G.R. No.
129093 August 30, 2001 reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO
CATAQUIZ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated
February 10, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, enjoining petitioners
from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and its subsequent Order 2 dated April 21, 1997 denying petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor
Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was
denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads:
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA "ILLEGAL GAMBLING" LALO NA ANG LOTTO
SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalo't higit sa mga
kabataan;
KUNG KAYA'T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-
Ala A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang
sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal
dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalo't higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng
Philippine National Police (PNP) Col. [illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo
sa lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na ang "Jueteng".3
As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief
with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint,
respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following
from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal
Mayor Calixto R Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an
order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision
enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants, their agents and representatives are
hereby enjoined from implementing or enforcing resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T.
1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Laguna prohibiting the operation of the lotto in
the province of Laguna.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated April
21, 1997, which reads:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D. Lina, Jr. and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, thru counsel, with the opposition filed by plaintiff's
counsel and the comment thereto filed by counsel for the defendants which were duly
noted, the Court hereby denies the motion for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.5
On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors were committed by
the respondent trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE PETITIONERS FROM IMPLEMENTING
KAPASIYAHAN BLG. 508, T. 1995 OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA
PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF THE LOTTO IN THE PROVINCE OF LAGUNA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT POSITED BY THE PETITIONERS
THAT BEFORE ANY GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR PROGRAM MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE
NATIONAL AGENCIES OR OFFICES, PRIOR CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED AND OTHER CONCERNED SECTORS IS REQUIRED.
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial
Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling.
It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government's police power under the General Welfare
Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. 6 They also
maintain that respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by
the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of
Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160.7
For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of
the power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as
legal and permitted its operations around the country.8 As for the allegation that no prior
consultations and approval were sought from the sangguniang panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent
Calvento contends this is not mandatory since such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration
of policy and not a self-executing provision of the Local Government Code of 1991.9 He also states
that his operation of the lotto system is legal because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which
in turn had been granted a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress.10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the Provincial Government of
Laguna has no power to prohibit a form of gambling which has been authorized by the national
government.11 He argues that this is based on the principle that ordinances should not contravene
statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of the national government. The local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. This
being the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be
permitted is for Congress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since
Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant
to its legislative grant of authority, the province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the
exercise of said authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.
The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid; and
(2) whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto
system can be operated in a given local government unit.
The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor's permit for the
operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private respondent. According to the mayor, he based his
decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The
ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but a mere
policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a
valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners
admit as much when they stated in their petition that:
5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and clear. The
Resolution is a policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement
opposition and/or objection to the operation of and/or all forms of gambling including the
Lotto operation in the Province of Laguna.12
As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.
This is part of the local government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the
national government's. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this
premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of
Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a
franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. The pertinent provision reads:
SECTION 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. — The Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government
agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and
services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers
conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as
amended, and shall have the authority:
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in
such frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and
regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government
deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local
government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits.
Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial
board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances
and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs.
Virac,13 ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for
this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.14
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo
the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate
by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from
the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As
it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is
some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we
can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of
 the municipal corporations in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know
of no limitation on the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They are,
so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids,
etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a different
conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has
not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of
local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that
Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced
degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the
power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True,
there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the
local government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which cannot
now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still
the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate
it.15
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted
to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central
authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in
imperio".16
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail
of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit
lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit
concerned. The Board's enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the
national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of
Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the
setting up of lotto outlets around the country. These provisions state:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — . . .
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and
people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project
or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. — No project or program shall be implemented
by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26
hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained;
Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be
evicted unless, appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or
projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor
a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by
the national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections
2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof. 17 Section 26 reads:
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological
Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled
corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or
program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources,
loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to
consult with the local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors
concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon
the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the
measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and
programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1)
may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-
renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate
certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be
implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the
province of Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly an afterthought
on their part. There is no indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons
for his refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions
of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or
implementing the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That
resolution expresses merely a policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding
legal force nor requires any act of implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent
mayor's refusal to issue the permit sought by private respondent in connection with a legitimate
business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LUCILA PAYUMO, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso M. Cruz Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmeña, Crisostomo Banzon and Horacio Apostol for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The EDSA revolution of 1986 restored the reality that the people's might is not a myth. The 1987
Constitution then included people power as an article of faith and Congress was mandated to p ass
laws for its effective exercise. The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted providing for two (2)
modes of initiating the recall from office of local elective officials who appear to have lost the
confidence of the electorate. One of these modes is recall through the initiative of a preparatory recall
assembly. In the case at bench, petitioners assail this mode of initiatory recall as unconstitutional. The
challenge cannot succeed.
We shall first unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the May 11, 1992
elections. In the early evening of July 1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province met at the National Power
Corporation compound in Bagac, Bataan. At about 12:30 A.M of the following day, July 2, 1993, they
proceeded to the Bagac town plaza where they constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable Oscar,
de los Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila Payumo, were chosen as Presiding
Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the
Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and he moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of
the petitioner on the ground of "loss of confidence."1 The motion was "unanimously seconded."2 The
resolution states:
RESOLUTION NO. 1
Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly in
the Province of Bataan have voluntarily constituted themselves for the purpose
of the recall of the incumbent provincial governor of the province of Bataan,
Honorable Enrique T. Garcia pursuant to the provisions of Section 70, paragraphs
(a), (b) and (c) of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991;
Whereas, the total number of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly
in the province of Bataan is One Hundred and Forty- Six (146) composed of all
mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of all the 12 towns
of the province of Bataan;
Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly,
after a serious and careful deliberation have decided to adopt this resolution for
the recall of the incumbent provincial governor Garcia for loss of confidence;
Now, therefore, be it resolved, as it is hereby resolved that having lost confidence
on the incumbent governor of Bataan, Enrique T. Garcia, recall proceedings be
immediately initiated against him;
Resolved further, that copy of this resolution be furnished the Honorable
Commission on Elections, Manila and the Provincial Election Supervisor, Balanga,
Bataan.
One hundred forty-six (146) names appeared in Resolution No. 1 but only eighty (80) carried the
signatures of the members of the PRA. Of the eighty (80) signatures, only seventy-four (74) were
found genuine.3 The PRAC of the province had a membership of one hundred forty-four (144)4 and
its majority was seventy-three (73).
On July 7, 1993, petitioners filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition to deny due course to said
Resolution No. 1. Petitioners alleged that the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and
procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. In a per curiamResolution promulgated August 31, 1993, the respondent
COMELEC dismissed the petition and scheduled the recall elections for the position of Governor of
Bataan on October 11 , 1993. Petitioners then filed with Us a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the said Resolution of the respondent COMELEC on
various grounds. They urged that section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative of the
PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether
or not to initiate proceedings, and (2) it violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to
the political minority to equal protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings followed by
the PRAC in passing Resolution No. I suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was the
deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly. On
September 7, 1993, We required the respondents to file their Comments within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days.5 On September 16, 1993, We set petition for hearing on September 21, 1993
at 11 A.M. After the hearing, We granted the petition on ground that the sending of selective notices
to members of the PRAC violated the due process protection of the Constitution and fatally flawed
the enactment of Resolution No. 1. We ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
After deliberation, the Court opts not to resolve the alleged constitutional
infirmity of sec. 70 of R.A. No. 7160 for its resolution is not unavoidable to decide
 the merits of the petition. The petition can be decided on the equally fundamental
issues of: (1) whether or not all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly
were notified of its meeting; and (2) assuming lack of notice, whether or not it
would vitiate the proceedings of the assembly including its Resolution No. 1.
The failure to give notice to all members of the assembly, especially to the
members known to be political allies of petitioner Garcia was admitted by both
counsels of the respondents. They did not deny that only those inclined to agree
with the resolution of recall were notified as a matter of political strategy and
security. They justified these selective notices on the ground that the law does
not specifically mandate the giving of notice.
We reject this submission of the respondents. The due process clause of the
Constitution requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should
always be considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its silence. The
need for notice to all the members of the assembly is also imperative for these
members represent the different sectors of the electorate of Bataan. To the
extent that they are not notified of the meeting of the assembly, to that extent is
the sovereign voice of the people they represent nullified. The resolution to recall
should articulate the majority will of the members of the assembly but the
majority will can be genuinely determined only after all the members of the
assembly have been given a fair opportunity to express the will of their
constituents. Needless to stress, the requirement of notice is indispensable in
determining the collective wisdom of the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly. Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall
petitioner Garcia as Governor of the province of Bataan.
The petition raises other issues that are not only prima impressionis but also of
transcendental importance to the rightful exercise of the sovereign right of the
people to recall their elected officials. The Court shall discuss these issues in a
more extended decision.
In accord with this Resolution, it appears that on September 22, 1993, the Honorable Mayor of
Dinalupihan, Oscar de los Reyes again sent Notice of Session to the members of the PRAC to "convene
in session on September 26, 1993 at the town plaza of Balanga, Bataan at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning."6 From news reports, the PRAC convened in session and eighty-seven (87) of its members
once more passed a resolution calling for the recall of petitioner Garcia.7 On September 27, 1993,
petitioners filed with Us a Supplemental Petition and Reiteration of Extremely Urgent Motion for a
resolution of their contention that section 70 of R.A. 7160 is unconstitutional.
We find the original Petition and the Supplemental Petition assailing the constitutionality of section
70 of R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly initiate the recall of local elective
officials as bereft of merit.
Every law enjoys the presumption of validity. The presumption rests on the respect due to the
wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative, by which the law is passed, and the Chief
Executive, by whom the law is
approved,8 For upholding the Constitution is not the responsibility of the judiciary alone but also the
duty of the legislative and executive.9 To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear
and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits. 10 The
annulment cannot be decreed on a doubtful, and arguable implication. The universal rule of legal
hermeneutics is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
law. 11
Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The
people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the
absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power
has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. 12 Not undeservedly,
it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy. 13
Recall is a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in our 1973
Constitution.14 It was mandated in section 2 of Article XI entitled Local Government, viz:
Sec. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code which may
not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members, defining
a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective
system of recall, allocating among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications,
election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall
not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied)
The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled "The Local Government Code of 1983." Section
54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of local elective officials,
i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the
local government unit concerned, viz:
Sec. 54. By Whom Exercised; Requisites. — (1) The power of recall shall be
exercised by the registered voters of the unit to which the local elective official
subject to such recall belongs.
(2) Recall shall be validly initiated only upon petition of at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government
unit concerned based on the election in which the local official sought to be
recalled was elected.
Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided by BP 337 was
exercised by our people.
In February 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall for they resorted to
revolution and they booted of office the highest elective officials of the land.
The successful use of people power to remove public officials who have forfeited the trust of the
electorate led to its firm institutionalization in the 1987 Constitution. Its Article XIII expressly
recognized the Role and Rights of People's Organizations, viz:
Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to
enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their
legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful
means.
People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated
capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership,
membership, and structure.
Sec. 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-
making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by laws, facilitate the establishment
of adequate consultation mechanisms.
Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local government code
which "shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and
referendum. . .," viz :
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsible and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
In response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992. In this Code, Congress provided for
a second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall assembly which in the
provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities. We quote the pertinent provisions of R.A. 7160, viz:
CHAPTER 5 — RECALL
Sec. 69. By Whom Exercised. — The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local
elective official subject to such recall belongs.
Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory
recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to which
the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district,
and municipality which shall be composed of the following:
(1) Provincial Level. — all mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities;
(2) City level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the
city;
(3) Legislative District level. — In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan
members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; in
cases where sangguniang panglungsod members are elected by district , all
elective barangay officials in the district; and
(4) Municipal level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members
in the municipality.
(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in
session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective
official in the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or
municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a
majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned during
its session called for the purpose.
(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may be
validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five (25) percent of the total
number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the
election which in the local official sought to be recalled was elected.
Sec. 71. Election Recall — Upon the filing of a valid resolution petition for with the
appropriate local office of the Comelec, the Commission or its duly authorized
representative shall set the date of the election on recall, which shall not be later
than thirty (30) days after the filing of the resolution or petition recall in the case
of the barangay, city, or municipal officials, forty-five (45) days in the case of
provincial officials. The official or officials sought to be recalled shall automatically
be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent
positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
 Sec. 72. Effectivity of Recall. — The recall of an elective local official shall be
effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of
the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on
recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of
votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.
Sec. 73. Prohibition from Resignation. — The elective local official sought to be
recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress.
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject
of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding regular election.
A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering
a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local elective officials originated from
the House of Representatives A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal
that the idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local
elective officials, originated from the House of Representatives and not the Senate. 15 The legislative
records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall
process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the
direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses. 16 Our lawmakers took note of the
undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized
only once in the City of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed.
Former Congressman Wilfredo Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct action of the
people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement. 17 Consequently,
our legislators added in the a second mode of initiating the recall of local officials thru a preparatory
recall assembly. They brushed aside the argument that this second mode may cause instability in the
local government units due to its imagined ease.
We have belabored the genesis of our recall law for it can light up many of the unillumined interstices
of the law. In resolving constitutional disputes, We should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence
some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional
settings and needs. Prescinding from this proposition, We shall now resolve the contention of
petitioners that the alternative mode of allowing a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the process
of recall is unconstitutional.
It is first postulated by the petitioners that "the right to recall does not extend merely to the
prerogative of the electorate to reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be
recalled at a special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes the sole and exclusive right to
decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings or not." 18
We do not agree. Petitioners cannot point to any specific provision of the Constitution that will sustain
this submission. To be sure, there is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the
people have the "soleand exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The
Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall
elections. 19 Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The
mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose
the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power given was to select which
among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment of
the electorate. Congress was not straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating recall
elections. What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or
many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion,
Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the
former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. Congress has made its choice as called for by
the Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment. The choice may
be erroneous but even then, the remedy against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 20
Petitioners also positive thesis that in passing Resolution 1, the Bataan Preparatory Recall Assembly
did not only initiate the process of recall but had de facto recalled petitioner Garcia from office, a
power reserved to the people alone. To quote the exact language of the petitioners: "The initiation
of a recall through the PRA effectively shortens and ends the term of the incumbent local officials.
Precisely, in the case of Gov. Garcia, an election was scheduled by the COMELEC on 11 October 1993
to determine who has the right to assume the unexpired portion of his term of office which should
have been until June 1995. Having been relegated to the status of a mere candidate for the same
position of governor (by operation of law) he has, therefore, been effectively recalled." 21 In their
Extremely Urgent Clarificatory Manifestation, 22 petitioners put the proposition more bluntly stating
that a "PRA resolution of recall is the re call itself."
Again, the contention cannot command our concurrence. Petitioners have misconstrued the nature
of the initiatory process of recall by the PRAC. They have embraced the view that initiation by the
PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation
by the people, albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It is not constitutionally
impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives. Nothing less than the
paramount task of drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to their representatives,
elected either to act as a constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assembly. The
initiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason why it cannot be entrusted
to and exercised by the elected representatives of the people. More far out is petitioners' stance that
a PRA resolution of recall is the recall itself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of
recall merely, starts the process. It is part of the process but is not the whole process. This ought to
be self evident for a PRA resolution of recall that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will
not recall its subject official. Likewise, a PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in the
election called for the purpose bears no effect whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the
stage for the official concerned to appear before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he
should be allowed to continue in office. Before the people render their sovereign judgment, the
official concerned remains in office but his right to continue in office is subject to question. This is
clear in section 72 of the Local Government Code which states that "the recall of an elective local
official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall."
We shall next settle the contention of petitioners that the disputed law infracts the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Petitioners asseverate:
5.01.2. It denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws for the local officials
constituting the majority party can constitute itself into a PRA and initiate the
recall of a duly elected provincial official belonging to the minority party thus
rendering ineffectual his election by popular mandate. Relevantly, the assembly
could, to the prejudice of the minority (or even partyless) incumbent official,
effectively declare a local elective position vacant (and demand the holding of a
special election) for purely partisan political ends regardless of the mandate of
the electorate. In the case at bar, 64 of the 74 signatories to the recall resolution
have been political opponents of petitioner Garcia, not only did they not vote for
him but they even campaigned against him in the 1992 elections.
Petitioners' argument does not really assail the law but its possible abuse by the members of the
PRAC while exercising their right to initiate recall proceedings. More specifically, the fear is expressed
that the members of the PRAC may inject political color in their decision as they may initiate recall
proceedings only against their political opponents especially those belonging to the minority. A
careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably show that it does not give an asymmetrical
treatment to locally elected officials belonging to the political minority. First to be considered is the
politically neutral composition of the preparatory recall assembly. Sec. 70 (b) of the Code provides:
Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory
recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local government unit to which
the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district,
and municipality which shall be composed of the following:
(1) Provincial level. — All mayors, vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities;
(2) City level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the
city;
(3) Legislative District Level. — In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan
members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; and
in cases where sangguniang panglungsod members are elected by district, all
elective barangay officials in the district; and
(4) Municipal level. — All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members
in the municipality.
Under the law, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and
component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its
membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation
of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the
elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability is that
no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only
ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members of
the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the
people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in
political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of
opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the
law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
The fear that a preparatory recall assembly may be dominated by a political party and that it may use
its power to initiate the recall of officials of opposite political persuasions, especially those belonging
to the minority, is not a ground to strike down the law as unconstitutional. To be sure, this argument
has long been in disuse for there can be no escape from the reality that all powers are susceptible of
abuse. The mere possibility of abuse cannot, however, infirm per se the grant of power to an
individual or entity. To deny power simply because it can be abused by the grantee is to render
government powerless and no people need an impotent government. There is no democratic
government that can operate on the basis of fear and distrust of its officials, especially those elected
by the people themselves. On the contrary, all our laws assume that officials, whether appointed or
elected, will act in good faith and will perform the duties of their office. Such presumption follows the
solemn oath that they took after assumption of office, to faithfully execute all our laws.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a
preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. As explained above, the
diverse and distinct composition of the membership of a preparatory recall assembly guarantees that
all the sectors of the electorate province shall be heard. It is for this reason that in Our Resolution of
September 21, 1993, We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine
qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the
preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. It also requires that
the recall resolution by the said majority must be adopted during its session called for the purpose.
The underscored words carry distinct legal meanings and purvey some of the parameters limiting the
power of the members of a preparatory recall assembly to initiate recall proceedings. Needless to
state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution
of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.
Furthermore, it cannot be asserted with certitude that the members of the Bataan preparatory recall
assembly voted strictly along narrow political lines. Neither the respondent COMELEC nor this Court
made a judicial inquiry as to the reasons that led the members of the said recall assembly to cast a
vote of lack of confidence against petitioner Garcia. That inquiry was not undertaken for to do so
would require crossing the forbidden borders of the political thicket. Former Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., a major author of the subject law in his book The Local Government Code of 1991: The IN VIEW WHEREOF, the original Petition and the Supplemental Petition assailing the constitutionality
Key to National Development, stressed the same reason why the substantive content of a vote of lack of section 70 of R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall
of confidence is beyond any inquiry, thus: process are dismissed for lack of merit. This decision is immediately executory.

There is only one ground for the recall of local government officials: loss of SO ORDERED.
confidence. This means that the people may petition or the Preparatory Recall
Assembly may resolve to recall any local elective officials without specifying any
particular ground except loss of confidence. There is no need for them to bring up
any charge of abuse or corruption against the local elective officials who are the
subject of any recall petition.

In the case of Evardone vs. Commission on Elections, et al., 204 SCRA 464, 472
(1991), the Court ruled that "loss of confidence" as a ground for recall is a political
question. In the words of the Court, "whether or not the electorate of the
municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political
question.

Any assertion therefore that the members of the Bataan preparatory recall assembly voted due to
their political aversion to petitioner Garcia is at best a surmise.

Petitioners also contend that the resolution of the members of the preparatory recall assembly
subverted the will of the electorate of the province of Bataan who elected petitioner Garcia with a
majority of 12,500 votes. Again, the contention proceeds from the erroneous premise that the
resolution of recall is the recall itself. It refuses to recognize the reality that the resolution of recall is
a mere proposal to the electorate of Bataan to subject petitioner to a new test of faith. The proposal
will still be passed upon by the sovereign electorate of Bataan. As this judgment has yet to be
expressed, it is premature to conclude that the sovereign will of the electorate of Bataan has been
subverted. The electorate of Bataan may or may not recall petitioner Garcia in an appropriate
election. If the electorate re-elects petitioner Garcia, then the proposal to recall him made by the
preparatory recall assembly is rejected. On the other hand, if the electorate does not re-elect
petitioner Garcia, then he has lost the confidence of the people which he once enjoyed. The judgment
will write finis to the political controversy. For more than judgments of courts of law, the judgment
of the tribunal of the people is final for "sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them."

In sum, the petition at bench appears to champion the sovereignty of the people, particularly their
direct right to initiate and remove elective local officials thru recall elections. If the petition would
succeed, the result will be a return to the previous system of recall elections which Congress found
should be improved. The alternative mode of initiating recall proceedings thru a preparatory recall
assembly is, however, an innovative attempt by Congress to remove impediments to the effective
exercise by the people of their sovereign power to check the performance of their elected officials.
The power to determine this mode was specifically given to Congress and is not proscribed by the
Constitution.
G.R. No. 164702 March 15, 2006 These provisions of [the] statute were transformed into the following formulas by the Supreme Court
in Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 136781, 136786 & 136795, October 6, 2000).
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM) and BUTIL FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL), Petitioners,
vs. For the party-list candidate garnering the highest number of votes, the following formula was
The HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), represented by its HON. CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN adopted:
ABALOS, SR., Respondent.

Number of votes of first party

DECISION Proportion of votes of first party
= relative to total votes for the party-list
PUNO, J.: system
Total votes for party-list system
The petition at bar involves the formula for computing the additional seats due, if any, for winners in
party-list elections.
And for the additional seats of other parties who reached the required two percent mark, the
The antecedents are undisputed. following formula applies:

Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent COMELEC regarding the formula to be
No. of votes of
adopted in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners in the May 10, 2004 elections. In
concerned party
response, the respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835,1 adopting the simplified formula
of "one additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list votes." The resolution reads: Additional seats No. of additional seats
= x
concerned party allocated to the first party
Considering that the simplified formula has long been the one adopted by the Commission and is now No. of votes of first
the formula of choice of the Supreme Court in its latest resolution on the matter, the Commission party
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the simplified formula of one additional seat per
additional two percent of the total party-list votes in the proclamation of the party-list winners in the
coming May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections.2(emphasis supplied)
The applicability of these formulas was reiterated in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Supreme
Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 147589) and Bayan Muna
In finding that this simplified formula is the "formula of choice of the Supreme Court," respondent
vs. COMELEC, et al. (G.R. No. 147613) penned by Justice Artemio Panganiban, wherein the Court
Commission quoted the memorandum of Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, Commissioner-In-Charge
declared that party-list BUHAY was not entitled to an additional seat even if it garnered 4.46 [percent]
for Party-List concerns, viz:
of the total party-list votes, contrary to BUHAY's contention which was based on the COMELEC
simplified formula of one additional seat per an additional two percent of the total party-list votes.
By way of review, following is a highlight of the legal discourse on the two [percent] vote requirement
for the party-list system and the corollary issue on additional seat allocation.
However, on November 10, 2003,3 the Supreme Court promulgated a Resolution in the same case,
this time penned by Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., granting BUHAY's motion for reconsideration of
Section 11(b) and Section 12 of R.A. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provide that "the parties, the June 25, 2003 Resolution, to wit:
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each, provided that those garnering more than two percent
It is thus established in the Resolution of 25 June 2003 that, like APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN,
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes xxx.
BUHAY had obtained more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast for the
The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis,
party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats. Accordingly, just like the first
rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
four whose additional nominees are now holding office as member of the House of Representatives,
proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization or
BUHAY should be declared entitled to one additional seat.
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system."

Effectively, the Supreme Court, with Justices Jose Vitug and Panganiban registering separate opinions,
adopted the simplified COMELEC formula of one additional seat per additional two percent of the
total party-list votes garnered when it declared BUHAY entitled to one additional seat and proceeded
12 Veterans Freedom Party (VFP) 340,759 2.6785
to order the COMELEC to proclaim BUHAY's second nominee.4 (emphasis supplied)

Party-List Canvass Report No. 205 showed that the total number of votes cast for all the party-list Cooperative Natcco Network Party (COOP-
13 270,950 2.1298
participants in the May 10, 2004 elections was 12,721,952 and the following parties, organizations NATCCO)
and coalitions received at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system, to
wit:
14 Anak Mindanao (AMIN) 269,750 2.1204

Percentage to
Votes 15 Ang Laban ng Indiginong Filipino (ALIF) 269,345 2.1172
Rank Party-List Group Total Votes Cast
Received
(%)
16 An Waray (AN WARAY) 268,164 2.1079

1 Bayan Muna (BAYAN MUNA) 1,203,305 9.4585

Based on the simplified formula, respondent Commission issued Resolution No. NBC 04-
Association of Philippine Electric 0046 proclaiming the following parties, organizations and coalition as winners and their qualified
2 934,995 7.3495
Cooperatives (APEC) nominees as representatives to the House of Representatives:

3 Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party (AKBAYAN!) 852,473 6.7008 BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA) - 3 seats

1. Saturnino C. Ocampo
4 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY) 705,730 5.5473

2. Teodoro A. Casiño, Jr.

3. Joel G. Virador
5 Anakpawis (AP) 538,396 4.2320
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC) - 3 seats

6 Citizen's Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) 495,193 3.8924

1. Edgar L. Valdez

7 Gabriela Women's Party (GABRIELA) 464,586 3.6518 2. Ernesto G. Pablo

8 Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) 448,072 3.5220 3. Sunny Rose A. Madamba

AKBAYAN! CITIZEN'S ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN!) - 3 seats

9 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL) 429,259 3.3742

1. Loreta Ann P. Rosales

10 Alliance of Volunteer Educators (AVE) 343,498 2.7000
2. Mario Joyo Aguja
11 Alagad (ALAGAD) 340,977 2.6802
3. Ana Theresa Hontiveros-Baraquel
BUHAY HAYAAN YUMABONG (BUHAY) - 2 seats Guillermo P. Cua

1. Rene M. Velarde AN WARAY (AN WARAY) - 1 seat

2. Hans Christian M. Señeres Florencio G. Noel

ANAKPAWIS (AP) - 2 seats ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN) - 1 seat

1. Crispin B. Beltran Mujiv S. Hataman7

2. Rafael V. Mariano
CITIZEN'S BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) - 1 seat
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY (GABRIELA) - 1 seat
Subsequently, ALIF was also proclaimed as "duly-elected party-list participant and its nominee, Hadji
Acmad M. Tomawis, as elected representative to the House of Representatives." 8
On June 22, 2004, petitioners PM and BUTIL, together with CIBAC, filed a Joint Motion for Immediate
Proclamation9 with the respondent Commission en banc. They prayed that they be declared as
entitled to one (1) additional seat each and their respective second nominees be proclaimed as duly
elected members of the House of Representatives. As basis, they cited the formula used by the Court
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,10 viz:

Liza Largoza-Maza
Votes Cast for Qualified Party
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM) - 1 seat
Additional Seats = x Allotted Seats for First Party

Renato B. Magtubo Votes Cast for First Party

BUTIL FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL) - 1 seat

On June 25, 2004, petitioners and CIBAC filed a Supplement to the Joint Motion (For Immediate
Benjamin A. Cruz Proclamation)11 to justify their entitlement to an additional seat, as follows:

ALLIANCE OF VOLUNTEER EDUCATORS (AVE) - 1 seat 5. To compute the additional seats that movants are entitled to using the Veterans formula of the
Supreme Court in the aforesaid Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna cases, and
Eulogio R. Magsaysay Party List Canvass Report No. 20, the following process is done: Bayan Muna is the "First Party" with
1,203,305 votes. To determine the number of seats allocated to the first party, we use the Veterans
formula, to wit:
ALAGAD (ALAGAD) - 1 seat

xxx Number of votes of

first party
VETERANS FREEDOM PARTY (VFP) - 1 seat Proportion of votes of first party relative to total
=
votes for party-list system
Ernesto S. Gidaya Total Votes for party-
list system
COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY (COOP-NATCCO) - 1 seat
Applying this formula, we arrive at 9.4585%
1,203,305

1,203,305
8. All the foregoing results are greater than one (1); therefore, the movant-party list organizations are
= 9.4585%
entitled to one (1) additional seat each.12
12,721,952
On July 31, 2004, respondent Commission en banc, issued Resolution No. NBC 04-011,13 viz:

6. Having obtained 9.4585%, the first party, Bayan Muna, is allotted three (3) seats. This pertains to the 06 July 2004 Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee, National Board of
Canvassers, submitting its comment/recommendation on the petition filed by Luzon Farmers Party
(BUTIL), Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Gabriela
7. The number of additional seats that the movants are entitled to are determined as follows: Women's Party for additional seat and to immediately proclaim their respective second nominees to
the House of Representatives, and the letter of Atty. Ivy Perucho, Legal counsel of the CIBAC, relative
to the Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation filed by BUTIL, CIBAC, PM requesting to calendar for
Votes Cast for Qualified Party
resolution the said Joint Motion.
Additional Seats = x Allotted Seats for First Party
The Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee reads:
Votes Cast for First Party
"This has reference to the Urgent Motion for Resolution (re: Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation
dated 22 June 2004) filed on July 1, 2004 by movants Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Citizens Battle
Against Corruption (CIBAC) and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), NBC Case No. 04-197 (195) and a
similar motion filed by party-list Gabriela Women's Party (NBC No. 04-200) through counsel, praying
For BUTIL, the computation is as follows:
to declare that the herein movants are entitled to one (1) additional seat each, and to immediately
429,259 proclaim the second nominees, to wit: x x x

Additional Seats = x3 = 1.0701 The Supreme Court, in its latest Resolution promulgated on November 10, 2003 (sic) in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. Comelec, et al. (G.R. No. 147589) and Bayan Muna vs. Comelec, et al.
1,203,305 (G.R. No. 147613), laid down a simplified formula of one additional seat per additional two (2) percent
of the total party list votes.
For CIBAC, the computation is:
The same simplified formula was adopted by the Commission in its Resolution No. 6835 promulgated
08 May 2004, to quote:
495,193

Additional Seats = x3 = 1.2345 "The additional seats of other parties who reached the required two percent mark, the following
formula applies:
1,203,305

For PM, the computation is:

No. of votes of
Additional seats for No. of additional seats
= concerned party x
448,072 concerned party allocated to first party
Additional Seats = x3 = 1.1171

No. of votes of the
first party
The aforenamed party-list organizations have not obtained the required additional two (2) percent of
the total party-list votes for them to merit an additional seat.
For your Honors' consideration."
xxx
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to direct the
Supervisory Committee to cause the re-tabulation of the votes for Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC), Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Gabriela Women's Party
(Gabriela) and to submit its comment/recommendation, together with the tabulated figures of the
foregoing parties, for appropriate action of the Commission.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution and to furnish copies hereof to the parties
concerned for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.14 (emphases supplied)
For failure of the respondent Commission to resolve the substantive issues raised by petitioners and
to cause the re-tabulation of the party-list votes despite the lapse of time, petitioners PM and BUTIL
filed the instant petition on August 18, 2004. They seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent Commission: a) to convene as the National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List System;
b) to declare them as entitled to one (1) additional seat each; c) to immediately proclaim their
respective second nominees; d) to declare other similarly situated party-list organizations as entitled
to one (1) additional seat each; and e) to immediately proclaim similarly situated parties' second
nominees as duly elected representatives to the House of Representatives. 15 They submit as sole
issue:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC, AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR
THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, COULD BE COMPELLED BY THE HONORABLE COURT TO MECHANICALLY
APPLY THE FORMULA STATED IN ITS 25 JUNE 2003 RESOLUTION REITERATED IN THE 20 NOVEMBER
2003 RESOLUTION IN ANG BAGONG BAYANI CASES IN THE DETERMINATION OF QUALIFIED PARTY-
LIST ORGANIZATIONS AND IN THE PROCLAMATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NOMINEES. 16
We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent Commission, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, submits that petitioners' recourse to a petition for mandamus with this Court is
improper. It raises the following procedural issues: (a) the proper remedy from the assailed resolution
of the respondent Commission is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; (b) the
instant action was filed out of time; and (c) failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
resolution with the respondent Commission is fatal to petitioners' action.17
In assailing petitioners' recourse to a petition for mandamus, respondent Commission relies on
Section 7, Article IX(A) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any decision, order or ruling" of
the respondent Commission "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." It contends that in Aratuc v. COMELEC18 and
Dario v. Mison,19 this provision was construed as the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65
and not the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. Respondent Commission further contends that its
duty to proclaim the second nominees of PM and BUTIL is not ministerial but discretionary, hence, it
is not subject to the writ of mandamus.
The arguments fail to impress.
Under the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.20We have consistently ruled that where the duty of the respondent Commission is
ministerial, mandamus lies to compel its performance.21 A purely ministerial act, as distinguished
from a discretionary act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.22
The case at bar is one of mandamus over which this Court has jurisdiction for it is respondent
Commission's ministerial duty to apply the formula as decided by this Court after interpreting the
existing law on party-list representation. It is given that this Court has the ultimate authority to
interpret laws and the Constitution.23Respondent Commission has no discretion to refuse
enforcement of any decision of this Court under any guise or guile.
In any event, it is the averments in the complaint, and not the nomenclature given by the parties, that
determine the nature of the action.24 Though captioned as a Petition for Mandamus, the same may
be treated as a petition for certiorari and mandamus considering that it alleges that the respondent
Commission acted contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, hence, with grave abuse of discretion and
without jurisdiction. In previous rulings,25 we have treated differently labeled actions as special civil
actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for reasons such as "justice, equity and fairplay" 26 and "novelty of
the issue presented and its far-reaching effects."27 The petition at bar involves the rightful
representation in the House of Representatives of the marginalized groups by the party-list winners
and their constitutional claim merits more than a disposition based on thin technicality.
Next, respondent Commission contends that the petition at bar was filed belatedly. Under Article
IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution and Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the instant petition
must be filed within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of the decision, order or ruling to be
reviewed. Since more than 30 days have lapsed from the time PM and BUTIL allegedly received notice
of respondent Commission's Resolution No. 6835, it is urged that the instant petition was filed out of
time.28
Again, the contention is without merit.
We have interpreted Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution and Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the respondent Commission rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.29 Before resolving whether Resolution No. 6835
was rendered in the exercise of respondent Commission's adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, we
recapitulate the pertinent events.
On May 8, 2004, respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835. On June 2, 2004, it also issued
Resolution No. NBC 04-004 holding petitioners entitled to only one (1) nominee each on the basis of
Resolution No. 6835. On June 22, 2004, petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation
with party-list co-participant CIBAC, claiming entitlement to an additional seat using the formula
stated in Ang Bagong Bayani. Thereafter, they filed their Supplement to the Joint Motion (For
Immediate Proclamation). On July 1, 2004, they filed an Urgent Motion for Resolution (Re: Joint
Motion for Immediate Proclamation dated 22 June 2004) and again, on July 12, 2004, they filed their
Motion to Resolve (Re: Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation filed on 22 June 2004). In response,
respondent Commission en banc issued Resolution No. NBC 04-011 quoted above, which directed the
Supervisory Committee "to cause the re-tabulation of the votes" of CIBAC, GABRIELA and petitioners
PM and BUTIL. The resolution referred to the Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee which
adopted the simplified formula in Resolution No. 6835. Without further ado, petitioners BUTIL and
PM filed the instant petition on August 18, 2004 or eighteen (18) days after the promulgation of
Resolution No. NBC 04-011. Clearly, the instant petition was timely filed. We hold that Resolution No.
6835 was not rendered in the exercise of respondent COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers. Its issuance
was not brought about by a matter or case filed before the respondent Commission. Rather, it was
issued by the respondent Commission in the exercise of its administrative function to enforce and
administer election laws to ensure an orderly election.
Finally, respondent Commission contends that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration
of Resolution No. 6835 is fatal.
Again, the argument is without merit.
Under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of an
en banc ruling, order or decision of the respondent Commission is not allowed. Moreover, the issue
of what formula applies in determining the additional seats to be allocated to party-list winners is a
pure question of law that is a recognized exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.30
We shall now resolve the substantive issue: the formula for computing the additional seats due, if
any, for winners in party-list elections.
Petitioners cite the formula crafted by the Court in the landmark case of Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC.31They allege that the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v.
COMELEC32 "reiterated that the additional seats for qualified party-list organizations shall be
computed in accordance with the above formula in Veterans" and that the November 20, 2003
Resolution33 of the Court in the same case "had not departed from its 25 June 2003 Resolution."34
A review of the pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence on the party-list system is appropriate.
The Constitution provides:
Art. VI, Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations. (emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the Constitution's mandate, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, also known as the "Party-
List System Act," to "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system." The law provides as follows:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.-- xxx
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
the proportion of their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives.-- The COMELEC shall tally all
the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to
the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system. (emphases supplied)
These provisions on the party-list system were put to test in the May 11, 1998 elections. In the
landmark case of Veterans,35 several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers
for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed by some
parties and organizations that had obtained at least two percent of the total party-list votes cast in
the May 11, 1998 party-list elections, against COMELEC and 38 other parties, organizations and
Number of votes of
coalitions which had been declared by COMELEC as entitled to party-list seats in the House of
first party
Representatives. The following issues were raised: 1) whether the twenty percent constitutional
allocation is mandatory; 2) whether the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit Proportion of votes of first party relative to total
=
under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is constitutional; and 3) how the additional seats of a qualified votes for party-list system
party should be determined. In said case, the Court set the "four inviolable parameters" of the party- Total votes for Party-
list system under the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, to wit: list system

First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat
in the House of Representatives.
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled
to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding
off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have
one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first
party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it xxx
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.
Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties
are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following
Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled complex fraction:
to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

Likewise, the Court spelled out the formula for allocating the seats for party-list winners, thus: No. of votes of
concerned party
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well
as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations
and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then Total No. of votes for
the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties party-list system
participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one No. of additional seats
Additional seats for
seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party = x allocated to the first
concerned party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party. party
No. of votes of first
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to party
be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that
to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes. Total No. of votes for
party-list system
xxx

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? x x x The formula x x x In simplified form, it is written as follows:
is as follows:
 No. of votes of 235,548/503,487 * 1 =
8. ABANSE!PINAY 235,548 2.57% 1 1
concerned party 0.47
No. of additional seats
Additional seats for
= x allocated to the first
concerned party 232,376/503,487 * 1 =
party36 9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 1
No. of votes of first 0.46
party
215,643/503,487 * 1 =
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 1
0.43
(emphases supplied)

194,617/503,487 * 1 =
Applying this formula, the Court found the outcome of the May 11, 1998 party-list elections as 11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 1
0.39
follows:

189,802/503,487 * 1 =
%age Initial 12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% 1 1
0.38
Votes of No.
Organization Additional Seats Total
Garnered Total of
Votes Seats 186,388/503,487 * 1 =
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 137
0.37

1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2

The case of Ang Bagong Bayani arose during the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. Two petitions for
321,646/503,487 * 1 = certiorari were filed by several party-list candidates: (a) to challenge a resolution of the COMELEC
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 1
0.64 approving the participation of some 154 organizations and parties in the May 14, 2001 party-list
elections; and (b) to disqualify certain parties classified as "political parties" and
"organizations/coalitions" by COMELEC. In a Decision dated June 26, 2001, the Court established the
312,500/503,487 * 1 =
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 1 eight-point guideline38 for the screening of party-list participants. The case was then remanded to the
0.62
COMELEC for the immediate conduct of summary evidentiary hearings to implement the eight-point
guideline.
4. VETERANS 304,802/503,487 * 1 =
304,802 3.33% 1 1
FEDERATION 0.61 In due time, COMELEC submitted its compliance reports to the Court. Based on the compliance
reports, the Court issued several resolutions proclaiming BAYAN MUNA with its three nominees and
AKBAYAN!, BUTIL, APEC and CIBAC, with one nominee each, as party-list winners.39
255,184/503,487 * 1 =
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 1
0.51
Subsequently, several motions for proclamation were filed by other party-list participants. In
resolving the motions, the Court had to consider, among others, the effect of the disqualification after
239,042/503,487 * 1 = the elections of many party-list participants to the total votes cast for the party-list elections. In the
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 1
0.47 previous case of Labo v. COMELEC,40 this Court ruled that the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified
candidate cannot be considered "stray" except when the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law
of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but
238,303/503,487 * 1 = nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In its Resolution dated June 25, 2003,
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 1
0.47 the Court held that the Labo doctrine cannot be applied to the party-list system in view of Sec. 10 of
R.A. No. 7941 which expressly provides that the votes cast for a party, a sectoral organization or a
coalition "not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted." The Court then proceeded to determine
1,708,253
the number of nominees the party-list winners were entitled, thus:41

We shall now determine the number of nominees each winning party is entitled to, in accordance = 0.51
with the formula in Veterans. For purposes of determining the number of its nominees, BAYAN MUNA
(the party that obtained the highest number of votes) is considered the first party. The applicable
formula is as follows: Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat. It is entitled to only one
qualifying seat like all the other qualified parties that are ranked below it, as shown in Table No. 3:
Number of votes of
first party Table No. 3
Proportion of votes of first party relative to total
=
votes for party-list system Rank Party-list Votes Percentage (%) Additional Seats
Total votes for party-
list system
2 APEC 802,060 12.29 n/c

3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79 n/c

Applying this formula, we arrive at 26.19 percent:

xxx 4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06 n/c

Having obtained 26.19 percent, BAYAN MUNA is entitled to three (3) seats. This finding is pursuant to 5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96 n/c
our ruling in Veterans x x x.

6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46 0.51

xxx

[W]e shall compute only the additional seat or seats to be allocated, if any, to the other qualified 7 AMIN 252,051 3.86 0.44
parties -- BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY.
8 ABA 242,199 3.71 0.42
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:

9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51 0.40

Votes Cast for Qualified
Party
Additional Allotted Seats for First 10 PM 216,823 3.32 0.38
= x
Seats Party

Votes Cast for First Party 11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31 0.26

290,760 12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07 0.24

= x 3

The additional seats for APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC, if any, were not determined in the Court's
Resolution dated June 25, 2003, as there was a separate pending motion filed by BAYAN MUNA to set
aside the resolution of the COMELEC proclaiming APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC's respective
additional nominees.
Dissatisfied by the Court's June 25, 2003 Resolution, BUHAY filed a motion to have it declared as
entitled to one (1) additional seat. On November 20, 2003, in the same case of Ang Bagong
Bayani,42 the Court computed the additional seats for APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC in
accordance with the formula stated in the Court's Resolution dated June 25, 2003, and found the
results as follows:
APEC -- 1.40
Second, in the November 20, 2003 Resolution in Ang Bagong Bayani, the Court gave an additional seat
to BUHAY only because it was similarly situated to APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN which "had
obtained more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast for the party-list
system and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats." Well to note, the grant of an additional
seat to BUHAY was pro hac vice, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby RESOLVES, pro hac vice
1. To consider closed and terminated the issue regarding the proclamation by the COMELEC
of the additional nominees of APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN, such nominees having
taken their oath and assumed office;

AKBAYAN -- 0.66 2. To DECLARE that BUHAY is entitled to one (1) additional seat in the party-list system in
the elections of May 2001 and;
BUTIL -- 0.58
3. To ORDER the COMELEC to proclaim BUHAY's second nominee.

CIBAC -- 0.56
SO ORDERED.46 (emphasis supplied)

Then, the Court resolved pro hac vice to grant BUHAY's motion, reasoning that:
It is thus established in the Resolution of 25 June 2003 that, like APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN,
BUHAY had obtained more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast for the
party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats. Accordingly, just like the first
four whose additional nominees are now holding office as member of the House of Representatives,
BUHAY should be declared entitled to additional seat.43
In light of all these antecedents, we deny the petition.
Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion."47 A ruling expressly qualified
as pro hac vice cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. It was therefore erroneous
for respondent Commission to apply the November 20, 2003 Resolution and rule that the formula in
Veterans has been abandoned.
The confusion in the petition at bar must have been created by the way the Veterans formula was
cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani.48 Be that as it may, we
reiterate that the prevailing formula for the computation of additional seats for party-list winners is
the formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans, viz:

No. of votes of
The formula in the landmark case of Veterans prevails.
concerned party
Additional seats for No. of additional seats
First, the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani referred to the Veterans case = x
concerned party allocated to first party49
in determining the number of seats due for the party-list winners. The footnote on said resolution in
computing the additional seats for the party-list winners states: "[f]or a discussion of how to compute No. of votes of the
additional nominees for parties other than the first, see Veterans, supra, at pp. 280-282. x x x."44 The first party
Court likewise held that:

We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised in Veterans for computing the Applying said formula to the undisputed figures in Party-List Canvass Report No. 20, we do not find
number of nominees that the party-list winners are entitled to cannot be disregarded by the petitioners entitled to any additional seat. Thus:
concerned agencies of government, especially the Commission on Elections. These formulas ensure
that the number of seats allocated to the winning party-list candidates conform to the principle of
proportional representation mandated by the law.45(emphases supplied) Additional seats for PM = 448,072 x 2
 1,203,305

= 0.74

429,259

Additional seats for BUTIL = x 2

1,203,305

= 0.71

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172103 April 13, 2007
CITIZENS’ BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GARCIA, (COMELEC), represented by CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS,
SR.,Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 7, 2006
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 06-0248,2 which rejected the Motion for
Proclamation of the Second Nominees of Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), et al. under the
party-list system in connection with the May 2004 National and Local Elections.
The Facts
The COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List System, issued
Resolution No. NBC 04-0043 promulgated on June 2, 2004, which proclaimed petitioner CIBAC as one
of those which qualified to occupy a seat in Congress having received the required two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list representatives. Based on Party-List Canvass Report No.
19,4 CIBAC received a total number of 493,546 votes out of the 12,627,852 votes cast for all the party-
list participants, which, by applying the formula adopted by the Supreme Court in Veterans Federation
Party v. COMELEC,5 resulted in a percentage of 3.9084.6 In the computation for additional seats for
the parties, the COMELEC adopted a simplified formula of one additional seat per additional 2%,
thereby foreclosing the chances of CIBAC to gain an additional seat under the party-list system for
having received less than what was prescribed by the poll body.7
On June 22, 2004, petitioner CIBAC, together with Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL) and Partido ng
Manggagawa (PM), filed a Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation8 entreating the COMELEC en
banc to recognize their entitlement to an additional seat and that their second nominees be
immediately proclaimed. They based their claim on Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC
(Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna), applying the following Veterans formula:
1awphi1.nét
Votes Cast for Qualified Party
Additional Seats = x Allotted Seats
Votes Cast for First Party for First Party9
On March 7, 2006, the COMELEC en banc issued the challenged Resolution No. 06-0248 contained in
the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular En Banc Meeting of the COMELEC, 10 which adopted the
March 6, 2006 Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee relative to the Urgent Motion to Resolve
the Motion for Proclamation of the Second Nominees of CIBAC, BUTIL, and PM party-lists, in
connection with the May 2004 elections for party-list representatives. The pertinent portion reads:
"On 01 May 2004, Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, then CIC on Party-List Concerns, acting on queries
from several party-list candidates regarding the formula to be used by the Commission in determining
the additional seats for party list winners in the 10 May 2004 elections, issued a memorandum on the
matter to the Commission en-banc. As a result, on the [sic] 08 May 2004, the Commission en banc
promulgated Resolution No. 6835 (Annex ‘A’) the resolutory portion of which reads… ‘RESOLVES, to
adopt the simplified formula of one additional seat per additional two percent (underscoring
supplied) of the total party-list votes in the proclamation of the party-list winners in the coming 10
May 2004 National and Local Elections.’
The Party List Canvass Report No. 22 of the National Board of Canvassers, (Annex ‘B’) shows that
CIBAC, BUTIL and PM have the following percentage of total votes garnered:
CIBAC - 3.8638
BUTIL - 3.3479
PM - 3.4947
Following the simplified formula of the Commission, after the first 2% is deducted from the
percentage of votes of the above-named party-lists, they are no longer entitled to an additional seat.
It is worth mentioning that the Commission, consistent with its formula, denied the petition for a seat
of ABA-AKO and ANAD after garnering a percentage of votes of 1.9900 and 1.9099 respectively.
For consideration."
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the
recommendation of the Supervisory Committee to deny the foregoing Motion of CIBAC, BUTIL and
PM party-lists for proclamation of second nominees, following the simplified formula of the
Commission on the matter per Comelec Resolution No. 6835 promulgated 08 May 2004.
The Issues
Undeterred, CIBAC filed the instant Petition for Certiorari11 before this Court, raising two issues,
viz:1^vvphi1.net
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, IN ADOPTING THE SIMPLIFIED FORMULA OF
ONE ADDITIONAL SEAT PER ADDITIONAL TWO PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PARTY-LIST VOTES IN THE
PROCLAMATION OF THE PARTY-LIST WINNERS IN THE MAY 10, 2004 NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTION,
THUS, ADJUDGING THE PETITIONER HEREIN AS ENTITLED ONLY TO ONE (1) SEAT, ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CIBAC, AND OTHER PARTY-LIST GROUPS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ARE
ENTITLED TO ONE (1) ADDITIONAL SEAT BASED ON THE FORMULA CRAFTED BY THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE CASES OF ANG BAGONG BAYANI AND BAYAN MUNA.12
In gist, the core issue is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied
petitioner CIBAC an additional seat in the House of Representatives under the party-list system by
using the simplified formula instead of the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula.
Petitioner CIBAC asseverates that the COMELEC committed a serious departure from settled
jurisprudence amounting to grave abuse of discretion when it mistakenly relied on the "simplified
formula" as the basis for its resolution. Moreover, it stressed that the COMELEC simplified formula
runs counter to the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the "number of allotted
seats for the first party" as multiplier. If the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula were
applied, CIBAC would be entitled to one additional seat, thus:
495,193 x 3
Additional seats = = 1.2345
1,203,305
Lastly, petitioner faults the COMELEC for its failure to act on and so dismiss the petitions for
disqualification filed by the other party-list groups which could have enabled the COMELEC to "make
an accurate determination of the votes that each party-list group has actually obtained." It therefore
asks the Court to set aside the assailed COMELEC Resolution No. 06-0248; and direct the COMELEC
to declare CIBAC as entitled to one (1) additional seat and to immediately proclaim Ma. Blanca Kim
Bernardo-Lokin, its second nominee, as member of the House of Representatives.
The Court’s Ruling
Entitlement to an additional seat
In deciding the controversy at hand, a second look at the enabling law, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941,
"An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor," is in order. The objective of the law was made clear in Section 2, thus:
Declaration of Policy.––The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Emphasis supplied.)
In determining the number of seats a party-list is entitled to, Sec. 11 prescribes that:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats (emphasis supplied).
The Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the four (4) inviolable parameters to determine the
winners in a Philippine-style party-list election mandated by the Constitution and R.A. 7941, as
follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation––the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold––only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit––each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation––the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall
be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."13 (Emphasis supplied.)
In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2% threshold,
"proportional representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats.
The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional seats of the first party and other
qualified party-list groups was clearly explicated in Veterans:
[H]ow do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the
law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat.
Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it No. of votes of
should be entitled to twice the latter’s number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for the first party
computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes of first party xxxx

Proportion of votes of first party relative to
=
total votes for party-list system
Total votes for party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled
to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding
off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have
one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first
party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted the six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum
number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number
of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and
are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties
are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of
Representatives.
xxxx
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled
to, based on proportional representation. x x x
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional
seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is
necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not
rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a
number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots.
An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would
result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two
additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
On June 25, 2003, the formula was put to test in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna.1ªvvphi1.nét In
determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties—BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM,
SANLAKAS, and ABANSE! PINAY––the following computation was made:
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:
Votes Cast for
Qualified Party
Additional Seats = x Allotted Seats for First Party
Votes Cast for
First Party
290,760

xxxx = x3

In simplified form, it is written as follows: 1,708,253

1ªvvphi1.nét = 0.51

Additional seats No. of votes of No. of additional seats allocated to first

for concerned = concerned x party Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat.15
party party (Emphasis supplied.)
From a scrutiny of the Veterans and Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formulae in determining the
additional seats for party-list representatives, it is readily apparent that the Veterans formula is
materially different from the one used in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. In Veterans, the
multiplier used was "the [number] of additional seats allocated to the first party," while in the Ang
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula, the multiplier "allotted seats for first party" was applied.
The dissimilarity in the multiplier used spells out a big difference in the outcome of the equation. This
divergence on the multiplier was pointed out and stressed by respondent COMELEC. Nevertheless,
petitioner insists that the correct multiplier is the ALLOTTED seats for the first party referring to the
three (3) seats won by Bayan Muna which emerged as the winning first party, as allegedly prescribed
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. On this issue, petitioner ratiocinates this way:
It cannot be emphasized enough that the formula in the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna cases
rendered in 2003, effectively modified the earlier Veterans formula, with the clear and explicit use of
the "allotted seats for the first party". Considering that the first party, Bayan Muna, was allotted to
the maximum three (3) seats under the law, it is therefore clear that the multiplier to be used is three
(3), the allotted seats for the first party.16
However, this postulation is bereft of merit and basis.1awphi1.nét
A careful perusal of the four corners of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna betrays petitioner’s claim
as it did not mention any revision or reshaping of the Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, the Court
had in mind the application of the original Veterans formula in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna.
This conclusion is based on the aforequoted formula in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna, as
follows:
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:
Votes Cast for Qualified Party
Additional Seats = x Allotted Seats for First Party
Votes Cast for First Party
290,760
= x 3
1,708,253
= 0.51
The phrase "applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY" admits of no other conclusion than
that the Court merely applied the Veterans formula to Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna in
resolving the additional seats by the other qualified party-list groups. However, it appears that there
was an inaccurate presentation of the Veterans formula as the Court used the multiplier "allotted
seats for the first party" in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna instead of the "[number] of additional
seats allocated to the first party" prescribed in the Veterans formula. It is apparent that the phrase
"[number] of additional" was omitted, possibly by inadvertence from the phrase "allotted seats for
First Party." The disparity is material, substantial, and significant since the multiplier "[number] of
additional seats allocated to the First Party" prescribed in the Veterans formula pertains to a
multiplier of two (2) seats, while the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party" in Ang Bagong Bayani
and Bayan Muna formula can mean a multiplier of maximum three (3) seats, since the first party can
garner a maximum of three (3) seats.
Moreover, footnote 37 of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna states that "for a discussion of how to
compute additional nominees for parties other than the first, see Veterans x x x." It clarifies the
confusion created by the imprecise formula expressed in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. Thus,
the Court rules that the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula has not modified the
Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, there was really no other formula approved by the Court other
than the Veterans formula in fixing the number of additional seats for the other qualified party-list
groups. Also, in Partido ng Manggagawa v. COMELEC, the Court found that the confusion in the
computation of additional seats for the other qualified party-list groups arose "[from] the way the
Veterans formula was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani." We
reiterated that "the prevailing formula for the computation of additional seats for party-list winners
is the formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans x x x."17
Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner’s case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled
to an additional seat. Party-List Canvass Report No. 2018 contained in the petition shows that the first
party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a total of 1,203,305 votes.
Petitioner CIBAC, on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was proclaimed that the first
party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats19 based on June 2, 2004 Resolution
No. NBC 04-004 of the COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans formula would therefore lead us
to the following result:
1awphi1.nét
No. of votes of concerned No. of additional
party seats allocated
to Additional Seats for
x =
the first party concerned party
(Emphasis
No. of votes of the first party supplied.)
Applying this formula, the result is as follows:
495,190
x 2 =
 1,203,305 a precedent to future cases. The simplified formula having already been abandoned, the COMELEC
should have used and adhered to the Veterans formula.

0.41152493 x 2 = 0.82304986
The Court has consistently reminded the COMELEC of its "function to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." As judicial decisions form part of the law of
the land, the COMELEC cannot just ignore or be oblivious to the rulings issued by the Court. Basic is
This is a far cry from the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the the rule that lower courts and quasi-judicial tribunals must bow to the decisions and resolutions of
multiplier "allotted seats for the first party," viz: the highest court of the land. The COMELEC is not an exception. It cannot do otherwise.

Votes Cast for WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed March 7, 2006 Comelec Resolution
Qualified Party No. 06-0248 is hereby AFFIRMED only insofar as it denied petitioner CIBAC’s motion for the
proclamation of its second nominee to an additional seat under the 2004 party-list elections. The
Additional Seats = x Allotted Seats for First Party portion of Comelec Resolution No. 06-0248, which adopted and applied the "simplified formula of
the Commission on the matter per Comelec Resolution No. 6835 promulgated 08 May 2004," is
Votes Cast for annulled and set aside. Respondent Comelec is ordered to strictly apply the Veterans formula in
First Party determining the entitlement of qualified party-list groups to additional seats in the party-list system.
No costs.
Applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula to CIBAC, it yields the following
result: SO ORDERED

495,190

Additional seats = x 3 = 1.2345

1,203,305

Unfortunately, it is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong
Bayani and Bayan Muna formula that petitioner alleges.

Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one (1), then it did not obtain
or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that
"in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary." Clearly,
petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat.

COMELEC’s application of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna is incorrect

The Court laments the fact that the COMELEC insisted in using a simplified formula when it is fully
aware of the ruling in the Veterans case. The COMELEC explained that it "merely based its judgment
on Comelec Resolution No. 6835 which cited Supreme Court Resolution20 dated 20 November 2003
granting BUHAY’s Motion for Reconsideration and entitling it to one additional seat for having
garnered more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast for the party-list
system, thus recognizing once again the simplified formula." However, in said Resolution, the Court,
in granting BUHAY an additional seat, meant to apply it on that specific case alone, not being a
precedent––pro hac vice (for this one particular occasion); thus, this Resolution cannot be applied as
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009 number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT), Petitioner, Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed
vs. a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor. The Facts
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC
CITIZENS),Intervenor.
counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009 because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the
national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in
AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners, BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely:
DECISION Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC),
Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher,
CARPIO, J.: Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
The Case

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings,
(BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3
a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine
August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s
(15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National
resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of
and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot.
BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution. WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of
Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher
than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS),
(16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior
Citizens).
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment
Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659
for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9
July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that
obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC
announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total
 ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated (i.e. 1,337,032 4 GABRIELA 610,451
canvass deferred)
5 APEC 538,971
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from areas not 102,430
yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del
6 A TEACHER 476,036
Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao)

7 AKBAYAN 470,872
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

8 ALAGAD 423,076
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:
9 BUTIL 405,052
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats. 11 BATAS 386,361

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the 12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four
hundred sixty-two (334,462)votes;
13 ARC 338,194
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC,
reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the 14 ABONO 337,046
additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent
(2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been
completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three which an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND
hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows: DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has
been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and
coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES party-list system of representation in the meantime.
COALITION RECEIVED
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the
1 BUHAY 1,163,218
Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to
PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties,
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730 organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:

3 CIBAC 760,260 1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

 Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with
2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
4 Gabriela Women’s Party GABRIELA
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)

5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC

6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms,
Inc.
7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the
A TEACHER COMELEC’s interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number
AKBAYAN of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;

8 Alagad ALAGAD WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of
Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes
actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the
projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s]
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO are as follows:

11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS Party-List Projected total number of votes

12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC 1 BUHAY 1,178,747

13 Abono ABONO 2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476

3 CIBAC 755,964
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may
later on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under
4 GABRIELA 621,718
the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined 5 APEC 622,489
pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of
the party-list results.
6 A TEACHER 492,369

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby

deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot 7 AKBAYAN 462,674
and academic.
 8 ALAGAD 423,190 Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat

9 BUTIL 409,298 Less than 4% No additional seat

10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
1,178,747
12 ARC 375,846 = 0.07248 or 7.2%

16,261,369
13 ABONO 340,151

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest
number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the
"first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC; coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of No. of votes of
representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or concerned party
seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans; No. of additional
Additional seats for
= x seats allocated
a concerned party
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed to first party
No. of votes of
in Veterans, is:
first party

Number of votes of first party

Proportion of votes of first
= party relative to total votes for WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
party-list system
Total votes for party-list system
Party List Percentage Additional Seat

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1
additional seats:
CIBAC 1.28 1
Proportion of votes received Additional seats
by the first party GABRIELA 1.05 1

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats APEC 1.05 1

 This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may
A TEACHER 0.83 0
later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the
party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes
AKBAYAN 0.78 0 to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with
ALAGAD 0.71 0
pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

BUTIL 0.69 0 Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
SO ORDERED.9

ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which
reads as follows:
ARC 0.63 0
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by
the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
ABONO 0.57 0
(BANAT).

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the
Commission on Elections en bancsitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to
additional seats, to wit:
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal
Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which
reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Party List Additional Seats Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition
to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the
following reliefs, to wit:
BUHAY 2

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated
BAYAN MUNA 1 by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

CIBAC 1 2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be
harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same
RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be
GABRIELA 1 allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

APEC 1 3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every
2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with
Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each
 party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after Party-List No. of Seat(s)
deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2%
threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-
LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used 1.1 Buhay 3
for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list
groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic]. 1.2 Bayan Muna 2

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and
1.3 CIBAC 2
that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12
of RA 7941 shall be followed.
1.4 Gabriela 2
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
1.5 APEC 2
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
1.6 A Teacher 1
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of
the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions
Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local 1.7 Akbayan 1
Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization
or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula 1.8 Alagad 1
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results."1awphi1

1.9 Butil 1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal
Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic. 1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution. 1.11 Anak Pawis 1

SO ORDERED.10 1.12 ARC 1

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
1.13 Abono 1
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider 1.14 AGAP 1
its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because
the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On 1.15 AMIN 1
the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.11

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed
three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the
Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao
(AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the certification15by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations
have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against
which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list
Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was
deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b)
of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to
qualified party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional
seats for the "First Party" violates the principle of proportional
representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for
the "First Party" and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section
11(b) of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different
from those required under RA 7941;
C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as
provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in
consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant
Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature,
involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of
transcendental importance to our nation.17
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases,
we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify
for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least
four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat
in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of
additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the 220
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, x .20 = 55
and sectoral parties or organizations.
.80
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
sector.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads: The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the
including those under the party-list. Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates
garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous
xxx interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the
Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent
in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula21 as an alternative.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The
House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-
The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section
Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+ 12 of which provide:

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x
representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available
to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be
from the first formula in Veterans, thus: observed:

Number of seats (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
available to legislative districts based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Number of seats available to
x .20 = party-list representatives (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
.80 garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes:Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all
the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to
the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide
votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of
the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by
making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the
allocation of seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second
interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list
representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement
with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as
prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and
Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats
shall have to be proclaimed.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6
formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being
filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the
entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the
2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing
the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats
allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the
second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers
as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified
parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or
remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on
the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up.26

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%)
of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have
more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941). Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups
under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all votes garnered during the elections.27
the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2%
threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.23
Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared 1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of
R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC: 2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541

(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast 5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
for the party-list system.24
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200 24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686 25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835

8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544 26 SENIOR 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098

CITIZENS
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
31 ANG 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
KASANGGA
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846

32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
PILIPINO

16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522

33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781

18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837

35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946

19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478

36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612

37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916

21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624

38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062

39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421

23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282

 40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241 4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1

41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161 5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445 6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1

43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915 7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471 8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406 9 COOP- 409,883 2.57% 1

NATCCO
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900
11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% 1

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions 12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one seat each." This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first
20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for all party-list candidates. 14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the
total votes for the party-list.28 15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1

Votes Votes Garnered over Total Guaranteed 16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1

Rank Party
Garnered Votes for Party-List, in % Seat
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
Total 17
2 BAYAN 979,039 6.14% 1
MUNA 18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0

 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total
number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-
percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat.
In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats
votes." This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula
for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in
the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
R.A. No. 7941.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20%
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of
of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second,
we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally,
100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is
million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million entitled. Thus:
votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number
of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. Votes
Garnere Addition (B) plus Applyin
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the Guarantee
d over al (C), in g the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent Votes d Seat
Ran Total Seats whole three
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of Party Garnere (First
k Votes (Second integer seat
the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, d Round)
for Party Round) s cap
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."30 (B)
List, in % (C) (D) (E)
(A)
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941,
the following procedure shall be observed:
1,169,23
1 BUHAY 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest 4
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
 BAYAN 18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
COOP-
931 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
ANAKPAWI
13 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
S
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

ANG
31 KASANGG 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A. A

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A. 32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A. 33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.

 MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
sectoral candidates.

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

Tota
17 55 MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents
l the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list
representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a
The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to
participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear
this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty
system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly
minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove
that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it
is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that
all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties
ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties.
My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats
as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district
legislation side of it only?
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be
banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also
field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that
we are allocating under the party list system. MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
participate in the party list system?
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no
reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very
leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And
if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which
is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In
the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass
organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed
because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and
the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is
open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the
names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop
this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for
example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic
Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and
the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic
Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there
is no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce,
influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for
sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way.
Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a
constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected
representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political
parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political
parties.
x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the
coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the
most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the
region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests
and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens
who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties
or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the
party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative
the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33In defining a "party" that participates
in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major
political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering
and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major
political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral
or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in
the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The
other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To
further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list
election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino
(KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines
for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read
and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the
day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee "wallow
in poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough
that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of
Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which
will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being
filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization
may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure
used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted
to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is
unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC
dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No.
07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-
list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with
the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating
in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners
Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual,
Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No.
7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive
term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section
7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special
law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision
requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by
Congress within three (3) years following the return of every
census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the
title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not
in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for
as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati
stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned
citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as
aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a
highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as
the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati
in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the
northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and
Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and,
on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the
appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving
questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining
local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes
and bounds with technical descriptions.2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of
the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers
which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local
Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the
description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.
We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area
of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the
proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the
time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of
Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect
to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts
to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which
could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by
its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.3 We take judicial notice of the fact that
Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local
government units with unsettled boundary disputes.4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable
difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing
boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate
resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that
section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in
this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil
that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly
created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with
technical descriptions" — was made in order to provide a means by which the
area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment
of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial
jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common
boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain
therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles,
as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which
the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is
to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks
to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents
while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To
invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description
was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It
then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way
around. This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will
not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Tañada v. Cuenco,
103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active
instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that
laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat
but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The
same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854.
Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall
exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and
the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising
their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city
government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
 Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term
of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House
of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new
corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point
that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already
served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and
eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998
and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term
as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been
conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a
litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision
on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the
same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of
R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city,
Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially
correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at
the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the first district, in
lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district.
(emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment6cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not
expressed in the title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of
a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment
can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a
new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or
province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population
of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia,
that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative
district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias
v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-
one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command
that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence,
we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995 Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein."
CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner,
vs. On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. province of Biliran became a regular province. It provides:

SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.
PUNO, J.:
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736
of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer
the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province. Intervenor Sergio
A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his
district. We gave due course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it involves the validity of the
unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative
districts.1
The first district2 covers Tacloban City and the municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San
Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
The second district3 is composed of the municipalities of Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara,
Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga.
The third district4 is composed of the municipalities of Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba.
The fourth district5
is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga,
Matagob, Merida, and Palompon.
Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular
provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite to be held in the sub-provinces and the original
provinces directly affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted
by the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections
following the effectivity of this code. The new legislative
districts created as a result of such conversion shall continue
to be represented in Congress by the duly-elected
representatives of the original districts out of which said new
provinces or districts were created until their own
representatives shall have been elected in the next regular
congressional elections and qualified.
The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the
Third District composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the Third District to five
(5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the
province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it promulgated
Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The
composition of the First District which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the
Fifth District were not disturbed. After the movement of municipalities, the composition of the five
(5) legislative districts appeared as follows:
First District: Population Registered
Voters
(1990) (1994)

1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679

The fifth district6 is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bate, Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang,
2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
Inopacan, Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.
3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No. 5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
2141 Section 1 of the law spelled out enacted on April 8, 1959.7 6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497
7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357
8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700 4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873
———— ———— 5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
TOTAL 303,349 178,688 6. Merida, and 22,345 12,474
———— ————
Second District: Population Registered TOTAL 269,347 155,995
Voters
(1990) (1994) Fifth District: Population Registered
Voters
1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237 (1990) (1994)
2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
3. Carigara 38,863 22,036 1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682
4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519 2. Bato, 28,197 116,13
5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375 3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139 4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
7. Julita, 9,944 6,196 5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659
8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003 6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868 7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628 8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616
11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348 9. Matalom 28,291 16,247
12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419 ———— ————
13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387 TOTAL 309,148 181,242
———— ————
TOTAL 272,167 156,462 Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent COMELEC,
among others, to the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and Second
Third District: Population Registered Districts. He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District has
Voters 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the difference, he
(1990) (1994) proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters be transferred from the First
to the Second District. The motion was opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol. Respondent
1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649 Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of municipalities involved the least
2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415 disruption of the territorial composition of each district; and (2) said adjustment complied with the
3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916 constitutional requirement that each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48 contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
6. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595 In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality
7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474 of representation ordained in the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders,8 he argues that
———— ———— respondent COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as much as practicable one man's vote
TOTAL 214,499 125,763 in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." The Solicitor General, in his
Comment, concurred with the views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however, opposed the petition
Fourth District: Population Registered on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2)
Voters assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC
(1990) (1994) filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the parameters of the Constitution.

1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140 We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889
While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our first inquiry will relate to the
constitutional power of the respondent COMELEC9 to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another legislative district in the province of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent
COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black and white in
section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not invoke this
provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power
of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is
entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines
to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area." Its
substantive sections state:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives
of the First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the
1986 Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise
provided by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
(2) empower the COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the power
by way of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 15 The different dimensions of the options were
discussed by Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote the debates
in extenso, viz.:16
xxx xxx xxx
MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion by way of amendment by
substitution and this was, I believe, a prior or a proposed amendment. Also, the
chairman of the Committee on the Legislative said that he was proposing a vote
first by the Chamber on the concept of whether the election is by province and
cities on the one hand, or by legislative districts on the other. So I propose this
simple formulation which reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION THE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS SHALL BE APPORTIONED BY THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS." I hope the chairman will accept the proposed
amendment.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION

Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population
MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the same insofar as the apportionment is
may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled
concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento et al. proposal would also provide for a
in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of
mandate for the apportionment later, meaning after the first election, which will
Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants
in effect embody what the Commission had approved, reading as follows: "Within
and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI
three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so
section."
increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied) So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a suspension of the session, so that all
the proponents can work together.
The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 10 of President Corazon C. Aquino,
ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is suspended.
Pambansa. 11 She then exercised legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. 12
It was 3:33 p.m.
The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., now a 13

distinguished member of this Court. The records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to RESUMPTION OF SESSION
resolve several prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional elections under the 1987
Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the members of the House of Representatives At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.
would be elected by district or by province; who shall undertake the apportionment of the legislative
districts; and, how the apportionment should be made.14Commissioner Davide, Jr. offered three (3)
options for the Commission to consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is resumed.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise, I wonder if the Commission
will allow this. We will just delete the proposed subparagraph (4) and all the
capitalized words in paragraph (5). So that in paragraph (5), what would be left
would only be the following: "Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section."
But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new Constitution indicating
specifically the following: "FOR PURPOSES OF THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION
PROPOSED BY THE 1986 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION AND SUBSEQUENT
ELECTIONS AND UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW, THE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN
MANILA AREA AS FOLLOWS."
And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to Metropolitan Manila Area,
to the provinces and to the cities, without indicating the municipalities comprising
each of the districts. Then, under Section 2, we will mandate the COMELEC to
make the actual apportionment on the basis of the number of seats provided for
and allocated to each province by us.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which will give mandate to
COMELEC to do the redistricting. Redistricting is vitally linked to the baneful
practices of cutting up areas or spheres of influence; in other words,
gerrymandering. This Commission, being a nonpartisan, a nonpolitical
deliberative body, is in the best possible situation under the circumstances to
undertake that responsibility. We are not wanting in expertise and in time
because in the first place, the Committee on the Legislative has prepared the
report on the basis of the recommendation of the COMELEC.
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Ople is recognized.
MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino in
this respect. We know that the reapportionment of provinces and cities for the
purpose of redistricting is generally inherent in the constituent power or in the
legislative power. And I would feel very uncertain about delegating this to a quasi-
judicial body even if it is one of the constitutional offices created under this
Constitution. We have the assurance of Commissioner Davide, as chairman of the
Committee on the Legislative, that even given the very short time remaining in
the life of this Commission, there is no reason why we cannot complete the work
of reapportionment on the basis of the COMELEC plan which the committee has
already thoroughly studied and which remains available to the Constitutional
Commission.
So, I support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino, Mr. Presiding Officer. I
think, it is the safest, the most reasonable, and the most workable approach that
is available to this Commission.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Davide say:
MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will make the apportionment
itself or whether we will leave it to the COMELEC. So, there arises, therefore, a
prejudicial question for the body to decide. I would propose that the Commission
should now decide what body should make the apportionment. Should it be the
Commission or should it be the COMELEC? And the Committee on the Legislative
will act accordingly on the basis of the decision.
MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Bengzon is recognized.
MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to inform the body that I believe the
Committee on the Legislative has precisely worked on this matter and they are
ready with a list of apportionment. They have, in fact, apportioned the whole
country into various districts based on the recommendation of the COMELEC. So
they are ready with the list and if this body would wish to apportion the whole
country by district itself, then I believe we have the time to do it because the
Committee on the Legislative is ready with that particular report which need only
to be appended to the Constitution. So if this body is ready to accept the work of
the Committee on the Legislative we would have no problem. I just would like to
give that information so that the people here would be guided accordingly when
they vote.
MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner Davide some questions.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide may yield if he so
desires.
MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are considering apply only to
the first election after the enactment of the Constitution?
MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it will be for the first election;
on the basis of the Sarmiento proposal, it will only apply to the first election.
MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the power to reapportion.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution — the reapportionment
based on the COMELEC study and between the approval of the Constitution and
the first election — the COMELEC no longer has the power to change that even a
bit.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory question to Commissioner Davide?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's proposed apportionment
and considering the fact that there will be a corresponding reduction to 183 seats,
would there be instances representation of under non-representation?
MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can assure the Commission that
there will be no case of inequitable distribution. It will come out to be one for
every 350 to 400,000 inhabitants.
MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the standard that we refer.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. REGALADO. Thank you.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there was a motion by
Commissioner Sarmiento to mandate COMELEC to do the redistricting. This was
also almost the same motion by Commissioner Padilla and I think we have had
some kind of meeting of minds. On the other hand, there seems to be a prejudicial
question, an amendment to the amendment as suggested by Commissioner
Aquino, that instead of the COMELEC, it should be this Commission that shall
make the redistricting. So may I ask Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on that
idea, to please formulate it into a motion so we can vote on that first as an
amendment to the amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this Commission to undertake the apportionment
of the legislative districts instead of the proposal that COMELEC be given the
mandate to undertake the responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it the motion or the
proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed amendment.
MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of this proposed amendment
which we substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5.
MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated merely as a motion to be
followed by a deletion of paragraph 4 because that should not really appear as a
paragraph in Section 5; otherwise, it will appear very ugly in the Constitution
where we mandate a Commission that will become functus officio to have the
authority. As a matter of fact, we cannot exercise that authority until after the
ratification of the new Constitution.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Sarmiento say?
MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer. So, may I move for the
approval of this proposed amendment.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or a simple plurality to adopt
that motion?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require a two-thirds vote.
MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission do the reapportionment
legislative districts.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the pleasure of Commissioner
Aquino?
MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion. Is Commissioner Sarmiento,
therefore, adopting my motion? Would it not be right for him to move that the
COMELEC be mandated?
MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment. It is already the Commission
that will be mandated.
MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has accepted the amendment the amendment.
Thank you.
MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission do the reapportionment.
VOTING
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed to vote.
As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their
hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 30 votes in favor and none against; the motion is approved.
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the
COMELEC "to make minoradjustments of the reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the
phrase "minor adjustments was again clarified in the debates 17 of the Commission, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. In Section 2, the
Commission on Elections is empowered to make minor adjustments on the
apportionment made here.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit for this.
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during the period of
amendments a proposal is made. The authority conferred would be on minor
corrections or amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we may have
forgotten an intervening municipality in the enumeration, which ought to be
included in one district. That we shall consider a minor amendment.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be
possible that one municipality in a district be transferred to another district and
call it a minor adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that
there should be no change in the allocations per district. However, it may happen
that we have forgotten a municipality in between which is still in the territory of
one assigned district, or there may be an error in the correct name of a particular
municipality because of changes made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the
Regular Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa enacted by both
the interim and the Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the names of
municipalities.
 MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of the District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the
municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it will be up transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of
for the COMELEC now to adjust or to put such municipality to a certain district. Leyte. No costs.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have the data SO ORDERED.
regarding a division of a municipality by the interim Batasang Pambansa or the
Regular Batasang Pambansa into two municipalities, meaning, a mother
municipality and the new municipality, but still actually these are within the
geographical district area.

MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC cannot do is that,
if, for example, my municipality is in the First District of Laguna, they cannot put
that in any other district.

MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive one.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not
also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is
to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created. . . ."

Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736
transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of
the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about
an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the
province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for
petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue involves a problem
of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4),
Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus: "Within
three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section." In Macias v. COMELEC, 18 we
ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable question. But while this Court can
strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as
petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the municipality of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of
money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome
Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that
the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.
This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from
the corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and,
if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of
the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant
to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance
at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI,
Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls
within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in
this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while
the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its
offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the
acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint
herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when
Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus
causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a
member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by
His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the
communication began with the following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless
involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected
members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your
Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information
which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to
expose.1äwphï1.ñët
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under
serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political
strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The
first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National
Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to
become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the
sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the
P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense,
and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" — the letter says — are "available to adequately finance a
political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor
Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4)
Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND,
and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this control, the
"Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while
Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias
Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero
was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col.
Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link
in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are
unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis
ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other
operational technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk
on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters — "typed in two (2)
typewriters only" — to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as
the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to
pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that
they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the
administration.
that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based
explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that
they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory
to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers
of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein
described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant,
knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public
hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these
allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not
prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their
complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware
of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again,
the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among
the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly
on their part, of said "planners".

Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future
developments".

Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the
public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging
the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind
him, and gain popular and civilian support.

The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed
Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian,
not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen.
Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in
the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned
elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas
and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all
military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions
by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed
by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that
Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the
planned coup d'etat".

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded
to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs
"probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added
G.R. Nos. 132875-76 November 16, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Court has declared that the state policy on the heinous offense of rape is clear and unmistakable.
Under certain circumstances, some of them present in this case, the offender may be sentenced to a
long period of confinement, or he may suffer death. The crime is an assault on human dignity. No
legal system worthy of the name can afford to ignore the traumatic consequences for the unfortunate
victim and grievous injury to the peace and good order of the community.1
Rape is particularly odious, one which figuratively scrapes the bottom of the barrel of moral depravity,
when committed against a minor.2
In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant is always scrutinized with extreme caution.3
In the present case, there are certain particulars which impelled the court to devote an even more
painstaking and meticulous examination of the facts on record and a similarly conscientious
evaluation of the arguments of the parties. The victim of rape in this case is a minor below twelve (12)
years of age. As narrated by her, the details of the rape are mesmerically sordid and repulsive. The
victim was peddled for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father.
Because the complainant was a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of
lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions. The accused is also a most unlikely rapist. He is a
member of Congress. Inspite of his having been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory
rape, his constituents liked him so much that they knowingly re-elected him to his congressional
office, the duties of which he could not perform.
Statutory rape committed by a distinguished Congressman on an eleven (11) year old commercial sex
worker is bound to attract widespread media and public attention. In the words of accused-appellant,
"he has been demonized in the press most unfairly, his image transmogrified into that of a dastardly,
ogre, out to get his slimy hands on innocent and naïve girls to satiate his lustful desires."4 This Court,
therefore, punctiliously considered accused-appellant’s claim that he suffered "invidiously
discriminatory treatment." Regarding the above allegation, the Court has ascertained that the
extensive publicity generated by the case did not result in a mistrial; the records show that the
accused had ample and free opportunity to adduce his defenses.
This is an appeal from the decision5 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, convicting accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos of two (2) counts of
statutory rape, and in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993,
for six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the Child Abuse Law.
There were six (6) other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and
96-1998, where the accused-appellant was acquitted of the charges of acts of lasciviousness for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime of statutory rape; and twelve (12) for acts
of lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, were filed against accused-appellant. The accusatory portion
of said informations for the crime of statutory rape state:
In Criminal Case No. 96-1985:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year old
minor ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of RAPE defined and
penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 18, 1996 at Room No.1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn
Delantar against her will, with damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
In Criminal Case No. 96-1986:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year old
minor ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of RAPE defined and
penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 20, 1996 at Room No. 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
(sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn Delantar against her will, with damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
For acts of lasciviousness, the informations8 under which accused-appellant was convicted were
identical except for the different dates of commission on June 14, 1996; June 15, 1996; June 16, 1996;
June 20, 1996; June 21, 1996; and June 22, 1996, to wit:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11)-year old
minor ROSILYN DELANTAR accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise
 known as the Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act, committed as follows:
That in the evening of June 14, 1996, or thereabout, in Room No. 1702, Ritz
Towers, Makati City, Metro-Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kiss, caress and fondle said complainant's face, lips,
neck, breasts, whole body, and vagina, suck her nipples and insert his finger and
then his tongue into her vagina, place himself on top of her, then insert his penis
in between her thighs until ejaculation, and other similar lascivious conduct
against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1988; 96-1990; and 96-1993, there were added averments that on the
different dates, the accused gave the complainant P10,000.00, P5,000.00 and P5,000.00 respectively.
Upon arraignment on January 29, 1997, accused-appellant refused to enter a plea. Hence, the trial
court entered a plea of not guilty for him. At the trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) main
witnesses and seven (7) rebuttal witnesses as well as documentary evidences marked as Exhibits A to
EEEE, inclusive of submarkings. The defense, on the other hand presented twenty-six (26) witnesses.
Its documentary evidence consists of Exhibits 1 to 153, inclusive of submarkings. The records of the
case are extremely voluminous.
The People’s version of the facts, culled mainly from the testimony of the victim, are as follows:
Maria Rosilyn Delantar was a slim, eleven-year old lass with long, straight black hair and almond-
shaped black eyes. She grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care of Simplicio
Delantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old homosexual whose
ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and accepting boarders at his house.
On the side, he was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
Rosilyn never got to see her mother, though she had known a younger brother, Shandro, who was
also under the care of Simplicio. At a very young age of 5, fair and smooth-complexioned Rosilyn was
exposed by Simplicio to his illicit activities. She and her brother would tag along with Simplicio
whenever he delivered prostitutes to his clients. When she turned 9, Rosilyn was offered by Simplicio
as a prostitute to an Arabian national known as Mr. Hammond. Thus begun her ordeal as one of the
girls sold by Simplicio for sexual favors.
Rosilyn first met accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, sometime in February 1996 at his office located
near Robinson’s Galleria. Rosilyn and Simplicio were brought there and introduced by a talent
manager by the name of Eduardo Suarez. Accused-appellant promised to help Rosilyn become an
actress. When he saw Rosilyn, accused-appellant asked how old she was. Simplicio answered, "10.
She is going to be 11 on May 11." Accused-appellant inquired if Rosilyn knows how to sing. Simplicio
told Rosilyn to sing, so she sang the song, "Tell Me You Love Me." Accused-appellant then asked if
Rosilyn has nice legs and then raised her skirt up to the mid-thighs. He asked if she was already
menstruating, and Simplicio said yes. Accused-appellant further inquired if Rosilyn already had
breasts. When nobody answered, accused-appellant cupped Rosilyn’s left breast. Thereafter,
accused-appellant assured them that he would help Rosilyn become an actress as he was one of the
producers of the TV programs, "Valiente" and "Eat Bulaga."
Simplicio and Suarez then discussed the execution of a contract for Rosilyn’s movie career. Accused-
appellant, on the other hand, said that he would adopt Rosilyn and that the latter would have to live
with him in his condominium at the Ritz Towers. Before Simplicio and Rosilyn went home, accused-
appellant gave Rosilyn P2,000.00.
The second time Rosilyn met accused-appellant was at his condominium unit, located at Room 1702,
Ritz Towers, Makati City. Accused-appellant and Simplicio discussed the contract and his plan to
finance Rosilyn’s studies. Accused-appellant gave Simplicio P500.00, thereafter, Rosilyn, Shandro and
Simplicio left.
The third meeting between Rosilyn and accused-appellant was also at Ritz Towers to discuss her
acting career. Accused-appellant referred the preparation of Rosilyn’s contract to his lawyer, who was
also present. After the meeting, Simplicio and Rosilyn left. As they were walking towards the elevator,
accused-appellant approached them and gave Rosilyn P3,000.00.
On June 14, 1996, at about 8:30 to 9:00 p.m., Simplicio and Rosilyn returned to accused-appellant’s
condominium unit at Ritz Towers. When accused-appellant came out of his bedroom, Simplicio told
Rosilyn to go inside the bedroom, while he and accused-appellant stayed outside. After a while,
accused-appellant entered the bedroom and found Rosilyn watching television. He walked towards
Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips, then left the room again. Simplicio came in and bid her goodbye.
Rosilyn told Simplicio that accused-appellant kissed her to which Simplicio replied, "Halik lang
naman."
Rosilyn was left alone in the bedroom watching television. After some time, accused-appellant came
in and entered the bathroom. He came out clad in a long white T-shirt on which was printed the word,
"Dakak." In his hand was a plain white T-shirt. Accused-appellant told Rosilyn that he wanted to
change her clothes. Rosilyn protested and told accused-appellant that she can do it herself, but
accused-appellant answered, "Daddy mo naman ako." Accused-appellant then took off Rosilyn’s
blouse and skirt. When he was about to take off her panties, Rosilyn said, "Huwag po." Again, accused-
appellant told her, "After all, I am your Daddy." Accused-appellant then removed her panties and
dressed her with the long white T-shirt.
The two of them watched television in bed. After sometime, accused-appellant turned off the lamp
and the television. He turned to Rosilyn and kissed her lips. He then raised her shirt, touched her
breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and cried out, "Tama na po." Accused-
appellant stopped. He continued to kiss her lips and fondle her breasts. Later, accused-appellant told
Rosilyn to sleep.
The following morning, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant whom she found bent over and
kissing her. He told her to get up, took her hand and led her to the bathroom. He removed Rosilyn’s
shirt and gave her a bath. While accused-appellant rubbed soap all over Rosilyn’s body, he caressed
her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. After that, he rinsed her body, dried her with a
towel and applied lotion on her arms and legs. Then, he dried her hair and told her to dress up. Rosilyn
put on her clothes and went out of the bathroom, while accused-appellant took a shower.
Accused-appellant ate breakfast while Rosilyn stayed in the bedroom watching television. When
accused-appellant entered the room, he knelt in front of her, removed her panties and placed her
legs on his shoulders. Then, he placed his tongue on her vagina. Thereafter, he gave Rosilyn
P10,000.00 and told his housemaid to take her shopping at Shoemart. When she returned to the Ritz
Towers, Simplicio was waiting for her. The two of them went home. Rosilyn narrated to Simplicio
what accused-appellant did to her, and pleaded for him not to bring her back to the Ritz Towers.
Simplicio told her that everything was alright as long as accused-appellant does not have sexual
intercourse with her.
That same evening, at around 9:00 to 9:30 in the evening, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz
Towers. After Simplicio left, accused-appellant removed Rosilyn’s clothes and dressed her with the
same long T-shirt. They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant sat beside Rosilyn and
kissed her on the lips. He made Rosilyn lie down, lifted her shirt above her breasts, and inserted his
finger into her vagina. Then, accused-appellant removed his own clothes, placed his penis between
Rosilyn’s thighs and made thrusting motions until he ejaculated on her thighs. Thereafter, accused-
appellant kissed her and told her to sleep.
The next day, June 16, 1996, accused-appellant roused her from sleep and bathed her. Again, he
rubbed soap all over her body, washed her hair, and thereafter rinsed her body and dried her hair.
While accused-appellant was bathing Rosilyn, he asked her to fondle his penis while he caressed her
breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. After their shower, accused-appellant ate breakfast.
He gave Rosilyn P5,000.00 and told her to just wait for Simplicio in the condominium unit. On their
way home, Simplicio told Rosilyn that if accused-appellant tries to insert his penis into her vagina, she
should refuse.
At around 8:00 p.m. of June 18, 1996, Simplicio brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. They found
accused-appellant sitting on the bed in his bedroom. Simplicio told Rosilyn to approach accused-
appellant, then he left. Accused-appellant took off Rosilyn’s clothes and dressed her with a long T-
shirt on which was printed a picture of accused-appellant and a woman, with the caption, "Cong.
Jalosjos with his Toy." They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant lay beside Rosilyn
and kissed her on the lips. He raised her shirt and parted her legs. He positioned himself between the
spread legs of Rosilyn, took off his own shirt, held his penis, and poked and pressed the same against
Rosilyn’s vagina. This caused Rosilyn pain inside her sex organ. Thereafter, accused-appellant fondled
her breasts and told her to sleep.
When Rosilyn woke up the following morning, June 19, 1996, accused-appellant was no longer around
but she found P5,000.00 on the table. Earlier that morning, she had felt somebody touching her
private parts but she was still too sleepy to find out who it was. Rosilyn took a bath, then went off to
school with Simplicio, who arrived to fetch her.
The next encounter of Rosilyn with accused-appellant was on June 21, 1996, at about 9:00 o’clock in
the evening in his bedroom at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant stripped her naked and again put
on her the long shirt he wanted her to wear. After watching television for a while, accused-appellant
knelt beside Rosilyn, raised her shirt, caressed her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina.
Then, he clipped his penis between Rosilyn’s thighs, and made thrusting motions until he ejaculated.
Thereafter, Rosilyn went to sleep.
The next day, June 22, 1996, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant who was kissing her and
fondling her sex organ. She, however, ignored him and went back to sleep. When she woke up, she
found the P5,000.00 which accused-appellant left and gave the same to Simplicio Delantar, when the
latter came to pick her up.
On June 29, 1996, Rosilyn again went to the Ritz Towers. During that visit, accused-appellant took
photographs of Rosilyn. He asked her to pose with her T-shirt pulled down thereby exposing her
breasts. He also took her photographs with her T-shirt rolled up to the pelvis but without showing her
pubis, and finally, while straddled on a chair facing the backrest, showing her legs.
Before Rosilyn went to sleep, accused-appellant kissed her lips, fondled her breasts and inserted his
finger into her vagina. The following morning, she woke up and found the P5,000.00 left by accused-
appellant on the table. She recalled that earlier that morning, she felt somebody caressing her breasts
and sex organ.
On July 2, 1996 at 7:00 p.m., Rosilyn and Simplicio returned to the Ritz Towers. Rosilyn had to wait
for accused-appellant, who arrived between 12:00 to 1:00 a.m. He again dressed her with the long
white shirt similar to what he was wearing. While sitting on the bed, accused-appellant kissed her lips
and inserted his tongue into her mouth. He then fondled her breasts and inserted his finger into her
vagina, causing her to cry in pain. Accused-appellant stopped and told her to sleep.
The next morning, accused-appellant bathed her again. While he soaped her body, he fondled her
breasts and inserted his finger in her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and shoved his hand away. After bathing
her, accused-appellant had breakfast. Before he left, he gave Rosilyn P5,000.00. As soon as Simplicio
arrived, Rosilyn gave her the money and then they left for school.
On July 20, 1996, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant was waiting
in his bedroom. He took off Rosilyn’s clothes, including her panties, and dressed her with a long T-
shirt similar to what he was wearing. After watching television, accused-appellant kissed Rosilyn on
the lips, inserted his tongue in her mouth and fondled her breasts. Then, he made Rosilyn lie on the
bed, spread her legs apart and placed a pillow under her back. He inserted his finger in her vagina and
mounted himself between her legs with his hands rested on her sides. After that, he lifted his shirt,
then pointed and pressed his penis against her vagina. Accused-appellant made thrusting motions,
which caused Rosilyn pain. Thereafter, accused-appellant told her to sleep.
In the early morning of July 21, 1996, Rosilyn felt somebody touching her sex organ, but she did not
wake up. When she woke up later, she found P5,000.00 on the table, and she gave this to Simplicio
when he came to fetch her.
On August 15, 1996, Rosilyn and Simplicio went to the Ritz Towers at around 7:00 p.m. Accused-
appellant was about to leave, so he told them to come back later that evening. The two did not return.
The following day, Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of Yamie Estreta, one of their boarders.
Yamie accompanied Rosilyn to the Pasay City Police, where she executed a sworn statement against
Simplicio Delantar. Rosilyn was thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD). The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation,
which eventually led to the filing of criminal charges against accused-appellant.
On August 23, 1996, Rosilyn was examined by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas at Camp Crame. The
examination yielded the following results:
EXTERNAL AND EXTRAGENITAL
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are conical with
pinkish brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen
is flat and soft
GENITAL
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with
the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed
an elastic, fleshy type hymen, with shallow healed laceration at 3 o'clock position and deep
healed laceration at 8 o'clock position. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance
to the introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin sized vaginal speculum.
Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is firm and closed.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.9
During the trial, accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that it was his
brother, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos, whom Rosilyn had met, once at accused-appellant’s Dakak office
and twice at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant insisted that he was in the province on the dates
Rosilyn claimed to have been sexually abused. He attributed the filing of the charges against him to a
small group of blackmailers who wanted to extort money from him, and to his political opponents,
particularly Ex-Congressman Artemio Adaza, who are allegedly determined to destroy his political
career and boost their personal agenda.
More specifically, accused-appellant claims that on June 16, 1996, he was on the Philippine Airlines
(PAL) 9:40 a.m. flight from Manila to Dipolog. He stayed in Dipolog until June 18, 1996. He submitted
in evidence airline ticket no. 10792424,10 showing that he was on board Flight PR 165; the said flight’s
passenger’s manifest,11 where the name JALOSJOS/RM/MR appears; and photographs showing
accused-appellant’s constituents welcoming his arrival and showing accused-appellant talking with
former Mayor Hermanico Carreon and Fiscal Empainado.
Accused-appellant further alleges that on June 28, 1996, he again took the 9:40 a.m. flight from
Manila to Dipolog City. On the same flight, he met Armando Nocom of the Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Upon arrival and after talking to his representatives, he proceeded to his residence known as
"Barangay House" in Taguinon, Dapitan, near Dakak Beach resort, and spent the night there.
On June 29, 1996, accused-appellant attended the fiesta at Barangay San Pedro. He stayed in the
house of Barangay Captain Mila Yap until 5:30 p.m. Then, together with some friends, he visited the
Rizal Shrine and the Pirate Bar at Dakak Beach Resort. Thereafter, he retired in the "Barangay House"
in Taguilon.
On June 30, 1996, accused-appellant alleges that he attended a city-wide consultation with his
political leaders at the Blue Room of Dakak, which lasted till the afternoon. In the evening, he went
home and slept in the "Barangay House."
On July 1, 1996, he attended the whole day celebration of Dipolog Day. He spent the night in the
"Barangay House."
On July 2, 1996, he attended the inauguration of the reception hall of Dakak Beach Resort. The
blessing ceremony was officiated by Assistant Parish Priest Adelmo Laput.
On July 3, 1996, he was the guest in the inaguration of the 3rd Engineering District of Dapitan City.
After the mass, he visited the Jamboree site in Barangay Taguilon, Dapitan City.
He further contended that after his arrival in Dipolog on June 28, 1996, there was never an instance
when he went to Manila until July 9, 1996, when he attended a conference called by the President of
the Philippines.
Accused-appellant likewise alleged that on July 21, 1996, he took the 5:00 a.m. flight of PAL from
Manila to Dumaguete City. From there, he was flown by a private plane to Dipolog, where he stayed
until the President of the Philippines arrived.
To buttress the theory of the defense, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos testified that he was the one, and
not accused-appellant, whom Rosilyn met on three occasions. These occurred once during the first
week of May 1996, at accused-appellant’s Dakak office where Rosilyn and Simplicio Delantar were
introduced to him by Eduardo Suarez, and twice at the Ritz Towers when he interviewed Rosilyn, and
later when Rosilyn and Simplicio followed up the proposed entry of Rosilyn into the show business.
Dominador’s admission of his meetings with Rosilyn on three instances were limited to interviewing
her and assessing her singing and modeling potentials. His testimony made no mention of any sexual
encounter with Rosilyn.
After trial, the court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, as principal in the
two (2) counts of statutory rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of these cases.
2. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:
2a. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of these cases.
2b. indemnify the victim, MA. ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages for each of the cases.
3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992 and 96-1993, the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO
JALOSJOS y GARCIA, as principal in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness defined under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610
otherwise known as the Child Abuse Law. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of these
cases;
4. Accordingly he is sentenced to:
4.a. suffer in each of the cases an indeterminate prison term of from eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum;
4.b. indemnify the victim, MA ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) as moral damages for each of the cases;
5. In Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997 and 96-1998, the
prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO
JALOSJOS y GARCIA, in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. Therefore, on the ground of
reasonable doubt, the accused in these cases is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, the instant appeal. Accused-appellant contends:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT INDICIA OF
INCONSISTENCIES AND UNTRUTHS.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONFLICTING
STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT’S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS A MINOR
LESS THAN TWELVE YEARS OF AGE WHEN THE CLAIMED INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE.
E.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE WAS COMMITTED AGAINST THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.13
In this jurisdiction, the testimony of the private complainant in rape cases is scrutinized with utmost
caution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires no less than moral certainty beyond
any scintilla of doubt. This applies with more vigor in rape cases where the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and is not allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence of the defense. As an inevitable consequence, it is the rape victim herself
that is actually put on trial. The case at bar is no exception. Bent on destroying the veracity of private
complainant’s testimony, the errors assigned by accused-appellant, particularly the first three, are
focused on the issue of credibility.
Accused-appellant makes much of his acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-
1996, 96-1997, and 96-1998, for acts of lasciviousness. According to him, the fact that the trial court
sustained his defense of alibi in the said cases only shows that Rosilyn concocted her stories and the
rest of her testimony ought not to be believed. Stated differently, accused-appellant urges the
application of the doctrine of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in part, false in everything).14
The contention is without merit. Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is
in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence.15 Thus, in People v. Yanson-Dumancas,16 citing People
v. Li Bun Juan,17 this Court held that:
 ... In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus is not an absolute one, and that it is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony
of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. In
People vs. Keller, 46 O.G. No. 7, pp. 3222-3223, the following was quoted with approval by
the Court of Appeals from 1 Moore on Facts, p. 23:
"18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected. --- Trier of facts are not
bound to believe all that any witness has said; they may accept some portions of
his testimony and reject other portions, according to what seems to them, upon
other facts and circumstances to be the truth… Even when witnesses are found
to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, the jury are not
required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but may credit
such portions as they deem worthy of belief." (p. 945)18
Being in the best position to discriminate between the truth and the falsehood, the trial court's
assignment of values and weight on the testimony of Rosilyn should be given credence. Significantly,
it should be borne in mind that the issue at hand hinges on credibility, the assessment of which, as
oft-repeated, is best made by the trial court because of its untrammeled opportunity to observe her
demeanor on the witness stand.
On the demeanor and manner of testifying shown by the complainant, the trial court stated:
Guided by the foregoing principles, this court found no reason why it should not believe
Rosilyn when she claimed she was raped. Testimonies of rape victims especially those who
are young and immature deserve full credence (People v. Liquiran, 228 SCRA 62 (1993)
considering that "no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of
her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public trial if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished." (People v.
Buyok, 235 SCRA 622 [1996]).
When asked to describe what had been done to her, Rosilyn was able to narrate
spontaneously in detail how she was sexually abused. Her testimony in this regard was firm,
candid, clear and straightforward, and it remained to be so even during the intense and
rigid cross-examination made by the defense counsel.19
Accused-appellant next argues that Rosilyn’s direct and redirect testimonies were rehearsed and
lacking in candidness. He points to the supposed hesitant and even idiotic answers of Rosilyn on cross
and re-cross examinations. He added that she was trained to give answers such as, "Ano po?", "Parang
po," "Medyo po," and "Sa tingin ko po."
Accused-appellant’s arguments are far from persuasive. A reading of the pertinent transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact firm and consistent on the fact of rape and
lascivious conduct committed on her by accused-appellant. She answered in clear, simple and natural
words customary of children of her age. The above phrases quoted by accused-appellant as uttered
by Rosilyn are, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, typical answers of child witnesses like
her.
At any rate, even assuming that Rosilyn, during her lengthy ordeals on the witness stand, may have
given some ambiguous answers, they refer merely to minor and peripheral details which do not in
any way detract from her firm and straightforward declaration that she had been molested and
subjected to lascivious conduct by accused-appellant. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that even
the most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes and confused statements. At times, far from
eroding the effectiveness of the evidence, such lapses could, indeed, constitute signs of veracity.20
Then, too, accused-appellant capitalizes on the alleged absence of any allegation of rape in the five
(5) sworn statements executed by Rosilyn as well as in the interviews and case study conducted by
the representatives of the DSWD. In particular, accused-appellant points to the following documents:
(1) Sworn statements dated August 22 and 26, 1996, executed before SPO5 Milagros A.
Carrasco of the Pasay City Police;
(2) Sworn statements dated September 5, 11, and 19, 1996, executed before NBI Agents
Cynthia L. Mariano and Supervising NBI Agent Arlis E. Vela;
(3) The Initial Interview of Rosilyn by the DSWD dated August 30, 1996;
(4) DSWD Final Case Study Report dated January 10, 1997.
It must be stressed that "rape" is a technical term, the precise and accurate definition of which could
not have been understood by Rosilyn. Indeed, without the assistance of a lawyer, who could explain
to her the intricacies of rape, she expectedly could not distinguish in her affidavits and consequently
disclose with proficient exactitude the act or acts of accused-appellant that under the contemplation
of law constitute the crime of rape. This is especially true in the present case where there was no
exhaustive and clear-cut evidence of full and complete penetration of the victim’s vagina. It may well
be that Rosilyn thought, as any layman would probably do, that there must be the fullest penetration
of the victim’s vagina to qualify a sexual act to rape.
In People v. Campuhan,21 we ruled that rape is consummated "by the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis." There need not be full and
complete penetration of the victim’s vagina for rape to be consummated. There being no showing
that the foregoing technicalities of rape was fully explained to Rosilyn on all those occasions that she
was interviewed by the police, the NBI agents and DSWD social workers, she could not therefore be
expected to intelligibly declare that accused-appellant’s act of pressing his sex organ against her labia
without full entry of the vaginal canal amounted to rape.
In the decision of the trial court, the testimony on one of the rapes is cited plus the court’s mention
of the jurisprudence on this issue, to wit:
 Q: You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, your
back was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread wide apart, what else did he do?
A: He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari
ko." (Italics supplied)
Q: And, after doing that: "Idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko"; what else did he do?
A: After that, "Itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."
(underscoring supplied)
(pp. 23, 25 to 30, TSN, 16 April 1997)
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that rape can be committed even without full
penetration of the male organ into the vagina of the woman. It is enough that there be
proof of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female
organ. (People vs. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 329; People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535; People vs.
Bacani, 181 SCRA 393). "Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the female organ
suffices to warrant a conviction." (People vs. Galimba, G.R. No. 111563-64, February 20,
1996 citing People vs. Abonada, 169 SCRA 530). Hence, with the testimony of Rosilyn that
the accused pressed against ("idiniin") and pointed to ("itinutok") Rosilyn’s vagina his sexual
organ on two (2) occasions, two (2) acts of rape were consummated. 22
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that Rosilyn’s purpose in executing the affidavits on August 22
and 26, 1996 before the Pasay City Police was to charge Simplicio Delantar, not accused-appellant. As
aptly pointed out by the trial court, it is preposterous to expect Rosilyn to make an exhaustive
narration of the sexual abuse of accused-appellant when he was not the object of the said complaint.
Additionally, Rosilyn’s statements, given to the NBI on September 11 and 19, 1996, concerned mainly
the identification of pictures. There was thus no occasion for her to narrate the details of her sexual
encounter with accused-appellant.
As to the interviews and studies conducted by the DSWD, suffice it to state that said meetings with
Rosilyn were specially focused on the emotional and psychological repercussions of the sexual abuse
on Rosilyn, and had nothing to do with the legal actions being prepared as a consequence thereof.
Thus, the documents pertaining to said interviews and studies cannot be relied upon to reveal every
minute aspect of the sexual molestations complained of.
At any rate, the inconsistencies between the affidavits and Rosilyn’s testimony, if at all they existed,
cannot diminish the probative value of Rosilyn’s declarations on the witness stand. The consistent
ruling of this Court is that, if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit of a witness and her
testimonies given in open court, the latter commands greater weight than the former.23
In the third assigned error, accused-appellant attempts to impress upon this Court that Rosilyn gave
the name Congressman Romeo Jalosjos as her abuser only because that was the name given to her
by the person to whom she was introduced. That same name, accused-appellant claims, was merely
picked up by Rosilyn from the name plate, plaque, and memo pad she saw on accused-appellant’s
office desk. Accused-appellant presented his brother, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos, in an attempt to cast
doubt on his culpability. It was Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos who allegedly met and interviewed Rosilyn
at the Dakak office. In advancement of this theory, accused-appellant cites the fact that out of a total
of 16 pictures presented to Rosilyn for identification, she picked up only 4, which depict Dominador
"Jun" Jalosjos. In the same vein, accused-appellant claims that the resulting cartographic sketch from
the facial characteristics given by Rosilyn to the cartographer, resembles the facial appearance of
Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos. Accused-appellant also points out that Rosilyn failed to give his correct age
or state that he has a mole on his lower right jaw.
Contrary to the contentions of accused-appellant, the records reveal that Rosilyn positively and
unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the courtroom. Such identification during the trial
cannot be diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accused-appellant
as her abuser based on the name she heard from the person to whom she was introduced and on the
name she saw and read in accused-appellant’s office. Verily, a person’s identity does not depend
solely on his name, but also on his physical features. Thus, a victim of a crime can still identify the
culprit even without knowing his name. Similarly, the Court, in People v. Vasquez,24 ruled that:
It matters little that the eyewitness initially recognized accused-appellant only by face… [the
witness] … acted like any ordinary person in making inquiries to find out the name that
matched [appellant’s] face. Significantly, in open court, he unequivocally identified
accused-appellant as their assailant.
Even in the case of People v. Timon,25 relied upon by accused-appellant to discredit his identification,
this Court said that even assuming that the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant was
defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it.
In light of the foregoing, Rosilyn’s failure to identify accused-appellant out of the 16 pictures shown
to her does not foreclose the credibility of her unqualified identification of accused-appellant in open
court. The same holds true with the subject cartographic sketch which, incidentally, resembles
accused-appellant. As noted by the trial court, accused-appellant and his brother Dominador Jalosjos
have a striking similarity in facial features. Naturally, if the sketch looks like Dominador, it logically
follows that the same drawing would definitely look like accused-appellant.
Likewise, Rosilyn’s failure to correctly approximate the age of accused-appellant and to state that he
has a mole on the lower right jaw, cannot affect the veracity of accused-appellant’s identification. At
a young age, Rosilyn cannot be expected to give the accurate age of a 56 year-old person. As to
accused-appellant’s mole, the Solicitor General is correct in contending that said mole is not so
distinctive as to capture Rosilyn’s attention and memory. When she was asked to give additional
information about accused-appellant, Rosilyn described him as having a "prominent belly." This, to
our mind, is indeed a more distinguishing feature that would naturally catch the attention of an eleven
year-old child like Rosilyn.
In his fifth assigned error, accused-appellant insists that the words "idinikit," "itinutok," and "idiniin- PROS. ZUNO:
diin," which Rosilyn used to describe what accused-appellant did to her vagina with his genitals, do
not constitute consummated rape. In addition, the defense argued that Rosilyn did not actually see Q. And, after kissing your lips; after kissing you in your lips, what else did he do?
accused-appellant’s penis in the supposed sexual contact. In fact, they stressed that Rosilyn declared
that accused-appellant’s semen spilled in her thighs and not in her sex organ.
A. After that, he was lifting my shirt.

Moreover, in his Reply Brief, accused-appellant, citing People v. Campuhan, argued that, assuming
Q. Now, while he was lifting your shirt, what was your position; will you tell the court?
that his penis touched or brushed Rosilyn’s external genitals, the same is not enough to establish the
crime of rape.
A. I was lying, sir.
True, in People v. Campuhan,26 we explained that the phrase, "the mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal Q. Lying on what?
knowledge," means that the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry
of the penis into the labia of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the A. On the bed, sir.
pudendum. We further elucidated that:
Q. And, after lifting your shirt, what else did he do?
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible
in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, A. He spread my legs sir.
the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after
puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the
outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. Q. And, after spreading your legs apart; what did he do?
The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while
the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hairs but has many sebaceous A. After that, he lifted his shirt and held his penis.
glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that
the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis Q. And while he was holding his penis; what did he do?
to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ
or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated
A. He pressed it in my vagina.
rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of
either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it
can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.27 ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

In the present case, there is sufficient proof to establish that the acts of accused-appellant went May we request that the vernacular be used?
beyond "strafing of the citadel of passion" or "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," as depicted
in the Campuhan case, and progressed into "bombardment of the drawbridge [which] is invasion A. Tapos po, idinikit-dikit po niya yong ari niya sa ari ko.
enough,"28 there being, in a manner of speaking, a conquest of the fortress of ignition. When the
accused-appellant brutely mounted between Rosilyn’s wide-spread legs, unfetteredly touching, PROS. ZUNO:
poking and pressing his penis against her vagina, which in her position would then be naturally wide
open and ready for copulation, it would require no fertile imagination to belie the hypocrisy claimed
May I respectfully move that the word: "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari ko," be
by accused-appellant that his penis or that of someone who looked like him, would under the
incorporated?
circumstances merely touch or brush the external genital of Rosilyn. The inevitable contact between
accused-appellant’s penis, and at the very least, the labia of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed
when she felt pain inside her vagina when the "idiniin" part of accused appellant’s sex ritual was Q. And while he was doing that; according to you, "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari
performed. mo;" what did you feel?

The incident on June 18, 1996 was described by Rosilyn as follows: A. I was afraid and then, I cried.
Q. Will you tell the Court why you felt afraid and why you cried? PROS. ZUNO:

A. Because I was afraid he might insert his penis into my vagina. Now, according to you, you don’t know how to say it; or what was done to you.
Now, will you tell the Court how can you describe what was done to you?
Q. And, for how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, which according to you,
"idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?" A. After he "dinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; itinutok naman niya ito."

COURT: Q. O.K. you said "itinutok niya ito;" what else did he do?

Place the Tagalog words, into the records. PROS. ZUNO:

A. Sandali lang po yon. She is now trying to describe.

Q. What part of your vagina, or "ari" was being touched by the ari or penis? COURT:

xxx xxx xxx Translate.

Q. You said that you felt… I withdraw that question. How did you know that Congressman A. He seems to be "parang idinidiin po niya."
Jalosjos was doing, "idinikit-dikit niya yung ari niya sa ari ko?"
Q. Now, what did you feel, when according to you; as I would quote: "parang idinidiin
A. Because I could feel it, sir. niya?"

Q. Now, you said you could feel it. What part of the vagina… in what part of your vagina A. Masakit po.
was Congressman Jalosjos, according to you, "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari mo?"
Q. And, just to make it clear in Tagalog: Ano itong idinidiin niya?
A. In front of my vagina, sir.
COURT:
Q. In front of your vagina? O.K.; will you tell the Court the position? Will you describe
the position of Congressman Jalosjos when he was doing that. "Idinikit-dikit niya sa ari ko?" Q. Sabi mo itinutok. Nakita mo bang itinutok?

A. Ide-demonstrate ko po ba? A. I saw him na nakaganuon po sa ano niya.

FISCAL ZUNO: PROS. ZUNO:

Q. Can you demonstrate? Q. O.K., clarify. You said "nakaganuon siya" what do you mean by "nakaganuon siya?"

xxx xxx xxx A. He was holding his penis, and then, that was the one which he itinutok sa ari ko.

A. He was holding me like this with his one hand; and was holding his penis while his PROS. ZUNO:
other hand, or his free hand was on the bed.
Q. And, when you said "idinidiin po niya;" to which you are referring? What is this
xxx xxx xxx "idinidiin niya?"
A. Idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko. A. Because I felt pity for myself. (Naaawa po ako sa sarili ko.)

Q. And what did you feel when you said: he was "idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko?" xxx xxx x x x.

A. Masakit po. (Emphasis supplied.)29

COURT: Even the July 20, 1996 encounter between Rosilyn and accused-appellant would not tax the sketchy
visualization of the naïve and uninitiated to conclude that there was indeed penile invasion by
The answer is "masakit po." accused-appellant of Rosilyn’s labia. On that occasion, accused-appellant was similarly ensconced
between the parted legs of Rosilyn, except that, this time, Rosilyn was conveniently rested on, and
elevated with a pillow on her back while accused-appellant was touching, poking and pressing his
Proceed.
penis against her vagina. Topped with the thrusting motions employed by accused-appellant, the
resulting pain felt by Rosilyn in her sex organ was no doubt a consequence of consummated rape.
PROS. ZUNO:
The pertinent portions of Rosilyn’s account of the July 20, 1996 incident is as follows:
Q. Where did you feel the pain?
PROS. ZUNO:
A. Inside my ari po. (Sa loob po ng ari ko.)
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Q. The moment when Cong. Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, what was your
PROS. ZUNO: position?

Q. And then, after that, what else did he do INTERPRETER:

A. After that, he touched my breast, sir. The witness is asking he (sic) she has to demonstrate?

Q. And, after touching your breast, what did he do? FISCAL ZUNO:

A. And after that I felt that he was (witness demonstrating to the court, with her index Q. Ipaliwanag mo lang?
finger, rubbing against her open left palm)
A. My back was rested on a pillow and my legs were spread apart.
Q. And after doing that, what else did he do?
Q. You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, your
A. After that, he instructed me to go to sleep. back was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread wide apart, what else did he do?

xxx xxx xxx A. He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari
ko."
A. I put down my clothes and then, I cried myself to sleep, sir.
Q. And what did you feel when he was doing that which according to you and I would
Q. Why did you cry? Will you tell the court, why did you cried after putting down your quote in Tagalog: "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?"
clothes?
A. I was afraid sir.
 Q. And, after doing that: "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko," what else did he do?
A. After that, "itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."
Q. You said: "Congressman Jalosjos itinutok niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; at idiniin-diin
niya yong ari niya sa ari ko;" Now, while he was doing that act, what was the position of
Congressman Jalosjos?
A. His two (2) hands were on my side and since my legs were spread apart; he was in-
between them, and doing an upward and downward movement.
(Witness demonstrated a pushing, or pumping movement)
Q. For how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, pushing or pumping
movement while his penis, or "ang ari niya ay nakatutok at idinidiin-diin yong ari niya sa ari
mo?"
A. I don’t know.
Q. And what did you feel when Congressman Jalosjos was making that movement,
pushing, or pumping?
A. I felt pain and then I cried.
Q. Where did you feel the pain?
A. Inside my vagina, sir.
xxx xxx x x x.30
The child’s narration of the rape sequence is revealing. The act of "idinikit-dikit niya" was followed by
"itinutok niya xxx at idiniin-diin niya." The "idiniin-diin niya" was succeeded by "Masakit po." Pain
inside her "ari" is indicative of consummated penetration.
The environmental circumstances displayed by the graphic narration of what took place at the
appellant’s room from June 14 to June 16 and June 21 to June 22, 1996 are consistent with the
complainant’s testimony which shows that rape was legally consummated.
In the case of People v. Campuhan, the victim put up a resistance --- by putting her legs close together
--- which, although futile, somehow made it inconvenient, if not difficult, for the accused-appellant
to attempt penetration. On the other hand, the ease with which accused-appellant herein
perpetrated the sexual abuse, not to mention the absence of time constraint, totally distinguishes the
instant case from Campuhan. Here, the victim was passive and even submissive to the lecherous acts
of accused-appellant. Thus, even assuming that his penis then was flaccid, his act of holding, guiding
and assisting his penis with his one hand, while touching, poking and pressing the same against
Rosilyn's vagina, would surely result in even the slightest contact between the labia of the pudendum
and accused-appellant's sex organ.
Considering that Rosilyn is a self-confessed sex worker, and the circumstances of the alleged sexual
assault at bar, the defense argued that it is highly improbable and contrary to human experience that
accused-appellant exercised a Spartan-like discipline and restrained himself from fully consummating
the sexual act when there was in fact no reason for him not to do so. In the same light, the defense
likewise branded as unnatural the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-appellant contented himself with
rubbing his penis clipped between her thighs until he reached orgasm and desisted from fully
penetrating her, when Rosilyn was then entirely at his disposal.
The defense seems to forget that there is no standard form of behavior when it comes to gratifying
one’s basic sexual instinct. The human sexual perversity is far too intricate for the defense to prescribe
certain forms of conduct. Even the word "perverse" is not entirely precise, as what may be perverse
to one may not be to another. Using a child of tender years who could even pass as one’s
granddaughter, to unleash what others would call downright bestial lust, may be utterly nauseating
and repulsive to some, but may peculiarly be a festive celebration of salacious fantasies to others. For
all we know, accused-appellant may have found a distinct and complete sexual gratification in such
kind of libidinous stunts and maneuvers.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant may not have fully and for a longer period penetrated Rosilyn for
fear of perpetrating his name through a child from the womb of a minor; or because of his previous
agreement with his "suking bugaw," Simplicio Delantar, that there would be no penetration,
otherwise the latter would demand a higher price. This may be the reason why Simplicio Delantar
gave his mocking fatherly advice to Rosilyn that it is bad if accused-appellant inserts his penis into her
sex organ, while at the same time ordering her to call him if accused-appellant would penetrate her.
Such instance of penile invasion would prompt Simplicio to demand a higher price, which is, after all,
as the Solicitor General calls it, the peculiarity of prostitution.
The defense contends that the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-appellant ejaculated on her thighs
and not in her vagina, only proves that there was no rape. It should be noted that this portion of
Rosilyn’s testimony refers to the June 15 and 21, 1996 charges of acts of lasciviousness, and not the
rape charges. In any event, granting that it occurred during the twin instances of rape on June 18 and
July 20, 1996, the ejaculation on the victim’s thighs would not preclude the fact of rape.
There is no truth to the contention of the defense that Rosilyn did not see the penis of accused-
appellant. As can be gleaned from the above-quoted portions of the transcripts, Rosilyn unequivocally
testified that accused-appellant held his penis then poked her vagina with it. And even if she did not
actually see accused-appellant’s penis go inside her, surely she could have felt whether it was his
penis or just his finger.
We now come to the issue of whether or not Rosilyn was below twelve (12) years of age at the time
the rape complained of occurred. To bolster the declaration of Rosilyn that she was then eleven years
old, the prosecution presented the following documents:
(1) Rosilyn’s birth certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985;31
(2) Rosilyn’s baptismal certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985;32
(3) Master List of Live Births stating that Ma. Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 to
Librada Telen as the mother;33
(4) Marked pages of the Cord Dressing Room Book;34
(5) Summary of the Cord Dressing Book, showing her birthday as May 11, 1985 and her
parents’ (Librada Telen and Simplicio Delantar) patient file number (39-10-71);35
(6) Record of admission showing her parents’ patient number (39-10-71) and confinement
at the Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital from May 5-14, 1985.36
It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be proved by the presentation
of her birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that the birth certificate of
Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court because said birth certificate has already
been ordered cancelled and expunged from the records by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11, 1997.37 However, it appears that the said
decision has been annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals on June 10, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No.
45289. The decision of the Court of Appeals was appealed to this Court by petition for review,
docketed as G.R. No. 140305. Pending the final outcome of that case, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is presumed valid and can be invoked as prima facie basis for holding that Rosilyn was indeed
eleven years old at the time she was abused by accused-appellant.
However, even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and ample proof
of the complainant’s age in the records.
Rosilyn’s Baptismal Certificate can likewise serve as proof of her age. In People v. Liban,38 we ruled
that the birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence that can help establish
the age of the victim, such as the baptismal certificate, school records, and documents of similar
nature, can be presented.
And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the birth and baptismal certificates of Rosilyn are
inadmissible to prove her age, the Master List of Live Births and the Cord Dressing Book of Dr. Jose
Fabella Memorial Hospital where Rosilyn was born are sufficient evidence to prove that her date of
birth was May 11, 1985. These documents are considered entries in official records, admissible
as prima facie evidence of their contents and corroborative of Rosilyn’s testimony as to her age.
Thus, Rule 130, Section 44, of the Rules of Court states:
Entries in official records. --- Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty especially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa v. Caltex, et al., (Phil), Inc., et al.,39 the Court laid down the requisites for the application of
the foregoing rule, thus:
(a) That the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so;
(b) That it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) That the public office or the other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
In order for a book to classify as an official register and admissible in evidence, it is not necessary that
it be required by an express statute to be kept, nor that the nature of the office should render the
book indispensable; it is sufficient that it be directed by the proper authority to be kept. Thus, official
registers, though not required by law, kept as convenient and appropriate modes of discharging
official duties, are admissible.40
Entries in public or official books or records may be proved by the production of the books or records
themselves or by a copy certified by the legal keeper thereof. 41 It is not necessary to show that the
person making the entry is unavailable by reason of death, absence, etc., in order that the entry may
be admissible in evidence, for his being excused from appearing in court in order that public business
be not deranged, is one of the reasons for this exception to the hearsay rule. 42
Corollary thereto, Presidential Decree No. 651, as amended by P.D. No. 766,43 mandates hospitals to
report and register with the local civil registrar the fact of birth, among others, of babies born under
their care. Said Decree imposes a penalty of a fine of not less that P500.00 nor more than P1,000.00
or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months nor more than six (6) months, or both, in the
discretion of the court, in case of failure to make the necessary report to the local civil registrar.
Hence, under the above-cited P.D. 651, as amended, in connection with Rule 30, Section 44, of the
Rules of Court, it is clear that the Cord Dressing Room Book where the fact of birth, name of the
mother and other related entries are initially recorded, as well as the Master List of Live Births of the
hospital, are considered entries in official record, being indispensable to and appropriate modes of
recording the births of children preparatory to registration of said entries with the local civil registrar,
in compliance with a duty specifically mandated by law.
It matters not that the person presented to testify on these hospital records was not the person who
actually made those entries way back in 1985, but Amelita Avenante, the records custodian of the
hospital in 1995. To reiterate, these records may be proved by the presentation of the record itself or
by a certified copy or the legal keeper thereof. Proof of the unavailability of the person who made
those entries is not a requisite for their admissibility. What is important is that the entries testified to
by Avenante were gathered from the records of the hospital which were accomplished in compliance
with a duty specifically mandated by law.
Therefore, the Cord Dressing Room Book and the Master List of Live Births of the hospital are
admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein.
The preparation of these hospital documents preceded that of the birth and baptismal certificates of
Rosilyn. They establish independent and material facts prepared by unbiased and disinterested
persons under environmental circumstances apart from those that may have attended the
preparation of the birth and baptismal certificates. Hence, these hospital records, to reiterate, are
sufficient to support the testimony of Rosilyn as to her age.
Consequently, the testimony of Simplicio Delantar that the entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn
are false and that he merely made them up, particularly her date of birth, was correctly disregarded
by the trial court. It should be noted that the criminal charges for child abuse filed by Rosilyn against
him was the direct cause of his incarceration. This raises a possibility that Simplicio falsely testified in
the present case, to get even with Rosilyn.
Likewise, the trial court correctly disregarded the testimonies of Gloria Binay and Angelito Intruzo
because the defense failed to prove that they were knowledgeable as to the circumstances of
Rosilyn’s birth. Their testimonies consist mainly of observations tending to show that Rosilyn’s
appearance belie her claim that she was born on May 11, 1985.
In the four instances of acts of lasciviousness allegedly committed on June 29, June 30, July 2, and
July 3, 1996 (Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, and 96-1997, respectively), the trial
court acquitted accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt as the defense was able to
prove that accused-appellant was not in Manila but either in Dipolog or Dapitan City at the time the
lascivious acts were supposedly committed. The evidence of the defense established that accused-
appellant flew to Dipolog on June 28, 1996, and stayed there until July 9, 1996.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1991 and 96-1998, for two counts of acts of lasciviousness allegedly
committed both in the early mornings of June 19 and July 21, 1996, Rosilyn merely testified that she
felt somebody touching her private part but failed to identify the person who was performing those
lecherous acts as she was too sleepy to wake up. Hence, accused-appellant was likewise acquitted in
these cases on the ground of reasonable doubt.
With respect, however, to the acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 15 and 22,
1996, and in the evening of June 14, 15, 18, and 21, 1996, as well as the rape perpetrated on June 18,
1996 and July 20, 1996, accused-appellant failed to account for his whereabouts. A careful review of
the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes reveals that accused-appellant did not give any
testimony as to where he was at the time these crimes were committed. Clearly, therefore, the trial
court correctly disregarded his unsubstantiated defense of denial, which cannot prevail over his
positive identification by Rosilyn as the culprit.
As regards the charge of acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 16, 1996, accused-
appellant claimed that it was impossible for him to have committed the same because he flew to
Dipolog on that day. The records disclose, however, that accused-appellant’s flight was at 9:40 a.m.
The possibility, therefore, of accused-appellant’s having performed the lascivious acts on the victim
before he went off to the airport is not at all precluded. For his failure to prove the physical
impossibility of his presence at the Ritz Towers in the morning of June 16, 1996, when the sexual
abuse of Rosilyn was committed, his defense of alibi must fail.
Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, states:
Child Prostitution and other Sexual Abuse. --- Children, whether male or female, who for
money or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraphs 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period; x x x . (Emphasis supplied.)
In People v. Optana,44 the Court, citing the case of People v. Larin,45 explained the elements of the
offense of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected other sexual
abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the
child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
 consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Under
RA 7610, children are "persons below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take
care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition."
"Lascivious conduct" is defined under Article XIII, Section 32 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulation of R.A. 7610, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant’s acts of kissing Rosilyn on the lips, fondling her breast, inserting
his finger into her vagina and placing his penis between her thighs, all constitute lascivious conduct
intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. Hence, the trial court correctly convicted accused-
appellant of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-
1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, charging him with the above-described
lascivious acts.
The penalty for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, where the victim is
below 12 years of age, is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The records show that on at least nine (9) separate occasions, the accused-appellant inserted his
finger into the complainant’s vagina. These insertions took place in 1996. A year later, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape law of 1997. It does not apply to this case but it indicates
state policy on rape. The Revised Penal Code is now amended to read as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Indicative of the continuing state policy towards rape, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 now classifies the
crime as an offense against persons. Any public prosecutor, not necessarily the victim or her parents,
can prosecute the case.
The penalties for the crime of rape in the light of various circumstances, which are now set forth and
contained in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, have also been increased.
Considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly
imposed on accused-appellant the maximum penalty of fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporal, which is within the medium period of reclusion temporal medium,
pursuant to our ruling in Dulla v. Court of Appeals.46 Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is a special law,
accused-appellant may enjoy a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be taken within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code.47However, the trial court erroneously
fixed the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence at eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of prision mayor in its medium period. In the aforesaid case of Dulla,48 we held that the
penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal medium is reclusion temporal minimum, the range
of which is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence,
for violation of Article III, Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate
sentence of twelve years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.
At the time of commission of the crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape was penalized
under Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. xxx.
In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age consummates the
crime of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. The law presumes that a
woman of tender age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to
the sexual act. Thus, it was held that carnal knowledge of a child below twelve years old even if she is
engaged in prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application of force and intimidation or
the deprivation of reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The absence of struggle or outcry of the
victim or even her passive submission to the sexual act will not mitigate nor absolve the accused from
liability.49

In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully proved that Rosilyn was only
eleven years of age at the time she was sexually abused. As such, the absence of proof of any struggle,
or for that matter of consent or passive submission to the sexual advances of accused-appellant, was
of no moment. The fact that accused-appellant had sexual congress with eleven year-old Rosilyn is
sufficient to hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

As to accused-appellant's civil liability, the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court for
each count of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 should be increased from
P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.50 On the other hand, the award of the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages for each count of statutory rape was correct.

In People v. Lor,51 citing the cases of People v. Victor,52 and People v. Gementiza,53 we held that the
indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, in the
amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is
itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. Said civil indemnity is mandatory
upon finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages
which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
judicial discretion.54 Hence, accused-appellant should be ordered to pay the offended party another
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape and acts of lasciviousness.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-
1985 and 96-1986 finding accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of statutory rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count, is AFFIRMED. Likewise, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62
in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in six counts, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer, for each count of acts of
lasciviousness, the indeterminate penalty of twelve years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Ma. Rosilyn Delantar, the
additional amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness. Finally, the award of moral damages for each count of acts of lasciviousness is
increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., CJ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998 The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña as presiding officer, convened on
July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of party
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners, affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as follows: 6
vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents. 10 members — Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)

7 members — Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United

PANGANIBAN, J.: Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government UMDP)
has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated
sphere. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for she sovereign acts, of a coequal branch 1 member — Liberal Party (LP)
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the
Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated,
1 member — Aksyon Demokrasya
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority. This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it
will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law. 1 member — People's Reform Party (PRP)

The Case 1 member — Gabay Bayan

On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original 2 members — Independent
petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the ——
rightful minority leader.
23 — total number of senators 7 (The last six members are all classified by
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the solicitor petitioners as "independent".)
general "to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice."
On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general submitted their respective On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the
Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also
their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, 8 Senator
the petition and deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
September 29, 1998.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction1 to hear and Drilon as majority leader.
decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a basic
deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the lower
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the
tribunals. 2 However, for special and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling
only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained
circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact,
that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had
original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of
voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
legislative officers like the Senate President4 and the Speaker of the House 5 have been recognized
as exceptions to this rule.
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7)
The Facts
and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on
the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with
Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met
in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by
the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,9 stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as
the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo
warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and con,
the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the
recognition of and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority
leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to
settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of
"majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1),
Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that the
issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the
domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing
the principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the
fundamental law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature
alone has the full discretion to provide for such office and, in that event, to determine the
procedure of selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question involving
an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate;
neither are there "peculiar circumstances" impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over the
petition. The solicitor general adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the
petitioners' theory that a senator who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from
becoming the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various
important cases involving this very important and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the
past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial
review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the
Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the
jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are
political in nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the
rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the
domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed
jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because
the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
presence of a quorum to hold a session 13 and therein elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority that this Court has
jurisdiction over cases like the present . . . so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well." 14
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber
of Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives.
It has already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has
created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be
 expected from any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the
hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned. 15
. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or
decide if this Court should refuse to decide them. 16
. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered. 17
18
In Tañada v. Cueno, this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that "it refers
to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
[the] legality, of a particular measure." 19
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the
senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's
"full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. 20 Thus, the
Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection
proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that the
Court "had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the
Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]." This ruling was
made in spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker 22 and Montenegro v.
Castañeda 23 that "the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension
(of the privilege . . .) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the
courts and upon all other persons." But the Chief Justice cautioned: "the function of the Court is
merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to
determine the wisdom of his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary: 24
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar
character are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal
bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of
separation of powers — characteristic of the presidential system of government
— the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into
three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the making of laws, which are
allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerning mainly with the
enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting
the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with
the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are
apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere — but only within such
sphere — each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each
is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action
assigned to any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon
the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions
made by the other departments — provided that such acts, measures or
decisions are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or
conditions have been met, or the limitations respected is justiciable or non-
political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the
contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or
limitations — particularly those prescribed by the Constitution — would be set
at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement
thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice under the presidential
form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks
and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the
authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under
the ineluctable obligation — made particularly more exacting and peremptory
by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend
the Constitution — to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky.
589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power,"
to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within
constitutional limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial
power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial
prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the
Court. Daza v. Singson, 26 Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr. 27 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 28 similarly resolved
issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning among political
parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments. The
Court held that the issue was justiciable, "even if the question were political in nature," since it
involved "the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments
as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Tañada v. Angara, 29 wherein the petitioners sought
to nullify the Senate's concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle
the dispute." The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions
questioning, an act of the political departments of government, it will not review the wisdom,
merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it down only on either of two grounds: (1)
unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 30 (HRET), the Court refused to
reverse a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been
conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications of their respective
members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 31 The Court may inquire into a decision or
resolution of said tribunals only if such "decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion" 32
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine
and to look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the bill,
which was later enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the legislative body.
Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in the passage of
the bill. They averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules was a
violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned the
internal procedures of the House, with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated: 34
It would-be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because
the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The
Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in
excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion were
it to do so. . . . In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume
that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its
conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due
the judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners — one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
constitutionalist — try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section
16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority
leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of
respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over
the petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the
plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of
petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials,
particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by majority vote of all members" carries
with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and "minority," as well as who may
elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision
refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted
committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no
such chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader
belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority
leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of
the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the
minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from
the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total."36 The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply
mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators.
Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the
"minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in
mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby
elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not
contested in petitioners' Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R Salonga as Senate
President was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the
ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a
consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators, including those
belonging to the minority. 39 This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where even the
minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. 40 History would also show that the "majority"
in either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of
lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a lesser number of
members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also refer to
"the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," 41 not necessarily more than one
half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction
with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority." 42 Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority while
the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not
as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In
a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners
themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be indentified by the
Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups
or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker,
it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of
Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely
a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules
of its proceedings." 44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern
its internal affairs. 45 Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a
President Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge
of their duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its
Members. Should there be more than one candidate for the same office, a
nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be by viva voce or by
resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of
creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may
not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court
is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene. 47
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence
and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 48 Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body 49 at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers
as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that
it is bound to protect and uphold — the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from
prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a
wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation,
a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the
petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate
was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire
whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion. 50 This is
the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the
judiciary the power and the duty not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable," but likewise "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, said in part: 51
. . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy[, the] power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies
and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words,
the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming
that such matters constitute a political question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of
Respondent Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power 52 by one
without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. 53 A quo warranto proceeding is the
proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment. 54 The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
prosecutor 55 or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another. 56 The action shall be brought against the person who
allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding of exercising such office. 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she
has aclear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly
usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof
of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may
lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or
the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can
it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and exercise of
the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has
been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government" is restricted only by the definition and confines of
the term "grave abuse of discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility. 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the
latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous
resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such
by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least
two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their
standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has
been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO
G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G.
TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and
EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59,respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman
Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the
ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members
of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition
that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads as
follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of
the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the
floor of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to
Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of Cebu
stated the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular
administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at
premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity
or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as
long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation
would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made
maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious
assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one
visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose said office to
contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to
be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of
the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,
in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to
issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses
and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,
fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House.
The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and
recommendations before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress
of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and
words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if
other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not
be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the Court's
jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer,
without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications,
and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the special
committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend
himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly
behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day—before closing its
session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from
office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda,
San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court
to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension,
upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended
its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee—whose members are the sole respondents—had thereby
ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House,
made the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59
and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to
substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and
for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended
from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59,
adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious,
reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in his privilege
speech of June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the
dignity of the House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as
he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress,
Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the floor
of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the
infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were censured
for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member
of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his
parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be
censured, committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this
decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional
power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a
foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.

As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20
practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its
that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing
proceedings.
he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had
taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional
position (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members. This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he
argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other
business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place."
parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States.
In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
other place" than Congress.
The situation might thus be compared to laws4 extending the period of limitation of actions and
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has
recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate." upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any
rate, court are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is
observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a particular
he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of
measure."6
that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of
Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and
application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect
 The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is
within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of
procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty
action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holt vs.Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411;
City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23
Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124
Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;
McGraw vs.Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145
Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of Rutherford vs. City of
Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted
the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the resolution,
despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds'
Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We
believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in
black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it
would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer
upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously
observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it
has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established that the
courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature since each department is equally independent within the
power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene
in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the
power to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most
arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In
1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a
bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no
hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court
of California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the
most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof,
taking in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the
Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express
provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the general
legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which
it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court
of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is
necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the
safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must
necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '. . .
There is no provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by
either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative
department and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is
supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house
thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions,
which it is expressly forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the
principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to
other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the
courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of
impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to
disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in
the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles
and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the
position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute
unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in several instances, it took action against
offenders, even after other business had been considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent.
In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months
because he had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered
in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity
of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no
jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate
had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and
the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove
an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house
may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes,
expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent
of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best
represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.

It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy."
But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then
the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth
District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the Governor-General, who
had appointed him.

It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were
granted to it by the Jones Law10; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and
preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the
Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the
power it then exercised—the power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the
Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution did not
impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months in
1949.

The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations
are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by
usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)

In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be
more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet
deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.12

Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special
Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction
had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved
the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such.
It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic. 13 Of
course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all members of the
House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most
probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as
in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15

At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court
thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and
decisive.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-
NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering
the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with
pending in criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from
investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
upon petitioner's request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of
the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the
Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13 May
1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three
informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise
of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization for the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra,
Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong
Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go,
Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu
Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang
Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo
Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen
Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of
Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving
unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized
by said accused." 1
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the
other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555
and No. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos.
Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from
injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05
June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon
manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come unaided to his office
on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed
provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the
Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition
issued a temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's arraignment and the
consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the Court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary
restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's intention to accept a fellowship
from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan issued an
order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from
the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992,
her motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed
G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the
Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose applications she purportedly
approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the
complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner's
arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit
thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations. The
court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and
directed her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against
her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No.
109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to
disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended
Informations, and seeking the nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to
cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution
ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceedings with
her arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by
the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman
to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were
consolidated into one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to
dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31
July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga
(Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st July 1995
motion of the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its
03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by
the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled "Miriam
Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan," docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her.
On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under
consideration and hereby suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her
position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from any other government
position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her suspension shall be for ninety (90)
days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.
"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate President,
Senate of the Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary
of the Senate, for the implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of
the Senate shall inform this Court of the action taken thereon within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of the
suspension order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be
lifted at that time." 2
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a
ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the
Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential
support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the
service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the
Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 the Court reiterated:
"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended — treating of the suspension pendente
lite of an accused public officer — may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly
upheld by this Court.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent
or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service." 4
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it." 5 Explaining the nature of the preventive
suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan 6observed:
"x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact,
if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension." 7
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear
and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than
once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees
indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused. 8
En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of the
information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the
conduct thereof. It has been said that —
"'x x x . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to
state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has not been afforded
the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not
constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the
Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under
section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the
grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x .'
"xxx xxx xxx
"Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the
ground that the acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019,
or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion
to quash the information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of court.
"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the
acts for which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep.
Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be treated only
in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash
on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the
challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to
an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted,
constitute the elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code." 9
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense
charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat
to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis
in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as,
that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him
do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13
of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out
in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 10
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case before the
Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called upon
to resolve several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez, 11 petitioner sought
to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic
Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez, 12 petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure
order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its
Hold Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs.
Garchitorena, 13petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal
Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena
disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed
as "filed" the 32 amended informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan, 14 petitioner assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for
reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these
cases, 15 the Court declared:
"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case
No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she
failed to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the
information against her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the
splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein
were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of
the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of
spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived
 in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in
not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact
in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived
in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions.'
"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section
3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019." 16
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress
to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each —
"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days." 17
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
et al., 18 the Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan,
despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of Congress. The
Court ruled:
"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution — which deals
with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly
behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members
subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not
exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension
spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes
each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its
own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave
abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in
general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging
milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question,
however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to
the view 19 that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the
Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of
government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision
that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases
to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in
the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue
raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.