est esse et qualification, although each of them is
bonum esse simpliciter: licet good in so far as it exists. In God,
quaelibet earum bona sit however, to be and to be good are simply
inquantum est. Deo vero the same thing.
simpliciter idem est esse et esse
bonum.
Si autem res quaelibet tendit in [8] So, if each thing tends toward a
divinae bonitatis similitudinem likeness of divine goodness as its end,
sicut in finem; divinae autem and if each thing becomes like the divine
bonitati assimilatur aliquid goodness in respect of all the things that
quantum ad omnia quae ad belong to its proper goodness, then the
propriam pertinent bonitatem; goodness of the thing consists not only in
bonitas autem rei non solum in its mere being, but in all the things
esse suo consistit, sed in omnibus needed for its perfection, as we have
aliis quae ad suam perfectionem shown. It is obvious, then, that things are
requiruntur, ut ostensum est: ordered to God as an end, not merely
manifestum est quod res according to their substantial act of being,
ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem but also according to those items which
non solum secundum esse are added as pertinent to perfection, and
substantiale, sed etiam secundum even according to the proper operation
ea quae ei accidunt pertinentia ad which also belongs to the thing’s
perfectionem; et etiam secundum perfection.
propriam operationem, quae etiam
pertinet ad perfectionem rei.
Caput 21 Chapter 21
Quod res intendunt naturaliter THAT THINGS NATURALLY TEND TO
assimilari Deo in hoc quod est BECOME LIKE GOD INASMUCH AS
causa HE IS A CAUSE
Ex his autem apparet quod res [1] As a result, it is evident that things
intendunt divinam similitudinem also tend toward the divine likeness by
etiam in hoc quod sunt causae the fact that they are the cause of other
aliorum. things.
Tendit enim in divinam [2] In fact, a created thing tends toward
similitudinem res creata per suam the divine likeness through its operation.
operationem. Per suam autem Now, through its operation, one thing
operationem una res fit causa becomes the cause of another.
alterius. Ergo in hoc etiam res Therefore, in this way, also, do things
intendunt divinam similitudinem, ut tend toward the divine likeness, in that
sint aliis causae. they are the causes of other things.
Adhuc. Res tendunt in divinam [3] Again, things tend toward the divine
similitudinem inquantum est likeness inasmuch as He is good, as we
bonus, ut supra dictum est. Ex said above. Now, it is as a result of the
bonitate autem Dei est quod aliis goodness of God that He confers being
esse largitur: unumquodque enim on all things, for a being acts by virtue of
agit inquantum est actu perfectum. the fact that it is actually perfect. So,
Desiderant igitur generaliter res in things generally desire to become like
hoc Deo assimilari, ut sint aliorum God in this respect, by being the causes
causae. of other things.
Amplius. Ordo ad bonum boni [4] Besides, an orderly relation toward
rationem habet, ut ex dictis est the good has the formal character of a
manifestum. Unumquodque autem good thing, as is clear from what we have
per hoc quod est causa alterius, said. Now, by the fact that it is the cause
ordinatur ad bonum: bonum enim of another, a thing is ordered toward the
solum causatur per se, malum good, for only the good is directly caused
autem per accidens tantum, ut in itself; evil is merely caused
ostensum est. Esse igitur aliorum accidentally, as we have shown.
causa est bonum. Secundum Therefore, to be the cause of other things
autem quodlibet bonum ad quod is good. Now, a thing tends toward the
aliquid tendit, intendit divinam divine likeness according to each good to
similitudinem: cum quodlibet which it inclines, since any created thing
bonum creatum sit ex is good through participation in divine
participatione divinae bonitatis. goodness. And so, things tend toward the
Intendunt igitur res divinam divine likeness by the fact that they are
similitudinem in hoc quod sunt causes of others.
aliorum causae.
Item. Eiusdem rationis est quod [5] Moreover, it is for the same reason
effectus tendat in similitudinem that the effect tends to the likeness of the
agentis, et quod agens assimilet agent, and that the agent makes the
sibi effectum: tendit enim effectus effect like to itself, for the effect tends
in finem in quem dirigitur ab toward the end to which it is directed by
agente. Agens autem intendit sibi the agent. The agent tends to make the
assimilare patiens non solum patient like the agent, not only in regard
quantum ad esse ipsius, sed etiam to its act of being, but also in regard to
quantum ad causalitatem: sicut causality. For instance, just as the
enim ab agente conferuntur principles by which a natural agent
effectui naturali principia per quae subsists are conferred by the agent, so
subsistat, ita principia per quae are the principles by which the effect is
aliorum sit causa; sicut enim the cause of others. Thus, an animal
animal, dum generatur, accipit a receives from the generating agent, at
generante virtutem nutritivam, ita the time of its generation, the nutritive
etiam virtutem generativam. power and also the generative power. So,
Effectus igitur tendit in the effect does tend to be like the agent,
similitudinem agentis non solum not only in its species, but also in this
quantum ad speciem ipsius, sed characteristic of being the cause of
etiam quantum ad hoc quod sit others. Now, things tend to the likeness
aliorum causa. Sic autem tendunt of God in the same way that effects tend
res in similitudinem Dei sicut to the likeness of the agent, as we have
effectus in similitudinem agentis, ut shown. Therefore, things naturally tend to
ostensum est. Intendunt igitur res become like God by the fact that they are
naturaliter assimilari Deo in hoc the causes of others.
quod sunt causae aliorum.
Praeterea. Tunc maxime [6] Furthermore, everything is at its peak

perfectum est unumquodque perfection when it is able to make
quando potest alterum sibi simile another thing like itself; thus, a thing is a
facere: illud enim perfecte lucet perfect source of light when it can
quod alia illuminare potest. enlighten other things. Now, everything

Unumquodque autem tendens in tending to its own perfection tends
suam perfectionem, tendit in toward the divine likeness. So, a thing
divinam similitudinem. Per hoc tends to the divine likeness by tending to
igitur unumquodque tendit in be the cause of other things.
divinam similitudinem, quod
intendit aliorum causa esse.
Quia vero causa, inquantum [7] And since a cause, as such, is
huiusmodi, superior est causato, superior to the thing caused, it is evident
manifestum est quod tendere in that to tend toward the divine likeness in
divinam similitudinem per hunc the manner of something that causes
modum ut sit aliorum causa, est others is appropriate to higher types of
superiorum in entibus. beings.
Item. Prius est unumquodque in se [8] Again, a thing must first be perfect in

perfectum quam possit alterum itself before it can cause another thing,
causare, ut iam dictum est. Haec as we have said already. So, this final
igitur perfectio ultimo accidit rei, ut perfection comes to a thing in order that it
aliorum causa existat. Cum igitur may exist as the cause of others.
per multa tendat res creata in Therefore, since a created thing tends to
divinam similitudinem, hoc ultimum the divine likeness in many ways, this
ei restat, ut divinam similitudinem one whereby it seeks the divine likeness
quaerat per hoc quod sit aliorum by being the cause of others takes the
causa. Unde Dionysius dicit, III ultimate place. Hence Dionysius says, in
cap. caelestis hierarchiae, quod the third chapter of On the Celestial
omnium divinius est Dei Hierarchy, that “of all things, it is more
cooperatorem fieri: secundum divine to become a coworker with God”;
quod apostolus dicit, I Corinth. 39: in accord with the statement of the
Dei adiutores sumus. Apostle: “we are God’s coadjutors” (1
Cor, 3:9)
Caput 22 Chapter 22
Quomodo diversimode res HOW THINGS ARE ORDERED TO
ordinantur in suos fines THEIR ENDS IN VARIOUS WAYS
Ex praemissis autem manifestum [1] It can be shown from the foregoing
esse potest quod ultimum per quod that the last thing through which any real
res unaquaeque ordinatur ad being is ordered to its end is its
finem, est eius operatio: operation. Yet this is done in various
diversimode tamen, secundum ways, depending on the diversity of
diversitatem operationis. operations.
Nam quaedam operatio est rei ut [2] One kind of operation pertains to a
aliud moventis, sicut calefacere et thing as the mover of another, as in the
secare. Quaedam vero est operatio actions of heating or sawing. Another is
rei ut ab alio motae, sicut calefieri the operation of a thing that is moved by
et secari. Quaedam vero operatio another, as in the case of being heated
est perfectio operantis actu or being sawed. Still another operation is
existentis in aliud transmutandum the perfection of an actually existing
non tendens: quorum primo agent which does not tend to produce a
differunt a passione et motu; change in another thing. And these last
secundo vero, ab actione differ, first of all, from passion and
transmutativa exterioris materiae. motion, and secondly from action
Huiusmodi autem operatio est sicut transitively productive of change in
intelligere, sentire et velle. Unde exterior matter. Examples of operations
manifestum est quod ea quae in this third sense are understanding,
moventur vel operantur tantum, sensing, and willing. Hence, it is clear
sine hoc quod moveant vel faciant, that the things which are moved, or
tendunt in divinam similitudinem passively worked on only, without
quantum ad hoc quod sint in actively moving or doing anything, tend
seipsis perfecta; quae vero faciunt to the divine likeness by being perfected
et movent, inquantum huiusmodi, within themselves; while the things that
tendunt in divinam similitudinem in actively make and move, by virtue of
hoc quod sint aliorum causae; quae their character, tend toward the divine
vero per hoc quod moventur likeness by being the causes of others.
movent, intendunt divinam Finally, the things that move as a result
similitudinem quantum ad of being moved tend toward the divine
utrumque. likeness in both ways.
Corpora autem inferiora, secundum [3] Lower bodies, inasmuch as they are

quod moventur motibus moved in their natural motions, are
naturalibus, considerantur ut mota considered as moved things only, and
tantum, non autem ut moventia, not as movers, except in the accidental
nisi per accidens: accidit enim sense, for it may happen that a falling
lapidi quod, descendens, aliquod stone will put in motion a thing that gets
obvians impellat. Et similiter est in in its way. And the same applies to
alteratione et aliis motibus. Unde alteration and the other kinds of change.
finis motus eorum est ut Hence, the end of their motion is to
consequantur divinam achieve the divine likeness by being
similitudinem quantum ad hoc quod perfected in themselves; for instance, by
sint in seipsis perfecta, utpote possessing their proper form and being
habentia propriam formam et in their proper place.
proprium ubi.
Corpora vero caelestia movent [4] On the other hand, celestial bodies
mota. Unde finis motus eorum est move because they are moved. Hence,
consequi divinam similitudinem the end of their motion is to attain the
quantum ad utrumque. Quantum divine likeness in both ways. In regard to
quidem ad propriam perfectionem, the way which involves its own
inquantum corpus caeleste sit in perfection, the celestial body comes to
aliquo ubi in actu in quo prius erat be in a certain place actually, to which
in potentia. Nec propter hoc minus place it was previously in potency. Nor
suam perfectionem consequitur, does it achieve its perfection any less
quamvis ad ubi in quo prius erat because it now stands in potency to the
actu, remaneat in potentia. Similiter place in which it was previously. For, in
enim et materia prima in suam the same way, prime matter tends
perfectionem tendit per hoc quod toward its perfection by actually
acquirit in actu formam quam prius acquiring a form to which it was
habebat in potentia, licet et aliam previously in. potency, even though it
habere desinat quam prius actu then ceases to have the other form
habebat: sic enim successive which it actually possessed before, for
materia omnes formas suscipit ad this is the way that matter may receive in
quas est in potentia, ut tota eius succession all the forms to which it is
potentia reducatur in actum potential, so that its entire potentiality
successive, quod simul fieri non may be successively reduced to act,
poterat. Unde, cum corpus caeleste which could not be done all at once.
sit in potentia ad ubi sicut materia Hence, since a celestial body is in
prima ad formam, perfectionem potency to place in the same way that
suam consequitur per hoc quod prime matter is to form, it achieves its
eius potentia tota ad ubi reducitur perfection through the fact that its entire
in actum successive, quod simul potency to place is successively reduced
non poterat fieri. to act, which could not be done all at
once.
Inquantum vero movendo movent, [5] In regard to the way which involves
est finis motus eorum consequi movers that actively move, the end of
divinam similitudinem in hoc quod their motion is to attain the divine
sint causae aliorum. Sunt autem likeness by being the causes of others.
aliorum causae per hoc quod Now, they are the causes of others by
causant generationem et the fact that they cause generation and
corruptionem et alios motus in istis corruption and other changes in these
inferioribus. Motus igitur corporum lower things. So, the motions of the
caelestium, inquantum movent, celestial bodies, as actively moving, are
ordinantur ad generationem et ordered to the generation and corruption
corruptionem quae est in istis which take Place in these lower bodies.
inferioribus. Non est autem —Nor is it unfitting that celestial bodies
inconveniens quod corpora should move for the sake of the
caelestia moveant ad generation and corruption of these lower
generationem horum inferiorum, things, even though lower bodies are of
quamvis haec inferiora corpora sint less value than celestial bodies, while, of
caelestibus corporibus indigniora, course, the end should be more
cum tamen finem oporteat esse important than what is for the sake of the
potiorem eo quod est ad finem. end.
Generans enim agit ad formam Indeed, the generating agent acts for the

generati: cum tamen generatum sake of the form of the product of
non sit dignius generante, sed in generation, yet this product is not more
agentibus univocis sit eiusdem valuable than the agent; rather, in the
speciei cum ipso. Intendit enim case of univocal agents it is of the same
generans formam generati, quae species as the agent. In fact, the
est generationis finis, non quasi generating agent intends as its ultimate
ultimum finem: sed similitudinem end, not the form of the product
esse divini in perpetuatione speciei, generated, which is the end of the
et in diffusione bonitatis suae, per process of generation, but the likeness
hoc quod aliis formam speciei suae of divine being in the perpetuation of the
tradit, et aliorum sit causa. Similiter species and in the diffusion of its
autem corpora caelestia, licet sint goodness, through the act of handing on
digniora inferioribus corporibus, its specific form to others, and of being
tamen intendunt generationem the cause of others. Similarly, then,
eorum, et formas generatorum in celestial bodies, although they are of
actum educere per suos motus, greater value than lower bodies, tend
non quasi ultimum finem: sed per toward the generation of these latter,
hoc ad divinam similitudinem and through their motions to the actual
intendentes quasi ad ultimum eduction of the forms of the products of
finem, in hoc quod causae aliorum generation, not as an ultimate end but as
existant. thereby intending the divine likeness as
an ultimate end, inasmuch as they exist
as the causes of other things.
Considerandum autem quod [6] Now, we should keep in mind that a
unumquodque, inquantum thing participates in the likeness of the
participat similitudinem divinae divine will, through which things are
bonitatis, quae est obiectum brought into being and preserved, to the
voluntatis eius, intantum participat extent that it participates in the likeness
de similitudine divinae voluntatis, of divine goodness which is the object of
per quam res producuntur in esse His will. Higher things participate more
et conservantur. Superiora autem simply and more universally in the
divinae bonitatis similitudinem likeness of divine goodness, while lower
participant simplicius et things do so more particularly and more
universalius: inferiora vero in detail. Hence, between celestial and
particularius et magis divisim. Unde lower bodies the likeness is not
et inter corpora caelestia et observed according to complete
inferiora non attenditur similitudo equivalence, as it is in the case of things
secundum aequiparantiam, sicut in of one kind. Rather, it is like the similarity
his quae sunt unius speciei: sed of a universal agent to a particular effect.
sicut universalis agentis ad Therefore, just as in the order of lower
particularem effectum. Sicut igitur bodies the intention of a particular agent
agentis particularis in istis is focused on the good of this species or
inferioribus intentio contrahitur ad that, so is the intention of a celestial
bonum huius speciei vel illius, ita body directed to the common good of
intentio corporis caelestis fertur ad corporeal substance which is preserved,
bonum commune substantiae and multiplied, and increased through
corporalis, quae per generationem generation.
conservatur et multiplicatur et
augetur.
Cum vero, ut dictum est, quaelibet [7] As we said, since any moved thing,
res mota, inquantum movetur, inasmuch as it is moved, tends to the
tendat in divinam similitudinem ut divine likeness so that it may be
sit in se perfecta; perfectum autem perfected in itself, and since a thing is
sit unumquodque inquantum fit perfect in so far as it is actualized, the
actu: oportet quod intentio intention of everything existing in
cuiuslibet in potentia existentis sit potency must be to tend through motion
ut per motum tendat in actum. toward actuality. And so, the more
Quanto igitur aliquis actus est posterior and more perfect an act is, the

posterior et magis perfectus, tanto more fundamentally is the inclination of
principalius in ipsum appetitus matter directed toward it. Hence. in
materiae fertur. Unde oportet quod regard to the last and most perfect act
in ultimum et perfectissimum actum that matter can attain, the inclination of
quem materia consequi potest, matter whereby it desires form must be
tendat appetitus materiae quo inclined as toward the ultimate end of
appetit formam, sicut in ultimum generation. Now, among the acts
finem generationis. In actibus pertaining to forms, certain gradations
autem formarum gradus quidam are found. Thus, prime matter is in
inveniuntur. Nam materia prima est potency, first of all, to the form of an
in potentia primo ad formam element. When it is existing under the
elementi. Sub forma vero elementi form of an element it is in potency to the
existens est in potentia ad formam form of a mixed body; that is why the
mixti: propter quod elementa sunt elements are matter for the mixed body.
materia mixti. Sub forma autem Considered under the form of a mixed
mixti considerata, est in potentia ad body, it is in potency to a vegetative
animam vegetabilem: nam talis soul, for this sort of soul is the act of a
corporis anima actus est. Itemque body. In turn, the vegetative soul is in
anima vegetabilis est potentia ad potency to a sensitive soul, and a
sensitivam; sensitiva vero ad sensitive one to an intellectual one. This
intellectivam. Quod processus the process of generation shows: at the
generationis ostendit: primo enim in start of generation there is the embryo
generatione est fetus vivens vita living with plant life, later with animal life,
plantae, postmodum vero vita and finally with human life. After this last
animalis, demum vero vita hominis. type of form, no later and more noble
Post hanc autem formam non form is found in the order of generable
invenitur in generabilibus et and corruptible things. Therefore, the
corruptibilibus posterior forma et ultimate end of the whole process of
dignior. Ultimus igitur finis generation is the human soul, and
generationis totius est anima matter tends toward it as toward an
humana, et in hanc tendit materia ultimate form. So, elements exist for the
sicut in ultimam formam. Sunt ergo sake of mixed bodies; these latter exist
elementa propter corpora mixta; for the sake of living bodies, among
haec vero propter viventia; in which plants exist for animals, and
quibus plantae sunt propter animals for men. Therefore, man is the
animalia; animalia vero propter end of the whole order of generation.
hominem. Homo igitur est finis
totius generationis.
Quia vero per eadem res generatur [8] And since a thing is generated and

et conservatur in esse, secundum preserved in being by the same reality,
ordinem praemissum in there is also an order in the preservation
generationibus rerum est etiam of things, which parallels the foregoing
ordo in conservationibus order of generation. Thus we see that
earundem. Unde videmus quod mixed bodies are sustained by the
corpora mixta sustentantur per appropriate qualities of the elements;
elementorum congruas qualitates: Plants, in turn, are nourished by mixed
plantae vero ex mixtis corporibus bodies; animals get their nourishment
nutriuntur; animalia ex plantis from plants: so, those that are more
nutrimentum habent; et quaedam perfect and more powerful from those
etiam perfectiora et virtuosiora ex that are more imperfect and weaker. In
quibusdam imperfectioribus et fact, man uses all kinds of things for his
infirmioribus. Homo vero utitur own advantage: some for food, others
omnium rerum generibus ad sui for clothing. That is why he was created
utilitatem. Quibusdam quidem ad nude by nature, since he is able to make
esum, quibusdam vero ad vestitum: clothes for, himself from other things;
unde et a natura nudus est just as nature also provided him with no
institutus, utpote potens ex aliis sibi appropriate nourishment, except milk,
vestitum praeparare; sicut etiam because he can obtain food for himself
nullum sibi congruum nutrimentum from a variety of things. Other things he
natura praeparavit nisi lac, ut ex uses for transportation, since we find
diversis rebus sibi cibum man the inferior of many animals in
conquireret. Quibusdam vero ad quickness of movement, and in the
vehiculum: nam in motus celeritate, strength to do work; other animals being
et in fortitudine ad sustinendos provided, as it were, for his assistance.
labores, multis animalibus infirmior And, in addition to this, man uses all
invenitur, quasi aliis animalibus ad sense objects for the perfection of
auxilium sibi praeparatis. Et super intellectual knowledge. Hence it is said
hoc omnibus sensibilibus utitur ad of man in the Psalms (8:8) in a
intellectualis cognitionis statement directed to God: “You have
perfectionem. Unde et de homine subjected all things under his feet,” And
in Psalmo dicitur, ad Deum directo Aristotle says, in the Politics I [5: 1254b
sermone: omnia subiecisti sub 9], that man has natural dominion over
pedibus eius. Et Aristoteles dicit, in all animals.
I politicorum, quod homo habet
naturale dominium super omnia
animalia.
Si igitur motio ipsius caeli ordinatur [9] So, if the motion of the heavens is

ad generationem; generatio autem ordered to generation, and if the whole
tota ordinatur ad hominem sicut in of generation is ordered to man as a last
ultimum finem huius generis: end within this genus, it is clear that the
manifestum est quod finis motionis end of celestial motion is ordered to
caeli ordinatur ad hominem sicut in man, as to an ultimate end in the genus
ultimum finem in genere of generable and mobile beings.
generabilium et mobilium.
Hinc est quod Deuteron. 419, Hence the statement in Deuteronomy
dicitur quod Deus corpora caelestia (4:19) that God made celestial bodies
fecit in ministerium cunctis “for the service of all peoples”.
gentibus.
Chapter 23
Caput 23
THAT THE MOTION OF THE
Quod motus caeli est a principio
HEAVENS COMES FROM AN
intellectivo
INTELLECTUAL PRINCIPLE
Ex praemissis etiam ostendi potest [1] From the preceding we can also
primum motivum motus caeli esse show that the prime motive principle of
aliquid intellectivum. the heavens is something intellectual.
Nihil enim secundum propriam [2] Nothing that acts in function of its
speciem agens intendit formam own species intends a form higher than
altiorem sua forma; intendit enim its own form, for every agent tends
omne agens sibi simile. Corpus toward its like. Now, a celestial body,
autem caeleste, secundum quod agit acting under its own motion, tends
per motum suum, intendit ultimam toward the ultimate form, which is the
formam, quae est intellectus human intellect; and which is, in fact,
humanus, quae quidem est altior higher than any bodily form, as is clear
omni corporali forma, ut ex from the foregoing. Therefore, a
praemissis patet. Corpus igitur caeli celestial body does not act for a
non agit ad generationem secundum generation according to its own
propriam speciem, sicut agens species as a principal agent, but
principale, sed secundum speciem according to the species of a higher
alicuius superioris agentis intellectual agent, to which the celestial
intellectualis, ad quod se habet body is related as an instrument to a
corpus caeleste sicut instrumentum principal agent. Now, the heavens act
ad agens principale. Agit autem for the purpose of generation in accord
caelum ad generationem secundum with the way in which they are moved.
quod movetur. Movetur igitur corpus So, a celestial body is moved by some
caeleste ab aliqua intellectuali intellectual substance.
substantia.
Adhuc. Omne quod movetur, [3] Again, everything that is moved
necesse est ab alio moveri, ut must be moved by another being, as
superius probatum est. Corpus igitur we proved earlier. Therefore, a
caeli ab alio movetur. Aut ergo illud celestial body is moved by something
aliud est omnino separatum ab eo: else. So, this other thing is either
aut est ei unitum, ita quod completely separated from it, or is
compositum ex caelo et movente united with it in the sense that the
dicatur movere seipsum, inquantum composite of the celestial body and the
una pars eius est movens et alia mover may be said to move itself, in so
mota. Si autem sic est; omne autem far as one of its parts is the mover and
movens seipsum est vivum et another part is the thing moved. Now, if
animatum: sequitur quod caelum sit it works this way, since everything that
animatum. Non autem alia anima moves itself is alive and animated, it
quam intellectuali: non enim would follow that the heavens are
nutritiva, cum in eo non sit generatio animated, and by no other soul than an
et corruptio; neque sensitiva, cum intellectual one: not by a nutritive soul,
non habeat organorum diversitatem. for generation and corruption are not
Sequitur ergo quod moveatur ab within its power; nor by a sensitive
anima intellectiva. Si autem movetur soul, for a celestial body has no
a motore extrinseco, aut illud erit diversity of organs. The conclusion is,
corporeum, aut incorporeum. Et si then, that it is moved by an intellective
quidem corporeum, non movet nisi soul.—On the other hand, if it is moved
motum: nullum enim corpus movet by an extrinsic mover, this latter will be
nisi motum, ut ex superioribus patet. either corporeal or incorporeal. Now, if
Oportebit ergo et illud ab alio moveri. it is corporeal, it will not move unless it
Cum autem non sit procedere in is moved, for no body moves unless it
infinitum in corporibus, oportebit is moved, as was evident previously.
devenire ad primum movens Therefore, it will also have to be moved
incorporeum. Quod autem est by another. And since there should be
penitus a corpore separatum, oportet no process to infinity in the order of
esse intellectuale, ut ex superioribus bodies, we will have to come to an
patet. Motus igitur caeli, quod est incorporeal first mover. Now, that which
primum corporeum, est ab is utterly separate from body must be
intellectuali substantia. intellectual, as is evident from earlier
considerations. Therefore, the motion
of the heavens, that is of the first body,
comes from an intellectual substance.
Item. Corpora gravia et levia [4] Besides, heavy and light bodies are

moventur a generante et removente moved by their generating agent, and
prohibens, ut probatur in VIII by that which takes away any
physicorum: non enim potest esse impediment to motion, as was proved
quod forma in eis sit movens et in Physics VIII [4: 256a 1]. For it cannot
materia mota, nihil enim movetur nisi be that the form in them is the mover,
corpus. Sicut autem elementorum and the matter the thing moved, since
corpora sunt simplicia, et non est in nothing is moved unless it be a body.
eis compositio nisi materiae et Now, just as the elemental bodies are
formae, ita et corpora caelestia sunt simple and there is no composition in
simplicia. Si igitur moventur sicut them, except of matter and form, so
gravia et levia, oportet quod also are the celestial bodies simple.
moveantur a generante per se, et a And so, if they are moved in the same
removente prohibens per accidens. way as heavy and light bodies, they
Hoc autem est impossibile: nam illa must be moved directly by their
corpora ingenerabilia sunt, utpote generating agent, and accidentally by
non habentia contrarietatem; et the agent which removes an
motus eorum impediri non possunt. impediment to motion. But this is
Oportet igitur quod moveantur illa impossible, for these bodies are not
corpora a moventibus per capable of generation: for they are not
apprehensionem. Non autem endowed with contrariety, and their
sensitivam, ut ostensum est. Ergo motions cannot, be impeded. So, these
intellectivam. bodies must be moved by movers that
function through knowing; not through
sensitive knowledge, as we showed,
but through intellectual knowledge.
Amplius. Si principium motus caeli [5] Moreover, if the principle of celestial

est sola natura, absque motion is simply a nature lacking any
apprehensione aliqua, oportet quod type of apprehension, then the
principium motus caeli sit forma principle of celestial motion must be
caelestis corporis, sicut et in the form of a celestial body, just as is
elementis: licet enim formae the case in the elements. For, although
simplices non sint moventes, sunt simple forms are not movers, they are
tamen principia motuum, ad eas nonetheless the principles of motions,
enim consequuntur motus naturales, since natural motions are resultant

sicut et omnes aliae naturales from them, as are all other natural
proprietates. Non autem potest esse properties. Now, it is impossible for
quod motus caelestis sequatur celestial motion to result from the form
formam caelestis corporis sicut of a celestial body, as from an active
principium activum. Sic enim forma principle. A form is the principle of local
est principium motus localis, motion in the same way that a certain
inquantum alicui corpori, secundum place is proper to a body by virtue of its
suam formam, debetur aliquis locus, form; it is moved to this place by the
in quem movetur ex vi suae formae force of its form tending to it, and, since
tendentis in locum illum, quam quia the generating agent gives the form, it
dat generans, dicitur esse motor: is said to be the mover. For instance, it
sicut igni secundum suam formam is appropriate to fire, by virtue of its
competit esse sursum. Corpori form, to be in a higher place. But one
autem caelesti, secundum suam place is no more appropriate than
formam, non magis congruit unum another for a celestial body, according
ubi quam aliud. Non igitur motus to its form. Therefore, the principle of
caelestis principium est sola natura. celestial motion is not simply the nature
Oportet igitur quod principium motus of the body. So, the principle of its
eius sit aliquid per apprehensionem motion must be something that moves
movens. as a result of apprehension.
Adhuc. Natura semper ad unum [6] Furthermore, nature always tends
tendit: unde quae sunt a natura, toward one objective; hence, things
semper sunt eodem modo, nisi which result from nature always occur
impediantur; quod est in paucioribus. in the same way, unless they are
Quod igitur ex sui ratione habet interfered with, and this happens to few
difformitatem, impossibile est quod of them. Indeed, that which has a
sit finis in quem tendit natura. Motus deformity within its very definition
autem secundum rationem suam est cannot be an end to which a nature
huiusmodi: quod enim movetur, tends. Now, motion, by definition, is of
inquantum huiusmodi, dissimiliter se this type, for whatever is moved, by
habet et nunc et prius. Impossibile virtue of that fact, is in a different
est igitur quod natura intendat condition before and after.” So, it is
motum propter seipsum. Intendit impossible for a nature to tend toward
igitur quietem per motum, quae se motion for the sake of motion.
habet ad motum sicut unum ad Therefore, it tends through motion
multa: quiescit enim quod similiter se toward rest, and the latter is related to
habet nunc et prius. Si igitur motus motion as one to many. Indeed, a thing
caeli sit a natura tantum, esset at rest is one which is in the same
ordinatus in aliquam quietem. Cuius condition before and after. If then, the
contrarium apparet: cum sit motion of the heavens were simply
continuus. Non est igitur motus caeli from a nature, it would be ordered to
a natura sicut a principio activo, sed some condition of rest. But the contrary
magis a substantia intelligente. of this is apparent, for celestial motion
is continuous. Therefore, the motion of
the heavens does not arise from a
nature, as its active principle, but rather
from an intelligent substance.
Item. Omni motui qui est a natura [7] Again, for every motion that is from

sicut a principio activo, oportet quod, a nature, as an active principle, if its
si accessus ad aliquid est naturalis, approach to something be natural, then
quod recessus ab eodem sit its removal from that objective must be
innaturalis et contra naturam: sicut unnatural and against nature. Thus, a
grave accedit deorsum naturaliter, heavy thing naturally moves
recedit autem inde contra naturam. downward, but for it to move in the
Si igitur motus caeli esset naturalis, opposite direction is against nature.
cum tendat ad occidentem Therefore, if the motion of the heavens
naturaliter, contra naturam ab were natural, since it tends westward
occidente recedens in orientem naturally, it would return to the east in
rediret. Hoc autem est impossibile: in the manner of a thing that recedes
motu enim caelesti nihil est from the west by a motion against
violentum et contra naturam. nature. Now, this is impossible. In
Impossibile est igitur quod principium celestial motion there is nothing violent
activum motus caelestis sit natura. and against nature. So, it is impossible
Est igitur principium activum eius for the active principle of celestial
aliqua vis apprehensiva, et per motion to be a nature. Therefore, its
intellectum, ut ex praedictis patet. active principle is some apprehensive
Movetur igitur corpus caeleste a power, and through understanding, as
substantia intellectuali. is clear from what was said earlier. So,
a celestial body is moved by an
intellectual substance.
Non tamen est negandum motum [8] Yet we must not deny that celestial
caelestem esse naturalem. Dicitur motion is natural. In fact, a motion is
enim esse motus aliquis naturalis, called natural, not simply because of its
non solum propter activum active principle, but also because of its
principium, sed etiam propter passive one. This is exemplified in the
passivum: sicut patet in generatione generation of simple bodies. Indeed,
simplicium corporum. Quae quidem this generation cannot be called natural
non potest dici naturalis ratione by reason of the active principle, for
principii activi: movetur enim id that is moved naturally by an active
naturaliter a principio activo cuius principle, which has its active principle
principium activum est intra, natura within it; “a nature is a principle of
enim est principium motus in eo in motion in that to which it belongs.” But
quo est; principium autem activum in the active principle in the generation of
generatione simplicis corporis est a simple body is outside. So, it is not
extra. Non est igitur naturalis ratione natural by reason of the active
principii activi, sed solum ratione principle, but only by reason of the
principii passivi, quod est materia, passive principle, which is the matter in
cui inest naturalis appetitus ad which the natural appetite for a natural
formam naturalem. Sic ergo motus form is present. And so, the motion of a
caelestis corporis, quantum ad celestial body, as far as its active
activum principium, non est principle is concerned, is not natural,
naturalis, sed magis voluntarius et but voluntary and intellectual; however,
intellectualis: quantum vero ad in relation to its passive principle, the
principium passivum est naturalis, motion is natural, for a celestial body
nam corpus caeleste habet has a natural aptitude for such motion.
naturalem aptitudinem ad talem

motum.
Hoc autem manifeste apparet si [9] This becomes clearly evident when

habitudo consideretur caelestis we consider the relation of a celestial
corporis ad suum ubi. Patitur enim et body to its location. A thing is acted on
movetur unumquodque secundum passively, and is moved, in so far as it
quod est in potentia, agit vero et is in potency; while it acts and moves,
movet secundum quod est actu. in so far as it is in act. Now, a celestial
Corpus autem caeleste, secundum body, considered in its substance, is
suam substantiam consideratum, found to be indifferently related to
invenitur ut in potentia indifferenter every place, just as prime matter is to
se habens ad quodlibet ubi, sicut every form, as we said before. Of
materia prima ad quamlibet formam, course, it is a different situation in the
sicut praedictum est. Aliter autem est case of a heavy or light body which,
de corpore gravi et levi, quod, in sua considered in its nature, is not
natura consideratum, non est indifferent to every place, but is
indifferens ad omnem locum, sed ex determined by virtue of its form to a
ratione suae formae determinatur place of its own. So, the nature of a
sibi locus. Natura igitur corporis heavy or light body is the active
gravis et levis est principium activum principle of its motion, while the nature
motus eius: natura vero corporis of a celestial body is the passive
caelestis est motus ipsius passivum principle of its motion. Hence, no one
principium. Unde non debet alicui should get the impression that the
videri quod violenter moveatur, sicut latter is moved violently, as is the case
corpora gravia et levia, quae a nobis with heavy and light bodies that are
moventur per intellectum. Corporibus moved by us through understanding.
enim gravibus et levibus inest For there is present in heavy and light
naturalis aptitudo ad contrarium bodies a natural aptitude for motion
motum ei quo moventur a nobis, et contrary to that in which they are
ideo a nobis moventur per moved by us, and so they are moved
violentiam: licet motus corporis by us through violence. However, the
animalis, quo movetur ab anima, non motion of an animated body, in which it
sit ei violentus inquantum est is moved by a soul, is not violent for it
animatum, etsi sit ei violentus as an animal, though it is violent for it
inquantum est grave quoddam. as a heavy object. Celestial bodies
Corpora autem caelestia non habent have no aptitude for contrary motion,
aptitudinem ad motum contrarium, but only for that whereby they are
sed ad illum quo moventur a moved by an intelligent substance.
substantia intelligente. Unde simul Consequently, it is at once voluntary, in
est voluntarius, quantum ad relation to the active principle, and
principium activum; et naturalis, natural, in relation to the passive
quantum ad principium passivum. principle.
Quod autem motus caeli est [10] That the motion of the heavens is
voluntarius secundum activum voluntary according to its active
principium, non repugnat unitati et principle is not repugnant to the unity
conformitati caelestis motus, ex hoc and uniformity of celestial motion
quod voluntas ad multa se habet, et because of the fact that the will is open
non est determinata ad unum. Quia to a plurality of actions and is not
sicut natura determinatur ad unum determined to one of them. In fact, just
per suam virtutem, ita voluntas as a nature is determined to one
determinatur ad unum per suam objective by its power, so is the will
sapientiam, qua voluntas dirigitur determined to one objective by its
infallibiliter ad unum finem. wisdom, whereby the will is infallibly
directed to one end.
Patet etiam ex praemissis quod in [11] It is also evident from the foregoing

motu caelesti non est contra that in celestial motion neither the
naturam neque accessus ad aliquod approach to a certain place, nor the
ubi, neque recessus ab eo. Hoc regression from that place, is against
enim accidit in motu gravium et nature. Such a thing does occur in the
levium propter duo: primo quidem, motion of heavy and light bodies for
quia intentio naturae est determinata two reasons. First, because the natural
in gravibus et levibus ad unum tendency in heavy and light things is
locum, unde, sicut naturaliter tendit determined to one place; hence, just as
in ipsum, ita contra naturam recedit such a body naturally tends to this
ab eo. Secundo, quia duo motus place, so does it go against nature in
quorum unus accedit ad terminum, receding from it. Second, because two
et alter recedit, sunt contrarii. Si motions, one approaching a term and
autem accipiatur in motu gravium et the other receding from it, are contrary.
levium non ultimus locus, sed But, if we take into consideration in this
medius, sicut ad ipsum acceditur motion of heavy and light bodies, not
naturaliter, ita ab ipso naturaliter the final place but an intermediate one,
receditur: quia totum stat sub una then just as an approach may naturally
intentione naturae; et non sunt be made to it, so also may a recession
motus contrarii, sed unus et be naturally made from it. For the
continuus. Ita autem est in motu whole motion comes under one natural
caelestium corporum: quia naturae tendency, and these motions are not
intentio non est ad aliquod ubi contrary but one and continuous.—So,
determinatum, ut iam dictum est; too, is the situation in the motion of
motus etiam quo recedit corpus celestial bodies, for the tendency of
circulariter motum ab aliquo signo, their nature is not toward some
non est contrarius motui quo illuc determinate place, as has been said
accedit, sed est unus motus et already. Also, the motion whereby a
continuus. Unde quodlibet ubi in body moves in a circle, away from a
motu caeli est sicut medium, et non point of reference, is not contrary to the
sicut extremum in motu recto. motion whereby it approaches the
point, but it is one continuous motion.
Hence, each place in the motion of the
heavens is like a middle point, and not
like a terminal point in straightline
motion.
Non differt autem, quantum ad [12] Nor does it make any difference,
praesentem intentionem, utrum as far as our present purpose is
corpus caeleste moveatur a concerned, whether a heavenly body is
substantia intellectuali coniuncta, moved by a conjoined intellectual
quae sit anima eius, vel a substantia substance which is its soul, or by a
separata; et utrum unumquodque separate substance; nor whether each

corporum caelestium moveatur a celestial body is moved immediately by
Deo immediate, vel nullum, sed God, or whether none is so moved,
mediantibus substantiis because all are moved through
intellectualibus creatis; aut primum intermediary, created, intellectual
tantum immediate a Deo, alia vero substances; nor whether the first body
mediantibus substantiis creatis; alone is immediately moved by God,
dummodo habeatur quod motus and the others through the mediation of
caelestis est a substantia created substances—provided it is
intellectuali. granted that celestial motion comes
from intellectual substance.
Caput 24 Chapter 24
Quomodo appetunt bonum HOW EVEN BEINGS DEVOID OF
etiam quae cognitione carent KNOWLEDGE SEEK THE GOOD
Si autem corpus caeleste a [1] Now, if a celestial body is moved by
substantia intellectuali movetur, ut intellectual substance, as we have shown,
ostensum est; motus autem and if the motion of a celestial body is
corporis caelestis ordinatur ad ordered to generation in the realm of
generationem in inferioribus: things here below, it must be that the
necesse est quod generationes et processes of generation and the motions
motus istorum inferiorum of these lower things start from the
procedant ex intentione intention of an intelligent substance. For
substantiae intelligentis. In idem the intention of the principal agent and
enim fertur intentio principalis that of the instrument are directed toward
agentis, et instrumenti. Caelum the same thing. Now, the heavens is the
autem est causa inferiorum cause of the movements of inferior
motuum secundum suum motum, bodies, by virtue of its own motion in
quo movetur a substantia which it is moved by an intellectual
intellectuali. Sequitur ergo quod sit substance. It follows, then, that the
sicut instrumentum intellectualis heavenly body is like an instrument for
substantiae. Sunt igitur formae et intellectual substance. Therefore, the
motus inferiorum corporum a forms and movements of lower bodies are
substantia intellectuali causatae et caused by intellectual substance which
intentae sicut a principali agente, intends them as a principal agent, while
a corpore vero caelesti sicut ab the celestial body is like an instrument.
instrumento.
Oportet autem quod species [2] It must be, then, that the species of
eorum quae causantur et things caused and intended by the
intenduntur ab intellectuali agente, intellectual agent exist beforehand in his
praeexistant in intellectu ipsius: intellect, as the forms of artifacts preexist
sicut formae artificiatorum in the intellect of the artist and are
praeexistunt in intellectu artificis, projected from there into their products.
et ex eis deriventur in effectus. So, all the forms that are in these lower
Omnes igitur formae quae sunt in substances, and all their motions, are
istis inferioribus, et omnes motus, derived from the intellectual forms which
derivantur a formis intellectualibus are in the intellect of some substance, or
quae sunt in intellectu alicuius substances. Consequently, Boethius says
substantiae, vel aliquarum. Et in his book, The Trinity, that “forms which
propter hoc dicit Boetius, in libro are in matter have come from forms
de Trin., quod formae quae sunt in which are without matter.” And on this
materia, venerunt a formis quae point, Plato’s statement is verified, that
sunt sine materia. Et quantum ad forms separated from matter are the
hoc verificatur dictum Platonis, principles of forms that are in it. Although
quod formae separatae sunt Plato claimed that they subsist in
principia formarum quae sunt in themselves and immediately cause the
materia: licet Plato posuerit eas forms of sensible things, we assert that
per se subsistentes, et causantes they exist in an intellect and cause lower
immediate formas sensibilium; forms through the motion of the heavens.
nos vero ponamus eas in
intellectu existentes, et causantes
formas inferiores per motum caeli.
Quia vero omne quod movetur ab [3] Since everything that is moved directly
aliquo per se, non secundum and not merely accidentally by another
accidens, dirigitur ab eo in finem being is directed by that being to the end
sui motus; corpus autem caeleste of its motion, and since the celestial body
movetur a substantia intellectuali; is moved by an intellectual substance,
corpus autem caeleste causat per and, moreover, the celestial body causes,
sui motum omnes motus in istis through its own motion, all the motions in
inferioribus: necessarium est quod these lower things, the celestial body
corpus caeleste dirigatur in finem must be directed to the end of its motion
sui motus per substantiam by an intellectual substance, and so must
intellectualem, et per consequens all lower bodies be directed to their own
omnia inferiora corpora in proprios ends.
fines.
Sic igitur non est difficile videre [4] So, then, it is not difficult to see how
qualiter naturalia corpora natural bodies, devoid of knowledge, are
cognitione carentia moveantur et moved and perform actions for an end.
agant propter finem. Tendunt enim They tend to the end as things directed to
in finem sicut directa in finem a that end by an intellectual substance, in
substantia intelligente, per modum the way that an arrow tends toward the
quo sagitta tendit ad signum target when it has been aimed by the
directa a sagittante. Sicut enim archer. just as the arrow attains its
sagitta consequitur inclinationem inclination to a definite end from the
ad finem determinatum ex archer’s act of shooting it, so do natural
impulsione sagittantis, ita corpora bodies attain their inclination to natural
naturalia consequuntur ends, from natural movers; from which
inclinationem in fines naturales ex movers they also receive their forms,
moventibus naturalibus, ex quibus powers, and motions.
sortiuntur suas formas et virtutes
et motus.
Unde etiam patet quod quodlibet [5] Consequently, it is also evident that
opus naturae est opus substantiae every working of nature is the work of an
intelligentis: nam effectus intelligent substance, because an effect is
principalius attribuitur primo more fundamentally attributed to the
moventi dirigenti in finem, quam prime mover, which aims at the end, than
instrumentis ab eo directis. Et to the instruments which have been
propter hoc operationes naturae directed by it. And because of this we find
inveniuntur ordinate procedere ad that the workings of nature proceed
finem, sicut operationes sapientis. toward their end in an orderly way, as do
the actions of a wise man.
Planum igitur fit quod ea etiam [6] Hence, it becomes obvious that even
quae cognitione carent, possunt things which lack knowledge can be
operari propter finem; et appetere made to work for an end, and to seek the
bonum naturali appetitu; et good by a natural appetite, and to seek
appetere divinam similitudinem; et the divine likeness and their own
propriam perfectionem. Non est perfection. And there is no difference
autem differentia sive hoc sive between saying one of these things or the
illud dicatur. Nam per hoc quod other. For, by the fact that they tend to
tendunt in suam perfectionem, their own perfection they tend to the
tendunt ad bonum: cum good, since a thing is good to the extent
unumquodque in tantum bonum that it is perfect. Moreover, by virtue of
sit in quantum est perfectum. tending to be good it tends to the divine
Secundum vero quod tendit ad likeness, for a thing is made like unto God
hoc quod sit bonum, tendit in in so far as it is good. And this or that
divinam similitudinem: Deo enim particular good thing becomes an object
assimilatur aliquid inquantum of desire according as it is a likeness of
bonum est. Bonum autem hoc vel prime goodness. So, too, for this reason it
illud particulare habet quod sit tends to its own good, because it tends to
appetibile inquantum est similitudo the divine likeness, and not conversely.
primae bonitatis. Propter hoc igitur Hence, it is clear that all things desire the
tendit in proprium bonum, quia divine likeness as an ultimate end.
tendit in divinam similitudinem, et
non e converso. Unde patet quod
omnia appetunt divinam
similitudinem quasi ultimum finem.
Bonum autem suum cuiuslibet rei [7] Now, the good that is proper to a thing

potest accipi multipliciter. Uno may be received in many ways. One way
quidem modo, secundum quod depends on what is appropriate to the
est eius proprium ratione individui. essential character of the individual. It is
Et sic appetit animal suum bonum thus that an animal seeks his good, when
cum appetit cibum, quo in esse he desires the food whereby he may be
conservatur. Alio modo, kept in existence. A second way depends
secundum quod est eius ratione on what is appropriate to the species. It is
speciei. Et sic appetit proprium in this way that an animal desires his
bonum animal inquantum appetit proper good, inasmuch as he desires the
generationem prolis et eius procreation of offspring and the
nutritionem, vel quicquid aliud nourishment of the same, or the
operetur ad conservationem vel performance of any other work that is for
defensionem individuorum suae the preservation or protection of

speciei. Tertio vero modo, ratione individuals belonging to his species. A
generis. Et sic appetit proprium third way depends on the essential
bonum in causando agens character of his genus. It is in this way
aequivocum: sicut caelum. Quarto that an equivocal agent seeks its proper
autem modo, ratione similitudinis good by an act of causation, as in the
analogiae principiatorum ad suum case of the heavens. And a fourth way
principium. Et sic Deus, qui est depends on the analogical likeness of
extra genus, propter suum bonum things produced, in relation to their
omnibus rebus dat esse. source. And it is in this way that God,
Who is beyond genus, gives existing
being to all, because of His own
goodness.
Ex quo patet quod quanto aliquid [8] It is evident, next, that the more
est perfectioris virtutis, et perfect something is in its power, and the
eminentius in gradu bonitatis, higher it is in the scale of goodness, the
tanto appetitum boni more does it have an appetite for a
communiorem habet, et magis in broader common good, and the more
distantibus a se bonum quaerit et does it seek and become involved in the
operatur. Nam imperfecta ad doing of good for beings far removed from
solum bonum proprii individui itself. Indeed, imperfect beings tend only
tendunt; perfecta vero ad bonum to the good proper to the individual, while
speciei; perfectiora vero ad perfect beings tend to the good of their
bonum generis; Deus autem, qui species. But more perfect beings tend to
est perfectissimus in bonitate, ad the good of the genus, while God, Who is
bonum totius entis. Unde non most perfect in goodness, tends toward
immerito dicitur a quibusdam quod the good of being as a whole. Hence it is
bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, est said by some people, and not
diffusivum: quia quanto aliquid inappropriately, that “the good, as such, is
invenitur melius, tanto ad diffusive,” because the better a thing is,
remotiora bonitatem suam the more does it diffuse its goodness to
diffundit. Et quia in quolibet remote beings. And since, “in every
genere quod est perfectissimum genus, that which is most perfect is the
est exemplar et mensura omnium archetype and measure of all things
quae sunt illius generis, oportet belonging in the genus,” God, Who is
quod Deus, qui est in bonitate most perfect in goodness and Who
perfectissimus et suam bonitatem diffuses His goodness in the broadest
communissime diffundens, in sua way, must be in His diffusion the
diffusione sit exemplar omnium archetype for all diffusers of goodness.
bonitatem diffundentium. Now, inasmuch as a thing diffuses
Inquantum autem unumquodque goodness to other beings, it comes to be
bonitatem diffundit in alia, fit their cause. As a result, it is also clear
aliorum causa. Hinc etiam patet that a thing which tends to become the
quod unumquodque tendens ad cause of others tends toward the divine
hoc quod sit aliorum causa, tendit likeness, and nonetheless it tends toward
in divinam similitudinem, et its own good.
nihilominus tendit in suum bonum.
Non est ergo inconveniens si [9] Therefore, it is not unfitting to say that

motus corporum caelestium, et the motions of the heavenly bodies and
actiones motorum eorum, dicantur the actions of their movers are in some
esse aliqualiter propter haec sense for the sake of these generable
corpora quae generantur et and corruptible bodies which are less
corrumpuntur, quae sunt eis worthy than they. They are not for the
indigniora. Non enim sunt propter sake of these bodies, in the sense of an
haec sicut propter ultimum finem: ultimate end; rather, by intending the
sed, intendentes horum generation of these bodies they intend
generationem, intendunt suum their own good and the divine likeness as
bonum, et divinam similitudinem an ultimate end.
tanquam ultimum finem.
Chapter 25
Caput 25
THAT TO UNDERSTAND GOD IS THE
Quod intelligere Deum est finis
END OF EVERY INTELLECTUAL
omnis intellectualis substantiae
SUBSTANCE
Cum autem omnes creaturae, [1] Since all creatures, even those devoid

etiam intellectu carentes, of understanding, are ordered to God as
ordinentur in Deum sicut in finem to an ultimate end, all achieve this end to
ultimum; ad hunc autem finem the extent that they participate somewhat
pertingunt omnia inquantum de in His likeness. Intellectual creatures
similitudine eius aliquid attain it in a more special way, that is,
participant: intellectuales through their proper operation of
creaturae aliquo specialiori modo understanding Him. Hence, this must be
ad ipsum pertingunt, scilicet per the end of the intellectual creature,
propriam operationem intelligendo namely, to understand God.
ipsum. Unde oportet quod hoc sit
finis intellectualis creaturae,
scilicet intelligere Deum.
Ultimus enim finis cuiuslibet rei [2] The ultimate end of each thing is God,

est Deus, ut ostensum est. as we have shown. So, each thing
Intendit igitur unumquodque sicut intends, as its ultimate end, to be united
ultimo fini Deo coniungi quanto with God as closely as is possible for it.
magis sibi possibile est. Vicinius Now, a thing is more closely united with
autem coniungitur aliquid Deo per God by the fact that it attains to His very
hoc quod ad ipsam substantiam substance in some manner, and this is
eius aliquo modo pertingit, quod accomplished when one knows something
fit dum aliquid quis cognoscit de of the divine substance, rather than when
divina substantia, quam dum one acquires some likeness of Him.
consequitur eius aliquam Therefore, an intellectual substance tends
similitudinem. Substantia igitur to divine knowledge as an ultimate end.
intellectualis tendit in divinam
cognitionem sicut in ultimum
finem.
Item. Propria operatio cuiuslibet [3] Again, the proper operation of a thing
rei est finis eius: est enim is an end for it, for this is its secondary
secunda perfectio ipsius; unde perfection. That is why whatever is fittingly
quod ad propriam operationem related to its proper operation is said to be
bene se habet, dicitur virtuosum virtuous and good. But the act of
et bonum. Intelligere autem est understanding is the proper operation of
propria operatio substantiae an intellectual substance. Therefore, this
intellectualis. Ipsa igitur est finis act is its end. Ana that which is most
eius. Quod igitur est perfect in this operation is the ultimate
perfectissimum in hac operatione, end, particularly in the case of operations
hoc est ultimus finis: et praecipue that are not ordered to any products, such
in operationibus quae non as the acts of understanding and sensing.
ordinantur ad aliqua operata, sicut Now, since operations of this type are
est intelligere et sentire. Cum specified by their objects, through which
autem huiusmodi operationes ex they are known also, any one of these
obiectis speciem recipiant, per operations must be more perfect when its
quae etiam cognoscuntur, oportet object is more perfect. And so, to
quod tanto sit perfectior aliqua understand the most perfect intelligible
istarum operationum, quanto eius object, which is God, is the most perfect
obiectum est perfectius. Et sic thing in the genus of this operation of
intelligere perfectissimum understanding. Therefore, to know God by
intelligibile, quod Deus est, est an act of understanding is the ultimate
perfectissimum in genere huius end of every intellectual substance.
operationis quae est intelligere.
Cognoscere igitur Deum
intelligendo est ultimus finis
cuiuslibet intellectualis
substantiae.
Potest autem aliquis dicere [4] Of course, someone could say that the

intellectualis quidem substantiae ultimate end of an intellectual substance
ultimum finem consistere in consists, in fact, in understanding the best
intelligendo optimum intelligibile: intelligible object—not that the best object
non tamen illud quod est optimum of understanding for this or that particular
intelligibile huius vel illius intellectual substance is absolutely the
intellectualis substantiae, est best intelligible object, but that, the higher
optimum intelligibile simpliciter, an intellectual substance is, the higher will
sed quanto aliqua intellectualis its best object of understanding be. And
substantia est altior, tanto suum so, perhaps the highest created
intelligibile optimum est altius. Et intellectual substance may have what is
ideo forte suprema intellectualis absolutely best as its best intelligible
substantia creata habet pro object, and, consequently, its felicity will
intelligibili optimo illud quod est consist in understanding God, but the
optimum simpliciter, unde eius felicity of any lower intellectual substance
felicitas erit in intelligendo Deum: will lie in the understanding of some lower
cuiuslibet vero inferioris intelligible object, which is, however, the
substantiae intellectualis felicitas highest thing understood by it. Particularly
erit intelligere aliquod inferius would it seem true of the human intellect
intelligibile, quod est tamen that its function is not to understand
altissimum eorum quae ab ipsa absolutely the best intelligible object,
intelliguntur. Et praecipue because of its weakness; indeed, it stands

intellectus humani videtur quod in relation to the knowing of the greatest
non sit intelligere optimum intelligible object, “as the owl’s eye is to
intelligibile simpliciter, propter eius the sunlight.”
debilitatem: habet enim se ad
cognoscendum illud quod est
maximum intelligibile sicut oculus
noctuae ad solem.
Sed manifeste apparet quod finis [5] But it seems obvious that the end of
cuiuslibet substantiae any intellectual substance, even the
intellectualis, etiam infimae, est lowest, is to understand God. It has been
intelligere Deum. Ostensum est shown above that the ultimate end of all
enim supra quod omnium entium things, to which they tend, is God. Though
ultimus finis in quem tendunt, est it is the lowest in the order of intellectual
Deus. Intellectus autem humanus, substances, the human intellect is,
etsi sit infimus in ordine nevertheless, superior to all things that
intellectualium substantiarum, est lack understanding. And so, since there
tamen superior omnibus intellectu should not be a less noble end for a more
carentibus. Cum ergo nobilioris noble substance, the end for the human
substantiae non sit ignobilior finis, intellect will be God Himself. And an
erit etiam intellectus humani finis intelligent being attains his ultimate end
ipse Deus. Unumquodque autem by understanding Him, as was indicated.
intelligens consequitur suum Therefore, the human intellect reaches
finem ultimum per hoc quod God as its end, through an act of
ipsum intelligit, ut ostensum est. understanding.
Intelligendo igitur pertingit
intellectus humanus ad Deum
sicut ad finem.
Adhuc. Sicut res intellectu [6] Again, just as things devoid of
carentes tendunt in Deum sicut in understanding tend toward God as an
finem per viam assimilationis, ita end, by way of assimilation, so intellectual
substantiae intellectuales per substances do so by way of cognition, as
viam cognitionis, ut ex praedictis is evident from the foregoing. Now,
patet. Res autem intellectu although things devoid of understanding
carentes, etsi tendant in tend to the likeness of their proximate
similitudinem proximorum agents, their natural tendency does not,
agentium, non tamen ibi quiescit however, rest there, for this tendency has
naturae intentio, sed habet pro as its end assimilation to the highest
fine assimilationem ad summum good, as is apparent from what we have
bonum, ut ex dictis patet, etsi said, even though these things can only
imperfectissime ad hanc attain this likeness in a very imperfect
similitudinem possint pertingere. way. Therefore, however small the
Intellectus igitur quantumcumque amount of divine knowledge that the
modicum possit de divina intellect may be able to grasp, that will be
cognitione percipere, illud erit sibi for the intellect, in regard to its ultimate
pro ultimo fine, magis quam end, much more than the perfect
perfecta cognitio inferiorum knowledge of lower objects of
intelligibilium. understanding.
Amplius. Unumquodque maxime [7] Besides, a thing has the greatest

desiderat suum finem ultimum. desire for its ultimate end. Now, the
Intellectus autem humanus magis human intellect has a greater desire, and
desiderat, et amat, et delectatur in love, and pleasure, in knowing divine
cognitione divinorum, quamvis matters than it has in the perfect
modicum quidem de illis percipere knowledge of the lowest things, even
possit, quam in perfecta though it can grasp but little concerning
cognitione quam habet de rebus divine things. So, the ultimate end of man
infimis. Est igitur ultimus finis is to understand God, in some fashion.
hominis intelligere quoquo modo
Deum.
Adhuc. Unumquodque tendit in [8] Moreover, a thing inclines toward the

divinam similitudinem sicut in divine likeness as to its own end. So, that
proprium finem. Illud igitur per whereby a thing chiefly becomes like God
quod unumquodque maxime Deo is its ultimate end. Now, an intellectual
assimilatur, est ultimus finis eius. creature chiefly becomes like God by the
Deo autem assimilatur maxime fact that it is intellectual, for it has this sort
creatura intellectualis per hoc of likeness over and above what other
quod intellectualis est: hanc enim creatures have, and this likeness includes
similitudinem habet prae ceteris all others. In the genus of this sort of
creaturis, et haec includit omnes likeness a being becomes more like God
alias. In genere autem huius by actually understanding than by
similitudinis magis assimilatur habitually or potentially understanding,
Deo secundum quod intelligit because God is always actually
actu, quam secundum quod understanding, as we proved in Book One
intelligit in habitu vel potentia: [56]. And, in this actual understanding, it
quia Deus semper actu intelligens becomes most like God by understanding
est, ut in primo probatum est. Et God Himself, for God understands all
in hoc quod intelligit actu, maxime things in the act of understanding Himself,
assimilatur Deo secundum quod as we proved in Book One [49].
intelligit ipsum Deum: nam ipse Therefore, to understand God is the
Deus intelligendo se intelligit ultimate end of every intellectual
omnia alia, ut in primo probatum substance.
est. Intelligere igitur Deum est
ultimus finis omnis intellectualis
substantiae.
Item. Quod est tantum propter [9] Furthermore, that which is capable of
aliud diligibile, est propter illud being loved only for the sake of some
quod est tantum propter se other object exists for the sake of that
diligibile: non enim est abire in other thing which is lovable simply on its
infinitum in appetitu naturae, quia own account. In fact, there is no point in
desiderium naturae frustraretur, going on without end in the working of
cum non sit possibile pertransire natural appetite, since natural desire
infinita. Omnes autem scientiae et would then be futile, because it is
artes et potentiae practicae sunt impossible to get to the end of an endless

tantum propter aliud diligibiles: series. Now, all practical sciences, arts,
nam in eis finis non est scire, sed and powers are objects of love only
operari. Scientiae autem because they are means to something
speculativae sunt propter seipsas else, for their purpose is not knowledge
diligibiles: nam finis earum est but operation. But the speculative
ipsum scire. Nec invenitur aliqua sciences are lovable for their own sake,
actio in rebus humanis quae non since their end is knowledge itself. Nor do
ordinetur ad alium finem, nisi we find any action in human affairs,
consideratio speculativa. Nam except speculative thought, that is not
etiam ipsae actiones ludicrae, directed to some other end. Even sports
quae videntur absque fine fieri, activities, which appear to be carried on
habent aliquem finem debitum, without any purpose, have a proper end,
scilicet ut per eas quodammodo namely, so that after our minds have been
mente relevati, magis simus somewhat relaxed through them we may
postmodum potentes ad be then better able to do serious jobs.
studiosas operationes: alias esset Otherwise, if sport were an end in itself,
semper ludendum, si ludus the proper thing to do would be to play all
propter se quaereretur, quod est the time, but that is not appropriate. So,
inconveniens. Ordinantur igitur the practical arts are ordered to the
artes practicae ad speculativas, et speculative ones, and likewise every
similiter omnis humana operatio human operation to intellectual
ad speculationem intellectus, sicut speculation, as an end. Now, among all
ad finem. In omnibus autem the sciences and arts which are thus
scientiis et artibus ordinatis ad subordinated, the ultimate end seems to
illam videtur pertinere ultimus finis belong to the one that is preceptive and
quae est praeceptiva et architectonic in relation to the others. For
architectonica aliarum: sicut ars instance, the art of navigation, to which
gubernatoria, ad quam pertinet the end, that is the use, of a ship pertains,
finis navis, qui est usus ipsius, est is architectonic and preceptive in relation
architectonica et praeceptiva to the art of shipbuilding. In fact, this is the
respectu navisfactivae. Hoc way that first philosophy is related to the
autem modo se habet philosophia other speculative sciences, for all the
prima ad alias scientias others depend on it, in the sense that they
speculativas, nam ab ipsa omnes take their principles from it, and also the
aliae dependent, utpote ab ipsa position to be assumed against those who
accipientes sua principia, et deny the principles. And this first
directionem contra negantes philosophy is wholly ordered to the
principia: ipsaque prima knowing of God, as its ultimate end; that
philosophia tota ordinatur ad Dei is why it is also called divine science. So,
cognitionem sicut ad ultimum divine knowledge is the ultimate end of
finem, unde et scientia divina every act of human knowledge and every
nominatur. Est ergo cognitio operation.
divina finis ultimus omnis
humanae cognitionis et
operationis.
Adhuc. In omnibus agentibus et [10] Again, in all agents and movers that
moventibus ordinatis oportet quod are arranged in an order, the end of the
finis primi agentis et motoris sit first agent and mover must be the ultimate
ultimus finis omnium: sicut finis end of all. Thus, the end of the
ducis exercitus est finis omnium commander of an army is the end of all
sub eo militantium. Inter omnes who serve as soldiers under him. Now, of
autem hominis partes, intellectus all the parts of man, the intellect is found
invenitur superior motor: nam to be the superior mover, for the intellect
intellectus movet appetitum, moves the appetite, by presenting it with
proponendo ei suum obiectum; its object; then the intellectual appetite.
appetitus autem intellectivus, qui that is the will, moves the sensory
est voluntas, movet appetitus appetites, irascible and concupiscible, and
sensitivos, qui sunt irascibilis et that is why we do not obey concupiscence
concupiscibilis, unde et unless there be a command from the will;
concupiscentiae non obedimus and finally, the sense appetite, with the
nisi voluntatis imperium adsit; advent of consent from the will, now
appetitus autem sensitivus, moves the body. Therefore, the end of the
adveniente consensu voluntatis, intellect is the end of all human actions.
movet iam corpus. Finis igitur “But the end and good of the intellect are
intellectus est finis omnium the true;” consequently, the first truth is
actionum humanarum. Finis the ultimate end. So, the ultimate end of
autem et bonum intellectus est the whole man, and of all his operations
verum: et per consequens ultimus and desires, is to know the first truth,
finis primum verum. Est igitur which is God.
ultimus finis totius hominis, et
omnium operationum et
desideriorum eius, cognoscere
primum verum, quod est Deus.
Amplius. Naturaliter inest omnibus [11] Besides, there is naturally present in

hominibus desiderium all men the desire to know the causes of
cognoscendi causas eorum quae whatever things are observed. Hence,
videntur: unde propter because of wondering about things that
admirationem eorum quae were seen but whose causes were
videbantur, quorum causae hidden, men first began to think
latebant, homines primo philosophically; when they found the
philosophari coeperunt, cause, they were satisfied. But the search
invenientes autem causam did not stop until it reached the first cause,
quiescebant. Nec sistit inquisitio for “then do we think that we know
quousque perveniatur ad primam perfectly, when we know the first cause.”
causam: et tunc perfecte nos Therefore, man naturally desires, as his
scire arbitramur quando primam ultimate end, to know the first cause. But
causam cognoscimus. Desiderat the first cause of all things is God.
igitur homo naturaliter cognoscere Therefore, the ultimate end of man is to
primam causam quasi ultimum know God.
finem. Prima autem omnium
causa Deus est. Est igitur ultimus
finis hominis cognoscere Deum.
Praeterea. Cuiuslibet effectus [12] Moreover, for each effect that he

cogniti naturaliter homo scire knows, man naturally desires to know the
causam desiderat. Intellectus cause. Now, the human intellect knows
autem humanus cognoscit ens universal being. So, he naturally desires
universale. Desiderat igitur to know its cause, which is God alone, as
naturaliter cognoscere causam we proved in Book Two [15]. Now, a
eius, quae solum Deus est, ut in person has not attained his ultimate end
secundo probatum est. Non est until natural desire comes to rest.
autem aliquis assecutus finem Therefore, for human happiness which is
ultimum quousque naturale the ultimate end it is not enough to have
desiderium quiescat. Non sufficit merely any kind of intelligible knowledge;
igitur ad felicitatem humanam, there must be divine knowledge, as an
quae est ultimus finis, ultimate end, to terminate the natural
qualiscumque intelligibilis desire. So, the ultimate end of man is the
cognitio, nisi divina cognitio adsit, knowledge of God.
quae terminat naturale desiderium
sicut ultimus finis. Est igitur
ultimus finis hominis ipsa Dei
cognitio.
Amplius. Corpus, quod naturali [13] Furthermore, a body tending toward

appetitu tendit in suum ubi, tanto its proper place by natural appetite is
vehementius et velocius movetur, moved more forcibly and swiftly as it
quanto magis appropinquat fini: approaches its end. Thus, Aristotle
unde probat Aristoteles in I de proves, in On the Heavens I [8: 27a 18],
caelo, quod motus naturalis that natural motion in a straight line
rectus non potest esse ad cannot go on to infinity, for then it would
infinitum, quia non magis be no more moved later than earlier. So, a
moveretur postea quam prius. thing that tends more forcibly later than
Quod igitur vehementius in aliquid earlier, toward an objective, is not moved
tendit post quam prius, non toward an indefinite objective, but tends
movetur ad infinitum, sed ad toward some determinate thing. Now, we
aliquid determinatum tendit. Hoc find this situation in the desire to know.
autem invenimus in desiderio The more a person knows, the more is be
sciendi: quanto enim aliquis plura moved by the desire to know. Hence,
scit, tanto maiori desiderio affectat man’s natural desire tends, in the process
scire. Tendit igitur desiderium of knowing, toward some definite end.
naturale hominis in sciendo ad Now, this can be none other than the most
aliquem determinatum finem. Hoc noble object of knowledge, which is God.
autem non potest esse aliud Therefore, divine knowledge is the
quam nobilissimum scibile, quod ultimate end of man.
Deus est. Est igitur cognitio divina
finis ultimus hominis.
Ultimus autem finis hominis, et [14] Now, the ultimate end of man, and of

cuiuslibet intellectualis every intellectual substance, is called
substantiae, felicitas sive felicity or happiness, because this is what
beatitudo nominatur: hoc enim est every intellectual substance desires as an
quod omnis substantia ultimate end, and for its own sake alone.
intellectualis desiderat tanquam Therefore, the ultimate happiness and
ultimum finem, et propter se felicity of every intellectual substance is
tantum. Est igitur beatitudo et to, know God.
felicitas ultima cuiuslibet

substantiae intellectualis
cognoscere Deum.
Hinc est quod dicitur Matth. 58: [15] And so, it is said in Matthew (5:8):
beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they
Deum videbunt. Et Ioan. 173: shall see God”; and in John (17:3): “This
haec est vita aeterna, ut is eternal life, that they may know Thee,
cognoscant te, Deum verum. the only true God.”
Huic etiam sententiae Aristoteles [16] With this view, the judgment of
in ultimo Ethicorum, concordat, Aristotle is also in agreement, in the last
ubi ultimam hominis felicitatem Book of his Ethics [X, 7: 1177a 18], where
dicit esse speculativam, quantum he says that the ultimate felicity of man is
ad speculationem optimi “speculative, in accord with the
speculabilis. contemplation of the best object of
speculation.”
Caput 26 Chapter 26
Utrum felicitas consistat in WHETHER FELICITY CONSISTS IN A
actu voluntatis WILL ACT
Quia vero intellectualis [1] Now, since an intellectual substance,

substantia sua operatione through its own operation, attains to God,
pertingit ad Deum non solum not only by understanding, but also
intelligendo, sed etiam per actum through an act of will, by desiring and
voluntatis, desiderando et loving Him and by taking delight in Him, it
amando ipsum et in ipso may appear to someone that the ultimate
delectationem habendo, potest end and the ultimate felicity of man do not
alicui videri quod ultimus finis, et lie in knowing, but in loving God, or in
ultima hominis felicitas, non sit in some other act of will relating to Him.
cognoscendo Deum, sed magis
in amando, vel aliquo alio actu
voluntatis se habendo ad ipsum:
Praecipue cum obiectum [2] Especially so, since the object of the
voluntatis sit bonum, quod habet will is the good, and the good has the
rationem finis; verum autem, rational character of an end, while the true
quod est obiectum intellectus, which is the object of the intellect does not
non habet rationem finis nisi have the rational character of an end,
inquantum et ipsum est bonum. except inasmuch as it is also a good.
Unde non videtur homo consequi Consequently, it does not seem that Man
ultimum finem per actum attains his ultimate end through an act of
intellectus, sed magis per actum understanding, but rather, through an act
voluntatis. of will.
Praeterea. Ultima perfectio [3] Again, the ultimate perfection of

operationis est delectatio, quae operation is delight “which perfects activity
perficit operationem sicut as beauty perfects youth,” as the
pulchritudo iuventutem, ut in X Philosopher says in Ethics X [4: 1174b 31].
Eth. philosophus dicit. Si igitur So, if perfect operation is the ultimate end,
perfecta operatio est ultimus it appears that the ultimate end is more in
finis, videtur quod ultimus finis accord with an operation of the will than of
magis sit secundum operationem the intellect.
voluntatis quam intellectus.
Adhuc. Delectatio videtur ita [4] Besides, delight seems to be so much
propter se desiderari quod an object of desire for its own sake that it is
nunquam propter aliud: stultum never desired for the sake of something
enim est quaerere ab aliquo else; indeed, it is foolish to ask a person
quare velit delectari. Haec autem why he wishes to be delighted. Now, this is
est conditio ultimi finis: ut scilicet characteristic of the ultimate end: it is
propter se quaeratur. Est igitur sought for its own sake. Therefore, the
ultimus finis magis in operatione ultimate end lies in an operation of the will
voluntatis quam intellectus, ut rather than of the intellect, it would seem.
videtur.
Item. In appetitu ultimi finis [5] Moreover, all men agree to the fullest
maxime omnes concordant: cum extent in their appetite for the ultimate end,
sit naturalis. Plures autem for it is natural. Now, more men seek
quaerunt delectationem quam delight than knowledge. So, it would seem
cognitionem. Magis igitur videtur that the end is delight rather than
esse finis delectatio quam knowledge.
cognitio.
Amplius. Voluntas videtur esse [6] Furthermore, the will seems to be a
altior potentia quam intellectus: higher power than the intellect, for the will
nam voluntas movet intellectum moves the intellect to its act; indeed, the
ad suum actum; intellectus enim intellect actually considers, whenever it
actu considerat quae habitu wills to, what it retains habitually.
tenet, cum aliquis voluerit. Actio Therefore, the action of the will seems to
igitur voluntatis videtur nobilior be nobler than the action of the intellect.
quam actio intellectus. Magis And so, it seems that the ultimate end,
igitur videtur ultimus finis, quae which is happiness, consists rather in an
est beatitudo, consistere in actu act of will than in an act of intellect.
voluntatis quam in actu
intellectus.
Hoc autem esse impossibile [7] However, it can be shown that this view

manifeste ostenditur. is quite impossible.
Cum enim beatitudo sit proprium [8] Since happiness is the proper good of

bonum intellectualis naturae, an intellectual nature, happiness must
oportet quod secundum id pertain to an intellectual nature by reason
intellectuali naturae conveniat of what is proper to that nature. Now,
quod est sibi proprium. Appetitus appetite is not peculiar to intellectual
autem non est proprium nature; instead, it is present in all things,
intellectualis naturae, sed though it is in different things in different
omnibus rebus inest: licet sit ways. And this diversity arises from the
diversimode in diversis. Quae fact that things are differently related to
tamen diversitas procedit ex hoc knowledge. ~For things lacking knowledge
quod res diversimode se habent entirely have natural appetite only. And
ad cognitionem. Quae enim things endowed with sensory knowledge
omnino cognitione carent, habent have, in addition, sense appetite, under
appetitum naturalem tantum. which irascible and concupiscible powers
Quae vero habent cognitionem are included. But things possessed of
sensitivam, et appetitum intellectual knowledge also have an
sensibilem habent, sub quo appetite proportionate to this knowledge,
irascibilis et concupiscibilis that is, will. So, the will is not peculiar to
continetur. Quae vero habent intellectual nature by virtue of being an
cognitionem intellectivam, et appetite, but only in so far as it depends on
appetitum cognitioni intellect. However, the intellect, in itself, is
proportionalem habent, scilicet peculiar to an intellectual nature.
voluntatem. Voluntas igitur, Therefore, happiness, or felicity, consists
secundum quod est appetitus, substantially and principally in an act of the
non est proprium intellectualis intellect rather than in an act of the will.
naturae: sed solum secundum
quod ab intellectu dependet.
Intellectus autem secundum se
proprius est intellectuali naturae.
Beatitudo igitur vel felicitas in
actu intellectus consistit
substantialiter et principaliter,
magis quam in actu voluntatis.
Adhuc. In omnibus potentiis quae [9] Again, in the case of all powers that are
moventur a suis obiectis, obiecta moved by their objects the objects are
sunt naturaliter priora actibus naturally prior to the acts of these powers,
illarum potentiarum: sicut motor just as a mover is naturally prior to the
naturaliter prior est quam moveri moving of its passive object. Now, the will
ipsius mobilis. Talis autem is such a power, for the object of appetition
potentia est voluntas: appetibile moves the appetite. So, the will’s object is
enim movet appetitum. Obiectum naturally prior to its act. Hence, its first
igitur voluntatis est prius object precedes every one of its acts.
naturaliter quam actus eius. Therefore, no act of the will can be the first
Primum igitur eius obiectum thing that is willed. But that is what the
praecedit omnem actum ipsius. ultimate end is, in the sense of happiness.
Non potest ergo actus voluntatis So, it is impossible for happiness, or
primum volitum esse. Hoc autem felicity, to be the very act of the will.
est ultimus finis, qui est
beatitudo. Impossibile est igitur
quod beatitudo sive felicitas sit
ipse actus voluntatis.
Praeterea. In omnibus potentiis [10] Besides, for all the powers capable of

quae possunt converti in suos reflection on their own acts, the act of such
actus, prius oportet quod actus a power must first be brought to bear on
illius potentiae feratur in some other object, and then directed to its
obiectum aliud, et postmodum own act. If the intellect is to understand
feratur in suum actum. Si enim itself in the act of understanding, it must
intellectus intelligit se intelligere, first be taken that it understands
prius oportet poni quod intelligat something, and then, as a result, that it
rem aliquam, et consequenter understands that it is understanding. For,
quod intelligat se intelligere: nam this act of understanding which the intellect
ipsum intelligere quod intellectus understands pertains to some object.
intelligit, alicuius obiecti est; unde Hence, it is necessary either to proceed
oportet quod vel procedatur in through an endless series, or, if we are to
infinitum, vel, si est devenire ad come to a first object of understanding, it
primum intellectum, hoc non erit will not be the act of understanding but
ipsum intelligere, sed aliqua res rather some intelligible thing. Likewise, the
intelligibilis. Similiter oportet quod first willed object must not be the will’s act
primum volitum non sit ipsum but some other good thing. But, for an
velle, sed aliquid aliud bonum. intellectual nature, the first thing that is
Primum autem volitum willed is happiness itself, or felicity, since it
intellectualis naturae est ipsa is for the sake of this happiness that we
beatitudo sive felicitas: nam will whatever we will. Therefore, it is
propter hanc volumus impossible for felicity to consist essentially
quaecumque volumus. in an act of the will.
Impossibile est igitur felicitatem
essentialiter in actu voluntatis
consistere.
Amplius. Unumquodque [11] Moreover, each thing possesses its

secundum ea quae constituunt true nature by virtue of the components
substantiam eius, habet naturae which make up its substance. Thus, a real
suae veritatem: differt enim verus man differs from a painting of a man by
homo a picto per ea quae virtue of the things that constitute the
substantiam hominis constituunt. substance of man. Now, in their relation to
Vera autem beatitudo non differt the will act, true happiness does not differ
a falsa secundum actum from false happiness. In fact, the will, when
voluntatis: nam eodem modo se it desires, loves or enjoys, is related in just
habet voluntas in desiderando the same way to its object, whatever it may
vel amando vel delectando, be that is presented to it as a highest good,
quicquid sit illud quod sibi whether truly or falsely. Of course, whether
proponitur ut summum bonum, the object so presented is truly the highest
sive vere sive falso; utrum autem good, or is false, this distinction is made on
vere sit summum bonum quod ut the part of the intellect. Therefore,
tale proponitur vel falso, hoc happiness, or felicity, essentially consists
differt ex parte intellectus. in understanding rather than in an act of
Beatitudo igitur, sive felicitas, in the will.
intellectu essentialiter magis
quam in actu voluntatis consistit.
Item. Si aliquis actus voluntatis [12] Furthermore, if any act of the will were

esset ipsa felicitas, hic actus this felicity, this act would be either one of
esset aut desiderare, aut amare, desire, of love, or of delight. Now, it is
aut delectari. Impossibile est impossible for the act of desiring to be the
autem quod desiderare sit ultimate end. For it is by desire that the will
ultimus finis. Est enim tends toward what it does not yet possess,
desiderium secundum quod but this is contrary to the essential
voluntas tendit in id quod character of the ultimate end.—So, two,
nondum habet: hoc autem the act of loving cannot be the ultimate
contrariatur rationi ultimi finis. end. For a good is loved not only when
Amare etiam non potest esse possessed but also when not possessed.
ultimus finis. Amatur enim bonum Indeed, it is as a result of love that what is
non solum quando habetur, sed not possessed is sought with desire, and if
etiam quando non habetur, ex the love of something already possessed is
amore enim est quod non more perfect, this results from the fact that
habitum desiderio quaeratur: et the good which was loved is possessed.
si amor iam habiti perfectior sit, So, it is a different thing to possess a good
hoc causatur ex hoc quod bonum which is the end, and to love it; for love,
amatum habetur. Aliud igitur est before possession, is imperfect, but after
habere bonum quod est finis, possession, perfect. —Similarly, delight is
quam amare, quod ante habere not the ultimate end. For the very
est imperfectum, post habere possession of the good is the cause of
vero perfectum. Similiter autem delight: we either experience it while the
nec delectatio est ultimus finis. good is presently possessed, or we
Ipsum enim habere bonum remember it when it was formerly
causa est delectationis: vel dum possessed, or we hope for it when it is to
bonum nunc habitum sentimus; be possessed in the future. So, delight is
vel dum prius habitum not the ultimate end. Therefore, none of
memoramur; vel dum in futuro the acts of will can be this felicity
habendum speramus. Non est substantially.
igitur delectatio ultimus finis.
Nullus ergo actus voluntatis
potest esse substantialiter ipsa
felicitas.
Adhuc. Si delectatio esset [13] Again, if delight were the ultimate end,

ultimus finis, ipsa secundum it would be desired for its own sake. But
seipsam esset appetenda. Hoc this is false. The value of desiring a certain
autem est falsum. Refert enim delight arises from the thing which delight
quae delectatio appetatur ex eo accompanies. For the delight that
ad quod consequitur delectatio: accompanies good and desirable
nam delectatio quae consequitur operations is good and desirable, but that
bonas et appetendas which accompanies evil deeds is evil and
operationes, bona est et repulsive. So, it owes the fact that it is
appetenda; quae autem malas, good and desirable to something else.
mala et fugienda. Habet igitur Therefore, delight is not the ultimate end,
quod sit bona et appetenda ex in the sense of felicity.
alio. Non est igitur ipsa ultimus
finis, qui est felicitas.
Adhuc. Rectus ordo rerum [14] Besides, the right order of things is in

convenit cum ordine naturae: agreement with the order of nature, for
nam res naturales ordinantur in natural things are ordered to their end
suum finem absque errore. In without error. In the order of natural things,
naturalibus autem est delectatio delight is for the sake of operation, and not
propter operationem, et non e conversely. In fact, we see that nature has
converso. Videmus enim quod associated pleasure with those operations
natura illis operationibus of animals that are clearly ordered to
animalium delectationem necessary ends; such as to the eating of
apposuit quae sunt manifeste ad food, for this is ordered to the preservation
fines necessarios ordinatae, sicut of the individual; and to the use of sexual
in usu ciborum, qui ordinatur ad capacities, for this is ordered to the
conservationem individui, et in preservation of the species. Indeed, unless
usu venereorum, qui ordinatur ad pleasure were associated with them,
conservationem speciei: nisi animals would refrain from these
enim adesset delectatio, animalia necessary activities that we have
a praedictis usibus necessariis mentioned. Therefore, it is impossible for
abstinerent. Impossibile ergo est pleasure to be the ultimate end.
quod delectatio sit ultimus finis.
Item. Delectatio nihil aliud esse [15] Moreover, pleasure seems to be
videtur quam quietatio voluntatis simply the repose of the will in some
in aliquo bono convenienti, sicut appropriate good, as desire is the
desiderium est inclinatio inclination of the will toward the attainment
voluntatis in aliquod bonum of some good. Now, just as a man is
consequendum. Sicut autem inclined through his will to the end and
homo per voluntatem inclinatur in reposes in it, so do physical bodies in
finem et quietatur in illo, ita nature possess natural inclinations to
corpora naturalia habent proper ends, and these inclinations come
inclinationes naturales in fines to rest when the end has already been
proprios, quae quidem quietantur reached. However, it is ridiculous to say
fine iam adepto. Ridiculum that the end of a heavy body’s motion is
autem est dicere quod finis not to be in its proper place, but that the
motus corporis gravis non sit end is the resting of the inclination
esse in loco proprio, sed whereby it tends there. If nature bad
quietatio inclinationis qua in hoc intended this at the beginning, that the
tendebat. Si enim hoc inclination would come to rest, it would not
principaliter natura intenderet ut have given such an inclination; instead, it
inclinatio quietaretur, non daret gives it so that, by this means, the thing
eam; dat autem eam ut per hoc may tend to a proper place. When this has
tendat in locum proprium; quo been reached, as an end, the repose of the
consecuto, quasi fine, sequitur inclination follows. And so, such repose is
inclinationis quietatio. Et sic not the end, but rather a concomitant of the
quietatio talis non est finis, sed end. Nor, indeed, is pleasure the ultimate
concomitans finem. Nec igitur end; it is its concomitant. And so, by an
delectatio est finis ultimus, sed even greater reason, no other act of the
concomitans ipsum. Multo igitur will is felicity.
magis nec aliquis voluntatis
actus est felicitas.
Adhuc. Si alicuius rei sit aliqua [16] If one thing has another thing as its
res exterior finis, illa eius external end, then the operation whereby
operatio dicetur etiam finis the first thing primarily attains the second
ultimus per quam primo will be called the ultimate end of the first
consequitur rem illam: sicut his thing. Thus, for those to whom money is an
quibus pecunia est finis, dicitur end, we say that to possess the money is
etiam possidere pecuniam finis, their end, but not the loving of it, not the
non autem amare, neque craving of it. Now, the ultimate end of an
concupiscere. Finis autem intellectual substance is God. So, that
ultimus substantiae intellectualis operation of man is substantially his
est Deus. Illa igitur operatio happiness, or his felicity, whereby be
hominis est substantialiter eius primarily attains to God. This is the act of
beatitudo vel felicitas, per quam understanding, for we cannot will what we
primo attingit ad Deum. Hoc do not understand. Therefore, the ultimate
autem est intelligere: nam velle felicity of man lies substantially in knowing
non possumus quod non God through his intellect, and not in an act
intelligimus. Est igitur ultima of the will.
felicitas hominis in cognoscendo
Deum per intellectum
substantialiter, non in actu
voluntatis.
Iam igitur per ea quae dicta sunt, [17] At this point, then, the answer to the

patet solutio in contrarium arguments against our view is clear from
obiectorum. what we have said.
Non enim, si felicitas per hoc For, if felicity is an object of the will
quod habet rationem summi because it has the rational character of a
boni, est obiectum voluntatis, highest good, that does not make it
propter hoc necesse est quod sit substantially an act of the will, as the first
substantialiter ipse actus argument implied. On the contrary, from
voluntatis: ut prima ratio the fact that it is a first object, the
procedebat. Immo ex hoc ipso conclusion is that felicity is not its act, as is
quod est primum obiectum, apparent in what we have said.
sequitur quod non sit actus eius,
ut ex dictis apparet.
Neque etiam oportet quod omne [18] Nor, indeed, is it necessary that
id quo res quocumque modo everything whereby a thing is in any way
perficitur, sit finis illius rei: sicut perfected be the end of that thing, as the
secunda ratio procedebat. Est second argument claimed. In fact,
enim aliquid perfectio alicuius something may be the perfection of a thing
dupliciter: uno modo, ut habentis in two ways: in one way, of a thing that
iam speciem; alio modo, ut ad already possesses its species; and in a
speciem habendam. Sicut second way, in order that the thing may
perfectio domus secundum quod acquire its species. For instance, the
iam habet speciem, est id ad perfection of a house which already has its

quod species domus ordinatur, species is that to which the species of the
scilicet habitatio: non enim house is ordered, namely, habitation. For a
domus fieret nisi propter hoc; house is made for this purpose only, and
unde et in definitione domus so this must be included in the definition of
oportet hoc poni, si debeat a house if the definition is to be perfect.
definitio esse perfecta. Perfectio But the perfection for the sake of the
vero ad speciem domus, est tam species of the house is both that which is
id quod ordinatur ad speciem directed to the setting up of the species,
constituendam, sicut principia such as its substantial principles, and also
substantialia ipsius; quam id that which is ordered to the preservation of
quod ordinatur ad speciei its species, such as the foundations made
conservationem, sicut to hold up the house, and even those
apodiacula, quae fiunt ad things that make the use of the house
sustentationem domus; quam more agreeable, such as the beauty of the
etiam illa quae faciunt ad hoc house. And then, that which is the
quod usus domus sit perfection of the thing, in so far as it
convenientior, sicut pulchritudo already possesses its species, is its end:
domus. Illud igitur quod est as habitation is the end of the house.
perfectio rei secundum quod iam Likewise, the proper operation of anything,
habet speciem, est finis ipsius: ut which is its use as it were, is its end. Now,
habitatio est finis domus. Et the things that are perfections leading up
similiter propria operatio to the species are not the end for the thing;
cuiuslibet rei, quae est quasi on the contrary, the thing is their end,
usus eius, est finis ipsius. Quae matter and form are for the sake of the
autem sunt perfectiones rei ad species. Though form is the end of the
speciem, non sunt finis rei: immo generative act, it is not the end of the thing
res est finis ipsarum; materia that is already generated and possessed of
enim et forma sunt propter its species. Rather, the form is required so
speciem. Licet enim forma sit that the species may be complete.
finis generationis, non tamen est Similarly, factors which preserve a thing in
finis iam generati et speciem its species, such as health and the nutritive
habentis: immo ad hoc quaeritur power, though perfectants of the animal,
forma ut species sit completa. are not the end of the animal; rather, the
Similiter conservantia rem in sua opposite is true. Also, items by which a
specie, ut sanitas et vis nutritiva, thing is improved for the perfection of its
licet perficiant animal, non tamen proper operations, and for the more
sunt finis animalis, sed magis e appropriate attainment of its proper end,
converso. Ea etiam quibus are not the end for the thing; rather, the
aptatur res ad proprias opposite is so. For instance, beauty is for
operationes speciei perficiendas, the man, and strength is for the body, and
et ad debitum finem congruentius so for other similar things which the
consequendum, non sunt finis Philosopher talks about in Ethics I [89:
rei, sed magis e converso: sicut 1099b 2–1099b 28], saying that “they
pulchritudo hominis, et robur contribute to felicity instrumentally.”
corporis, et alia huiusmodi, de
quibus dicit philosophus, in I
Ethicorum, quod organice
deserviunt felicitati.
Delectatio autem est perfectio Pleasure, however, is a perfection of

operationis, non ita quod ad operation, not in such a way that operation
ipsam ordinetur operatio is ordered to it as to its species; rather,
secundum suam speciem, sed pleasure is ordered to other ends, as
ordinatur ad alios fines, sicut eating is ordered specifically to the
comestio ordinatur secundum preservation of the individual. But pleasure
suam speciem ad is like the perfection that is conducive to
conservationem individui: sed est the species of the thing, since because of
similis perfectioni quae ordinatur pleasure we apply ourselves more
ad speciem rei; nam propter carefully and suitably to the operation in
delectationem attentius et which we take pleasure. Hence the
decentius operationi insistimus in Philosopher says in Ethics X [4: 1174b 31]
qua delectamur. Unde in X that “pleasure perfects operation as beauty
Ethicorum philosophus dicit quod perfects youth.” For, of course, beauty is
delectatio perficit operationem for the sake of him in whom youth is found,
sicut decor iuventutem, qui and not the converse.
quidem est propter eum cui inest
iuventus, et non e converso.
Neque autem quod [19] Nor is the fact that men desire
delectationem non propter aliud pleasure for its own sake, and not for the
volunt homines sed propter sake of something else, enough to indicate
seipsam, est sufficiens signum that pleasure is the ultimate end, as the
quod delectatio sit ultimus finis: third argument concluded. For, although
sicut tertia ratio concludebat. pleasure is not the ultimate end, it is, of
Nam delectatio, etsi non sit course, a concomitant of this end, since
ultimus finis, est tamen ultimum pleasure arises out of the attainment of the
finem concomitans: cum ex end.
adeptione finis delectatio
consurgat.
Non autem plures quaerunt [20] Nor do more persons seek the
delectationem quae est in pleasure that is associated with knowing
cognoscendo, quam rather than the knowledge. Rather, there
cognitionem. Sed plures sunt qui are more people who seek sensual
quaerunt delectationes sensibiles pleasures than intellectual knowledge and
quam cognitionem intellectus et its accompanying pleasure, because things
delectationem ipsam that are external stand out as better
consequentem: quia ea quae known, since human knowledge starts
exterius sunt, magis nota from sensible objects.
pluribus existunt, eo quod a
sensibilibus incipit humana
cognitio.
Quod autem quinta ratio [21] Now, what the fifth argument
proponit, voluntatem esse suggests, that the will is higher than the
altiorem intellectu, quasi eius intellect, in the sense of moving it, is
motivam, falsum esse clearly false. For, primarily Ad directly, the
manifestum est. Nam primo et intellect moves the will; indeed, the will, as
per se intellectus movet such, is moved by its object which is the
voluntatem: voluntas enim, known good. But the will moves the
inquantum huiusmodi, movetur a intellect rather accidentally, that is, in so far
suo obiecto, quod est bonum as the act of understanding is itself
apprehensum. Voluntas autem apprehended as good, and so is desired
movet intellectum quasi per by the will, with the result that the intellect
accidens, inquantum scilicet actually understands. Even in this act, the
intelligere ipsum apprehenditur ut intellect precedes the will, for the will would
bonum, et sic desideratur a never desire the act of understanding
voluntate, ex quo sequitur quod unless, first of all, the intellect were to
intellectus actu intelligit. Et in hoc apprehend the act of understanding as a
ipso intellectus voluntatem good.—And again, the will moves the
praecedit: nunquam enim intellect actually to perform its operation, in
voluntas desideraret intelligere the way that an agent is said to move;
nisi prius intellectus ipsum while the intellect moves the will in the way
intelligere apprehenderet ut that an end moves something, since the
bonum. Et iterum, voluntas good that is understood is the end for the
movet intellectum ad operandum will. Now, the agent comes later, in the
in actu per modum quo agens process of moving, than does the end,
movere dicitur; intellectus autem since the agent does not move except for
voluntatem per modum quo finis the sake of the end. Hence, it is evident
movet, nam bonum intellectum that the intellect is, without qualification,
est finis voluntatis; agens autem higher than the will. On the other hand, the
est posterior in movendo quam will is higher than the intellect, accidentally
finis, nam agens non movet nisi and in a qualified sense.
propter finem. Unde apparet
intellectum simpliciter esse
altiorem voluntate: voluntatem
vero intellectu per accidens et
secundum quid.
Caput 27 Chapter 27
Quod felicitas humana non THAT HUMAN FELICITY DOES NOT
consistit in delectationibus CONSIST IN PLEASURES OF THE
carnalibus FLESH
Ex praemissis autem apparet quod [1] Now, it is clear from what we have
impossibile est felicitatem said that it is impossible for human
humanam consistere in felicity to consist in bodily pleasures, the
delectationibus corporalibus, chief of which are those of food and sex.
quarum praecipuae sunt in cibis et
venereis.
Ostensum est enim quod [2] In fact, we have shown that in the
secundum naturae ordinem order of nature pleasure depends on
delectatio est propter operationem, operation, and not the converse. So, if
et non e converso. Si igitur operations are not the ultimate end, the
operationes non fuerint ultimus pleasures that result from them are not
finis, delectationes consequentes the ultimate end, either; nor are they
eas neque sunt ultimus finis, concomitant with the ultimate end. It
neque concomitantes ultimum stands to reason that the operations
finem. Constat autem quod which accompany the abovementioned
operationes quas consequuntur pleasures are not the ultimate end, for
praedictae delectationes, non sunt they are ordered to certain ends that are
ultimus finis: ordinantur enim ad quite obvious: eating, for instance, to the
aliquos fines manifestos; sicut preservation of the body, and sexual
comestio ad conservationem intercourse to the generation of offspring.
corporis, coitus autem ad Therefore, the aforementioned Pleasures
generationem prolis. Delectationes are not the ultimate end, nor are they
igitur praemissae non sunt ultimus concomitants of the ultimate end. So,
finis, neque ultimum finem felicity is not to be located in these
concomitantes. Non est igitur in his pleasures.
ponenda felicitas.
Adhuc. Voluntas est superior quam [3] Again, the will is higher than sense

appetitus sensitivus: movet enim appetite, for it moves itself, as we said
ipsum, sicut superius dictum est. In above. Now, we have already shown that
actu autem voluntatis non consistit felicity does not lie in an act of the will.
felicitas, sicut iam supra ostensum Still less will it consist in the
est. Multo igitur minus in aforementioned pleasures which are
delectationibus praedictis, quae located in the sense appetite.
sunt in appetitu sensitivo.
Amplius. Felicitas est quoddam [4] Besides, felicity is a certain kind of
bonum hominis proprium: non good, appropriate to man. Indeed, brute
enim bruta possunt dici felicia, nisi animals cannot be deemed happy,
abusive. Delectationes autem unless we stretch the meaning of the
praemissae sunt communes term. But these pleasures that we are
hominibus et brutis. Non est igitur talking about are common to men and
in eis ponenda felicitas. brutes. So, felicity should not be
attributed to them.
Item. Ultimus finis est nobilissimum [5] Moreover, the ultimate end is the

eorum quae ad rem pertinent: noblest appurtenance of a thing; in fact,
habet enim rationem optimi. Hae the term means the best. But these
autem delectationes non pleasures are not agreeable to man by
conveniunt homini secundum id virtue of what is noblest in him, namely,
quod est nobilissimum in ipso, his understanding, but by virtue of his
quod est intellectus, sed sense capacity. So, felicity should not be
secundum sensum. Non est igitur located in pleasures of this kind.
in talibus delectationibus ponenda
felicitas.
Praeterea. Summa perfectio [6] Furthermore, the highest perfection of

hominis esse non potest in hoc man cannot lie in a union with things
quod coniungitur rebus se inferior to himself, but, rather, in a union
inferioribus, sed per hoc quod with some reality of a higher character,
coniungitur alicui rei altiori: finis for the end is better than that which is for
enim est melior eo quod est ad the sake of the end. Now, the
finem. Delectationes autem aforementioned pleasures consist in this
praemissae consistunt in hoc quod fact: that man is, through his senses,
homo secundum sensum united with some things that are his
coniungitur aliquibus se inferiors, that is, with certain. sensible
inferioribus, scilicet sensibilibus objects. So, felicity is not to be located in
quibusdam. Non est igitur in pleasures of this sort.
talibus delectationibus felicitas
ponenda.
Amplius. Quod non est bonum nisi [7] Again, something which is not good

secundum quod est moderatum, unless it be moderated is not good of
non est secundum se bonum, sed itself; rather, it receives goodness from
accipit bonitatem a moderante. the source of the moderation. Now, the
Usus autem praedictarum enjoyment of the aforementioned
delectationum non est bonus pleasures is not good for man unless it
homini nisi sit moderatus: aliter be moderated; otherwise, these
enim hae delectationes se invicem pleasures will interfere with each other.
impedirent. Non sunt igitur hae So, these pleasures are not of
delectationes secundum se bonum themselves the good for man. But that
hominis. Quod autem est summum which is the highest good is good of
bonum, est per se bonum: quia itself, because what is good of itself is
quod per se bonum est, melius est better than what depends on something
eo quod per aliud. Non sunt igitur else. Therefore, such pleasures are not
tales delectationes summum the highest good for man, that is, felicity.
hominis bonum, quod est felicitas.
Item. In omnibus quae per se [8] Besides, in the case of all things that

dicuntur, sequitur magis ad magis, are predicated per se, an absolute
si simpliciter sequatur ad variation is directly accompanied by a
simpliciter: sicut, si calidum similar variation in the degree of
calefacit, magis calidum magis intensification. Thus, if a hot thing heats,
calefacit, et maxime calidum then a hotter thing heats more, and the
maxime calefaciet. Si igitur hottest thing will heat the most. So, if the
delectationes praemissae essent aforementioned pleasures were goods of
secundum se bonae, oporteret themselves, the maximum enjoyment of
quod maxime uti eis esset them should be the best. But this is
optimum. Hoc autem patet esse clearly false, for excessive enjoyment of
falsum: nam nimius usus earum them is considered vicious, and is also,
reputatur in vitium, et est etiam harmful to the body, and it prevents the
corporis noxius, et similium enjoyment of similar pleasures.
delectationum impeditivus. Non Therefore, they are not of themselves the
sunt igitur per se bonum hominis. good for man. So, human felicity does
In eis igitur non consistit humana not consist in them.
felicitas.
Praeterea. Actus virtutum sunt [9] Moreover, virtuous acts are

laudabiles ex hoc quod ad praiseworthy because they are ordered

felicitatem ordinantur. Si igitur in to felicity. So, if human felicity consisted
delectationibus praemissis in the aforementioned pleasures, a
consisteret humana felicitas, actus virtuous act would be more praiseworthy
virtutis magis esset laudabilis in when it involved the enjoyment of these
accedendo ad has delectationes pleasures than when it required
quam in abstinendo ab eis. Hoc abstention from them. However, it is clear
autem patet esse falsum: nam that this is false, for the act of
actus temperantiae maxime temperance is given most praise when it
laudatur in abstinendo a involves abstaining from pleasures; as a
delectationibus; unde ab hoc result, it gets its name from this fact.
denominatur. Non est igitur in Therefore, man’s felicity does not lie in
delectationibus praemissis hominis the aforesaid pleasures.
felicitas.
Amplius. Finis ultimus cuiuslibet rei [10] Furthermore, the ultimate end of

Deus est, ut ex praemissis patet. everything is God, as is clear from what
Illud igitur oportet ultimum finem has been indicated earlier. So, we should
hominis poni, per quod maxime consider the ultimate end of man to be
appropinquat ad Deum. Per that whereby be most closely
praedictas autem delectationes approaches God. But, through the
homo impeditur a maxima aforesaid pleasures, man is kept away
appropinquatione ad Deum, quae from a close approach to God, for this
fit per contemplationem, quam approach is effected through
maxime praedictae delectationes contemplation, and the aforementioned
impediunt, utpote ad sensibilia pleasures are the chief impediment to
maxime hominem immergentes, et contemplation, since they plunge man
per consequens ab intelligibilibus very deep into sensible things,
retrahentes. Non est igitur in consequently distracting him from
delectationibus corporalibus intelligible objects. Therefore, human
felicitas humana ponenda. felicity must not be located in bodily
pleasures.
Per hoc autem excluditur error [11] Through this conclusion we are
Epicureorum in his voluptatibus refuting the error of the Epicureans, who
felicitatem hominis ponentium: ex placed man’s felicity in these
quorum persona dicit Salomon, enjoyments. Acting as their spokesman,
Eccle. 517: hoc itaque visum est Solomon says in Ecclesiastes (5:17):
mihi bonum, ut comedat quis et “This therefore seemed good to me, that
bibat et fruatur laetitia ex labore a man should eat and drink and enjoy the
suo et haec est pars illius. Et Sap. fruit of his labor, and this is his portion”;
29: ubique relinquamus signa and again in Wisdom (2:9): “let us
laetitiae: quoniam haec est pars everywhere leave tokens of joy, for this is
nostra, et haec est sors nostra. our portion, and this our lot.”
Excluditur etiam error [12] Also refuted is the error of the
Cerinthianorum qui in ultima Cerinthians, for they told a fabulous story
felicitate, post resurrectionem, about ultimate felicity, that after the
mille annos in regno Christi resurrection there would be, in the reign
secundum carnales ventris of Christ, a thousand years of carnal

voluptates fabulantur futuros: unde pleasures of the belly. Hence, they were
et Chiliastae (quasi millenarii), sunt also called Chiliasts; that is, Millenarians.
appellati.
Excluduntur etiam Iudaeorum et [13] Refuted, too, are the fables of the
Saracenorum fabulae, quae Jews and the Saracens, who identified
retributiones iustorum in praedictis the rewards for just men with these
voluptatibus ponunt: felicitas enim pleasures, for felicity is the reward for
est virtutis praemium. virtue.
Caput 28 Chapter 28
Quod felicitas non consistit in THAT FELICITY DOES NOT CONSIST
honoribus IN HONORS
Ex praedictis etiam patet quod nec [1] It is also clear from the foregoing that
in honoribus est summum bonum the highest good for man, that is felicity,
hominis, quod est felicitas. does not lie in honors.
Finis enim ultimus hominis, et sua [2] Indeed, the ultimate end of man, and

felicitas, est eius perfectissima his felicity, is his most perfect operation,
operatio, ut ex superioribus patet. as is evident in what has preceded. Now,
Honor autem hominis non consistit a man’s honor is not identified with his
in sua operatione, sed alterius ad operation, but with something done by
ipsum, qui ei reverentiam exhibet. another person who shows respect for
Non est igitur felicitas hominis in him. Therefore, the felicity of man should
honoribus ponenda. not be identified with honors.
Adhuc. Quod est propter alterum [3] Again, that which is good and
bonum et desiderabile, non est desirable on account of something else
ultimus finis. Tale autem est honor: is not the ultimate end. But honor is of
non enim aliquis recte honoratur this sort. A person is not rightly honored
nisi propter aliquod aliud bonum in unless it be because of some other good
eo existens. Et propter hoc that is present in him. And this is why
homines honorari quaerunt, quasi men seek to be honored, desiring, as it
boni alicuius quod in eis est were, to have a witness to some good
testimonium habere volentes: unde feature present in them. Hence, men
et magis gaudent homines a take greater joy in being honored by
magnis et sapientibus honorari. important and wise people. So, man’s
Non est igitur in honoribus felicitas felicity is not to be identified with honors.
hominis ponenda.
Amplius. Ad felicitatem per virtutem [4] Besides, the attainment of felicity is

pervenitur. Operationes autem accomplished through virtue. Now,
virtutum sunt voluntariae: aliter virtuous operations are voluntary;
enim non essent laudabiles. otherwise, they would not merit praise.
Oportet igitur felicitatem esse So, felicity ought to be some good which
aliquod bonum ad quod homo sua man may attain by his own will. But the
voluntate perveniat. Hoc autem gaining of honor is not within the power
quod honorem assequatur, non est of any man; rather, it is in the power of
in potestate hominis, sed magis in the one who gives the honor. Therefore,
potestate honorantis. Non est igitur human felicity is not to be identified with
in honoribus felicitas humana honors.
ponenda.
Item. Esse dignum honore non [5] Moreover, to be worthy of honor can

potest nisi bonis inesse. Honorari only be an attribute of good men. But it
autem possunt etiam mali. Melius is possible for even evil men to be
est igitur fieri honore dignum quam honored. So, it is better to become
honorari. Non est igitur honor worthy of honor than to be honored.
summum hominis bonum. Therefore, honor is not the highest good
for man.
Praeterea. Summum bonum est [6] Furthermore, the highest good is the

perfectum bonum. Perfectum perfect good. But the perfect good is
autem bonum non compatitur completely exclusive of evil. Now, that in
aliquod malum. Cui autem non which there can be no evil cannot itself
inest aliquod malum, impossibile be evil. Therefore, that which is in
est esse malum. Impossibile est possession of the highest good cannot
igitur esse malum cui adest be evil. But it is possible for a bad man
summum bonum. Potest autem to attain honor. So, honor is not the
aliquis malus honorem consequi. highest good for man.
Non est igitur honor summum
hominis bonum.
Caput 29 Chapter 29
Quod felicitas hominis non THAT MAN’S FELICITY DOES NOT
consistit in gloria CONSIST IN GLORY
Ex quo etiam apparet quod nec in [1] From this it is also apparent that the
gloria, quae est in celebritate highest good for man does not consist in
famae, consistit summum hominis glory, which means a widely recognized
bonum. reputation.
Est enim gloria, secundum Tullium [2] Now, according to Tully, glory is

frequens de aliquo fama cum “widespread repute accompanied by
laude: et secundum Ambrosium, praise of a person.” And according to
clara cum laude notitia. Ad hoc Ambrose, it is “an illustrious reputation
autem homines volunt innotescere accompanied by praise.” Now, men desire
cum laude et claritate quadam, ut to become known in connection with
ab eis quibus innotescunt some sort of praise and renown, for the
honorentur. Est igitur gloria purpose of being honored by those who
propter honorem quaesita. Si know them. So, glory is sought for the
igitur honor non est summum sake of honor. Hence, if honor is not the
bonum, multo minus gloria. highest good, much less is glory.
Adhuc. Laudabilia bona sunt [3] Again, praiseworthy goods are those
secundum quae aliquis ostenditur whereby a person is shown to be well
ordinatus ad finem. Qui autem ordered to his end. Now, he who is well
ordinatur ad finem, nondum est ordered to his end has not yet achieved
ultimum finem assecutus. Laus the ultimate end. So, praise is not given to
igitur non attribuitur ei qui iam est him who has already attained the ultimate
ultimum finem assecutus: sed end, but honor, as the Philosopher says in
magis honor, ut philosophus dicit, Ethics I [12: 1101b 24]. Therefore, glory
in I Ethicorum. Non potest igitur cannot be the highest good, because it
gloria esse summum bonum: cum consists principally in praise.
principaliter in laude consistat.
Amplius. Cognoscere nobilius est [4] Besides, to know is more noble than to

quam cognosci: non enim be known; only the more noble things
cognoscunt nisi quae sunt know, but the lowest things are known.
nobiliora in rebus; cognoscuntur So, the highest good for man cannot be
autem infima. Non potest igitur glory, for it consists in the fact that a
summum hominis bonum esse person is well known.
gloria, quae consistit in hoc quod
aliquis cognoscatur.
Item. Cognosci aliquis non [5] Moreover, a person desires to be

desiderat nisi in bonis: in malis known only for good things; where bad
autem quaerit latere. Cognosci things are concerned, he seeks
igitur bonum est et desiderabile concealment. So, to be known is a good
propter bona quae in aliquo and desirable thing, because of the good
cognoscuntur. Illa igitur sunt things that are known about a person.
meliora. Non est igitur gloria, quae And so, these good things are better than
in hoc consistit quod aliquis being widely known. Therefore, glory is
cognoscatur, summum hominis not the highest good, for it consists in a
bonum. person being widely known.
Praeterea. Summum bonum [6] Furthermore, the highest good should

oportet esse perfectum: cum be perfect, for it should satisfy the
quietet appetitum: cognitio autem appetite. Now, the knowledge associated
famae, in qua gloria humana with fame, in which human glory consists,
consistit, est imperfecta: est enim is imperfect, for it is possessed of the
plurimum incertitudinis et erroris greatest uncertainty and error. Therefore,
habens. Non potest igitur talis such glory cannot be the highest good.
gloria esse summum bonum.
Item. Id quod est summum [7] Again, the highest good for man
hominis bonum, oportet esse should be what is most enduring among
stabilissimum in rebus humanis: human affairs, for an endless duration of
naturaliter enim desideratur the good is naturally desired. Now, glory,
diuturna boni constantia. Gloria in the sense of fame, is the least
autem, quae in fama consistit, est permanent of things; in fact, nothing is

instabilissima: nihil enim est more variable than opinion and human
mutabilius opinione et laude praise. Therefore, such glory is not the
humana. Non est igitur talis gloria highest good for man.
summum hominis bonum.
Caput 30 Chapter 30
Quod felicitas hominis non THAT MAN’S FELICITY DOES NOT
consistit in divitiis CONSIST IN RICHES
Ex hoc autem apparet quod nec [1] From this, moreover, it is also clear
divitiae sunt summum hominis that riches are not the highest good for
bonum. man.
Non enim appetuntur divitiae nisi [2] Indeed, riches are only desired for
propter aliud: per se enim nihil boni the sake of something else; they provide
inferunt, sed solum cum utimur eis, no good of themselves but only when
vel ad corporis sustentationem, vel we use them, either for the maintenance
ad aliquid huiusmodi. Quod autem of the body or some such use. Now, that
est summum bonum, est propter se which is the highest good is desired for
desideratum, et non propter aliud. its own sake and not for the sake of
Non sunt igitur divitiae summum something else. Therefore, riches are
hominis bonum. not the highest good for man.
Adhuc. Eorum possessio vel [3] Again, man’s highest good cannot lie

conservatio non potest esse in the possession or keeping of things
summum hominis bonum quae that chiefly benefit man through being
maxime conferunt homini in hoc spent. Now, riches are chiefly valuable
quod emittuntur. Divitiae autem in because they can be expended, for this
hoc maxime conferunt quod is their use. So, the possession of riches
expenduntur: hoc enim earum usus cannot be the highest good for man.
est. Non potest igitur divitiarum
possessio esse summum hominis
bonum.
Amplius. Actus virtutis laudabilis est [4] Besides, an act of virtue is

secundum quod ad felicitatem praiseworthy in so far as it comes closer
accedit. Magis autem est laudabilis to felicity. Now, acts of liberality and
actus liberalitatis et magnificentiae, magnificence, which have to do with
quae sunt circa pecunias, ex hoc money, are more praiseworthy in a
quod pecuniae emittuntur, quam ex situation in which money is spent than in
hoc quod conservantur: unde et ab one in which it is saved. So, it is from
hoc nomina harum virtutum this fact that the names of these virtues
sumuntur. Non consistit igitur are derived. Therefore, the felicity of
hominis felicitas in possessione man does not consist in the possession
divitiarum. of riches.
Item. Illud in cuius consecutione [5] Moreover, that object in whose
summum hominis bonum est, attainment man’s highest good lies must
oportet esse homine melius. Divitiis be better than man. But man is better
autem homo est melior: cum sint than riches, for they are but things
res quaedam ad usum hominis subordinated to man’s use. Therefore,
ordinatae. Non est igitur in divitiis the highest good for man does not lie in
summum hominis bonum. riches.
Praeterea. Summum hominis [6] Furthermore, man’s highest good is

bonum fortunae non subiacet: nam not subject to fortune, for things subject
fortuita absque studio rationis to fortune come about independently of
eveniunt; oportet autem quod per rational effort. But it must be through
rationem homo proprium finem reason that man will achieve his proper
consequatur. In consecutione end. Of course, fortune occupies an
autem divitiarum maximum locum important place in the attainment of
habet fortuna. Non est igitur in riches, Therefore, human felicity is not
divitiis humana felicitas constituta. founded on riches.
Amplius. Hoc evidens fit per hoc [7] Again, this becomes evident in the
quod divitiae involuntarie fact that riches are lost in an involuntary
amittuntur; et quod malis advenire manner, and also that they may accrue
possunt, quos necesse est summo to evil men who must fail to achieve the
bono carere; et quod instabiles highest good, and also that riches are
sunt; et alia huiusmodi, quae ex unstable—and for other reasons of this
superioribus rationibus colligi kind which may be gathered from the
possunt. preceding arguments.
Caput 31 Chapter 31
potentia mundana IN WORLDLY POWER
Similiter autem nec mundana [1] Similarly, neither can worldly power
potentia summum hominis bonum be man’s highest good, since in its
esse potest: cum etiam in ea attainment, also, fortune can play a
obtinenda plurimum fortuna possit; most important part. It is also unstable;
et instabilis sit; et non subiaceat nor is it subject to man’s will; oftentimes
hominis voluntati; et plerumque it comes to bad men—and these
malis adveniat; quae summo bono characteristics are incompatible with the
repugnant, ut ex praemissis patet. highest good, as was evident in the
foregoing arguments.
Item. Homo maxime dicitur bonus [2] Again, man is deemed good chiefly
secundum quod ad summum in terms of his attainment of the highest
bonum attingit. Secundum autem good. Now, he is not called good, or
quod habet potentiam, non dicitur bad, simply because he has power, for
neque bonus neque malus: non not everyone who can do good things is
enim est bonus omnis qui potest a good man, nor is a person bad
bona facere; neque malus est because he is able to do evil things.
aliquis ex hoc quod potest mala Therefore, the highest good does not
facere. Summum igitur bonum non consist in the fact of being powerful.
consistit in hoc quod est esse
potentem.
Adhuc. Omnis potentia ad alterum [3] Besides, all power is relative to some

est. Summum autem bonum non other thing. But the highest good is not
est ad alterum. Non est igitur relative to something else. Therefore,
potentia summum hominis bonum. power is not man’s highest good.
Amplius. Illud quo quis potest et [4] Moreover, a thing that one can use
bene et male uti, non potest esse both for good and for evil cannot be
summum hominis bonum: melius man’s highest good, for that is better
enim est quo nullus male uti potest. which no one can use in a bad way.
Potentia autem aliquis bene et male Now, one can use power well or badly,
uti potest: nam potestates “for rational powers are capable of
rationales ad opposita sunt. Non est contrary effects.” Therefore, man’s
igitur potestas humana summum highest good does not consist in human
hominis bonum. power.
Praeterea. Si aliqua potestas est [5] Furthermore, if any sort of power is
summum bonum, oportet illam esse the highest good, it ought to be the most
perfectissimam. Potestas autem perfect. But human power is most
humana est imperfectissima: imperfect, since it is rooted in the wills
radicatur enim in hominum and the opinions of men, in which there
voluntatibus et opinionibus, in is the greatest inconstancy. And the
quibus est maxima inconstantia. Et more important the power is considered
quanto maior reputatur potestas, to be, the more does it depend on large
tanto a pluribus dependet: quod numbers of people, which fact also
etiam ad eius debilitatem pertinet; contributes to its frailty, since what
cum quod a multis dependet, depends on many can be destroyed in
destrui multipliciter possit. Non est many ways. Therefore, man’s highest
igitur in potestate mundana good does not lie in worldly power.
summum hominis bonum.
Felicitas igitur hominis in nullo [6] Man’s felicity, then, consists in no
exteriori bono consistit: cum omnia exterior good, since all exterior goods,
exteriora bona, quae dicuntur bona the ones that are called “goods of
fortunae, sub praedictis fortune,” are contained under the
contineantur. preceding headings.
Caput 32 Chapter 32
bonis corporis IN GOODS OF THE BODY
Quod autem nec in corporis bonis, [1] Moreover, that man’s highest good
cuiusmodi sunt sanitas, pulchritudo does not lie in goods of the body, such
et robur, sit hominis summum as health, beauty, and strength, is
bonum, per similia manifeste clearly evident from similar
apparet. Haec enim etiam bonis et considerations. For these things are
malis communia sunt; et instabilia possessed in common by both good
sunt; et voluntati non subiacent. and bad men; they are also unstable;
moreover, they are not subject to the
will.
Praeterea. Anima est melior [2] Again, the soul is better than the
corpore, quod non vivit, nec body, which is not alive, and which
praedicta bona habet, nisi per does not possess the aforementioned
animam. Bonum igitur animae, sicut goods except by means of the soul. So,
intelligere et alia huiusmodi, est a good of the soul, like understanding
melius quam bonum corporis. Non and that sort of thing, is better than a
est igitur corporis bonum summum good of the body. Therefore, the good
hominis bonum. of the body is not man’s highest good.
Adhuc. Haec bona sunt homini et [3] Besides, these goods are common
aliis animalibus communia. Felicitas to men and other animals. But felicity is
autem est proprium hominis bonum. the proper good of man. Therefore,
Non est igitur in praemissis bonis man’s felicity does not lie in the
hominis felicitas. aforesaid goods.
Amplius. Multa animalia, quantum [4] Moreover, many animals are better
ad bona corporis, sunt homine endowed than men, as far as the goods
potiora: quaedam enim sunt of the body go; for some are faster than
velociora homine, quaedam man, some are stronger, and so on. If,
robustiora, et sic de aliis. Si igitur in then, man’s highest good lay in these
his esset summum hominis bonum, things, man would not be the most
non esset homo optimum excellent of animals; which is obviously
animalium: quod patet esse falsum. false. Therefore, human felicity does
Non est igitur felicitas humana in not consist in goods of the body.
bonis corporis consistens.
Caput 33 Chapter 33
Quod felicitas humana non THAT HUMAN FELICITY DOES NOT
consistit in sensu LIE IN THE SENSES
Per eadem etiam apparet quod [1] In the same way, it is also apparent
neque summum hominis bonum that man’s highest good does not lie in
est in bonis sensitivae partis. Nam the goods of his sensitive part. For these
haec etiam bona sunt homini et goods, too, are common to men and
aliis animalibus communia. other animals.
Item. Intellectus est melior sensu. [2] Again, intellect is better than sense.
Bonum igitur intellectus est melius So, the good of the intellect is better than

quam bonum sensus. Non igitur the good of the senses. Therefore, man’s
summum hominis bonum in sensu highest good does not lie in sense.
consistit.
Adhuc. Maximae delectationes [3] Besides, the greatest pleasures in the

secundum sensum sunt in cibis et sense order have to do with food and
venereis, in quibus oporteret esse sexual activities; and so, the highest
summum bonum, si in sensu good ought to lie in these areas, if it were
esset. Non est autem in his. Non in sense. But it is not found in these
est igitur in sensu summum things. Therefore, man’s highest good
hominis bonum. does not lie in the senses.
Amplius. Sensus diliguntur propter [4] Moreover, the senses are treasured
utilitatem, et propter cognitionem. because of their usefulness, and also
Tota autem utilitas sensuum ad because of their knowledge. Now, the
corporis bona refertur. Cognitio entire utility of the senses has reference
autem sensus ad intellectivam to the goods of the body. But sense
ordinatur: unde animalia intellectu cognition is subordinated to intellectual
carentia non delectantur in cognition; thus, animals devoid of
sentiendo nisi per comparationem understanding take no pleasure in
ad utilitatem ad corpus sensing, except in regard to some benefit
pertinentem, secundum quod per pertaining to the body, according as they
sensus cognitionem consequuntur obtain food or sexual satisfaction through
cibos vel venerea. Non est igitur in sense knowledge. Therefore, man’s
parte sensitiva summum hominis highest good, his felicity, does not lie in
bonum, quod est felicitas. his sensitive part.
Caput 34 Chapter 34
Quod ultima hominis felicitas THAT MAN’S ULTIMATE FELICITY
non consistit in actibus virtutum DOES NOT LIE IN ACTS OF THE
moralium MORAL VIRTUES
Apparet autem quod nec in [1] It is clear, too, that the ultimate felicity

operationibus moralibus consistit of man does not consist in moral actions.
ultima felicitas hominis.
Felicitas enim humana non est ad [2] In fact, human felicity is incapable of
ulteriorem finem ordinabilis, si sit being ordered to a further end, if it is
ultima. Omnes autem operationes ultimate. But all moral operations can be
morales sunt ordinabiles ad aliquid ordered to something else. This is
aliud. Quod patet ex his quae inter evident from the most important
eas sunt praecipuae. Operationes instances of these actions. The
enim fortitudinis quae sunt in rebus operations of fortitude, which are
bellicis, ordinantur ad victoriam et concerned with warlike activities, are
ad pacem: stultum enim esset ordered to victory and to peace. Indeed,
propter se tantum bellare. Similiter it would be foolish to make war merely
operationes iustitiae ordinantur ad for its own sake. Likewise, the operations

pacem inter homines servandam, of justice are ordered to the preservation
per hoc quod unusquisque quiete of peace among men, by means of each
quod suum est possidet. Et man having his own possessions
similiter patet in omnibus aliis. Non undisturbed. And the same thing is
est igitur in operationibus evident for all the other virtues.
moralibus ultima hominis felicitas. Therefore, man’s ultimate felicity does
not lie in moral operations.
Adhuc. Virtutes morales ad hoc [3] Again, the moral virtues have this
sunt ut per eas conservetur purpose: through them the mean is
medium in passionibus intrinsecis preserved in the internal passions and in
et exterioribus rebus. Non est regard to external things. Now, it is not
autem possibile quod modificatio possible for such a measuring of
passionum vel rerum exteriorum sit passions, or of external things, to be the
ultimus finis humanae vitae: cum ultimate end of human life, since these
ipsae passiones et exteriores res passions and exterior things are capable
sint ad aliud ordinabiles. Non est of being ordered to something else.
igitur possibile quod in actibus Therefore, it is not possible for man’s
virtutum moralium sit ultima ultimate felicity to lie in acts of the moral
hominis felicitas. virtues.
Amplius. Cum homo sit homo ex [4] Besides, since man is man by virtue
eo quod est rationem habens, of his possession of reason, his proper
oportet quod proprium eius bonum, good which is felicity should be in accord
quod est felicitas, sit secundum id with what is appropriate to reason. Now,
quod est proprium rationi. Magis that is more appropriate to reason which
autem est proprium rationis quod reason has within itself than which it
ipsa in se habet, quam quod in alio produces in another thing. So, since the
facit. Cum igitur bonum moralis good of moral virtue is something
virtutis sit quoddam a ratione in produced by reason in things other than
rebus aliis a se institutum, non itself, it could not be that which is best for
poterit esse optimum hominis, man; namely, felicity. Rather would
quod est felicitas: sed magis felicity seem to be a good situated in
bonum quod est in ipsa ratione reason itself.
situm.
Item. Ostensum est supra quod [5] Moreover, it was shown above that
finis omnium rerum ultimus est the ultimate end of all things is to
assimilari ad Deum. Illud igitur become like unto God. So, that whereby
secundum quod homo maxime man is made most like God will be his
assimilatur Deo, erit eius felicitas. felicity. Now, this is not a function of
Hoc autem non est secundum moral acts, since such acts cannot be
actus morales: cum tales actus attributed to God, except metaphorically.
Deo attribui non possint nisi Indeed, it does not befit God to have
metaphorice; non enim Deo passions, or the like, with which moral
convenit habere passiones, vel acts are concerned. Therefore, man’s
aliqua huiusmodi, circa quae sunt ultimate felicity, that is, his ultimate end,
actus morales. Non est igitur ultima does not consist in moral actions.
felicitas hominis, quae est ultimus
eius finis, consistens in actibus
moralibus.
Praeterea. Felicitas est proprium [6] Furthermore, felicity is the proper
hominis bonum. Illud igitur quod good for man. So, that which is most
est maxime proprium hominis inter proper among all human goods, for man
omnia bona humana respectu in contrast to the other animals, is the
aliorum animalium, est in quo good in which his ultimate felicity is to be
quaerenda est eius ultima felicitas. sought. Now, an act of moral virtue is not
Huiusmodi autem non est virtutum of this sort, for some animals share
moralium actus: nam aliqua somewhat, either in liberality or in
animalia aliquid participant vel fortitude, but an animal does not
liberalitatis vel fortitudinis; participate at all in intellectual action.
intellectualis autem actionis nullum Therefore, man’s ultimate felicity does
animal aliquid participat. Non est not lie in moral acts.
igitur ultima hominis felicitas in
actibus moralibus.
Caput 35 Chapter 35
Quod ultima felicitas non sit in THAT ULTIMATE FELICITY DOES NOT
actu prudentiae LIE IN THE ACT OF PRUDENCE
Ex hoc etiam apparet quod neque [1] From this it is also apparent that
in actu prudentiae est ultima man’s ultimate felicity does not lie in an
hominis felicitas. act of prudence.
Actus enim prudentiae est solum [2] For the act of prudence is only
circa ea quae sunt moralium concerned with things that pertain to the
virtutum. Non est autem in actibus moral virtues. Now, man’s ultimate felicity
moralium virtutum ultima hominis does not lie in acts of the moral virtues,
felicitas. Neque igitur in actu nor, then, in the act of prudence.
prudentiae.
Adhuc. Ultima felicitas hominis est [3] Again, man’s ultimate felicity consists
in optima hominis operatione. in the best operation of man. Now, the
Optima autem hominis operatio, best operation of man, according to what
secundum id quod est proprium is proper to man, lies in a relationship to
hominis, est in comparatione ad the most perfect object. But the operation
perfectissima obiecta. Operatio of prudence is not concerned with the
autem prudentiae non est circa most perfect object of understanding or
obiecta perfectissima intellectus reason; indeed, it does not deal with
vel rationis: non enim est circa necessary objects, but with contingent
necessaria, sed circa contingentia problems of action. Therefore, man’s
operabilia. Non est igitur in eius ultimate felicity does not lie in this
operatione ultima hominis felicitas. operation.
Amplius. Quod ordinatur ad [4] Besides, that which is ordered to

alterum sicut ad finem, non est another thing as an end is not the
ultima hominis felicitas. Operatio ultimate felicity for man. But the
autem prudentiae ordinatur ad operation ,of prudence is ordered to
alterum sicut ad finem: tum quia something else as an end: both because
omnis practica cognitio, sub qua all practical knowledge, in which category
continetur prudentia, ordinatur ad prudence is included, is ordered to
operationem; tum etiam quia action, and because prudence makes a
prudentia facit hominem bene se man well disposed in regard to things
habere in his quae sunt ad finem that are to be chosen for the sake of the
eligenda, sicut patet per end, as is clear from Aristotle, in Ethics
Aristotelem, in VI Ethicorum. Non VI [13: 1145a 6]. Therefore, man’s
est igitur in operatione prudentiae ultimate felicity does not lie in the
ultima hominis felicitas. operation of prudence.
Item. Animalia irrationabilia non [5] Moreover, irrational animals do not
participant aliquid felicitatis: sicut participate in felicity, as Aristotle proves
probat Aristoteles in I Ethicor. in Ethics I [9: 1099b 33]. However, some
Participant autem quaedam eorum of them do participate somewhat in
aliquid prudentiae: ut patet per prudence, as appears in the same writer,
eundem in I metaphysicae. Igitur in Metaphysics I [1: 980a 30]. Therefore,
felicitas non consistit in operatione felicity does not consist in the operation
prudentiae. of prudence.
Chapter 36
Caput 36
THAT FELICITY DOES NOT
Quod felicitas non consistit in
CONSIST IN THE OPERATION OF
operatione artis
ART
Patet etiam quod neque in [1] It is also clear that it does not lie in

operatione artis. the operation of art.
Quia etiam artis cognitio practica est. [2] For the knowledge that pertains to

Et ita ad finem ordinatur, et ipsa non art is also practical knowledge. And so,
est ultimus finis. it is ordered to an end, and is not itself
the ultimate end.
Praeterea. Operationum artis fines [3] Again, the ends of art operations
sunt artificiata. Quae non possunt are artifacts. These cannot be the
esse ultimus finis humanae vitae: ultimate end of human life, for we
cum magis nos sumus fines omnium ourselves are, rather, the ends for all
artificialium; omnia enim propter artificial things. Indeed, they are all
hominis usum fiunt. Non potest igitur made for man’s use. Therefore,
in operatione artis esse ultima ultimate felicity cannot lie in the
felicitas. operation of art.
Chapter 37
Caput 37
THAT THE ULTIMATE FELICITY OF
Quod ultima felicitas hominis
MAN CONSISTS IN THE
consistit in contemplatione Dei
CONTEMPLATION OF GOD
Si igitur ultima felicitas hominis non [1] So, if the ultimate felicity of man
consistit in exterioribus, quae does not consist in external things
dicuntur bona fortunae; neque in which are called the goods of fortune,
bonis corporis; neque in bonis nor in the goods of the body, nor in the
animae quantum ad sensitivam goods of the soul according to its
partem; neque quantum ad sensitive part, nor as regards the
intellectivam secundum actum intellective part according to the activity
moralium virtutum; neque of the moral virtues, nor according to
secundum intellectuales quae ad the intellectual virtues that are
actionem pertinent, scilicet artem et concerned with action, that is, art and
prudentiam: relinquitur quod ultima prudence—we are left with the
hominis felicitas sit in conclusion that the ultimate felicity of
contemplatione veritatis. man lies in the contemplation of truth.
Haec enim sola operatio hominis [2] Indeed, this is the only operation of
est sibi propria; et in ea nullo modo man which is proper to him, and in it he
aliquod aliorum animalium shares nothing in common with the
communicat. other animals.
Haec etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur [3] So, too, this is ordered to nothing
sicut ad finem: cum contemplatio else as an end, for the contemplation of
veritatis propter seipsam quaeratur. truth is sought for its own sake.
Per hanc etiam operationem homo [4] Also, through this operation man is
suis superioribus coniungitur per united by way of likeness with beings
similitudinem: quia haec tantum de superior to him, since this alone of
operationibus humanis in Deo et in human operations is found also in God
substantiis separatis est. and in separate substances.
Hac etiam operatione ad illa [5] Indeed, in this operation he gets in
superiora contingit, cognoscendo touch with these higher beings by
ipsa quocumque modo. knowing them in some way.
Ad hanc etiam operationem sibi [6] Also, for this operation man is rather

homo magis est sufficiens: utpote sufficient unto himself, in the sense that
ad eam in parum auxilio exteriorum for it he needs little help from external
rerum egens. things.
Ad hanc etiam omnes aliae [7] In fact, all other human operations
humanae operationes ordinari seem to be ordered to this one, as to an
videntur sicut ad finem. Ad end. For, there is needed for the
perfectionem enim contemplationis perfection of contemplation a

requiritur incolumitas corporis, ad soundness of body, to which all the
quam ordinantur artificialia omnia products of art that are necessary for
quae sunt necessaria ad vitam. life are directed. Also required are
Requiritur etiam quies a freedom from the disturbances of the
perturbationibus passionum, ad passions—this is achieved through the
quam pervenitur per virtutes moral virtues and prudence—and
morales et per prudentiam; et quies freedom from external disorders, to
ab exterioribus perturbationibus, ad which the whole program of government
quam ordinatur totum regimen vitae in civil life is directed. And so, if they are
civilis. Ut sic, si recte considerentur, rightly considered, all human functions
omnia humana officia servire may be seen to subserve the
videantur contemplantibus contemplation of truth.
veritatem.
Non est autem possibile quod [8] However, it is not possible for man’s

ultima hominis felicitas consistat in ultimate felicity to consist in the
contemplatione quae est secundum contemplation which depends on the
intellectum principiorum, quae est understanding of principles, for that is
imperfectissima, sicut maxime very imperfect, being most universal,
universalis, rerum cognitionem in including the potential cognition of
potentia continens; et est things. Also, it is the beginning, not the
principium, non finis humani studii, end, of human enquiry, coming to us
a natura nobis proveniens, non from nature and not because of our
secundum studium veritatis. Neque search for truth. Nor, indeed, does it lie
etiam secundum scientias quae in the area of the sciences which deal
sunt de rebus infimis: cum oporteat with lower things, because felicity
felicitatem esse in operatione should lie in the working of the intellect
intellectus per comparationem ad in relation to the noblest objects of
nobilissima intelligibilia. Relinquitur understanding. So, the conclusion
igitur quod in contemplatione remains that man’s ultimate felicity
sapientiae ultima hominis felicitas consists in the contemplation of
consistat, secundum divinorum wisdom, based on the considering of
considerationem. divine matters.
Ex quo etiam patet inductionis via [9] From this, that is also clear by way of

quod supra rationibus est probatum, induction, which was proved above by
quod ultima felicitas hominis non rational arguments, namely, that man’s
consistit nisi in contemplatione Dei. ultimate felicity consists only in the
contemplation of God.
Chapter 38
Caput 38
THAT HUMAN FELICITY DOES NOT
Quod felicitas humana non
CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF
consistit in cognitione Dei quae
GOD WHICH IS GENERALLY
communiter habetur a pluribus
POSSESSED BY MOST MEN
Inquirendum autem relinquitur in [1] It remains to investigate the kind of
quali Dei cognitione ultima felicitas knowledge in which the ultimate felicity
substantiae intellectualis consistit. of an intellectual substance consists. For
Est enim quaedam communis et there is a common and confused
confusa Dei cognitio, quae quasi knowledge of God which is found in
omnibus hominibus adest: sive hoc practically all men; this is due either to
sit per hoc quod Deum esse sit per the fact that it is selfevident that God
se notum, sicut alia exists, just as other principles of
demonstrationis principia, sicut demonstration are—a view held by some
quibusdam videtur, ut in primo libro people, as we said in Book One [25]—or,
dictum est; sive, quod magis verum what seems indeed to be true, that man
videtur, quia naturali ratione statim can immediately reach some sort of
homo in aliqualem Dei cognitionem knowledge of God by natural reason.
pervenire potest. Videntes enim For, when men see that things in nature
homines res naturales secundum run according to a definite order, and
ordinem certum currere; cum that ordering does not occur without an
ordinatio absque ordinatore non sit, orderer, they perceive in most cases that
percipiunt, ut in pluribus, aliquem there is some orderer of the things that
esse ordinatorem rerum quas we sec. But who or what kind of being,
videmus. Quis autem, vel qualis, or whether there is but one orderer of
vel si unus tantum est ordinator nature, is not yet grasped immediately in
naturae, nondum statim ex hac this general consideration, just as, when
communi consideratione habetur: we see that a man is moved and
sicut, cum videmus hominem performs other works, we perceive that
moveri et alia opera agere, there is present in him some cause of
percipimus ei inesse quandam these operations which is not present in
causam harum operationum quae other things, and we call this cause the
aliis rebus non inest, et hanc soul; yet we do not know at that point
causam animam nominamus; what the soul is, whether it is a body, or
nondum tamen scientes quid sit how it produces these operations which
anima, si est corpus, vel qualiter have been mentioned.
operationes praedictas efficiat.
Non est autem possibile hanc [2] Of course, it is not possible for this
cognitionem Dei ad felicitatem knowledge of God to suffice for felicity.
sufficere.
Felicis enim operationem oportet [3] In fact, the operation of the man
esse absque defectu. Haec autem enjoying felicity must be without defect.
cognitio est multorum errorum But this knowledge admits of a mixture
admixtionem suscipiens. Quidam of many errors. Some people have
enim rerum mundanarum non believed that there is no other orderer of
alium ordinatorem esse crediderunt worldly things than the celestial bodies,
quam corpora caelestia: unde and so they said that the celestial bodies
corpora caelestia deos esse are gods. Other people pushed it farther,
dixerunt. Quidam vero ulterius ipsa to the very elements and the things
elementa et quae ex eis generated from them, thinking that
generantur: quasi aestimantes motion and the natural functions which
motus et operationes naturales these elements have are not present in
quas habent, non ab alio ordinatore them as the effect of some other orderer,
eis inesse, sed ab eis alia ordinari. but that other things are ordered by
Quidam vero, humanos actus non them. Still other people, believing that
alicuius ordinationi subesse human acts are not subject to any
credentes nisi humanae, homines ordering, other than human, have said
qui alios ordinant, deos esse that men who order others are gods. And
dixerunt. Ista igitur Dei cognitio non so, this knowledge of God is not enough
sufficit ad felicitatem. for felicity.
Amplius. Felicitas est finis [4] Again, felicity is the end of human
humanorum actuum. Ad acts. But human acts are not ordered to
praedictam autem cognitionem non the aforementioned knowledge, as to an
ordinantur humani actus sicut ad end. Rather, it is found in all men, almost
finem: immo quasi statim a at once, from their beginning. So, felicity
principio omnibus adest. Non igitur does not consist in this knowledge of
in hac Dei cognitione felicitas God.
consistit.
Item. Nullus propter hoc [5] Besides, no man seems to be
vituperabilis apparet quia felicitate blameworthy because of the fact that he
careat: quinimmo carentes ea et in lacks felicity; in point of fact, those who
ipsam tendentes laudantur. Ex hoc lack it, but are tending toward it, are
autem quod praedicta Dei given praise. But the fact that a person
cognitione aliquis caret, maxime lacks the aforesaid knowledge of God
vituperabilis apparet: designatur makes him appear very blameworthy.
enim per hoc maxime hominis Indeed, a man’s dullness is chiefly
stoliditas, quod tam manifesta Dei indicated by this: he fails to perceive
signa non percipit; sicut stolidus such evident signs of God, just as a
reputaretur qui, hominem videns, person is judged to be dull who, while
eum habere animam non observing a man, does not grasp the fact
comprehenderet. Unde et in that he has a soul. That is why it is said
Psalmo dicitur: dixit insipiens in in the Psalms ( 13:1, 52:1): “The fool
corde suo: non est Deus. Non est hath said in his heart: There is no God.”
igitur haec Dei cognitio quae ad So, this is not the knowledge of God
felicitatem sufficiat. which suffices for felicity.
Amplius. Cognitio quae habetur de [6] Moreover, the knowledge that one

re tantum in communi, non has of a thing, only in a general way and
secundum aliquid sibi proprium, est not according to something proper to it,
imperfectissima, sicut cognitio is very imperfect, just like the knowledge
quae haberetur de homine ex hoc one might have of a man when one
quod movetur: est enim huiusmodi knows simply that he is moved. For this
cognitio per quam res cognoscitur is the kind of knowledge whereby a thing
in potentia tantum; propria enim in is known only in potency, since proper
communibus potentia continentur. attributes are potentially included within
Felicitas autem est operatio common ones. But felicity is a perfect
perfecta; et summum hominis operation, and man’s highest good ought
bonum oportet esse secundum id to be based on what is actual and not
quod est actu, et non secundum simply on what is potential, for potency
quod est potentia tantum; nam perfected by act has the essential
potentia per actum perfecta habet character of the good. Therefore, the
boni rationem. Non est igitur aforementioned knowledge is not

praemissa Dei cognitio ad enough for our felicity.
felicitatem nostram sufficiens.
Chapter 39
Caput 39
THAT HUMAN FELICITY DOES NOT
Quod felicitas humana non
CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF
consistit in cognitione Dei quae
GOD GAINED THROUGH
habetur per demonstrationem
DEMONSTRATION
Rursus, est quaedam alia Dei [1] On the other hand, there is another
cognitio, altior quam praemissa, sort of knowledge of God, higher than
quae de Deo per demonstrationem the foregoing, and we may acquire it
habetur, per quam magis ad through demonstration. A closer
propriam ipsius cognitionem approach to a proper knowledge of Him
acceditur: cum per is effected through this kind, for many
demonstrationem removeantur ab things are set apart from Him, through
eo multa, per quorum remotionem demonstration, whose removal enable
ab aliis discretus intelligitur. Him to be understood in distinction from
Ostendit enim demonstratio Deum other beings. In fact, demonstration
esse immobilem, aeternum, shows that God is immutable, eternal,
incorporeum, omnino simplicem, incorporeal, altogether simple, one, and
unum, et alia huiusmodi, quae in other such things which we have shown
libro primo de Deo ostendimus. about God in Book One[1538].
Ad propriam autem alicuius rei Now, we reach a proper knowledge of a

cognitionem pervenitur non solum thing not only through affirmations but
per affirmationes, sed etiam per also through negations; for instance, it is
negationes: sicut enim proprium proper to a man to be a rational animal,
hominis est esse animal rationale, and so it is proper to him not to be
ita proprium eius est non esse inanimate or irrational. But there is this
inanimatum neque irrationale. Sed difference between these two modes of
hoc interest inter utrumque proper knowledge: through affirmations,
cognitionis propriae modum, quod, when we have a proper knowledge of a
per affirmationes propria cognitione thing, we know what the thing is, and
de re habita, scitur quid est res, et bow it is separated from others; but
quomodo ab aliis separatur: per through negations, when we have a
negationes autem habita propria proper knowledge of a thing, we know
cognitione de re, scitur quod est ab that it is distinct from other things, yet
aliis discreta, tamen quid sit what it is remains unknown. Now, such is
remanet ignotum. Talis autem est the proper knowledge that we have of
propria cognitio quae de Deo God through demonstrations. Of course,
habetur per demonstrationes. Non this is not sufficient for the ultimate
est autem nec ista ad ultimam felicity of man.
hominis felicitatem sufficiens.
Ea enim quae sunt alicuius speciei, [2] For, the things which pertain to a

perveniunt ad finem illius speciei ut species extend to the end of that

in pluribus: ea enim quae sunt a species, in most cases; in fact, things
natura, sunt semper vel in pluribus, which are of natural origin are so always,
deficiunt autem in paucioribus or in most cases, though they may fail in
propter aliquam corruptionem. a few instances because of some
Felicitas autem est finis humanae corruption. Now, felicity is the end of the
speciei: cum omnes homines human species, since all men naturally
ipsam naturaliter desiderent. desire it. So, felicity is a definite common
Felicitas igitur est quoddam good, capable of accruing to all men,
commune bonum possibile unless an impediment occurs by which
provenire omnibus hominibus, nisi some may be deprived of it. Now, few
accidat aliquibus impedimentum men attain the knowledge of God that we
quo sint orbati. Ad praedictam have just mentioned, acquired by way of
autem cognitionem de Deo demonstration, because of the obstacles
habendam per viam to this knowledge which we touched on
demonstrationis pauci perveniunt, in the beginning of this work. Therefore,
propter impedimenta huius such knowledge of God is not essentially
cognitionis, quae in principio libri identical with human felicity.
tetigimus. Non est igitur talis Dei
cognitio essentialiter ipsa humana
felicitas.
Adhuc. Esse in actu est finis [3] Then, again, to be actual is the end of

existentis in potentia, ut ex what is potential, as is clear from the
praemissis patet. Felicitas igitur, foregoing. So, felicity which is the
quae est ultimus finis, est actus cui ultimate end is an act to which no
non adiungitur potentia ad potency for further actuality is attached.
ulteriorem actum. Talis autem But this sort of knowledge of God,
cognitio per viam demonstrationis acquired by way of demonstration, still
de Deo habita remanet adhuc in remains in potency to something further
potentia ad aliquod ulterius de Deo to be learned about God, or to the same
cognoscendum, vel eadem nobiliori knowledge possessed in a higher way,
modo: posteriores enim conati sunt for later men have endeavored to add
aliquid ad divinam cognitionem something pertinent to divine knowledge
pertinens adiungere his quae a to the things which they found in the
prioribus invenerunt tradita. Non heritage of their predecessors.
est igitur talis cognitio ultima Therefore, such knowledge is not
humana felicitas. identical with ultimate felicity.
Amplius. Felicitas omnem [4] Moreover, felicity excludes all

miseriam excludit: nemo enim unhappiness, for no man can be at once
simul miser et felix esse potest. unhappy and happy. Now, deception and
Deceptio autem et error magna error constitute a great part of
pars miseriae est: hoc est enim unhappiness; in fact, that is what all men
quod omnes naturaliter fugiunt. naturally avoid. But manifold error can
Praedictae autem cognitioni quae accompany the aforesaid knowledge that
de Deo habetur, multiplex error is acquired about God, and this is
adiungi potest: quod patet in multis evident in many men who learned some
qui aliqua vera de Deo per viam truths about God by way of
demonstrationis cognoverunt, qui, demonstration, and who, following their

suas aestimationes sequentes, own opinions in cases where
dum demonstratio eis deesset, in demonstration fails them, have fallen into
errores multiplices inciderunt. Si many errors. In fact, if there have been
autem aliqui fuerunt qui sic de any men who have discovered the truth
divinis veritatem invenerunt about divine things in such a way, by
demonstrationis via quod eorum means of demonstration, that no falsity
aestimationi nulla falsitas attached to their judgment, it is clear that
adiungeretur, patet eos fuisse there have been few such. This is not
paucissimos: quod non congruit appropriate to felicity, which is a common
felicitati, quae est communis finis. end. So, man’s ultimate felicity does not
Non igitur est in hac cognitione de lie in this knowledge of God.
Deo ultima hominis felicitas.
Praeterea. Felicitas in operatione [5] Besides, felicity consists in a perfect
perfecta consistit. Ad perfectionem operation. Now, certainty is required for
autem cognitionis requiritur perfect knowledge; for this reason we
certitudo: unde scire aliter non are not said to know unless we learn
dicimur nisi cognoscamus quod something that cannot be otherwise, as
impossibile est aliter se habere, ut is evident in the Posterior Analytics [I, 2:
patet in I posteriorum. Cognitio 72a17]. Now, the knowledge we have
autem praedicta multum been talking about includes much
incertitudinis habet, quod uncertainty; the diversity of the sciences
demonstrat diversitas sententiarum of divine matters among those who have
de divinis eorum qui haec per viam tried to find out these things by way of
demonstrationis invenire conati demonstration shows this. Therefore,
sunt. Non est igitur in tali ultimate felicity is not found in such
cognitione ultima felicitas. knowledge.
Item. Voluntas cum consecuta [6] Moreover, the will rests its desire
fuerit ultimum finem, quietatur eius when it has attained the ultimate end.
desiderium. Ultimus autem finis But the ultimate cud of all human
omnis cognitionis humanae est knowledge is felicity. So, that knowledge
felicitas. Illa igitur cognitio Dei of God which, when acquired, leaves no
essentialiter est ipsa felicitas, qua knowledge of a knowable object to be
habita non restabit alicuius scibilis desired is essentially this felicity. But this
desideranda cognitio. Talis autem is not the kind of knowledge about God
non est cognitio quam philosophi that the philosophers were able to get
per demonstrationes de Deo through demonstrations, because, even
habere potuerunt: quia adhuc, illa when we acquire this knowledge, we still
cognitione habita, alia desideramus desire to know other things that are not
scire, quae per hanc cognitionem known through this knowledge.
nondum sciuntur. Non est igitur in Therefore, felicity is not found in such
tali cognitione Dei felicitas. knowledge of God.
Adhuc. Finis cuiuslibet existentis in [7] Furthermore, the end of every being

potentia est ut ducatur in actum: ad which is in potency is to be brought into
hoc enim tendit per motum, quo act, for it tends toward this through the
movetur in finem. Tendit autem motion by which it is moved to its end. Of
unumquodque ens in potentia ad course, every being in potency tends to
hoc quod sit actu secundum quod become actual, in so far as that is
est possibile. Aliquid enim est possible. Now, there is one kind of being
existens in potentia cuius tota in potency whose entire potency can be
potentia potest reduci in actum: reduced to act; hence, its end is to be
unde huius finis est ut totaliter in completely reduced to act. Thus, a heavy
actum reducatur; sicut grave, extra body in some unusual position is in
medium existens, est in potentia ad potency to its proper place. But there is
proprium ubi. Aliquid vero cuius another kind of thing whose entire
potentia tota non potest simul in potency cannot be reduced to act at the
actum reduci, sicut patet de same time. This is the case with prime
materia prima: unde per suum matter, and that is why, through its
motum appetit successive in actum change, it seeks to be actuated
diversarum formarum exire, quae successively under different forms which
sibi, propter earum diversitatem, cannot be simultaneously present in it,
simul inesse non possunt. because of their diversity. Now, our
Intellectus autem noster est in intellect is in potency to all intelligible
potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, ut in objects, as was explained in Book Two
secundo dictum est. Duo autem [47]. But two intelligible objects can exist
intelligibilia possunt simul in simultaneously in the possible intellect,
intellectu possibili existere by way of the first act which is science,
secundum actum primum, qui est though perhaps not by way of the
scientia: licet forte non secundum second act which is consideration. It is
actum secundum, qui est evident from this that the entire potency
consideratio. Ex quo patet quod of the possible intellect can be reduced
tota potentia intellectus possibilis to act at one time. So, this is required for
potest reduci simul in actum. Hoc its ultimate end which is felicity. But the
igitur requiritur ad eius ultimum aforesaid knowledge of God which can
finem, qui est felicitas. Hoc autem be acquired through demonstration does
non facit praedicta cognitio quae not do this, since, even when we
de Deo per demonstrationem possess it, We still remain ignorant of
haberi potest: quia, ea habita, many things. Therefore, such knowledge
adhuc multa ignoramus. Non est of God is not sufficient for ultimate
igitur talis cognitio Dei sufficiens ad felicity.
ultimam felicitatem.
Caput 40 Chapter 40
Quod felicitas humana non HUMAN FELICITY DOES NOT CONSIST
consistit in cognitione Dei quae IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD WHICH
est per fidem IS THROUGH FAITH
Est autem et alia Dei cognitio, [1] Now, there is still another knowledge of

quantum ad aliquid superior God, in one sense superior to the
cognitione praedicta, qua scilicet aforementioned knowledge, and by this
Deus ab hominibus per fidem God is known to men through faith. In
cognoscitur. Quae quidem comparison with the knowledge that we
quantum ad hoc cognitionem have of God through demonstration, this
quae de Deo per knowledge through faith surpasses it, for
demonstrationem habetur, we know some things about God through

excedit, quia quaedam de Deo faith which, because of their sublimity,
per fidem cognoscimus ad quae, demonstrative reason cannot attain, as
propter sui eminentiam, ratio we said at the beginning of this work. Yet,
demonstrans pervenire non it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity
potest, sicut in principio huius to consist in even this knowledge of God.
operis dictum est. Non est autem
possibile neque in hac Dei
cognitione ultimam hominis
felicitatem consistere.
Felicitas enim est perfecta [2] Felicity, indeed, is a perfect operation
intellectus operatio, sicut ex dictis of the intellect as is clear from what we
patet. In cognitione autem fidei have said. But, in the knowledge of faith,
invenitur operatio intellectus there is found a most imperfect operation
imperfectissima quantum ad id of the intellect, having regard to what is on
quod est ex parte intellectus, the side of the intellect, though the
quamvis maxima perfectio greatest perfection is discovered on the
inveniatur ex parte obiecti: non side of the object. For the intellect does
enim intellectus capit illud cui not grasp the object to which it gives
assentit credendo. Non est igitur assent in the act of believing. Therefore,
neque in hac Dei cognitione neither does man’s ultimate felicity lie in
ultima hominis felicitas. this kind of knowledge of God.
Item. Ostensum est supra quod [3] Again, we showed above, that ultimate

ultima felicitas non consistit felicity does not consist primarily in an act
principaliter in actu voluntatis. In of the will. But in the knowledge of faith
cognitione autem fidei the will takes priority; indeed, the intellect
principalitatem habet voluntas: assents through faith to things resented to
intellectus enim assentit per fidem it, because of an act of will and not
his quae sibi proponuntur, quia because it is necessarily moved by the
vult, non autem ex ipsa veritatis very evidence of the truth. So, man’s
evidentia necessario tractus. Non ultimate felicity does not lie in this
est igitur in hac cognitione ultima knowledge.
hominis felicitas.
Adhuc. Qui credit, assensum [4] Besides, one who believes gives
praebet his quae sibi ab alio assent to things that are proposed to him
proponuntur, quae ipse non videt: by another person, and which he himself
unde fides magis habet does not see. Hence, faith has a
cognitionem auditui similem quam knowledge that is more like hearing than
visioni. Non autem crederet vision. Now, a man would not believe in
aliquis non visis ab alio propositis things that are unseen but proposed to
nisi aestimaret eum perfectiorem him by another man unless he thought
cognitionem habere de propositis that this other man had more perfect
quam ipse habeat qui non videt. knowledge of these proposed things than
Aut igitur aestimatio credentis est he himself who does not see them. So,
falsa: aut oportet quod proponens either the believer’s judgment is false or
habeat perfectiorem cognitionem else the proposer must have more perfect
propositorum. Quod et si ipse knowledge of the things proposed. And if
solum cognoscit ea quasi ab alio the proposer only knows these things by
audiens, non potest hoc in hearing them from another man, this
infinitum procedere: esset enim cannot go on indefinitely, for the assent of
vanus et absque certitudine fidei faith would be foolish and without
assensus; non enim inveniretur certitude; indeed, we would discover no
aliquod primum ex se certum, first thing certain in itself which would
quod certitudinem fidei bring certainty to the faith of the believer.
credentium afferret. Non est Now, it is not possible for the knowledge
autem possibile fidei cognitionem of faith to be false and empty, as is
esse falsam neque vanam, ut ex evident from what we have said in the
dictis patet in principio libri: et opening Book [I, 7]. Yet, if it were false
tamen, si esset falsa et vana, in and empty, felicity could not consist in
tali cognitione felicitas non posset such knowledge.
consistere.
Est igitur aliqua hominis cognitio So, there is for man some knowledge of
de Deo altior cognitione fidei: sive God which is higher than the knowledge
ipse homo proponens fidem of faith: either the man who proposes the
immediate videat veritatem, sicut faith sees the truth immediately, as is the
Christo credimus; sive a vidente case when we believe in Christ; or he
immediate accipiat, sicut takes it immediately from one who does
credimus apostolis et prophetis. see, as when we believe the Apostles and
Cum igitur in summa Dei Prophets. So, since man’s felicity consists
cognitione felicitas hominis in the highest knowledge of God, it is
consistat, impossibile est quod impossible for it to consist in the
consistat in fidei cognitione. knowledge of faith.
Amplius. Per felicitatem, cum sit [5] Moreover, through felicity, because it is

ultimus finis, naturale desiderium the ultimate end, natural desire comes to
quietatur. Cognitio autem fidei non rest. Now, the knowledge of faith does not
quietat desiderium, sed magis bring rest to desire but rather sets it
ipsum accendit: quia unusquisque aflame, since every man desires to see
desiderat videre quod credit. Non what he believes. So, man’s ultimate
est igitur in cognitione fidei ultima felicity does not lie in the knowledge of
hominis felicitas. faith.
Praeterea. Cognitio de Deo dicta [6] Furthermore, the knowledge of God
est finis inquantum ultimo fini has been called the end because it is
rerum, scilicet Deo, coniungit. Per joined to the ultimate end of things, that is,
cognitionem autem fidei non fit to God. But an item of belief is not made
res credita intellectui praesens perfectly present to the intellect by the
perfecte: quia fides de absentibus knowledge of faith, since faith is of things
est, non de praesentibus. Unde et absent, not of things present. For this
apostolus dicit 2 Cor. 5, quod reason the Apostle says, in 2 Corinthians
quandiu per fidem ambulamus, (5:67), that “while we are in the body we
peregrinamur a domino. Fit tamen walk by faith and we are absent from the
per fidem Deus praesens affectui, Lord.” Yet God is brought into the
cum voluntarie credens Deo presence of love through faith, since the
assentiat: secundum quod dicitur believer assents to God voluntarily,

Ephes. 317, habitare Christum according to what is said in Ephesians
per fidem in cordibus nostris. Non (3:17): “that Christ may dwell by faith in
est ergo possibile quod in our hearts.” Therefore, it is not possible
cognitione fidei ultima felicitas for ultimate human felicity to consist in the
humana consistat. knowledge of faith.
Chapter 41
Caput 41
WHETHER IN THIS LIFE MAN IS
Utrum in hac vita homo possit
ABLE TO UNDERSTAND SEPARATE
intelligere substantias separatas
SUBSTANCES THROUGH THE
per studium et inquisitionem
STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF
scientiarum speculativarum
THE SPECULATIVE SCIENCES
Habet autem et adhuc aliam [1] An intellectual substance has still
cognitionem de Deo intellectualis another kind of knowledge of God.
substantia. Dictum est enim in Indeed, it has been stated in Book Two
secundo libro quod intellectualis [96ff] that a separate substance, in
substantia separata, cognoscendo knowing its own essence, knows both
essentiam suam, cognoscit et quod what is above and what is below itself,
est supra se, et quod est sub se in a manner proper to its substance.
secundum modum suae This is especially necessary if what is
substantiae. Quod praecipue above it is its cause, since the likeness
necesse est si illud quod est supra of the cause must be found in the
ipsam, sit causa eius: cum oporteat effects. And so, since God is the cause
in effectibus similitudinem inveniri of all created intellectual substances, as
causae. Unde, cum Deus sit causa is evident from the foregoing, then
omnium substantiarum separate intellectual substances, in
intellectualium creatarum, ut ex knowing their own essence, must know
superioribus patet, necesse est God Himself by way of a vision of some
quod intellectuales substantiae kind. For a thing whose likeness exists
separatae, cognoscendo suam in the intellect is known through the
essentiam, cognoscant per modum intellect by way of vision, just as the
visionis cuiusdam ipsum Deum: res likeness of a thing which is seen
enim illa per intellectum visionis corporeally is present in the sense of
modo cognoscitur, cuius similitudo the viewer. So, whatever intellect
in intellectu existit, sicut et similitudo understands a separate substance, by
rei corporaliter visae est in sensu knowing what it is, sees God in a higher
videntis. Quicumque ergo intellectus way than He is known by any of the
apprehendit substantiam separatam previously treated types of knowledge.
cognoscendo de ea quid est, videt
Deum altiori modo quam aliqua
praedictarum cognitionum
cognoscatur.
Quia ergo quidam posuerunt [2] Hence, since some men have
ultimam felicitatem hominis esse in claimed that man’s ultimate end is in
hac vita per hoc quod cognoscunt this life, because they know separate
substantias separatas, substances, we must consider whether

considerandum est utrum homo in man can know separate substances in
hac vita possit substantias this life. Now, on this point there is
separatas cognoscere. Hoc autem some dispute. For, our intellect in our
quaestionem habet. Intellectus enim present state understands nothing
noster, secundum statum without a phantasm, and the phantasm
praesentem, nihil intelligit sine is related to the possible intellect,
phantasmate, quod ita se habet ad whereby we understand, as colors are
intellectum possibilem, quo related to vision, as is evident from
intelligimus, sicut se habent colores what we have treated in Book Two.
ad visum, ut patet ex his quae in Therefore, if any of us could achieve
secundo tractata sunt. Si igitur per the understanding of separate
cognitionem intellectivam quae est substances through the intellectual
ex phantasmatibus, possit pervenire knowledge which is from phantasms,
aliquis nostrum ad intelligendas then it would be possible for a person in
substantias separatas, possibile erit this life to understand separate
quod aliquis in hac vita intelligat substances themselves. Consequently,
ipsas substantias separatas; et per by seeing these separate substances
consequens, videndo ipsas one will participate in that mode of
substantias separatas, participabit knowledge whereby the separate
modum illius cognitionis quo substance, while understanding itself,
substantia separata, intelligens se, understands God. But, if one cannot in
intelligit Deum. Si autem per any way attain to the understanding of
cognitionem quae est ex separate substances through the
phantasmatibus, nullo modo possit knowledge which depends on
pervenire ad intelligendas phantasms, then it will not be possible
substantias separatas, non erit for man in the present state of life to
possibile quod homo in statu huius achieve the aforesaid mode of divine
vitae praedictum modum divinae knowledge.
cognitionis assequatur.
Quod autem ex cognitione quae est [3] Now, various people have claimed in
per phantasmata, ad intelligendum different ways that we could reach an
substantias pervenire possimus, understanding of separate substances
aliqui diversimode posuerunt. from the knowledge which is
Avempace namque posuit quod per accomplished through phantasms. For
studium speculativarum scientiarum instance, Avempace claimed that,
possumus, ex his intellectis quae through the study of the speculative
per phantasmata cognoscimus, sciences, we can, on the basis of things
pervenire ad intelligendas understood through phantasms, reach
substantias separatas. Possumus an understanding of separate
enim actione intellectus extrahere substances. For we can by the action of
quidditatem rei cuiuslibet habentis the intellect abstract the quiddity of
quidditatem quae non est sua anything that has a quiddity, and which
quidditas. Est enim intellectus natus is not identical with its quiddity. Indeed,
cognoscere quamlibet quidditatem the intellect is naturally equipped to
inquantum est quidditas: cum know any quiddity, in so far as it is
intellectus proprium obiectum sit quiddity, since the proper object of the
quod quid est. Si autem illud quod intellect is what a thing is. But, if what is
primo per intellectum possibilem primarily understood by the possible
intelligitur, est aliquid habens intellect is something having a quiddity,

quidditatem, possumus per we can abstract through the possible
intellectum possibilem abstrahere intellect the quiddity of that which is
quidditatem illius primo intellecti; et primarily understood. Moreover, if that
si illa quidditas habeat quidditatem, quiddity also has a quiddity, it will in turn
possibile erit iterum abstrahere be possible to abstract the quiddity of
quidditatem illius quidditatis; et cum this quiddity. And since an infinite
non sit procedere in infinitum, process is impossible, it must stop
oportet quod stetur alicubi. Potest somewhere. Therefore, our intellect is
igitur intellectus noster pervenire via able to reach, by way of resolution, the
resolutionis ad cognoscendam knowledge of a quiddity which has no
quidditatem non habentem aliquam further quiddity. Now, this is the sort of
quidditatem. Talis autem est quiddity proper to a separate
quidditas substantiae separatae. substance. So, our intellect can,
Potest igitur intellectus noster, per through the knowledge of those
cognitionem horum sensibilium sensible things that is received from
quae ex phantasmatibus accipitur, phantasms, reach an understanding of
pervenire ad intelligendas separate substances.
substantias separatas.
Procedit autem ad idem [4] He proceeds, moreover, to show the

ostendendum per aliam similem same thing in another, similar way. For
viam. Ponit enim quod intellectum he maintains that the understanding of
unius rei, ut puta equi, apud me et one thing, say a horse, is plurally
apud te multiplicatur solum per present in me and in you, simply by
multiplicationem specierum means of a multiplication of spiritual
spiritualium, quae sunt diversae in species which are diversified in me and
me et in te. Oportet igitur quod in you. So, then, it is necessary that an
intellectum quod non sustentatur in object of understanding, which is not
aliqua huiusmodi specie, sit idem based on any species of this kind, be
apud te et apud me. Sed quidditas identical in me and in you. But the
intellecti quam intellectus noster quiddity of an object of understanding,
natus est abstrahere, ut probatum which quiddity our intellect is naturally
est, non habet aliquam speciem capable of abstracting, has no spiritual
spiritualem et individualem: cum but individual species, as we have
quidditas intellecti non sit quidditas proved, because the quiddity of a thing
individui, neque spiritualis neque that is understood is not the quiddity of
corporalis, cum intellectum, an individual, either spiritual or
inquantum est huiusmodi, sit corporeal, for a thing that is understood,
universale. Intellectus igitur noster as such, is universal. So, our intellect is
natus est intelligere quidditatem by nature capable of understanding a
cuius intellectus est unus apud quiddity for which the understanding is
omnes. Talis autem est quidditas one among all men. Now, such is the
substantiae separatae. Est igitur quiddity of a separate substance.
intellectus noster natus cognoscere Hence, our understanding is naturally
substantiam separatam. equipped to know separate substance.
Si autem diligenter consideretur, [5] However, if a careful consideration

viae istae frivolae invenientur. Cum be made, these ways of arguing will be
enim intellectum, inquantum discovered to be frivolous. Since a thing
huiusmodi, sit universale, oportet that is understood, as such, is

quod quidditas intellecti sit quidditas universal, the quiddity of the thing
alicuius universalis, scilicet generis understood must be the quiddity of
vel speciei. Quidditas autem generis something universal; namely, of a
vel speciei horum sensibilium, cuius genus or a species. Now, the quiddity of
cognitionem intellectivam per a genus or species pertaining to these
phantasmata accipimus, sensible things, whose intellectual
comprehendit in se materiam et knowledge we get through phantasms,
formam. Est igitur omnino dissimilis includes matter and form within itself.
quidditati substantiae separatae, So, it is entirely unlike the quiddity of a
quae est simplex et immaterialis. separate substance, which latter is
Non est igitur possibile quod per hoc simple and immaterial. Therefore, it is
quod intelligitur quidditas rei not possible for the quiddity of a
sensibilis per phantasmata, separate substance to be understood,
intelligatur quidditas substantiae simply because the quiddity of a
separatae. sensible thing is understood through
phantasms.
Praeterea. Non est eiusdem rationis [6] Besides, the form which in actual

forma quae secundum esse non being cannot be separated from a
potest separari ab aliquo subiecto, subject is not of the same rational
cum illa quae separatur secundum character as the form which is
esse a tali subiecto, licet utraque separated in its being from such a
secundum considerationem subject, even though both of them can
accipiatur absque tali subiecto. Non be taken, in an act of consideration,
enim est eadem ratio magnitudinis, without such a subject. Thus, there is
et substantiae separatae, nisi not the same essential character for
ponamus magnitudines separatas magnitude and for a separate
medias inter species et sensibilia, substance, unless we claim that
sicut aliqui Platonici posuerunt. magnitudes are separate things midway
Quidditas autem generis vel speciei between specific forms and sensible
rerum sensibilium non potest things, as some of the Platonists
separari secundum esse ab hac maintained. Of course, the quiddity of a
individuali materia: nisi forte, genus or species of sensible things
secundum Platonicos, ponamus cannot be separate in actual being from
rerum species separatas, quod est a given material individual, unless,
ab Aristotele improbatum. Est igitur perhaps, we maintain with the
omnino dissimilis quidditas Platonists separate forms of things, but
praedicta substantiis separatis, this has been disproved by Aristotle.
quae nullo modo sunt in materia. Therefore, the quiddity of the
Non igitur per hoc quod hae aforementioned separate substances,
quidditates intelliguntur, substantiae which in no way exist in matter, is
separatae intelligi possunt. utterly different. Therefore, separate
substances cannot be understood
simply by virtue of the fact that these
quiddities are understood.
Adhuc. Si quidditas substantiae [7] Again, if it is granted that the
separatae detur esse eiusdem quiddity of a separate substance is of
rationis cum quidditate generis vel the same rational character as the
speciei istorum sensibilium, non quiddity of a genus or species of these
poterit dici quod sit eiusdem rationis sensible things, that does not warrant
secundum speciem nisi dicamus saying that it is of the same rational
quod species horum sensibilium sint character specifically, unless we say
ipsae substantiae separatae, sicut that the species of sensible things are
Platonici posuerunt. Remanet igitur themselves separate substances, as
quod non erunt eiusdem rationis nisi the Platonists claimed. The conclusion
quantum ad rationem quidditatis stands, then, that they will not be of the
inquantum est quidditas. Haec same rational character, except
autem est ratio communis, generis according to the rational character of
scilicet et substantiae. Non igitur per quiddity as quiddity. Now, this is a
has quidditates de substantiis meaning of rational chasracter which is
separatis aliquid intelligi poterit nisi common to genus and to substance.
remotum genus ipsarum. Cognito Therefore, nothing except their remote
autem genere, non propter hoc genus could be understood concerning
cognoscitur species nisi in potentia. separate substances through these
Non poterit igitur intelligi substantia sensible quiddities. Now, the fact that
separata per intellectum quidditatum the genus is known does not mean that
horum sensibilium. hte species is known, except in
potency. So, separate substances could
not be understood through an
understanding of the quiddities of these
sensible things.
Amplius. Maior est distantia [8] Moreover, there is a greater

substantiae separatae a sensibilibus difference between separate
quam unius sensibilis ab alio. Sed substances and sensible things than
intelligere quidditatem unius between one sensible thing and
sensibilis non sufficit ad another. But to understand the quiddity
intelligendam quidditatem alterius of one sensible thing is not enough to
sensibilis: caecus enim natus, per enable one to understand the quiddity
hoc quod intelligit quidditatem soni, of another sensible thing. For instance,
nullo modo potest pervenire ad a man who is born blind is not at all
intelligendam quidditatem coloris. enabled to achieve understanding of
Multo igitur minus per hoc quod the quiddity of color simply because he
intelligat aliquis quidditatem understands the quiddity of sound.
sensibilis substantiae, poterit Much less, then, is one enabled to
intelligere quidditatem substantiae understand the quiddity of a separate
separatae. substance by the fact that he
understands the quiddity of a sensible
substance.
Item. Si etiam ponamus quod [9] Furtherfore, even if we claim that
substantiae separatae orbes separate substances move the spheres,
moveant, ex quorum motibus and that from their motions the forms of
causantur formae sensibilium, hic these sensible things are produced, this
modus cognitionis substantiae way of knowing separate substance,
separatae ex sensibilibus non from sensible things, does not suffice
sufficit ad sciendam quidditatem for a knowing of their quiddity. For a
ipsarum. Nam per effectum scitur cause is known through an effect, either

causa vel ratione similitudinis quae by reason of a likeness which exists
est inter effectum et causam: vel between the effect and the cause or in
inquantum effectus demonstrat so far as the effect shows the power of
virtutem causae. Ratione autem the cause. Now, it would not be
similitudinis, ex effectu non poterit possible to know from the effect, by
sciri de causa quid est, nisi sit reason of likeness, what the cause is
agens unius speciei: sic autem non unless the agent is of one species with
se habent substantiae separatae ad the effect. But that is not the way
sensibilia. Ratione autem virtutis, separate substances are related to
hoc etiam non potest esse nisi sensible things. On the other hand, on
quando effectus adaequat virtutem the basis of power, this cannot be done
causae: tunc enim per effectum tota except when the effect is equal to the
virtus causae cognoscitur; virtus power of the cause. For, in that case,
autem rei demonstrat substantiam the whole power of the cause is known
ipsius. Hoc autem in proposito dici through the effect, and the power of a
non potest: nam virtutes thing demonstrates its substance. But
substantiarum separatarum this cannot be asserted in the present
excedunt effectus sensibiles omnes case, for the powers of separate
quos intellectu comprehendimus, substances exceed all the sensible
sicut virtus universalis effectum effects which we may grasp
particularem. Non est igitur possibile intellectuallly, as a universal power
quod per sensibilium intellectum surpases a particular effect. Therefore,
devenire possumus ad it is not possible for us to be enabled,
intelligendum substantias separatas. through an understanding of sensible
things, to come to an understanding of
separate substance.
Adhuc. Omnia intelligibilia in quorum [10] Again, all intelligible objects whose
cognitionem devenimus per knowledge we reach through
inquisitionem et studium, ad aliquam investigation and study belong to some
scientiarum speculativarum one of the speculative sciences. So, if
pertinent. Si igitur per hoc quod we attain the understanding of separate
intelligimus naturas et quidditates substances as a result of our
istorum sensibilium, pervenimus ad understanding of the natures and
intelligendas substantias separatas, quiddities of these sensible things, then
oportet quod intelligere substantias it must be that the understanding of
separatas contingat per aliquam separate substances depends on one
scientiarum speculativarum. Hoc of the speculative sciences. Yet we do
autem non videmus: non est enim not observe this; there is no speculative
aliqua speculativa scientia quae science whihc teaches what any of the
doceat de aliqua substantiarum separate substances is, but only that
separatarum quid est, sed solum they are. So, it is not possible for us to
quia sunt. Non est igitur possibile reach an understanding of separate
quod per hoc quod intelligimus substances simply because we
naturas sensibilium, perveniamus understand sensible natures.
ad intelligendas substantias
separatas.
Si autem dicatur quod est possibile [11] On the other hand, if it be
esse aliquam talem speculativam suggested that such a speculative
scientiam quamvis adhuc non sit science is possible, even though it has
inventa, hoc nihil est: quia non est not yet been discovered, this is no
possibile per aliqua principia nobis argument, because it is not possible to
nota ad intelligendas substantias arrive at an understanding of the
praedictas devenire. Omnia enim aforesaid substances through any
propria principia cuiuscumque principles known to us. Indeed, all the
scientiae dependent ex principiis proper principles of any science depend
primis indemonstrabilibus per se on first indemonstrable principles, which
notis, quorum cognitionem a are selfevident, and we get our
sensibilibus accipimus, ut patet in knowledge of these from the senses, as
fine posteriorum. Sensibilia autem is shown at the end of the Posterior
non sufficienter ducunt in Analytics. However sensible things are
cognitionem rerum immaterialium, ut not adequate guides to the knowledge
per superiores rationes est of immaterial things, as we have proved
probatum. Non est ergo possibile by the arguments above. Therefore, it is
aliquam scientiam esse per quam not possible for there to be any science
ad intelligendas substantias whereby one might achieve
separatas perveniri possit. understanding of separate substances.
Chapter 42
Caput 42
THAT WE CANNOT IN THIS LIFE
Quod non possumus in hac vita
UNDERSTAND SEPARATE
SUBSTANCES IN THE WAY THAT
sicut ponit Alexander
ALEXANDER CLAIMED
Quia vero Alexander posuit quod [1] Because Alexander [of Aphrodisias]
intellectus possibilis est generabilis claimed that the possible intellect is
et corruptibilis, utpote quaedam capable of being generated and
praeparatio naturae humanae corrupted, in the sense that it is “a
consequens commixtionem perfection of human nature resulting
elementorum, ut in secundo from a mixture of the elements,” as we
habitum est; non est autem saw in Book Two, and since it is not
possibile ut talis virtus supra possible for such a power to transcend
materialia elevetur: posuit quod material conditions, he maintained that
intellectus possibilis noster our possible intellect can never reach an
nunquam potest pervenire ad understanding of separate substances.
intelligendas substantias separatas; Yet he asserted that, in our present state
posuit tamen quod nos, secundum of life, we are able to understand
statum praesentis vitae, possumus separate substances.
substantias separatas intelligere.
Quod quidem ostendere nitebatur [2] In fact, he tried to show this in the
hoc modo. Unumquodque quando following way. Whenever anything has
pervenerit ad complementum in reached maturity in its process of
sua generatione, et ad ultimam generation and has come to the full
perfectionem suae substantiae, perfection of its substance, the operation
complebitur operatio sua propria, proper to it will be at its peak, whether
sive actio sive passio: sicut enim as action or as passion. For, as
operatio substantiam sequitur, ita operation is consequent upon
operationis perfectio perfectionem substance, so also is the perfection of
substantiae; unde animal, cum operation a result of the perfection of
fuerit ex toto perfectum, poterit per substance. Hence, an animal, when it
se ambulare. Intellectus autem has become wholly perfect, is able to
habitualis, qui nihil est aliud quam walk by itself. Now, the habitual
species intelligibiles factae per understanding which is simply
intellectum agentem existentes in “intelligible species made to exist in the
intellectu possibili, operatio est possible intellect by the agent intellect”
duplex: una ut faciat intellecta in has a twofold operation: one, to make
potentia esse intellecta in actu, potentially understood things to be
quam habet ex parte intellectus actually understood, and it owes this to
agentis; secunda est intelligere the role of the agent intellect; and the
intellecta in actu; haec enim duo second is actually to understand the
homo potest facere per habitum objects of understanding. These two
intellectualem. Quando igitur things, then, man can do through an
complebitur generatio intellectus in intellectual habit. So, whenever the
habitu, complebitur in ipso utraque generating of the habitual understanding
praemissarum operationum. has reached completion, both of these
Semper autem accedit ad stated operations will be at their peak in
complementum suae generationis, it. Now, it always approaches the peak
dum novas species intellectas perfection of its generation when it
acquirit. Et sic necesse est quod acquires new kinds of objects of
quandoque sua generatio understanding. And thus, its process of
compleatur, nisi sit impedimentum: generation must be completed at some
quia nulla generatio est ad infinitum time, unless there be an impediment,
tendens. Complebitur igitur because no process of generation tends
quandoque utraque operationum to an indefinite termination. So, it will
intellectus in habitu, per hoc quod reach completion whenever both
omnia intellecta in potentia faciet in operations are habitually present in the
actu, quod est complementum intellect, by virtue of the fact that it
primae operationis; et per hoc quod makes all the potential objects of
intelliget omnia intelligibilia, et understanding actual, which is the
separata et non separata. completion of the first operation, and
because of the fact that it understands
all intelligible objects, both separate and
not separate.
Cum autem intellectus possibilis [3] Now, since according to his opinion
non possit intelligere substantias the possible intellect cannot understand
separatas, secundum eius separate substances, as has already
opinionem, ut iam dictum est; been said, he thought that we will
intendit quod intelligemus per understand separate substances
intellectum in habitu substantias through the habitual understanding, in
separatas, inquantum intellectus so far as the agent intellect, which he
agens, qui ab ipso ponitur supposes to be a separate substance,
substantia separata, fiet forma becomes the form of the habitual
intellectus in habitu et nobis ipsis; understanding, and a form for us
ita quod per eum intelligemus sicut ourselves. Thus, we will understand

nunc intelligimus per intellectum through it, as we now understand
possibilem; et, cum de virtute through the possible intellect; and since
intellectus agentis sit facere omnia it is the function of the power of the
intellecta in actu quae sunt agent intellect to make all things which
intelligibilia potentia, et intelligere are potentially intelligible to be actually
substantias separatas, in statu illo understood, and to understand the
intelligemus substantias separatas, separate substances, we will understand
et omnia intelligibilia non separata. separate substances in this life, and also
all nonseparate intelligible things.
Et secundum hoc, per hanc [4] So, according to this theory, we reach

cognitionem quae est ex the knowledge of separate substances
phantasmatibus, pervenimus in through this knowledge which comes
cognitionem substantiae separatae; from the phantasms, not in the sense
non quasi et ipsa phantasmata et that these phantasms and the things
intellecta per ea sint medium understood through them are means for
aliquod ad cognoscendas the knowing of separate substances (as
substantias separatas, prout accidit is the case with the speculative
in scientiis speculativis, sicut posuit sciences, according to the position
opinio superior; sed inquantum advanced in the preceding chapter), but,
species intelligibiles sunt quaedam rather, in so far as the intelligible species
dispositiones in nobis ad talem are certain dispositions within us to the
formam quae est intellectus agens. kind of form that the agent intellect is.
Et hoc est primum in quo differunt And this is the first point on which these
hae duae opiniones. two opinions differ.
Unde, quando intellectus in habitu [5] Hence, when the habitual
fuerit perfectus per huiusmodi understanding will be perfected through
species intelligibiles in nobis factas the production in us by the agent
ab intellectu agente, fiet ipse intellect of these intelligible species, the
intellectus agens nobis forma, ut agent intellect will itself become a form
dictum est. Et nominat ipsum for us, as we have said. And he calls
intellectum adeptum, de quo dicunt this the “acquired understanding,” which,
Aristotelem dicere quod sit ab according to their statement, Aristotle
extrinseco. Et sic, licet in scientiis says comes from outside. And so,
speculativis non sit perfectio ultima though the ultimate human perfection is
humana, sicut superior ponebat not in the speculative sciences, as the
opinio; per eas tamen homo preceding opinion claimed, man is
disponitur ad ultimam perfectionem disposed through these sciences to the
consequendam. Et hoc est attainment of the ultimate perfection.
secundum in quo differt secunda And this is the second point on which
opinio a prima. the first and second opinions differ.
Tertio autem differt per hoc quod, [6] However, they differ on a third point,

secundum primam opinionem, because, according to the first opinion,
intelligere intellectum agentem est our actual understanding of the agent
causa quod continuetur nobiscum. intellect is the cause of its being united
Secundum vero hanc secundam with us. Whereas, according to the
opinionem, est e converso: nam second opinion, the converse is the
propter hoc quod nobiscum case, for, since it is united with us as a
continuatur ut forma, intelligimus form, we understand it and the other
ipsum et alias substantias separate substances.
separatas.
Haec autem irrationabiliter dicuntur. [7] Now, these statements are

Intellectus enim in habitu, sicut unreasonable. Indeed, the habitual
intellectus possibilis, ponitur ab understanding, as also the possible
Alexandro esse generabilis et understanding, is supposed by
corruptibilis. Aeternum autem non Alexander to be generable and
potest fieri forma generabilis et corruptible. Now, the eternal cannot
corruptibilis, secundum eum: become the form of the generable and
propter hoc enim ponit intellectum corruptible, according to him. For this
possibilem, qui unitur nobis ut reason, he claims that the possible
forma, esse generabilem et intellect, which is united to us as a form,
corruptibilem, intellectum vero is generable and corruptible, while the
agentem, qui est incorruptibilis, agent intellect which is incorruptible is a
esse substantiam separatam. Cum separate substance. Hence, since the
igitur intellectus agens, secundum agent intellect, according to Alexander,
Alexandrum, ponatur esse is supposed to be an eternal separate
quaedam substantia separata substance, it will be impossible for the
aeterna, impossibile erit quod agent intellect to become the form of the
intellectus agens fiat forma habitual intellect.
intellectus in habitu.
Praeterea. Forma intellectus, [8] Moreover, the form of the intellect, as

inquantum est intellectus, est intellect, is the intelligible object, just as
intelligibile, sicut forma sensus est the form of the sense is the sensible
sensibile: non enim recipit aliquid object; indeed, the intellect receives
intellectus, per se loquendo, nisi nothing, strictly speaking, except in an
intelligibiliter sicut nec sensus nisi intellectual way, just as the sense power
sensibiliter. Si igitur non potest only receives sensitively. So, if the agent
intellectus agens esse intelligibile intellect cannot be an intelligible object
per intellectum in habitu, through the habitual intellect, then it will
impossibile erit quod sit forma eius. be impossible for it to be its form.
Item. Intelligere aliquo tripliciter [9] Besides, we are said to understand
dicimur. Uno modo, sicut something in three ways. First, as we
intelligimus intellectu, qui est virtus understand by means of the intellect
a qua egreditur talis operatio: unde which is the power from which such an
et ipse intellectus intelligere dicitur, operation proceeds; hence, both the
et ipsum intelligere intellectus fit intellect itself is said to understand, and
intelligere nostrum. Alio modo, sicut also the intellect’s act of understanding
specie intelligibili: qua quidem becomes our act of understanding.
dicimur intelligere, non quasi ipsa Second, we understand by means of an
intelligat, sed quia vis intellectiva intelligible species; of course, we are not
per eam perficitur in actu, sicut vis said to understand by it, in the sense
visiva per speciem coloris. Tertio that it understands, but because the
modo, sicut medio per cuius intellective power is actually perfected
cognitionem devenimus in by it, as the visual power is by the
cognitionem alterius. species of color. Third, we understand
as by an intermediary through the
knowing of which we come to the
knowledge of something else.
Si igitur homo quandoque per [10] So, if at some point man
intellectum agentem intelligat understands separate substances
substantias separatas, oportet through the agent intellect, this must be
aliquo modorum dictorum hoc dici. explained by one of these ways that
Non autem dicitur hoc modo tertio: have been mentioned. Now, it is not
quia non concedit Alexander quod explained by the third way, for Alexander
intelligat intellectum agentem vel did not admit that either the possible or
intellectus possibilis, vel intellectus the habitual intellect understands the
in habitu. Nec etiam secundo agent intellect. Nor, indeed, is it in the
modo: quia intelligere per speciem second way, for to understand through
intelligibilem attribuitur virtuti an intelligible species is the attribute of
intellectivae cuius illa species the intellective power for which this
intelligibilis est forma; non autem intelligible species is the form. Now,
concedit Alexander quod intellectus Alexander did not grant that the possible
possibilis, vel intellectus in habitu, intellect or the habitual intellect
intelligat substantias separatas; understands separate substances;
unde non potest esse quod sic hence, it is not possible for us to
intelligamus substantias separatas understand separate substances
per intellectum agentem sicut through the agent intellect in the same
intelligimus aliqua per speciem way that we understand other things
intelligibilem. Si autem sicut per through an intelligible species. But, if it is
virtutem intellectivam, oportet quod as through an intellective power, then
ipsum intelligere intellectus agentis the agent intellect’s act of understanding
sit intelligere hominis. Hoc autem must be man’s act of understanding.
esse non potest nisi ex substantia Now, this cannot be so unless one
intellectus agentis et substantia actual being is made from the substance
hominis fiat unum secundum esse: of the agent intellect and the substance
impossibile enim est, si sint duae of man; indeed, it is impossible if they
substantiae secundum esse are two substances with different acts of
diversae, quod operatio unius sit being, for the operation of the one to be
operatio alterius. Erit igitur the operation of the other. Therefore, the
intellectus agens unum secundum agent intellect will be one existing being
esse cum homine. Non autem with man, not one accidentally, for then
secundum esse accidentale: quia the agent intellect would be not a
iam non esset intellectus agens substance but an accident, as is the
substantia, sed accidens; sic enim case when a thing that is one being
ex colore et corpore fit unum accidentally is made from color and a
secundum esse accidentale. body. The conclusion remains, then, that
Relinquitur igitur quod intellectus the agent intellect is united with man in
agens sit cum homine unum substantial being. It will be, then, either
secundum esse substantiale. Erit the human soul or a part of it, and not
igitur vel anima humana, vel pars some separate substance as Alexander
eius, et non aliqua substantia claimed. Therefore, it cannot be
separata, sicut Alexander ponit. maintained, on the basis of Alexander’s

Non igitur secundum opinionem opinion, that man understands separate
Alexandri potest poni quod homo substances.
intelligat substantias separatas.
Amplius. Si intellectus agens [11] Furthermore, if the agent intellect at

quandoque fiet forma istius any time becomes the form of one man,
hominis, ita quod per ipsum so that he is enabled to understand
intelligere possit, eadem ratione through it, by the same token it could
poterit fieri forma alterius hominis become the form of another man
per ipsum similiter intelligentis. similarly understanding through it. It will
Sequetur ergo quod duo homines Mow, then, that two men will understand
simul per intellectum agentem at the same time through the agent
intelligent sicut per formam suam. intellect as through their own form. This
Hoc autem est ita quod ipsum is so because the agent intellect’s own
intelligere intellectus agentis sit act of understanding is the act of
intelligere intelligentis per ipsum, ut understanding of ‘the man who
iam dictum est. Erit ergo idem understands through it, as was said
intelligere duorum intelligentium. already. Therefore, there will be the
Quod est impossibile. same act of understanding for two
intelligent beings; and this is impossible.
Ratio etiam sua frivola omnino est. [12] As a matter of fact, his theory is
Primo quidem quia, quando entirely frivolous. First of all because,
perficitur generatio alicuius generis, whenever the process of generation is
oportet quod perficiatur sua perfected in any member of a genus its
operatio, sed tamen secundum operation must be perfected, but, of
modum sui generis, non autem course, according to the manner of its
secundum modum generis altioris: own genus and not according to the
cum enim perficitur generatio aeris, mode of a higher genus. For instance,
habet generationem et motum when the generation of air is perfected it
completum sursum, non tamen ut has a development and complete
moveatur ad locum ignis. Similiter movement upward, but not such that it is
autem, cum completur generatio moved to the place proper to fire.
intellectus in habitu, complebitur Similarly, when the development of the
eius operatio, quae est intelligere, habitual intellect is completed its
secundum suum modum: non operation of understanding will be
autem secundum modum quo completed according to its own mode,
intelligunt substantiae separatae, ut but not according to the mode whereby
scilicet intelligat substantias separate substances understand, so
separatas. Unde ex generatione that it may understand separate
intellectus in habitu non potest substances. Hence, from the generation
concludi quod homo quandoque of the habitual intellect one cannot
intelligat substantias separatas. conclude that man will understand
separate substance at some time.
Secundo, quia eiusdem virtutis est [13] Secondly, it is frivolous because the

complementum operationis cuius perfection of an operation belongs to the
est operatio ipsa. Si igitur intelligere same power to which the operation itself
substantias separatas sit belongs. So, if to understand separate

complementum operationis substances be a perfection of the
intellectus in habitu, sequitur quod operation of the habitual intellect, it
intellectus in habitu intelligat follows that the habitual intellect
quandoque substantias separatas. understands separate substances at
Quod Alexander non ponit: some point in time. Now, Alexander
sequeretur enim quod intelligere does not claim this, for it would follow
substantias separatas contingeret that to understand separate substances
per scientias speculativas, quae would depend on the speculative
sub intellectu in habitu sciences which are included under the
comprehenduntur. notion of habitual understanding.
Tertio, quia eorum quae generari [14] Thirdly, it is frivolous because the
incipiunt, completur generatio ut in generation of things that begin to be
pluribus: cum omnes generationes generated is nearly always brought to
rerum sint a causis determinatis, completion, since all processes of
quae consequuntur effectus suos generating things are due to determinate
vel semper vel in maiori parte. Si causes which achieve their effects,
igitur ad completionem generationis either always, or in the majority of cases.
sequitur etiam complementum If, then, the perfection of action also
actionis, oportet etiam quod follows upon the completion of
operatio completa consequatur ea generation, it must also be the case that
quae generantur vel semper, vel in perfect operation accompanies the
maiori parte. Intelligere autem generated things, either always, or in the
substantias separatas non majority of cases. Now, the actual
consequuntur qui ad generationem understanding of separate substances is
intellectus in habitu student, neque not achieved by those who apply
in pluribus neque semper: themselves to the development of
quinimmo nullus professus est se habitual understanding, either in most
ad hanc perfectionem pervenisse. cases or always; on the contrary, no
Non est igitur complementum man has openly declared that be had
operationis intellectus in habitu achieved this perfection. Therefore, the
intelligere substantias separatas. perfection of the operation of habitual
understanding does not consist in the
actual understanding of separate
substances.
Chapter 43
Caput 43
THAT WE CANNOT IN THIS LIFE
UNDERSTAND SEPARATE
intelligere substantias
SUBSTANCES IN THE WAY THAT
separatas sicut ponit Averroes
AVERROES CLAIMED
Quia vero maxima difficultas est [1] Because there is very great difficulty in

in opinione Alexandri ex hoc quod Alexander’s opinion, as a result of his
ponit intellectum possibilem in supposition that the possible intellect in a
habitu totaliter corruptibilem, condition of habituation is entirely
Averroes faciliorem viam se corruptible, Averroes thought that be

existimavit adinvenisse ad found an easier way to show that we
ostendendum quod quandoque sometimes understand separate
intelligamus substantias substances. In fact, he asserted that the
separatas, ex hoc quod ponit possible intellect is incorruptible and
intellectum possibilem separate in being from us, as is also the
incorruptibilem, et a nobis agent intellect.
secundum esse separatum, sicut
et intellectum agentem.
Ostendit enim primo, quod [2] He showed, first of all, that it was
necesse est ponere quod necessary to hold that the agent intellect
intellectus agens se habeat ad is related to principles naturally known to
principia naturaliter cognita a us, either as agent is to instrument, or as
nobis vel sicut agens ad form to matter. For the habitual intellect,
instrumentum, vel sicut forma ad by which we understand, has not only this
materiam. Intellectus enim in action of understanding, but also another,
habitu, quo intelligimus, non which is to make things actually
solum habet hanc actionem quae understood; indeed, we know by
est intelligere, sed etiam hanc experience that both actions stand within
quae est facere intellecta in actu: our power. Now, the action of making
utrumque enim experimur in things actual objects of understanding is
nostra potestate existere. Hoc more properly indicative of the meaning of
autem quod est facere intellecta habitual intellect than is the act of
in actu magis proprie notificat understanding, for to make things actually
intellectum in habitu quam intelligible precedes the act of
intelligere: quia prius est facere understanding them. But there are some
intellecta in actu quam intelligere. things within us which are rendered
Sunt autem quaedam in nobis actually understood in a natural way, not
facta intellecta in actu naturaliter, as a result of our effort or of the action of
non ex studio aut ex nostra our will: such are the first intelligible
voluntate, sicut prima intelligibilia. things. In fact, to make these actually
Haec autem facere intellecta actu understood does not depend on the
non contingit per intellectum in habitual intellect, through which things
habitu, per quem fiunt intellecta in that we know from study are made to be
actu ea quae scimus ex studio: actually understood; rather, these first
sed magis sunt initium intellectus intelligibles are the starting point of the
in habitu; unde et habitus horum habitual intellect. And that is why the habit
intelligibilium ab Aristotele, in VI of these intelligibles is also called
Ethicorum, intellectus dicitur. Fiunt understanding by Aristotle, in Ethics VI [6:
autem intellecta in actu per solum 1141a 7]. Now, they are made to be
intellectum agentem. Per haec actually understood by the agent intellect
autem fiunt intellecta in actu alia, alone. And by means of them other things
quae ex studio scimus. Facere are made to be actually understood: these
igitur haec consequentia intellecta are the things that we know from study.
in actu est actio et intellectus in So, to make these subsequent things
habitu, quantum ad prima actually understood is the work both of the
principia; et ipsius intellectus habitual intellect, as regards first
agentis. Una autem actio non est principles, and of the agent intellect. Now,
duorum nisi unum eorum one action is not attributed to two things
comparetur ad alterum sicut unless one of them is related to the other

agens ad instrumentum, vel sicut as agent to instrument or as form to
forma ad materiam. Oportet igitur matter. So, the agent intellect is
quod intellectus agens necessarily related to the first principles of
comparetur ad prima principia the habitual intellect either as agent to
intellectus in habitu vel sicut instrument or as form to matter.
agens ad instrumentum, vel sicut
forma ad materiam.
Quod quidem qualiter possit esse [3] In fact, he indicates how this is

sic ostendit. Intellectus possibilis, possible in the following way. Since the
cum sit, secundum eius possible intellect, according to his theory,
positionem, quaedam substantia is a separate substance, it understands
separata, intelligit intellectum the agent intellect and the other separate
agentem et alias substantias substances, and also the first objects of
separatas, et etiam prima speculative understanding. So, it is the
intellecta speculativa. Est igitur subject for both types of objects. Now,
subiectum utrorumque. whenever two things are united in one
Quaecumque autem conveniunt subject, one of them is like the form of the
in uno subiecto, alterum eorum other. Thus, when color and light are
est sicut forma alterius: sicut, cum present in a diaphanous body as their
color et lux sint in diaphano sicut subject, one of them, namely, light, must
in subiecto, oportet quod alterum, be like the form of the other, namely,
scilicet lux, sit quasi forma color. Now, this is necessary when they
alterius, scilicet coloris. Hoc have an ordered relationship to each
autem necesse est quando other, but not in the case of things
habent ordinem ad invicem: non accidentally associated in the same
in his quae per accidens subject, like whiteness and musical ability.
coniunguntur in eodem subiecto, But speculatively understood things and
sicut albedo et musica. Sunt the agent intellect do have an ordered
autem intellecta speculativa et relationship to each other, since the
intellectus agens ordinem ad objects of speculative understanding are
invicem habentia: cum intellecta rendered actually understood by means of
speculativa sint facta intellecta in the agent intellect. So, the agent intellect
actu per intellectum agentem. is related to the objects of speculative
Habet se igitur intellectus agens understanding as form is to matter.
ad intellecta speculativa quasi
forma ad materiam.
Oportet igitur quod, cum intellecta Therefore, when the objects of

speculativa sint nobis copulata speculative understanding are united with
per phantasmata, quae sunt us through the phantasms, which are in a
quoddam subiectum ipsorum, sense their subject, the agent intellect
quod etiam intellectus agens must also be connected with us, because
continuetur nobiscum, inquantum it is the form of the objects of speculative
est forma intellectorum understanding. Thus, when the objects of
speculativorum. Quando igitur speculative understanding are only
intellecta speculativa sunt in nobis potentially present in us, the agent
solum in potentia, intellectus intellect is only potentially connected with
agens continuatur nobiscum us. But, when some objects of speculative

solum in potentia. Quando autem understanding are actually in us, and
aliqua intellecta speculativa sunt some are potentially present, its
in nobis in actu et aliqua in connection with us is partly actual and
potentia, continuatur nobis partim partly potential. Then it is that we are said
actu et partim in potentia: et tunc to be in motion toward the aforementioned
dicimur moveri ad continuationem connection, for, as more things are made
praedictam: quia quanto plura to be actually understood within us, the
intellecta in actu fuerint in nobis agent intellect becomes more perfectly
facta, perfectius intellectus agens connected with us. This progress and
continuatur nobis. Hic autem movement toward the connection is
profectus et motus ad accomplished through study in the
continuationem fit per studium in speculative sciences, through which we
scientiis speculativis, per quas acquire true objects of understanding, and
vera intellecta acquirimus, et also false opinions that are outside the
falsae opiniones excluduntur, orderly process of this movement are
quae sunt extra ordinem huius excluded, just as monstrosities are
motus, sicut monstruosa extra outside the order of natural operation.
ordinem naturalis operationis. Hence, men may help each other in
Unde et ad hunc profectum iuvant making this progress, as they are of
se homines, sicut iuvant se mutual assistance in the speculative
invicem in scientiis speculativis. sciences.
Quando ergo omnia intellecta in And so, when all potential objects of
potentia fuerint in nobis facta in understanding have been made actual
actu, tunc intellectus agens within us, the agent intellect is perfectly
perfecte copulabitur nobis ut united with us as a form, and then we will
forma, et intelligemus per ipsum understand perfectly through it, just as we
perfecte, sicut nunc perfecte now understand perfectly through the
intelligimus per intellectum in habitual intellect. Hence, since it is the
habitu. Unde, cum ad intellectum function of the agent intellect to
agentem pertineat intelligere understand separate substances, we will
substantias separatas, then understand separate substances, as
intelligemus tunc substantias we now understand the objects of
separatas, sicut nunc intelligimus speculative understanding. And this will
intellecta speculativa. Et haec erit be the ultimate felicity of man, in which
ultima hominis felicitas, in qua man will be “like some sort of God.”
homo erit sicut quidam Deus.
Huius autem positionis destructio [4] Now, the refutation of this theory is
ex praemissis sufficienter apparet: sufficiently evident from the things that we
procedit enim ex suppositione have said earlier: in fact, it proceeds from
multorum quae in superioribus the supposition of many points which are
sunt improbata. disproved in the foregoing sections.
Primo quidem, supra ostensum [5] First of all, we showed above that the
est quod intellectus possibilis non possible intellect is not some substance
est aliqua substantia separata a separated from us in its being. Hence, it
nobis secundum esse. Unde non will not be necessary for it to be the
oportebit quod sit subiectum subject of separate substances, especially

substantiarum separatarum: since Aristotle says that the intellect is
praecipue cum Aristoteles dicat possible, “in that it is able to become all
quod intellectus possibilis est in things.” From this we see that it is the
quo est omnia fieri; unde videtur subject only of those things that are made
quod sit subiectum solum illorum actually understood.
quae sunt facta intellecta.
Item. De intellectu agente etiam [6] Again, we have shown above,
supra ostensum est quod non est concerning the agent intellect, that it is not
aliqua substantia separata, sed a separate substance, but a part of the
pars animae: cui Aristoteles soul, to which Aristotle assigns this
attribuit hanc operationem, scilicet operation: “to make things actually
facere intellecta in actu, quae est understood” [De anima III, 5: 430a 14],
in nostra potestate. Unde non and this lies within our power. Hence, it
oportebit quod intelligere per will not be necessary for the act of
intellectum agentem sit nobis understanding —through the agent
causa quod possimus intelligere intellect to be the cause, for us, of our
substantias separatas: alias ,capacity to understand separate
semper intelligeremus eas. substances; otherwise, we would always
understand them.
Adhuc. Si intellectus agens est [7] Furthermore, if the agent intellect is a
substantia separata, non separate substance, it cannot be joined to
copulatur nobiscum nisi per us except through species that have been
species factas intellectas in actu, made actually understood, according to
secundum eius positionem, sicut this theory; and neither can the possible
nec intellectus possibilis: licet intellect, even though the possible intellect
intellectus possibilis se habeat ad is related to these species as matter to
illas species sicut materia ad form, while, conversely, the agent intellect
formam, intellectus autem agens is as form to matter. Now, species that
e converso sicut forma ad have been made actually understood are
materiam. Species autem factae joined with us, according to his theory, by
intellectae in actu copulantur means of the phantasms which are
nobiscum, secundum eius related to the possible intellect as colors
positionem, propter phantasmata, to the visual power, but to the agent
quae ita se habent ad intellectum intellect as colors to light: as we see from
possibilem sicut colores ad visum, the words of Aristotle in Book in of On the
ad intellectum vero agentem sicut Soul [III, 5: 430a 15]. But to the stone in
colores ad lucem, ut ex verbis which color is present, neither the action
Aristotelis in III de anima patet. of the power of sight as it sees nor the
Non autem lapidi, in quo est color, action of the sun as it enlightens can be
potest attribui neque actio visus ut attributed. Therefore, according to the
videat, neque actio solis ut aforesaid theory, it would be impossible to
illuminet. Ergo, secundum attribute to man either the action of the
positionem praedictam, homini possible intellect as it understands or the
non poterit attribui neque actio action of the agent intellect as it
intellectus possibilis ut intelligat; understands separate substances or as it
neque actio intellectus agentis ut makes things actually understood.
intelligat substantias separatas,
vel ut faciat intellecta in actu.
Amplius. Secundum positionem [8] Besides, according to this theory, the
praemissam, intellectus agens agent intellect is not asserted to be
non ponitur continuari nobiscum connected with us as a form except by the
ut forma nisi per hoc quod est fact that it is the form of objects of
forma speculativorum speculative understanding; and it is
intellectorum, quorum etiam claimed to be the form of these objects
ponitur forma per hoc quod because the same action belongs to the
eadem actio est intellectus agent intellect and to these objects of
agentis et illorum intellectorum, understanding, which action is to make
scilicet facere intellecta actu. Non things actually understood. So, it could
igitur poterit esse forma nobis nisi not be a form for us, unless by virtue of
secundum quod communicant in the fact that the objects of speculative
actione eius intellecta speculativa. understanding share in its action. Now,
Haec autem non communicant in these objects do not share in its operation
operatione eius quae est which consists in understanding separate
intelligere substantias separatas, substances, for they are the species of
cum sint species rerum sensible things, unless we go back to the
sensibilium: nisi redeamus ad opinion of Avempace that the quiddities of
opinionem Avempace, quod separate substances can be known
quidditates substantiarum through the things that we understand
separatarum possint cognosci per about sensible objects. Therefore, it would
ea quae intelligimus de istis not be at all possible for us to understand
sensibilibus. Nullo igitur modo per separate substances in the aforesaid way.
viam praedictam poterimus
intelligere substantias separatas.
Praeterea. Intellectus agens [9] Moreover, the agent intellect is related

secundum alium ordinem to the objects of speculative
comparatur ad intellecta understanding, which it makes to be so, in
speculativa, quorum est factivus; a different way from its relation to
et ad substantias separatas, separate substances, which it does not
quarum non est factivus, sed make, but only knows, according to this
cognoscitivus tantum, secundum theory. So, there is no necessity for it to
eius positionem. Non igitur be joined to us in its function as knower of
oportet, si copuletur nobis per hoc separate substances, even if it is joined to
quod est factivus intellectorum us in its function as maker of the objects
speculativorum, quod copuletur of speculative understanding. Rather,
nobis secundum quod est there is clearly a fallacy of accident in
cognoscitivus substantiarum reasoning such as his.
separatarum: sed in tali processu
est deceptio manifeste secundum
accidens.
Adhuc. Si per intellectum [10] Again, if we know separate
agentem cognoscimus substances through the agent intellect,
substantias separatas, hoc non this is not accomplished because the
est inquantum intellectus agens agent intellect is the form of this or that
est forma huius vel illius intellecti object of speculative understanding, but
speculativi, sed inquantum fit because it becomes a form for us, for in
forma nobis: sic enim per ipsum this way we are enabled to understand
possumus intelligere. Fit autem through it. Now, it becomes a form for us
forma nobis etiam per prima even through the first objects of
intellecta speculativa, secundum speculative understanding, according to
quod ipse dicit. Ergo statim a his own statement. Therefore,
principio homo potest per immediately at the start, man can know
intellectum agentem intelligere separate substances through the agent
substantias separatas. intellect.
Si autem dicatur quod non fit [11] Of course, it might be answered that
nobis perfecte forma per the agent intellect does not become a
quaedam intellecta speculativa form for us, in a perfect way, by virtue of
intellectus agens, ut per ipsum certain objects of speculative
possimus intelligere substantias understanding, so that we might
separatas: hoc non est nisi quia understand separate substances through
illa intellecta speculativa non it and the only reason for this is that these
adaequant perfectionem objects of speculative understanding are
intellectus agentis in intelligendo not sufficient for the perfecting of the
substantias separatas. Sed nec agent intellect in the act of understanding
omnia intellecta speculativa simul separate substances. But not even all the
accepta adaequant illam objects of speculative understanding
perfectionem intellectus agentis taken together are sufficient for that
secundum quod intelligit perfection of the agent intellect by which it
substantias separatas: cum omnia understands separate substances. For all
haec non sint intelligibilia nisi these objects are intelligible only in so far
inquantum sunt facta intellecta; as they have been made to be
illa vero sunt intelligibilia understood, while those separate
secundum suam naturam. Non substances are intelligible by their own
igitur per hoc quod omnia nature. So, not even the fact that we will
speculativa intelligibilia sciemus, know all the objects of speculative
oportebit quod ita perfecte understanding will make it necessary for
intellectus agens fiat nobis forma the agent intellect to become a form for
quod per ipsum intelligamus us, in such a perfect way that we may
substantias separatas. Vel, si hoc understand separate substances through
non requiritur, oportebit dicere it. Or, if this is not required, then we will
quod, intelligendo quodlibet have to say that, in understanding any
intelligibile, intelligamus intelligible object, we understand separate
substantias separatas. substances.
Caput 44 Chapter 44
Quod ultima felicitas hominis THAT MAN’S ULTIMATE FELICITY
non consistit in cognitione DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KIND OF
substantiarum separatarum KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE
qualem praedictae opiniones SUBSTANCES THAT THE
fingunt FOREGOING OPINIONS ASSUME
Non est autem possibile neque [1] Of course, it is not possible to identify

felicitatem humanam in tali human felicity with such knowledge of
cognitione substantiarum separate substances, as the
separatarum ponere sicut praedicti aforementioned philosophers have
philosophi posuerunt. maintained.
Vanum enim est quod est ad finem [2] Indeed, a thing is futile which exists

quem non potest consequi. Cum for an end which it cannot attain. So,
igitur finis hominis sit felicitas, in since the end of man is felicity, to which
quam tendit naturale ipsius his natural desire tends, it is not possible
desiderium, non potest poni for the felicity of man to be placed in
felicitas hominis in eo ad quod something that man cannot achieve.
homo pervenire non potest: Otherwise, it would follow that man is a
alioquin sequeretur quod homo futile being, and his natural desire would
esset in vanum, et naturale eius be incapable of fulfillment, which is
desiderium esset inane, quod est impossible. Now, it is clear from what
impossibile. Quod autem intelligere has been said that man cannot
substantias separatas homini sit understand separate substances on the
impossibile secundum praedictas basis of the foregoing opinions. So,
positiones, ex dictis est man’s felicity is not located in such
manifestum. Non est igitur in tali knowledge of separate substances.
cognitione substantiarum
separatarum felicitas hominis
constituta.
Praeterea. Ad hoc quod intellectus [3] Again, in order that the agent intellect

agens uniatur nobis ut forma ita be united to us as a form, so that we
quod per ipsum intelligamus may understand separate substances
substantias separatas, requiritur through it, it is required that the
quod generatio intellectus in habitu generation of the habitual intellect be
sit completa, secundum complete, according to Alexander; or
Alexandrum; vel quod omnia that all objects of speculative
intellecta speculativa sint facta in understanding be made actual within us,
nobis in actu, secundum Averroem; according to Averroes. And these two
quae duo in idem redeunt, nam views reduce to the same thing, for in
secundum hoc intellectus in habitu this explanation the habitual intellect is
generatur in nobis, secundum quod generated in us, in so far as the objects
intellecta speculativa fiunt in nobis of speculative understanding are made
in actu. Omnes autem species actual within us. Now, all species from
rerum sensibilium sunt intellectae sensible things are potential objects of
in potentia. Ad hoc igitur quod understanding. So, in order that the
intellectus agens copuletur alicui, agent intellect be joined with any person,
oportet quod intelligat in actu per he must actually understand all the
intellectum speculativum omnes natures of sensible things, and all their
naturas rerum sensibilium, et powers, operations, and motions,
omnes virtutes, operationes et through speculative understanding. This
motus eorum. Quod non est is not possible for any man to know
possibile aliquem hominem scire through the principles of the speculative
per principia scientiarum sciences, by which principles we are
speculativarum, per quas movemur moved to a connection with the agent

ad continuationem intellectus intellect, as they say. For, one could not
agentis, ut ipsi dicunt: cum ex his attain all these objects of knowledge
quae nostris sensibus subsunt, ex from the things that come under the
quibus sumuntur principia scope of our senses, and from which the
scientiarum speculativarum, non principles of the speculative sciences
possit perveniri ad omnia praedicta are drawn. So, it is impossible for a man
cognoscenda. Est igitur impossibile to achieve this connection, in the
quod aliquis homo ad illam manner suggested by them. Therefore, it
continuationem perveniat per is not possible for man’s felicity to
modum ab eis assignatum. Non est consist in such a connection.
igitur possibile quod in tali
continuatione sit hominis felicitas.
Adhuc. Dato quod talis continuatio [4] Besides, even granting that such a
hominis ad intellectum agentem sit connection of man with the agent
possibilis qualem ipsi describunt, intellect were possible as they describe
planum est quod talis perfectio it, it is plain that such perfection comes
paucissimis hominum advenit; in to very few men; so much so that not
tantum quod nec ipsi, nec aliqui, even these men, nor any other men,
quantumcumque in scientiis however diligent and expert in
speculativis studiosi et periti, ausi speculative sciences, have dared to
sunt talem perfectionem de se claim such perfection for themselves. On
profiteri. Quinimmo omnes plurima the contrary, they all state that many
a se asserunt ignorata: sicut things are unknown to them, Thus,
Aristoteles quadraturam circuli, et Aristotle speaks of the squaring of the
rationes ordinis caelestium circle, and he can give only probable
corporum, in quibus, ut ipsemet arguments for his principles for the
dicit in II de caelo, non nisi topicas ordering of celestial bodies, as he admits
rationes reddere potest; et quid sit himself, in Book II of On the Heavens [5:
in eis necessarium et eorum 288a 2], and what is necessary in regard
motoribus, aliis reservat in XI to these bodies and their movers he
metaphysicae. Felicitas autem est keeps for others to explain, in
quoddam commune bonum, ad Metaphysics XI [8: 1073b 2]. Now,
quod plures pervenire possunt, nisi felicity is a definite common good, which
sint orbati, ut Aristoteles dicit in I many people can attain, “unless they are
Ethicorum. Et hoc etiam verum est defective,” as Aristotle puts it, in Ethics I
de omni fine naturali alicuius [9: 1099b 19]. And this is also true of
speciei, quod ipsum consequuntur every natural end in any species, that
ea quae sunt illius speciei ut in the members of this species do attain it,
pluribus. Non est ergo possibile in most cases. Therefore, it is not
quod ultima hominis felicitas in possible for man’s ultimate felicity to
continuatione praedicta consistat. consist in the aforesaid connection.
Patet autem quod nec Aristoteles, [5] However, it is clear that Aristotle,
cuius sententiam sequi conantur whose view the aforementioned
praedicti philosophi, in tali philosophers try to follow, did not think
continuatione ultimam felicitatem that man’s ultimate felicity is to be found
hominis opinatus est esse. Probat in such a connection. For he proves, in
enim in I Ethicorum quod felicitas Ethics I [13: 1102a 5], that man’s felicity
hominis est operatio ipsius is his operation according to perfect
secundum virtutem perfectam: virtue. Hence, he had to develop his
unde necesse fuit quod de teaching on the virtues, which he divided
virtutibus determinaret, quas divisit into the moral and the intellectual
in virtutes morales et intellectuales. virtues. Now, he shows in Book X [7:
Ostendit autem in X quod ultima 1177a 18], that the ultimate felicity of
felicitas hominis est in man lies in speculation. Hence, it clearly
speculatione. Unde patet quod non does not lie in the act of any moral
est in actu alicuius virtutis moralis; virtue, nor of prudence or art, though
nec prudentiae nec artis, quae these are intellectual virtues. It remains,
tamen sunt intellectuales. then, that it is an operation in accord
Relinquitur ergo quod sit operatio with wisdom, the chief of the three
secundum sapientiam, quae est remaining intellectual virtues, which are
praecipua inter tres residuas wisdom, science, and understanding, as
intellectuales, quae sunt sapientia, he points out in Ethics VI [6: 1141a 3].
scientia et intellectus, ut ostendit in Hence, in Ethics X [8: 1179a 32], he
VI Ethicorum: unde et in X gives his judgment that the wise man is
Ethicorum sapientem iudicat esse happy. Now, wisdom, for him, is one of
felicem. Sapientia autem, the speculative knowledges, “the head of
secundum ipsum, est una de the others,” as he says in Ethics VI [6].
scientiis speculativis, caput And at the beginning of the Metaphysics
aliarum, ut dicit in VI Ethicorum: et [I, 1: 981b 26], he calls the science
in principio metaphysicae scientiam which he intends to treat in this work,
quam in illo libro tradere intendit, wisdom. Therefore, it is clear that
sapientiam nominat. Patet ergo Aristotle’s opinion was that the ultimate
quod opinio Aristotelis fuit quod felicity which man can acquire in this life
ultima felicitas quam homo in vita is the kind of knowledge of divine things
ista acquirere potest, sit cognitio de which can be gained through the
rebus divinis qualis per scientias speculative sciences. But that later way
speculativas haberi potest. Ille of knowing divine things, not by means
autem posterior modus of the speculative sciences but by a
cognoscendi res divinas, non per process of generation in the natural
viam scientiarum speculativarum, order, was made up by some of his
sed quodam generationis ordine commentators.
naturali, est confictus ab
expositoribus quibusdam.
Chapter 45
Caput 45
THAT IN THIS LIFE WE CANNOT
UNDERSTAND SEPARATE
SUBSTANCES
Quia ergo secundum modos [1] Hence, since separate substances

praedictos substantiae separatae cannot be known by us in this life in the
non possunt cognosci a nobis in preceding ways, the question remains
vita ista, inquirendum restat utrum whether we may understand these
aliquo modo in vita ista substantias separate substances in any way during
ipsas separatas intelligere this life.
possimus.
Quod autem hoc sit possibile nititur [2] Themistius tries to show that it is

ostendere Themistius per locum a possible, by an argument from a less
minori. Substantiae enim important case. Separate substances are
separatae sunt magis intelligibiles indeed more intelligible than material
quam materialia: haec enim sunt ones; the latter are intelligible, in so far
intelligibilia inquantum sunt facta as they are made to be actually
intellecta in actu per intellectum understood by the agent intellect, but the
agentem; illa vero sunt secundum former are intelligible in themselves.
seipsa intelligibilia. Si ergo Therefore, if our intellect comprehends
intellectus noster comprehendit these material substances, it is naturally
haec materialia, multo magis natus much more capable of understanding
est intelligere illas substantias separate substances.
separatas.
Haec autem ratio, secundum [3] Now, this argument must be judged in

diversas opiniones de intellectu different ways, depending on the various
possibili, diversimode iudicanda opinions concerning the possible
est. Si enim intellectus possibilis intellect. For, if the possible intellect is
non sit virtus a materia not a power which depends on matter,
dependens; et sit iterum and again if it is separate in being from
secundum esse a corpore body, as Averroes supposes, then it
separatus, ut Averroes ponit, follows that it has no necessary relation
sequetur quod nullum to material things. Consequently, things
necessarium ordinem ad res that are more intelligible in themselves
materiales habeat; unde quae sunt will be more intelligible to it. But then it
magis intelligibilia in seipsis, erunt seems to follow that, since we
sibi magis intelligibilia. Sed tunc understand from the start by means of
sequi videtur quod, cum nos a the possible intellect, we therefore
principio per intellectum possibilem understand separate substances from
intelligamus, quod a principio the start: which is clearly false.
intelligamus, substantias
separatas: quod patet esse
falsum.
Sed hoc inconveniens evitare [4] But Averroes tried to avoid this
Averroes nititur, secundum ea difficulty by the explanation which has
quae de eius opinione praedicta been mentioned above, in connection
sunt: quae patet esse falsa ex with his opinion. And this is plainly false,
praemissis. on the basis of what we have
established.
Si autem intellectus possibilis non [5] However, if the possible intellect is not

est a corpore separatus secundum separated in being from body, then by
esse, ex hoc ipso quod est tali virtue of such a union in being with body
corpori unitus secundum esse, it has a necessary relation to material
habet quendam necessarium things, so that it could not reach a
ordinem ad materialia, ut nisi per knowledge of other things except by
illa ad aliorum cognitionem means of these material things. Hence, it

pervenire non possit. Unde non does not follow that, if separate
sequitur, si substantiae separatae substances are more intelligible in
sint in seipsis magis intelligibiles, themselves, they are for this reason
quod propter hoc sint magis more intelligible to our intellect. And the
intelligibiles intellectui nostro. Et words of Aristotle in Metaphysics II [1:
hoc demonstrant verba Aristotelis 993b 9] prove this. For he says there that
in II metaphysicae. Dicit enim “the difficulty of understanding these
ibidem quod difficultas intelligendi things comes from us not from them, for
res illas accidit ex nobis, non ex our intellect is to the most evident things,
illis: nam intellectus noster se as the eye of the owl is to the light of the
habet ad manifestissima rerum sun.” Hence, since separate substances
sicut se habet oculus vespertilionis cannot be understood through material
ad lucem solis. Unde, cum per things that are understood, as was
materialia intellecta non possint shown above, it follows that our possible
intelligi substantiae separatae, ut intellect can in no way understand
supra ostensum est, sequetur separate substances.
quod intellectus possibilis noster
nullo modo possit intelligere
Hoc etiam apparet ex ordine [6] This is also evident from the relation
intellectus possibilis ad agentem. of the possible intellect to the agent
Potentia enim passiva ad illa intellect. A passive potency is only a
solum est in potentia in quae potency in regard to those things that are
potest proprium eius activum: omni within the power of its proper active
enim potentiae passivae respondet principle; for, to every passive potency in
potentia activa in natura; alias nature there corresponds an active
potentia passiva esset frustra, cum potency; otherwise, the passive potency
non possit reduci in actum nisi per would be useless, for it could not be
activam; unde videmus quod visus reduced to act except through an active
non est susceptivus nisi colorum, potency. Hence we see that the visual
qui illuminantur per lucem. power is only receptive of colors which
Intellectus autem possibilis, cum are illuminated by light. Now, the possible
sit virtus quodammodo passiva, intellect, since it is a passive power in
habet proprium agens sibi some sense, has its proper
respondens, scilicet intellectum corresponding agent, namely, the agent
agentem, qui ita se habet ad intellect which is related to the possible
intellectum possibilem sicut se intellect as light is to sight. So, the
habet lux ad visum. Non est igitur possible intellect is only in potency to
intellectus possibilis in potentia nisi those intelligible objects which are made
ad illa intelligibilia quae sunt facta by the agent intellect. Hence, Aristotle,
per intellectum agentem. Unde et describing both intellects in Book III of
Aristoteles, in III de anima, On the Soul [5: 430a 14], says that the
describens utrumque intellectum, possible intellect is “the capacity to
dicit quod intellectus possibilis est become all things,” while the agent
quo est omnia fieri, agens vero intellect is “the capacity to make all
quo est omnia facere; ut ad eadem things”; so, each potency is understood
utriusque potentia referri to be referred to the same thing, but one
intelligatur, huius activa, illius is active and the other passive, Thus,
passiva. Cum ergo substantiae since separate substances are not made

separatae non sint factae to be actually intelligible by the agent
intellectae in actu per intellectum intellect, but only material substances
agentem, sed solum materialia, ad are, the possible intellect only includes
haec sola se extendit possibilis the latter within its scope. Therefore, we
intellectus. Non igitur per ipsum cannot understand separate substances
possumus intelligere substantias through it.
separatas.
Propter quod et Aristoteles [7] For this point Aristotle made use of an

congruo exemplo usus est: nam appropriate example, for the eye of an
oculus vespertilionis nunquam owl can never see the light of the sun;
potest videre lucem solis. Quamvis though Averroes tries to ruin this
Averroes hoc exemplum depravare example by saying that the similarity
nitatur, dicens quod simile non est between our intellect in relation to
de intellectu nostro ad substantias separate substances and the eye of the
separatas, et oculo vespertilionis owl in relation to the light of the sun does
ad lucem solis, quantum ad not extend to impossibility, but only to
impossibilitatem, sed solum difficulty. He gives a proof for this, in the
quantum ad difficultatem. Quod tali same place, using the following
ratione probat ibidem. Quia si illa argument: If those things which are
quae sunt intellecta secundum se, understood in themselves, namely,
scilicet substantiae separatae, separate substances, were not possible
essent nobis impossibiles ad for us to understand, they would be for
intelligendum, frustra essent: sicut no purpose, just as if there were a visible
si esset aliquod visibile quod nullo object which could not be seen by any
visu videri posset. visual power.
Quae quidem ratio quam frivola sit, [8] How frivolous this argument is, is

apparet. Etsi enim a nobis quite apparent. For, though these
nunquam illae substantiae substances might never be understood
intelligerentur, tamen intelliguntur a by us, they are nonetheless understood
seipsis. Unde nec frustra by themselves. Hence, they are not
intelligibiles essent: sicut nec sol intelligible in a purposeless way, as the
frustra visibilis est, ut Aristotelis sun (to pursue Aristotle’s example) is
exemplum prosequamur, quia non visible, yet not in a purposeless way,
potest ipsum videre vespertilio; simply because the owl cannot see it. For
cum possit ipsum videre homo et man and other animals can see it.
alia animalia.
Sic ergo intellectus possibilis, si [9] And thus, the possible intellect, if it be

ponitur corpori unitus secundum granted that it is united with the body in
esse, non potest intelligere being, cannot understand separate
substantias separatas. Interest substances. However, it makes a
tamen qualiter de substantia ipsius difference how one thinks about its
sentiatur. Si enim ponatur esse substance. For, if it is supposed to be a
quaedam virtus materialis material power, capable of generation
generabilis et corruptibilis, ut and corruption, as some have claimed,
quidam posuerunt, sequitur quod then it follows that it is limited by its own
ex sua substantia determinatur ad substance to the understanding of

intelligendum materialia. Unde material things. Consequently, that it
necesse est quod nullo modo could in no way understand separate
intelligere possit substantias substances is quite necessary, since it
separatas: quia impossibile erit could not be separate in its own being.
ipsum esse separatum.
Si autem intellectus possibilis, On the other hand, if the possible
quamvis sit corpori unitus, est intellect, though united with a body, is,
tamen incorruptibilis et a materia however, incorruptible and not dependent
non dependens secundum suum on matter in its actual being, as we
esse, sicut supra ostendimus; showed above,” it follows that the
sequitur quod obligatio ad limitation to the understanding of material
intelligendas res materiales accidat things accrues to it as a result of its union
ei ex unione ad corpus. Unde, cum with the body. Consequently, when the
anima a corpore tali fuerit soul will have been separated from this
separata, intellectus possibilis body, the possible intellect will be able to
intelligere poterit ea quae sunt understand things that are intelligible in
secundum se intelligibilia, scilicet themselves, through the light of the agent
substantias separatas, per lumen intellect, which is the likeness in the
intellectus agentis, quae est intellectual soul of the light which is
similitudo in anima intellectualis present in separate substances.
luminis quod est in substantiis
separatis.
Et haec est sententia nostrae fidei [10] And this is the view of our faith,
de intelligendo substantias concerning the understanding of
separatas a nobis post mortem, et separate substances by us after death,
non in hac vita. and not in this life.
Caput 46 Chapter 46
Quod anima in hac vita non THAT THE SOUL DOES NOT
intelligit seipsam per UNDERSTAND ITSELF THROUGH ITSELF
seipsam IN THIS LIFE
Videtur autem difficultas [1] Now, it seems that some objection may
quaedam contra praedicta be offered against what we have said, on
afferri ex quibusdam Augustini the basis of a text of Augustine which
verbis, quae diligenter requires careful interpretation. In fact, he
pertractanda sunt. Dicit enim in says in Book IX of The Trinity: “Just as the
IX de Trinitate libro: mens, sicut mind gathers knowledge of bodily things
corporearum rerum notitias per through the bodily senses, so does it obtain
sensus corporis colligit, sic knowledge of incorporeal things through
incorporearum rerum per itself. And so, it knows itself through itself,
semetipsam. Ergo et seipsam since it is incorporeal.” Indeed, it does
per seipsam novit: quoniam est appear from these words that our mind
incorporea. Ex his enim verbis understands itself, through itself, and by
videtur quod mens nostra se understanding itself it understands separate
per seipsam intelligat, et substances. And this is in opposition to what

intelligendo se, intelligat was shown above. Therefore, it is necessary
substantias separatas: quod est to investigate how our soul understands
contra praeostensa. Inquirere itself through itself.
ergo oportet quomodo anima
nostra per seipsam intelligat se.
Impossibile est autem dici quod [2] Now, it cannot be said that it understands
per seipsam intelligat de se what it is, through itself. For, a cognitive
quid est. Per hoc enim fit potency becomes an actual knower by the
potentia cognoscitiva actu fact that there is present in it that whereby
cognoscens, quod est in ea id the knowing is accomplished. Of course, if it
quo cognoscitur. Et si quidem be present in a potential way in the potency,
sit in ea in potentia, cognoscit one knows potentially; but if it be there
in potentia; si autem in actu, actually, one knows actually; and if it be
cognoscit actu; si autem medio there in an intermediate fashion, one knows
modo, cognoscit habitu. Ipsa habitually. But the soul is always actually
autem anima semper sibi adest present to itself, never merely potentially or
actu, et nunquam in potentia habitually. So, if the soul knows itself
vel in habitu tantum. Si igitur through itself, in the sense of what it is, it will
per seipsam anima seipsam always actually understand what it is. And
cognoscit quid est, semper actu this is plainly false.
intelliget de se quid est. Quod
patet esse falsum.
Adhuc. Si anima per seipsam [3] Again, if the soul understands what it is,

cognoscit de se quid est; omnis through itself, and if every man has a soul,
autem homo animam habet: then every man knows what soul is. And this
omnis igitur homo cognoscit de is plainly false.
anima quid est. Quod patet
esse falsum.
Amplius. Cognitio quae fit per [4] Moreover, the knowledge which comes
aliquid naturaliter nobis inditum, about through something naturally implanted
est naturalis: sicut principia in us is natural, as is the case with
indemonstrabilia, quae indemonstrable principles which are known
cognoscuntur per lumen through the light of the agent intellect. If,
intellectus agentis. Si igitur nos then, we know concerning the soul what it is,
de anima scimus quid est per through the soul itself, then this will be
ipsam animam, hoc erit something naturally known. Now, in the case
naturaliter notum. In his autem of things that are naturally known no one
quae sunt naturaliter nota, can err; for instance, in the knowing of
nullus potest errare: in indemonstrable principles no one makes an
cognitione enim principiorum error. So, no one would be in error
indemonstrabilium nullus errat. concerning what the soul is, if the soul knew
Nullus igitur erraret circa this through itself. And this is clearly false,
animam quid est, si hoc anima for many men have held the opinion that the
per seipsam cognosceret. soul is this or that body, and some have
Quod patet esse falsum: cum thought it a number or a harmony.
multi opinati sint animam esse Therefore, the soul does not, through itself,
hoc vel illud corpus, et aliqui know concerning itself what it is.
numerum, vel harmoniam. Non
igitur anima per seipsam
cognoscit de se quid est.
Amplius. In quolibet ordine, [5] Besides, in any order, “that which exists
quod est per se est prius eo through itself is prior to, and is the principle
quod est per aliud, et of, that which is through another.” So, that
principium eius. Quod ergo est which is known through itself is known
per se notum, est prius notum before all things that are known through
omnibus quae per aliud another, and it is the principle of the knowing
cognoscuntur, et principium of them. Thus, the first propositions are prior
cognoscendi ea: sicut primae to the conclusions. If, then, the soul knows
propositiones conclusionibus. through itself what it is in itself, this will be
Si igitur anima per seipsam de something known through itself, and,
se cognoscit quid est, hoc erit consequently, a first known thing and a
per se notum, et per principle for the knowing of other things.
consequens primo notum et Now, this is clearly false. For, what the soul
principium cognoscendi alia. is no science takes as something known;
Hoc autem patet esse falsum: rather, it is a topic proposed for
nam quid est anima non investigation, starting from other items of
supponitur in scientia quasi knowledge. Therefore, the soul does not
notum, sed proponitur ex aliis know concerning itself what it is, through
quaerendum. Non igitur anima itself.
de seipsa cognoscit quid est
per seipsam.
Patet autem quod nec ipse [6] Now, it appears that even Augustine
Augustinus hoc voluit. Dicit himself did not intend that it does. For he
enim in X libro de Trin. quod says in Book X of The Trinity that “the soul,
anima, cum sui notitiam quaerit, when seeking knowledge of itself, does not
non velut absentem se quaerit endeavor to see itself as something absent,
cernere, sed praesentem se but takes care to observe itself as present;
curat discernere: non ut not to learn about itself as if it were ignorant,
cognoscat se, quasi non norit; but to distinguish itself from what it knows as
sed ut dignoscat ab eo quod another thing.” Thus, he makes us
alterum novit. Ex quo dat understand that the soul, through itself, does
intelligere quod anima per se know itself as present, but not as distinct
cognoscit seipsam quasi from other things. Consequently, he says
praesentem, non quasi ab aliis that some people have erred on this point
distinctam. Unde et in hoc dicit because they have not distinguished the
aliquos errasse, quod animam soul from those things which are different
non distinxerunt ab illis quae from it. Now, because a thing is known from
sunt ab ipsa diversa. Per hoc the point of view of what it is, that thing is
autem quod scitur de re quid also known in distinction from others;
est, scitur res prout est ab aliis consequently, the definition which signifies
distincta: unde et definitio, quae what a thing is distinguishes the thing
significat quid est res, distinguit defined from all else. Therefore, Augustine
definitum ab omnibus aliis. Non did not wish to say that, through itself, the
igitur voluit Augustinus quod soul knows concerning itself what it is.
anima de se cognoscat quid est
per seipsam.
Sed nec Aristoteles hoc voluit. [7] But neither did Aristotle intend this.
Dicit enim in III de anima, quod Indeed, he says in Book III of On the Soul
intellectus possibilis intelligit se [4: 430a 2] that “the possible intellect
sicut alia. Intelligit enim se per understands itself as it does other things.”
speciem intelligibilem, qua fit For it understands itself through an
actu in genere intelligibilium. In intelligible species, by which it is made
se enim consideratus, est actual in the genus of intelligible objects.
solum in potentia ad esse Considered in itself, it is merely in potency in
intelligibile: nihil autem regard to intelligible being; nothing is known
cognoscitur secundum quod est according to what it is potentially, but only as
in potentia, sed secundum it is actually. Hence, separate substances,
quod est actu. Unde whose substances are like something
substantiae separatae, quarum actually existing in the genus of intelligible
substantiae sunt ut aliquid actu objects, do understand, concerning
ens in genere intelligibilium, de themselves, what they are, through their
se intelligunt quid sunt per suas own substances; while our possible intellect
substantias: intellectus vero does so, through an intelligible species, by
possibilis noster per speciem which it is made an actual agent which
intelligibilem, per quam fit actu understands. Hence, also, Aristotle, in Book
intelligens. Unde et Aristoteles, III of On the Soul [4: 429a 2], demonstrates
in III de anima, ex ipso from the very act of understanding what is
intelligere demonstrat naturam the nature of the possible intellect, namely,
intellectus possibilis, scilicet that it is “unmixed and incorruptible,” as is
quod sit immixtus et clear from what we have said earlier.
incorruptibilis, ut ex praemissis
patet.
Sic igitur, secundum [8] And so, according to Augustine’s

intentionem Augustini, mens meaning, our mind knows itself through
nostra per seipsam novit itself, in so far as it knows concerning itself,
seipsam inquantum de se that it is. Indeed, from the fact that it
cognoscit quod est. Ex hoc perceives that it acts it perceives that it is. Of
enim ipso quod percipit se course, it acts through itself, and so, through
agere, percipit se esse; agit itself, it knows concerning itself that it is.
autem per seipsam, unde per
seipsam de se cognoscit quod
est.
Sic ergo et de substantiis [9] So, also, in regard to separate
separatis anima, cognoscendo substances, the soul by knowing itself
seipsam, cognoscit quia sunt: knows that they are, but not what they are,
non autem quid sunt, quod est for to do the latter is to understand their
earum substantias intelligere. substances. Indeed, when we know this
Cum enim de substantiis about separate substances, either through

separatis hoc quod sint demonstration or through faith, that there
intellectuales quaedam are certain intellectual substances, we would
substantiae cognoscamus, vel not be able to get this knowledge on either
per demonstrationem vel per basis unless our soul knew on its own part
fidem, neutro modo hanc this point: what it is to be intellectual.
cognitionem accipere Consequently, the knowledge concerning
possemus nisi hoc ipsum quod the soul’s understanding must be used as a
est esse intellectuale, anima starting point for all that we learn about
nostra ex seipsa cognosceret. separate substances.
Unde et scientia de intellectu
animae oportet uti ut principio
ad omnia quae de substantiis
separatis cognoscimus.
Non autem oportet quod, si per [10] Nor is it a necessary conclusion that, if
scientias speculativas we succeed in knowing what the soul is
possumus pervenire ad through the speculative sciences, we must
sciendum de anima quid est, then be able to reach a knowledge of what
quod possimus ad sciendum separate substances are, through these
quod quid est de substantiis same sciences. As a matter of fact, our act
separatis per huiusmodi of understanding, whereby we attain to the
scientias pervenire: nam knowledge of what our soul is, is very
intelligere nostrum, per quod remote from the intelligence of a separate
pervenimus ad sciendum de substance. Nevertheless, it is possible
anima nostra quid est, multum through knowing what our soul is to reach a
est remotum ab intelligentia knowledge of a remote genus for separate
substantiae separatae. Potest substances, but this does not mean an
tamen per hoc quod scitur de understanding of these substances.
anima nostra quid est, perveniri
ad sciendum aliquod genus
remotum substantiarum
separatarum: quod non est
earum substantias intelligere.
Sicut autem de anima scimus [11] just as we know, through itself, that the

quia est per seipsam, soul is, in so far as we perceive its act, and
inquantum eius actus we seek to discover what it is, from a
percipimus; quid autem sit, knowledge of its acts and objects, by means
inquirimus ex actibus et obiectis of the principles of the speculative sciences,
per principia scientiarum so also do we ‘know concerning the things
speculativarum: ita etiam de his that are within our soul, such as powers and
quae sunt in anima nostra, habits, that they indeed are, by virtue of our
scilicet potentiis et habitibus, perception of their acts; but we discover
scimus quidem quia sunt, what they are, from the qualitative character
inquantum actus percipimus; of their acts.
quid vero sint, ex ipsorum
actuum qualitate invenimus.
Caput 47 Chapter 47
Quod non possumus in hac vita THAT IN THIS LIFE WE CANNOT SEE
videre Deum per essentiam GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE
Si autem alias substantias [1] Now, if we are not able to understand

separatas in hac vita intelligere non other separate substances in this life,
possumus, propter because of the natural affinity of our
connaturalitatem intellectus nostri intellect for phantasms, still less are we
ad phantasmata, multo minus in able in this life to see the divine essence
hac vita divinam essentiam videre which transcends all separate
possumus, quae transcendit omnes substances.
Huius autem signum hinc etiam [2] An indication of this may also be
accipi potest, quia quanto magis taken from the fact that the higher our
mens nostra ad contemplanda mind is elevated to the contemplation of
spiritualia elevatur, tanto magis spiritual beings, the more is it withdrawn
abstrahitur a sensibilibus. Ultimus from sensible things. Now, the final limit
autem terminus quo contemplatio to which contemplation can reach is the
pertingere potest, est divina divine substance. Hence, the mind which
substantia. Unde oportet mentem sees the divine substance must be
quae divinam substantiam videt, completely cut off from the bodily
totaliter a corporalibus sensibus senses, either by death or by ecstasy.
esse absolutam, vel per mortem vel Thus, it is said by one who speaks for
per aliquem raptum. Hinc est quod God: “Man shall not see me and live”
dicitur ex persona Dei, Exodi 33 (Exod. 33:20).
20: non videbit me homo et vivet.
Quod autem in sacra Scriptura [3] But that some men are spoken of in
aliqui Deum vidisse dicuntur, Sacred Scripture as having seen God
oportet intelligi hoc fuisse vel per must be understood either in reference
aliquam imaginariam visionem; seu to an imaginary vision, or even a
etiam corporalem, prout scilicet per corporeal one: according as the
aliquas corporeas species, vel presence of divine power was
exterius apparentes vel interius manifested through some corporeal
formatas in imaginatione, divinae species, whether appearing externally,
virtutis praesentia demonstrabatur; or formed internally in the imagination; or
vel etiam secundum quod aliqui per even according as some men have
spirituales effectus aliquam perceived some intelligible knowledge of
cognitionem de Deo intelligibilem God through His spiritual effects.
perceperunt.
Difficultatem autem afferunt [4] However, certain words of Augustine

quaedam verba Augustini, ex do present a difficulty; for it appears from
quibus videtur quod in hac vita them that we can understand God
possimus intelligere ipsum Deum. Himself in this life. He says in Book IX of
Dicit enim in IX libro de Trin., quod The Trinity that “we see with the vision of
in aeterna veritate, ex qua omnia the mind, in the eternal truth, from which

temporalia facta sunt, formam all temporal things have been made, the
secundum quam sumus, et form in accord with which we exist, and
secundum quam vel in nobis vel in in accord with which we perform any
corporibus vera et recta ratione action by true and right reason, either
aliquid operamur, visu mentis within ourselves or in bodies, and as a
aspicimus, atque inde conceptam result of this we have with us a
rerum veracem notitiam apud nos conception and a true knowledge of
habemus. In XII etiam things.” He also says in Book VII of the
confessionum dicit: si ambo Confessions: “Suppose both of us see
videmus verum esse quod dicis, et that what you say is true, and both of us
ambo videmus verum esse quod see that what I say is true: where, I ask,
dico, ubi quaeso, id videmus? Nec do we see it? Certainly, I do not see it in
ego utique in te, nec tu in me. Sed you, nor you in me, but both in that
ambo in ipsa quae supra mentes immutable truth which is above our
nostras est, incommutabili veritate. minds. Again, he says in the book On
In libro etiam de vera religione dicit the True Religion that “we judge all
quod secundum veritatem divinam things according to the divine truth.” And
de omnibus iudicamus. In libro he says in the Soliloquies that “truth
autem Soliloquiorum dicit quod must be known first, and through it other
prius est veritas cognoscenda, per things can be known.” And this seems to
quam possunt alia cognosci. Quod mean the divine truth. It appears, then,
de veritate divina intelligere videtur. from his words, that we see God
Videtur ergo ex verbis eius quod Himself, Who is His own truth, and thus
ipsum Deum, qui sua veritas est, we know other things through Him.
videamus, et per ipsum alia
cognoscamus.
Ad idem etiam pertinere videntur [5] The same writer’s words seem to
verba eiusdem quae ponit in XII de tend toward the same view, words which
Trin., sic dicens: rationis est he puts in Book XII of The Trinity, saying
iudicare de istis corporalibus the following: “It pertains to reason to
secundum rationes incorporales et judge concerning these bodily things in
sempiternas, quae, nisi supra accord with the incorporeal and
mentem humanam essent, sempiternal reasons which, unless they
incommutabiles profecto non were above the human mind, certainly
essent. Rationes autem would not be immutable.” Now, the
incommutabiles et sempiternae immutable and sempiternal reasons
alibi quam in Deo esse non cannot exist in any other location than in
possunt: cum solus Deus, God, since only God, according to the
secundum fidei doctrinam, sit teaching of our faith, is sempiternal.
sempiternus. Videtur igitur sequi Therefore, it seems to follow that we are
quod Deum in ista vita videre able to see God in this life, and because
possimus, et per hoc quod eum et we see the reasons of things in Him we
in eo rationes rerum videmus, de may judge concerning other things.
aliis iudicemus.
Non est autem credendum quod [6] However, we must not believe that
Augustinus hoc in verbis Augustine held this view, in the texts
praemissis senserit, quod in hac which have been quoted: that we are
vita Deum per suam essentiam able in this life to understand God
intelligere possimus. Qualiter igitur through His essence. So, we have to
illam incommutabilem veritatem, make a study of how we may see this
vel istas rationes aeternas, in hac immutable truth, or these eternal
vita videamus, et secundum eam reasons, in this life, and thus judge other
de aliis iudicemus, inquirendum things in accord with this vision.
est.
Veritatem quidem in anima esse, [7] As a matter of fact, Augustine himself

ipse Augustinus in libro admits that truth is in the soul, in the
Soliloquiorum confitetur: unde ex Soliloquies, and as a result he proves
aeternitate veritatis immortalitatem the immortality of the soul from the
animae probat. Non solum autem eternity of truth. But truth is not in the
sic veritas est in anima sicut Deus soul simply in the way that God is said to
per essentiam in rebus omnibus be in all things by His essence, nor as
dicitur; neque sicut in rebus He is in all things by His likeness, in the
omnibus est per suam sense that each thing is called true to
similitudinem, prout unaquaeque the extent that it approaches the
res in tantum dicitur vera likeness of God; for it is not on this basis
inquantum ad Dei similitudinem that the soul is set above other things.
accedit: non enim in hoc anima Therefore, it is present in a special way
rebus aliis praeferretur. Est ergo in the soul, inasmuch as it knows truth.
speciali modo in anima inquantum So, just as souls and other things are
veritatem cognoscit. Sicut igitur indeed said to be true in their own
animae et res aliae verae quidem natures, because they have a likeness to
dicuntur in suis naturis, secundum the highest nature, which is Truth Itself,
quod similitudinem illius summae since it is its own actual being as
naturae habent, quae est ipsa understood—so also, what is known by
veritas, cum sit suum intellectum the soul is true in so far as some
esse: ita id quod per animam likeness exists in it of that divine truth
cognitum est, verum est inquantum which God knows. Hence the Gloss on
illius divinae veritatis quam Deus Psalm 11:2: “Truths are decayed from
cognoscit, similitudo quaedam among the children of men,” says that:
existit in ipso. Unde et Glossa “as from one face there may result many
super illud Psalmi, diminutae sunt reflections in a mirror, so from one first
veritates a filiis hominum, dicit truth there may result many truths in the
quod, sicut ab una facie resultant minds of men.
multae in speculo, ita ab una prima
veritate resultant multae veritates in
mentibus hominum.
Quamvis autem diversa a diversis Now, although different things are known

cognoscuntur et creduntur vera, and believed to be true by different
tamen quaedam sunt vera in people, certain things are true on which
quibus omnes homines concordant, all men agree, such as the first principles
sicut sunt prima principia intellectus of understanding, both speculative and
tam speculativi quam practici: practical, according as an image of
secundum quod universaliter in divine truth is reflected universally in the
mentibus omnium divinae veritatis minds of all men. So, in so far as any
quasi quaedam imago resultat. mind knows anything whatever with
Inquantum ergo quaelibet mens certitude, the object is intuited in these
quicquid per certitudinem principles, by means of which judgment
cognoscit, in his principiis intuetur, is made concerning all things, by
secundum quae de omnibus resolving them back into these
iudicatur, facta resolutione in ipsa, principles; and so the mind is said to see
dicitur omnia in divina veritate vel in all things in the divine truth, or in the
rationibus aeternis videre, et eternal reasons, and is said to judge all
secundum eas de omnibus things in accord with them. And this
iudicare. Et hunc sensum interpretation the words of Augustine
confirmant Augustini verba in libro confirm, in the Soliloquies, for he says
Soliloquiorum, qui dicit quod that the principles of the sciences are
scientiarum spectamina videntur in seen in the divine truth as these visible
divina veritate sicut haec visibilia in objects are seen in the light of the sun.
lumine solis, quae constat non Yet it is obvious that they are not seen in
videri in ipso corpore solis, sed per the actual body of the sun, but through
lumen, quod est similitudo solaris its light, which is a likeness in the air of
claritatis in aere et similibus solar brilliance, transmitted to suitable
corporibus relicta. bodies.
Ex his ergo verbis Augustini non [8] Therefore, we should not gather from

habetur quod Deus videatur these words of Augustine that God can
secundum suam substantiam in be seen in His substance in this life, but
hac vita, sed solum sicut in only as in a mirror. And this is what the
speculo. Quod et apostolus de Apostle professes concerning the
cognitione huius vitae confitetur, knowledge of this life, for he says: “We
dicens, I Cor. 1312: videmus nunc see now through a glass in a dark
per speculum in aenigmate. manner” (1 Cor. 13:l2).
Quamvis autem hoc speculum [9] Although this mirror, which is the
quod est mens humana, de human mind, reflects the likeness of God
propinquiori Dei similitudinem in a closer way than lower creatures do,
repraesentet quam inferiores the knowledge of God which can be
creaturae, tamen cognitio Dei quae taken in by the human mind does not go
ex mente humana accipi potest, beyond the type of knowledge that is
non excedit illud genus cognitionis derived from sensible things, since even
quod ex sensibilibus sumitur: cum the soul itself knows what it is itself as a
et ipsa anima de seipsa cognoscat result of understanding the natures of
quid est per hoc quod naturas sensible things, as we have said. Hence,
intelligit sensibilium, ut dictum est. throughout this life God can be known in
Unde nec per hanc viam cognosci no higher way than that whereby a
Deus altiori modo potest quam cause is known through its effect.
sicut causa cognoscitur per
effectum.
Caput 48 Chapter 48
Quod ultima hominis felicitas THAT MAN’S ULTIMATE FELICITY
non sit in hac vita DOES NOT COME IN THIS LIFE
Si ergo humana felicitas ultima non [1] If, then, ultimate human felicity does

consistit in cognitione Dei qua not consist in the knowledge of God,
communiter ab omnibus vel whereby He is known in general by all, or
pluribus cognoscitur secundum most, men, by a sort of confused
quandam aestimationem appraisal, and again, if it does not
confusam, neque iterum in consist in the knowledge of God which is
cognitione Dei qua cognoscitur per known by way of demonstration in the
viam demonstrationis in scientiis speculative sciences, nor in the cognition
speculativis, neque in cognitione of God whereby He is known through
Dei qua cognoscitur per fidem, ut faith, as has been shown in the
in superioribus est ostensum; non foregoing; and if it is not possible in this
est autem possibile in hac vita ad life to reach a higher knowledge of God
altiorem Dei cognitionem pervenire so as to know Him through His essence,
ut per essentiam cognoscatur, vel or even in such a way that, when the
saltem ita quod aliae substantiae other separate substances are known,
separatae intelligantur, ut ex his God might be known through the
posset Deus quasi de propinquiori knowledge of them, as if from a closer
cognosci, ut ostensum est; oportet vantage point, as we showed; and if it is
autem in aliqua Dei cognitione necessary to identify ultimate felicity with
felicitatem ultimam poni, ut supra some sort of knowledge of God, as we
probatum est: impossibile est quod proved above; then it is not possible for
in hac vita sit ultima hominis man’s ultimate felicity to come in this life.
felicitas.
Item. Ultimus finis hominis terminat [2] Again, the ultimate end of man brings
eius appetitum naturalem, ita quod, to a termination man’s natural appetite,
eo habito, nihil aliud quaeritur: si in the sense that, once the end is
enim adhuc movetur ad aliud, acquired, nothing else will be sought.
nondum habet finem in quo For, if he is still moved onward to
quiescat. Hoc autem in hac vita something else, he does not yet have the
non est possibile accidere. Quanto end in which he may rest. Now, this
enim plus aliquis intelligit, tanto termination cannot occur in this life. For,
magis in eo desiderium intelligendi the more a person understands, the
augetur, quod est hominibus more is the desire to understand
naturale: nisi forte aliquis sit qui increased in him, and this is natural to
omnia intelligat. Quod in hac vita man, unless, perchance, there be
nulli unquam accidit qui esset someone who understands all things.
solum homo, nec est possibile But in this life this does not happen to
accidere: cum in hac vita anyone who is a mere man, nor could it
substantias separatas, quae sunt happen, since we are not able to know in
maxime intelligibilia, cognoscere this life the separate substances, and
non possimus, ut ostensum est. they are most intelligible, as has been
Non est igitur possibile ultimam shown. Therefore, it is not possible for
hominis felicitatem in hac vita esse. man’s ultimate felicity to be in this life.
Adhuc. Omne quod movetur in [3] Besides, everything that is moved
finem, desiderat naturaliter stabiliri toward an end naturally desires to be
et quiescere in illo: unde a loco quo stationed at, and at rest in, that end;
corpus naturaliter movetur, non consequently, a body does not move

recedit nisi per motum violentum, away from the place to which it is moved
qui contrariatur appetitui. Felicitas naturally, unless by virtue of a violent
autem est ultimus finis, quem movement which runs counter to its
homo naturaliter desiderat. Est appetite. Now, felicity is the ultimate end
igitur hominis desiderium naturale which man naturally desires. So, there is
ad hoc quod in felicitate stabiliatur. a natural desire of man to be established
Nisi igitur cum felicitate pariter in felicity. Therefore, unless along with
immobilem stabilitatem felicity such an unmoving stability be
consequatur, nondum est felix, eius attained, he is not yet happy, for his
desiderio naturali nondum natural desire is not yet at rest. And so,
quiescente. Cum igitur aliquis when a person attains felicity he likewise
felicitatem consequitur, pariter attains stability and rest, and that is why
stabilitatem et quietem this is the notion of all men concerning
consequetur: unde et omnium haec felicity, that it requires stability as part of
est de felicitate conceptio, quod de its essential character. For this reason,
sui ratione stabilitatem requirat; the Philosopher says, in Ethics I [10:
propter quod philosophus dicit, in I 1100b 5], that “we do not regard the
Eth., quod non aestimamus felicem happy man as a sort of chameleon.”
esse chamaleontem quendam. In Now, in this life there is no certain
vita autem ista non est aliqua certa stability, for to any man, no matter how
stabilitas: cuilibet enim, happy he is reputed to be, illnesses and
quantumcumque felix dicatur, misfortunes may possibly come, and by
possibile est infirmitates et them he may be hindered in that
infortunia accidere, quibus operation, whatever it may be, with
impeditur ab operatione, which felicity is identified. Therefore, it is
quaecumque sit illa, in qua ponitur not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to
felicitas. Non est igitur possibile in be in this life.
hac vita esse ultimam hominis
felicitatem.
Amplius. Inconveniens videtur et [4] Moreover, it appears inappropriate

irrationabile quod tempus and irrational for the time of generation
generationis alicuius rei sit of a thing to be long, while the time of its
magnum, tempus autem durationis maturity is short. For it would follow that
ipsius sit parvum: sequeretur enim a nature would be without its end, most
quod natura in maiori tempore suo of the time. Consequently, we see that
fine privaretur; unde videmus quod animals which live but a short time also
animalia quae parvo tempore take but a short time to come to perfect
vivunt, parvum etiam tempus ad maturity. Now, if felicity consists in
hoc quod perficiantur habent. Si perfect operation, in accord with perfect
autem felicitas consistat in perfecta virtue, whether intellectual or moral, it is
operatione secundum virtutem impossible for it to come to man until a
perfectam, vel intellectualem vel long time has elapsed, And this is
moralem, impossibile est eam especially evident in speculative
advenire homini nisi post tempus pursuits, in which man’s ultimate felicity
diuturnum. Et hoc maxime in is placed, as is clear from what we have
speculativis apparet, in quibus said. For man is barely able to reach
ultima felicitas hominis ponitur, ut perfection in scientific speculation in the
ex dictis patet: nam vix in ultima last stage of his life. But then, in most
aetate homo ad perfectum in cases, only a little part of human life
speculatione scientiarum pervenire remains. So, it is not possible for man’s
potest. Tunc autem, ut plurimum, ultimate felicity to be in this life.
modicum restat humanae vitae.
Non est igitur possibile in hac vita
ultimam hominis felicitatem esse.
Praeterea. Felicitatem perfectum [5] Furthermore, all men admit that

quoddam bonum omnes felicity is a perfect good; otherwise, it
confitentur: alias appetitum non could not satisfy desire. Now, a perfect
quietaret. Perfectum autem bonum good is one which lacks any admixture of
est quod omnino caret admixtione evil, just as a perfectly white thing is
mali: sicut perfecte album est quod completely unmixed with black. Of
est omnino impermixtum nigro. course, it is not possible for man in the
Non est autem possibile quod present state of life to be entirely free
homo in statu istius vitae omnino from evils, not only from corporeal ones,
sit immunis a malis: non solum such as hunger, thirst, heat and cold,
corporalibus, quae sunt fames, and other things of this kind, but also
sitis, aestus et frigus, et alia from evils of the soul. For we can find no
huiusmodi; sed etiam a malis one who is not disturbed at times by
animae. Nullus enim invenitur qui unruly passions, who does not at times
non aliquando inordinatis overstep the mean in which virtue lies,
passionibus inquietetur; qui non either by excess or defect, who also is
aliquando praetereat medium, in not mistaken in certain matters, or who
quo virtus consistit, vel in plus vel at least is ignorant of things which he
in minus; qui non etiam in aliquibus desires to know, or who also conceives
decipiatur; vel saltem ignoret quae with uncertain opinion things about which
scire desiderat; aut etiam debili he would like to be certain. Therefore, no
opinione concipiat ea de quibus person is happy in this life.
certitudinem habere vellet. Non est
igitur aliquis in hac vita felix.
Adhuc. Homo naturaliter refugit [6] Again, man naturally shrinks from
mortem, et tristatur de ipsa: non death, and is sorrowful at its prospect,
solum ut nunc, cum eam sentit, not only at the instant when he feels its
eam refugiens, sed etiam cum eam threat and tries to avoid it, but even
recogitat. Hoc autem quod non when he thinks back upon it. But
moriatur, homo non potest assequi freedom from death is something man
in hac vita. Non est igitur possibile cannot achieve in this life. Therefore, it is
quod homo in hac vita sit felix. not possible for man in this life to be
happy.
Amplius. Felicitas ultima non [7] Besides, ultimate felicity does not
consistit in habitu, sed in consist in an habitual state, but in an
operatione: habitus enim propter operation, since habits are for the sake
actus sunt. Sed impossibile est in of acts. But it is impossible to perform
hac vita continue agere any action continuously in this life.
quamcumque actionem. Therefore, it is impossible for man in this
Impossibile est igitur in hac vita life to be entirely happy.
hominem totaliter esse felicem.
Item. Quanto aliquid est magis [8] Furthermore, the more a thing is
desideratum et dilectum, tanto eius desired and loved, the more does its loss
amissio maiorem dolorem vel bring sorrow and sadness. Now, felicity
tristitiam affert. Felicitas autem is what is most desired and loved.
maxime desideratur et amatur. Therefore, its loss holds the greatest
Maxime igitur eius amissio prospect of sorrow. But, if ultimate felicity
tristitiam habet. Sed si sit in hac were possible in this life, it is certain that
vita ultima felicitas, certum est it would be lost, at least by death. And it
quod amitteretur, saltem per is not certain whether it would last until
mortem. Et non est certum utrum death, since for any man in this life there
duratura sit usque ad mortem: cum is the possibility of sickness, by which he
cuilibet homini possibile sit in hac may be completely impeded from the
vita accidere morbos quibus work of virtue: such things as mental
totaliter ab operatione virtutis illness and the like, by which the use of
impeditur, sicut phrenesim et alios reason is halted. So, such felicity always
huiusmodi, quibus impeditur will have sorrow naturally associated
rationis usus. Semper igitur talis with it. Therefore, it will not be perfect
felicitas habebit tristitiam naturaliter felicity.
annexam. Non erit igitur perfecta
felicitas.
Potest autem aliquis dicere quod, [9] However, someone may say that,
cum felicitas sit bonum since felicity is a good of intellectual
intellectualis naturae, perfecta et nature, perfect and true felicity belongs
vera felicitas est illorum in quibus to those beings in whom a perfect
natura intellectualis perfecta intellectual nature is found, that is, to
invenitur, idest in substantiis separate substances, but that in man
separatis: in hominibus autem there is found an imperfect happiness, in
invenitur imperfecta, per modum the manner of some sort of participation.
participationis cuiusdam. Ad For, in regard to the full understanding of
veritatem enim intelligendam truth, men can attain it only through
plene, non nisi per quendam enquiry, and they are utterly deficient in
inquisitionis motum pertingere regard to objects which are most
possunt; et ad ea quae sunt intelligible in their nature, as is clear from
secundum naturam maxime what we have said. And so, felicity in its
intelligibilia, omnino deficiunt, sicut perfect character cannot be present in
ex dictis patet. Unde nec felicitas, men, but they may participate somewhat
secundum suam perfectam in it, even in this life. And this seems to
rationem, potest hominibus have been Aristotle’s view on felicity.
adesse: sed aliquid ipsius Hence, in Ethics I, where he asks
participant, etiam in hac vita. Et whether misfortunes take away
haec videtur fuisse sententia happiness, having shown that felicity
Aristotelis de felicitate. Unde in I consists in the works of virtue which
Ethicorum, ubi inquirit utrum seem to be most enduring in this life, he
infortunia tollant felicitatem, concludes that those men for whom such
ostenso quod felicitas sit in perfection in this life is possible are
operibus virtutis, quae maxime happy as men, as if they bad not
permanentes in hac vita esse attained felicity absolutely, but merely in
videntur, concludit illos quibus talis human fashion.
perfectio in hac vita adest, esse
beatos ut homines, quasi non
simpliciter ad felicitatem
pertingentes, sed modo humano.
Quod autem praedicta responsio [10] Now, we have to show that the
rationes praemissas non evacuet foregoing reply does not invalidate the
ostendendum est. arguments which we have given above.
Homo enim etsi naturae ordine Indeed, though man is by nature inferior

substantiis separatis sit inferior, to separate substances, he is
creaturis tamen irrationabilibus nonetheless superior to irrational
superior est. Perfectiori igitur modo creatures. So, he attains his ultimate end
suum finem ultimum consequitur in a more perfect way than they do. They
quam illa. Illa vero sic perfecte achieve their ultimate end with such
suum finem ultimum consequuntur perfection because they seek nothing
quod nihil aliud quaerunt: grave else, for the heavy thing comes to rest
enim, cum fuerit in suo ubi, when it has occupied its own place; and
quiescit; animalia etiam cum even in the case of animals, when they
fruuntur delectabilibus secundum enjoy sensual pleasures their natural
sensum, eorum naturale desire is at rest. So, it is much more
desiderium quietatur. Oportet igitur necessary for man’s natural desire to
multo fortius quod, cum homo come to rest when he has reached his
pervenerit ad suum finem ultimum, ultimate end. But this cannot come about
naturale eius desiderium quietetur. in this life. Therefore, man does not
Sed hoc non potest fieri in vita ista. attain felicity, understood as his proper
Ergo homo non consequitur end, during this life, as we have shown.
felicitatem, prout est finis proprius Therefore, he must attain it after this life.
eius, in hac vita, ut ostensum est.
Oportet ergo quod consequatur
post hanc vitam.
Adhuc. Impossibile est naturale [11] Again, it is impossible for natural
desiderium esse inane: natura desire to be unfulfilled, since “nature
enim nihil facit frustra. Esset autem does nothing in vain.”“ Now, natural
inane desiderium naturae si desire would be in vain if it could never
nunquam posset impleri. Est igitur be fulfilled. Therefore, man’s natural
implebile desiderium naturale desire is capable of fulfillment, but not in
hominis. Non autem in hac vita, ut this life, as we have shown. So, it must
ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod be fulfilled after this life. Therefore,
impleatur post hanc vitam. Est man’s ultimate felicity comes after this
igitur felicitas ultima hominis post life.
hanc vitam.
Amplius. Quandiu aliquid movetur [12] Besides, as long as anything is in
ad perfectionem, nondum est in motion toward perfection, it is not yet at
ultimo fine. Sed omnes homines in the ultimate end. But all men, while
cognoscendo veritatem semper se learning the truth, are always disposed

habent ut moti et tendentes ad as beings in motion, and as tending
perfectionem: quia illi qui toward perfection, because men who
sequuntur, superinveniunt aliqua come later make other discoveries, over
illis quae a prioribus sunt inventa, and above those found out by earlier
sicut etiam dicitur in II men, as is also stated in Metaphysics II
metaphysicae. Non igitur homines [1: 993a 31]. So, men in the process of
in cognitione veritatis sic se habent learning the truth are not situated as if
quasi in ultimo fine existentes. they were at the ultimate end. Thus,
Cum igitur in speculatione, per since man’s ultimate felicity in this life
quam quaeritur cognitio veritatis, seems mainly to consist in speculation,
maxime videatur ultima felicitas whereby the knowledge of the truth is
hominis in hac vita consistere, sicut sought, as Aristotle himself proves in
etiam ipse Aristoteles probat in X Ethics X [7: 1177a 18], it is impossible to
Eth., impossibile est dicere quod say that man achieves his ultimate end
homo in hac vita ultimum suum in this life.
finem consequatur.
Praeterea. Omne quod est in [13] Moreover, everything that is in

potentia, intendit exire in actum. potency tends to proceed into act. So, as
Quandiu igitur non est ex toto long as it is not made wholly actual, it is
factum in actu, non est in suo fine not at its ultimate end. Now, our intellect
ultimo. Intellectus autem noster est is in potency in regard to all the forms of
in potentia ad omnes formas rerum things to be known, and it is reduced to
cognoscendas: reducitur autem in act when it knows any one of them. So, it
actum cum aliquam earum will not be wholly in act, nor at its
cognoscit. Ergo non erit ex toto in ultimate end, until it knows all things, at
actu, nec in ultimo suo fine, nisi least all these material things. But man
quando omnia, saltem ista cannot achieve this through the
materialia, cognoscit. Sed hoc non speculative sciences, through which he
potest homo assequi per scientias knows truth in this life. Therefore, it is not
speculativas, quibus in hac vita possible for man’s ultimate felicity to be
veritatem cognoscimus. Non est in this life.
igitur possibile quod ultima felicitas
hominis sit in hac vita.
Propter has autem et huiusmodi [14] For these and like reasons,
rationes, Alexander et Averroes Alexander and Averroes claimed that
posuerunt ultimam hominis man’s ultimate felicity does not consist in
felicitatem non esse in cognitione the human knowledge which comes
humana, quae est per scientias through the speculative sciences, but
speculativas, sed per through a connection with a separate
continuationem cum substantia substance, which they believed to be
separata, quam esse credebant possible for man in this life. But, since
possibilem homini in hac vita. Quia Aristotle saw that there is no other
vero Aristoteles vidit quod non est knowledge for man in this life than
alia cognitio hominis in hac vita through the speculative sciences, he
quam per scientias speculativas, maintained that man does not achieve
posuit hominem non consequi perfect felicity, but only a limited kind.
felicitatem perfectam, sed suo
modo.
In quo satis apparet quantam [15] On this point there is abundant
angustiam patiebantur hinc inde evidence of how even the brilliant minds
eorum praeclara ingenia. A quibus of these men suffered from the
angustiis liberabimur si ponamus, narrowness of their viewpoint. From
secundum probationes which narrow attitudes we shall be freed
praemissas, hominem ad veram if we grant in accord with the foregoing
felicitatem post hanc vitam proofs that man can reach true felicity
pervenire posse, anima hominis after this life, when man’s soul is existing
immortali existente in quo statu immortally; in which state the soul will
anima intelliget per modum quo understand in the way that separate
intelligunt substantiae separatae, substances understand, as we showed
sicut in secundo huius operis in Book Two [81] of this work.
ostensum est.
Erit igitur ultima felicitas hominis in [16] And so, man’s ultimate felicity will lie
cognitione Dei quam habet in the knowledge of God that the human
humana mens post hanc vitam, per mind has after this life, according to the
modum quo ipsum cognoscunt way in which separate substances know
substantiae separatae. Propter Him. For which reason our Lord
quod, Matth. 512, dominus promises us “a reward in heaven” and
mercedem nobis in caelis promittit; says that the saints “shall be as the
et Matth. 2230, dicit quod sancti angels... who always see God in
erunt sicut Angeli, qui vident heaven,” as it is said (Matt 5:12; 22:30;
semper Deum in caelis, ut dicitur 18:10).
Matth. 1810.
Caput 49 Chapter 49
Quod substantiae separatae THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO
non vident Deum per essentiam NOT SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE BY
ex hoc quod cognoscunt eum KNOWING HIM THROUGH THEIR
per suam essentiam ESSENCE
Oportet autem inquirere utrum [1] Moreover, we must inquire whether
haec ipsa cognitio qua this knowledge whereby the separate
substantiae separatae, et animae substances and the soul after death know
post mortem, cognoscunt Deum God, through their own essences, suffices
per suas essentias, sufficiat ad for their ultimate felicity.
ipsarum ultimam felicitatem.
Ad cuius veritatis indaginem, [2] The first thing to be done, in
primo ostendendum est quod per investigating the truth of this question, is
talem modum cognitionis non to show that the divine essence is not
cognoscitur divina essentia. known through such a type of knowledge.
Contingit enim ex effectu [3] In fact, it is possible to know a cause
cognoscere causam multipliciter. from its effect, in many ways. One way is
Uno modo, secundum quod to take the effect as a means of finding
effectus sumitur ut medium ad out, concerning the cause, that it exists
cognoscendum de causa quod sit, and that it is of a certain kind. This occurs
et quod talis sit: sicut accidit in in the sciences which demonstrate the
scientiis, quae causam cause through the effect. Another way is
demonstrant per effectum. Alio to see the cause in the effect itself,
modo, ita quod in ipso effectu according as the likeness of the cause is
videatur causa, inquantum reflected in the effect; thus a man may be
similitudo causae resultat in seen in a mirror, by virtue of his likeness.
effectu: sicut homo videtur in And this way is different from the first. In
speculo propter suam fact, in the first way there are two
similitudinem. Et differt hic modus cognitions, one of the effect and one of
a primo. Nam in primo sunt duae the cause, and one is the cause of the
cognitiones, effectus et causae, other; for the knowledge of the effect is
quarum una est alterius causa: the cause of the knowing of its cause. But
nam cognitio effectus est causa in the second way there is one vision of
quod cognoscatur eius causa. In both, since at the same time that the
modo autem secundo una est effect is seen the cause is also seen in it.
visio utriusque: simul enim dum A third way is such that the very likeness
videtur effectus, videtur et causa of the cause, in its effect, is the form by
in ipso. Tertio modo, ita quod ipsa which the effect knows its own cause. For
similitudo causae in effectu sit instance, suppose a box had an intellect,
forma qua cognoscit causam suus and so knew through its form the skilled
effectus: sicut si arca haberet mind from which such a form proceeded
intellectum, et per formam suam as a likeness of that mind. Now, it is not
cognosceret artem a qua talis possible in any of these ways to know
forma, velut eius similitudo, from the effect what the cause is, unless
processit. Nullo autem istorum the effect be adequate to the cause, one
modorum per effectum potest in which the entire virtuality of the cause
cognosci de causa quid est, nisi is expressed.
sit effectus causae adaequatus, in
quo tota virtus causae exprimatur.
Substantiae autem separatae [4] Now, separate substances know God

cognoscunt Deum per suas through their substances, as a cause is
substantias sicut causa known through its effect; not, of course, in
cognoscitur per effectum: non the first way, for then their knowledge
autem primo modo, quia sic would be discursive; but in the second
eorum cognitio esset discursiva, way, according as one substance sees
sed secundo modo, inquantum God in another; and also in the third way,
una videt Deum in alia; et modo according as any one of them sees God
tertio, inquantum quaelibet earum within itself. Now, none of them is an
videt Deum in seipsa. Nulla autem effect adequately representing the power
earum est effectus adaequans of God, as we showed in Book Two [22ff].
virtutem Dei, ut in secundo libro So, it is impossible for them to see the
ostensum est. Non est igitur divine essence itself by this kind of
possibile quod per hunc modum knowledge.
cognitionis ipsam divinam
essentiam videant.
Amplius. Similitudo intelligibilis per [5] Besides, the intelligible likeness

quam intelligitur aliquid secundum through which a thing is understood in its
suam substantiam, oportet quod substance must be of the same species
sit eiusdem speciei, vel magis or, rather, of an identical species; as the
species eius; sicut forma domus form of the house which exists in the mind
quae est in mente artificis, est of the artisan is of the same species as
eiusdem speciei cum forma the form of the house which exists in
domus quae est in materia, vel matter, or, rather, the species are
potius species eius; non enim per identical; for one is not going to
speciem hominis intelligitur de understand what a donkey or a horse is
asino vel equo quid est. Sed ipsa through the species of a man. But the
natura substantiae separatae non nature of a separate substance is not the
est idem specie cum natura same in species as the divine nature, not
divina, quinimmo nec genere, ut in even the same in genus, as we showed in
primo libro ostensum est. Non est Book One [25]. Therefore, it is not
igitur possibile quod substantia possible for a separate substance,
separata intelligat divinam through its own nature, to understand the
substantiam per propriam divine substance.
naturam.
Item. Omne creatum ad aliquod [6] Furthermore, every created thing is
genus vel speciem terminatur. limited to some genus or species. But the
Divina autem essentia est infinita, divine essence is unlimited,
comprehendens in se omnem comprehending within itself every
perfectionem totius esse, ut in perfection in the whole of existing being,
primo libro ostensum est. as we showed in Book One [28, 43].
Impossibile est igitur quod per Therefore, it is impossible for the divine
aliquid creatum divina substantia substance to be seen through any
videatur. created being.
Praeterea. Omnis intelligibilis [7] Moreover, every intelligible species

species per quam intelligitur whereby the quiddity or essence of any
quidditas vel essentia alicuius rei, thing is understood comprehends that
comprehendit in repraesentando thing while representing it; consequently,
rem illam: unde et orationes we call words signifying what such a thing
significantes quod quid est is terms and definitions. But it is
terminos et definitiones vocamus. impossible for a created likeness to
Impossibile est autem quod aliqua represent God in this way, since every
similitudo creata taliter Deum created likeness belongs to a definite
repraesentet: cum quaelibet genus, while God does not, as we
similitudo creata sit alicuius explained in Book One [25]. Therefore, it
generis determinati, non autem is not possible for the divine substance to
Deus, ut in primo ostensum est. be understood through a created
Non est igitur possibile quod per likeness.
aliquam similitudinem creatam
divina substantia intelligatur.
Amplius. Divina substantia est [8] Furthermore, divine substance is its
suum esse ut in primo ostensum own existing being, as we showed in
est. Ipsum autem esse Book One [22]. But the being of separate
substantiae separatae est aliud substance is other than its substance, as
quam sua substantia, ut in we proved in Book Two [52]. Therefore,
secundo probatum est. Essentia the essence of a separate substance is
igitur substantiae separatae non not an adequate medium whereby God
est sufficiens medium quo Deus could be seen essentially.
per essentiam videri possit.
Cognoscit tamen substantia [9] However a separate substance does

separata per suam substantiam know through its own substance that God
de Deo quia est; et quod est is, and that He is the cause of all things,
omnium causa; et eminentem that He is eminent above all and set apart
omnibus; et remotum ab omnibus, from all, not only from things which exist,
non solum quae sunt, sed etiam but also from things which can be
quae mente creata concipi conceived by the created mind. Even we
possunt. Ad quam etiam are able to reach this knowledge of God,
cognitionem de Deo nos in some sense; for we know through His
utcumque pertingere possumus: effects, that God is, and that He is the
per effectus enim de Deo cause of other beings, that He is
cognoscimus quia est et quod supereminent over other things and set
causa aliorum est, aliis apart from all. And this is the ultimate and
supereminens, et ab omnibus most perfect limit of our knowledge in this
remotus. Et hoc est ultimum et life, as Dionysius says in Mystical
perfectissimum nostrae Theology. “We are united with God as the
cognitionis in hac vita, ut Unknown.” Indeed, this is the situation,
Dionysius dicit, in libro de mystica for, while we know of God what He is not,
theologia, cum Deo quasi ignoto what He is remains quite unknown.
coniungimur: quod quidem Hence, to manifest his ignorance of this
contingit dum de eo quid non sit sublime knowledge, it is said of Moses
cognoscimus, quid vero sit penitus that “he went to the dark cloud wherein
manet ignotum. Unde et ad huius God was” (Exod. 20:21).
sublimissimae cognitionis
ignorantiam demonstrandam, de
Moyse dicitur, Exodi 2021, quod
accessit ad caliginem in qua est
Deus.
Quia vero natura inferior in sui [10] Now, since a lower nature only
summo non nisi ad infimum touches with its highest part the lowest
superioris naturae attingit oportet part of the next higher nature, this
quod haec ipsa cognitio sit knowledge must be more eminent in
eminentior in substantiis separatis separate substances than in us. This
quam in nobis. Quod per singula becomes evident in a detailed
patet. Nam quanto propinquior et consideration. For, the more closely and
expressior alicuius causae definitely we know the effect of a cause,
effectus cognoscitur, tanto the more evident does it become that its
evidentius apparet de causa eius cause exists. Now, separate substances,
quod sit. Substantiae autem which know God through themselves, are
separatae, quae per seipsas nearer effects and more definite bearers
Deum cognoscunt, sunt of the likeness of God than the effects
propinquiores effectus, et through which we know God. Therefore,
expressius Dei similitudinem the separate substances know more
gerentes, quam effectus per quos certainly and clearly than we that God is.
nos Deum cognoscimus. Certius
ergo sciunt substantiae separatae
et clarius quam nos, quod Deus
est.
Rursus: cum per negationes ad Again, since it is possible to come in
propriam cognitionem rei quoquo some way to the proper knowledge of a
modo deveniatur, ut supra dictum thing by means of negations, as we said
est, quanto plura et magis above, the more a person can know that
propinqua quis ab aliquo remota a large number of closely related things
esse cognoverit, tanto magis ad are set apart from an object, the more
propriam ipsius cognitionem does one approach toward a proper
accedit: sicut magis accedit ad knowledge of it. For instance, one
propriam hominis cognitionem qui approaches closer to a proper knowledge
scit eum non esse neque of man when he knows that he is neither
inanimatum neque insensibilem, an inanimate, nor an insensitive, being
quam qui scit solum eum non than when one merely knows that he is
esse inanimatum, licet neuter not inanimate; even though neither of
sciat de homine quid sit. them makes it known what man is. Now,
Substantiae autem separatae separate substances know more things
plura cognoscunt quam nos, et than we do, and things that are closer to
quae sunt Deo magis propinqua: God; consequently, in their
et per consequens suo intellectu understanding, they set apart from God
plura et magis propinqua a Deo more things, and more intimately related
removent quam nos. Magis igitur things, than we do. So, they approach
accedunt ad propriam ipsius more closely to a proper knowledge of
cognitionem quam nos: licet nec Him than we do, although even these
ipsae, per hoc quod seipsas substances do not see the divine
intelligunt, divinam substantiam substance by means of their
videant. understanding of themselves.
Item: tanto aliquis alicuius Also, the more one knows how a man is
altitudinem magis novit, quanto placed in authority over people in higher
altioribus scit eum esse positions, the more does one know the
praelatum: sicut, etsi rusticus sciat high position of this man. Thus, though a
regem esse summum in regno, rustic may know that the king occupies
quia tamen non cognoscit nisi the highest office in the kingdom, since he
quaedam infima regni officia, cum is acquainted only with some of the
quibus aliquid habet negotii, non lowest official positions in the kingdom
ita cognoscit regis eminentiam with which he may have some business,
sicut aliquis qui omnium principum he does not know the eminence of the
regni dignitates novit, quibus scit king in the way that another man does
regem esse praelatum; quamvis who is acquainted with all the leading
neuter altitudinem regiae dignitatis dignitaries of the kingdom and knows that
comprehendat. Nos autem the king holds authority over them; even
nescimus nisi quaedam infima though neither type of lower office
entium. Licet ergo sciamus Deum comprehends the exalted position
omnibus entibus eminere, non appropriate to the dignity of the king. Of
tamen ita cognoscimus course, we are in ignorance, except in
eminentiam divinam sicut regard to the lowest types of beings. So,
substantiae separatae, quibus although we may know that God is higher
altissimi rerum ordines noti sunt, than all beings, we do not know the divine
et eis omnibus superiorem Deum eminence as separate substances do, for
esse cognoscunt. the highest orders of beings are known to
them, and they know that God is superior
to all of them.
Ulterius: manifestum est quod Finally, it is obvious that the more the
causalitas alicuius causae, et large number, and great importance, of
virtus eius, tanto magis the effects of a cause become known, the
cognoscitur, quanto plures et more does the causality of the cause, and
maiores eius effectus innotescunt. its power, become known. As a result, it
Ex quo manifestum fit quod becomes manifest that separate
substantiae separatae substances know the causality of God,
causalitatem Dei et eius virtutem and His power, better than we do; even
magis cognoscunt quam nos, licet though we know that He is the cause of
nos omnium entium eum esse all beings.
causam sciamus.
Chapter 50
Caput 50
THAT THE NATURAL DESIRE OF
Quod in naturali cognitione
SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DOES NOT
quam habent substantiae
COME TO REST IN THE NATURAL
separatae de Deo non quiescit
KNOWLEDGE WHICH THEY HAVE OF
earum naturale desiderium
GOD
Non potest autem esse quod in tali [1] However, it is impossible for the

Dei cognitione quiescat naturale natural desire in separate substances to
desiderium substantiae separatae. come to rest in such a knowledge of God.
Omne enim quod est imperfectum [2] For everything that is an imperfect
in aliqua specie, desiderat member of any species desires to attain
consequi perfectionem speciei the perfection of its species. For
illius: qui enim habet opinionem de instance, a man who has an opinion
re aliqua, quae est imperfecta illius regarding something, that is, an imperfect
rei notitia, ex hoc ipso incitatur ad knowledge of the thing, is thereby
desiderandum illius rei scientiam. aroused to desire knowledge of the thing.
Praedicta autem cognitio quam Now, the aforementioned knowledge
substantiae separatae habent de which the separate substances have of
Deo, non cognoscentes ipsius God, without knowing His substance, is
substantiam, est imperfecta an imperfect species of knowledge. In
cognitionis species: non enim fact, we do not think that we know a thing
arbitramur nos aliquid cognoscere if we do not know its substance. Hence, it

si substantiam eius non is most important, in knowing a thing, to
cognoscamus; unde et know what it is. Therefore, natural desire
praecipuum in cognitione alicuius does not come to rest as a result of this
rei est scire de ea quid est. Ex hac knowledge which separate substances
igitur cognitione quam habent have of God; rather, it further arouses the
substantiae separatae de Deo, desire to see the divine substance.
non quiescit naturale desiderium,
sed incitatur magis ad divinam
substantiam videndam.
Item. Ex cognitione effectuum [3] Again, as a result of knowing the
incitatur desiderium ad effects, the desire to know their cause is
cognoscendum causam: unde aroused; thus, men began to
homines philosophari incoeperunt philosophize when they investigated the
causas rerum inquirentes. Non causes of things.” Therefore, the desire
quiescit igitur sciendi desiderium, to know, which is naturally implanted in
naturaliter omnibus substantiis all intellectual substances, does not rest
intellectualibus inditum, nisi, until, after they have come to know the
cognitis substantiis effectuum, substances of the effects, they also know
etiam substantiam causae the substance of the cause. The fact,
cognoscant. Per hoc igitur quod then, that separate substances know that
substantiae separatae cognoscunt God is the cause of all things whose
omnium rerum quarum substantias substances they see, does not mean that
vident, esse Deum causam, non natural desire comes to rest in them,
quiescit desiderium naturale in unless they also see the substance of
ipsis, nisi etiam ipsius Dei God Himself.
substantiam videant.
Adhuc. Sicut se habet quaestio [4] Besides, the problem of why
propter quid ad quaestionem quia, something is so is related to the problem
ita se habet quaestio quid est ad of whether it is so, in the same way that
quaestionem an est: nam quaestio an inquiry as to what something is stands
propter quid quaerit medium ad in regard to an inquiry as to whether it
demonstrandum quia est aliquid, exists. For the question why looks for a
puta quod luna eclipsatur; et means to demonstrate that something is
similiter quaestio quid est quaerit so, for instance, that there is an eclipse
medium ad demonstrandum an of the moon; likewise, the question what
est, secundum doctrinam traditam is it seeks a means to demonstrate that
in II posteriorum. Videmus autem something exists, according to the
quod videntes quia est aliquid, traditional teaching in Posterior Analytics
naturaliter scire desiderant propter II [1: 89b 22]. Now, we observe that those
quid. Ergo et cognoscentes an est who see that something is so naturally
aliquid, naturaliter scire desiderant desire to know why. So, too, those
quid est ipsum, quod est intelligere acquainted with the fact that something
eius substantiam. Non igitur exists naturally desire to know what this
quietatur naturale sciendi thing is, and this is to understand its
desiderium in cognitione Dei qua substance. Therefore, the natural desire
scitur de ipso solum quia est. to know does not rest in that knowledge
of God whereby we know merely that He
is.
Amplius. Nihil finitum desiderium [5] Furthermore, nothing finite can fully
intellectus quietare potest. Quod satisfy intellectual desire. This is shown
exinde ostenditur quod intellectus, from the fact that, whenever a finite
quolibet finito dato, aliquid ultra object is presented, the intellect extends
molitur: unde qualibet linea finita its interest to something more, so that,
data, aliquam maiorem molitur given any finite line, it strives to
apprehendere, et similiter in apprehend a longer one; and the same
numeris; et haec est ratio infinitae thing takes place in regard to numbers.
additionis in numeris et lineis This is the reason for infinite series in
mathematicis. Altitudo autem et numbers and in mathematical lines. Now,
virtus cuiuslibet substantiae the eminence and power of any created
creatae finita est. Non igitur substance are finite. Therefore, the
intellectus substantiae separatae intellect of a separate substance does
quiescit per hoc quod cognoscit not come to rest simply because it knows
substantias creatas created substances, however lofty they
quantumcumque eminentes, sed may be, but it still tends by natural desire
adhuc naturali desiderio tendit ad toward the understanding of substance
intelligendum substantiam quae which is of infinite eminence, as we
est altitudinis infinitae, ut in primo showed concerning divine substance in
libro ostensum est de substantia Book One [43].
divina.
Praeterea. Sicut naturale [6] Moreover, just as the natural desire to

desiderium inest omnibus know is present in all intellectual natures,
intellectualibus naturis ad so is there present in them the natural
sciendum, ita inest eis naturale desire to put off ignorance and lack of
desiderium ignorantiam seu knowledge. Now, the separate
nescientiam pellendi. Substantiae substances know, as we have said, by
autem separatae, sicut iam dictum the aforesaid mode of knowledge, that
est, cognoscunt, praedicto the substance of God is above them and
cognitionis modo, substantiam Dei above everything understood by them;
esse supra se et supra omne id consequently, they know that the divine
quod ab eis intelligitur: et per substance is unknown to them.
consequens sciunt divinam Therefore, their natural desire tends
substantiam sibi esse ignotam. toward the understanding of divine
Tendit igitur naturale ipsorum substance.
desiderium ad intelligendum
divinam substantiam.
Item. Quanto aliquid est fini [7] Besides, the nearer a thing comes to
propinquius, tanto maiori desiderio its end, the greater is the desire by which
tendit ad finem: unde videmus it tends to the end; thus, we observe that
quod motus naturalis corporum in the natural motion of bodies is increased
fine intenditur. Intellectus autem toward the end. Now, the intellects of
substantiarum separatarum separate substances are nearer to the
propinquiores sunt divinae knowledge of God than our intellects are.
cognitioni quam noster intellectus. So, they desire the knowledge of God
Intensius igitur desiderant Dei more intensely than we do. But, no
cognitionem quam nos. Nos matter how fully we know that God exists,
autem, quantumcumque sciamus and the other things mentioned above,
Deum esse, et alia quae supra we do not cease our desire, but still
dicta sunt, non quiescimus desire to know Him through His essence.
desiderio, sed adhuc desideramus Much more, then, do the separate
eum per essentiam suam substances desire this naturally.
cognoscere. Multo igitur magis Therefore, their desire does not come to
substantiae separatae hoc rest in the aforesaid knowledge of God.,
naturaliter desiderant. Non igitur in
cognitione Dei praedicta earum
desiderium quietatur.
Ex quibus concluditur quod ultima [8] The conclusion from these
felicitas substantiae separatae non considerations is that the ultimate felicity
est in illa cognitione Dei qua eum of separate substances does not lie in
cognoscunt per suas substantias: the knowledge of God, in which they
cum adhuc earum desiderium know Him through their substances, for
ducat eas usque ad Dei their desire still leads them on toward
substantiam. God’s substance.
In quo etiam satis apparet quod in [9] Also, quite apparent in this conclusion
nullo alio quaerenda est ultima is the fact that ultimate felicity is to be
felicitas quam in operatione sought in nothing other than an operation
intellectus: cum nullum desiderium of the intellect, since no desire carries on
tam in sublime ferat sicut to such sublime heights as the desire to
desiderium intelligendae veritatis. understand the truth. Indeed, all our
Omnia namque nostra desideria desires for pleasure, or other things of
vel delectationis, vel cuiuscumque this sort that are craved by men, can be
alterius quod ab homine satisfied with other things, but the
desideratur, in aliis rebus aforementioned desire does not rest until
quiescere possunt: desiderium it reaches God, the highest point of
autem praedictum non quiescit nisi reference for, and the maker of, things.
ad summum rerum cardinem et This is why Wisdom appropriately states:
factorem Deum pervenerit. Propter “I dwelt in the highest places, and my
quod convenienter sapientia dicit, throne is in a pillar of a cloud” (Sirach
Eccli. 247: ego in altissimis 24:7). And Proverbs (9:3) says that
habitavi, et thronus meus in Wisdom “by her maids invites to the
columna nubis. Et Proverb. 93 tower.” Let those men be ashamed, then,
dicitur quod sapientia per ancillas who seek man’s felicity in the most
suas vocat ad arcem. Erubescant inferior things, when it is so highly
igitur qui felicitatem hominis, tam situated.
altissime sitam, in infimis rebus
quaerunt.
Caput 51 Chapter 51
Quomodo Deus per essentiam HOW GOD MAY BE SEEN IN HIS
videatur ESSENCE
Cum autem impossibile sit naturale [1] Since it is impossible for a natural
desiderium esse inane, quod desire to be incapable of fulfillment, and
quidem esset si non esset possibile since it would be so, if it were not
pervenire ad divinam substantiam possible to reach an understanding of
intelligendam, quod naturaliter divine substance such as all minds
omnes mentes desiderant; necesse naturally desire, we must say that it is
est dicere quod possibile sit possible for the substance of God to be
substantiam Dei videri per seen intellectually, both by separate
intellectum, et a substantiis intellectual substances and by our
intellectualibus separatis, et ab souls.
animabus nostris.
Modus autem huius visionis satis [2] It is already sufficiently apparent
iam ex dictis qualis esse debeat, from what we have said what should be
apparet. Ostensum enim est supra the mode of this vision. For we showed
quod divina substantia non potest above that the divine substance cannot
videri per intellectum aliqua specie be seen intellectually by means of any
creata. Unde oportet, si Dei created species. Consequently, if the
essentia videatur, quod per divine essence is seen, it must be done
ipsammet essentiam divinam as His intellect sees the divine essence
intellectus ipsam videat: ut sit in tali itself through itself, and in such a vision
visione divina essentia et quod the divine essence must be both what is
videtur, et quo videtur. seen and that whereby it is seen.
Cum autem intellectus substantiam [3] Now, since the created intellect
aliquam intelligere non possit nisi cannot understand any substance
fiat actu secundum aliquam unless it becomes actual by means of
speciem informantem ipsum quae some species, which is the likeness of
sit similitudo rei intellectae, the thing understood, informing it, a
impossibile videri potest alicui quod person might consider it impossible for
per essentiam divinam intellectus a created intellect to be able to see, by
creatus possit videre ipsam Dei means of the divine essence serving as
substantiam quasi per quandam a sort of intelligible species, the very
speciem intelligibilem: cum divina substance of God. For the divine
essentia sit quiddam per seipsum essence is a certain being subsisting
subsistens; et in primo ostensum sit through itself, and we showed in Book
quod Deus nullius potest esse One [26] that God cannot be a form for
forma. any other being.
Ad huius igitur intelligentiam [4] In order to understand the truth of
veritatis, considerandum est quod this matter, we must consider that self
substantia quae est per seipsam subsistent substance is either a form
subsistens, est vel forma tantum, only, or a composite of matter and form.
vel compositum ex materia et And a thing composed of matter and
forma. Illud igitur quod ex materia et form cannot be the form of another
forma compositum est, non potest being, because the form in it is already
alterius esse forma: quia forma in limited to this matter in such a way that
eo est iam contracta ad illam it could not be the form of another thing.

materiam, ut alterius rei forma esse But a being which subsists in such a
non possit. Illud autem quod sic est way that it is a form only can be the
subsistens ut tamen solum sit form of another, provided its being is
forma, potest alterius esse forma, such that it could be participated by that
dummodo esse suum sit tale quod other thing, as we showed concerning
ab aliquo alio participari possit, sicut the human soul, in Book Two [68].
in secundo ostendimus de anima However, if its being could not be
humana. Si vero esse suum ab participated by another, it could not be
altero participari non posset, nullius the form of any other thing, for then it
rei forma esse posset: sic enim per would be determined within itself by its
suum esse determinatur in seipso, own being, just as material things are by
sicut quae sunt materialia per their own matter.
materiam.
Hoc autem, sicut in esse Now, this should be observed as
substantiali vel naturali invenitur, sic obtaining in the same way in the order
et in esse intelligibili considerandum of intelligible being as it does in
est. Cum enim intellectus perfectio substantial or physical being. For, since
sit verum, illud intelligibile erit ut the perfection of the intellect is what is
forma tantum in genere true, in the order of intelligible objects,
intelligibilium quod est veritas ipsa. that object which is a purely formal
Quod convenit soli Deo nam cum intelligible will be truth itself. And this
verum sequatur ad esse, illud characteristic applies only to God, for,
tantum sua veritas est quod est since the true is consequent on being,
suum esse, quod est proprium soli that alone is its own truth which is its
Deo, ut in secundo ostensum est. own being. But this is proper to God
Alia igitur intelligibilia subsistentia only, as we showed in Book Two [15].
sunt non ut pura forma in genere So, other intelligible subsistents do not
intelligibilium, sed ut formam in exist as pure forms in the order of
subiecto aliquo habentes: est enim intelligible beings, but as possessors of
unumquodque eorum verum, non a form in some subject. In fact, each of
veritas; sicut et est ens, non autem them is a true thing but not truth, just as
ipsum esse. each is a being but not the very act of
being.
Manifestum est igitur quod essentia So, it is manifest that the divine essence
divina potest comparari ad may be related to the created intellect
intellectum creatum ut species as an intelligible species by which it
intelligibilis qua intelligit: quod non understands, but this does not apply to
contingit de essentia alicuius the essence of any other separate
alterius substantiae separatae. Nec substance. Yet, it cannot be the form of
tamen potest esse forma alterius rei another thing in its natural being, for the
secundum esse naturale: result of this would be that, once joined
sequeretur enim quod, simul cum to another thing, it would make up one
alio iuncta, constitueret unam nature. This could not be, since the
naturam; quod esse non potest, divine essence is in itself perfect in its
cum essentia divina in se perfecta own nature. But an intelligible species,(
sit in sui natura. Species autem united with an intellect, does not make
intelligibilis, unita intellectui, non up a nature; rather, it perfects the
constituit aliquam naturam, sed intellect for the act of understanding,
perficit ipsum ad intelligendum: and this is not incompatible with the
quod perfectioni divinae essentiae perfection of the divine essence.
non repugnat.
Haec igitur visio immediata Dei [5] This immediate vision of God is
repromittitur nobis in Scriptura, I promised us in Scripture: “We see now
Cor. 1312: videmus nunc per through a glass in a dark manner; but
speculum in aenigmate: tunc autem then face to face” (1 Cor. 13:12). It is
facie ad faciem. Quod corporali wrong to understand this in a corporeal
modo nefas est intelligere, ut in ipsa way, picturing in our imagination a
divinitate corporalem faciem bodily face of the Divinity, since we
imaginemur: cum ostensum sit have shown that God is incorporeal. Nor
Deum incorporeum esse; neque is it even possible for us to see God
etiam sit possibile ut nostra with our bodily face, for the power of
corporali facie Deum videamus, corporeal vision, which is associated
cum visus corporalis, qui in facie with our face, can only apply to
nostra residet, non nisi rerum corporeal things. Thus, then, shall we
corporalium esse possit. Sic igitur see God face to face, in the sense that
facie ad faciem Deum videbimus, we shall see Him without a medium, as
quia immediate eum videbimus, is true when we see a man face to face.
sicut hominem quem facie ad
faciem videmus.
Secundum autem hanc visionem [6] In this vision, of course, we become

maxime Deo assimilamur, et eius most like unto God, and we are
beatitudinis participes sumus: nam partakers in His happiness. For God
ipse Deus per suam essentiam Himself understands His own substance
suam substantiam intelligit, et haec through His own essence; and this is
est eius felicitas. Unde dicitur I Ioan. His felicity. Hence it is said: “When He
32: cum autem apparuerit, similes shall appear, we shall be like to Him,
ei erimus et videbimus eum sicuti because we shall see Him as He is” (1
est. Et Luc. 22, dominus dicit: ego John 3:2). And the Lord says “I dispose
dispono vobis sicut disposuit mihi to you, as My Father has disposed to
pater meus mensam, ut edatis et me... my table, that you may eat and
bibatis super mensam meam in drink at my table, in my kingdom” (Luke
regno meo. Quod quidem non de 22:2930). Of course, this can be
corporali cibo vel potu intelligi understood not in reference to corporeal
potest, sed de eo qui in mensa food or drink, but to Him who is received
sapientiae sumitur, de quo a at the table of Wisdom, of whom
sapientia dicitur, Proverb. 95: Wisdom speaks: “Eat My bread and
comedite panes meos, et bibite drink the wine which I have mingled for
vinum quod miscui vobis. Super you” (Proverbs 9:5). And so, may they
mensam ergo Dei manducant et who enjoy the same felicity whereby
bibunt qui eadem felicitate fruuntur God is happy eat and drink at God’s
qua Deus felix est, videntes eum illo table, seeing Him in the way that lie
modo quo ipse videt seipsum. sees Himself.
Caput 52 Chapter 52
Quod nulla creata substantia THAT NO CREATED SUBSTANCE
potest sua naturali virtute CAN, BY ITS OWN NATURAL
pervenire ad videndum Deum per POWER, ATTAIN THE VISION OF
essentiam GOD IN HIS ESSENCE
Non est autem possibile quod ad [1] However, it is not possible for any
illum visionis divinae modum aliqua created substance, by its own power, to
creata substantia ex virtute propria be able to attain this manner of divine
possit attingere. vision.
Quod enim est superioris naturae [2] Indeed, a lower nature cannot
proprium, non potest consequi acquire that which is proper to a higher
natura inferior nisi per actionem nature except through the action of the
superioris naturae cuius est higher nature to which the property
proprium: sicut aqua non potest belongs. For instance, water cannot be
esse calida nisi per actionem ignis. hot except through the action of fire.
Videre autem Deum per ipsam Now, to see God through His divine
essentiam divinam est proprium essence is proper to the divine nature,
naturae divinae: operari enim per for it is the special prerogative of any
propriam formam est proprium agent to perform its operation through
cuiuslibet operantis. Nulla igitur its own form. So, no intellectual
intellectualis substantia potest substance can see God through His
videre Deum per ipsam divinam divine essence unless God is the agent
essentiam nisi Deo hoc faciente. of this operation.
Amplius. Forma alicuius propria [3] Again, the form proper to any being
non fit alterius nisi eo agente: does not come to be in another being
agens enim facit sibi simile unless the first being is the agent of this
inquantum formam suam alteri event, for an agent makes something
communicat. Videre autem like itself by communicating its form to
substantiam Dei impossibile est nisi another thing. Now, it is impossible to
ipsa divina essentia sit forma see the substance of God unless the
intellectus qua intelligit, ut probatum divine essence itself is the form whereby
est. Impossibile est igitur quod the intellect understands, as we have
aliqua substantia creata ad illam proved. Therefore, it is not possible for a
visionem perveniat nisi per created substance to attain this vision,
actionem divinam. except through divine action.
Adhuc. Si aliqua duo debeant ad [4] Besides, if any two factors are to be

invicem copulari quorum unum sit mutually united, so that one of them is
formale et aliud materiale, oportet formal and the other material, their
quod copulatio eorum compleatur union must be completed through action
per actionem quae est ex parte eius coming from the side of the formal
quod est formale, non autem per factor, and not through the action of the
actionem eius quod est materiale: one that is material. In fact, form is the
forma enim est principium agendi, principle of action, while matter is the
materia vero principium patiendi. principle of passion. For the created
Ad hoc autem quod intellectus intellect to see God’s substance, then,
creatus videat Dei substantiam, the divine essence itself must be joined
oportet quod ipsa divina essentia as an intelligible form to the intellect, as
copuletur intellectui ut forma we have proved. Therefore, it is not
intelligibilis, sicut probatum est. Non possible for the attainment of this vision
est igitur possibile ad hanc to be accomplished by a created
visionem perveniri ab aliquo intellect except through divine action.
intellectu creato nisi per actionem
divinam.
Item. Quod est per se, causa est [5] Furthermore, “that which is of itself is

eius quod est per aliud. Intellectus the cause of that which is through
autem divinus per seipsum divinam another being.” But the divine intellect
substantiam videt: nam intellectus sees the divine substance through itself,
divinus est ipsa divina essentia, for the divine intellect is the divine
qua Dei substantia videtur, ut in essence itself whereby the substance of
primo probatum est. Intellectus God is seen, as was proved in Book
autem creatus videt divinam One [45]. However, the created intellect
substantiam per essentiam Dei, sees the divine substance through the
quasi per aliud a se. Haec igitur essence of God, as through something
visio non potest advenire intellectui other than itself. Therefore, this vision
creato nisi per actionem Dei. cannot come to the created intellect
except through God’s action.
Praeterea. Quidquid excedit limites [6] Moreover, whatever exceeds the

alicuius naturae, non potest sibi limitations of a nature cannot accrue to it
advenire nisi per actionem alterius: except through the action of another
sicut aqua non tendit sursum nisi being. For instance, water does not tend
ab aliquo alio mota. Videre autem upward unless it is moved by something
Dei substantiam transcendit limites else. Now, seeing God’s substance
omnis naturae creatae: nam cuilibet transcends the limitations of every
naturae intellectuali creatae created nature; indeed, it is proper for
proprium est ut intelligat secundum each created intellectual nature to
modum suae substantiae; understand according to the manner of
substantia autem divina non potest its own substance. But divine substance
sic intelligi, ut supra ostensum est. cannot be understood in this way, as we
Impossibile est ergo perveniri ab showed above. Therefore, the
aliquo intellectu creato ad visionem attainment by a created intellect to the
divinae substantiae nisi per vision of divine substance is not
actionem Dei, qui omnem possible except through the action of
creaturam transcendit. God, Who transcends all creatures.
Hinc est quod Rom. 623 dicitur: [7] Thus, it is said: “The grace of God is

gratia Dei vita aeterna. In ipsa enim life everlasting” (Rom. 6:23). In fact, we
divina visione ostendimus esse have shown that man’s happiness,
hominis beatitudinem, quae vita which is called life everlasting, consists
aeterna dicitur: ad quam sola Dei in this divine vision, and we are said to
gratia dicimur pervenire, quia talis attain it by God’s grace alone, because
visio omnem creaturae facultatem such a vision exceeds all the capacity of

excedit, nec est possibile ad eam a creature and it is not possible to reach
pervenire nisi divino munere; quae it without divine assistance. Now, when
autem sic adveniunt creaturae, Dei such things happen to a creature, they
gratiae deputantur. Et Ioan. 1421 are attributed to God’s grace. And the
dominus dicit: ego manifestabo ei Lord says: “I will manifest Myself to him”
meipsum. (John 14:21).
Caput 53 Chapter 53
Quod intellectus creatus THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT
indiget aliqua influentia divini NEEDS AN INFLUX OF DIVINE LIGHT IN
luminis ad hoc quod Deum per ORDER TO SEE GOD THROUGH HIS
essentiam videat ESSENCE
Oportet autem quod ad tam [1] For such a noble vision, the created
nobilem visionem intellectus intellect must be elevated by means of an
creatus per aliquam divinae influx of divine goodness.
bonitatis influentiam elevetur.
Impossibile est enim quod id [2] Indeed, it is not possible for what is the

quod est forma alicuius rei proper form of one thing to become the
propria, fiat alterius rei forma, nisi form of another unless the latter thing
res illa participet aliquam participates some likeness of the thing to
similitudinem illius cuius est which the form belongs. For instance, light
propria forma: sicut lux non fit can only become the act of a body if the
actus alicuius corporis nisi aliquid body participates somewhat in the
participet de diaphano. Essentia diaphanous. But the divine essence is the
autem divina est propria forma proper intelligible form for the divine
intelligibilis intellectus divini, et ei intellect and is proportioned to it; in fact,
proportionata: nam haec tria in these three are one in God: the intellect,
Deo unum sunt, intellectus, quo that whereby understanding is
intelligitur, et quod intelligitur. accomplished, and the object which is
Impossibile est igitur quod ipsa understood. So, it is impossible for this
essentia fiat intelligibilis forma essence to become the intelligible form of
alicuius intellectus creati, nisi per a created intellect unless by virtue of the
hoc quod aliquam divinam fact that the created intellect participates in
similitudinem intellectus creatus the divine likeness. Therefore, this
participat. Haec igitur divinae participation in the divine likeness is
similitudinis participatio necessary so that the substance of God
necessaria est ad hoc quod Dei may be seen.
substantia videatur.
Adhuc. Nihil est susceptivum [3] Again, nothing is receptive of a more
formae sublimioris nisi per sublime form unless it be elevated by
aliquam dispositionem ad illius means of a disposition to the capacity for
capacitatem elevetur: proprius this form, for a proper act is produced in a
enim actus in propria potentia fit. proper potency. Now, the divine essence is
Essentia autem divina est forma a higher form than any created intellect.
altior omni intellectu creato. Ad So, in order that the divine essence may
hoc igitur quod essentia divina become the intelligible species for a
fiat intelligibilis species alicuius created intellect, which is needed in order
intellectus creati, quod requiritur that the divine substance may be seen, it
ad hoc quod divina substantia is necessary for the created intellect to be
videatur, necesse est quod elevated for this purpose by a more
intellectus creatus aliqua sublime disposition.
dispositione sublimiori ad hoc
elevetur.
Amplius. Si aliqua duo prius [4] Besides, suppose that two things are
fuerint non unita et postmodum not united at first, and then later they are
uniantur, oportet quod hoc fiat united; this must be done by changing
per mutationem utriusque, vel both of them, or at least one. Now,
alterius tantum. Si autem ponatur suppose that a created intellect starts for
quod intellectus aliquis creatus the first time to see God’s substance; then,
de novo incipiat Dei substantiam necessarily, according to the preceding
videre, oportet, secundum arguments, the divine essence must be
praemissa, quod divina essentia united with it for the first time as an
copuletur ei de novo ut intelligible species. Of course, it is not
intelligibilis species. Impossibile possible for the divine essence to be
est autem quod divina essentia changed, as we showed above. So, this
moveatur, sicut supra ostensum union must start to exist by means of a
est. Oportet igitur quod talis unio change in the created intellect. In fact, this
incipiat esse per mutationem change can only come about by means of
intellectus creati. Quae quidem the created intellect acquiring some new
mutatio aliter esse non potest nisi disposition.
per hoc quod intellectus creatus
aliquam dispositionem de novo
acquirat.
Idem autem sequitur si detur Indeed, the same conclusion follows if it
quod a principio suae creationis be granted that a created intellect is
tali visione aliquis creatus endowed with such a vision from the start
intellectus potiatur. Nam si talis of its creation. For, if this vision exceeds
visio facultatem naturae creatae the capacity of a created nature, as we
excedit, ut probatum est, potest have proved, then any created intellect
intelligi quivis intellectus creatus may be understood to enjoy complete
in specie suae naturae consistere existence in the species proper to its
absque hoc quod Dei nature, without seeing the substance of
substantiam videat. Unde, sive a God. Hence, whether it begins to see God
principio sive postmodum Deum at the start of its existence, or later,
videre incipiat, oportet eius something must be added to its nature.
naturae aliquid superaddi.
Item. Nihil potest ad altiorem [5] Furthermore, nothing can be elevated
operationem elevari nisi per hoc to a higher operation unless because its
quod eius virtus fortificatur. power is strengthened. But there are two
Contingit autem dupliciter alicuius possible ways in which a thing’s power
virtutem fortificari. Uno modo, per may be strengthened. One way is by a

simplicem intensionem ipsius simple intensification of the power itself;
virtutis: sicut virtus activa calidi thus, the active power of a hot thing is
augetur per intensionem caloris, increased by an intensification of the heat,
ut possit efficere vehementiorem so that it is able to perform a stronger
actionem in eadem specie. Alio action of the same species. A second way
modo, per novae formae is by the imposition of a new form; thus,
appositionem: sicut diaphani the power of a diaphanous object is
virtus augetur ad hoc quod possit increased so that it can shine with light, by
illuminare, per hoc quod fit virtue of its becoming actually luminous,
lucidum actu per formam lucis through the form of light received for the
receptam in ipso de novo. Et hoc first time within it. And in fact, this latter
quidem virtutis augmentum kind of increase of power is needed for the
requiritur ad alterius speciei acquisition of an operation of another
operationem consequendam. species. Now, the power of a created
Virtus autem intellectus creati intellect is not sufficient to see the divine
naturalis non sufficit ad divinam substance, as is clear from what we have
substantiam videndam, ut ex said. So, its power must be increased in
dictis patet. Oportet ergo quod order that it may attain such a vision. But
augeatur ei virtus, ad hoc quod the increase through the intensification of
ad talem visionem perveniat. Non a natural power does not suffice, since this
sufficit autem augmentum per vision is not of the same essential type as
intensionem naturalis virtutis: the vision proper to a natural created
quia talis visio non est eiusdem intellect. This is evident from the difference
rationis cum visione naturali between the objects of these visions.
intellectus creati; quod ex Therefore, an increase of the intellectual
distantia visorum patet. Oportet power by means of the acquisition of a
igitur quod fiat augmentum new disposition must be accomplished.
virtutis intellectivae per alicuius
novae dispositionis adeptionem.
Quia vero in cognitionem [6] However, since we reach the
intelligibilium ex sensibilibus knowledge of intelligible things from
pervenimus, etiam sensibilis sensible things, we also take over the
cognitionis nomina ad names proper to sense knowledge for
intelligibilem cognitionem intellectual knowledge, especially the ones
transumimus: et praecipue quae which apply to sight, which, compared to
pertinent ad visum, qui inter the other senses, is more noble and more
ceteros sensus nobilior est et spiritual, and so more closely related to
spiritualior, ac per hoc intellectui the intellect. Thus it is that this intellectual
affinior; et inde est quod ipsa knowledge is called vision. And since
intellectualis cognitio visio corporeal vision is not accomplished
nominatur. Et quia corporalis without light, those things whereby
visio non completur nisi per intellectual vision is perfected take on the
lucem, ea quibus intellectualis name fight. Hence, even Aristotle, in Book
visio perficitur, lucis nomen III of On the Soul [5: 430a 15], likens the
assumunt: unde et Aristoteles, in agent intellect to light, because of the fact
III de anima, intellectum agentem that the agent intellect makes things
luci assimilat, ex eo quod actually intelligible, just as light in a way
intellectus agens facit intelligibilia makes things actually visible. Therefore,

in actu, sicut lux facit this disposition whereby the created
quodammodo visibilia actu. Illa intellect is raised to the intellectual vision
igitur dispositio qua intellectus of divine substance is fittingly called the
creatus ad intellectualem divinae light of glory; not because it makes some
substantiae visionem extollitur, object actually intelligible, as does the light
congrue lux gloriae dicitur: non of the agent intellect, but because it makes
propter hoc quod faciat the intellect actually powerful enough to
intelligibile in actu, sicut lux understand.
intellectus agentis; sed per hoc
quod facit intellectum potentem
actu intelligere.
Hoc autem est lumen de quo in [7] Now, this is the light of which it is said

Psalmo dicitur: in lumine tuo in the Psalms (35:10): “In Thy light we
videbimus lumen, scilicet divinae shall see the light,” that is, of the divine
substantiae. Et Apoc. 22 dicitur: substance. And it is said in the Apocalypse
civitas, scilicet beatorum, non (22:5; see also 21:23): “The city,” that is, of
eget sole neque luna: nam the Blessed, “has no need of the sun, nor
claritas Dei illuminavit illam. Et of the moon . . . for the glory of God bath
Isaiae 60 dicitur: non erit tibi enlightened it.” And it is said in Isaiah
amplius sol ad lucendum per (60:19): “You shall no more have the sun
diem, nec splendor lunae for your light by day, neither shall the
illuminabit te: sed erit tibi brightness of the moon enlighten you; but
dominus in lucem sempiternam, the Lord shall be an everlasting light for
et Deus tuus in gloriam tuam. you, and your God for your glory.”—It is
Inde est etiam, quia Deo idem also so, because in God to be and to
esse est quod intelligere, et est understand is the same thing; and
omnibus causa intelligendi, quod because He is for all the cause of
dicitur esse lux, Ioan. 19: erat understanding, He is said to be the light
lux vera, quae illuminat omnem (John 1:9): “That was the true light which
hominem venientem in hunc enlightened every man that comes into
mundum; et I Ioan. 15: Deus lux this world” (John 1:9); and: “God is light” (1
est; et in Psalmo: amictus lumine John 1:5); and in the Psalms (103:7):
sicut vestimento. Et propter hoc “You... are clothed with light as with a
etiam tam Deus quam Angeli in garment.”And for this reason also, both
sacra Scriptura in figuris igneis God and the angels are described in
describuntur, propter ignis Sacred Scripture in figures of fire (Exod.
claritatem. 24:17; Acts 2:3; Ps 103:4), because of the
brilliance of fire.
Chapter 54
Caput 54
ARGUMENTS BY WHICH IT SEEMS
Rationes quibus videtur probari
TO BE PROVED THAT GOD CANNOT
quod Deus non possit videri per
BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE, AND THE
essentiam, et solutiones earum
ANSWERS TO THEM
Nullum enim lumen adveniens [1] Now, someone will object against the

visui potest visum elevare ad preceding statements. No light that is
videndum ea quae naturalem added to the power of vision can elevate
facultatem visus corporalis this power to a vision of things which
excedunt: non enim potest visus exceed the capacity of bodily sight, for
videre nisi colorata. Divina autem the power of sight is able to see colored
substantia excedit omnem objects only. But divine substance
intellectus creati capacitatem, exceeds all the capacity of a created
etiam magis quam intellectus intellect, even more than understanding
excedat capacitatem sensus. Nullo exceeds the capacity of sense.
igitur lumine superveniente Therefore, the created intellect could not
intellectus creatus elevari poterit be elevated by any adventitious light so
ad divinam substantiam videndam. as to see the divine substance.
Praeterea. Lumen illud quod in [2] Again, the light which is received in a

intellectu creato recipitur, creatum created intellect is something created.
aliquid est. Et ipsum ergo in And so, it is infinitely removed from God.
infinitum a Deo distat. Non potest Therefore, the created intellect cannot be
igitur per huiusmodi lumen elevated to the vision of the divine
intellectus creatus ad divinae substance by this kind of light.
substantiae visionem elevari.
Item. Si hoc quidem potest facere [3] Besides, if the aforesaid light can in
lumen praedictum propter hoc fact do this because it is a likeness of the
quod est divinae substantiae divine substance, then since every
similitudo, cum omnis intellectualis intellectual substance, by the fact of
substantia, ex hoc ipso quod being intellectual, bears the divine
intellectualis est, divinam likeness, the very nature of any
similitudinem gerat ipsa natura intellectual substance whatever is
cuiuslibet intellectualis substantiae adequate to the divine vision.
ad visionem divinam sufficiet.
Adhuc. Si lumen illud creatum est; [4] Furthermore, if this light is created,
nihil autem prohibet quod est then nothing prevents it from being
creatum alicui rei creatae created connatural with some creature;
connaturale esse; poterit aliquis hence, there could be a created intellect
intellectus creatus esse qui suo which, by its own connatural light, would
connaturali lumine divinam see the divine substance. The contrary of
substantiam videbit. Cuius this has been proved.
contrarium ostensum est.
Amplius. Infinitum inquantum [5] Moreover, “the infinite as such is

huiusmodi, ignotum est. Ostensum unknown.” Now, we have shown in Book
est autem in primo Deum esse One [43] that God is infinite. Therefore,
infinitum. Non igitur potest divina the divine substance cannot be seen by
substantia per lumen praedictum means of the aforesaid light.
videri.
Adhuc. Oportet esse proportionem [6] Again, there must be a proportion
intelligentis ad rem intellectam. between the understander and the thing
Non est autem aliqua proportio understood. But there is no proportion
intellectus creati, etiam lumine between the created intellect, even when
praedicto perfecti, ad substantiam perfected by this light, and the divine
divinam: cum adhuc remaneat substance, because their distance apart
distantia infinita. Non potest igitur still remains infinite. Therefore, the
intellectus creatus ad divinam created intellect cannot be elevated to
substantiam videndam per lumen the vision of the divine substance by any
aliquod elevari. light.
Ex his autem et similibus rationibus [7] For these and similar reasons some

aliqui moti sunt ad ponendum quod men have been moved to assert that the
divina substantia nunquam ab divine substance is never seen by any
aliquo intellectu creato videtur. created intellect. Of course, this position
Quae quidem positio et veram both takes away true happiness from the
creaturae rationalis beatitudinem rational creature, for it can consist in
tollit, quae non potest esse nisi in nothing other than a vision of divine
visione divinae substantiae, ut substance, as we have shown; and it
ostensum est; et auctoritati sacrae also contradicts the text of Sacred
Scripturae contradicit, ut ex Scripture, as is evident from the
superioribus patet. Unde tanquam preceding texts. Consequently, it is to be
falsa et haeretica abiicienda est. spurned as false and heretical.
Rationes autem praedictas non [8] Indeed, it is not difficult to answer
difficile est solvere. Divina enim these arguments. The divine substance
substantia non sic est extra is not beyond the capacity of the created
facultatem creati intellectus quasi intellect in such a way that it is altogether
aliquid omnino extraneum ab ipso, foreign to it, as sound is from the object
sicut est sonus a visu, vel of vision, or as immaterial substance is
substantia immaterialis a sensu, from sense power; in fact, the divine
nam divina substantia est primum substance is the first intelligible object
intelligibile, et totius intellectualis and the principle of all intellectual
cognitionis principium: sed est cognition. But it is beyond the capacity of
extra facultatem intellectus creati the created intellect, in the sense that it
sicut excedens virtutem eius, sicut exceeds its power; just as sensible
excellentia sensibilium sunt extra objects of extreme character are beyond
facultatem sensus. Unde et the capacity of sense power. Hence, the
philosophus in II Metaphys., dicit Philosopher says that “our intellect is to
quod intellectus noster se habet ad the most evident things, as the eye of the
rerum manifestissima sicut oculus owl is to the light of the sun.” So, a
noctuae ad lucem solis. Indiget created intellect needs to be
igitur confortari intellectus creatus strengthened by a divine light in order
aliquo divino lumine ad hoc quod that it may be able to see the divine
divinam essentiam videre possit. essence. By this, the first argument is
Per quod prima ratio solvitur. answered.
Huiusmodi autem lumen [9] Moreover, this sort of light raises the
intellectum creatum ad Dei created intellect to the vision of God, not
visionem exaltat, non propter eius on the basis of a diminution of its
indistantiam a divina substantia, distance from the divine substance, but
sed propter virtutem quam a Deo by virtue of a power which it receives
sortitur ad talem effectum: licet from God in relation to such an effect;
secundum suum esse a Deo in even though it remains far away from
infinitum distet, ut secunda ratio God in its being, as the second argument
proponebat. Non enim hoc lumen suggested. In fact, this light does not
intellectum creatum Deo coniungit unite the created intellect with God in the
secundum esse, sed secundum act of being but only in the act of
intelligere solum. understanding.
Quia vero ipsius Dei proprium est [10] Since, however, it is proper to God
ut suam substantiam perfecte Himself to know His own substance
cognoscat, lumen praedictum Dei perfectly, the aforesaid light is a likeness
similitudo est quantum ad hoc of God, inasmuch as it conduces to the
quod ad Dei substantiam seeing of God’s substance. But no
videndam perducit. Hoc autem intellectual substance can be a likeness
modo nulla intellectualis substantia of God in this sense. For, since the divine
similitudo Dei esse potest. Cum simplicity is not equaled by any created
enim nullius substantiae creatae substance, it is not possible for a created
simplicitas sit aequalis divinae, substance to have its entire perfection in
impossibile est quod totam suam the same identity; indeed, this is proper
perfectionem creata substantia to God, as we showed in Book One [28],
habeat in eodem: hoc enim est for He is being, understanding and
proprium Dei, ut in primo ostensum blessed, identically. So, in a created
est, qui secundum idem est ens, intellectual substance, the light whereby
intelligens et beatus. Aliud igitur it is beatified in the divine vision is one
oportet esse in substantia thing, while the light whereby it is in any
intellectuali creata lumen quo sense perfected within its natural
divina visione beatificatur; et aliud species, and whereby it understands in a
quodcumque lumen quo in specie manner proportioned to its substance, is
suae naturae completur, et quite a different thing. From this the
proportionaliter suae substantiae answer to the third argument is evident.
intelligit. Ex quo patet solutio
tertiae rationis.
Quarta vero solvitur per hoc quod [11] Now, the fourth is answered by the
visio divinae substantiae omnem fact that the vision of the divine
naturalem virtutem excedit, ut substance exceeds every natural power,
ostensum est. Unde et lumen quo as we have shown. Hence, the light
intellectus creatus perficitur ad whereby the created intellect is perfected
divinae substantiae visionem, for the vision of the divine substance
oportet esse supernaturale. must be supernatural.
Neque autem divinae substantiae [12] Nor does the fact that God is called

visionem impedire potest quod infinite hinder the vision of the divine
Deus dicitur esse infinitus, ut substance, as the fifth argument
quinta ratio proponebat. Non enim suggested. For, He is not called infinite in
dicitur infinitus privative, sicut the privative sense, as quantity is. This
quantitas. Huiusmodi enim latter kind of infinity is rationally

infinitum rationabiliter est ignotum: unknown, because it is like matter devoid
quia est quasi materia carens of form, which is the principle of
forma, quae est cognitionis knowledge. Rather, He is called infinite in
principium. Sed dicitur infinitus the negative sense, like a selfsubsistent
negative, quasi forma per se form, not limited by matter receiving it.
subsistens non limitata per Hence, a being which is infinite in this
materiam recipientem. Unde quod sense is most knowable in itself.
sic infinitum est, maxime
cognoscibile est secundum se.
Proportio autem intellectus creati [13] Now, the proportion of the created
est quidem ad Deum intellect to the understanding of God is
intelligendum, non secundum not, in fact, based on a commensuration
commensurationem aliquam in an existing proportion, but on the fact
proportione existente, sed that proportion means any relation of one
secundum quod proportio significat thing to another, as of matter to form, or
quamcumque habitudinem unius of cause to effect. In this sense, then,
ad alterum, ut materiae ad formam, nothing prevents there being a proportion
vel causae ad effectum. Sic autem of creature to God on the basis of a
nihil prohibet esse proportionem relation of one who understands to the
creaturae ad Deum secundum thing understood, just as on the basis of
habitudinem intelligentis ad the relation of effect to cause. Hence the
intellectum, sicut et secundum answer to the sixth objection is clear.
habitudinem effectus ad causam.
Unde patet solutio sextae
obiectionis.
Caput 55 Chapter 55
Quod intellectus creatus non THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT
comprehendit divinam DOES NOT COMPREHEND THE
substantiam DIVINE SUBSTANCE
Quia vero cuiuslibet actionis [1] However, since the type of action
modus sequitur efficaciam activi appropriate to any agent depends on the
principii, magis enim calefacit cuius efficacy of its active principle, and thus a
calor virtuosior est; oportet quod thing whose heat is stronger performs
etiam modus cognitionis sequatur the act of heating more intensely, then it
efficaciam principii cognoscendi. must be that the manner of knowing
depends on the efficacy of the principle
of the act of knowing.
Lumen autem praedictum est [2] Now, the aforementioned light is a
quoddam divinae cognitionis certain principle of divine knowledge,
principium: cum per ipsum elevetur because the created intellect is elevated
intellectus creatus ad divinam by it to the seeing of the divine
substantiam videndam. Oportet substance. Therefore, the mode of the
ergo quod modus divinae visionis divine vision must be commensurate with
commensuretur virtuti praedicti the power of this light. Of course, the
luminis. Lumen autem praedictum aforementioned light, in its power, falls
multo deficit in virtute a claritate far short of the clarity of the divine
divini intellectus. Impossibile est intellect. So, it is impossible for the divine
ergo quod per huiusmodi lumen ita substance to be seen as perfectly by
perfecte divina substantia videatur means of this kind of light, as it is seen
sicut eam videt intellectus divinus. by the divine intellect itself. Indeed, the
Intellectus autem divinus divine intellect sees its substance as
substantiam illam videt ita perfecte perfectly as its perfect capacity to be
sicut perfecte visibilis est: veritas seen permits. In fact, the truth of the
enim divinae substantiae, et divine substance and the clarity of the
claritas intellectus divini, sunt divine intellect are equal, or, better, they
aequalia; immo magis sunt unum. are but one. So, it is impossible for a
Impossibile est igitur quod created intellect, by means of the
intellectus creatus per lumen aforesaid light, to see the divine
praedictum videat divinam substance as perfectly as its perfect
substantiam ita perfecte sicut capacity to be seen permits. Now,
perfecte est visibilis. Omne autem everything that is comprehended by a
quod comprehenditur ab aliquo knower is known by him in as perfect a
cognoscente, cognoscitur ab eo ita way as the knowable object permits. For
perfecte sicut cognoscibile est: qui instance, a person who knows that a
enim novit quod triangulus habet triangle has three angles equal to two
tres angulos aequales duobus right angles, but merely as a matter of
rectis, quasi opinabile quoddam opinion on the basis of probable
probabili ratione, quia sic a reasoning, since it is said to be so by
sapientibus dicitur, nondum hoc wise men, does not yet comprehend it;
comprehendit; sed solum ille qui but only the man who knows this as a
hoc novit quasi quoddam scibile, definite knowable object, by means of
per medium quod est causa. whatever is its cause. It is impossible,
Impossibile est igitur quod then, for the created intellect to
intellectus creatus divinam comprehend the divine substance.
substantiam comprehendat.
Adhuc. Virtus finita non potest [3] Again, a finite power in its, operation
adaequare in sua operatione cannot be on a par with an infinite object.
obiectum infinitum. Substantia But the divine substance is something
autem divina est quoddam infinite in relation to every created
infinitum per comparationem ad intellect, since every created intellect is
omnem intellectum creatum: cum limited under a definite species. So, it is
omnis intellectus creatus sub certa impossible for any created intellect’s
specie terminetur. Impossibile est vision to be equal to the seeing of the
ergo quod visio alicuius intellectus divine substance; that is to say, to seeing
creati adaequet in videndo divinam it as perfectly as its capacity to be seen
substantiam, scilicet ita perfecte permits. Therefore, no created intellect
ipsam videndo sicut visibilis est. may comprehend it.
Nullus igitur intellectus creatus
ipsam comprehendit.
Amplius. Omne agens in tantum [4] Besides, every agent acts perfectly to

perfecte agit in quantum perfecte the extent that it participates in the form
participat formam quae est which is the principle of its operation.
operationis principium. Forma Now, the intelligible form, by which the
autem intelligibilis qua divina divine substance is seen, is the divine
substantia videtur, est ipsa divina essence itself, and, though it becomes
essentia: quae etsi fiat forma the intelligible form of the created
intelligibilis intellectus creati, non intellect, the created intellect does not
tamen intellectus creatus capit grasp it according to its entire capacity.
ipsam secundum totum posse So, it does not see it as perfectly as its
eius. Non igitur ita perfecte ipsam capacity to be seen permits. Therefore, it
videt sicut ipsa visibilis est. Non is not comprehended by the created
ergo comprehenditur ab intellectu intellect.
creato.
Item. Nullum comprehensum [5] Furthermore, no object of

excedit terminos comprehendentis. comprehension exceeds the limitations
Si igitur intellectus creatus divinam of the one who comprehends. Thus, if
substantiam comprehenderet, the created intellect were to comprehend
divina substantia non excederet the divine substance, the divine
limites intellectus creati: quod est substance would not exceed the limits of
impossibile. Impossibile est igitur the created intellect. But this is
quod intellectus creatus divinam impossible. Therefore, it is not possible
substantiam comprehendat. for a created intellect to comprehend the
divine substance.
Non autem sic dicitur quod divina [6] Now, this statement that the divine
substantia ab intellectu creato substance is seen by the created
videtur, non tamen intellect, yet not comprehended, does not
comprehenditur, quasi aliquid eius mean that part of it is seen and part not
videatur et aliquid non videatur: seen, because the divine substance is
cum divina substantia sit simplex entirely simple. Rather, it means that it is
omnino. Sed quia non ita perfecte not seen as perfectly by the created
ab intellectu creato videtur sicut intellect as its visibility would permit. In
visibilis est: per quem modum the same way, a man who has an
dicitur opinans conclusionem opinion regarding a demonstrative
demonstrativam cognoscere sed conclusion is said to know it but not to
non comprehendere, quia non comprehend it, since he does not know it
perfecte ipsam cognoscit, scilicet perfectly, that is, in a scientific way,
per modum scientiae, licet nulla though there is no part of it that he does
pars eius sit quam non cognoscat. not know.
Caput 56 Chapter 56
Quod nullus intellectus creatus, THAT NO CREATED INTELLECT
videndo Deum, videt omnia quae WHILE SEEING GOD SEES ALL THAT
in eo videri possunt CAN BE SEEN IN HIM
Ex hoc autem apparet quod [1] It is evident from this that, though the

intellectus creatus, etsi divinam created intellect may see the divine
substantiam videat, non tamen substance, it does not know all that can
omnia cognoscit quae per divinam be known through the divine substance.

substantiam cognosci possunt.
Tunc enim solum necesse est [2] For it is only in the case of the
quod, cognito aliquo principio, principle being comprehended by the
omnes eius effectus cognoscantur intellect that, once the principle is known,
per ipsum, quando principium all its effects are of necessity known
comprehenditur intellectu: sic enim through it. Indeed, in that case, when all
principium aliquod secundum suam its effects are known from itself, a
totam virtutem cognoscitur, quando principle is known in its entire capacity.
omnes effectus eius cognoscuntur Now, other things are known through the
ex ipso. Per divinam autem divine essence, as the effect is known
essentiam alia cognoscuntur sicut from its cause. But, since the created
cognoscitur effectus ex causa. intellect cannot know the divine
Cum igitur intellectus creatus non substance in such a way that it
possit divinam substantiam comprehends it, the intellect does not
cognoscere sic quod ipsam have to see all things that can be known
comprehendat, non est necesse through this substance, when it sees it.
quod videndo ipsam, omnia videat
quae per ipsam cognosci possunt.
Item. Quanto aliquis intellectus est [3] Again, the higher the nature of an
altior, tanto plura cognoscit, vel intellect, the more does it know: either in
secundum rerum multitudinem, vel the sense of a multitude of things, or
saltem secundum earundem rerum even in the sense of a greater number of
plures rationes. Intellectus autem reasons for the same things. But the
divinus excedit omnem intellectum divine intellect surpasses every created
creatum. Plura igitur cognoscit intellect. So, it knows more than any
quam aliquis intellectus creatus. created intellect does, and it does not
Non autem cognoscit aliquid nisi know anything without seeing its
per hoc quod suam essentiam essence, as we showed in Book One
videt, ut in primo ostensum est. [49]. Therefore, more things are
Plura igitur sunt cognoscibilia per knowable through the divine essence
essentiam divinam quam aliquis than any created intellect can see,
intellectus creatus per ipsam videre through the aforesaid essence.
possit.
Adhuc. Quantitas virtutis attenditur [4] Besides, the quantity of a power
secundum ea in quae potest. Idem depends on the things that it can do. So,
igitur est cognoscere omnia in it is the same to know all the things that
quae potest aliqua virtus, et ipsam a power can do and to comprehend the
virtutem comprehendere. Divinam power itself. But, since the divine power
autem virtutem, cum sit infinita, non is infinite, no created intellect can
potest aliquis creatus intellectus comprehend it, just as its essence
comprehendere, sicut nec cannot be comprehended, as we have
essentiam eius, ut probatum est. proved. Nor can the created intellect
Neque igitur intellectus creatus know all that the divine power can do.
potest cognoscere omnia in quae But all things that the divine power can
divina virtus potest. Omnia autem do are knowable through the divine
in quae divina virtus potest, sunt essence, for God knows all and in no
per essentiam divinam other way than through His essence.
cognoscibilia: omnia enim Therefore, the created intellect, seeing
cognoscit Deus, et non nisi per the divine substance, does not see all
essentiam suam. Non igitur that can be seen in God’s substance.
intellectus creatus, videns divinam
substantiam, videt omnia quae in
Dei substantia videri possunt.
Amplius. Nulla virtus cognoscitiva [5] Moreover, no cognoscitive power

cognoscit rem aliquam nisi knows a thing except under the rational
secundum rationem proprii obiecti: character of its proper object. For
non enim visu cognoscimus aliquid instance, we do not know anything by
nisi inquantum est coloratum. sight except according as it is colored.
Proprium autem obiectum Now, the proper object of the intellect is
intellectus est quod quid est, idest that which is, that is, the substance of a
substantia rei, ut dicitur in III de thing, as is stated in Book III of On the
anima. Igitur quicquid intellectus de Soul [4: 429b 10]. Therefore, whatever
aliqua re cognoscit, cognoscit per the intellect knows about any thing, it
cognitionem substantiae illius rei: knows through knowing the substance of
unde in qualibet demonstratione the thing. Consequently, in any
per quam innotescunt nobis propria demonstration through which the proper
accidentia, principium accipimus accidents become known to us, we take
quod quid est, ut dicitur in I as our principle that which is, as is stated
posteriorum. Si autem substantiam in Posterior Analytics I [4: 73a 37]. Now,
alicuius rei intellectus cognoscat if the intellect knows the substance of a
per accidentia, sicut dicitur in I de thing through its accidents, in
anima, quod accidentia magnam accordance with what is said in Book I of
partem conferunt ad On the Soul [1: 402b 21], that “the
cognoscendum quod quid est; hoc accidents contribute a good deal to the
est per accidens, inquantum knowing of that which is,” this is
cognitio intellectus oritur a sensu, accidental, inasmuch as the intellect
et sic per sensibilium accidentium must attain to substance through the
cognitionem oportet ad substantiae knowledge of sensible accidents. For
intellectum pervenire; propter quod this reason, this procedure has no place
hoc non habet locum in in mathematics, but only in the area of
mathematicis, sed in naturalibus physical things. Therefore, whatever is in
tantum. Quicquid igitur est in re a thing and cannot be known through a
quod non potest cognosci per knowledge of its substance must be
cognitionem substantiae eius, unknown to the intellect.
oportet esse intellectui ignotum.
Quid autem velit aliquis volens, non However, what a volitional agent wills

potest cognosci per cognitionem cannot be known through a knowledge
substantiae ipsius: nam voluntas of his substance, for the will does not
non tendit in sua volita omnino incline to its object in a purely natural
naturaliter; propter quod voluntas way; this is why the will and nature are
et natura duo principia activa said to be two active principles. So, an
ponuntur. Non potest igitur aliquis intellect cannot know what a volitional
intellectus cognoscere quid volens agent wills except, perhaps, through

velit, nisi forte per aliquos effectus, certain effects. For instance, when we
sicut, cum videmus aliquem see someone acting voluntarily we may
voluntarie operantem, scimus quid know what he wishes: either through
voluerit; aut per causam, sicut their cause, as God knows our will acts,
Deus voluntates nostras sicut et just as He does His other effects,
alios suos effectus, cognoscit per because He is for us a cause of our
hoc quod est nobis causa volendi; willing; or by means of one person
aut per hoc quod aliquis alteri indicating his wish to another, as when a
suam voluntatem insinuat, ut cum man expresses his feeling in speech.
aliquis loquendo suum affectum And so, since many things are
exprimit. Cum igitur multa ex dependent on the simple will of God, as
simplici Dei voluntate dependeant, is partly clear from earlier
ut partim ex superioribus patet, et considerations, and will later be more
adhuc erit amplius manifestum; evident, though the created intellect may
intellectus creatus, etsi Dei see God’s, substance, it does not know
substantiam videat, non tamen all that God sees through His substance.
omnia cognoscit quae Deus per
suam substantiam videt.
Potest autem aliquis contra [6] Of course, someone can object
praedicta obiicere quod Dei against the foregoing that God’s
substantia maius est aliquid quam substance is something greater than all
omnia quae ipse facere, vel the things which He can make, or
intelligere, vel velle potest, praeter understand, or will, apart from Himself;
seipsum: unde, si intellectus hence, if the created intellect can see
creatus Dei substantiam videre God’s substance, it is much more
potest, multo magis possibile est possible for it to know all things which
quod omnia cognoscat quae Deus, God understands, or wills, or makes,
praeter seipsum, vel intelligit, vel except for Himself.
vult, vel facere potest.
Sed, si diligenter consideretur non [7] But, if it is carefully considered, the
est eiusdem rationis aliquid fact that something is known in itself
cognosci in seipso, et in sua causa: does not have the same meaning as that
quaedam enim in seipsis de facili it is known in its cause. For some things
cognoscibilia sunt quae tamen in easily known in themselves are not,
suis causis non de facili however, easily known in their causes.
cognoscuntur. Verum est igitur So, it is true that it is a greater thing to
quod maius est intelligere divinam understand the divine substance than
substantiam quam quicquid est anything whatever other than that
aliud praeter ipsam, quod in seipso substance which might be known in
cognosci potest. Perfectioris tamen itself. However, to know the divine
cognitionis est cognoscere divinam substance and to see its effects in it is a
substantiam et in ea eius effectus more perfect knowledge than to know
videre, quam cognoscere divinam the divine substance without seeing the
substantiam sine hoc quod effectus effects in it. And this seeing of the divine
videantur in ipsa. Et hoc quidem substance can be done without
quod divina substantia videatur, comprehension of it. But for all things
absque comprehensione ipsius fieri which can be understood through it to be
potest. Quod autem omnia quae known is something which cannot
per ipsam intelligi possunt, happen without comprehending this
cognoscantur, hoc absque ipsius substance, as is evident from what we
comprehensione non potest have said.
accidere, ut ex praedictis patet.
Caput 57 Chapter 57
Quod omnis intellectus, THAT EVERY INTELLECT, WHATEVER
cuiuscumque gradus, particeps ITS LEVEL, CAN BE A PARTICIPANT
esse potest divinae visionis IN THE DIVINE VISION
Cum autem ad visionem divinae [1] Since the created intellect is exalted
substantiae intellectus creatus to the vision of the divine substance by a
quodam supernaturali lumine certain supernatural light, as is evident
sublimetur, ut patet ex dictis, non from what has been said, there is no
est aliquis intellectus creatus ita created intellect so low in its nature that it
secundum suam naturam infimus, cannot be elevated to this vision.
qui non ad hanc visionem possit
elevari.
Ostensum enim est quod lumen [2] It has been shown, in fact, that this
illud non potest esse alicui light cannot be connatural with any
creaturae connaturale, sed omnem creature, but, that it surpasses every
creatam naturam excedit created nature in its power. But what is
secundum virtutem. Quod autem fit done by supernatural power is not
virtute supernaturali, non impeditur hindered by a diversity of nature, since
propter naturae diversitatem, cum divine power is infinite. And so, in the
divina virtus sit infinita: unde in case of the healing of an afflicted person,
sanatione infirmi quae fit accomplished miraculously, it makes no
miraculose, non differt utrum difference whether the person is much or
aliquis multum vel parum little afflicted. Therefore, the varying level
infirmetur. Diversus ergo gradus of the intellectual nature does not hinder
naturae intellectualis non impedit the lowest member of such a nature from
quin infimum in tali natura ad illam being able to be brought to this vision by
visionem perduci possit praedicto the aforementioned light.
lumine.
Adhuc. Distantia intellectus [3] Again, the gap between the intellect,

secundum ordinem naturae at its highest natural level, and God is
supremi ad Deum est infinita in infinite in perfection and goodness. But
perfectione et bonitate. Eius autem the distance from the highest to the
distantia ad intellectum infimum est lowest intellect is finite, for there cannot
finita: finiti enim ad finitum non be an infinite distance between one finite
potest esse infinita distantia. being and another. So, the distance
Distantia igitur quae est inter which lies between the lowest created
infimum intellectum creatum et intellect and the highest one is like
supremum, est quasi nihil in nothing in comparison to the gap which
comparatione ad illam distantiam lies between the highest created intellect

quae est inter supremum and God. Now, that which is practically
intellectum creatum et Deum. nothing cannot make a noticeable
Quod autem est quasi nihil, non difference; thus, the distance between
potest variationem sensibilem the center of the earth and our level of
facere: sicut distantia quae est vision is like nothing in comparison with
inter centrum terrae et visum, est the distance that lies between our eye
quasi nihil in comparatione ad level and the eighth sphere, in regard to
distantiam quae est inter visum which sphere the whole earth takes the
nostrum et octavam sphaeram, ad place of a point; this is why no noticeable
quam tota terra comparata obtinet variation results from the fact that
locum puncti; et propter hoc nulla astronomers in their demonstrations use
sensibilis variatio fit per hoc quod our eye level of sight as the center of the
astrologi in suis demonstrationibus earth. Therefore, it makes no difference
utuntur visu nostro quasi centro what level of intellect it is that is elevated
terrae. Nihil ergo differt quicumque to the vision of God by the
intellectus sit qui ad Dei visionem aforementioned light: it may be the
per lumen praedictum elevetur, highest, the lowest, or one in the middle.
utrum summus, vel infimus, vel
medius.
Item. Supra probatum est quod [4] Besides, it was proved above that
omnis intellectus naturaliter every intellect naturally desires the vision
desiderat divinae substantiae of the divine substance, but natural
visionem. Naturale autem desire cannot be incapable of fulfillment.
desiderium non potest esse inane. Therefore, any created intellect whatever
Quilibet igitur intellectus creatus can attain to the vision of the divine
potest pervenire ad divinae substance, and the inferiority of its nature
substantiae visionem, non is no impediment.
impediente inferioritate naturae.
Hinc est quod Matth. 2230, [5] Hence it is that the Lord promises
dominus hominibus repromittit men the glory of the angels: “They shall
gloriam Angelorum: erunt, inquit, be,” He says, speaking of men, “like the
de hominibus loquens, sicut Angeli angels of God in heaven” (Matt. 22:30).
Dei in caelo. Et Apoc. 20, eadem And also it is said that there is “the same
mensura hominis et Angeli esse measure for man and for angel” (Apoc.
perhibetur. Propter quod et fere 21:37). For this reason, too, almost
ubique in sacra Scriptura Angeli in everywhere in Sacred Scripture angels
forma hominum describuntur: vel in are described in the shape of men: either
toto, sicut patet de Angelis qui wholly, as is evident of the angels who
apparuerunt Abrahae in appeared to Abraham in the likeness of
similitudine virorum, Gen. 182; vel men (Gen. 18:2); or partially, as is the
in parte, sicut patet de animalibus, case of the animals of whom it is said
Ezech. 18, de quibus dicitur quod that “they had the hands of a man under
manus hominis erant sub pennis their wings” (Ez. 1:8).
eorum.
Per hoc autem excluditur error [6] By this conclusion we refute the error

quorundam qui dicebant quod of those who have said that the human
anima humana, quantumcumque soul, no matter how much it be elevated,
elevetur, non potest ad cannot attain equality with the higher
aequalitatem superiorum intellects.
intellectuum pervenire.
Chapter 58
Caput 58
THAT ONE BEING IS ABLE TO SEE
Quod unus alio perfectius Deum
GOD MORE PERFECTLY THAN
videre potest
ANOTHER
Quia vero modus operationis [1] Since the mode of operation results
consequitur formam quae est from the form which is the principle of
operationis principium; visionis operation, and since the principle of the
autem qua intellectus creatus vision in which the created intellect sees
divinam substantiam videt, the divine substance is the
principium quoddam est lumen aforementioned light, as is clear from
praedictum, ut ex dictis patet: what we have said, the mode of the
necesse est quod secundum divine vision must be in accord with the
modum huius luminis sit modus mode of this light. Now, it is possible for
divinae visionis. Possibile est there to be different degrees of
autem huius luminis diversos esse participation in this light, and so one
participationis gradus, ita quod intellect may be more perfectly
unus eo perfectius illustretur quam illuminated than another. Therefore, it is
alius. Possibile igitur est quod unus possible that one of those who see God
Deum videntium eum perfectius may see Him more perfectly than
alio videat, quamvis uterque videat another, even though both see His
eius substantiam. substance.
Adhuc. In quocumque genere est [2] Again, whenever there is a highest
aliquod summum, quod excedit member which surpasses others in a
alia, est etiam invenire magis et genus, we also find that there are
minus, secundum maiorem degrees of more and less, depending on
propinquitatem vel distantiam ab the greater proximity to, or distance from,
ipso: sicut aliqua sunt magis et this highest member. For instance,
minus calida secundum quod certain things are more or less hot
magis vel minus appropinquant ad depending on whether they are more or
ignem, qui est summe calidus. less near to fire, which is the highest
Deus autem suam substantiam type of hot thing. But God sees His own
perfectissime videt, utpote qui substance most perfectly, being the only
solus eam comprehendit, ut supra One Who comprehends it, as we showed
ostensum est. Igitur et eum above. And so, of those who see Him,
videntium unus alio magis vel one may see His substance more or less
minus substantiam eius videt, than another, depending on whether one
secundum quod magis vel minus ei is more or less near to Him.
appropinquat.
Amplius. Lumen gloriae ex hoc ad [3] Besides, the light of glory elevates to

divinam visionem elevat, quod est the divine vision due to the fact that it is
quaedam similitudo intellectus a certain likeness of the divine intellect,
divini, sicut iam dictum est. as we have already stated. Now, it is
Contingit autem aliquid magis vel possible for a thing to become more or
minus assimilari Deo. Possibile est less like God. Therefore, it is possible for
igitur aliquem perfectius vel minus one to see the divine substance more or
perfecte divinam substantiam less perfectly.
videre.
Item. Cum finis proportionaliter [4] Furthermore, because the end is

respondeat his quae sunt ad finem, related in a proportional way to the
oportet quod sicut aliqua things which are directed to the end,
diversimode praeparantur ad these things must participate in the end
finem, ita diversimode participent differently, depending on the different
finem. Visio autem divinae ways in which they are disposed toward
substantiae est ultimus finis the end. But the vision of the divine
cuiuslibet intellectualis substantiae, substance is the ultimate end of every
ut ex dictis patet. Intellectuales intellectual substance, as is clear from
autem substantiae non omnes what we have said. Now, not all
aequaliter praeparantur ad finem: intellectual substances are disposed with
quaedam enim sunt maioris equal perfection to the end; some, in
virtutis, et quaedam minoris; virtus fact, are more virtuous and others less,
autem est via ad felicitatem. and virtue is the road to felicity. So, there
Oportet igitur quod in visione divina must be diversity within the divine vision:
sit diversitas, quod quidam some seeing the divine substance more
perfectius, quidam minus perfecte perfectly; others, less perfectly.
divinam substantiam videant.
Hinc est quod, ad hanc felicitatis [5] Thus it is that, in order to indicate the

differentiam designandam, variation in this felicity, the Lord says: “In
dominus dicit, Io. 142: in domo My Father’s house there are many
patris mei mansiones multae sunt. mansions” (John 14:2).
Per hoc autem excluditur error [6] On this basis, then, the error of those

quorundam qui dicunt omnia who say that all rewards are equal is
praemia esse aequalia. refuted.
Sicut autem ex modo visionis [7] Moreover, just as the different
apparet diversus gradus gloriae in degrees of glory among the blessed are
beatis, ita ex eo quod videtur evident from the mode of this vision, so
apparet gloria eadem: nam from the side of the object that is seen
cuiuslibet felicitas ex hoc est quod the glory appears to be the same, for the
Dei substantiam videt, ut probatum felicity of each person is due to his
est. Idem ergo est quod omnes seeing God’s substance, as we proved.
beatos facit: non tamen ab eo Therefore, it is the same being that
omnes aequaliter beatitudinem makes all blessed; yet they do not all
capiunt. grasp happiness therefrom in equal
degree.
Unde praedictis non obviat quod [8] Hence, there is no contradiction
dominus, Matth. 2010 omnibus between the foregoing and what our Lord
laborantibus in vinea, licet non teaches (Matt. 20:10), that to all who
aequaliter laboraverint, idem tamen labor in the vineyard, though they may
praemium redditum docet, scilicet not do equal work, there is paid
denarium: quia idem est quod nevertheless the same reward, namely, a
omnibus datur in praemium ad penny, because it is the same reward
videndum et fruendum, scilicet that is given to all, to be seen and
Deus. enjoyed, namely, God.
In quo etiam considerandum est [9] On this point we must also take into
quod quodammodo contrarius est consideration the fact that the order of
ordo corporalium et spiritualium corporeal movements is somewhat
motuum. Omnium enim contrary to that of spiritual movements.
corporalium motuum est idem For there is numerically the same first
numero primum subiectum, fines subject for all corporeal motions, but the
vero diversi. Spiritualium vero ends are different. While there are, on
motuum, scilicet intellectualium the other hand, different first subjects for
apprehensionum et voluntatum, spiritual movements, that is to say, for
sunt quidem diversa subiecta acts of intellectual apprehension and of
prima, finis vero numero idem. willing, their end is, however, numerically
the same.
Caput 59 Chapter 59
Quomodo videntes divinam HOW THOSE WHO SEE THE DIVINE
substantiam omnia videant SUBSTANCE MAY SEE ALL THINGS
Quia vero visio divinae [1] Since the vision of the divine
substantiae est ultimus finis substance is the ultimate end of every
cuiuslibet intellectualis intellectual substance, as is evident from
substantiae, ut patet ex dictis; what we have said, and since the natural
omnis autem res cum pervenerit appetite of everything comes to rest when
ad ultimum finem, quiescit the thing reaches its ultimate end, the
appetitus eius naturalis: oportet natural appetite of an intellectual
quod appetitus naturalis substance must come to rest completely
substantiae intellectualis divinam when it sees the divine substance. Now,
substantiam videntis omnino the natural appetite of the intellect is to
quiescat. Est autem appetitus know the genera and species and powers
naturalis intellectus ut cognoscat of all things, and the whole order of the
omnium rerum genera et species universe; human investigation of each of
et virtutes, et totum ordinem the aforementioned items indicates this.
universi: quod demonstrat Therefore, each one who sees the divine
humanum studium circa singula substance knows all the things mentioned
praedictorum. Quilibet igitur above.
divinam substantiam videntium
cognoscet omnia supradicta.
Amplius. In hoc intellectus et [2] Again, the intellect and the senses
sensus differt, ut patet in III de differ on this point as is clear from Book III
anima, quod sensus ab of On the Soul [4: 429a 14], the power to
excellentibus sensibilibus sense is destroyed, or weakened, by the
corrumpitur vel debilitatur, ut more striking sense objects, so that later
postmodum minora sensibilia it is unable to perceive weaker objects;
percipere non possit: intellectus but the intellect, not being corrupted or
autem, quia non corrumpitur nec hindered by its object but only perfected,
impeditur a suo obiecto, sed after understanding a greater object of the
solum perficitur, postquam intellect, is not less able to understand
intellexit maius intelligibile, non other intelligibles but more able. Now, the
minus poterit alia intelligibilia highest object in the genus of intelligible
intelligere, sed magis. Summum objects is the divine substance. So, the
autem in genere intelligibilium est intellect which is elevated by divine light
divina substantia. Intellectus igitur in order to see God’s substance is much
qui per lumen divinum elevatur ad more perfected by this same light, so that
videndam Dei substantiam, multo it may understand all other objects which
magis eodem lumine perficitur ad exist in the nature of things.
omnia alia intelligenda quae sunt
in rerum natura.
Adhuc. Esse intelligibile non est [3] Besides, intelligible being is not of
minoris ambitus quam esse lesser scope than natural being, but
naturale, sed forte maioris: perhaps it is more extensive; indeed,
intellectus enim natus est omnia intellect is from its origin capable of
quae sunt in rerum natura understanding all things existing in reality,
intelligere, et quaedam intelligit and it also understands things that have
quae non habent esse naturale, no natural being, such as negations and
sicut negationes et privationes. privations. So, whatever things are
Quaecumque igitur requiruntur ad needed for the perfection of natural being
perfectionem esse naturalis, are also needed for the perfection of
requiruntur ad perfectionem esse intelligible being, and even more. But the
intelligibilis, vel etiam plura. perfection of intelligible being is present
Perfectio autem esse intelligibilis when the intellect reaches its ultimate
est cum intellectus ad suum end, just as the perfection of natural being
ultimum finem pervenerit: sicut consists in the very establishment of
perfectio esse naturalis in ipsa things in actual being. Therefore, God
rerum institutione consistit. Omnia shows the intellect that is seeing Him all
igitur quae Deus ad perfectionem the things which He has produced for the
universi produxit, intellectui se perfection of the universe.
videnti manifestat.
Item. Quamvis videntium Deum [4] Moreover, although one of the
unus alio perfectius eum videat, ut intellects seeing God may see Him more
ostensum est, quilibet tamen ita perfectly than another, as we have
perfecte eum videt quod impletur shown, each one sees Him so perfectly
tota capacitas naturalis: quinimmo that its whole natural capacity is fulfilled.

ipsa visio omnem capacitatem Or, rather, this vision exceeds all natural
naturalem excedit, ut ostensum capacity, as we have shown. So, each
est. Oportet igitur quod quilibet one seeing the divine substance knows in
videns divinam substantiam in this divine substance all the things to
ipsa substantia divina cognoscat which its natural capacity extends. But the
omnia ad quae se extendit sua natural capacity of every intellect extends
capacitas naturalis. Capacitas to the knowing of all genera and species
autem naturalis cuiuslibet and orders of things. Therefore, each one
intellectus se extendit ad who sees God will know these things in
cognoscenda omnia genera et the divine substance.
species et ordinem rerum. Haec
igitur quilibet Deum videntium in
divina substantia cognoscet.
Hinc est quod dominus Moysi [5] Hence it is that the Lord replies to
petenti divinae substantiae Moses, when he asks for the vision of the
visionem respondet, Exod. 3319: divine substance: “I will show thee all
ego ostendam tibi omne bonum. good” (Exod, 33:19). And Gregory says:
Et Gregorius dicit: quid est quod “What do they not know, who know Him
nesciant qui scientem omnia Who knows all things?”
sciunt?
Si autem praemissa diligenter [6] Moreover, if the foregoing statements
considerentur, patet quod quodam are carefully considered, it becomes clear
modo videntes divinam that, in a way, those who see the divine
substantiam omnia vident, substance do see all things; whereas, in
quodam vero modo non. Si enim another way, they do not. Indeed, if the
per omnia illa intelligantur quae ad word all means whatever things pertain to
universi perfectionem pertinent, the perfection of the universe, it is
manifestum est ex dictis quod obvious from what has been said that
videntes divinam substantiam those who see the divine substance do
omnia vident, ut rationes modo see all things, as the arguments that have
inductae ostendunt. Cum enim just been advanced show. For, since the
intellectus sit quodammodo intellect is in some way all things,
omnia, quaecumque ad whatever things belong to the perfection
perfectionem naturae pertinent, of nature belong also in their entirety to
omnia etiam pertinent ad the perfection of intelligible being. For this
perfectionem esse intelligibilis: reason, according to Augustine’s Literal
propter quod, secundum Commentary on Genesis, whatever things
Augustinum, super Gen. ad Litt., have been made by the Word of God to
quaecumque facta sunt per Dei subsist in their proper nature have also
verbum ut in propria natura come to be in the angelic understanding,
subsisterent, fiebant etiam in so that they might be understood by the
intelligentia angelica ut ab Angelis angels. Now, within the perfection of
intelligerentur. De perfectione natural being belong the nature of species
autem naturalis esse sunt naturae and their properties and powers, for the
specierum, et earum proprietates inclination of nature is drawn to the
et virtutes: ad naturas enim natures of species, since individuals are
specierum intentio naturae fertur; for the sake of the species. So, it is
individua enim sunt propter pertinent to the perfection of intellectual
speciem. Pertinet igitur ad substance to know the natures of all
perfectionem intellectualis species and their powers and proper
substantiae ut omnium specierum accidents. Therefore, this will be obtained
naturas et virtutes et propria in the final beatitude through the vision of
accidentia cognoscat. Hoc igitur in the divine essence. Moreover, through the
finali beatitudine consequetur per cognition of natural species the
divinae essentiae visionem. Per individuals existing under these species
cognitionem autem naturalium are known by the intellect that sees God,
specierum, et individua sub as can be made evident from what has
speciebus huiusmodi existentia been said above on the knowledge
cognoscuntur ab intellectu Deum appropriate to God and the angels.
vidente, ut ex his quae dicta sunt
supra de cognitione Dei et
Angelorum, potest esse
manifestum.
Si vero per omnia intelligantur [7] However, if the term all means all the
omnia quae Deus, suam things that God knows in seeing His own
essentiam videndo, cognoscit, essence, then no created intellect sees all
nullus intellectus creatus omnia in things in God’s substance, as we have
Dei substantia videt, ut superius showed above.
est ostensum.
Hoc autem considerari potest [8] But this can be considered under
quantum ad plura. Primo, several points. First, in regard to those
quantum ad ea quae Deus facere things which God can make but has not
potest, sed nec fecit nec facturus made, nor will ever make. Indeed, all
est unquam. Omnia enim things of this kind cannot be known
huiusmodi cognosci non possunt unless His power is comprehended, and
nisi eius virtus comprehenderetur: this is not possible for any intellectual
quod non est possibile alicui creature, as we showed above. Hence,
intellectui creato, ut supra the statement in Job 11 [7ff]: “Do you
ostensum est. Hinc est quod Iob think you can understand the steps of
11 dicitur: forsitan vestigia Dei God, and find out the Almighty perfectly?
comprehendes, et omnipotentem He is higher than heaven, and what will
usque ad perfectum reperies? you do? He is deeper than hell, and how
Excelsior caelo est, et quid will you know? His measure is longer than
facies? Profundior Inferno, et the earth, and broader than the sea.”
unde cognosces? Longior terra Indeed, these things are not said as
mensura eius, et latior mari. Non though God were great in quantitative
enim haec dicuntur quasi dimensions, but because His power is not
dimensionibus quantitatis Deus sit limited to all things which are seen to be
magnus: sed quia eius virtus non great, for, on the contrary, He can make
limitatur ad omnia quae magna even greater things.
esse videntur, quin possit etiam
maiora facere.
Secundo, quantum ad rationes [9] Secondly, let us consider it in regard to

rerum factarum: quas omnes the reasons for the things that have been
cognoscere non potest intellectus made: the intellect cannot know all of
nisi divinam bonitatem these unless it comprehend the divine
comprehendat. Ratio enim goodness. For, the reason for everything
cuiuslibet rei factae sumitur ex that has been made is derived from the
fine quem faciens intendit. Finis end which its maker intended. But the end
autem omnium a Deo factorum of all things made by God is divine
divina bonitas est. Ratio igitur goodness. Therefore, the reason for the
rerum factarum est ut divina things that have been made is so that the
bonitas diffundatur in rebus. Sic divine goodness might be diffused among
igitur aliquis omnes rationes rerum things. And so, one would know all the
creatarum cognosceret, si reasons for things created if he knew all
cognosceret omnia bona quae in the goods which could come about in
rebus creatis, secundum ordinem created things in accord with the order of
divinae sapientiae, provenire divine wisdom. This would be to
possunt. Quod esset divinam comprehend divine goodness And
bonitatem et sapientiam wisdom, something no created intellect
comprehendere: quod nullus can do. Hence it is said: “I understand
intellectus creatus potest. Hinc est that man can find no reason of all those
quod dicitur Eccle. 817: intellexi works of God” (Eccle. 8:17).
quod omnium operum Dei non
possit homo invenire rationem.
Tertio, quantum ad ea quae ex [10] Thirdly, we may consider the point in

sola Dei voluntate dependent: regard to those things which depend on
sicut praedestinatio, electio et the will of God alone: for instance,
iustificatio, et alia huiusmodi quae predestination, election, justification, and
ad sanctificationem pertinent other similar things which pertain to the
creaturae. Hinc est quod dicitur I sanctification of the creature. On this
Cor. 211: quae sunt hominis matter, it is said: “No man knows the
nemo novit nisi spiritus hominis, things of a man, but the spirit of man that
qui in ipso est. Ita et quae sunt is in him. So the things also that are of
Dei nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei. God, no man knows, but the Spirit of
God” (1 Cor. 2:11).
Caput 60 Chapter 60
Quod videntes Deum omnia THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD SEE ALL
simul vident in ipso THINGS IN HIM AT ONCE
Cum autem ostensum sit quod [1] Now that we have shown that the
intellectus creatus, divinam created intellect, seeing the divine
substantiam videns, in ipsa Dei substance, understands all the species of
substantia omnes species rerum things in God’s very substance, and that
intelligat; quaecumque autem una whatever things are seen by one species
specie videntur, oportet simul et must be seen at once and by one vision,
una visione videri, cum visio since a vision corresponds to the principle
principio visionis respondeat: of the vision, it necessarily follows that the
necesse est ut intellectus qui intellect which sees the divine substance
divinam substantiam videt, non contemplates all things at once and not in
successive, sed simul omnia succession.
contempletur.
Item. Summa et perfecta felicitas [2] Again, the highest and perfect felicity
intellectualis naturae in Dei of intellectual nature consists in the vision
visione consistit, ut supra of God, as we showed above. But felicity
ostensum est. Felicitas autem non is not a matter of habit but of act, since it
est secundum habitum, sed is the ultimate perfection and the ultimate
secundum actum: cum sit ultima end. So, of the things that are seen
perfectio et ultimus finis. Ea igitur through the vision of the divine
quae videntur per visionem substance, whereby we are made
divinae substantiae, qua beati blessed, all are seen actually. Therefore,
sumus, omnia secundum actum one is not first and then another later.
videntur. Non ergo unum prius et
aliud posterius.
Adhuc. Unaquaeque res, cum [3] Besides, when each thing reaches its
pervenerit ad suum ultimum ultimate end it rests, for all motion is in
finem, quiescit: cum omnis motus order to attain an end. Now, the ultimate
sit ad acquirendum finem. Ultimus end of the intellect is the vision of the
autem finis intellectus est visio divine substance as we showed above.
divinae substantiae, ut supra So, the intellect seeing the divine
ostensum est. Intellectus igitur substance is not moved from one
divinam substantiam videns non intelligible object to another. Therefore, it
movetur de uno intelligibili in aliud. considers actually at once all the things
Omnia igitur quae per hanc that it knows through this vision.
visionem cognoscit, simul actu
considerat.
Amplius. In divina substantia [4] Moreover, the intellect knows all the
intellectus omnes rerum species species of things in the divine substance,
cognoscit, ut ex dictis patet. as is clear from what has been said. Now
Quorundam autem generum sunt in some genera there are infinite species,
species infinitae: sicut for example, of numbers, figures, and
numerorum, figurarum et proportions. So, the intellect sees an
proportionum. Intellectus igitur in infinity of things in the divine substance.
divina substantia videt infinita. But it could not see all of these unless it
Non autem omnia ea videre saw them at once, for it is impossible to
posset nisi simul videret: quia pass through an infinity of things.
infinita non est transire. Oportet Therefore, all that the intellect sees in the
igitur quod omnia quae intellectus divine substance must be seen at once.
in divina substantia videt, simul
videat.
Hinc est quod dicit Augustinus, in [5] Hence, what Augustine says, in Book
XV de Trin.: non erunt tunc XV of The Trinity: “Our thoughts will not
volubiles nostrae cogitationes, ab then be fleeting, going to and fro from
aliis in alia euntes et redeuntes: some things to others, but we shall see all

sed omnem scientiam nostram our knowledge in one single glance.”
uno simul conspectu videbimus.
Chapter 61.
Caput 61
THAT THROUGH THE VISION OF
Quod per visionem Dei aliquis fit
GOD ONE BECOMES A PARTAKER
particeps vitae aeternae
OF ETERNAL LIFE
Ex hoc autem apparet quod per [1] From this consideration it is apparent

visionem praedictam intellectus that the created intellect becomes a
creatus vitae aeternae fit particeps. partaker in the eternal life through this
vision.
In hoc enim aeternitas a tempore [2] For, eternity differs from time in this
differt, quod tempus in quadam way: time has its being in a sort of
successione habet esse, succession, whereas the being of
aeternitatis vero esse est totum eternity is entirely simultaneous. But we
simul. Iam autem ostensum est have shown that there is no succession
quod in praedicta visione non est in the aforesaid vision; instead, all things
aliqua successio, sed omnia quae that are seen through it are seen at
per illam videntur, simul et uno once, and in one view. So, this vision is
intuitu videntur. Illa ergo visio in perfected in a sort of participation in
quadam aeternitatis participatione eternity. Moreover, this vision is a kind of
perficitur. Est autem illa visio life, for the action of the intellect is a kind
quaedam vita: actio enim intellectus of life. Therefore, the created intellect
est vita quaedam. Fit ergo per illam becomes a partaker in eternal life
visionem intellectus creatus vitae through this vision.
aeternae particeps.
Item. Per obiecta actus [3] Again, acts are specified by their
specificantur. Obiectum autem objects. But the object of the
visionis praedictae est divina aforementioned vision is the divine
substantia secundum seipsam, non substance in itself, and not in a created
secundum aliquam eius likeness of it, as we showed above.
similitudinem creatam, ut supra Now, the being of the divine substance
ostensum est. Esse autem divinae is in eternity, or, rather, is eternity itself.
substantiae in aeternitate est, vel Therefore, this vision also consists in a
magis est ipsa aeternitas. Ergo et participation in eternity.
visio praedicta in participatione
aeternitatis est.
Adhuc. Si aliqua actio sit in [4] Besides, if a given action is done in
tempore, hoc erit vel propter time, this will be either because the
principium actionis, quod est in principle of the action is in time—in this
tempore, sicut actiones rerum sense the actions of temporal things are
naturalium sunt temporales: vel temporal; or because of the terminus of
propter operationis terminum, sicut the operation, as in the case of spiritual

substantiarum spiritualium, quae substances which are above time but
sunt supra tempus, quas exercent perform their actions on things subject to
in res tempori subditas. Visio autem time. Now, the aforementioned vision is
praedicta non est in tempore ex not in time by virtue of what is seen, for
parte eius quod videtur: cum hoc sit this is the eternal substance; nor by
substantia aeterna. Neque ex parte virtue of that whereby the seeing is
eius quo videtur: quod etiam est accomplished, for this also is the eternal
substantia aeterna. Neque etiam ex substance; nor even by virtue of the
parte videntis, quod est intellectus, agent who sees, that is the intellect,
cuius esse non subiacet tempori: whose being does not come under time,
cum sit incorruptibile, ut supra since it is incorruptible, as we proved
probatum est. Est igitur visio illa above. Therefore, this vision consists in
secundum aeternitatis a participation in eternity, as completely
participationem, utpote omnino transcending time.
transcendens tempus.
Amplius. Anima intellectiva est [5] Furthermore, the intellective soul is

creata in confinio aeternitatis et created “on the border line between
temporis, ut in libro de causis eternity and time,” as is stated in the
dicitur, et ex praemissis potest esse Book on Causes, and as can be shown
manifestum: quia est ultima in from our earlier statements. In fact, it is
ordine intellectuum, et tamen eius the lowest in the order of intellects, yet
substantia est elevata supra its substance is raised above corporeal
materiam corporalem, non matter, not depending on it. But its
dependens ab ipsa. Sed actio eius action, as joined to lower things which
secundum quam coniungitur exist in time, is temporal. Therefore, its
inferioribus, quae sunt in tempore, action, as joined to higher things which
est temporalis. Ergo actio eius exist above time, participates in eternity.
secundum quam coniungitur Especially so is the vision by which it
superioribus, quae sunt supra sees the divine substance. And so, by
tempus, aeternitatem participat. this kind of vision it comes into the
Talis autem est maxime visio qua participation of eternity; and for the
divinam substantiam videt. Ergo same reason, so does any other created
per huiusmodi visionem fit in intellect that sees God.
participatione aeternitatis: et,
eadem ratione, quicumque alius
intellectus creatus Deum videt.
Hinc est quod dominus dicit, Io. 17 [6] Hence, the Lord says: “This is eternal
3: haec est vita aeterna, ut life, that they may know you, the only
cognoscant te, verum Deum unum. true God” (John 17:3).
Caput 62 Chapter 62
Quod videntes Deum in THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD WILL
perpetuum eum videbunt SEE HIM PERPETUALLY
Ex hoc autem apparet quod illi qui [1] Now, it is clear from this that those
ultimam felicitatem consequuntur who obtain ultimate felicity as a result of
ex visione divina, nunquam ab illa the divine vision never depart from it.
decident.
Omne enim quod quandoque est et [2] For, “everything which at one time

quandoque non est, tempore exists, and at another does not, is
mensuratur: ut patet in IV measured by time,” as is clear in Physics
physicorum. Visio autem praedicta, IV [12: 221b 28]. But the aforementioned
quae intellectuales creaturas vision, which makes intellectual
beatas facit, non est in tempore, creatures happy, is not in time but in
sed in aeternitate. Impossibile est eternity. So, it is impossible for a person
ergo quod ex quo illius particeps to lose it, once he has become a
aliquis fit, ipsam amittat. partaker in it.
Adhuc. Creatura intellectualis non [3] Again, the intellectual creature does
pervenit ad ultimum finem nisi not reach his ultimate end until his
quando eius naturale desiderium natural desire comes to rest. But, just as
quietatur. Sicut autem naturaliter one naturally desires felicity, so also
desiderat felicitatem, ita naturaliter does he naturally desire everlasting
desiderat felicitatis perpetuitatem: felicity; for, since he is everlasting in his
cum enim in sua substantia sit substance, he desires to possess forever
perpetua, illud quod propter se that object which is desired for its own
desiderat et non propter aliud, sake and not because of something else.
desiderat ut semper habendum. Therefore, his felicity would not be the
Non igitur esset felicitas ultimus ultimate end unless it endured
finis nisi perpetuo permaneret. perpetually.
Amplius. Omne illud quod cum [4] Besides, everything that is possessed

amore possidetur, si sciatur quod with love may cause sorrow, provided it
quandoque amittatur, tristitiam be recognized that such a thing may be
infert. Visio autem praedicta, quae lost. But the aforesaid vision which
beatos facit, cum sit maxime makes men happy is especially loved by
delectabilis et maxime desiderata, its possessors, since it is the most
maxime a possidentibus eam lovable and desirable of objects.
amatur. Impossibile ergo esset eos Therefore, it would not be possible for
non tristari si scirent se quandoque them to avoid sorrow if they knew that
eam amissuros. Si autem non they would lose it at some time. Now, if it
esset perpetua, hoc scirent: iam were not perpetual, they would know
enim ostensum est quod, videndo this, for we have shown already, that,
divinam substantiam, etiam alia while seeing the divine substance, they
cognoscunt quae naturaliter sunt; also know other things that are naturally
unde multo magis cognoscunt so. Hence, they certainly know what kind
qualis illa visio sit, utrum perpetua of vision it is, whether perpetual or to
vel quandoque desitura. Non ergo stop at some future time. So, this vision
talis visio adesset eis sine tristitia. would not be theirs without sorrow. And
Et ita non esset vera felicitas, quae thus it will not be true felicity which
ab omni malo immunem reddere should be made free from all evil, as we
debet, ut supra ostensum est. showed above.
Item. Quod movetur naturaliter ad [5] Moreover, that which is naturally
aliquid sicut ad finem sui motus, moved toward something, as to the end
non removetur ab eo nisi per of its motion, may not be removed from it
violentiam, sicut grave cum without violence, as in the case of a
proiicitur sursum. Constat autem weight when it is thrown upward. But
ex praedictis quod omnis from what we have said, it is obvious that
substantia intellectualis naturali every intellectual substance tends by
desiderio tendit ad illam visionem. natural desire toward that vision. So, it
Non ergo ab illa deficiet nisi per cannot fail to continue that vision, unless
violentiam. Nihil autem tollitur per because of violence. But nothing is taken
violentiam alicuius nisi virtus away from a thing by violence unless the
auferentis sit maior virtute power removing it is greater than the
causantis. Visionis autem divinae power which causes it. Now, the cause
causa est Deus, ut supra probatum of the divine vision is God, as we proved
est. Ergo, cum nulla virtus divinam above. Therefore, since no power
virtutem excedat, impossibile est surpasses the divine power, it is
quod illa visio per violentiam impossible for this vision to be taken
tollatur. In perpetuum ergo durabit. away by violence. Hence, it will endure
forever.
Adhuc. Si aliquis videre desinat [6] Furthermore, if a person ceases to
quod prius videbat, aut hoc erit see what he formerly saw, this cessation
quia deficit ei facultas videndi, sicut will be either because the power of sight
cum aliquis moritur vel caecatur, fails him, as when one dies or goes
vel aliqualiter aliter impeditur; aut blind, or because he is impeded in some
erit quia non vult amplius videre, other way, or it will be because he does
sicut cum quis avertit visum a re not wish to see any longer, as when a
quam prius videbat; vel quia man turns away his glance from a thing
obiectum subtrahitur. Et hoc that he formerly saw, or because the
communiter verum est, sive de object is taken away. And this is true in
visione sensus, sive de intellectuali general whether we are talking about
visione loquamur. Substantiae sensory or intellectual vision. Now, in
autem intellectuali videnti Deum regard to the intellectual substance that
non potest deesse facultas Deum sees God there cannot be a failure of the
videndi: neque per hoc quod esse ability to see God: either because it
desinat, cum sit perpetua, ut supra might cease to exist, for it exists in
ostensum est; neque per defectum perpetuity, as we showed above, or
luminis quo Deum videt, cum because of a failure of the light whereby
lumen illud incorruptibiliter it sees God, since the light is received
recipiatur, secundum conditionem incorruptibly both in regard to the
et recipientis et dantis. Neque condition of the receiver and of the giver.
potest deesse ei voluntas tali Nor can it lack the will to enjoy such a
visione fruendi, ex quo percipit in vision, because it perceives that its
illa visione esse suam ultimam ultimate felicity lies in this vision, just as
felicitatem: sicut non potest velle it cannot fail to will to be happy. Nor,
non esse felix. Nec etiam videre indeed, may it cease to see because of a
desinet per subtractionem obiecti: removal of the object, for the object,
quia obiectum illud, quod est Deus, which is God, is always existing in the
semper eodem modo se habet; same way; nor is He far removed from
nec elongatur a nobis nisi us, unless by virtue of our removal from

inquantum nos elongamur ab ipso. Him. So, it is impossible for the vision of
Impossibile est igitur quod visio illa God, which makes men happy, ever to
Dei, quae beatos facit, unquam fail.
deficiat.
Praeterea. Impossibile est quod [7] Again, it is impossible for a person to

aliquis a bono quo fruitur velit will to abandon a good which he is
discedere nisi propter aliquod enjoying, unless because of some evil
malum quod in fruitione illius boni which he perceives in the enjoyment of
aestimat, saltem propter hoc quod that good; even if it be simply that it is
aestimatur impeditivum maioris thought to stand in the way of a greater
boni: sicut enim nihil desiderat good. For, just as the appetite desires
appetitus nisi sub ratione boni, ita nothing except under the rational
nihil fugit nisi sub ratione mali. Sed character of a good, so does it shun
in fruitione illius visionis non potest nothing except under the character of an
esse aliquod malum: cum sit evil But there can be no evil in the
optimum ad quod creatura enjoyment of this vision, because it is the
intellectualis pervenire potest. best to which the intellectual creature
Neque etiam potest esse quod ab can attain. Nor, in fact, can it be that he
eo qui illa fruitur visione, aestimetur who is enjoying this vision might think
in ea esse aliquod malum, vel that there is some evil in it, or that there
aliquid eo melius: cum visio illius is something better than it. For the vision
summae veritatis omnem falsam of the highest Truth excludes all falsity.
aestimationem excludat. Therefore, it is impossible for the
Impossibile est igitur quod intellectual substance that sees God
substantia intellectualis quae ever to will to be without that vision.
Deum videt, unquam illa visione
carere velit.
Item. Fastidium alicuius quo prius [8] Besides, dislike of an object which
aliquis delectabiliter fruebatur, one formerly enjoyed with delight occurs
accidit propter hoc quod res illa because this thing produces some kind
aliquam immutationem facit in re, of real change, destroying or weakening
corrumpendo vel debilitando one’s power. And this is why the sense
virtutem ipsius. Et propter hoc vires powers, subject to fatigue in their actions
sensibiles, quibus accidit fatigatio because of the changing of the bodily
in suis actionibus propter organs by sense objects, are corrupted,
immutationem corporalium even by the best of such objects. Indeed,
organorum a sensibilibus; a quibus after a period of enjoyment, they grow to
etiam, si fuerint excellentia, dislike what they formerly perceived with
corrumpuntur; fastidiunt post delight. And for this reason we even
aliquod tempus frui eo quod prius suffer boredom in the use of our intellect,
delectabiliter sentiebant. Et propter after a long or strenuous meditation,
hoc etiam in intelligendo fastidium because our powers that make use of
patimur post longam vel the bodily organs become tired, and
vehementem meditationem, quia intellectual thinking cannot be
fatigantur potentiae utentes accomplished without these. But the
corporalibus organis, sine quibus divine substance does not corrupt;
consideratio intellectus nunc rather, it greatly perfects the intellect. Nor
compleri non potest. Divina autem does any act exercised through bodily
substantia non corrumpit, sed organs accompany this vision.
maxime perficit intellectum. Neque Therefore, it is impossible for anyone
ad eius visionem concurrit aliquis who at one time took joy in the delight of
actus qui per organa corporalia this vision to grow weary of it.
exerceatur. Impossibile est igitur
quod illius visionis aliquem fastidiat
qui prius ea delectabiliter fruebatur.
Amplius. Nihil quod cum [9] Furthermore, nothing that is

admiratione consideratur, potest contemplated with wonder can be
esse fastidiosum: quia quandiu tiresome, since as long as the thing
admiratione est, adhuc desiderium remains in wonder it continues to
movet. Divina autem substantia a stimulate desire. But the divine
quolibet intellectu creato semper substance is always viewed with wonder
cum admiratione videtur: cum by any created intellect, since no created
nullus intellectus creatus eam intellect comprehends it. So, it is
comprehendat. Impossibile est impossible for an intellectual substance
igitur quod substantia intellectualis to become tired of this vision. And thus, it
illam visionem fastidiat. Et ita non cannot, of its own will, desist from this
potest esse quod per propriam vision.
voluntatem ab illa visione desistat.
Adhuc. Si aliqua duo fuerunt prius [10] Moreover, if any two things were
unita et postmodum separantur, formerly united and later come to be
oportet quod hoc accidat per separated, this must be due to a change
mutationem alicuius eorum: relatio in one of them. For, just as a relation
enim, sicut non incipit esse de does not come into being for the first
novo absque mutatione alterius time without a change in one of the
relatorum, ita nec absque alterius things related, so also it does not cease
mutatione de novo esse desistit. to be without a new change in one of
Intellectus autem creatus videt them. Now, the created intellect sees
Deum per hoc quod ei God by virtue of being united to Him in
quodammodo unitur, ut ex dictis some way, as is clear from what we have
patet. Si ergo visio illa desinat, said. So, if this vision were to cease,
unione huiusmodi desinente, bringing this union to an end, it would
oportet quod hoc fiat per have to be done by a change in the
mutationem divinae substantiae, divine substance, or in the intellect of the
vel intellectus ipsam videntis. one who sees it. Both of these changes
Quorum utrumque est impossibile: are impossible: for the divine substance
nam divina substantia immutabilis is immutable, as we showed in Book
est, ut in primo libro ostensum est; One [13], and, also, the intellectual
substantia etiam intellectualis substance is raised above all change
elevatur supra omnem mutationem when it sees God’s substance.
cum Dei substantiam videt. Therefore, it is impossible for anyone to
Impossibile est igitur quod aliquis depart from the felicity in which he sees
decidat ab illa felicitate qua Dei God’s substance.
substantiam videt.
Item. Quanto aliquid est Deo [11] Besides, the nearer a thing is to
propinquius, qui est omnino God, Who is entirely immutable, the less
immobilis, tanto est minus mutable is it and the more lasting.
mutabile, et magis perseverans: Consequently, certain bodies, because
unde quaedam corpora, propter “they are far removed from God,” as is
hoc quod longe distant a Deo, non stated in On Generation II [10: 336b 30],
possunt in perpetuum durare, sicut cannot endure forever. But no creature
dicitur in II de generatione. Sed can come closer to God than the one
nulla creatura potest Deo vicinius who sees His substance. So, the
appropinquare quam quae eius intellectual creature that sees God’s
substantiam videt. Creatura igitur substance attains the highest
intellectualis quae Dei substantiam immutability. Therefore, it is not possible
videt, summam immutabilitatem for it ever to lapse from this vision.
consequetur. Non igitur possibile
est quod unquam ab illa visione
deficiat.
Hinc est quod in Psalm. dicitur: [12] Hence it is said in the Psalm (83:5):

beati qui habitant in domo tua, "Blessed are they who dwell in Your
domine: in saecula saeculorum house, O Lord: they shall praise You for
laudabunt te. Et alibi: non ever and ever." And in another text: "He
commovebitur in aeternum qui shall not be moved for ever that dwells in
habitat in Ierusalem. Et Isaiae 33 Jerusalem" (Ps. 124: 1) And again: "Your
20 oculi tui videbunt Ierusalem eyes shall see Jerusalem, a rich
civitatem opulentam, tabernaculum habitation, a tabernacle that cannot be
quod nequaquam transferri poterit, removed; neither shall the nails thereof
nec auferentur clavi eius in be taken away for ever; neither shall any
sempiternum, et omnes funiculi of the cords thereof be broken, because
eius non rumpentur: quia only there our Lord is magnificent" (Is.
solummodo ibi magnificus dominus 33:2021). And again: "He who
Deus noster. Et Apoc. 312: qui overcomes, I will make him a pillar in the
vicerit, faciam illum columnam in temple of My God: and he shall go out
templo Dei mei, et foras non no more" (Rev. 3:12)
egredietur amplius.
Per haec autem excluditur error [13] By these considerations, then, the
Platonicorum, qui dicebant error of the Platonists is refuted, for they
separatas animas, postquam said that separated souls, after having
felicitatem ultimam adeptae attained ultimate felicity, would begin to
fuissent, iterum ad corpora incipere desire to return to their bodies, and
velle redire; et, finita felicitate illius having brought to an end the felicity of
vitae, iterum miseriis huius vitae that life they would again become
involvi. Et etiam error Origenis, qui enmeshed in the troubles of this life; and
dixit animas et Angelos, post also the error of Origen, who said that
beatitudinem, iterum posse ad souls and angels, after beatitude, could
miseriam devenire. again return to unhappiness.
Caput 63
Qualiter in illa ultima felicitate Chapter 63
omne desiderium hominis
completur HOW MAN'S EVERY DESIRE IS
FULFILLED IN THAT ULTIMATE
FELICITY
Ex praemissis autem evidenter [1] From the foregoing it is quite
apparet quod in illa felicitate quae apparent that, in the felicity that comes
provenit ex visione divina, omne from the divine vision, every human
desiderium humanum impletur, desire is fulfilled, according to the text
secundum illud Psalmi, qui replet in of the Psalm (102:5): "Who satisfies
bonis desiderium tuum; et omne your desire with good things." And
humanum studium ibi suam every human effort attains its
consummationem accipit. Quod completion in it. This, in fact, becomes
quidem patet discurrenti per singula. clear to anyone who thinks over
particular instances.
Est enim quoddam desiderium [2] For there is in man, in so far as he

hominis inquantum intellectualis est, is intellectual, one type of desire,
de cognitione veritatis: quod quidem concerned with the knowledge of truth;
desiderium homines prosequuntur indeed, men seek to fulfill this desire
per studium contemplativae vitae. Et by the effort of the contemplative life.
hoc quidem manifeste in illa visione And this will clearly be fulfilled in that
consummabitur, quando, per vision, when, through the vision of the
visionem primae veritatis, omnia First Truth, all that the intellect
quae intellectus naturaliter scire naturally desires to know becomes
desiderat, ei innotescent, ut ex supra known to it, as is evident from what
dictis apparet. was said above.
Est etiam quoddam hominis [3] There is also a certain desire in
desiderium secundum quod habet man, based on his possession of
rationem, qua inferiora disponere reason, whereby he is enabled to
potest: quod prosequuntur homines manage lower things; this, men seek to
per studium activae et civilis vitae. fulfill by the work of the active and civic
Quod quidem desiderium life. Indeed, this desire is chiefly for
principaliter ad hoc est, ut tota this end, that the entire life of man may
hominis vita secundum rationem be arranged in accord with reason, for
disponatur, quod est vivere this is to live in accord with virtue. For
secundum virtutem: cuiuslibet enim the end of the activity of every virtuous
virtuosi finis in operando est propriae man is the good appropriate to his
virtutis bonum, sicut fortis ut fortiter virtue, just as, for the brave man, it is
agat. Hoc autem desiderium tunc to act bravely. Now, this desire will
omnino complebitur: quia ratio in then be completely fulfilled, since
summo vigore erit, divino lumine reason will be at its peak strength,
illustrata, ne a recto deficere possit. having been enlightened by the divine
light, so that it cannot swerve away
from what is right.
Consequuntur etiam civilem vitam [4] Going along, then, with the civic life

quaedam bona quibus homo indiget are certain goods which man needs for
ad civiles operationes. Sicut honoris civic activities. For instance, there is a
sublimitas: quam homines inordinate high position of honor, which makes
appetentes, superbi et ambitiosi men proud and ambitious, if they
fiunt. Ad summam autem honoris desire it inordinately. But men are
altitudinem per illam visionem raised through this vision to the highest
homines sublimantur, inquantum Deo peak of honor, because they are in a
quodam modo uniuntur, ut supra sense united with God, as we pointed
ostensum est. Et propter hoc, sicut out above. For this reason, just as God
ipse Deus rex saeculorum est, ita et Himself is the "King of ages" (1 Tim.
beati ei coniuncti reges dicuntur, 1:17), so are the blessed united with
Apoc. 206: regnabunt cum Christo. Him called kings: "They shall reign with
Christ" (Apoc. 20:6).
Consequitur etiam civilem vitam aliud [5] Another object of desire associated
appetibile, quod est famae with civic life is popular renown; by an
celebritas: per cuius inordinatum inordinate desire for this men are
appetitum homines inanis gloriae deemed lovers of vainglory. Now, the
cupidi dicuntur. Beati autem per illam blessed are made men of renown by
visionem redduntur celebres, non this vision, not according to the opinion
secundum hominum, qui et decipi et of men, who can deceive and be
decipere possunt, opinionem sed deceived, but in accord with the truest
secundum verissimam cognitionem knowledge, both of God and of all the
et Dei et omnium beatorum. Et ideo blessed. Therefore, this blessedness is
illa beatitudo in sacra Scriptura frequently termed glory in Sacred
frequentissime gloria nominatur: sicut Scripture; for instance, it is said in the
in Psalmo dicitur: exultabunt sancti in Psalm (149:5): "The saints shall rejoice
gloria. in glory."
Est etiam et aliud in civili vita [6] There is, indeed, another object of
appetibile, scilicet divitiae: per cuius desire in civic life; namely, wealth. By
inordinatum appetitum et amorem the inordinate desire and love of this,
homines illiberales et iniusti fiunt. In men become illiberal and unjust. But in
illa autem beatitudine est bonorum this beatitude there is a plenitude of all
omnium sufficientia: inquantum beati goods, inasmuch as the blessed come
perfruuntur illo qui comprehendit to enjoy Him Who contains the
omnium bonorum perfectionem. perfection of all good things. For this
Propter quod dicitur Sap. 711: reason it is said in Wisdom (7:11): “All
venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter good things came to me together with
cum illa. Unde et in Psalmo dicitur: her.” Hence it is also said in the Psalm
gloria et divitiae in domo eius. (111:3): “Glory and wealth shall be in
His house.”
Est etiam tertium hominis [7] There is even a third desire of man,

desiderium, quod est sibi et aliis which is common to him and the other
animalibus commune, ut animals, to enjoy pleasures. Men
delectationibus perfruatur: quod chiefly seek after this in the voluptuous
homines maxime prosequuntur life, and they become intemperate and
secundum vitam voluptuosam; et per incontinent through immoderation in

eius immoderantiam homines regard to it. However, the most perfect
intemperati et incontinentes fiunt. In delight is found in this felicity: as much
illa vero felicitate est delectatio more perfect than the delight of the
perfectissima: tanto quidem sense, which even brute animals can
perfectior ea quae secundum sensus enjoy, as the intellect is superior to
est, qua etiam bruta animalia perfrui sense power; and also as that good in
possunt, quanto intellectus est altior which we shall take delight is greater
sensu; quanto etiam illud bonum in than any sensible good, and more
quo delectabimur, maius est omni intimate, and more continually
sensibili bono, et magis intimum, et delightful; and also as that delight is
magis continue delectans; quanto freer from all admixture of sorrow, or
etiam illa delectatio est magis pura concern about trouble. Of this it is said
ab omni permixtione contristantis, aut in the Psalm (35:9): “They shall be
sollicitudinis alicuius molestantis; de inebriated with the plenty of your
qua dicitur in Psalmo: inebriabuntur house, and you shall make them drink
ab ubertate domus tuae, et torrente of the torrent of your pleasure.”
voluptatis tuae potabis eos.
Est etiam et naturale desiderium, [8] There is, moreover, a natural desire

omnibus rebus commune, per quod common to all things by which they
conservationem sui desiderant, desire their own preservation, to the
secundum quod possibile est: per extent that this is possible: men are
cuius immoderantiam homines timidi made fearful and excessively chary of
redduntur, et nimis a laboribus sibi work that is bard for them by
parcentes. Quod quidem desiderium immoderation in this desire. But this
tunc omnino complebitur, quando desire will then be completely satisfied
beati perfectam sempiternitatem when the blessed attain perfect
consequentur, ab omni nocumento sempiternity and are safe from all
securi: secundum illud Isaiae 4910 harm; according to the text of Isaiah
et Apoc. 21: non esurient neque (49:10) and Apocalypse 21 [see 7:16]:
sitient amplius, neque cadet super “They shall no more hunger or thirst,
illos sol neque ullus aestus. neither shall the sun fall on them, nor
any heat.”
Sic igitur patet quod per visionem [9] And so, it is evident that through the

divinam consequuntur intellectuales divine vision intellectual substances
substantiae veram felicitatem, in qua obtain true felicity, in which their
omnino desideria quietantur, et in desires are completely brought to rest
qua est plena sufficientia omnium and in which is the full sufficiency of all
bonorum, quae, secundum the goods which, according to
Aristotelem, ad felicitatem requiritur. Aristotle,” are required for happiness.
Unde et Boetius dicit quod beatitudo Hence, Boethius also says that
est status omnium bonorum “happiness is a state of life made
congregatione perfectus. perfect by the accumulation of all
goods” [De consolatione philosophiae
III, 2].
Huius autem ultimae et perfectae [10] Now, there is nothing in this life so

felicitatis in hac vita nihil est adeo like this ultimate and perfect felicity as

simile sicut vita contemplantium the life of those who contemplate truth,
veritatem, secundum quod est to the extent that it is possible in this
possibile in hac vita. Et ideo life. And so, the philosophers who
philosophi, qui de illa felicitate ultima were not able to get full knowledge of
plenam notitiam habere non this ultimate happiness identified
potuerunt, in contemplatione quae man’s ultimate happiness with the
est possibilis in hac vita, ultimam contemplation which is possible in this
felicitatem hominis posuerunt. life. On this account, too, of all other
Propter hoc etiam, inter alias vitas, in lives the contemplative is more
Scriptura divina magis contemplativa approved in divine Scripture, when our
commendatur, dicente domino, Lord says: “Mary has chosen the better
Lucae 1042: Maria optimam partem part,” namely, the contemplation of
elegit, scilicet contemplationem truth, “which shall not be taken from
veritatis, quae non auferetur ab ea. her” (Luke 10:42) . In fact, the
Incipit enim contemplatio veritatis in contemplation of truth begins in this
hac vita, sed in futura consummatur: life, but reaches its climax in the future;
activa vero et civilis vita huius vitae whereas the active and civic life does
terminos non transcendit. not go beyond the limits of this life.
Caput 64 Chapter 64
Quod Deus sua providentia THAT GOD GOVERNS THINGS BY
gubernat res HIS PROVIDENCE
Ex his autem quae praemissa sunt, [1] From the points that have been set

sufficienter habetur quod Deus est forth we have adequately established
rerum omnium finis. Ex quo haberi that God is the end of all things. The
potest ulterius quod ipse sua next possible conclusion from this is that
providentia gubernet vel regat He governs, or rules, the whole of things
universa. by His providence.
Quandocumque enim aliqua [2] Whenever certain things are ordered

ordinantur ad aliquem finem, omnia to a definite end they all come under the
dispositioni illius subiacent ad quem control of the one to whom the end
principaliter pertinet ille finis, sicut primarily belongs. This is evident in an
in exercitu apparet: omnes enim army: all divisions of an army and their
partes exercitus, et eorum opera, functions are ordered to the
ordinantur ad bonum ducis, quod commander’s good as an ultimate end,
est victoria, sicut in ultimum finem; and this is victory. And for this reason it
et propter hoc ad ducem pertinet is the function of t he commander to
totum exercitum gubernare. govern the whole army. Likewise, an art
Similiter ars quae est de fine, which is concerned with the end
imperat et dat leges arti quae est commands and makes the laws for an
de his quae sunt ad finem: ut civilis art I concerned with means to the end.
militari, et militaris equestri, et ars Thus, the art of civil government
gubernatoria navifactivae. Cum commands that of the military; the
igitur omnia ordinentur ad military commands the equestrian; and
bonitatem divinam sicut in finem, ut the art of navigation commands that of
ostensum est, oportet quod Deus, shipbuilding. So, since all things are
ad quem principaliter illa bonitas ordered to divine goodness as an end,
pertinet, sicut substantialiter habita as we showed, it follows that God, to
et intellecta et amata, sit gubernator Whom this goodness primarily belongs,
omnium rerum. as something substantially possessed
and known and loved, must be the
governor of all things.
Adhuc. Quicumque facit aliquid [3] Again, whoever makes a thing for the

propter finem, utitur illo ad finem. sake of an end may use the thing for
Ostensum autem est supra quod that end. Now, we showed above that all
omnia quae habent esse things possessing being in any way
quocumque modo, sunt effectus whatever are God’s products, and also
Dei; et quod Deus omnia facit that God makes all things for an end
propter finem qui est ipse. Ipse which is Himself. Therefore, He uses all
igitur utitur omnibus dirigendo ea in things by directing them to their end.
finem. Hoc autem est gubernare. Now, this is to govern. So, God is the
Est igitur Deus per suam governor of all things through His
providentiam omnium gubernator. providence.
Amplius. Ostensum est quod Deus [4] Besides, we have shown that God is

est primum movens non motum. the first unmoved mover. The first mover
Primum autem movens non minus does not move fewer things, but more,
movet quam secunda moventia, than the secondary movers, for the latter
sed magis: quia sine eo non do not move other things without the
movent alia. Omnia autem quae first. Now, all things that are moved are
moventur, moventur propter finem, so moved because of the end, as we
ut supra ostensum est. Movet igitur showed above. So, God moves all
Deus omnia ad fines suos. Et per things to their ends, and He does so
intellectum: ostensum enim est through His understanding, for we have
supra quod non agit per shown above that He does not act
necessitatem naturae, sed per through a necessity of His nature, but
intellectum et voluntatem. Nihil est through understanding and will. Now, to
autem aliud regere et gubernare rule or govern by providence is simply to
per providentiam quam movere per move things toward an end through
intellectum aliqua ad finem. Deus understanding. Therefore, God by His
igitur per suam providentiam providence governs and rules all things
gubernat et regit omnia quae that are moved toward their end,
moventur in finem: sive moveantur whether they be moved corporeally, or
corporaliter; sive spiritualiter, sicut spiritually as one who desires is moved
desiderans dicitur moveri a by an object of desire.
desiderato.
Item. Probatum est quod corpora [5] Moreover, that natural bodies are
naturalia moventur et operantur moved and made to operate for an end,
propter finem, licet finem non even though they do not know their end,
cognoscant, ex hoc quod semper was proved by the fact that what
vel frequentius accidit in eis quod happens to them is always, or often, for
melius est; et non aliter fierent si the best; and, if their workings resulted
fierent per artem. Impossibile est from art, they would not be done
autem quod aliqua non differently. But it is impossible for things
cognoscentia finem operentur that do not know their end to work for
propter finem et ordinate perveniant that end, and to reach that end in an
in ipsum nisi sint mota ab aliquo orderly way, unless they are moved by
habente cognitionem finis: sicut someone possessing knowledge of the
sagitta dirigitur ad signum a end, as in the case of the arrow directed
sagittante. Oportet ergo quod tota to the target by the archer. So, the
operatio naturae ab aliqua whole working of nature must be
cognitione ordinetur. Et hoc quidem ordered by some sort of knowledge. And
vel mediate vel immediate oportet this, in fact, must lead back to God,
reducere in Deum: oportet enim either mediately or immediately, since
quod omnis inferior ars et cognitio a every lower art and type of knowledge
superiori principia accipiat, sicut must get its principles from a higher
etiam in scientiis speculativis et one, as we also see in the speculative
operativis apparet. Deus igitur sua and operative sciences. Therefore, God
providentia mundum gubernat. governs the world by His providence.
Adhuc. Ea quae sunt secundum [6] Furthermore, things that are different

suam naturam distincta, in unum in their natures do not come together
ordinem non conveniunt nisi ab uno into one order unless they are gathered
ordinante colligantur in unum. In into a unit by one ordering agent. But in
universitate autem rerum sunt res the whole of reality things are distinct
distinctas et contrarias naturas and possessed of contrary natures; yet
habentes, quae tamen omnes in all come together in one order, and
unum ordinem conveniunt, dum while some things make use of the
quaedam operationes quorundam actions of others, some are also helped
excipiunt, quaedam etiam a or commanded by others. Therefore,
quibusdam iuvantur vel imperantur. there must be one orderer and governor
Oportet igitur quod sit universorum of the whole of things.
unus ordinator et gubernator.
Amplius. Eorum quae circa [7] Moreover, it is not possible to give an

caelestium corporum motus explanation, based on natural necessity,
apparent, ratio assignari non potest for the apparent motions of celestial
ex necessitate naturae: cum bodies, since some of them have more
quaedam eorum habeant plures motions than others, and altogether
motus quibusdam, et omnino incompatible ones. So, there must be an
difformes. Oportet igitur quod ordering of their motions by some
illorum motuum ordinatio sit ab providence, and, consequently, of the
aliqua providentia. Et per motions and workings of all lower things
consequens omnium inferiorum that are controlled by their motions.
motuum et operationum, qui per
illos motus disponuntur.
Item. Quanto aliquid propinquius [8] Besides, the nearer a thing is to its
est causae, tanto plus participat de cause, the more does it participate in its
effectu ipsius. Unde, si aliquid tanto influence. Hence, if some perfection is
participatur perfectius ab aliquibus more perfectly participated by a group of
quanto alicui rei magis things the more they approach a certain

appropinquant, signum est quod illa object, then this is an indication that this
res sit causa illius quod object is the cause of the perfection
diversimode participatur: sicut, si which is participated in various degrees.
aliqua magis sunt calida secundum For instance, if certain things become
quod magis appropinquant igni, hotter as they come nearer to fire, this is
signum est quod ignis sit causa an indication that fire is the cause of
caloris. Inveniuntur autem tanto heat. Now, things are found to be more
aliqua perfectius ordinata esse, perfectly ordered the nearer they are to
quanto magis sunt Deo propinqua: God. For, in the lower types of bodies,
nam in corporibus inferioribus, quae which are very far away from God in the
sunt maxime a Deo distantia dissimilarity of their natures, there is
naturae dissimilitudine, invenitur sometimes found to be a falling away
esse defectus aliquando ab eo from the regular course of nature, as in
quod est secundum cursum the case of monstrosities and other
naturae, sicut patet in monstruosis chance events; but this never happens
et aliis casualibus; quod nunquam in the case of the celestial bodies,
accidit in corporibus caelestibus, though they are somewhat mutable, and
quae tamen sunt aliquo modo it does not occur among separate
mutabilia; quod non accidit in intellectual substances. Therefore, it is
substantiis intellectualibus plain that God is the cause of the whole
separatis. Manifestum est ergo order of things. So, He is the governor
quod Deus est causa totius ordinis of the whole universe of reality through
rerum. Est igitur ipse per suam His providence.
providentiam gubernator totius
universitatis rerum.
Adhuc. Sicut supra probatum est, [9] Furthermore, as we proved above,
Deus res omnes in esse produxit, God brings all things into being, not from
non ex necessitate naturae, sed per the necessity of His nature, but by
intellectum et voluntatem. understanding and will. Now, there can
Intellectus autem et voluntatis be no other ultimate end for His
ipsius non potest esse alius finis understanding and will than His
ultimus nisi bonitas eius, ut scilicet goodness, that is, to communicate it to
eam rebus communicaret, sicut ex things, as is clear from what has been
praemissis apparet. Res autem established. But things participate in the
participant divinam bonitatem per divine goodness to the extent that they
modum similitudinis, inquantum are good, by way of likeness. Now, that
ipsae sunt bonae. Id autem quod which is the greatest good in caused
est maxime bonum in rebus things is the good of the order of the
causatis, est bonum ordinis universe; for it is most perfect, as the
universi, quod est maxime Philosopher says.” With this, divine
perfectum, ut philosophus dicit: cui Scripture is also in agreement, for it is
etiam consonat Scriptura divina, said in Genesis (1:31): “God saw all the
Gen. 1, cum dicitur, vidit Deus things He had made, and they were very
cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde good,” while He simply said of the
bona, cum de singulis operibus individual works, that “they were good.”
dixisset simpliciter quod erant bona. So, the good of the order of things
Bonum igitur ordinis rerum caused by God is what is chiefly willed
causatarum a Deo est id quod est and caused by God. Now, to govern
praecipue volitum et causatum a things is nothing but to impose order on

Deo. Nihil autem aliud est them. Therefore, God Himself governs
gubernare aliqua quam eis ordinem all things by His understanding and will.
imponere. Ipse igitur Deus omnia
suo intellectu et voluntate gubernat.
Amplius. Unumquodque intendens [10] Moreover, any agent intending an

aliquem finem, magis curat de eo end is more concerned about what is
quod est propinquius fini ultimo: nearer to the ultimate end, because this
quia hoc etiam est finis aliorum. nearer thing is also an end for other
Ultimus autem finis divinae things. Now, the ultimate end of the
voluntatis est bonitas ipsius, cui divine will is His goodness, and the
propinquissimum in rebus creatis nearest thing to this latter, among
est bonum ordinis totius universi: created things, is the good of the order
cum ad ipsum ordinetur, sicut ad of the whole universe, since every
finem, omne particulare bonum particular good of this or that thing is
huius vel illius rei, sicut minus ordered to it as to an end (just as the
perfectum ordinatur ad id quod est less perfect is ordered to what is more
perfectius; unde et quaelibet pars perfect); and so, each part is found to be
invenitur esse propter suum totum. for the sake of its whole. Thus, among
Id igitur quod maxime curat Deus in created things, what God cares for most
rebus creatis, est ordo universi. Est is the order of the universe. Therefore,
igitur gubernator ipsius. He is its governor.
Item. Quaelibet res creata [11] Again, every created thing attains its

consequitur suam ultimam ultimate perfection through its proper
perfectionem per operationem operation, for the ultimate end and the
propriam: nam oportet quod ultimus perfection of a thing must be either its
finis et perfectio rei sit vel ipsa operation or the term or product of its
operatio, vel operationis terminus operation. Of course, the form, by virtue
aut effectus, forma vero secundum of which the thing exists, is its first
quam res est, est perfectio prima, perfection, as is evident from Book II of
ut patet in II de anima. Ordo autem On the Soul [1: 412a 28]. But the order
rerum causatarum secundum of caused things, according to the
distinctionem naturarum et gradum distinction of their natures and levels,
ipsarum, procedit ex divina proceeds from divine Wisdom, as we
sapientia, sicut in secundo est showed in Book Two. So also does the
ostensum. Ergo et ordo order of their operations, whereby
operationum, per quas res caused things draw nearer to their
causatae magis appropinquant ad ultimate end. Now, to order the actions
ultimum finem. Ordinare autem of certain things toward their end is to
actiones aliquarum rerum ad finem, govern them. Therefore, God provides
est gubernare ipsa. Deus igitur per governance and regulation for things by
suae sapientiae providentiam rebus the providence of His wisdom.
gubernationem et regimen praestat.
Hinc est quod sacra Scriptura [12] Hence it is that Sacred Scripture
Deum dominum et regem profitetur, proclaims God as Lord and King,
secundum illud Psalmi, dominus according to the text of the Psalm (99:2)
ipse est Deus, et item, rex omnis : “The Lord, He is God”; and again: “God

terrae Deus: regis enim et domini is the King of all the earth” (Ps. 46:8); for
est suo imperio regere et gubernare it is the function of the king and lord to
subiectos. Unde et rerum cursum rule and govern those subject to their
sacra Scriptura divino praecepto command. And so, Sacred Scripture
adscribit, Iob 97, qui praecipit soli attributes the course of things to divine
et non oritur, et stellas claudit quasi decree: “Who commands the sun, and it
sub signaculo; et in Psalmo, rises not, and shuts up the stars, as it
praeceptum posuit et non were under a seal” (Job 9:7); and also in
praeteribit. the Psalm (10:6): “He has made a
decree and it shall not pass away.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error [13] Now, by this conclusion the error of

antiquorum naturalium, qui dicebant the ancient philosophers of nature is
omnia ex necessitate materiae refuted, for they said that all things
provenire: ex quo sequebatur come about as a result of material
omnia casu accidere, et non ex necessity, the consequence of which
aliquo providentiae ordine. would be that all things happen by
chance and not from the order of
providence.
Chapter 65
Caput 65
THAT GOD PRESERVES THINGS IN
Quod Deus conservat res in esse
BEING
Ex eo autem quod Deus res sua [1] Now, from the fact that God rules
providentia regit, sequitur quod in things by His providence it follows that
esse conservet. He preserves them in being.
Ad gubernationem enim aliquorum [2] Indeed, everything whereby things

pertinet omne illud per quod suum attain their end pertains to the
finem consequuntur: secundum governance of these things. For things
hoc enim aliqua regi vel gubernari are said to be ruled or governed by
dicuntur, quod ordinantur in finem. virtue of their being ordered to their end.
In finem autem ultimum quem Deus Now, things are ordered to the ultimate
intendit, scilicet bonitatem divinam, end which God intends, that is, divine
ordinantur res non solum per hoc goodness, not only by the fact that they
quod operantur, sed etiam per hoc perform their operations, but also by the
quod sunt: quia inquantum sunt, fact that they exist, since, to the extent
divinae bonitatis similitudinem that they exist, they bear the likeness of
gerunt, quod est finis rerum, ut divine goodness which is the end for
supra ostensum est. Ad divinam things, as we showed above. Therefore,
igitur providentiam pertinet quod it pertains to divine providence that
res conserventur in esse. things are preserved in being.
Item. Oportet quod idem sit causa [3] Again, the same principle must be the

rei, et conservationis ipsius: nam cause of a thing and of its preservation,
conservatio rei non est nisi for the preservation of a thing is nothing

continuatio esse ipsius. Ostensum but the continuation of its being. Now,
est autem supra quod Deus per we showed above that God, through His
suum intellectum et voluntatem est understanding, and will, is the cause of
causa essendi omnibus rebus. being for all things. Therefore, He
Igitur per suum intellectum et preserves all things in being through His
voluntatem conservat res omnes in intellect and will.
esse.
Item. Nullum particulare agens [4] Besides, no particular univocal agent

univocum potest esse simpliciter can be the unqualified cause of its
causa speciei: sicut hic homo non species; for instance, this individual man
potest esse causa speciei cannot be the cause of the human
humanae; esset enim causa omnis species, for he would then be the cause
hominis, et per consequens sui of every man, and, consequently, of
ipsius, quod est impossibile. Est himself—which is impossible. But this
autem causa hic homo huius individual man is the cause, properly
hominis, per se loquendo. Hic speaking, of that individual man. Now,
autem homo est per hoc quod this man exists because human nature is
natura humana est in hac materia, present in this matter, which is the
quae est individuationis principium. principle of individuation. So, this man is
Hic igitur homo non est causa not the cause of a man, except in the
hominis nisi inquantum est causa sense that he is the cause of a human
quod forma humana fiat in hac form coming to be in this matter. This is
materia. Hoc autem est esse to be the principle of the generation of
principium generationis huius an individual man. So, it is apparent that
hominis. Patet ergo quod nec hic neither this man, nor any other univocal
homo, nec aliquod aliud agens agent in nature, is the cause of anything
univocum in natura, est causa nisi except the generation of this or that
generationis huius vel illius rei. individual thing. Now, there must be
Oportet autem ipsius speciei some proper agent cause of the human
humanae esse aliquam per se species itself; its composition shows this,
causam agentem: quod ipsius and also the ordering of its parts, which
compositio ostendit, et ordinatio is uniform in all cases unless it be
partium, quae eodem modo se accidentally impeded. And the same
habet in omnibus, nisi per accidens reasoning applies to all the other species
impediatur. Et eadem ratio est de of natural things.
omnibus aliis speciebus rerum
naturalium.
Haec autem causa est Deus, vel Now, this cause is God, either mediately

mediate vel immediate: ostensum or immediately. For we have shown that
enim est quod ipse est prima He is the first cause of all things. So, He
omnium rerum causa. Oportet ergo must stand in regard to the species of
quod ipse hoc modo se habeat ad things as the individual generating agent
species rerum sicut se habet hic in nature does to generation, of which he
generans in natura ad is the direct cause. But generation
generationem, cuius est per se ceases as soon as the operation of the
causa. Generatio autem cessat, generative agent ceases. Therefore, all
cessante operatione generantis. the species of things would also cease
Ergo et omnes species rerum as soon as the divine operation ceased.
cessarent, cessante operatione So, He preserves things in being through
divina. Igitur ipse per suam His operation.
operationem conservat res in esse.
Adhuc. Licet alicui existenti accidat [5] Moreover, though motion may occur

motus, tamen motus est praeter for any existing thing, motion is apart
esse rei. Nullum autem corporeum from the being of the thing. Now,
est causa alicuius rei nisi nothing. corporeal, unless it be moved,
inquantum movetur: quia nullum is the cause of anything, for no body
corpus agit nisi per motum, ut acts unless by motion, as Aristotle
Aristoteles probat. Nullum igitur proves. Therefore, no body is the cause
corpus est causa esse alicuius rei of the being of anything, in so far as it is
inquantum est esse, sed est causa being, but it is the cause of its being
eius quod est moveri ad esse, quod moved toward being, that is, of the
est fieri rei. Esse autem cuiuslibet thing’s becoming. Now, the being of any
rei est esse participatum: cum non thing is participated being, since no thing
sit res aliqua praeter Deum suum is its own act of being, except God, as
esse, ut supra probatum est. Et sic we proved above. And thus, God
oportet quod ipse Deus, qui est Himself, Who is His own act of being,
suum esse, sit primo et per se must be primarily and essentially the
causa omnis esse. Sic igitur se cause of every being. So, divine
habet ad esse rerum operatio operation is related to the being of things
divina, sicut motio corporis as the motion of a corporeal mover is to
moventis ad fieri et moveri rerum the becoming and passive movement of
factarum vel motarum. Impossibile the things that are made or moved. Now,
autem est quod fieri et moveri it is impossible for the becoming and
alicuius rei maneat, cessante passive movement of a thing to continue
motione moventis. Impossibile ergo if the motion of the mover cease.
est quod esse alicuius rei remaneat Therefore, it is impossible for the being
nisi per operationem divinam. of a thing to continue except through
divine operation.
Amplius. Sicut opus artis [6] Furthermore, just as art work
praesupponit opus naturae, ita presupposes a work of nature, so does a
opus naturae praesupponit opus work of nature presuppose the work of
Dei creantis: nam materia God the creator. In fact, the material for
artificialium est a natura, naturalium art products comes from nature, while
vero per creationem a Deo. that of natural products comes through
Artificialia autem conservantur in creation by God. Moreover, art objects
esse virtute naturalium: sicut are preserved in being by the power of
domus per soliditatem lapidum. natural things; a home, for instance, by
Omnia igitur naturalia non the solidity of its stories. Therefore, all
conservantur in esse nisi virtute natural things are preserved in being by
Dei. nothing other than the power of God.
Item. Impressio agentis non [7] Again, the impression of an agent
remanet in effectu, cessante does not continue in the product, if the
actione agentis, nisi vertatur in agent’s action ceases, unless the

naturam effectus. Formae enim impression be converted into the nature
generatorum, et proprietates of the product. Indeed, the forms of
ipsorum, usque in finem manent in things generated, and their properties,
eis post generationem, quia remain in them after generation until the
efficiuntur eis naturales. Et similiter end, since they become natural to them.
habitus sunt difficile mobiles, quia And likewise, habits are difficult to
vertuntur in naturam: dispositiones change because they are turned into a
autem et passiones, sive nature. But dispositions and passions,
corporales sive animales, manent whether of the body or soul, endure for a
aliquantum post actionem agentis, little while after the action of the agent,
sed non semper, quia insunt ut in but not forever, since they are present in
via ad naturam. Quod autem a state transitional to nature. Now,
pertinet ad naturam superioris whatever belongs to the nature of a
generis, nullo modo manet post higher type of being does not last at all
actionem agentis: sicut lumen non after the action of the agent; light, for
manet in diaphano, recedente instance, does not continue in a
illuminante. Esse autem non est diaphanous body when the source of
natura vel essentia alicuius rei light has gone away. Now, to be is not
creatae, sed solius Dei, ut in primo the nature or essence of any created
ostensum est. Nulla igitur res thing, but only of God, as we showed in
remanere potest in esse, cessante Book One [22]. Therefore, no thing can
operatione divina. remain in being if divine operation
cease.
Adhuc. Circa rerum originem [8] Furthermore, there are two positions
duplex est positio: una fidei, quod regarding the origin of things: one, from
res de novo fuerint a Deo faith, holding that things have been
productae in esse; et positio brought into being by God, at the
quorundam philosophorum, quod beginning; and the position of certain
res a Deo ab aeterno effluxerint. philosophers, that things have emanated
Secundum autem utramque from God eternally. Now, in either
positionem oportet dicere quod res position one has to say that things are
conserventur in esse a Deo. Nam preserved in being by God. For, if things
si res a Deo productae sunt in esse are brought into being by God, after they
postquam non fuerant, oportet were not existing, then the being of
quod esse rerum divinam things, and similarly their nonbeing,
voluntatem consequatur, et similiter must result from the divine will; for He
non esse: quia permisit res non has permitted things not to be, when He
esse quando voluit, et fecit res so willed; and He made things to be,
esse cum voluit. Tandiu igitur sunt when He so willed. Hence, they exist just
quandiu eas esse vult. Sua igitur as long as He wills them to be.
voluntas conservatrix est rerum. Therefore, His will is the preserver of
things.
Si autem res ab aeterno a Deo But, if things have eternally emanated
effluxerunt, non est dare tempus from God, we cannot give a time or
aut instans in quo primo a Deo instant at which they first flowed forth
effluxerint. Aut igitur nunquam a from God. So, either they never were
Deo productae sunt: aut semper a produced by God, or their being is
Deo esse earum procedit quandiu always flowing forth from God as long as
sunt. Sua igitur operatione res in they exist. Therefore, He preserves
esse conservat. things in being by His operation.
Hinc est quod dicitur Hebr. 13: [9] Hence it is said: “Upholding all things

portans omnia verbo virtutis suae. by the word of His Power” (Heb. 1:3).
Et Augustinus dicit, IV super Gen. And Augustine says: “The power of the
ad Litt.: creatoris potentia, et Creator, and the strength of the
omnipotentis atque omnitenentis Omnipotent and Allsustaining is the
virtus, causa est subsistendi omnis cause of the subsistence of every
creaturae. Quae virtus ab eis quae creature. And, if this power were ever to
creata sunt regendis si aliquando cease its ruling of the things which have
cessaret, simul et eorum cessaret been created, their species would at
species, omnisque natura once come to an end, and all nature
concideret. Neque enim sicut would collapse. For the situation is not
structuram aedium cum fabricaverit like that of a man who has built a house
quis, abscedit atque, illo cessante and has then gone away, and, while he
atque abscedente, stat opus eius, is not working and is absent, his work
ita mundus vel in ictu oculi stare stands. For, if God were to withdraw His
poterit, si ei regimen Deus rule from it, the world could not stand,
subtraxerit. even for the flick of an eye.”
Per hoc autem excluditur [10] Now, by this conclusion the position

quorundam loquentium in lege of the exponents of the Law of the Moors
Maurorum positio, qui, ad hoc quod is refuted, for, in order to be able to
sustinere possent mundum Dei maintain that the world needs God’s
conservatione indigere, posuerunt preservation, they took the view that all
omnes formas esse accidentia, et forms are accidents, and that no
quod nullum accidens durat per accident endures through two instants.
duo instantia, ut sic semper rerum So that, in this view, the informing of
formatio esset in fieri: quasi res non things would be in continuous process,
indigeret causa agente nisi dum est as if a thing would not need an agent
in fieri. Unde et aliqui eorum cause except while in the process of
ponere dicuntur quod corpora becoming. Hence, also, some of these
indivisibilia, ex quibus omnes people are said to claim that indivisible
substantias dicunt esse bodies (out of which, they say, all
compositas, quae sola, secundum substances are composed and which
eos, firmitatem habent, possunt ad alone, according to them, possess
horam aliquam remanere, si Deus stability) could last for about an hour if
suam gubernationem rebus God were to withdraw His governance
subtraheret. Quorum etiam quidam from things. Also, some of them say that
dicunt quod res esse non desineret a thing could not even cease to be
nisi Deus in ipsa accidens unless God caused in it the accident of
desitionis causaret. Quae omnia “cessation.”— Now, all these views are
patet esse absurda. clearly absurd.
Chapter 66
Caput 66 THAT NOTHING GIVES BEING
Quod nihil dat esse nisi EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS IT ACTS BY
inquantum agit in virtute divina DIVINE POWER
Ex hoc autem manifestum est quod [1] From this it is manifest that no lower

omnia inferiora agentia non dant agents give being except in so far as
esse nisi inquantum agunt in virtute they act by divine power.
divina.
Nihil enim dat esse nisi inquantum [2] Indeed, a thing does not give being

est ens actu. Deus autem conservat except in so far as it is an actual being.
res in esse per suam providentiam, But God preserves things in being by
ut ostensum est. Ex virtute igitur His providence, as we showed.
divina est quod aliquid det esse. Therefore, it is as a result of divine
power that a thing gives being.
Amplius. Quando aliqua agentia [3] Again, when several different agents

diversa sub uno agente ordinantur, are subordinated to one agent, the
necesse est quod effectus qui ab eis effect that is produced by their common
communiter fit, sit eorum secundum action must be attributed to them as
quod uniuntur in participando motum they are united in their participation in
et virtutem illius agentis: non enim the motion and power of this agent. For
plura faciunt unum nisi inquantum several agents do not produce one
unum sunt; sicut patet quod omnes result unless they are as one. It is
qui sunt in exercitu operantur ad clear, for example, that all the men in
victoriam causandam, quam causant an army work to bring about victory,
secundum quod sunt sub and they do this by virtue of being
ordinatione ducis, cuius proprius subordinated to the leader, whose
effectus victoria est. Ostensum est proper product is victory. Now, we
autem in primo quod primum agens showed in Book One [13] that the first
est Deus. Cum igitur esse sit agent is God. So, since being is the
communis effectus omnium common product of all agents, because
agentium, nam omne agens facit every agent produces actual being,
esse actu; oportet quod hunc they must produce this effect because
effectum producunt inquantum they are subordinated to the first agent
ordinantur sub primo agente, et and act through His power.
agunt in virtute ipsius.
Adhuc. In omnibus causis agentibus [4] Besides, in the case of all agent

ordinatis illud quod est ultimum in causes that are ordered, that which is
generatione et primum in intentione, last in the process of generation and
est proprius effectus primi agentis: first in intention is the proper product of
sicut forma domus, quae est the primary agent. For instance, the
proprius effectus aedificatoris, form of a house, which is the proper
posterius provenit quam praeparatio product of the builder, appears later
caementi et lapidis et lignorum, quae than the preparation of the cement,
fiunt per artifices inferiores, qui stones, and timbers, which are made
subsunt aedificatori. In omni autem by the lower workmen who come under
actione esse in actu est principaliter the builder. Now, in every action, actual

intentum, et ultimum in generatione: being is primarily intended, but is last in
nam, eo habito, quiescit agentis the process of generation. In fact, as
actio et motus patientis. Est igitur soon as it is achieved, the agent’s
esse proprius effectus primi agentis, action and the patient’s motion come to
scilicet Dei: et omnia quae dant rest. Therefore, being is the proper
esse, hoc habent inquantum agunt product of the primary agent, that is, of
in virtute Dei. God; and all things that give being do
so because they act by God’s power.
Amplius. Ultimum in bonitate et [5] Moreover, the ultimate in goodness
perfectione inter ea in quae potest and perfection among the things to
agens secundum, est illud in quod which the power of a secondary agent
potest ex virtute agentis primi: nam extends is that which it can do by the
complementum virtutis agentis power of the primary agent, for the
secundi est ex agente primo. Quod perfection of the power of the
autem est in omnibus effectibus secondary agent is due to the primary
perfectissimum, est esse: quaelibet agent. Now, that which is most perfect
enim natura vel forma perficitur per of all effects is the act of being, for
hoc quod est actu; et comparatur ad every nature or form is perfected by the
esse in actu sicut potentia ad actum. fact that it is actual, and it is related to
Ipsum igitur esse est quod agentia actual being as potency is to act.
secunda agunt in virtute agentis Therefore, the act of being is what
primi. secondary agents produce through the
power of the primary agent.
Item. Secundum ordinem causarum [6] Besides, the order of the effects
est ordo effectuum. Primum autem follows the order of the causes. But the
in omnibus effectibus est esse: nam first among all effects is the act of
omnia alia sunt quaedam being, since all other things are certain
determinationes ipsius. Igitur esse determinations of it. Therefore, being is
est proprius effectus primi agentis, et the proper effect of the primary agent,
omnia alia agunt ipsum inquantum and all other things produce being
agunt in virtute primi agentis. because they act through the power of
Secunda autem agentia, quae sunt the primary agent. Now, secondary
quasi particulantes et determinantes agents, which are like particularizers
actionem primi agentis, agunt sicut and determinants of the primary
proprios effectus alias perfectiones, agent’s action, produce as their proper
quae determinant esse. effects other perfections which
determine being.
Praeterea. Quod est per essentiam [7] Furthermore, that which is of a
tale, est propria causa eius quod est certain kind through its essence is the
per participationem tale: sicut ignis proper cause of what is of such a kind
est causa omnium ignitorum. Deus by participation. Thus, fire is the cause
autem solus est ens per essentiam of all things that are afire. Now, God
suam, omnia autem alia sunt entia alone is actual being through His own
per participationem: nam in solo Deo essence, while other beings are actual
esse est sua essentia. Esse igitur beings through participation, since in
cuiuslibet existentis est proprius God alone is actual being identical with

effectus eius, ita quod omne quod His essence. Therefore, the being of
producit aliquid in esse, hoc facit every existing thing is His proper effect.
inquantum agit in virtute Dei. And so, everything that brings
something into actual being does so
because it acts through God’s power.
Hinc est quod dicitur Sap. 114: [8] Hence it is said: “God created, that
creavit Deus ut essent omnia. Et in all things might be” (Wis. 1:14). And in
pluribus Scripturae locis dicitur quod several texts of Scripture it is stated
Deus omnia facit. In libro etiam de that God makes all things. Moreover, it
causis dicitur quod nec intelligentia is said in the Book on Causes that not
dat esse nisi inquantum est divina, even an intelligence gives being
idest, inquantum agit in virtute “unless in so far as it is divine,” that is;
divina. in so far as it acts through divine
power.
Chapter 67
Caput 67
THAT GOD IS THE CAUSE OF
Quod Deus est causa operandi
OPERATION FOR ALL THINGS THAT
omnibus operantibus
OPERATE
Ex hoc autem apparet quod Deus [1] It is evident, next, that God is the cause
causa est omnibus operantibus ut enabling all operating agents to operate.
operentur. Omne enim operans In fact, every operating agent is a cause of
est aliquo modo causa essendi, being in some way, either of substantial or
vel secundum esse substantiale, of accidental being. Now, nothing is a
vel accidentale. Nihil autem est cause of being unless by virtue of its
causa essendi nisi inquantum acting through the power of God, as we
agit in virtute Dei, ut ostensum showed. Therefore, every operating agent
est. Omne igitur operans operatur acts through God’s power.
per virtutem Dei.
Adhuc. Omnis operatio quae [2] Again, every operation that results from

consequitur aliquam virtutem, a certain power is attributed causally to
attribuitur sicut causae illi rei the thing which has given the power. For
quae dedit illam virtutem: sicut instance, the natural motion of heavy and
motus gravium et levium naturalis light things results from their form,
consequitur formam ipsorum, depending on whether they are heavy or
secundum quam sunt gravia et light, and so the cause of their motion is
levia, et ideo causa motus said to be the generating agent that has
ipsorum dicitur esse generans, given them the form. Now, every power in
qui dedit formam. Omnis autem any agent is from God, as from a first
virtus cuiuscumque agentis est a principle of all perfection. Therefore, since
Deo, sicut a primo principio every operation results from a power, the
omnis perfectionis. Ergo, cum cause of every operation must be God.
omnis operatio consequatur
aliquam virtutem, oportet quod

cuiuslibet operationis causa sit
Deus.
Amplius. Manifestum est quod [3] Besides, it is obvious that every action

omnis actio quae non potest which cannot continue after the influence
permanere cessante impressione of a certain agent has ceased results from
alicuius agentis, est ab illo that agent. For instance, the manifestation
agente: sicut manifestatio of colors could not continue if the sun’s
colorum non posset esse action of illuminating the air were to cease,
cessante actione solis qua aerem so there is no doubt that the sun is the
illuminat, unde non est dubium cause of the manifestation of colors. And
quin sol sit causa manifestationis the same thing appears in connection with
colorum. Et similiter patet de violent motion, for it stops with the
motu violento, qui cessat cessation of violence on the part of the
cessante violentia impellentis. impelling agent. But just as God has not
Sicut autem Deus non solum only given being to things when they first
dedit esse rebus cum primo esse began to exist, and also causes being in
incoeperunt, sed quandiu sunt, them as long as they exist, conserving
esse in eis causat, res in esse things in being, as we have shown, so
conservans, ut ostensum est; ita also has He not merely granted operative
non solum cum primo res powers to them when they were originally
conditae sunt, eis virtutes created, but He always causes these
operativas dedit, sed semper eas powers in things. Hence, if this divine
in rebus causat. Unde, cessante influence were to cease, every operation
influentia divina, omnis operatio would cease. Therefore, every operation
cessaret. Omnis igitur rei operatio of a thing is traced back to Him as to its
in ipsum reducitur sicut in cause.
causam.
Item. Quicquid applicat virtutem [4] Moreover, whatever agent applies

activam ad agendum, dicitur esse active power to the doing of something, it
causa illius actionis: artifex enim is said to be the cause of that action.
applicans virtutem rei naturalis ad Thus, an artisan who applies the power of
aliquam actionem, dicitur esse a natural thing to some action is said to be
causa illius actionis, sicut coquus the cause of the action; for instance, a
decoctionis, quae est per ignem. cook of the cooking which is done by
Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad means of fire. But every application of
operationem est principaliter et power to operation is originally and
primo a Deo. Applicantur enim primarily made by God. For operative
virtutes operativae ad proprias powers are applied to their proper
operationes per aliquem motum operations by some movement of body or
vel corporis, vel animae. Primum of soul. Now, the first principle of both
autem principium utriusque types of movement is God. Indeed, He is
motus est Deus. Est enim the first mover and is altogether incapable
primum movens omnino of being moved, as we shown above.
immobile, ut supra ostensum est. Similarly, also, every movement of a will
Similiter etiam omnis motus whereby Powers are applied to operation
voluntatis quo applicantur aliquae is reduced to God, as a first object of
virtutes ad operandum, reducitur appetite and a first agent of willing.
in Deum sicut in primum Therefore; every operation should be

appetibile et in primum volentem. attributed to God, as to a first and principal
Omnis igitur operatio debet agent.
attribui Deo sicut primo et
principali agenti.
Adhuc. In omnibus causis [5] Furthermore, in all agent causes
agentibus ordinatis semper arranged in an orderly way the
oportet quod causae sequentes subsequent causes must act through the
agant in virtute causae primae: power of the first cause. For instance, in
sicut in rebus naturalibus corpora the natural order of things, lower bodies
inferiora agunt in virtute corporum act through the power of the celestial
caelestium; et in rebus voluntariis bodies; and, again, in the order of
omnes artifices inferiores voluntary things, all lower artisans work in
operantur secundum imperium accord with the direction of the top
supremi architectoris. In ordine craftsman. Now, in the order of agent
autem causarum agentium Deus causes, God the first cause, as we
est prima causa, ut in primo showed in Book One [64]. And so, all
ostensum est. Ergo omnes lower agent causes act through His power.
causae inferiores agentes agunt But the cause of an action is the one by
in virtute ipsius. Causa autem whose power the action is done rather
actionis magis est illud cuius than the one who acts: the principal agent,
virtute agitur quam etiam illud for instance, rather than the instrument.
quod agit: sicut principale agens Therefore, God is more especially the
magis quam instrumentum. Deus cause of every action than are the
igitur principalius est causa secondary agent causes.
cuiuslibet actionis quam etiam
secundae causae agentes.
Item. Omne operans per suam [6] Again, every agent is ordered through
operationem ordinatur ad finem his operation to an ultimate end, for either
ultimum: oportet enim quod vel the operation itself is the end, or the thing
operatio ipsa sit finis; vel that is made, that is, the product of the
operatum, quod est operationis operation. Now, to order things to their end
effectus. Ordinare autem res in is the prerogative of God Himself, as we
finem est ipsius Dei, sicut supra showed above. So, we have to say that
ostensum est. Oportet igitur every agent acts by the divine power.
dicere quod omne agens virtute Therefore, He is the One Who is the
divina agat. Ipse est igitur qui est cause of action for all things.
causa actionis omnium rerum.
Hinc est quod dicitur Isaiae 26 [7] Hence it is said: “Lord, Thou hast
12, omnia opera nostra operatus wrought all our works in us” (Is. 26:12);
es in nobis, domine; et Ioan. 15 and: “Without Me, you can do nothing”
5, sine me nihil potestis facere, et (John 15:5); and: “It is God Who works in
Philip. 213, Deus est qui us both to will and to accomplish
operatur in nobis velle et according to His good will” (Phil. 2: 13).
perficere pro bona voluntate. Et And for this reason, the products of nature
hac ratione frequenter in are often attributed, in Scripture, to divine
Scripturis naturae effectus working, because it is He Who works in
operationi divinae attribuuntur, every agent operating naturally or
quia ipse est qui operatur in omni voluntarily, as the text has it: “Have you
operante per naturam vel per not milked me as milk, and curdled me like
voluntatem: sicut illud Iob 1010 cheese? You have clothed me with skin;
nonne sicut lac mulsisti me, et You have put me together with bones and
sicut caseum me coagulasti? sinews” (Job 10:1011); and in the Psalm
Pelle et carnibus vestisti me, (17:14): “The Lord thundered from
ossibus et nervis compegisti me; heaven, and the Highest gave His voice:
et in Psalmo, intonuit de caelo hail and coals of fire.”
dominus, et altissimus dedit
vocem suam, grando et carbones
ignis.
Caput 68 Chapter 68
Quod Deus est ubique THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE
Ex hoc autem apparet quod [1] As a consequence, it is clear that God
necesse est Deum esse ubique must be everywhere and in all things.
et in omnibus rebus.
Movens enim et motum oportet [2] For, the mover and the thing moved
esse simul, ut probat philosophus must be simultaneous, as the Philosopher
in VII physicorum. Deus autem proves. But God moves all things to their
omnia movet ad suas operations, as we have shown. Therefore,
operationes, ut ostensum est. Est He is in all things.
igitur in omnibus rebus.
Item. Omne quod est in loco, vel [3] Again, everything that is in a place, or

in re quacumque, aliquo modo in something, is in some way in contact
contingit ipsam: res enim with it. For instance, a bodily thing is in
corporea est in aliquo sicut in place in something according to the
loco secundum contactum contact of dimensive quantity; while an
quantitatis dimensivae; res incorporeal thing is said to be in something
autem incorporea in aliquo esse according to the contact of power, since it
dicitur secundum contactum lacks dimensive quantity. And so, an
virtutis, cum careat dimensiva incorporeal thing is related to its presence
quantitate. Sic igitur se habet res in something by its power, in the same way
incorporea ad hoc quod sit in that a corporeal thing is related to its
aliquo per virtutem suam, sicut presence in something by dimensive
se habet res corporea ad hoc quantity. Now, if there were any body
quod sit in aliquo per quantitatem possessed of infinite dimensive quantity, it
dimensivam. Si autem esset would have to be everywhere. So, if there
aliquod corpus habens be an incorporeal being possessed of
quantitatem dimensivam infinite power, it must be everywhere. But
infinitam, oporteret illud esse we showed in Book One [43] that God is of
ubique. Ergo, si sit aliqua res infinite power. Therefore, He is
incorporea habens virtutem everywhere.
infinitam, oportet quod sit ubique.
Ostensum est autem in primo
Deum esse infinitae virtutis. Est
igitur ubique.
Adhuc. Sicut se habet causa [4] Besides, as a Particular cause is to a
particularis ad particularem particular effect, so is a universal cause to
effectum, ita se habet causa a universal effect. Now, a particular cause
universalis ad universalem must be simultaneous with its proper
effectum. Oportet autem causam particular effect. Thus, fire heats through
particularem proprio effectui its essence, and the soul confers life on
particulari adesse simul: sicut the body through its essence. Therefore,
ignis per suam essentiam since God is the universal cause of the
calefacit, et anima per suam whole of being, as we showed in Book
essentiam vitam corpori confert. Two [15], it must be that wherever being is
Cum igitur Deus sit causa found, the divine presence is also there.
universalis totius esse, ut in
secundo ostensum est, oportet
quod in quocumque est invenire
esse, ei adsit divina praesentia.
Amplius. Quodcumque agens est [5] Moreover, whenever an agent is

praesens tantum uni suorum present only to one of its effects, its action
effectuum, eius actio non potest cannot be transferred to another, unless by
derivari ad alia nisi illo mediante, using the first effect as an intermediary,
eo quod agens et patiens oportet because the agent and the patient must be
esse simul: sicut vis motiva non simultaneous. For instance, the organic
movet alia membra nisi mediante motive power does not have a member of
corde. Si igitur Deus esset the body except through the heart as an
praesens uni tantum suorum intermediary. So, if God were present to
effectuum, utpote primo mobili, but one of His effects—for instance, to the
quod ab eo immediate movetur, first moved sphere which would be moved
sequeretur quod eius actio non immediately by Him—it would follow that
posset ad alia derivari nisi illo His action could not be transferred to
mediante. Hoc autem est another thing except through the mediation
inconveniens. Si enim alicuius of this sphere. Now, this is not appropriate.
agentis actio non potest derivari Indeed, if the action of any agent cannot
ad alia nisi mediante aliquo be transferred to other things except
primo, oportet quod illud through the mediation of a first effect, then
proportionaliter respondeat this effect must correspond proportionally
agenti secundum totam eius with the agent according to its entire
virtutem, aliter enim non posset power; otherwise, the agent could not use
agens tota sua virtute uti: sicut his entire power. We see an instance of
videmus quod omnes motus this in the fact that all the motions that the
quos potest causare virtus motive power can cause can be carried
motiva, expleri possunt per cor. out through the heart. But there is no
Non est autem aliqua creatura creature that can serve as a medium for
per quam posset expleri quicquid the carrying out of whatever the divine
divina virtus facere potest: cum power can do, for divine power infinitely
divina virtus excedat in infinitum surpasses every created thing, as is
quamlibet rem creatam, ut evident from the things shown in Book
apparet ex his quae in primo One [43]. Therefore, it is not appropriate to
ostensa sunt. Inconveniens est say that divine action does not extend to
igitur dicere quod divina actio other effects except through the mediation
non se extendat ad alia nisi of a first one. So, He is not merely present
mediante uno primo. Non est in one of His effects, but in all of them. The
igitur praesens in uno tantum same reasoning will be used if a person
suorum effectuum, sed in says that He is present in some and not in
omnibus. Eadem enim ratione others, because, no matter how many
opinabitur si quis dicat eum esse divine effects are taken, they could not be
in aliquibus, et non in omnibus: sufficient to carry out the execution of the
quia quotcumque effectus divini divine power.
accipiantur, non sufficienter
explere poterunt divinae virtutis
executionem.
Praeterea. Necesse est ut causa [6] Furthermore, an agent cause must be

agens sit simul cum suo effectu simultaneous with its proximate and
proximo et immediato. In qualibet immediate effect. But there is in everything
autem re est aliquis effectus a proximate and immediate effect of God
proximus et immediatus ipsius Himself. For we showed in Book Two [21]
Dei. Ostensum est enim in that God alone can create. Now, there is in
secundo quod solus Deus creare everything something caused by creation:
potest. In qualibet autem re est prime matter in the case of corporeal
aliquid quod per creationem things, in incorporeal things their simple
causatur: in rebus quidem essences, as is evident from the things
corporalibus prima materia; in that we determined in Book Two [15ff].
rebus autem incorporeis Therefore, God must be simultaneously
simplices earum essentiae; ut present in all things, particularly since He
apparet ex his quae in secundo continually and always preserves in being
sunt determinata. Oportet igitur those things which He has brought into
simul Deum adesse in omnibus being from nonbeing, as has been shown.
rebus: praesertim cum ea quae
de non esse ad esse produxit,
continuo et semper in esse
conservet, ut ostensum est.
Hinc est quod dicitur Ier. 24, [7] Hence it is said: “I fill heaven and earth”

caelum et terram ego impleo; et (Jer. 23:24); and in the Psalm (138:8): “If I
in Psalmo, si ascendero in ascend into heaven, You art there; if I
caelum, tu illic es; et si descend into hell, You art present.”
descendero ad Infernum, ades.
Per hoc autem excluditur error [8] Through this conclusion, moreover, the

quorundam dicentium Deum in error is set aside of those who say that
aliqua parte mundi determinata God is in some definite part of the world
esse, puta in primo caelo et in (for instance, in the first heaven and in the
parte orientis, unde est eastern section) and that He is
principium motus caeli. Quorum consequently the principle of heavenly
tamen dictum sustineri posset si motion.—Of course, this statement of

sane accipiatur: ut scilicet non theirs could be supported, if soundly
intelligamus Deum aliqua interpreted: not, for instance, that we may
determinata mundi parte esse understand God as being confined to
conclusum; sed quia omnium some determinate part of the world, but
corporearum motionum that the source of all corporeal motions,
principium, secundum naturae according to the order of nature, takes its
ordinem, ab aliqua determinata start from a determinate part, being moved
incipit parte, Deo movente. by God. Because of this He is spoken of in
Propter quod et in sacra Sacred Scripture also as being in the
Scriptura Deus dicitur specialiter heavens in a particular way; in the text of
esse in caelo: secundum illud Isaiah toward the end (66:1): “Heaven is
Isaiae ult., caelum mihi sedes My throne,” and in the Psalm (113: 16):
est; et in Psalmo, caelum caeli “The heaven of heaven is the Lord’s,” and
domino, et cetera. Sed ex hoc so on.—But from the fact that, apart from
quod, praeter naturae ordinem, the order of nature, God performs some
etiam in infimis corporibus Deus operation in even the lowest of bodies
aliquid operatur quod virtute which cannot be, caused by the power of a
caelestis corporis causari non celestial body it is clearly shown that God
potest, manifeste ostenditur is immediately present, not only in the
Deum non solum caelesti corpori, celestial body, but also in the lowest
sed etiam infimis rebus things.
immediate adesse.
Non est autem aestimandum [9] But we must not think that God is
Deum sic esse ubique quod per everywhere in such a way that He is
locorum spatia dividatur, quasi divided in various areas of place, as if one
una pars eius sit hic et alia alibi, part of Him were here and another part
sed totus ubique est. Deus enim, there. Rather, His entire being is
cum sit omnino simplex, partibus everywhere. For God, as a completely
caret. simple being, has no parts.
Neque sic simplex est [10] Nor is His simplicity something like
quemadmodum punctus, qui est that of a point, which is the terminus of a
terminus continui, et propter hoc continuous line and thus has a definite
determinatum situm in continuo position on this line, with the consequence
habet: unde non potest unus that one point is impossible unless it A at
punctus nisi in uno loco one, indivisible place. In fact, God is
indivisibili esse. Deus autem indivisible, in the sense of existing entirely
indivisibilis est quasi omnino outside the genus of continuous things.
extra genus continui existens. And so, He is not determined in regard to
Unde non determinatur ad locum, place, either large or small, by any
vel magnum vel parvum, ex necessity of His essence requiring Him to
necessitate suae essentiae, be in a certain place, for Ile has been from
quasi oporteat eum esse in eternity prior to all place. But by the
aliquo loco: cum ipse fuerit ab immensity of His power He touches upon
aeterno ante omnem locum. Sed all things that are in place, for He is the
immensitate suae virtutis attingit universal cause of being, as we said.
omnia quae sunt in loco: cum sit Thus, He is present in His entirety
universalis causa essendi, ut wherever He is, since He touches upon all

dictum est. Sic igitur ipse totus things by His simple power.
est ubicumque est: quia per
simplicem suam virtutem
universa attingit.
Non est tamen aestimandum [11] Yet, we must not think that He is
quod sic sit in rebus quasi in present in things, in the sense of being
rebus mixtus: ostensum est enim combined with them as one of their parts.
in primo quod neque materia For it was shown in Book One [17, 27] that
neque forma est alicuius. Sed est He is neither the matter nor the form of
in omnibus per modum causae anything. Instead, He is in all things in the
agentis. fashion of an agent cause.
Caput 69 Chapter 69
De opinione eorum qui rebus ON THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO
naturalibus proprias subtrahunt TAKE AWAY PROPER ACTIONS
actiones FROM NATURAL THINGS
Ex hoc autem quidam occasionem [1] From this conclusion some men
errandi sumpserunt, putantes quod have taken the opportunity to fall into
nulla creatura habet aliquam error, thinking that no creature has an
actionem in productione effectuum active role in the production of natural
naturalium: ita scilicet quod ignis non effects. So, for instance, fire does not
calefacit, sed Deus causat calorem give heat, but God causes heat in the
praesente igne; et similiter dicunt in presence of fire, and they said like
omnibus aliis effectibus naturalibus. things about all other natural effects.
Hunc autem errorem rationibus [2] Now, they tried to support this error

confirmare conati sunt, ostendentes by arguments pointing out that no form,
nullam formam, neque substantialem substantial or accidental, can be
neque accidentalem, nisi per viam brought into being except by way of
creationis produci in esse. Non enim creation. Indeed, forms and accidents
possunt formae et accidentia fieri ex cannot come into being from matter,
materia: cum non habeant materiam since they do not have matter as one
partem sui. Unde, si fiunt, oportet of their parts. Hence, if they are made,
quod fiant ex nihilo, quod est creari. they must be made from nothing, and
Et quia creatio solius Dei actus est, this is to be created. And because
ut in secundo ostensum est, sequi creation is an act of God alone, as we
videtur quod solus Deus tam formas showed in Book Two [21], it would
substantiales quam accidentales in seem to follow that God alone
natura producat. produces both substantial and
accidental forms in nature.
Huic autem positioni partim etiam [3] Of course, the opinion of some
quorundam philosophorum opinio philosophers is partly in agreement
concordavit. Quia enim omne quod with this position. In fact, since
per se non est, ab eo quod est per everything that does not exist through
se derivatum invenitur, videtur quod itself is found to be derived from that
formae rerum quae non sunt per se which does exist through itself, it
existentes sed in materia, proveniant appears that the forms of things, which
ex formis quae per se sine materia are not existing through themselves
sint: quasi formae in materia but in matter, come from forms which
existentes sint quaedam are existent through themselves
participationes illarum formarum without matter. It is as if forms existing
quae sine materia sunt. Et propter in matter were certain participations in
hoc Plato posuit species rerum those forms which exist without matter.
sensibilium esse quasdam formas And because of this, Plato claimed that
separatas, quae sunt causae the species of sensible things are
essendi his sensibilibus, secundum certain forms separate from matter,
quod eas participant. which are the causes of being for these
sensible things, according as these
things participate in them.
Avicenna, vero posuit omnes formas [4] On the other hand, Avicenna

substantiales ab intelligentia agente maintained that all substantial forms
effluere. Accidentales autem formas flow forth from the agent Intelligence.
esse ponebat materiae But he claimed that accidental forms
dispositiones, quae ex actione are dispositions of matter which have
inferiorum agentium materiam arisen from the action of lower agents
disponentium proveniebant: in quo a disposing matter. In this way he
priore stultitia declinabat. avoided the foolish aspects of the
preceding erroneous view.
Huius autem signum esse videbatur [5] Now, an indication of this seemed to

quod nulla virtus activa invenitur lie in the fact that no active power is
esse in istis corporibus nisi found to exist in these bodies, except
accidentalis forma, sicut qualitates accidental form; for instance, the active
activae et passivae, quae non and passive qualities, which do not
videntur esse ad hoc sufficientes appear to be adequate in their power
quod formas substantiales causare to cause substantial forms.
possint.
Inveniuntur etiam quaedam in istis [6] Moreover, certain things are found,
inferioribus quae non generantur ex among things here below, which are
sibi similibus, sicut animalia ex not generated as like from like; for
putrefactione generata. Unde videtur instance, animals generated as a result
quod horum formae ex altioribus of putrefaction. Hence, it seems that
principiis proveniant. Et pari ratione the forms of these beings come from
aliae formae, quarum quaedam sunt higher principles; by the same
multo nobiliores. reasoning, so do other forms, some of
which are much more noble.
Quidam vero ad hoc argumentum [7] In fact, some people derive an
assumunt ex naturalium corporum argument for this from the weakness of
imbecillitate ad agendum. Nam natural bodies in regard to acting. For
omnis corporis forma est adiuncta every bodily form is combined with
quantitati. Quantitas autem impedit quantity, but quantity hinders action
actionem et motum: cuius signum and motion. As an indication of this,
ponunt quia quantum additur in they assert that the more that is added
quantitate alicui corpori, tanto fit to the quantity of a body, the heavier it
ponderosius, et tardatur motus eius. becomes and the more its motion is
Unde ex hoc concludunt quod nullum slowed down. So, from this they
corpus sit activum, sed passivum conclude that no body is active but
tantum. only passive.
Hoc etiam ostendere nituntur per hoc [8] They also try to show this by the
quod omne patiens est subiectum fact that every patient is a subject for
agenti; et omne agens praeter an agent, and every agent, apart from
primum, quod creat, requirit the first which creates, needs a subject
subiectum inferius se. Nulla autem lower than itself. But no substance is
substantia est inferior corporali. lower than corporeal substance.
Unde videtur quod nullum corpus sit Hence, it appears that no body is
activum. active.
Addunt etiam ad hoc quod corporalis [9] They also add, in regard to this

substantia est in ultima distantia a point, that corporeal substance is at
primo agente: unde non videtur eis the greatest distance from the first
quod virtus activa perveniat usque agent; hence, it does not seem to them
ab substantiam corporalem; sed, that active power could reach the
sicut Deus est agens tantum, ita whole way to corporeal substance.
substantia corporalis, cum sit infima Instead, just as God is an agent only,
in genere rerum, sit passiva tantum. so is corporeal substance passive only,
for it is the lowest in the genus of
things.
Propter has igitur rationes ponit [10] So, because of these arguments,
Avicebron, in libro fontis vitae, quod Avicebron maintained in the book, The
nullum corpus est activum; sed virtus Source of Life, that no body is active,
substantiae spiritualis, pertransiens but that the power of spiritual
per corpora, agit actiones quae per substance, passing through bodies,
corpora fieri videntur. does the actions which seem to be
done by bodies.
Quidam etiam loquentes in lege [11] Moreover, certain exponents of the

Maurorum dicuntur ad hoc rationem Law of the Moors are reported to
inducere quod etiam accidentia non adduce in support of this argument the
sint ex actione corporum, quia point that even accidents do not come
accidens non transit a subiecto in from the action of bodies, because an
subiectum. Unde reputant accident does not pass from subject to
impossibile quod calor transeat a subject. Hence, they regard it as
corpore calido in aliud corpus ab impossible for heat to pass over from a
ipso calefactum: sed dicunt omnia hot body into another body heated by
huiusmodi accidentia creari a Deo. it. They say, rather, that all accidents

like this are created by God.
Ad praemissas autem positiones [12] Now, many inappropriate

multa inconvenientia sequuntur. Si conclusions follow from the foregoing
enim nulla inferior causa, et maxime theories. For, if no lower cause, and
corporalis, aliquid operatur, sed especially no bodily one, performs any
Deus operatur in omnibus solus; operation, but, instead, God operates
Deus autem non variatur per hoc alone in all things, and if God is not
quod operatur in rebus diversis: non changed by the fact that He operates
sequetur diversus effectus ex in different things, then different effects
diversitate rerum in quibus Deus would not follow from the diversity of
operatur. Hoc autem ad sensum things in which God operates. Now,
apparet falsum: non enim ex this appears false to the senses, for
appositione calidi sequitur cooling does not result from putting
infrigidatio, sed calefactio tantum; something near a hot object, but only
neque ex semine hominis sequitur heating; nor does the generation of
generatio nisi hominis. Non ergo anything except a man result from the
causalitas effectuum inferiorum est semen of man. Therefore, the causality
ita attribuenda divinae virtuti quod of the lower type of effects is not to be
subtrahatur causalitas inferiorum attributed to divine power in such a
agentium. way as to take away the causality of
lower agents.
Item. Contra rationem sapientiae est [13] Again, it is contrary to the rational
ut sit aliquid frustra in operibus character of wisdom for there to be
sapientis. Si autem res creatae nullo anything useless in the activities of the
modo operarentur ad effectus possessor of wisdom. But, if created
producendos, sed solus Deus things could in no way operate to
operaretur omnia immediate, frustra produce their effects, and if God alone
essent adhibitae ab ipso aliae res ad worked all operations immediately,
producendos effectus. Repugnat these other things would be employed
igitur praedicta positio divinae in a useless way by Him, for the
sapientiae. production of these effects. Therefore,
the preceding position is incompatible
with divine wisdom.
Adhuc. Quod dat alicui aliquod [14] Besides, the giver of some
principale, dat eidem omnia quae principal part to a thing gives the thing
consequuntur ad illud: sicut causa all the items that result from that part.
quae dat corpori elementari For instance, the cause that gives
gravitatem, dat ei motum deorsum. weight to an elemental body also gives
Facere autem aliquid actu it downward motion. But the ability to
consequitur ad hoc quod est esse make an actual thing results from
actu, ut patet in Deo: ipse enim est being actually existent, as is evident in
actus purus, et est etiam prima the case of God, for He is pure act and
causa essendi omnibus, ut supra is also the first cause of being for all
ostensum est. Si igitur communicavit things, as we showed above.
aliis similitudinem suam quantum ad Therefore, if He has communicated His
esse, inquantum res in esse likeness, as far as actual being is
produxit, consequens est quod concerned, to other things, by virtue of
communicaverit eis similitudinem the fact that He has brought things into
suam quantum ad agere, ut etiam being, it follows that He has
res creatae habeant proprias communicated to them His likeness, as
actiones. far as acting is concerned, so that
created things may also have their own
actions.
Amplius. Perfectio effectus [15] Furthermore, the perfection of the

demonstrat perfectionem causae: effect demonstrates the perfection of
maior enim virtus perfectiorem the cause, for a greater power brings
effectum inducit. Deus autem est about a more perfect effect. But God is
perfectissimum agens. Oportet igitur the most perfect agent. Therefore,
quod res ab ipso creatae things created by Him obtain perfection
perfectionem ab ipso consequantur. from Him. So, to detract from the
Detrahere ergo perfectioni perfection of creatures is to detract
creaturarum est detrahere perfectioni from the perfection of divine power.
divinae virtutis. Sed si nulla creatura But, if no creature has any active role
habet aliquam actionem ad aliquem in the production of any effect, much is
effectum producendum, multum detracted from the perfection of the
detrahitur perfectioni creaturae: ex creature. Indeed, it is part of the
abundantia enim perfectionis est fullness of perfection to be able to
quod perfectionem quam aliquid communicate to another being the
habet, possit alteri communicare. perfection which one possesses.
Detrahit igitur haec positio divinae Therefore, this position detracts from
virtuti. the divine power.
Item. Sicut est boni bonum facere, [16] Moreover, as it is the function of
ita est summi boni aliquid optime the good to make what is good, so it is
facere. Deus autem est summum the prerogative of the highest good to
bonum, ut in primo ostensum est. make what is best. But God is the
Igitur eius est optime facere omnia. highest good, as we showed in Book
Melius autem est quod bonum alicui One. So, it is His function to make all
collatum sit multorum commune, things best. Now, it is better for a good
quam quod sit proprium: quia bonum that is conferred on a thing to be
commune semper invenitur esse common to many than for it to be
divinius quam bonum unius tantum. exclusive, for “the common good is
Sed bonum unius fit multis commune always found to be more divine than
si ab uno in alia derivatur, quod non the good of one alone.” But the good of
potest esse nisi inquantum diffundit one being becomes common to many
ipsum in alia per propriam actionem: if it can pass from one to the other; this
si vero potestatem non habet illud in cannot occur unless it can diffuse this
alia transfundendi, manet sibi ipsi good to others through its own action.
proprium. Sic igitur Deus rebus On the other hand, if it lacks the power
creatis suam bonitatem to transfer this good to others, it
communicavit ut una res, quod continues to keep it exclusively.
accepit, possit in aliam transfundere. Therefore, God so communicates His
Detrahere ergo actiones proprias goodness to created beings that one
rebus, est divinae bonitati derogare. thing which receives it can transfer it to
another. Therefore, to take away their
proper actions from things is to
disparage the divine goodness.
Adhuc. Subtrahere ordinem rebus [17] Again, to take away order from
creatis est eis subtrahere id quod created things is to deprive them of
optimum habent: nam singula in their best possession, for individual
seipsis sunt bona, simul autem things are good in themselves, but all
omnia sunt optima, propter ordinem things together are best because of the
universi; semper enim totum est order of the whole. Indeed, the whole
melius partibus et finis ipsarum. Si is always better than its parts, and is
autem rebus subtrahantur actiones, their end. Now, if actions be taken
subtrahitur ordo rerum ad invicem: away from things, the mutual order
rerum enim quae sunt diversae among things is removed, for, in regard
secundum suas naturas, non est to things that are different in their
colligatio in ordinis unitatem nisi per natures, there can be no gathering
hoc quod quaedam agunt et together into a unity of order unless by
quaedam patiuntur. Inconveniens the fact that some of them act and
igitur est dicere quod res non others undergo action. Therefore, it is
habeant proprias actiones. inappropriate to say that things do not
have their own actions.
Amplius. Si effectus non producuntur [18] Besides, if effects are not

ex actione rerum creatarum, sed produced by the action of created
solum ex actione Dei, impossibile est things, but only by the action of God, it
quod per effectus manifestetur virtus is impossible for the power of any
alicuius causae creatae: non enim created cause to be manifested
effectus ostendit virtutem causae nisi through its effects. Of course, an effect
ratione actionis quae, a virtute does not show the power of a cause
procedens, ad effectum terminatur. unless by virtue of the action which
Natura autem causae non proceeding from the power terminates
cognoscitur per effectum nisi in the effect. Now, the nature of a
inquantum per ipsum cognoscitur cause is not known through the effect
virtus eius, quae naturam unless its power is known through this
consequitur. Si igitur res creatae non effect, for the power results from the
habeant actiones ad producendos nature. So, if created things have no
effectus, sequetur quod nunquam actions productive of effects, it follows
natura alicuius rei creatae poterit that no nature of anything would ever
cognosci per effectum. Et sic be known through the effect. And thus,
subtrahitur nobis omnis cognitio all the knowledge of natural science is
scientiae naturalis, in qua praecipue taken away from us, for the
demonstrationes per effectum demonstrations in it are chiefly derived
sumuntur. from the effect.
Item. Apparet per inductionem in [19] Furthermore, it is inductively

omnibus quod simile agat suum evident in all cases that like produces
simile. Id autem quod generatur in like. But what is generated in lower
rebus inferioribus non est forma things is not merely the form, but the
tantum, sed compositum ex materia thing composed of matter and form,
et forma: nam omnis generatio ex since every process of generation is
aliquo est, scilicet ex materia, et ad from something, namely from matter,
aliquid, scilicet formam. Oportet ergo and to something, namely form.
quod generans non sit forma tantum, Therefore, the generating agent cannot
sed compositum ex materia et forma. be merely a form, but is, rather, the
Non igitur species rerum separatae, composite of matter and form.
ut Platonici posuerunt; neque Therefore, it is not the separate
intelligentia agens, ut posuit species of things, as the Platonists
Avicenna, est causa formarum quae claimed, nor the agent Intelligence, as
sunt in materiis, sed magis hoc Avicenna held, that is, the cause of the
compositum ex materia et forma. forms which exist in matter; rather, it is
the individual composed of matter and
form.
Item. Si agere sequitur ad esse in [20] Moreover, if to act is the result of a

actu, inconveniens est quod actus being which is in act, it is inappropriate
perfectior actione destituatur. for a more perfect act to be deprived of
Perfectior autem actus est forma action. But the substantial form is a
substantialis quam accidentalis. Si more perfect act than accidental form.
igitur formae accidentales quae sunt So, if accidental forms in corporeal
in rebus corporalibus habent things have their proper actions, by all
proprias actiones, multo magis forma the greater reason the substantial form
substantialis habet aliquam propriam has its proper action. But to dispose
actionem. Non est autem eius matter is not a proper action for it,
propria actio disponere materiam: since this is done by alteration, for
quia hoc fit per alterationem, ad which accidental forms are sufficient.
quam sufficiunt formae accidentales. Therefore, the substantial form of the
Igitur forma substantialis generantis generating agent is the source of the
est principium actionis ut forma action, as a substantial form is put into
substantialis introducatur in the product of generation.
generatum.
Rationes autem quas inducunt facile [21] Now, it is easy to break down the
est solvere. Cum enim ad hoc aliquid arguments which they bring forward. In
fiat ut sit, sicut forma non dicitur ens fact, since a thing is made so that it will
quasi ipsa habeat esse, sed quia per exist, and since a form is not called a
eam compositum est; ita nec forma being in the sense that it possesses
proprie fit, sed incipit esse per hoc being but because the composite
quod compositum sit reductum de exists by means of it, so also the form
potentia in actum, qui est forma. is not made, in the proper sense, but it
begins to be by the fact that the
composite is reduced from potency to
act, which is the form.
Neque etiam oportet ut omne quod [22] Nor, indeed, is it necessary that
habet aliquam formam quasi everything which has a form by
participatam, recipiat eam immediate participation should receive it
ab eo quod est essentialiter forma: immediately from that which is form
sed immediate quidem ab alio quod essentially; rather, it may receive it
habet similem formam, simili modo immediately from another being that
scilicet participatam, quod tamen has a similar form, participated in the
agat in virtute illius formae same way, and, of course, this being
separatae, si qua sit talis. Sic enim may act by the power of the separate
agens similem sibi effectum producit. form, if there be any such. So, it is in
this way that an agent produces an
effect like itself.
Similiter etiam non oportet quod, [23] Likewise, it is not necessary,
quia omnis actio inferiorum corporum because every action of lower bodies
fit per qualitates activas et passivas, is done by active and passive qualities
quae sunt accidentia, quod non which are accidents, that only an
producatur ex actione eorum nisi accident be produced by their actions.
accidens. Quia illae formae For, just as they are caused by the
accidentales, sicut causantur a substantial form which, together with
forma substantiali, quae simul cum matter, is the cause of all the proper
materia est causa omnium accidents, these accidental forms also
propriorum accidentium, ita agunt act by the power of the substantial
virtute formae substantialis. Quod form. Now, that which acts by the
autem agit in virtute alterius, producit power of another produces an effect
effectum similem non sibi tantum, similar not only to itself but more
sed magis ei in cuius virtute agit: especially to that by whose power it
sicut ex actione instrumenti fit in acts. For instance, from the action of
artificiato similitudo formae artis. Ex an instrument there is produced in the
quo sequitur quod ex actione artifact a likeness of the form in the
formarum accidentalium producuntur mind of the artist. Consequently, it
formae substantiales, inquantum follows that substantial forms are
agunt instrumentaliter in virtute produced from the action of accidental
substantialium formarum. forms, as they act instrumentally
through the power of the substantial
forms.
In animalibus autem quae ex [24] In the case of animals generated
putrefactione generantur, causatur from putrefaction, the substantial form
forma substantialis ex agente is caused by a corporeal agent,
corporali, scilicet corpore caelesti, namely, the celestial body which is the
quod est primum alterans, unde first agent of alteration; and so all
oportet quod omnia moventia ad things that produce a change of form in
formam in istis inferioribus, agant in these lower bodies do so by its power.
virtute illius. Et propter hoc, ad And for this reason the celestial power
producendas aliquas formas is enough, without a univocal agent, to
imperfectas sufficit virtus caelestis, produce some imperfect forms. But to
absque agente univoco. Ad produce perfect forms, like the souls of
producendas autem formas perfect animals, there is also required
perfectiores, sicut sunt animae a univocal agent together with the
animalium perfectorum, requiritur celestial agent. In fact, such animals
etiam cum agente caelesti agens are not generated except from semen.
univocum: talia enim animalia non And that is why Aristotle says that
generantur nisi ex semine. Et propter “man and the sun generate man”

hoc dicit Aristoteles, in II Phys., quod [Physics II, 2: 194b 14].
homo generat hominem et sol.
Non est autem verum quod quantitas [25] Moreover, it is not true that

impediat actionem formae, nisi per quantity impedes the action of a form,
accidens: inquantum scilicet omnis except accidentally; that is to say, in so
quantitas continua est in materia; far as all continuous quantity is in
forma autem in materia existens, matter, and form existing in matter,
cum sit minoris actualitatis, est per having lesser actuality, is consequently
consequens minoris virtutis in less powerful in acting. Hence, a body
agendo. Unde corpus quod habet that has less matter and more form, for
minus de materia et plus de forma, instance, fire, is more active. But, if we
scilicet ignis, est magis activum. consider a kind of action which a form
Supposito autem modo actionis existing in matter may have, then
quam forma in materia existens quantity helps to increase rather than
habere potest, quantitas coauget to diminish the action. For instance, the
magis quam minuat actionem. Nam larger a hot body is, granting equal
quanto corpus calidum fuerit maius, intensity of heat, the more is it able to
supposita aeque intensa caliditate, give off heat; and granting equal
tanto magis calefacit; et supposita degree of weight, the bigger a heavy
gravitate aeque intensa, quanto body is, the more rapidly will it be
maius fuerit corpus grave, tanto moved by natural motion; that is why it
velocius movebitur motu naturali; et is moved more slowly by unnatural
inde est quod tardius movetur motu motion. Therefore, the fact that heavy
innaturali. Quod ergo corpora gravia bodies have slower unnatural motion
sunt tardioris motus innaturalis cum when they have larger quantity does
fuerint maioris quantitatis, non not show that quantity impedes action,
ostendit quod quantitas impediat but that it helps to increase it.
actionem, sed magis quod coaugeat
ipsam.
Non oportet etiam quod corpus [26] Nor, indeed, is it necessary for
omne careat actione propter hoc every body to lack action because
quod in ordine rerum substantia bodily substance is generically the
corporalis est infima secundum lowest in the order of things. For, even
suum genus. Quia etiam inter among bodies, one is higher than
corpora unum est superius altero, et another, and more formal, and more
formalius et magis activum: sicut active: as fire is in regard to lower
ignis respectu inferiorum corporum. bodies. Nor, in fact, is even the lowest
Nec tamen etiam infimum corpus body prevented from. acting. For it is
excluditur ab agendo. Manifestum clear that a body cannot act in its
est enim quod corpus non potest entirety, since it is composed of matter
agere se toto, cum sit compositum which is potential being, and of form
ex materia, quae est ens in potentia, which is act. Indeed, each thing acts
et ex forma, quae est actus: agit according as it is in act. And because
enim unumquodque secundum quod of this, every body acts in accord with
est actu. Et propter hoc omne corpus its form; and related to it is another
agit secundum suam formam: ad body, namely, the patient, which is a
quam comparatur aliud corpus, subject by virtue of its matter, because

scilicet patiens, secundum suam its matter is in potency to the form of
materiam ut subiectum, inquantum the agent. But, conversely, if the matter
materia eius est in potentia ad of the agent’s body be in potency to
formam agentis. Si autem e the form of the patient’s body, they will
converso ad formam corporis be mutually related as agent to patient.
patientis sit in potentia materia This happens, for instance, between
corporis agentis, erunt agentia et two elemental bodies. But, on the other
patientia ad invicem: sicut accidit in hand, one may be only an agent and
duobus corporibus elementaribus. the other only a patient in relation to
Sin autem, erit unum tantum agens, the first, as is the relation between a
et alterum tantum patiens respectu celestial body and an elemental body.
illius: sicut est comparatio corporis And so, a body that is an agent acts on
caelestis ad corpus elementare. Sic a subject, not by virtue of its entire
igitur corpus agens agit in subiectum body, but of the form through which it
non ratione totius corporis, sed acts.
formae per quam agit.
Non est etiam verum quod corpora [27] Nor is it even true that bodies are

sint in ultima remotione a Deo. Cum at the greatest distance from God. For,
enim Deus sit actus purus, since God is pure act, things are more
secundum hoc aliqua magis vel or less distant from Him on this basis:
minus ab eo distant, quod sunt plus that they are more or less in act or in
vel minus in actu vel in potentia. Illud potency. So, among beings that is most
igitur in entibus est extreme distans distant from God which is merely
a Deo quod est potentia tantum, potential; namely, prime matter. Hence,
scilicet materia prima. Unde eius est its function is solely to undergo, and
pati tantum et non agere. Corpora not to perform, action. But bodies, as
vero, cum sint composita ex materia composed of matter and form,
et forma, accedunt ad divinam approach the divine likeness because
similitudinem inquantum habent they possess form, which Aristotle calls
formam, quam Aristoteles, in I Phys., a divine thing [Physics I, 9: 192a 16].
nominat divinum quiddam. Et propter And because of this, they act in so far
hoc, secundum quod habent as they possess form, but they
formam, agunt: secundum vero quod undergo action in so far as they
habent materiam, patiuntur. possess matter.
Ridiculum autem est dicere quod [28] Again, it is laughable to say that a

ideo corpus non agat quia accidens body does not act because an accident
non transit de subiecto in subiectum. does not pass from subject to subject.
Non enim hoc modo dicitur corpus For a hot body is not said to give off
calidum calefacere quod idem heat in this sense, that numerically the
numero calor qui est in calefaciente same heat which is in the heating body
corpore, transeat ad corpus passes over into the heated body.
calefactum: sed quia virtute caloris Rather, by the power of the heat which
qui est in corpore calefaciente, alius is in the heating body, a numerically
calor numero fit actu in corpore different heat is made actual in the
calefacto, qui prius erat in eo in heated body, a heat which was
potentia. Agens enim naturale non previously in it in potency. For a natural
est traducens propriam formam in agent does not hand over its own form
alterum subiectum: sed reducens to another subject, but it reduces the
subiectum quod patitur, de potentia passive subject from potency to act.
in actum.
Non igitur auferimus proprias [29] Therefore, we do not take away
actiones rebus creatis, quamvis their proper actions from created
omnes effectus rerum creatarum things, though we attribute all the
Deo attribuamus quasi in omnibus effects of created things to God, as an
operanti. agent working in all things.
Caput 70 Chapter 70
Quomodo idem effectus sit a HOW THE SAME EFFECT IS FROM
Deo et a natura agente GOD AND FROM A NATURAL AGENT
Quibusdam autem difficile videtur [1] Now, it seems difficult for some people

ad intelligendum quod effectus to understand how natural effects are
naturales et Deo attribuantur et attributed to God and to a natural agent.
naturali agenti.
Nam una actio a duobus agentibus [2] For it does not seem possible for one
non videtur progredi posse. Si action to proceed from two agents. So, if
igitur actio per quam effectus the action whereby a natural effect is
naturalis producitur, procedit a produced proceeds from a natural body, it
corpore naturali, non procedit a does not proceed from God.
Deo.
Item. Quod potest fieri sufficienter [3] Again, when a thing can be done
per unum, superfluum est si per adequately by one agent, it is
multa fiat: videmus enim quod superfluous for it to be done by many; in
natura non facit per duo fact, we see that nature does not do with
instrumenta quod potest facere two instruments what it can do with one.
per unum. Cum igitur virtus divina So, since the divine power is sufficient to
sufficiens sit ad producendos produce natural effects, it is superfluous
effectus naturales, superfluum est to use natural powers, too, for the
adhibere ad eosdem effectus production of the same effects. Or, if the
producendos etiam naturales natural power adequately produces the
virtutes: vel, si virtus naturalis proper effect, it is superfluous for the
sufficienter proprium effectum divine power to act for the same effect.
producit, superfluum est quod
divina ad eundem effectum agat.
Praeterea. Si Deus totum effectum [4] Besides, if God produces the entire

naturalem producit, nihil relinquitur natural effect, then nothing is left of the
de effectu naturali agenti ad effect for the natural agent to produce.
producendum. Non videtur igitur So, it does not seem to be possible to
esse possibile quod eosdem say that God produces the same effects
effectus Deus producere dicatur that natural agents produce.
quos res naturales producunt.
Haec autem difficultatem non [5] However, these points present no

afferunt si praemissa difficulty, provided the things previously
considerentur. In quolibet enim established be considered. In every
agente est duo considerare, agent, in fact, there are two things to
scilicet rem ipsam quae agit, et consider: namely, the thing itself that
virtutem qua agit: sicut ignis acts, and the power by which it acts. Fire,
calefacit per calorem. Virtus autem for instance, heats by means of heat. But
inferioris agentis dependet a the power of a lower agent depends on
virtute superioris agentis, the power of the superior agent,
inquantum superius agens dat according as the superior agent gives
virtutem ipsam inferiori agenti per this power to the lower agent whereby it
quam agit; vel conservat eam; aut may act; or preserves it; or even applies
etiam applicat eam ad agendum, it to the action, as the artisan applies an
sicut artifex applicat instrumentum instrument to its proper effect, though he
ad proprium effectum; cui tamen neither gives the form whereby the
non dat formam per quam agit instrument works, nor preserves it, but
instrumentum, nec conservat, sed simply gives it motion. So, it is necessary
dat ei solum motum. Oportet ergo for the action of a lower agent to result
quod actio inferioris agentis non not only from the agent by its own power,
solum sit ab eo per virtutem but also from the power of all higher
propriam, sed per virtutem agents; it acts, thus, through the power of
omnium superiorum agentium: agit all. And just as the lowest agent is found
enim in virtute omnium. Et sicut immediately active, so also is the power
agens infimum invenitur of the primary agent found immediate in
immediatum activum, ita virtus the production of the effect. For the
primi agentis invenitur immediata power of the lower agent is not adequate
ad producendum effectum: nam to produce this effect of itself, but from
virtus infimi agentis non habet the power of the next higher agent; and
quod producat hunc effectum ex the power of the next one gets this ability
se, sed ex virtute proximi from the power of the next higher one;
superioris; et virtus illius hoc habet and thus the power of the highest agent
ex virtute superioris; et sic virtus is discovered to be of itself productive of
supremi agentis invenitur ex se the effect, as an immediate cause. This is
productiva effectus, quasi causa evident in the case of the principles of
immediata; sicut patet in principiis demonstration, the first of which is
demonstrationum, quorum primum immediate. So, just as it is not unfitting
est immediatum. Sicut igitur non for one action to be produced by an
est inconveniens quod una actio agent and its power, so it is not
producatur ex aliquo agente et inappropriate for the same effect to be
eius virtute, ita non est produced by a lower agent and God: by
inconveniens quod producatur both immediately, though in different
idem effectus ab inferiori agente et ways.
Deo: ab utroque immediate, licet
alio et alio modo.
Patet etiam quod, etsi res naturalis [6] It is also evident that, though a natural
producat proprium effectum, non thing produces its proper effect, it is not
est superfluum quod Deus illum superfluous for God to produce it, since
producat: quia res naturalis non the natural thing does not produce it
producit ipsum nisi virtute divina. except by divine power.
Neque est superfluum, si Deus per [7] Nor is it superfluous, even if God can
seipsum potest omnes effectus by Himself produce all natural effects, for
naturales producere, quod per them to be produced by certain other
quasdam alias causas causes. For this is not a result of the
producantur. Non enim hoc est ex inadequacy of divine power, but of the
insufficientia divinae virtutis, sed immensity of His goodness, whereby He
ex immensitate bonitatis ipsius, has willed to communicate His likeness
per quam suam similitudinem to things, not only so that they might
rebus communicare voluit non exist, but also that they might be causes
solum quantum ad hoc quod for other things. Indeed, all creatures
essent, sed etiam quantum ad hoc generally attain the divine likeness in
quod aliorum causae essent: his these two ways, as we showed above.
enim duobus modis creaturae By this, in fact, the beauty of order in
communiter omnes divinam created things is evident.
similitudinem consequuntur, ut
supra ostensum est. Per hoc etiam
decor ordinis in rebus creatis
apparet.
Patet etiam quod non sic idem [8] It is also apparent that the same effect

effectus causae naturali et divinae is not attributed to a natural cause and to
virtuti attribuitur quasi partim a divine power in such a way that it is partly
Deo, et partim a naturali agente done by God, and partly by the natural
fiat, sed totus ab utroque agent; rather, it is wholly done by both,
secundum alium modum: sicut according to a different way, just as the
idem effectus totus attribuitur same effect is wholly attributed to the
instrumento, et principali agenti instrument and also wholly to the
etiam totus. principal agent.
Chapter 71
Caput 71
THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT
Quod divina providentia non
ENTIRELY EXCLUDE EVIL FROM
excludit totaliter malum a rebus
THINGS
Ex his autem apparet quod divina [1] Now, from these conclusions it

providentia, qua res gubernat, non becomes evident that divine providence,
impedit quin corruptio et defectus whereby He governs things, does not
et malum in rebus inveniatur. prevent corruption, deficiency, and evil
from being found in things.
Divina enim gubernatio, qua Deus [2] Indeed, divine governance, whereby

operatur in rebus, non excludit God works in things, does not exclude the
operationem causarum working of secondary causes, as we have

secundarum, sicut iam ostensum already shown. Now, it is possible for a
est. Contingit autem provenire defect to happen in an effect, because of
defectum in effectu propter a defect in the secondary agent cause,
defectum causae secundae without there being a defect in the primary
agentis, absque eo quod sit agent. For example, in the case of the
defectus in primo agente: sicut product of a perfectly skilled artisan,
cum in effectu artificis habentis some defect may occur because of a
perfecte artem, contingit aliquis defect in his instrument. And again, in the
defectus propter instrumenti case of a man whose motive power is
defectum; et sicut hominem cuius strong, he may limp as a result of no
vis motiva est fortis, contingit defect in his bodily power to move, but
claudicare, non propter defectum because of a twist in his leg bone. So, it is
virtutis motivae, sed propter tibiae possible, in the case of things made and
curvitatem. Contingit igitur in his governed by God, for some defect and
quae aguntur et gubernantur a evil to be found, because of a defect of
Deo, aliquem defectum et aliquod the secondary agents, even though there
malum inveniri, propter defectum be no defect in God Himself.
agentium secundorum, licet in
ipso Deo nullus sit defectus.
Amplius. Perfecta bonitas in rebus [3] Moreover, perfect goodness would not
creatis non inveniretur nisi esset be found in created things unless. there
ordo bonitatis in eis, ut scilicet were an order of goodness in them, in the
quaedam sint aliis meliora: non sense that some of them are better than
enim implerentur omnes gradus others. Otherwise, all possible grades of
possibiles bonitatis; neque etiam goodness would not be realized, nor
aliqua creatura Deo similaretur would any creature be like God by virtue
quantum ad hoc quod alteri of holding a higher place than another.
emineret. Tolleretur etiam The highest beauty would be taken away
summus decor a rebus, si ab eis from things, too, if the order of distinct
ordo distinctorum et disparium and unequal things were removed. And
tolleretur. Et quod est amplius, what is more, multiplicity would be taken
tolleretur multitudo a rebus, away from things if inequality of goodness
inaequalitate bonitatis sublata: were removed, since through the
cum per differentias quibus res ad differences by which things are
invicem differunt, unum altero distinguished from each other one thing
melius existat; sicut animatum stands out as better than another; for
inanimato, et rationale irrationali. instance, the animate in relation to the
Et sic, si aequalitas omnimoda inanimate, and the rational in regard to
esset in rebus, non esset nisi the irrational. And so, if complete equality
unum bonum creatum: quod were present in things, there would be but
manifeste perfectioni derogat one created good, which clearly
creaturae. Gradus autem bonitatis disparages the perfection of the creature.
superior est ut aliquid sit bonum Now, it is a higher grade of goodness for
quod non possit a bonitate a thing to be good because it cannot fall
deficere: inferior autem eo est from goodness; lower than that is the
quod potest a bonitate deficere. thing which can fall from goodness. So,
Utrumque igitur gradum bonitatis the perfection of the universe requires
perfectio universi requirit. Ad both grades of goodness. But it pertains
providentiam autem gubernantis to the providence of the governor to

pertinet perfectionem in rebus preserve perfection in the things
gubernatis servare, non autem governed, and not to decrease it.
eam minuere. Igitur non pertinet Therefore, it does not pertain to divine
ad divinam providentiam ut goodness, entirely to exclude from things
omnino excludat a rebus the power of falling from the good. But
potentiam deficiendi a bono. Hanc evil is the consequence of this power,
autem potentiam sequitur malum: because what is able to fall does fall at
quia quod potest deficere, times. And this defection of the good is
quandoque deficit. Et ipse evil, as we showed above. Therefore, it
defectus boni malum est, ut supra does not pertain to divine providence to
ostensum est. Non est igitur ad prohibit evil entirely from things.
divinam providentiam pertinens ut
omnino malum a rebus prohibeat.
Adhuc. Optimum in gubernatione [4] Again, the best thing in any
qualibet est ut rebus gubernatis government is to provide for the things
secundum modum suum governed according to their own mode,
provideatur: in hoc enim regiminis for the justice of a regime consists in this.
iustitia consistit. Sicut igitur esset Therefore, as it would be contrary to the
contra rationem humani regiminis rational character of a human regime for
si impedirentur a gubernatore men to be prevented by the governor
civitatis homines agere secundum from acting in accord with their own duties
sua officia nisi forte quandoque —except, perhaps, on occasion, due to
ad horam, propter aliquam the need of the moment—so, too, would it
necessitatem, ita esset contra be contrary to the rational character of the
rationem divini regiminis si non divine regime to refuse permission for
sineret res creatas agere created things to act according to the
secundum modum propriae mode of their nature. Now, as a result of
naturae. Ex hoc autem quod this fact, that creatures do act in this way,
creaturae sic agunt, sequitur corruption and evil result in things,
corruptio et malum in rebus: cum, because, due to the contrariety and
propter contrarietatem et incompatibility present in things, one may
repugnantiam quae est in rebus, be a source of corruption for another.
una res sit alterius corruptiva. Non Therefore, it does not pertain to divine
est igitur ad divinam providentiam providence to exclude evil entirely from
pertinens malum omnino a rebus the things that are governed.
gubernatis excludere.
Item. Impossibile est quod agens [5] Besides, it is impossible for an agent
operetur aliquod malum nisi to do something evil, unless by virtue of
propter hoc quod intendit aliquod the fact that the agent intends something
bonum, sicut ex superioribus good, as is evident from the foregoing.
apparet. Prohibere autem But to prohibit universally the intending of
cuiuscumque boni intentionem the good for the individual on the part of
universaliter a rebus creatis, non created things is not the function of the
pertinet ad providentiam eius qui providence of Him Who is the cause of
est omnis boni causa: sic enim every good thing. For, in that way, many
multa bona subtraherentur ab goods would be taken away from the
universitate rerum; sicut, si whole of things. For example, if the
subtraheretur igni intentio inclination to generate its like were taken
generandi sibi simile, ad quam away from fire (from which inclination
sequitur hoc malum quod est there results this particular evil which is
corruptio rerum combustibilium, the burning up of combustible things),
tolleretur hoc bonum quod est there would also be taken away this
generatio ignis, et conservatio particular good which is the generation of
ipsius secundum suam speciem. fire and the preservation of the same
Non est igitur divinae providentiae according to its species. Therefore, it is
malum totaliter a rebus excludere. not the function of divine providence
totally to exclude evil from things.
Adhuc. Multa bona sunt in rebus [6] Furthermore, many goods are present

quae, nisi mala essent, locum non in things which would not occur unless
haberent: sicut non esset patientia there were evils. For instance, there
iustorum si non esset malignitas would not be the patience of the just if
persequentium; nec esset locus there were not the malice of their
iustitiae vindicanti si delicta non persecutors; there would not be a place
essent; in rebus etiam naturalibus for the justice of vindication if there were
non esset unius generatio nisi no offenses; and in the order of nature,
esset alterius corruptio. Si ergo there would not be the generation of one
malum totaliter ab universitate thing unless there were the corruption of
rerum per divinam providentiam another. So, if evil were totally excluded
excluderetur, oporteret etiam from the whole of things by divine
bonorum multitudinem diminui. providence, a multitude of good things
Quod esse non debet: quia would have to be, sacrificed. And this is
virtuosius est bonum in bonitate as it should be, for the good is stronger in
quam in malitia malum, sicut ex its goodness than evil is in its malice, as
superioribus patet. Igitur non is clear from earlier sections. Therefore,
debet per divinam providentiam evil should not be totally excluded from
totaliter malum excludi a rebus. things by divine providence.
Amplius. Bonum totius praeminet [7] Moreover, the good of the whole takes

bono partis. Ad providum igitur precedence over the good of a part. it is
gubernatorem pertinet negligere proper for a governor with foresight to
aliquem defectum bonitatis in neglect some lack of goodness in a part,
parte, ut fiat augmentum bonitatis so that there may be an increase of
in toto: sicut artifex abscondit goodness in the whole. Thus, an artisan
fundamenta sub terra ut tota bides the foundations beneath earth, so
domus habeat firmitatem. Sed si that the whole house may have stability.
malum a quibusdam partibus But, if evil were removed from some parts
universi subtraheretur, multum of the universe, much perfection would
deperiret perfectionis universi, perish from the ‘universe, whose beauty
cuius pulchritudo ex ordinata arises from an ordered unification of evil
malorum et bonorum adunatione and good things. In fact, while evil things
consurgit, dum mala ex bonis originate from good things that are
deficientibus proveniunt, et tamen defective, still, certain good things also
ex eis quaedam bona result from them, as a consequence of
consequuntur, ex providentia the providence of the governor. Thus,
gubernantis: sicut et silentii even a silent pause makes a hymn

interpositio facit cantilenam esse appealing. Therefore, evil should not have
suavem. Non igitur per divinam been excluded from things by divine
providentiam debuit malum a providence.
rebus excludi.
Adhuc. Res aliae, et praecipue [8] Again, other things, particularly lower
inferiores, ad bonum hominis ones, are ordered to man’s good as an
ordinantur sicut ad finem. Si end. Now, if no evils were present in
autem nulla mala essent in rebus, things, much of man’s good would be
multum de bono hominis diminished, both in regard to knowledge
diminueretur, et quantum ad and in regard to the desire or love of the
cognitionem, et quantum ad boni good. In fact, the good is better known
desiderium vel amorem. Nam from its comparison with evil, and while
bonum ex comparatione mali we continue to suffer certain evils our
magis cognoscitur; et dum aliqua desire for goods grows more ardent. For
mala perpetimur, ardentius bona instance, how great a good health is, is
optamus; sicut quantum bonum sit best known by the sick; and they also
sanitas, infirmi maxime crave it more than do the healthy.
cognoscunt; qui etiam ad eam Therefore, it is not the function of divine
magis exardent quam sani. Non providence totally to exclude evils from
igitur pertinet ad divinam things.
providentiam mala a rebus
totaliter excludere.
Propter quod dicitur, Isaiae 457: [9] For this reason, it is said: “I make
faciens pacem et creans malum. peace and create evil” (Is. 45:7); and
Et Amos 36: non est malum in again: “There is no evil in a city which
civitate quod Deus non faciat. God will not do” (Amos 3:6).
Per haec autem excluditur [10] Now, with these considerations we

quorundam error qui, propter hoc dispose of the error of those who,
quod mala in mundo evenire because they noticed that evils occur in
videbant, dicebant Deum non the world, said that there is no God. Thus,
esse: sicut Boetius, in I de Cons., Boethius introduces a certain philosopher
introducit quendam philosophum who asks: “If God exists, whence comes
quaerentem: si Deus est, unde evil?” [De consolatione philosophiae I, 4].
malum? Esset autem e contrario But it could be argued to the contrary: “If
arguendum: si malum est, Deus evil exists, God exists.” For, there would
est. Non enim esset malum be no evil if the order of good were taken
sublato ordine boni, cuius privatio away, since its privation is evil. But this
est malum. Hic autem ordo non order would not exist if there were no
esset, si Deus non esset. God.
Tollitur etiam et erroris occasio per [11] Moreover, by the foregoing

praemissa illis qui divinam arguments, even the occasion of error is
providentiam usque ad haec removed from those who denied that
corruptibilia extendi negabant, divine providence is extended to these
propter hoc quod in eis multa corruptible things, because they saw that
mala evenire conspiciebant; sola many evils occur in them; they said,
autem incorruptibilia divinae moreover, that only incorruptible things
providentiae subdi dicebant, in are subject to divine providence, things in
quibus nullus defectus, nec which no defect or evil part is found.
malum aliquod invenitur.
Per haec etiam tollitur errandi [12] By these considerations, the
occasio Manichaeis, qui duo occasion of erring is also taken away from
prima principia agentia posuerunt, the Manicheans who maintained two first
bonum et malum, quasi malum agent principles, good and evil, as though
sub providentia boni Dei locum evil could have no place under the
habere non posset. providence of a good God.
Solvitur etiam et quorundam [13] So, too, the difficulty of some people

dubitatio: utrum scilicet actiones is solved; namely, whether evil actions
malae sint a Deo? Nam cum are from God. Indeed, since it has been
ostensum sit omne agens shown that every agent produces its
actionem suam producere action by acting through the divine power,
inquantum agit virtute divina, et ex and, consequently that God is the cause
hoc, Deum esse omnium et both of all effects and all actions, and
effectuum et actionum causam; since it was also shown that evil and
itemque ostensum sit quod malum defects occur in things ruled by divine
et defectus in his quae providentia providence as a result of the
divina reguntur, accidat ex establishment of secondary causes in
conditione secundarum causarum, which there can be deficiency, it is evident
in quibus potest esse defectus: that bad actions, according as they are
manifestum est quod actiones defective, are not from God but from
malae, secundum quod defective proximate causes; but, in so far
deficientes sunt, non sunt a Deo, as they possess something of action and
sed a causis proximis entity, they must be from God. Thus
deficientibus; quantum autem ad limping arises from the motive power, in
id quod de actione et entitate so far as it possesses something of
habent, oportet quod sint a Deo; motion, but in regard to what it has by
sicut claudicatio est a virtute way of defect it is due to the crookedness
motiva quantum ad id quod habet of the leg.
de motu, quantum vero ad id quod
habet de defectu, est ex curvitate
cruris.
Chapter 72
Caput 72
THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES
NOT EXCLUDE CONTINGENCY
excludit contingentiam a rebus
FROM THINGS
Sicut autem divina providentia non [1] just as divine providence does not
excludit universaliter malum a wholly exclude evil from things, so also
rebus, ita etiam non excludit it does not exclude contingency, or
contingentiam, nec necessitatem impose necessity on things.
rebus imponit.
Iam enim ostensum est quod [2] It has already been shown that the
operatio providentiae qua Deus operation of providence, whereby God
operatur in rebus, non excludit works in things, does not exclude
causas secundas, sed per eas secondary causes, but, rather, is fulfilled
impletur, inquantum agunt virtute by them, in so far as they act by God’s
Dei. Ex causis autem proximis aliqui power. Now certain effects are called
effectus dicuntur necessarii vel necessary or contingent in regard to
contingentes, non autem ex causis proximate causes, but not in regard to
remotis: nam fructificatio plantae est remote causes. Indeed, the fact that a
effectus contingens propter causam plant bears fruit is a fact contingent on a
proximam, quae est vis germinativa, proximate cause, which is the
quae potest impediri et deficere; germinative power which can be
quamvis causa remota, scilicet sol, impeded and can fail, even though the
sit causa ex necessitate agens. remote cause, the sun, be a cause
Cum igitur inter causas proximas acting from necessity. So, since there
multae sint quae deficere possunt, are many things among proximate
non omnes effectus qui providentiae causes that may be defective, not all
subduntur, erunt necessarii, sed effects subject to providence will be
plurimi sunt contingentes. necessary, but a good many are
contingent.
Adhuc. Ad divinam providentiam [3] Again, it pertains to divine
pertinet ut gradus entium qui providence that the grades of being
possibiles sunt, adimpleantur, ut ex which are possible be fulfilled, as is
supra dictis patet. Ens autem evident from what was said above. But
dividitur per contingens et being is divided into the contingent and
necessarium: et est per se divisio the necessary, and this is an essential
entis. Si igitur divina providentia division of being. So, if divine
excluderet omnem contingentiam, providence excluded all contingency,
non omnes gradus entium not all grades of beings would be
conservarentur. preserved.
Amplius. Quanto aliqua sunt [4] Besides, the nearer certain things
propinquiora Deo, tanto magis de are to God, the more they participate in
similitudine ipsius participant: et His likeness; and the farther they are
quanto magis distant, tanto magis a away, the more defective are they in
similitudine ipsius deficiunt. Illa regard to His likeness. Now, those that
autem quae sunt Deo are nearest to God are quite immobile;
propinquissima, sunt omnino namely, the separate substances which
immobilia: scilicet substantiae most closely approach the likeness of
separatae, quae maxime ad Dei God, Who is completely immutable. But
similitudinem accedunt, qui est the ones which are next to these, and
omnino immobilis. Quae autem sunt which are moved immediately by those
his proxima, et moventur immediate which always exist in the same way,
ab his quae semper eodem modo retain a certain type of immobility by the
se habent, quandam immobilitatis fact that they are always moved in the
speciem retinent, in hoc quod same way, which is true of the celestial
semper eodem modo moventur, bodies. It follows, then, that those things

sicut corpora caelestia. Consequitur which come after them and are moved
ergo quod ea quae consequuntur by them are far distant from the
ad ista, et ab eis sunt mota, longius immutability of God, so that they are not
ab immobilitate Dei distant, ut always moved in the same way. And
scilicet non semper eodem modo beauty is evident in this order. Now,
moveantur. Et in hoc ordinis every necessary thing, as such, always
pulchritudo apparet. Omne autem exists in the same wav. It would be
necessarium, inquantum huiusmodi, incompatible, then, with divine
semper eodem modo se habet. providence. to which the establishment
Repugnaret igitur divinae and preservation of order in things
providentiae, ad quam pertinet belongs, if all things came about as a
ordinem in rebus statuere et result of necessity.
conservare, si omnia ex necessitate
evenirent.
Praeterea. Quod necessarium est [5] Furthermore, that which is necessary

esse, semper est. Nullum autem is always. Now, no corruptible thing
corruptibile semper est. Si igitur always exists. So, if divine providence
divina providentia hoc requirit quod required this, that all things be
omnia sint necessaria, sequitur necessary, it would follow that nothing
quod nihil sit in rebus corruptibile: et corruptible exists among things, and,
per consequens nec generabile. consequently, nothing generable. Thus,
Subtraheretur ergo a rebus tota the whole area of generable and
pars generabilium et corruptibilium. corruptible things would be removed
Quod perfectioni derogat universi. from reality. This detracts from the
perfection of the universe.
Adhuc. In omni motu est quaedam [6] Moreover, in every motion there is
generatio et corruptio: nam in eo some generation and corruption, for, in
quod movetur, aliquid incipit et a thing that is moved, something begins
aliquid desinit esse. Si igitur omnis and something ceases to be. So, if all
generatio et corruptio subtraheretur, generation and corruption were
subtracta contingentia rerum, ut removed as a result of taking away the
ostensum est, consequens est quod contingency of things, as we showed,
etiam motus subtraheretur a rebus, the consequence would be that even
et omnia mobilia. motion would be taken away from
things, and so would all movable things.
Item. Debilitatio virtutis alicuius [7] Besides, the weakening of the power

substantiae, et eius impedimentum of any substance, and the hindering of it
ex aliquo contrario agente, est ex by a contrary agent, are due to some
aliqua eius immutatione. Si ergo change in it. So, if divine providence
divina providentia non impedit does not prevent motion from going on
motum a rebus, neque etiam in things, neither will the weakening of
impedietur debilitatio virtutis their power be prevented, nor the
ipsarum, aut impedimentum ex blocking of their power by the resistance
resistentia alterius. Ex virtutis autem of another thing. Now, the result of the
debilitate, et eius impedimento, weakness in power, and the impeding of
contingit quod res naturalis non it, is that a thing in nature does not
semper eodem modo operatur, sed always work uniformly, but sometimes
quandoque deficit ab eo quod fails in regard to what is appropriate for
competit sibi secundum suam it naturally; and so, natural effects do
naturam, ut sic naturales effectus not occur by necessity. Therefore, it is
non ex necessitate proveniant. Non not the function of divine providence to
igitur pertinet ad providentiam impose necessity on things ruled by it.
divinam quod rebus provisis
necessitatem imponat.
Amplius. In his quae providentia [8] Furthermore, among things that are
debite reguntur, non debet esse properly regulated by providence there
aliquid frustra. Cum igitur should be none incapable of fulfillment.
manifestum sit causas aliquas esse So, if it be manifest that some causes
contingentes, ex eo quod impediri are contingent, because they can be
possunt ut non producant suos prevented from producing their effects,
effectus, patet quod contra rationem it would evidently be against the
providentiae esset quod omnia ex character of providence for all things to
necessitate contingerent. Non igitur happen out of necessity. Therefore,
divina providentia necessitatem divine providence does not impose
rebus imponit, contingentiam a necessity on things by entirely excluding
rebus universaliter excludens. contingency from things.
Chapter 73
Caput 73
NOT EXCLUDE FREEDOM OF
excludit arbitrii libertatem
CHOICE
Ex quo etiam patet quod [1] From this it is also evident that
providentia voluntatis libertati non providence is not incompatible with
repugnat. freedom of will.
Cuiuslibet enim providentis [2] Indeed, the governance of every

gubernatio ad perfectionem rerum provident ruler is ordered either to the
gubernatarum ordinatur vel attainment, or the increase, or the
adipiscendam, vel augendam, vel preservation of the perfection of the
conservandam. Quod igitur things governed. Therefore, whatever
perfectionis est, magis pertains to perfection is to be preserved
conservandum est per by providence rather than what pertains
providentiam quam quod est to imperfection and deficiency. Now,
imperfectionis et defectus. In rebus among inanimate things the contingency
autem inanimatis causarum of causes is due to imperfection and
contingentia ex imperfectione et deficiency, for by their nature they are
defectu est: secundum enim suam determined to one result which they
naturam sunt determinata ad unum always achieve, unless there be some
effectum, quem semper impediment arising either from a
consequuntur nisi sit weakness of their power, or on the part
impedimentum vel ex debilitate of an external agent, or because of the
virtutis, vel ex aliquo exteriori unsuitability of the matter. And for this
agente, vel ex materiae reason, natural agent causes are not
indispositione; et propter hoc capable of varied results; rather, in most
causae naturales agentes non sunt cases, they produce their effect in the
ad utrumque, sed ut frequentius same way, failing to do so but rarely.
eodem modo suum effectum Now, the fact that the will is a contingent
producunt, deficiunt autem raro. cause arises from its perfection, for it
Quod autem voluntas sit causa does not have power limited to one
contingens, ex ipsius perfectione outcome but rather has the ability to
provenit: quia non habet virtutem produce this effect or that; for which
limitatam ad unum, sed habet in reason it is contingent in regard to either
potestate producere hunc effectum one or the other. Therefore, it is more
vel illum; propter quod est pertinent to divine providence to
contingens ad utrumlibet. Magis preserve liberty of will than contingency
igitur pertinet ad providentiam in natural causes.
divinam conservare libertatem
voluntatis quam contingentiam in
naturalibus causis.
Amplius. Ad providentiam divinam [3] Moreover, it is proper to divine
pertinet ut rebus utatur secundum Providence to use things according to
modum earum. Modus autem their own mode. Now, the mode of
agendi cuiuslibet rei consequitur acting peculiar to each thing results from
formam eius, quae est principium its form, which is the source of action.
actionis. Forma autem per quam Now, the form whereby an agent acts
agit voluntarie agens, non est voluntarily is not determined, for the will
determinata: agit enim voluntas per acts through a form apprehended by the
formam apprehensam ab intellectu, intellect, since the apprehended good
nam bonum apprehensum movet moves the will as its object. Now, the
voluntatem ut eius obiectum; intellect does not have one form
intellectus autem non habet unam determined to an effect; rather, it is
formam effectus determinatam, sed characteristic of it to comprehend a
de ratione sua est ut multitudinem multitude of forms. And because of this
formarum comprehendat. Et the will can produce effects according to
propter hoc voluntas multiformes many forms. Therefore, it does not
effectus producere potest. Non pertain to the character of providence to
igitur ad rationem providentiae exclude liberty of will.
pertinet quod excludat voluntatis
libertatem.
Item. Per gubernationem [4] Besides, by the governance of every

cuiuscumque providentis res provident agent the things governed are
gubernatae deducuntur ad finem led to a suitable end; hence, Gregory of
convenientem: unde et de Nyssa says of divine providence that it is
providentia divina Gregorius the “will of God through which all things
Nyssenus dicit quod est voluntas that exist receive a suitable end.” But
Dei per quam omnia quae sunt, the ultimate end of every creature is to
convenientem deductionem attain the divine likeness, as we showed
accipiunt. Finis autem ultimus above. Therefore, it would be
cuiuslibet creaturae est ut incompatible with providence for that

consequatur divinam similitudinem, whereby a thing attains the divine
sicut supra ostensum est. Esset likeness to be taken away from it. Now,
igitur providentiae repugnans si the voluntary agent attains the divine
alicui rei subtraheretur illud per likeness because it acts freely, for we
quod assequitur similitudinem showed in Book One [88] that there is
divinam. Agens autem voluntarium free choice in God. Therefore, freedom
assequitur divinam similitudinem in of will is not taken away by divine
hoc quod libere agit: ostensum est providence.
enim in primo liberum arbitrium in
Deo esse. Non igitur per
providentiam subtrahitur voluntatis
libertas.
Adhuc. Providentia est [5] Again, providence tends to multiply

multiplicativa bonorum in rebus goods among the things that are
gubernatis. Illud ergo per quod governed. So, that whereby many goods
multa bona subtraherentur a rebus, are removed from things does not
non pertinet ad providentiam. Si pertain to providence. But, if freedom of
autem libertas voluntatis tolleretur, will were taken away, many goods would
multa bona subtraherentur. be removed. Taken away, indeed, would
Tolleretur enim laus virtutis be the praise of human virtue which is
humanae, quae nulla est si homo nothing, if man does not act freely.
libere non agit. Tolleretur etiam Taken away, also, would be justice
iustitia praemiantis et punientis, si which rewards and punishes, if man
non libere homo ageret bonum vel could not freely do good or evil. Even
malum. Cessaret etiam the careful consideration of
circumspectio in consiliis, quae de circumstances in processes of
his quae ex necessitate aguntur, deliberation would cease, for it is
frustra tractantur. Esset igitur contra useless to dwell upon things that are
providentiae rationem si done of necessity. Therefore, it would be
subtraheretur voluntatis libertas. against the very character of providence
if liberty of will were removed.
Hinc est quod dicitur Eccli. 1514 [6] Hence it is said: “God made man
Deus ab initio constituit hominem, from the beginning and left him in the
et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. hand of his own counsel”; and again:
Et iterum: 18 ante hominem vita et “Before man is life and death, good and
mors, bonum et malum: quod evil, that which he shall choose shall be
placuerit ei, dabitur illi. given him” (Sirach 15:14, 18).
Per haec autem excluditur opinio [7] Now, by these considerations the
Stoicorum, qui secundum ordinem opinion of the Stoics is set aside, for
quendam causarum they said that all things come about by
intransgressibilem, quem Graeci necessity, according to an irrevocable
ymarmenen vocabant, omnia ex order of causes, which the Greeks
necessitate dicebant provenire. called ειμαρμενη.
Chapter 74
Caput 74
NOT EXCLUDE FORTUNE AND
excludit fortunam et casum
CHANCE
Ex praemissis etiam apparet quod [1] It is also apparent from the foregoing

divina providentia non subtrahit a that divine providence does not take
rebus fortunam et casum. away fortune and chance from things.
In his enim quae in minori parte [2] For it is in the case of things that
accidunt, dicitur esse fortuna et happen rarely that fortune and chance
casus. Si autem non provenirent are said to be present. Now, if some
aliqua ut in minori parte, omnia ex things did not occur in rare instances, all
necessitate acciderent: nam ea things would happen by necessity.
quae sunt contingentia ut in Indeed, things that are contingent in most
pluribus, in hoc solo a necessariis cases differ from necessary things only in
differunt, quod possunt in minori this: they can fail to happen, in a few
parte deficere. Esset autem contra cases. But it would be contrary to the
rationem providentiae divinae si essential character of divine providence if
omnia ex necessitate contingerent, all things occurred by necessity, as we
ut ostensum est. Igitur et contra showed. Therefore, it would also be
rationem providentiae divinae contrary to the character of divine
esset si nihil foret fortuitum et providence if nothing were to be
casuale in rebus. fortuitous and a matter of chance in
things.
Amplius. Contra rationem [3] Again, it would be contrary to the very

providentiae esset si res meaning of providence if things subject
providentiae subiectae non to providence did not act for an end,
agerent propter finem: cum since it is the function of providence to
providentiae sit omnia ordinare in order all things to their end. Moreover, it
finem. Esset etiam contra would be against the perfection of the
perfectionem universi si nulla res universe if no corruptible thing existed,
corruptibilis esset, nec aliqua virtus and no power could fail, as is evident
deficere potens, ut ex supra dictis from what was said above. Now, due to
patet. Ex hoc autem quod aliquod the fact that an agent fails in regard to an
agens propter finem deficit ab eo end that is intended, it follows that some
quod intendit, sequitur aliqua casu things occur by chance. So, it would be
contingere. Esset igitur contra contrary to the meaning of providence,
rationem providentiae, et and to the perfection of things, if there
perfectionis rerum, si non essent were no chance events.
aliqua casualia.
Adhuc. Multitudo et diversitas [4] Besides, the large number and variety

causarum ex ordine divinae of causes stem from the order of divine
providentiae et dispositionis providence and control. But, granted this
procedit. Supposita autem variety of causes, one of them must at
causarum diversitate, oportet times run into another cause and be
unam alteri quandoque concurrere impeded, or assisted, by it in the

per quam impediatur, vel iuvetur, production of its effect. Now, from the
ad suum effectum producendum. concurrence of two or more causes it is
Ex concursu autem duarum vel possible for some chance event to occur,
plurium causarum contingit aliquid and thus an unintended end comes
casualiter evenire, dum finis non about due to this causal concurrence.
intentus ex concursu alicuius For example, the discovery of a debtor,
causae provenit: sicut inventio by a man who has gone to market to sell
debitoris ab eo qui ibat ad forum something, happens because the debtor
causa emendi aliquid, provenit ex also went to market. Therefore, it is not
hoc quod debitor etiam ad forum contrary to divine providence that there
ivit. Non est igitur divinae are some fortuitous and chance events
providentiae contrarium quod sint among things.
aliqua fortuita et casualia in rebus.
Item. Quod non est, non potest [5] Moreover, what does not exist cannot

esse alicuius causa. Unde oportet be the cause of anything. Hence, each
quod unumquodque, sicut se thing must stand in the same relation to
habet ad esse, ita se habeat ad the fact that it is a cause, as it does to
hoc quod sit causa. Oportet igitur the fact that it is a being. So, depending
quod secundum diversitatem on the diversity of order in beings, there
ordinis in entibus sit etiam must also be a diversity of order among
diversitas ordinis in causis. Ad causes. Now, it is necessary for the
perfectionem autem rerum perfection of things that there be among
requiritur quod non solum sint in things not only substantial beings but
rebus entia per se, sed etiam entia also accidental beings. Indeed, things
per accidens: res enim quae non that do not possess ultimate perfection in
habent in sua substantia ultimam their substance must obtain such
perfectionem, oportet quod perfection through accidents, and the
perfectionem aliquam more of these there are, the farther are
consequantur per accidentia; et they from the simplicity of God. From the
tanto per plura, quanto magis fact, then, that a certain subject has
distant a simplicitate Dei. Ex hoc many accidents it follows that it is a being
autem quod aliquod subiectum accidentally, because a subject and an
habet multa accidentia, sequitur accident, and even two accidents of one
quod sit aliquod ens per accidens: substance, are a unit and a being
nam subiectum et accidens, et accidentally; as in the example of a white
etiam duo accidentia unius man, and of a musical, white being. So, it
subiecti, sunt unum et ens per is necessary to the perfection of things
accidens; sicut homo albus, et that there should also be some
musicum album. Oportet igitur ad accidental causes. Now, things which
perfectionem rerum quod sint result accidentally from any causes are
etiam causae quaedam per said to happen by chance or fortune.
accidens. Ea autem quae ex Therefore, it is not contrary to the rational
causis aliquibus procedunt per character of providence, which preserves
accidens, dicuntur accidere a casu the perfection of things, for certain things
vel fortuna. Non est igitur contra to come about as a result of chance or
rationem providentiae, quae fortune.
perfectionem rerum conservat, ut
aliqua fiant a casu vel fortuna.
Praeterea. Ad ordinem divinae [6] Furthermore, that there be order and
providentiae pertinet ut sit ordo et a gradation of causes is important to the
gradus in causis. Quanto autem order of divine providence. But the higher
aliqua causa est superior, tanto est a cause is, the greater is its power; and
maioris virtutis: unde eius so, its causality applies to a greater
causalitas ad plura se extendit. number of things. Now, the natural
Nullius autem causae naturalis intention of a cause cannot extend
intentio se extendit ultra virtutem beyond its power, for that would be
eius: esset enim frustra. Oportet useless. So, the particular intention of a
ergo quod intentio causae cause cannot extend to all things that
particularis non se extendat ad can happen. Now, it is due to the fact that
omnia quae contingere possunt. some things happen apart from the
Ex hoc autem contingit aliquid intention of their agents that there is a
casualiter vel fortuito, quod possibility of chance or fortuitous
eveniunt aliqua praeter occurrence. Therefore, the order of
intentionem agentium. Ordo igitur divine providence requires that there be
divinae providentiae exigit quod sit chance and fortune in reality.
casus et fortuna in rebus.
Hinc est quod dicitur Eccle. 911: [7] Hence it is said: “I saw that the race is

vidi nec velocium esse cursum not to the swift ... but time and chance in
etc., sed tempus casumque in all” (Sirach 9:11), that is, among things
omnibus, scilicet inferioribus. here below.
Chapter 75
Caput 75
THAT GOD’S PROVIDENCE
Quod providentia Dei sit
APPLIES TO CONTINGENT
singularium contingentium
SINGULARS
Ex his autem quae ostensa sunt, [1] It is obvious from what we have
manifestum fit quod divina shown that divine providence reaches
providentia pervenit usque ad out to singulars that are generable and
singularia generabilium et corruptible.
corruptibilium.
Non enim videtur horum non esse [2] Except for the fact of their
providentia nisi propter eorum contingency, and the fact that many of
contingentiam, et quia multa in eis them come about by chance and
casualiter et fortuito eveniunt: in hoc fortune, it does not seem that
enim solum differunt ab providence is inapplicable to them. For
incorruptibilibus et universalibus it is only on this basis that they differ
corruptibilium, quorum dicunt from incorruptible things, and the
providentiam esse. Providentiae universal natures of corruptible things,
autem non repugnat contingentia, et to which providence does apply, as
casus et fortuna, neque voluntarium, people say. But contingency is not
ut ostensum est. Nihil igitur prohibet incompatible with providence, nor are
et horum providentiam esse, sicut chance or fortune or voluntary action,
incorruptibilium et universalium. as we have shown. Therefore, nothing
prohibits providence from also applying
to these things, just as it does to
incorruptible and universal things.
Adhuc. Si Deus horum singularium [3] Again, if God does not exercise
providentiam non habet, aut hoc est providence over these singulars, this is
quia non cognoscit ea; aut quia non either because He does not know
potest; aut quia non vult eorum them, or because He is not able to do
curam habere. Non autem potest dici so, or because He does not wish to
quod Deus singularia non take care of them. Now, it cannot be
cognoscat: ostensum enim est supra said that God does not know singulars;
quod Deus eorum notitiam habet. we showed above that God does
Neque etiam potest dici quod Deus possess knowledge of them. Nor can it
eorum curam habere non possit: be said that God is unable to take care
cum eius potentia sit infinita, ut of them, for His power is infinite, as we
supra probatum est. Nec etiam haec proved above. Nor, indeed, are these
singularia gubernationis non capacia singulars incapable of being governed,
sunt: cum videamus ea gubernari since we see them governed by the
rationis industria, sicut patet in use of reason in the case of men, and
hominibus; et per naturalem by means of natural instinct in the case
instinctum, sicut patet in apibus et of bees and many brute animals that
multis animalibus brutis, quae are governed by some sort of natural
quodam naturali instinctu instinct. Nor, in fact, can it be said that
gubernantur. Neque etiam potest dici God does not wish to govern them,
quod Deus non velit ea gubernare: since His will is universally concerned
cum voluntas ipsius sit universaliter with every good thing, and the good of
omnis boni; bonum autem eorum things that are governed lies chiefly in
quae gubernantur, in ordine the order of governance. Therefore, it
gubernationis maxime consistit. Non cannot be said that God takes no care
igitur potest dici quod Deus horum of these singulars.
singularium curam non habeat.
Amplius. Omnes causae secundae, [4] Besides, all secondary causes, by

in hoc quod causae existunt, divinam the fact of being causes, attain the
similitudinem consequuntur, ut ex divine likeness, as is evident from what
supra dictis patet. Invenitur autem we said above. Now, we find one thing
hoc communiter in causis in common among causes that
producentibus aliquid, quod curam produce something: they take care of
habent eorum quae producunt: sicut their products. Thus, animals naturally
animalia naturaliter nutriunt foetus nourish their young. So, God takes
suos. Deus igitur curam habet eorum care of the things of which He is the
quorum causa existit. Est autem cause. Now, He is the cause even of
causa etiam istorum particularium, ut these particular things, as is obvious
ex supra dictis patet. Habet igitur from our previous statements.” So, He
eorum curam. does take care of them.
Item. Ostensum est supra quod [5] Moreover, we showed above that
Deus in rebus creatis non ex God does not act in regard to created
necessitate naturae agit, sed per things by a necessity of His nature, but
voluntatem et intellectum. Ea autem through His will and intellect. Now,
quae aguntur per intellectum et things done by intellect and will are
voluntatem, curae providentis subject to the care of a provident
subduntur, quae in hoc consistere agent, for that is what such care seems
videtur quod per intellectum aliqua to consist in: the fact that certain things
dispensentur. Divinae ergo are managed through understanding.
providentiae subduntur ea quae ab And so, the things that result from His
ipso aguntur. Ostensum est autem action are subject to divine providence.
supra quod Deus operatur in But we showed before that God works
omnibus causis secundis, et omnes through all secondary causes, and that
earum effectus reducuntur in Deum all their products may be traced back to
sicut in causam: et sic oportet quod God as their cause; so it must be that
ea quae in istis singularibus aguntur, the things that are done among
sint ipsius opera. Igitur haec singulars are His works. Therefore,
singularia, et motus et operationes these singulars, and also their motions
ipsorum, divinae providentiae and operations, come under the scope
subiacent. of divine providence.
Praeterea. Stulta est providentia [6] Furthermore, foolish is the

alicuius qui non curat ea sine quibus providence of a person who does not
ea quae curat esse non possunt. take care of the things needed by the
Constat autem quod, si omnia things for which he does care. But it is
deficerent particularia, quod obvious that, if all particular things
universalia eorum remanere non vanished, their universals could not
possent. Si igitur Deus universalia endure. So, if God be only concerned
tantum curat, singularia vero ista with universals, and if He be entirely
omnino derelinquit, stulta et negligent of these singulars, then His
imperfecta erit eius providentia. providence will be foolish and
imperfect.
Si autem dicat aliquis quod horum [7] However, suppose someone says
singularium Deus curam habet that God takes care of these singulars
usque ad hoc quod conserventur in to the extent of preserving them in
esse, non autem quantum ad alia: being, but not in regard to anything
hoc omnino esse non potest. Nam else; this is utterly impossible. In fact,
omnia alia quae circa singularia all other events that occur in
accidunt, ad eorum conservationem connection with singulars are related to
vel corruptionem ordinantur. Si ergo their preservation or corruption. So, if
Deus habet curam singularium God takes care of singulars as far as
quantum ad eorum conservationem, their preservation is concerned, He
habet curam omnium circa ea takes care of every contingent event
contingentium. connected with them.
Potest autem aliquis dicere quod [8] Of course, a person could say that
sola cura universalium sufficit ad the mere care of the universals is
particularium conservationem in enough for the preservation of
esse. Provisa sunt enim cuilibet particulars in being, for in each species
speciei ea per quae quodlibet there are provided the means whereby

individuum speciei illius potest any individual of the species may be
conservari in esse: sicut data sunt preserved in being. For example,
animalibus organa ad cibum organs for the taking in and digestion
sumendum et digerendum, et cornua of food have been given to animals,
ad protegendum se. Utilitates autem and also horns with which to protect
horum non deficiunt nisi in minori themselves. Moreover, good uses of
parte: cum ea quae sunt a natura, these cannot fail to be made, except in
producant effectus suos vel semper, rare instances, because things that are
vel frequenter. Et sic non possunt from nature produce their effects in all
omnia individua deficere, etsi aliquod cases, or frequently. Thus, it is not
deficiat. possible for all individuals to fall, even
though a particular one may do so.
Sed secundum hanc rationem, [9] But according to this argument all
omnia quae circa individua events that occur in connection with
contingunt, providentiae individuals will be subject to
subiacebunt, sicut et conservatio providence, in the same way that their
eorum in esse: quia circa singularia preservation in being is, because
alicuius speciei nihil potest accidere nothing can happen in connection with
quod non reducatur aliquo modo ad the singular members of any species
principia illius speciei. Sic igitur that cannot be reduced in some way to
singularia non magis subiacent the sources of that species. And so,
divinae providentiae quantum ad singulars come no more under the
conservationem in esse, quam scope of divine providence in regard to
quantum ad alia. their preservation in being than they do
in regard to their other aspects.
Praeterea. In comparatione rerum ad [10] Furthermore, in the relation of

finem talis ordo apparet quod things to their end, an order appears,
accidentia sunt propter substantias, such that accidents exist for the sake
ut per ea perficiantur; in substantiis of substances, in order that substances
vero materia est propter formam; per may be perfected by them; on the other
hanc enim participat divinam hand, within substances matter is for
bonitatem, propter quam omnia facta the sake of form, for it participates in
sunt, ut supra ostensum est. Ex quo divine goodness through form, and that
patet quod singularia sunt propter is why all things were made, as we
naturam universalem. Cuius signum showed above. Consequently, it is
est quod in his in quibus potest clear that singulars exist for the sake of
natura universalis conservari per the universal nature. The sign of this is
unum individuum, non sunt multa the fact that, in the case of beings
individua unius speciei: sicut patet in whose universal nature can be
sole et luna. Cum autem providentia preserved by one individual, there are
sit ordinativa aliquorum in finem, not plural individuals of one species, as
oportet quod ad providentiam is instanced by the sun and the moon.
pertineant et fines, et ea quae sunt But, since providence has the function
ad finem. Subiacent igitur of ordering things to their end, both the
providentiae non solum universalia, ends and the things that are related to
sed etiam singularia. an end must be a matter of concern to
providence. Therefore, not only
universals, but also singulars, come

under the scope of providence.
Adhuc. Haec est differentia inter [11] Again, this is the difference
cognitionem speculativam et between speculative and practical
practicam, quod cognitio speculativa, knowledge: speculative knowledge and
et ea quae ad ipsam pertinent, the functions that pertain to it reach
perficiuntur in universali; ea vero their perfection in the universal, while
quae pertinent ad cognitionem the things that belong to practical
practicam, perficiuntur in particulari: knowledge reach their perfection in the
nam finis speculativae est veritas, particular. In fact, the end of
quae primo et per se in speculative cognition is truth, which
immaterialibus consistit et in consists primarily and essentially in
universalibus; finis vero practicae est immaterial and universal things; but the
operatio, quae est circa singularia. end of practical cognition is operation,
Unde medicus non curat hominem in which is concerned with singulars. So,
universali, sed hunc hominem: et ad the physician does not heal man as a
hoc est tota scientia medicinae universal, but, rather, this individual
ordinata. Constat autem quod man, and the whole science of
providentia ad practicam medicine is ordered to this result. Now,
cognitionem pertinet: cum sit it is obvious that providence belongs to
ordinativa rerum in finem. Esset the area of practical knowledge, for its
igitur imperfectissima Dei providentia function is to order things to their end.
si in universalibus consisteret, et Therefore, God’s providence would be
usque ad singularia non perveniret. most imperfect if it were to confine
itself to universals and not extend as
far as singulars.
Item. Cognitio speculativa magis [12] Besides, speculative knowledge is

perficitur in universali quam in perfected in the universal rather than in
particulari: quia magis sciuntur the particular, because universals are
universalia quam particularia; et better known than particulars. Because
propter hoc universalissimorum of this, the knowledge of the most
principiorum cognitio omnibus est universal principles is common.
communis. Ille vero perfectior est in However, that man who has not only
scientia speculativa qui non solum universal, but also a proper, knowledge
universalem, sed propriam of things is more perfect in speculative
cognitionem de rebus habet: nam science, for, the man who knows only
qui cognoscit in universali tantum, universally merely knows a thing
cognoscit rem solum in potentia. potentially. This is why a student is led
Propter quod discipulus de universali from a universal knowledge of
cognitione principiorum reducitur in principles to a proper knowledge of
propriam cognitionem conclusionum conclusions, by his teacher who
per magistrum, qui utramque possesses knowledge of both —just as
cognitionem habet: sicut aliquid a thing is brought from potency to act
reducitur de potentia in actum per by an actual being. So, in practical
ens actu. Multo igitur magis in science, he is much more perfect who
scientia practica perfectior est qui directs things to act, not only
non solum in universali, sed etiam in universally, but also in the particular
particulari res disponit ad actum. case. Therefore, divine providence,

Divina igitur providentia, quae est being most perfect, extends to
perfectissima, usque ad singularia singulars.
se extendit.
Amplius. Cum Deus sit causa entis [13] Moreover, since God is the cause
inquantum est ens, ut supra of actual being because He is being, as
ostensum est, oportet quod ipse sit was shown above, He must be the
provisor entis inquantum est ens: agent of providence for being, because
providet enim rebus inquantum est He is being. Indeed, He does provide
causa earum. Quicquid ergo for things, because He is their cause.
quocumque modo est, sub eius So, whatever a thing is, and whatever
providentia cadit. Singularia autem its mode of existing, it falls under His
sunt entia, et magis quam providence. Now, singulars are beings,
universalia: quia universalia non and more so than universals, for
subsistunt per se, sed sunt solum in universals do not subsist of
singularibus. Est igitur divina themselves, but are only in singulars.
providentia etiam singularium. Therefore, divine providence also
applies to singulars.
Item. Res creatae providentiae [14] Furthermore, created things are

divinae subduntur prout ab ipso in subject to divine providence inasmuch
finem ultimum ordinantur, qui est as they are ordered by it to their
bonitas sua. Participatio ergo divinae ultimate end, which is divine goodness.
bonitatis a rebus creatis est per Therefore, the participation of divine
providentiam divinam. Bonitatem goodness by created things is
autem divinam participant etiam accomplished by divine providence.
singularia contingentia. Oportet ergo But even contingent singulars
quod etiam ad ea divina providentia participate in divine goodness. So,
se extendat. divine providence must extend even to
them.
Hinc est quod dicitur Matth. 6: duo [15] Hence it is said: “Are not two
passeres asse veneunt, et unus ex sparrows sold for a farthing: and not
eis non cadit in terra sine patre meo. one of them shall fall on the ground
Et Sap. 81: attingit a fine usque ad without My Father” (Matt. 10:29; see
finem fortiter: idest, a primis creaturis 6:26). And again: “She reaches from
usque ad infimas earum. Ezechiel end to end mightily” (Wis. 8:1), that is,
etiam 99 arguitur opinio quorundam from the noblest creatures down to the
qui dicebant, dereliquit dominus lowest of them. So, also, we oppose
terram, dominus non videt; et Iob 22 the view of those who said: “The Lord
14, circa cardines caeli perambulat, has forsaken the earth, and the Lord
nec nostra considerat. does not see” (Ez. 9:9); and again: “He
walks about the poles of heaven, and
He does not consider our things” (Job
22:14).
Per haec autem excluditur opinio [16] By this conclusion we set aside the

quorundam qui dixerunt quod divina opinion of those who said that divine
providentia non se extendit usque ad providence does not extend as far as

haec singularia. Quam quidem these singular things. In fact, some
opinionem quidam Aristoteli attribute this opinion to Aristotle, even
imponunt, licet ex verbis eius haberi though it cannot be gathered from his
non possit. own words.
Caput 76 Chapter 76
Quod providentia Dei sit THAT GOD’S PROVIDENCE APPLIES
omnium singularium immediate IMMEDIATELY TO ALL SINGULARS
Quidam autem concesserunt [1] Now, some have conceded that divine
providentiam divinam usque ad providence extends to singulars, but
haec singularia procedere, sed through certain intermediary causes.
quibusdam mediantibus causis. Indeed, Plato asserted a threefold
Posuit enim Plato, ut Gregorius providence, according to Gregory of
Nyssenus dicit, triplicem Nyssa [Nemesius, De natura hominis, 44].
providentiam. Quarum prima est The first of these is that of the highest
summi Dei, qui primo et God, Who primarily and above all provides
principaliter providet propriis, for His own things, that is, for all things
idest omnibus spiritualibus et spiritual and intellectual, but subsequently
intellectualibus; consequenter for the whole world, as far as genera and
vero toti mundo quantum ad species go, and the universal causes
genera et species, et universales which are the celestial bodies. Then the
causas, quae sunt corpora second type of providence is that by which
caelestia. Secunda vero est qua provision is made for individual animals
providetur singularibus animalium and plants, and for other generable and
et plantarum, et aliorum corruptible individuals, in respect to their
generabilium et corruptibilium, generation and corruption, and other
quantum ad eorum generationem changes. Now, Plato attributes this kind of
et corruptionem et alias providence to the “gods that circulate
mutationes. Quam quidem about the heavens.” Aristotle, on the other
providentiam Plato attribuit diis hand, attributes their causality to the
qui caelum circumeunt. “oblique circle. Finally, he assigns a third
Aristoteles vero horum kind of providence to things that pertain to
causalitatem attribuit obliquo human life. So, he attributes this function
circulo. Tertiam vero providentiam to certain “daemons living in the region of
ponit rerum quae ad humanam the earth” who are caretakers for human
vitam pertinent. Quam quidem actions, according to him. But still,
attribuit quibusdam Daemonibus according to Plato, the second and third
circa terram existentibus, qui types of providence depend on the first,
sunt, secundum ipsum, for the highest God has established the
humanarum actionum custodes. ones on the second and third levels as
Sed tamen, secundum Platonem, provident agents.
secunda et tertia providentia a
prima dependet: nam Deus
summus secundos et tertios
statuit provisores.
Haec autem positio Catholicae [2] Now, this theory is in agreement with
fidei consonat quantum ad hoc the Catholic faith, in so far as it traces the
quod omnium providentiam providence of all things back to God as its
reducit in Deum sicut in primum first author. But it seems incompatible with
auctorem. Videtur autem the view of the faith, in regard to this: it
sententiae fidei repugnare says that not all particulars are
quantum ad hoc, quod non omnia immediately subject to divine providence.
particularia divinae providentiae Now, we can show from the foregoing that
immediate dicit esse subiecta. they are.
Quod ex praemissis ostendi
potest.
Habet enim Deus immediatam [3] In point of fact, God has immediate
singularium cognitionem, non knowledge of singulars, not merely in the
quasi ea in suis causis sense that He knows them in their causes,
cognoscens tantum, sed etiam in but even in themselves, as we showed in
seipsis, sicut in primo huius Book One [65ff]of this work. But it would
operis ostensum est. appear inappropriate for Him to know
Inconveniens autem videtur quod, singulars and yet not to will their order, in
singularia cognoscens, eorum which their chief good consists, for His will
ordinem non velit, in quo bonum is the source of goodness in its entirety.
praecipuum eorum constat: cum Therefore, just as He knows singulars
voluntas sua sit totius bonitatis immediately, He must also establish order
principium. Oportet ergo quod, for them immediately.
sicut immediate singularia
cognoscit, ita immediate eorum
ordinem statuat.
Amplius. Ordo qui per [4] Again, the order that is established by
providentiam in rebus gubernatis providence among things that are
statuitur, ex ordine illo provenit governed arises from the order which the
quem provisor in sua mente provident agent decides on within his own
disponit: sicut et forma artis quae mind. For example, the artistic form that is
fit in materia, ab ea procedit quae produced in matter proceeds from the
est in mente artificis. Oportet form that is in the mind of the artist. Now,
autem, ubi sunt multi provisores where there are many overseers,
unus sub alio, quod ordinem arranged one under the next, the order
conceptum superior inferiori that is conceived by the higher one must
tradat: sicut ars inferior accipit be handed down to the lower one; just as
principia a superiori. Si igitur a lower type of an receives its principles
secundi et tertii provisores from a higher one. If, then, the second and
ponuntur esse sub primo third provident agents are claimed to be
provisore, qui est Deus summus, under the first provident agent, Who is the
oportet quod ordinem statuendum highest God, they must receive the order
in rebus a summo Deo accipiant. that is to be established in things from the
Non est autem possibile quod iste highest God. Now, it is not possible for this
ordo sit in eis perfectior quam in order to be more perfect in them than in
summo Deo: quinimmo omnes the highest God; on the contrary, all
perfectiones per modum perfections come to other things from Him
descensus ab eo in alia by way of descent, as appears from things

proveniunt, ut ex superioribus said earlier. The order of things must,
patet. Oportet autem quod ordo then, be present in the secondary agents
rerum sit in secundis provisoribus of providence, not merely universally, but
non solum in universali, sed etiam also in respect to singulars; otherwise,
quantum ad singularia: alias non they could not establish, order in singulars
possent sua providentia in by their providence. Therefore, the
singularibus ordinem statuere. ordering of singulars is much more under
Multo igitur magis ordo the control of divine providence.
singularium est in divinae
providentiae dispositione.
Adhuc. In his quae humana [5] Besides, in the case of things regulated

providentia reguntur, invenitur by human providence we find that a
quod aliquis superior provisor certain higher overseer thinks out the way
circa quaedam magna et in which some of the big and universal
universalia per seipsum excogitat matters are to be ordered, but he does not
qualiter sint ordinanda, himself think out the ordering of the
minimorum vero ordinem ipse smallest details; rather, he leaves these to
non excogitat, sed aliis be planned by agents on a lower level.
inferioribus excogitandum But, as a matter of fact, this is so because
relinquit. Et hoc quidem contingit of his own deficiency, either because he
propter eius defectum: inquantum does not know the circumstances for the
vel singularium minimorum individual details, or because he is not
conditiones ignorat; vel non able to think out the order for all, by virtue
sufficit ad omnium ordinem of the effort and length of time that might
excogitandum, propter laborem et be needed. Now, deficiencies of this kind
temporis prolixitatem quae are far removed from God, because He
requireretur. Huiusmodi autem knows all singular things, and He does not
defectus longe sunt a Deo: nam make an effort to understand, or require
ipse omnia singularia cognoscit; any time for it; since, by understanding
nec in intelligendo laborat, aut Himself He knows all other things, as we
tempus requirit, cum intelligendo showed above. Therefore, He plans even
seipsum, omnia alia cognoscat, the order for all singular things. So, His
sicut supra ostensum est. Ipse providence applies to all singulars
igitur omnium et singularium immediately.
ordinem excogitat. Eius igitur
providentia est omnium
singularium immediate.
Item. In rebus humanis inferiores [6] Moreover, in human affairs the lower
provisores per suam industriam overseers, through their own efforts, plan
ordinem excogitant in his quorum the order for those things whose direction
gubernatio eis a praesidente has been given them by the chief
committitur. Quam quidem executive. Of course, they do not get this
industriam a praesidente homine ability from the man who is in charge, or
non habent, nec usum ipsius: si even its use. Indeed, if they did get it from
vero a superiore eam haberent, him, the ordering would already be
iam ordinatio per superiorem accomplished by the higher executive,
fieret, ipsi autem essent illius and they would not be the agents
ordinationis non provisores, sed responsible for this ordering, but simply
executores. Constat autem per the ones who carry it out. Now, it is
supra dicta quod omnis sapientia obvious from things said above that all
et intellectus a summo Deo in wisdom and understanding are caused in
omnibus intelligentibus causatur; intelligent beings by the highest God, and
nec intellectus aliquis potest that no intellect can understand anything
aliquid intelligere nisi virtute unless by divine power; just as no agent
divina, sicut nec aliquod agens can perform any operation unless be act
operatur nisi inquantum agit in by this divine power. Therefore, God
virtute ipsius. Est igitur ipse Deus Himself is the disposer of all things
immediate sua providentia omnia immediately by His providence, and
dispensans: quicumque vero sub whatever beings are called agents of
ipso provisores dicuntur, sunt providence under Him are executors of
providentiae ipsius executores. His providence.
Praeterea. Superior providentia [7] Furthermore, a higher providence gives

dat regulas providentiae inferiori: regulations to a lower providence, just as
sicut politicus dat regulas et leges a statesman gives regulations and laws to
duci exercitus, qui dat leges et the leader of an army, who gives laws and
regulas centurionibus et tribunis. regulations to the heads of larger or
Si igitur sub prima providentia Dei smaller military units. If, then, there be
summi sunt aliae providentiae, other providences under the first
oportet quod Deus illis secundis providence of the supreme God, God
vel tertiis provisoribus det regulas must give these secondary or tertiary
sui regiminis. Aut ergo dat eis overseers the regulations for their
regulas et leges universales, aut commands. So, He gives them either
particulares. Si autem dat eis universal regulations and laws or
universales regulas regiminis, particular ones. But, if He gives them
cum universales regulae non universal regulations for their commands,
possint semper ad particularia since universal regulations cannot be
applicari, maxime in rebus applied in all cases, to particulars,
mobilibus, quae non semper especially in the case of variable things
eodem modo se habent; that do not always remain the same, these
oporteret quod illi provisores secondary or tertiary overseers would
secundi vel tertii quandoque have to give orders at times that are
praeter regulas sibi datas contrary to the regulations given them for
ordinarent de rebus suae the things subject to their control. So, they
provisioni subiectis. Haberent would be able to pass judgment on the
ergo iudicium super regulas regulations that they have received, as to
acceptas: quando secundum eas when action should accord with these
oporteret agere, et quando eas regulations and when one should overlook
praetermittere oporteret. Quod them. Now, this could not be, for such
esse non potest: quia hoc judgment belongs to a superior. Indeed, it
iudicium ad superiorem pertinet; is the prerogative of the one who
nam eius est interpretari leges et establishes the laws to interpret them and
dispensare in eis, cuius est eas issue dispensations from them. So, this
condere. Hoc igitur iudicium de judgment over universally given
regulis universalibus datis, regulations must be carried out by the
oportet quod fiat per supremum supreme overseer. Of course, He could
provisorem. Quod quidem esse not do this if He refused to involve Himself
non posset si se ordinationi immediately in the ordering of these
horum singularium immediate non singular things. So, according to this, He
immisceret. Oportet igitur, must be the immediate overseer of these
secundum hoc, quod sit horum things. On the other hand, if the
immediatus provisor. Si vero secondary and tertiary overseers receive
secundi et tertii provisores a particular regulations and laws from the
summo provisore particulares highest overseer, then it is quite obvious
regulas et leges accipiunt, that the ordering of these singulars is
manifeste apparet quod horum done immediately by divine providence.
singularium ordinatio fit
immediate per divinam
providentiam.
Amplius. Semper provisor [8] Again, the superior overseer always

superior habet iudicium de his holds the power of judgment over the
quae ab inferioribus provisoribus orders issued by inferior overseers, as to
ordinantur: utrum sint bene whether the orders are properly given or
ordinata necne. Si igitur secundi not. If, then, the secondary or tertiary
provisores vel tertii sunt sub Deo overseers are under God as the first
primo provisore, oportet quod overseer, God must hold the power of
Deus iudicium habeat de his judgment over the things ordered by them.
quae ab his ordinantur. Quod In fact, He could not do this if He did not
quidem esse non potest, si horum consider the order of these singulars.
singularium ordinem non Therefore He Himself takes care by
consideret. Habet igitur ipse per Himself of these singulars.
seipsum curam de his
singularibus.
Adhuc. Si Deus per seipsum [9] Besides, if God does not immediately
immediate haec inferiora by Himself take care of these inferior
singularia non curat, hoc non est singular things, this can only be either
nisi vel quia ea despicit; vel ne because He despises them or because
eis eius dignitas inquinetur, ut His dignity might be lowered by them, as
quidam dicunt. Hoc autem some people say. But this is
irrationabile est. Nam dignius est unreasonable. It is indeed a matter of
provide aliquorum ordinationem greater dignity to oversee the planning of
excogitare, quam in eis operari. the order for certain things than for it to be
Si igitur Deus in omnibus produced in them. So, if God works in all
operatur, sicut supra ostensum things, as we showed above, and if His
est, nec in hoc aliquid eius dignity is not diminished thereby, and if
dignitati derogatur, quinimmo this belongs rather to His universal and
pertinet ad eius universalem et supreme power, it is in no sense
summam virtutem; nullo modo something to be despised by Him, or
despiciendum est ei, vel eius something that might besmirch His dignity,
dignitatem commaculat, si circa if He exercises His providence
haec singularia immediate immediately over these singulars.
providentiam habeat.
Item. Omnis sapiens qui provide [10] Moreover, every wise being who uses

sua virtute utitur, in agendo his power providently sets limits on the
moderatur suae virtutis usum, use of his power, when he acts, by
ordinans ad quid et quantum ordering the objective and the extent to
perveniat: alias virtus in agendo which it goes; otherwise, his power would
sapientiam non sequeretur. not keep pace with his wisdom in such
Constat autem ex praemissis action. But it is obvious from the foregoing
quod divina virtus in operando that the divine power, in operating,
usque ad infima rerum pervenit. reaches to the lowest things. So, the
Igitur divina sapientia est divine wisdom is in control of ordering
ordinativa qui, et quot, et qualiter what, bow many, and what kind of effects
ex eius virtute progrediantur proceed from His power, even down to the
effectus, etiam in infimis rebus. lowest things. Therefore, He is Himself
Est igitur ipse immediate sua planning the order for all things
providentia omnium rerum immediately by His providence.
ordinem excogitans.
Hinc est quod dicitur Rom. 131: [11] Hence it is said: “The things that are
quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. from God are well ordered” (Rom. 13:1).
Et Iudith. 94: tu fecisti priora, et And again: “You have done the things of
illa post illa cogitasti, et hoc old, and have devised one thing after
factum est quod ipse voluisti. another; and what You have willed has
been done” (Judith 9:4).
Caput 77 Chapter 77
Quod executio divinae THAT THE EXECUTION OF DIVINE
providentiae fit mediantibus PROVIDENCE IS ACCOMPLISHED BY
causis secundis MEANS OF SECONDARY CAUSES
Attendendum est autem quod ad [1] We should attend to the fact that two
providentiam duo requiruntur: things are required for providence: the
ordinatio, et ordinis executio. ordering and the execution of the order.
Quorum primum fit per virtutem The first of these is accomplished by the
cognoscitivam: unde qui cognitive power; as a consequence, those
perfectioris cognitionis sunt, who have more perfect knowledge are
ordinatores aliorum dicuntur, called orderers of the others. “For it is the
sapientis enim est ordinare. function of the wise man to order.” But the
Secundum vero fit per virtutem second is done by the operative power.
operativam. E contrario autem se Now, the situations in these two functions
habet in his duobus: nam tanto are contrary to each other. For, the more
perfectior est ordinatio, quanto perfect an ordering is, the more does it
magis descendit ad minima; descend to small details; but the
minimorum autem executio execution of small details is appropriate to
condecet inferiorem virtutem, a lower power, proportionate to such an
effectui proportionatam. In Deo effect. Now, in God the highest perfection
autem quantum ad utrumque in regard to both functions is found; in
summa perfectio invenitur: est fact, there is in Him the most perfect
enim in eo perfectissima sapientia wisdom for ordering and the most perfect
ad ordinandum, virtus power for operating. So, He Himself

perfectissima ad operandum. through His wisdom must arrange the
Oportet ergo quod ipse omnium orders for all things, even the least; on the
ordines per sapientiam suam other hand, He may execute the small
disponat, etiam minimorum: details by means of other lower powers,
exequatur vero minima per alias through which He Himself works, as does
inferiores virtutes, per quas ipse a universal and higher power through a
operetur, sicut virtus universalis et lower and particular power. It is
altior per inferiorem et appropriate, then, that there be inferior
particularem virtutem. agents as executors of divine providence.
Conveniens est igitur quod sint
inferiores agentes divinae
providentiae executores.
Item. Ostensum est supra quod [2] Again, we showed above that divine
divina operatio non excludit operation does not exclude the operations
operationes causarum of secondary causes. But the resultants of
secundarum. Ea vero quae ex the operations of secondary causes are
operationibus causarum within the scope of divine providence,
secundarum proveniunt, divinae since God orders all singulars by Himself,
providentiae subiacent: cum Deus as we showed. Therefore, secondary
omnia singularia ordinet per causes are the executors of divine
seipsum, ut ostensum est. Sunt providence.
igitur secundae causae divinae
providentiae executrices.
Adhuc. Quanto virtus alicuius [3] Besides, the stronger the power of an
agentis est fortior, tanto in magis agent is, the farther does its operation
remota suam operationem extend to more remote effects. For
extendit: sicut ignis, quanto est instance, the bigger a fire is, the farther
maior, magis remota calefacit. away are the things it heats. But this does
Hoc autem non contingit in not occur in the case of an agent that acts
agente quod non agit per without a medium, for whatever it acts on
medium: quia quidlibet in quod is adjacent to it. Therefore, since the
agit, est sibi proximum. Cum igitur power of divine providence is the greatest,
virtus divinae providentiae sit it must extend its operation to its most
maxima, per aliqua media ad distant effects through some
ultima suam operationem intermediaries.
perducere debet.
Amplius. Ad dignitatem regentis [4] Moreover, it belongs to the dignity of a

pertinet ut habeat multos ruler to have many ministers and a variety
ministros, et diversos sui of executors of his rule, for, the more
regiminis executores: quia tanto subjects he has, on different levels, the
altius et maius ostendetur suum higher and greater is his dominion shown
dominium, quanto plures in to be. But no ruler’s dignity is comparable
diversis gradibus ei subduntur. to the dignity of the divine rule. So, it is
Nulla autem dignitas alicuius appropriate that the execution of divine
regentis est comparabilis dignitati providence be carried out by diverse
divini regiminis. Conveniens igitur levels of agents.
est quod per diversos gradus
agentium fiat divinae providentiae
executio.
Praeterea. Convenientia ordinis [5] Furthermore, the propriety of its order
perfectionem providentiae manifests the perfection of providence,
demonstrat: cum ordo sit proprius since order is the proper effect of
providentiae effectus. Ad providence. Now, it is pertinent to the
convenientiam autem ordinis propriety of order that nothing be left in
pertinet ut nihil inordinatum disorder. So, the perfection of divine
relinquatur. Perfectio igitur divinae providence requires that the excess of
providentiae requirit ut excessum certain things over others lit reduced to a
aliquarum rerum supra alias ad suitable order. Now, this is done when one
ordinem convenientem reducat. makes available some good for those that
Hoc autem fit cum ex abundantia have less, from the abundance of those
aliquorum magis habentium, that have more. So, since the perfection of
provenit aliquod bonum minus the universe requires that certain things
habentibus. Cum igitur perfectio participate in divine goodness more
universi requirat quod quaedam abundantly than others, as we showed
aliis abundantius divinam above, the perfection of divine providence
bonitatem participent, ut supra demands that the execution of the divine
ostensum est, exigit divinae rule be accomplished by those that
providentiae perfectio ut per ea participate more fully in divine goodness.
quae plenius divinam bonitatem
participant, executio divini
regiminis compleatur.
Adhuc. Nobilior est ordo [6] Besides, the order of causes is more
causarum quam effectuum: sicut noble than the order of effects, just as a
et causa potior est effectu. Magis cause is better than an effect. So, the
igitur in eo perfectio providentiae perfection of providence is better
demonstratur. Si autem non manifested by the first order. But, if there
essent aliquae causae mediae were no intermediary causes carrying out
exequentes divinam providentiam divine providence, there would not be an
non esset in rebus ordo order of causes in reality but only an order
causarum, sed effectuum tantum. of effects, Therefore, the perfection of
Exigit igitur divinae providentiae divine providence demands that there be
perfectio quod sint causae intermediary causes as executors of it.
mediae executrices ipsius.
Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: [7] Hence it is said in the Psalm (102:21):

benedicite domino omnes virtutes “Bless the Lord, all His hosts; you
eius, ministri eius, qui facitis ministers of His who do His will”; and
voluntatem eius; et alibi: ignis, elsewhere: “Fire, hail, snow, stormy winds,
grando, nix, spiritus procellarum, which fulfill His word” (Ps. 148:8).
quae faciunt verbum eius.
Caput 78 Chapter 78
Quod mediantibus creaturis THAT OTHER CREATURES ARE
intellectualibus aliae creaturae RULED BY GOD BY MEANS OF
reguntur a Deo INTELLECTUAL CREATURES
Quia vero ad providentiam [1] Since it is the function of divine
divinam pertinet ut ordo servetur providence to maintain order in things,
in rebus; congruus autem ordo est and since a suitable order is such that
ut a supremis ad infima there is a proportional descent from the
proportionaliter descendatur: highest things to the lowest it must be
oportet quod divina providentia that divine providence reaches the
secundum quandam proportionem farthest things by some sort of proportion.
usque ad res ultimas perveniat. Now, the proportion is like this: as the
Haec autem proportio est ut, sicut highest creatures are under God and are
supremae creaturae sunt sub Deo governed by Him, so the lower creatures
et gubernantur ab ipso, ita are under the higher ones and are ruled
inferiores creaturae sint sub by them. But of all creatures the highest
superioribus et regantur ab ipsis. are the intellectual ones, as is evident
Inter omnes autem creaturas sunt from what we said earlier. Therefore, the
supremae intellectuales, sicut ex rational plan of divine providence
superioribus patet. Exigit igitur demands that the other creatures be
divinae providentiae ratio ut ruled by rational creatures.
ceterae creaturae per creaturas
rationales regantur.
Amplius. Quaecumque creatura [2] Again, whatever type of creature

exequitur divinae providentiae carries out the order of divine providence,
ordinem, hoc habet inquantum it is able to do so because it participates
participat aliquid de virtute primi in something of the power of the first
providentis: sicut et instrumentum providential being; just as an instrument
non movet nisi inquantum per does not move unless, through being
motum participat aliquid de virtute moved, it participates somewhat in the
principalis agentis. Quae igitur power of the principal agent. So, the
amplius de virtute divinae beings that participate more fully in the
providentiae participant, sunt power of the divine providence are
executiva divinae providentiae in executive agents of divine providence in
illa quae minus participant. regard to those that participate less. But
Creaturae autem intellectuales intellectual creatures participate more
plus aliis de ipsa participant: nam, than others in it, because an ability to
cum ad providentiam requiratur et establish order which is done by cognitive
dispositio ordinis, quae fit per power, and an ability to execute it which
cognoscitivam virtutem, et is clone by operative power, are both
executio, quae fit per operativam, required for providence, and rational
creaturae rationales utramque creatures share in both types of power,
virtutem participant, reliquae vero while the rest of creatures have operative
creaturae virtutem operativam powers only. Therefore, all other
tantum. Per creaturas igitur creatures are ruled by means of rational
rationales omnes aliae creaturae creatures under divine providence.
sub divina providentia reguntur.
Adhuc. Cuicumque datur a Deo [3] Besides, to whomever any power is
aliqua virtus, datur ei in ordine ad given by God, the recipient is given the
effectum ipsius virtutis: sic enim power together with an ordination toward
optime omnia disponuntur, dum the effect of that power. For in that way all
unumquodque ordinatur ad omnia things are arranged for the best,
bona quae ex ipso nata sunt inasmuch as each thing is ordered to all
provenire. Virtus autem intellectiva the goods that can naturally come from it.
de se est ordinativa et regitiva: Now, the intellectual power by itself is
unde videmus quod, quando capable of ordering and ruling; hence, we
coniunguntur in eodem, virtus see that the operative power follows the
operativa sequitur regimen direction of the intellective power, when
intellectivae virtutis; sicut in they are combined in the same subject. In
homine videmus quod ad man, for instance, we observe that the
imperium voluntatis moventur bodily members are moved at the
membra. Idem etiam apparet si in command of the will. The same is evident
diversis existant: nam illi homines even if they are in different subjects; for
qui excedunt in virtute operativa, instance, those men who excel in
oportet quod dirigantur ab illis qui operative power must be directed by
in virtute intellectiva excedunt. those who excel in intellectual power.
Exigit igitur divinae providentiae Therefore, the rational plan of divine
ratio quod creaturae aliae per providence demands that other creatures
intellectuales creaturas regantur. be ruled by intellectual creatures.
Item. Virtutes particulares natae [4] Moreover, particular powers are

sunt moveri a virtutibus naturally adapted to be moved by
universalibus: ut patet tam in arte universal powers; this is evident quite as
quam in natura. Constat autem much in the artistic as in the natural
quod virtus intellectiva est sphere. Now, it is obvious that intellectual
universalior omni alia virtute power is more universal than any
operativa: nam virtus intellectiva operative power, for the intellectual power
continet formas universales, contains universal forms, while each
omnis autem virtus operativa power is operative only because of some
tantum est ex aliqua forma propria form proper to the agent. Therefore, all
operantis. Oportet igitur quod per other creatures must be moved and
virtutes intellectuales moveantur regulated by means of intellectual
et regantur omnes aliae creaturae. powers.
Praeterea. In omnibus potentiis [5] Furthermore, in all powers arranged in

ordinatis una est directiva alterius, an order, one is directive in relation to the
quae magis rationem cognoscit: next, and it knows the rational plan best.
unde videmus in artibus quod ars Thus, we see in the case of the arts that
illa ad quam pertinet finis, ex quo one art, which is concerned with the end
sumitur ratio totius artificii, dirigit from which the plan for the entire artistic
illam, et imperat ei, quae artificium production is derived, directs and
operatur, sicut ars gubernatoria commands another art which makes the
navifactivae; et illa quae formam product, as the ‘art of navigation does in
inducit, imperat ei quae materiam regard to shipbuilding. So, the one that
disponit. Instrumenta vero, quae introduces the form commands the one
non cognoscunt aliquam rationem, that prepares the matter. Instruments, on
reguntur tantum. Cum igitur solae the other hand, which do not know the
intellectuales creaturae rationes plan at all, are simply ruled. Since only
ordinis creaturarum cognoscere intellectual creatures can know the
possint, earum erit regere et rational plans for the ordering of
gubernare omnes alias creaturas. creatures, it will therefore be their
function to rule and govern all other
creatures.
Adhuc. Quod est per se, est causa [6] Again, that which is of itself is the
eius quod est per aliud. Solae cause of that which is through another.
autem creaturae intellectuales But only intellectual creatures operate by
operantur per seipsas, utpote themselves, in the sense that they are
suarum operationum per liberum masters of their operations through free
voluntatis arbitrium dominae choice of their will. On the other hand,
existentes: aliae vero creaturae ex other creatures are involved in operation
necessitate naturae operantur, resulting from the necessity of nature,
tanquam ab alio motae. Creaturae since they are moved by something else.
igitur intellectuales per suam Therefore, intellectual creatures by their
operationem sunt motivae et operation are motivating and regulative of
regitivae aliarum creaturarum. other creatures.
Caput 79 Chapter 79
Quod substantiae intellectivae THAT LOWER INTELLECTUAL
inferiores reguntur per SUBSTANCES ARE RULED BY
superiores HIGHER ONES
Cum autem inter creaturas [1] Since certain intellectual creatures

intellectuales quaedam sint aliis are higher than others, as is clear from
altiores, ut ex superioribus patet, the foregoing, the lower ones of an
oportet quod etiam inferiores intellectual nature must be governed by
intellectualium naturarum per the higher ones.
superiores gubernentur.
Adhuc. Virtutes magis universales [2] Again, more universal powers are
sunt motivae virtutum particularium, able to move particular powers, as we
sicut dictum est. Superiores autem said. But the higher intellectual natures
inter intellectuales naturas habent have more universal forms, as was
formas magis universales, ut supra shown above. Therefore, they are
ostensum est. Sunt igitur ipsae capable of ruling the lower intellectual
regitivae inferiorum intellectualium natures.
naturarum.
Item. Potentia intellectiva quae est [3] Besides, an intellectual potency that

propinquior principio, semper is nearer to the principle is always
invenitur regitiva intellectualis capable of ruling an intellectual power
virtutis quae magis a principio that is more removed from the principle.
distat. Quod quidem apparet tam in This is evident in both speculative and

scientiis speculativis quam in active sciences; for a speculative
activis: scientia enim speculativa science which derives its principles of
quae accipit ab alia principia ex demonstration from another science is
quibus demonstrat, dicitur esse illi said to be subalternated to that other;
subalternata; et scientia activa quae and an active science which is nearer
est propinquior fini, qui est the end, which is the principle in matters
principium in operativis, est of operation, is architectonic in regard to
architectonica respectu magis a more distant one. Therefore, since
distantis. Cum ergo inter some intellectual substances are nearer
intellectuales substantias quaedam the first principle, namely God, as was
sint primo principio, scilicet Deo, shown in Book Two [95], they will be
propinquiores, ut in secundo capable of ruling others.
ostensum est, ipsae erunt aliarum
regitivae.
Adhuc. Superiores intellectuales [4] Moreover, superior intellectual

substantiae perfectius divinae substances receive the influence of
sapientiae influentiam in seipsis divine wisdom into themselves more
recipiunt: cum unumquodque perfectly, because each being receives
recipiat aliquid secundum modum something according to the being’s own
suum. Per sapientiam autem mode. Now, all things are governed by
divinam omnia gubernantur. Et sic divine wisdom. And so, things that
oportet quod ea quae magis participate more in divine wisdom must
divinam sapientiam participant, sint be capable of governing those that
gubernativa eorum quae minus participate less. Therefore, the lower
participant. Substantiae igitur intellectual substances are governed by
intellectuales inferiores gubernantur the higher ones.
per superiores.
Dicuntur ergo superiores spiritus et [5] Thus, the higher spirits are also
Angeli, inquantum inferiores spiritus called angels, because they direct the
dirigunt quasi eis annuntiando, nam lower spirits, as it were, by bringing
Angeli quasi nuntii dicuntur; et messages to them; in fact, angels are
ministri, inquantum per suam spoken of as messengers. And they are
operationem exequuntur, etiam in also called ministers, because they
corporalibus, divinae providentiae carry out by their operation the order of
ordinem, nam minister est quasi divine providence even in the area of
instrumentum animatum, secundum bodily things. Indeed, a minister is “like
philosophum. Et hoc est quod a living instrument,” according to the
dicitur in Psalmo. Qui facit Angelos Philosopher [Politics I, 4: 1253b 29]. So
suos spiritus, et ministros suos this is what is said in the Psalm (103:4):
flammam ignis. “You make your angels spirits, and your
ministers a burning fire.”
Caput 80 Chapter 80
De ordinatione Angelorum ad ON THE ORDERING OF THE ANGELS
invicem AMONG THEMSELVES
Cum autem corporalia per [1] Since bodily things are ruled by
spiritualia regantur, ut ostensum spiritual things, as we showed, and since
est, corporalium autem est quidam there is an order of bodily things, the
ordo: oportet quod superiora higher bodies must be ruled by the higher
corpora per superiores intellectual substances, while the lower
intellectuales substantias regantur, bodies are ruled by the lower ones.
inferiora vero per inferiores. Quia Moreover, since the higher a substance is
etiam quanto aliqua substantia est the more universal is its power, but the
superior, tanto virtus eius est power of an intellectual substance is
universalior; virtus vero more universal than the power of a body,
intellectualis substantiae est the higher intellectual substances, then,
universalior virtute corporis: have powers incapable of functioning
superiores quidem inter through bodily power, and so they are not
intellectuales substantias habent united with bodies. But the lower ones
virtutes non explicabiles per have particular powers that are capable
aliquam virtutem corpoream, et of functioning through certain bodily
ideo non sunt corporibus unitae; organs, and so they must be united with
inferiores vero habent virtutes bodies.
particulatas explicabiles per aliqua
corporea instrumenta, et ideo
oportet quod corporibus uniantur.
Sicut autem superiores inter [2] Now, as the higher intellectual
substantias intellectuales sunt substances are more universal in their
universalioris virtutis, ita etiam power, they are also more perfectly
perfectius divinam dispositionem receptive of divine control from Him, in
ab ipso recipiunt, in hoc quod the sense that they know the plan of this
usque ad singula ordinis rationem order down to its singular details because
cognoscunt per hoc quod a Deo they receive it from God. However, this
accipiunt. Haec autem divinae manifesting of the divine ordering
ordinationis manifestatio divinitus stretches down by divine action to the
facta usque ad ultimas last of the intellectual substances; as it is
intellectualium substantiarum stated: “Is there any numbering of His
pertingit: sicut dicitur Iob 253: soldiers? And upon whom shall not His
nunquid est numerus militum eius, light arise?” (Job 25:3). But the lower
et super quem non splendet lumen understandings do not receive it with
eius? Sed inferiores intellectus such perfection that they are able to
non in ea perfectione ipsam know through it the individual details
recipiunt quod per eam singula which pertain to the order of providence,
quae ad ordinem providentiae and which they are to execute. Rather,
spectant, ab ipsis exequenda, they know them in a general sort of way.
cognoscere possint, sed solum in The lower they are, the fewer details of
quadam communitate: quantoque the divine order do they receive through
sunt inferiores, tanto per primam the first illumination which they get from
illuminationem divinitus acceptam the divine source. So much so, that the
minus in speciali divini ordinis human understanding, which is the
cognitionem accipiunt; in tantum lowest according to natural knowledge,
quod intellectus humanus, qui est gets a knowledge of certain most
infimus secundum naturalem universal items only.
cognitionem, solum quorundam

universalissimorum notitiam habet.
Sic igitur substantiae intellectuales [3] And thus, the higher intellectual

superiores perfectionem substances obtain immediately from God
cognitionis praedicti ordinis a perfect knowledge of the
immediate consequuntur a Deo, aforementioned order; and then, other
quam quidem perfectionem lower substances must obtain this perfect
oportet quod aliae inferiores per knowledge through them, just as we said
eas consequantur: sicut supra above that the student’s universal
diximus quod universalis discipuli knowledge is brought to perfection by the
cognitio per cognitionem magistri, knowledge of the teacher who knows in
qui in speciali cognoscit, detail.
perducitur ad perfectum.
Hinc est quod Dionysius de Hence, Dionysius, speaking of the

supremis intellectualibus highest intellectual substances whom he
substantiis, quas primae calls the first hierarchy, that is, the sacred
hierarchiae, idest sacri principatus sovereignty, says: “they are not sanctified
nominat, 7 cap. Cael. Hier., dicit by other substances but they are
quod non per alias substantias immediately ranged about Himself by the
sanctificatae, sed ab ipsa Godhead and are conducted to the
divinitate, in ipsam immediate immaterial and invisible beauty, in so far
extenduntur et ad immaterialem et as it is permitted, and to the knowable
invisibilem pulchritudinem, reasons for the divine workings.” And
quantum fas est, in thus, through them, he says, “those
contemplationem adducuntur et ad placed below in the ranks of the celestial
divinorum operum scibiles essences are instructed.” In this way,
rationes; et per has dicit then, the higher understandings receive a
suppositas caelestium perfect knowledge from a higher source
essentiarum dispositiones erudiri. of knowledge.
Sic ergo altiores intellectus in
altiori principio cognitionis
perfectionem suscipiunt.
In qualibet autem dispositione [4] Moreover, in every arrangement of

providentiae ipsa ordinatio providence this ordering of effects is
effectuum ex forma agentis derived from the form of the agent,
derivatur: oportet enim effectus a because the effect must proceed from the
causa secundum aliquam cause by virtue of a certain likeness.
similitudinem procedere. Quod Now, the fact that an agent
autem agens suae formae communicates a likeness of his form to
similitudinem effectibus his effects is due to some end. So, the
communicet, est propter aliquem first principle in providential arrangement
finem. Primum ergo principium in is the end; the second is the form of the
dispositione providentiae est finis; agent; and the third is the arrangement of
secundum, forma agentis; tertium, the order of the effects. Therefore, the
ipsa dispositio ordinis effectuum. highest function in the order of
Supremum igitur in ordine understanding is for the rational nature of
intellectus est quod in fine ordinis the order to be considered in relation to
ratio attendatur; secundum autem, the end; and the second most important
quod in forma; tertium vero, quod thing is to observe it in relation to the
ipsa ordinis dispositio in seipsa, form; while the third thing is to know the
non in aliquo altiori principio arrangement of this order in itself, and
cognoscatur. Unde et ars quae not in a higher source. Thus, the art
considerat finem, est which considers the end is architectonic
architectonica respectu eius quae in relation to the one which considers the
considerat formam, sicut form, as the art of navigating a ship is to
gubernatoria respectu navis the art of making one; but the art which
factivae; ea vero quae considerat considers the form is architectonic in
formam, respectu eius quae relation to the art which merely considers
considerat solum ordines motuum the orders of the motions that are ordered
qui ordinantur ad formam, sicut in terms of the form, as the art of
navis factiva respectu manu shipbuilding orders the skill of the
artificum. workmen.
Sic ergo inter illos intellectus qui [5] So, there is a definite order in those
immediate in ipso Deo perfectam understandings which grasp immediately
cognitionem ordinis providentiae in God Himself a perfect knowledge of
divinae percipiunt, est quidam the order of divine providence. For the
ordo, quia supremi et primi ordinis highest and first intellects perceive the
providentiae rationem percipiunt in plan of the providential order in the
ipso ultimo fine, qui est divina ultimate end itself, which is the divine
bonitas; quidam tamen eorum aliis goodness, and some of them do so more
clarius. Et isti dicuntur Seraphim, clearly than others. These are called
quasi ardentes vel incendentes, Seraphim, meaning the “ardent” or
quia per incendium designari solet “burning” ones, because the intensity of
intensio amoris vel desiderii, quae love or desire, which are functions
sunt de fine. Unde Dionysius dicit, concerned with the end, is customarily
7 cap. Cael. Hier., quod ex hoc symbolized by fire. Thus Dionysius says
eorum nomine designatur that, as a result of this name of theirs,
mobilitas eorum circa divina, there is a suggestion of “their mobility in
fervens et flexibilis, et reductio relation to the divine, a fervent and
inferiorum in Deum, sicut in finem. flexible mobility, and of their leading of
lower things to God,” as to their end.
Secundi autem rationem ordinis [6] The second type of understandings
providentiae in ipsa forma divina know the plan of providence perfectly in
perfecte cognoscunt. Et hi dicuntur the divine form itself. These are called
Cherubim, quod interpretatur Cherubim, which means “fullness of
scientiae plenitudo: scientia enim knowledge.” Indeed, knowledge is made
per formam scibilis perficitur. Unde perfect through the form of the knowable
dicit Dionysius quod talis object. Hence, Dionysius says that this
nominatio significat, quod sunt way of naming them suggests that they
contemplativi in prima operatrice are “capable of contemplating the first
virtute divinae pulchritudinis. operative power of divine beauty.
Tertii vero ipsam dispositionem [7] Then, the third type of understandings

divinorum iudiciorum in seipsa consider the very arrangement of the
considerant. Et hi dicuntur throni: divine judgments in themselves. These
nam per thronum potestas are called Thrones; for, by thrones the
iudiciaria designatur, secundum judiciary power is symbolized, according
illud: sedes super thronum et to this text: “You sit on the throne and
iudicas iustitiam. Unde dicit judge justice” (Ps. 9:5). And so Dionysius
Dionysius quod per hanc says that this designation suggests that
nominationem designatur quod they are “bearers of God, immediately
sunt deiferi, et ad omnes divinas available for all divine undertakings.
susceptiones familiariter aperti.
Non autem sic praemissa [8] Now, the preceding statements are
intelligenda sunt quasi aliud sit not to be understood in the sense that
divina bonitas, aliud divina there is a difference between divine
essentia, et aliud eius scientia goodness, divine essence, and divine
rerum dispositionem continens: knowledge as it contains the
sed quia secundum haec alia et arrangement of things; rather, there is a
alia est eius consideratio. different way of considering each one.
Inter ipsos etiam inferiores [9] So, also, among the lower spirits who

spiritus, qui divini ordinis per eos attain, through the higher spirits, a perfect
exequendi perfectam cognitionem knowledge of the divine order which they
per superiores spiritus are to carry out there must be some
consequuntur, oportet ordinem order. In fact, the superior ones among
esse. Nam quae inter ea sunt them have a more universal power of
altiora, virtutis etiam sunt knowing; hence, they obtain knowledge
universalioris in cognoscendo: of the order of providence through
unde cognitionem ordinis principles and causes that are more
providentiae in principiis et causis universal, whereas the lower ones
magis universalibus adipiscuntur; acquire it in more particular causes. For
inferiores vero in causis magis instance, the man who could consider the
particularibus; altioris enim order of all natural things in the celestial
intellectus esset homo qui ordinem bodies would be possessed of higher
omnium naturalium considerare understanding than the man who is
posset in corporibus caelestibus, obliged, for the sake of perfect
quam qui indiget ad perfectam knowledge, to direct his gaze upon the
cognitionem ad inferiora corpora lower bodies. So, those who can perfectly
prospicere. Illi igitur qui in causis know the order of providence in the
universalibus, quae sunt mediae universal causes, which are
inter Deum, qui est intermediaries between God, Who is the
universalissima causa, et causas most universal cause, and particular
particulares, possunt ordinem causes are intermediate between the
providentiae perfecte cognoscere, ones who are able to consider the plan of
medii sunt inter illos qui in ipso this order in God Himself and the ones
Deo rationem praedicti ordinis who must consider it in particular causes.
considerare sufficiunt, et eos qui in These are placed by Dionysius in the
causis particularibus necesse middle hierarchy, for, just as it is directed
habent considerare. Et hi a by the highest, so also does it direct the
Dionysio ponuntur in media lowest one, as he says in On the
hierarchia, quae, sicut a suprema Celestial Hierarchy VIII.
dirigitur, ita dirigit infimam: ut dicit

in 8 cap. Cael. Hier.
Inter has etiam intellectuales [10] Moreover, there must be a definite
substantias oportet quod ordo order among these intellectual
quidam existat. Nam ipsa substances. In fact, the very arrangement
universalis providentiae dispositio in general, according to providence, is
distribuitur quidem, primo, in assigned first to many executors. This is
multos executores. Quod quidem accomplished through the order of
fit per ordinem dominationum: Dominations, for it is the function of those
dominorum enim est praecipere who hold dominion to prescribe what the
quid alii exequantur. Unde others execute. Hence, Dionysius says
Dionysius dicit, 8 cap. Cael. Hier., that the word Domination suggests “a
quod nomen dominationis certain freedom from control, placed
designat aliquam anagogen above all servitude and superior to all
superpositam omni servituti, et subjection.”
omni subiectione superiorem.
Secundo autem, ab operante et [11] Then, secondly, there is a distribution

exequente distribuitur et and multiplication in the form of diverse
multiplicatur ad varios effectus. effects on the part of the agent and
Quod quidem fit per ordinem executor. In fact, this is done by the order
virtutum, quarum nomen, ut of Virtues, whose name, as Dionysius
Dionysius ibidem dicit, significat says in the same place, suggests “a
quandam fortem virilitatem in strong forcefulness in regard to all
omnes deiformes operationes, non Godlike operations, one which does not
relinquentem suimet imbecillitate abandon its Godlike movement because
aliquem deiformem motum. In quo of any weakening in itself.” It is evident
patet quod principium universalis from this that the source of universal
operationis ad hunc ordinem operation belongs to this order. Hence it
pertinet. Unde videtur quod ad appears that pertinent to this order is the
hunc ordinem pertineat motus motion of the celestial bodies, from which
caelestium corporum, ex quibus, bodies as universal causes, the particular
sicut ex quibusdam universalibus effects in nature follow. So, they are
causis, consequuntur particulares called “the powers of the heavens” where
effectus in natura: et ideo virtutes it is said: “the powers of the heavens
caelorum nominantur Luc. 2126, shall be moved” (Luke 21:26). Also
ubi dicitur: virtutes caelorum pertinent to these spirits is the execution
movebuntur. Ad eos etiam spiritus of divine works which are done outside
pertinere videtur executio the order of nature, for these are most
divinorum operum quae praeter sublime among the divine ministrations.
naturae ordinem fiunt, nam ista For which reason, Gregory says, “those
sunt sublimissima in divinis spirits are called Virtues through which
ministeriis: propter quod Gregorius miracles are frequently wrought” [In
dicit quod virtutes dicuntur illi Evangelium, homil. 34]. And if there be
spiritus per quos signa frequentius anything else that is universal and
fiunt. Et si quid aliud universale et primary in the carrying out of divine
primum est in ministeriis divinis ministrations, it is proper to assign it to
exequendis, conveniens est ad this order.
hunc ordinem pertinere.
Tertio vero, universalis [12] And, thirdly, the universal order of

providentiae ordo, iam in providence, already established in the
effectibus institutus, inconfusus effects, is guarded from all confusion,
custoditur, dum cohibentur ea provided those things which might disturb
quae possent hunc ordinem this order are kept in check. Now, this
perturbare. Quod quidem pertinet pertains to the order of Powers. Hence,
ad ordinem potestatum. Unde Dionysius says, in the same place, that
Dionysius ibidem dicit quod the word Powers means “a wellordered
nomen potestatum importat and unconfused ordering in regard to
quandam bene ordinatam et divine undertakings.” And Gregory says
inconfusam circa divinas that pertinent to this order “is to check
susceptiones ordinationem. Et contrary powers.”
ideo Gregorius dicit quod ad hunc
ordinem pertinet contrarias
potestates arcere.
Infimi autem inter superiores [13] Now, the lowest of the superior
intellectuales substantias sunt qui intellectual substances are those who
ordinem divinae providentiae ut in receive the order of divine providence
particularibus causis from a divine source, as it is knowable in
cognoscibilem divinitus accipiunt: particular causes. These are put
et hi immediate rebus humanis immediately in charge of human affairs.
praeponuntur. Unde de eis Hence, Dionysius says of them: “this third
Dionysius dicit quod ista tertia order of spirits commands, in turn, the
dispositio spirituum humanis human hierarchies.” By human affairs we
hierarchiis per consequentiam must understand all lower natures and
praecipit. Per res autem humanas particular causes which are related to
intelligendae sunt omnes man and which fall to the use of man, as
inferiores naturae et causae is clear from the foregoing.
particulares, quae ad hominem
ordinantur et in usum hominis
cedunt, sicut patet ex praemissis.
Inter hos etiam quidam ordo [14] Of course, there is a certain order
existit. Nam in rebus humanis est among these. For in human affairs there
aliquod bonum commune, quod is a common good which is, in fact, the
quidem est bonum civitatis vel good of a state or a people, and this
gentis, quod videtur ad seems to belong to the order of
principatuum ordinem pertinere. Principalities. Hence, Dionysius says, in
Unde Dionysius eodem capitulo the same chapter, that the name
dicit quod nomen principatuum Principality suggests “a certain leadership
designat quiddam ductivum cum along with sacred order.” For this reason,
ordine sacro. Propter quod et Dan. mention is made of “Michael the Prince of
10, fit mentio de Michaele principe the Jews,” and of “a Prince of the
Iudaeorum, et principe Persarum, Persians and a Prince of the Greeks”
et Graecorum. Et sic dispositio (Dan. 10:13, 20). And so, the
regnorum, et mutatio dominationis arrangement of kingdoms and the
a gente in gentem, ad ministerium changing of domination from one people

huius ordinis pertinere oportet. to another ought to belong to the ministry
Instructio etiam eorum qui inter of this order. Also, the instruction of those
homines existunt principes, de his who occupy the position of leaders
quae ad administrationem sui among men concerning matters pertinent
regiminis pertinent, ad hunc to the administration of their rule seems
ordinem spectare videtur. to be the concern of this order.
Est etiam aliquod humanum [15] There is also a type of human good
bonum quod non in communitate which does not lie in the community, but
consistit, sed ad unum aliquem pertains to one. person as such; whose
pertinet secundum seipsum, non profit is not confined to one but is
tamen uni soli utile, sed multis: available to many. Examples are the
sicut quae sunt ab omnibus et things to be believed and practiced by all
singulis credenda et observanda, and sundry, such as items of faith, of
sicut ea quae sunt fidei, et cultus divine worship, and the like. This pertains
divinus, et alia huiusmodi. Et hoc to the Archangels, of whom Gregory
ad Archangelos pertinet, de says: “they announce the most important
quibus Gregorius dicit quod things.” For instance, we call Gabriel an
summa nuntiant: sicut Gabrielem Archangel, because he announced the
Archangelum nominamus, qui Incarnation of the Word to the Virgin, for
virgini verbi incarnationem the belief of all.
nuntiavit ab omnibus credendam.
Quoddam vero humanum bonum [16] Still another human good is pertinent

est ad unumquemque singulariter to each person individually. This type of
pertinens. Et huiusmodi ad good belongs to the Angels; of whom
ordinem pertinent Angelorum, de Gregory says: “they announce less
quibus Gregorius dicit quod infima important things.” So, they are said to be
nuntiant: unde et hominum “guardians of men,” according to the
custodes esse dicuntur, secundum Psalm (90:11): “He gave His angels
illud Psalmi: Angelis suis Deus charge over you, to keep you in all thy
mandavit de te, ut custodiant te in ways.” Hence, Dionysius says that the
omnibus viis tuis. Unde et Archangels are intermediate between the
Dionysius dicit quod Archangeli Principalities and the Angels, having
medii sunt inter principatus et something in common with both: with the
Angelos, habentes aliquid Principalities, “in so far as they have
commune cum utrisque: cum charge of leading the lower angels,” and
principatibus quidem, inquantum this is as it should be, for in human affairs
inferioribus Angelis ducatum private goods should be allotted on the
praestant, nec immerito, quia quae basis of the things that are common; and
sunt propria in humanis, in common with the Angels, because
secundum ea quae sunt “they make announcements to the Angels
communia dispensari oportet; cum and through the Angels to us,” and the
Angelis vero, quia annuntiant function of the Angels is to make known
Angelis, et per Angelos nobis, to men “the things that pertain to them, in
quorum est manifestare accord with what is proper to each man.”
hominibus, quae ad eos pertinent For this reason, too, the last order takes
secundum uniuscuiusque the common name for its own special
analogiam. Propter quod et one; that is to say, because it has the
commune nomen ultimus ordo duty of making announcements
quasi speciale sibi assumit: quia immediately to us. That is also why the
scilicet officium habet nobis name Archangel is composed of both
immediate nuntiandi. Et propter names, for Archangels are called, as it
hoc Archangeli nomen were, Principal Angels.
compositum habent ex utroque:
dicuntur enim Archangeli quasi
principes Angeli.
Assignat autem et Gregorius aliter [17] However, Gregory assigns a different
caelestium spirituum ordering to the celestial spirits; for he
ordinationem: nam principatus numbers the Principalities among the
inter medios spiritus connumerat, intermediate spirits, immediately after the
post dominationes immediate; Dominations, while he puts the Virtues
virtutes vero inter infimos, ante among the lowest, before the Archangels.
Archangelos. Sed, diligenter But to people who consider the matter
inspicientibus, utraque ordinatio in carefully the two ways of ordering them
modico differt. Nam secundum differ but slightly. In fact, according to
Gregorium, principatus dicuntur, Gregory, Principalities are called, not
non qui gentibus praeponuntur, those put in charge of peoples, but “who
sed qui etiam ipsis bonis spiritibus are given leadership even over good
principantur, quasi primi existentes spirits,” as if they held first position in the
in ministeriorum divinorum execution of the divine ministrations. He
executione: dicit enim quod says, indeed, that “to be put in the
principari est inter alios priorem position of leader is to stand out as first
existere. Hoc autem, secundum among the rest.” Now, we said that this
assignationem ante dictam, characteristic, in the previously given
diximus ad virtutum ordinem arrangement, belongs to the order of
pertinere. Virtutes autem, Virtues. But, according to Gregory, the
secundum Gregorium, sunt quae Virtues are those related to certain
ad quasdam particulares particular operations, when in some
operationes ordinantur, cum in special case outside the general order
aliquo speciali casu, praeter something has to be done miraculously.
communem ordinem, oportet On the basis of this meaning, they are
aliqua miraculose fieri. Secundum quite appropriately put in the same order
quam rationem satis convenienter with the lowest ones.
cum infimis ordinantur.
Utraque autem ordinatio ex verbis [18] Moreover, both ways of ordering

apostoli auctoritatem habere them can find support in the words of the
potest. Dicit enim Ephes. 120 Apostle. For he says: “Sitting Him,” that
constituens illum, scilicet is, Christ, “on His right hand in heavenly
Christum, ad dexteram suam in places, above all principality, and power,
caelestibus, supra omnem and virtue, and dominion” (Eph. 3:2021).
principatum et potestatem et It is clear that in the ascending order of
virtutem et dominationem. In quo this list he placed Powers above
patet quod, ascendendo, supra Principalities, and the Virtues above
principatus potestates posuit, et these, and the Dominations over these.
supra has virtutes, supra quas Now, this is the order that Dionysius kept.
dominationes collocavit. Quem However, to the Colossians, in speaking

ordinem Dionysius observavit. Ad of Christ, he says: “whether thrones, or
Colossenses autem, loquens de dominations, or principalities, or powers,
Christo, dicit: sive throni, sive all things were created by Him and in
dominationes, sive principatus, Him” (Col. 1:16). In this text it appears
sive potestates, omnia per ipsum that, starting with Thrones and going
et in ipso creata sunt. In quo patet downward, he placed under them the
quod, a thronis incipiens, Dominations, under them the
descendendo, sub eis Principalities, and under these the
dominationes, sub quibus Powers. Now, this is the order that
principatus, et sub his potestates Gregory retained.
posuit. Quem ordinem Gregorius
observavit.
De Seraphim autem fit mentio [19] Mention is made of the Seraphim in
Isaiae 6; de Cherubim, Ezech. 1; Isaiah (6:2, 6); of the Cherubim in Ezekiel
de Archangelis, in canonica Iudae, 1 (3ff); of the ‘Archangels in the canonical
cum Michael Archangelus cum Epistle of Jude (9): “When Michael the
Diabolo disputans etc.; de Angelis archangel, disputing with the devil, etc.”;
autem in Psalmis, ut dictum est. and of the Angels in the Psalms, as we
have said.
Est autem in omnibus ordinatis [20] There is also this common feature in

virtutibus hoc commune, quod in vi all ordered powers, that all lower ones act
superioris virtutis omnes inferiores by virtue of the higher power. Hence,
agunt. Unde id quod diximus ad what we explained as pertaining to the
Seraphim ordinem pertinere, order of Seraphim all the lower orders
omnes inferiores ex virtute ipsius carry out through the power of the
exequuntur. Et similiter etiam est Seraphim. And the same conclusion
in aliis ordinibus considerandum. should be applied to the other orders,
too.
Caput 81 Chapter 81
De ordinatione hominum ad ON THE ORDERING OF MEN AMONG
invicem et ad alia THEMSELVES AND TO OTHER THINGS
Inter alias vero intellectuales [1] As a matter of fact, human souls bold
substantias humanae animae the lowest rank in relation to the other
infimum gradum habent: quia, intellectual substances, because, as we
sicut supra dictum est, in prima said above,” at the start of their existence
sui institutione cognitionem they receive a knowledge of divine
ordinis providentiae divinae in providence, wherein they know it only in a
sola quadam universali cognitione general sort of way. But the soul must be
suscipiunt; ad perfectam vero brought to a perfect knowledge of this
ordinis secundum singula order, in regard to individual details, by
cognitionem, oportet quod ex ipsis starting from the things themselves in
rebus, in quibus ordo divinae which the order of divine providence has
providentiae iam particulariter already been established in detail. So, the
institutus est, perducatur. Unde soul had to have bodily organs by which it

oportuit quod haberet organa might draw knowledge from corporeal
corporea, per quae a rebus things. Yet, even with such equipment,
corporalibus cognitionem hauriret. because of the feebleness of its
Ex quibus tamen, propter intellectual light, man’s soul is not able to
debilitatem intellectualis luminis, acquire a perfect knowledge of the things
perfectam notitiam eorum quae that are important to man unless it be
ad hominem spectant, adipisci helped by higher spirits, for the divine
non valent nisi per superiores disposition requires this, that lower spirits
spiritus adiuventur, hoc exigente acquire perfection through the higher
divina dispositione, ut inferiores ones, as we showed above. Nevertheless,
per superiores spiritus since man does participate somewhat in
perfectionem acquirant, ut supra intellectual light, brute animals are subject
ostensum est. Quia tamen aliquid to him by the order of divine providence,
homo de lumine intellectuali for they participate in no way in
participat, ei secundum understanding. Hence it is said: “Let us
providentiae divinae ordinem make man to our own image and
subduntur animalia bruta, quae likeness,” namely, according as he has
intellectu nullo modo participant. understanding, “and let him have
Unde dicitur Gen. 126: faciamus dominion over the fishes of the sea, and
hominem ad imaginem et the fowls of the air, and the beasts of the
similitudinem nostram, scilicet earth” (Gen. 1:26).
secundum quod intellectum
habet, et praesit piscibus maris, et
volatilibus caeli, et bestiis terrae.
Animalia vero bruta, etsi intellectu [2] Even brute animals, though devoid of

careant, quia tamen cognitionem understanding, have some knowledge;
aliquam habent, plantis, et aliis and so, in accord with the order of divine
quae cognitione carent, providence, they are set above plants and
secundum divinae providentiae other things that lack knowledge. Hence it
ordinem praeferuntur. Unde dicitur is said: “Behold I give you every herb
Gen. 129 ecce, dedi vobis bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees
omnem herbam afferentem that have in themselves seed of their own
semen super terram, et universa kind, to be your meat, and to all the
ligna quae habent in semetipsis beasts of the earth” (Gen. 1:2930).
sementem generis sui, ut sint
vobis in escam, et cunctis
animantibus terrae.
Inter ea vero quae penitus [3] Moreover, among things utterly devoid

cognitione carent, unum subiacet of knowledge one thing comes under
alteri secundum quod est unum another, depending on whether the one is
altero potentius in agendo. Non more powerful in acting than the other.
enim participant aliquid de Indeed, they do not participate in anything
dispositione providentiae, sed of the disposition of providence, but only
solum de executione. in its execution.
Quia vero homo habet et [4] Now, since man possesses intellect,
intellectum et sensum et sense, and bodily power, these are

corporalem virtutem, haec in ipso interrelated within him by a mutual order,
ad invicem ordinantur, secundum according to the disposition of divine
divinae providentiae providence, in a likeness to the order
dispositionem, ad similitudinem which is found in the universe. In fact,
ordinis qui in universo invenitur, corporeal power is subject to sense and
nam virtus corporea subditur intellectual power, as carrying out their
sensitivae et intellectivae virtuti, command, and the sensitive power is
velut exequens earum imperium; subject to the intellectual and is included
ipsa sensitiva potentia under its command.
intellectivae subditur, et eius
imperio continetur.
Ex eadem autem ratione, et inter [5] On the same basis, there is also found

ipsos homines ordo invenitur. an order among men themselves. Indeed,
Nam illi qui intellectu praeminent, those who excel in understanding
naturaliter dominantur; illi vero qui naturally gain control, whereas those who
sunt intellectu deficientes, corpore have defective understanding, but a
vero robusti, a natura videntur strong body, seem to be naturally fitted for
instituti ad serviendum; sicut service, as Aristotle says in his Politics [I,
Aristoteles dicit in sua politica. Cui 5: 1254b 25]. The view of Solomon is also
etiam concordat sententia in accord with this, for he says: “The fool
Salomonis, qui dicit, Proverb. 11 shall serve the wise” (Prov. 11:29); and
29: qui stultus est, serviet again: “Provide out of all the people wise
sapienti. Et Exod. 18 dicitur: men such as fear God... who may judge
provide de omni plebe viros the people at all times” (Exod. 18:2122).
sapientes et timentes Deum, qui
iudicent populum omni tempore.
Sicut autem in operibus unius [6] Now, just as in the activities of one
hominis ex hoc inordinatio man disorder arises from the fact that
provenit quod intellectus understanding follows the lead of sensual
sensualem virtutem sequitur; power, while the sensual power is
sensualis vero virtus propter dragged down to the movement of the
corporis indispositionem trahitur body by virtue of some disorder of the
ad corporis motum, ut in body, as is evident in the case of men
claudicantibus apparet: ita et in who limp, so also does disorder arise in a
regimine humano inordinatio human government, as a result of a man
provenit ex eo quod non propter getting control, not because of the
intellectus praeminentiam aliquis eminence of his understanding, but either
praeest, sed vel robore corporali because he usurps dominion for himself
dominium sibi usurpat, vel propter by bodily strength or because someone is
sensualem affectionem aliquis ad set up as a ruler on the basis of sensual
regendum praeficitur. Quam affection. Nor is Solomon silent on this
quidem inordinationem nec kind of disorder, for he says: “There is an
Salomon tacet, qui dicit, Eccle. evil that I have seen under the sun, as it
105 est et malum quod vidi sub were by an error proceeding from the face
sole, quasi per errorem egrediens of the prince: a fool set in high dignity”
a facie principis, positum stultum (Eccles. 10:56). But disorder of this kind
in dignitate sublimi. Huiusmodi does not exclude divine providence; it

autem inordinatio divinam comes about, indeed, with divine
providentiam non excludit: permission, as a result of the deficiency of
provenit enim, permissione divina, lower agents, just as we explained in
ex defectu inferiorum agentium; connection with other evils. Nor is the
sicut et de aliis malis dictum est. natural order entirely perverted by such
Neque per huiusmodi disorder, for the dominion of fools is weak
inordinationem totaliter naturalis unless strengthened by the counsel of the
ordo pervertitur: nam stultorum wise. Hence it is said in Proverbs (20:16):
dominium infirmum est, nisi “Designs are strengthened by counsels,
sapientum consilio roboretur. and wars are to be arranged by
Unde dicitur Proverb. 2018: governments”; and again: “a wise man is
cogitationes consiliis roborabuntur strong, and a knowing man stout and
et gubernaculis tractanda sunt valiant: because war is managed by due
bella; et 245 vir sapiens fortis est ordering, and there shall be safety when
et vir doctus validus et robustus: there are many counsels” (Prov. 24:56).
quia cum dispositione initur And since he who gives counsel rules the
bellum, et erit salus ubi multa man who takes counsel, and in a sense
consilia. Et quia consilians regit governs him, it is said in Proverbs (17:2):
eum qui consilium accipit, et “a wise servant shall rule over foolish
quodammodo ei dominatur, dicitur sons.”
Proverb. 172, quod servus
sapiens dominabitur filiis stultis.
Patet ergo quod divina providentia [7] So, it is evident that divine providence
ordinem omnibus rebus imponit: imposes order on all things; thus, what the
ut sic verum sit quod dicit Apostle says is certainly true: “the things
apostolus, Rom. 131: quae a which are of God are well ordered” (Rom.
Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. 13:1).
Chapter 82
Caput 82
THAT LOWER BODIES ARE RULED
Quod inferiora corpora reguntur a
BY GOD THROUGH CELESTIAL
Deo per corpora caelestia
BODIES
Sicut autem in substantiis [1] Now, just as there is a difference
intellectualibus est superius et between higher and lower intellectual
inferius, ita etiam in substantiis substances, so also is there such a
corporalibus. Substantiae autem difference between corporeal
intellectuales reguntur a substances. But intellectual substances
superioribus, ut dispositio divinae are ruled by the higher ones, since the
providentiae proportionaliter disposition of divine providence
descendat usque ad infima, sicut descends proportionally to the lowest,
iam dictum est. Ergo, pari ratione, as we have said already. Therefore, on
inferiora corpora per superiora a like basis, the lower bodies are
disponuntur. ordered through the higher ones.
Amplius. Quanto aliquod corpus est [2] Again, the higher a body is in place,

superius loco, tanto invenitur esse the more formal is it found to be. And
formalius et propter hoc etiam even the place of a lower body
rationabiliter est locus inferioris, nam reasonably follows this rule, since it is
formae est continere, sicut et loci; the function of form to limit, just as it is
aqua enim est formalior terra, aer of place. In fact, water is more formal
aqua, ignis aere. Sed corpora than earth, air than water, fire than air.
caelestia sunt omnibus loco But the celestial bodies are superior in
superiora. Ipsa igitur sunt magis place to all bodies. So, they are more
formalia omnibus aliis. Ergo magis formal than all the others, and,
activa. Agunt ergo in inferiora therefore, more active. So, they act on
corpora. Et sic per ea inferiora the lower bodies; thus, the lower ones
disponuntur. are disposed by them.
Item. Quod est in sua natura [3] Besides, that which is in its nature
perfectum absque contrarietate, est perfected without contrariety is more
universalioris virtutis quam illud universal than that which is not
quod in sua natura non perficitur nisi perfected in its nature without
cum contrarietate: contrarietas enim contrariety. Indeed, contrariety arises
est ex differentiis determinantibus et from the various things that determine
contrahentibus genus; unde in and contract a genus; hence, in the
acceptione intellectus, quia est realm of understanding, because it is
universalis, species contrariorum universal the species of contraries are
non sunt contrariae, cum sint simul. not contraries, for they may coexist.
Corpora autem caelestia sunt in suis But celestial bodies are perfected
naturis absque omni contrarietate without any contrariety in their natures,
perfecta: non enim sunt levia neque for they are neither light nor heavy,
gravia, neque calida neque frigida. neither hot nor cold. However, lower
Corpora vero inferiora non bodies are not perfected in their
perficiuntur in suis naturis nisi cum natures without some contrariety. Their
aliqua contrarietate. Et hoc etiam motions also demonstrate this, for there
motus eorum demonstrant: nam is nothing contrary to the circular
motui circulari corporum caelestium motion of the celestial bodies, and,
non est aliquid contrarium, unde nec consequently, there can be no violence
in eis violentia esse potest; motui in regard to them; but there are
autem inferiorum corporum contrarii contraries to the motion of lower
sunt, scilicet motus deorsum motui bodies, namely, downward motion as
sursum. Corpora ergo caelestia sunt opposed to upward motion. So,
universalioris virtutis quam corpora celestial bodies are possessed of more
inferiora. Universales autem virtutes universal power than lower bodies. But
sunt motivae particularium, sicut ex universal powers move particular ones,
dictis patet. Corpora igitur caelestia as is evident from what we have said.
movent et disponunt corpora Therefore, celestial bodies move and
inferiora. dispose lower bodies.
Adhuc. Ostensum est supra quod [4] Moreover, it was shown above that
per substantias intellectuales alia all things are ruled through intellectual
omnia reguntur. Corpora autem substances. But celestial bodies are
caelestia sunt similiora substantiis more like intellectual substances than
intellectualibus quam alia corpora, are other bodies because the former
inquantum sunt incorruptibilia. Sunt are incorruptible. They are also nearer
etiam eis propinquiora, inquantum to them, inasmuch as they are moved
ab eis immediate moventur, ut supra immediately by them, as we showed
ostensum est. Per ipsa igitur above. Therefore, the lower bodies are
reguntur inferiora corpora. ruled by them.
Praeterea. Oportet primum [5] Furthermore, the first source of

principium motus esse aliquid motion must be something immutable.
immobile. Quae ergo magis So, the things that are nearest to
accedunt ad immobilitatem, debent immutability should be movers of the
esse aliorum motiva. Corpora autem rest. But celestial bodies approach
caelestia magis accedunt ad more closely to the immutability of the
immobilitatem primi principii quam first source than do lower bodies, for
inferiora: quia non moventur nisi una they are not moved except by one kind
specie motus, scilicet motu locali; of motion, namely, local motion; while
alia vero corpora moventur omnibus other bodies are moved by all the
speciebus motus. Corpora igitur species of motion. Therefore, the
caelestia sunt motiva et regitiva celestial bodies move and govern the
inferiorum corporum. lower bodies.
Amplius. Primum in quolibet genere [6] Again, the first in any genus is the
est causa eorum quae sunt post. cause of members which are posterior.
Inter omnes autem alios motus, Now, in regard to all other motions, the
primus est motus caeli. Primo first is the motion of the heavens; first
quidem, quia motus localis est of all, of course, because local motion
primus inter omnes motus. Et is first among all motions, This is so in
tempore: quia solus potest esse regard to time, for it alone can be
perpetuus, ut probatur in VIII Phys. perpetual, as is proved in the Physics
Et naturaliter: quia sine eo non VIII [7: 260b 29]. It is also so in regard
potest esse aliquis aliorum; non to nature, for without it there cannot be
enim augmentatur aliquid nisi any other kind of motion, In fact, a thing
praeexistente alteratione, per quam is not increased unless there be a
quod prius erat dissimile, preceding alteration by which what was
convertatur et fiat simile; neque formerly unlike is changed and
alteratio potest esse nisi becomes like; nor can alteration be
praeexistente loci mutatione, quia ad accomplished unless there be a
hoc quod fiat alteratio, oportet quod preceding local change, since for
alterans magis sit propinquum alteration to be achieved the agent of
alterato nunc quam prius. Est etiam alteration must now be brought closer
perfectione prior: quia motus localis to the thing altered than it was before. It
non variat rem secundum aliquid ei is also prior in perfection, because local
inhaerens, sed solum secundum motion does not change the thing in
aliquid extrinsecum; et propter hoc regard to any inherent factor but only
est rei iam perfectae. according to something extrinsic; for
this reason it belongs to an already
perfected thing.
Secundo, quia etiam inter motus Secondly, even among local motions
locales est motus circularis prior. Et the circular is prior. And again, in
tempore: quia solus ipse potest esse regard to time: because it alone can be
perpetuus, ut probatur in VIII Phys. perpetual, as is proved in the Physics
Et naturaliter: quia est magis [VIII, 8: 261b 27]. And in regard to
simplex et unus, cum non nature: for it is more simple and unified,
distinguatur in principium, medium et since it is not divided into beginning,
finem, sed totus sit quasi medium. middle, and end; rather, the whole
Et etiam perfectione: quia reflectitur motion is like a middle. And even in
ad principium. perfection: because it is brought back
to its origin.
Tertio, quia solus motus caeli Thirdly, because only the motion of the

invenitur semper regularis et heavens is found always to be regular
uniformis: in motibus enim and uniform, for in the case of the
naturalibus gravium et levium fit natural motions of heavy and light
additio velocitatis in fine, in violentis things there is an increase in velocity
autem additio tarditatis. Oportet ergo toward the end; in the case of violent
quod motus caeli sit causa omnium motion, there is an increase in
aliorum motuum. retardation. So, the motion of the
heavens must be the cause of all other
motions.
Adhuc. Sicut se habet immobile [7] Besides, as the absolutely immobile

simpliciter ad motum simpliciter, ita is to unqualified motion, so is the
se habet immobile secundum hunc immobile, that is qualified by a given
motum ad motum talem. Id autem motion, related to that motion. Now,
quod est immobile simpliciter, est that which is absolutely immobile is the
principium omnis motus, ut supra source of all motion, as we proved
probatum est. Quod ergo est above. So, what is immobile in regard
immobile secundum alterationem, to alteration is the source of all
est principium omnis alterationis. alteration. Now, the celestial bodies,
Corpora autem caelestia sola inter alone among bodily things, are
corporalia sunt inalterabilia: quod inalterable; their condition shows this,
demonstrat dispositio eorum, quae for it is always the same. So, the
semper eadem invenitur. Est ergo celestial body is the cause of all
corpus caeleste causa omnis alteration in things that are changed by
alterationis in his quae alterantur. alteration. Now, in these lower bodies
Alteratio autem in his inferioribus est alteration is the source of all motion, for
principium omnis motus: nam per through alteration a thing achieves
alterationem pervenitur ad increase and generation, whereas the
augmentum et generationem; agent of generation is a selfmover in
generans autem est motor per se in the local motion of heavy and light
motu locali gravium et levium. things. Therefore, the heavens must be
Oportet ergo quod caelum sit causa the cause of all motion in these lower
omnis motus in istis inferioribus bodies.
corporibus.
Sic ergo patet quod corpora inferiora [8] Thus, it is evident that lower bodies
a Deo per corpora caelestia are ruled by God through the celestial
reguntur. bodies.
Chapter 83
Caput 83
EPILOGUE TO THE PRECEDING
Epilogus praedictorum
CHAPTERS
Ex omnibus autem quae ostensa [1] Now, from all the things that have
sunt colligere possumus quod, been pointed out we may gather that, as
quantum ad ordinis excogitationem far as the planning of the order to be
rebus imponendum, Deus omnia imposed on things is concerned, God
per seipsum disponit. Unde super disposes everything by Himself. And so,
illud Iob 33, quem posuit alium in his commentary on the text of Job
super orbem quem fabricatus est? 34:13 (“What other did He appoint over
Dicit Gregorius: mundum quippe the earth?”) Gregory says: “Indeed, He
per seipsum regit qui per seipsum Who created the world by Himself rules
condidit. Et Boetius, in III de it by Himself” [Moralia XXIV, 20]. And
Consol.: Deus per se solum cuncta Boethius says, in Consolation of
disponit. Philosophy III: “God disposes all things
of Himself alone.”
Sed quantum ad executionem, [2] But, in regard to the execution, He
inferiora per superiora dispensat. orders the lower things through the
Corporalia quidem per spiritualia. higher ones, and the bodily things
Unde Gregorius dicit, in IV Dialog.: through the spiritual ones. Hence,
in hoc mundo visibili nihil nisi per Gregory says, in his fourth Dialogue: “in
invisibilem creaturam disponi this visible world nothing can be ordered
potest. Inferiores vero spiritus per except through an invisible creature.”
superiores. Unde dicit Dionysius, IV And the lower spirits are ordered
cap. Cael. Hier., quod caelestes through the higher ones. Hence,
essentiae intellectuales primo in Dionysius says that “the heavenly
seipsas divinam edunt intellectual essences first give divine
illuminationem, et in nos deferunt illumination to themselves, and then
quae supra nos sunt bring us manifestations which are above
manifestationes. Inferiora etiam us.” Also, the lower bodies are ordered
corpora per superiora. Unde dicit by the higher ones. Hence, Dionysius
Dionysius, IV cap., de Div. Nom., says that “the sun brings generation to
quod sol generationem visibilium visible bodies, and stimulates them to
corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsam life itself, and nourishes, increases and
movet, et nutrit et auget et perficit, perfects, cleanses and renews.”
et mundat et renovat.
De his autem omnibus simul dicit [3] Moreover, Augustine speaks on all
Augustinus, in III de Trin.: these points together, in the Book III of
quemadmodum corpora crassiora The Trinity: “As the grosser and lower
et inferiora per subtiliora et bodies are ruled in a certain order by
potentiora quodam ordine reguntur, means of the subtler and more powerful
ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae ones, so are all bodies by means of the
rationalem; et spiritus rationalis rational spirit of life, and also the sinful
peccator per spiritum rationalem rational spirit of the sinner by the
iustum. righteous rational spirit.”

Providence of God by St. Thomas

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5/4/2016 dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3a.

Deus magnus dominus et rex “The Lord is a great God and a great King

Unum esse primum entium, totius [1] That there is one First Being,

Alia vero, intellectu carentia, [5] Still other beings, devoid of

Alia vero, corruptibilia existentia, [6] Other beings, however, are corruptible.

Ostendendum est igitur primo, [1] The first thing that we must show, then,

ad aliquid ulterius. Sed in actione further. Now, in the action of all agents,

Amplius. Si actiones agentis [4] Besides, if the actions of an agent are

Metaph., forma enim est agendi proved in Metaphysics [Ia, 2: 994a 1–b6],

Sunt autem aliquae actiones [9] Of course, there are some actions that

Ex hoc autem ulterius [1] Next after this we must show that every

Hoc autem est de ratione boni, the essential meaning of the good is that it

Adhuc. Omnis actio et motus ad [4] Besides, every action and movement

Item. Omne quod movetur [10] Furthermore, everything that is moved

Quod enim ex actione consequitur [2] For that which follows from an action,

Praeterea. Omnis motus naturalis [4] Besides, every natural change has an

habet finem intentum a natura. end intended by nature. Now, corruption

Et quia tam privationes quam And since privations, just as much as habits

Malum ergo corruptionis [5] So the evil of natural corruption, though

patet in eo qui vult uti femina sake of pleasure, to which pleasure there is

Patet ergo ex praemissis quod [11] It is clear, then, from the foregoing that

Adhuc. Unumquodque secundum [3] Again, each thing has actual being in

Adhuc. Omnis essentia est alicui [6] Furthermore, every essence belongs to

Amplius. Quicquid habet [7] Again, whatever possesses an essence

Item. Ens per actum et potentiam [8] Besides, being is divided by act and

Amplius. Probatum est in [9] Moreover, we have proved in Book Two

Ex propria enim differentia specifica [2] Each thing is specified by its own

Praeterea. Utrumque contrariorum est [3] Again, of two contraries, each is a

Adhuc. Omne quod agit, est res aliqua. [5] Moreover, everything that acts is

Amplius. In quibuscumque invenitur [6] Furthermore, wherever the

Has autem rationes non difficile est [1] It is not difficult to answer these

bonum, malum autem homini, reason which is the good for man.

Ex quo etiam patet quod malum et [2] From this it is also clear that evil and

Habet tamen et hoc dictum aliquam In fact, this statement has some truth,

Dicitur autem aliquid altero magis et [5] We do indeed say that something is

Ex praemissis autem concludi [1] The foregoing arguments enable us to

Si enim alicuius mali est causa [2] For, if an evil thing were the cause of a

Praeterea. Omnis causa vel est [5] Moreover, every cause is either matter,

Hoc autem accidens in naturalibus [7] Now, in the order of nature, this

re apprehensa. Primum igitur principle in moral actions is the thing that

Actus autem virtutis exequentis [13] Now, the act of the power that carries

Praecedit igitur in voluntate [17] Hence, a defect of ordering to reason

voluntas in finem indebitum will occurs.

Ex praemissis etiam ostendi potest [1] It can also be shown from the

Adhuc. Malum privatio quaedam [3] Again, evil is a certain privation, as is

Amplius. Ex hoc dicitur aliquid [4] Besides, something is called evil due

Semper enim oportet quod [2] In fact, there must always continue to

Non autem potest dici, ut dicunt [4] Now, it cannot be answered, as some

malum, magis multiplicatur, tanto contrary good diminished. And this is

Item. Quod est in potentia ad [3] Again, that which is in potency to either

Adhuc. Quicquid inest alicui [4] Besides, whatever is present in

Amplius. Omne malum [5] Moreover, every evil is the consequence

Ex eisdem etiam patet quod [1] It is plain, from the same consideration,

Si enim aliquid est causa alicuius [2] For, if a thing is the direct cause of

Praeterea. Ex defectu causae [4] Besides, from a defect in a cause there

Amplius. Malum non agit nisi virtute [5] Moreover, evil acts only through

Praeterea. Cum id quod est per [6] Furthermore, since “that which is

Adhuc. Omne malum habet causam per [7] Again, every evil has an

Item. Causa per se prior est ea quae [8] Besides, a per sc cause is prior

per accidens. Sed malum non est causa to one which is accidental. But evil

Per hoc autem excluditur error [9] By means of this conclusion, the

Ex hoc autem apparet quod omnia [1] It is, consequently, apparent that all

Item. Quod est maximum in [3] Again, that which is supreme in any