FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there
is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
NO MAJORITY VOTE ANG SC 7-7, HENCE PETITION DISMISSED, HENCE ANCESTRAL DOMAIN MAY
INCLUDE NA. RESOURCES, SOMEHOW AGAINST REGALIAN DOCTRINE

FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition
for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the
survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island
as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from
filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition
countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part
of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition
pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:
 Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural
land, therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must
be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
--The private claimants cannot apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first
element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.

Arceo v. CA

G.R. No. 81401,18 May 1990

Nature: petition to review the decision of the CA

Ponente: InesLuciano, J.

Facts:

● Spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo had one son, Esteban. Spouses were also the
owners of 4 parcels of unregistered land located in Pulilan, Bulacan. Abdon died in 1953,
Escolastica in 16 sept 1942 and Esteban in 2 Sept 1941. Esteban sired Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo,
Antonio and Sotera. Jose married Virginia Franco with whom he fathered 6 children and are the
petitioners of this case against Jose’s siblings.
● On October (or Sept) 27 1941, the spouses Arceo executed a deed of donation on the said
parcels of land in favor of Jose, presented in court as “exhibit J”. On 2 August 1950, the spouses
 Arceo executed another deed of donation to Jose on the same parcels of land, presented in
court as “exhibit T”. Exhibit J and T were executed inter vivos. On the other hand, on October
3(or 30) 1941 which was, “exhibit 1”, the spouses Arceo executed a deed of donation to ALL
GRANDCHILDREN including Jose, thereby revoking “exhibit J”.
● On 12 January 1972, Petitioners filed with the Cadastral Court (CC) an application for the 4 lots
under the strength of exhibits J and T. Respondents contested the petition on the strength of
exhibit 1. CC dismissed the petition and distributed the land based on intestate succession, CA
affirmed the decision CC, hence this petition.
●
Issue: WON the CC had no jurisdiction to decide cases on claims of ownership of property.

Ruling: No. The CC HAD jurisdiction to decide cases on claims of ownership of property.

Under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as a land
registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration
act. The PRD “has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by Act 497 when acting merely as a Cadastral court.” Such
amendment conferred upon the trial courts he authority to act not only on applications for ‘original
registration” but also “over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions.”

Likewise, where the issues of ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration,
the Cadastral Court has jurisdiction over it. Hence, decision of CA is set aside.

Junio vs. De Los Santos

GR No. L-35744 ; September 28, 1984

Facts:

Wenceslao Junio is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Bayambang, Pangasinan with an
area of 7.65 hectares covered by TCT No. 1004. An Affidavit of Adverse Claim was executed by
respondent Feliciano de los Santos, claiming one third undivided portion of Junio’s property by virtue of
a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Junio. Junio then denies having sold any portion of his
property to De Los Santos, hence his petition for the cancellation of said adverse claim. Junio disputes
the appropriateness of the annotation alleging that under section 110 of the land registration act such
inscription may be resorted only when there is no other means of registering an interest or right, and
that section 57 of the same statute provides for the registration of a documented sale involving a titled
property and that the register of deeds acted negligently in registering the document without the formal
legal requisites. Respondent de los Santos countered that he had tried to avail himself of Section 57 by
requesting Junio to surrender his owner’s dusplicate certificate of title but since the latter refused to do
so he was compelled to present an adverse claim pursuant to section 110 of the LRA.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s acts were appropriate

Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties

Held:

The court ruled that considering that Junio had refused to surrender the title; De Los Santos could not
avail of Section 57. Hence the latter correctly resorted to the annotation of an adverse claim. Further,
the court found that the genuineness and due execution of the sale between the parties is in
controversy. Moreover, although the grounds relied upon by Junio for the cancellation of the adverse
claim were unmeritous, it behoved the lower court to have conducted a speedy hearing upon the
question of validity of the adverse claim. The case was remanded to the RTC for hearing and for passing
upon the controversy on the merits between Junio and De Los Santos.

Doctrinal jurisprudence holds that the Court of First Instance

(now the Regional Trial Court), as a Land Registration Court,
can hear cases otherwise litigable only in ordinary civil actions,
since the Courts of First Instance are at the same time, Courts of
general jurisdiction and could entertain and dispose of the
validity or invalidity of respondent's adverse claim, with a view
to determining whether petitioner is entitled or not to the relief
that he seeks.[

Baranda vs. Gustilo

GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988

FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara,
Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between
petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria
Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the said land.
However during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents
was fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of
petitioners. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito
Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and
issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However, by reason of a separate case
pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new certificate
of title. This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in
the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for
reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of
lis pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?
HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand
that the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the
Court of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of
deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting register of
deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judge’s Order
directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: “It shall be the
duty of the register of deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.

If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the
presentor or such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him
of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree.” On the other hand,
Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the
proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other
instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with
the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question
shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the
party in interest through the Register of Deeds.”

Teodoro Almirol v Registry of Deeds

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

FACTS

In June 1961, Petitioner Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land
situated in Esperanza, Agusan, and covered by OCT P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo,
married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May 1962, Almirol will cause the registration of
the deed of sale and to secure in his name a TCT. Registration was refused by the Register of
Deeds since the property was a conjugal one and that Agusan cannot dispose such property even
if his wife has already died.

Almirol the filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Agusan to
compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale, to issue the TCT and damages. It is
Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required
of him, and that Almirol has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

ISSUE

W/N a petition for mandamus is the remedy to compel the respondent to register the deed of
sale in question.

RULING
 Yes. It is the ministerial duty of respondent Registry of Deeds to register the deed of sale in
question. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this
function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.

The supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their registration,
because invalidity is no proof of their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their
registration. The law on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be
registered.

The registry of deeds is precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his
personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a
deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt
as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the
Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question.

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds G.R. No. L-630. November 15,

1947
Facts: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in December
1941. The registration was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish the said
registration but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on the grounds that he is a foreigner and
he cannot acquire a land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of Manila. The CFI
ruled that he cannot own a land, being an alien. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

Held: No.

Ratio: Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about the conservation and utilization of natural resources.
The said provision embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain. Its purpose is to establish a
permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the
nation. Although it mentions agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held that in determining
whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its
susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. Hence, “public agricultural land” was construed as
referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral. Therefore, it includes residential lands.

Halili v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 113539, March 12, 1998
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real
properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow private respondent Helen
Meyers Guzman, and his son, private respondent David Rey Guzman, both of whom
are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim,
assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in
and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.
Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation Guzman then sold the
parcel of land to Catanaig, who is one of respondents in this case. Petitioners, who are
owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances —
between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano
Cataniag — and claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption
under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA
denied the appeal of the Halilis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the land is null and void.

No, because the prohibition in the constitution has already been served. Article
XII, Section 7 provides that Non- Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to
private lands or
to lands of the public domain, In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to
private
lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession. While it
is true that the transfer of Helen of his right to her son who is an American citizen
contradicts the prohibition set forth in the Constitution, the Supreme Court upheld the
subsequent sale of the land to Catanig, a Filipino citizen. Jurisprudence is consistent
that “if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid.”
The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus
“[I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as
construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation’s lands for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization. “
Petition was denied

LLANTINO vs CO LIONG CHONG (1990)

FACTS:

Sometime 1954, The Llantinos (petitioners) leased real property to Chong, a

Chinese national, for 13 years. Chong became a naturalized Filipino Citizen in
1961 and now known as Juan Molina. When the lease contract was about to
expire, petitioners requested Chong for a conference but the latter refused and
rather informed the petitioners that he already built a commercial building on
the land and that the contract of lease is good for 60 years. Surprised by this
contentions, the Llantinos filed an action to quiet title, claiming that the lease
contract was invalid for circumventing the constitutional prohibition on the
acquisition of land by aliens.

Lower court ruled in favor of respondent - the contract is valid.

ISSUE:

WON the contract of lease entered into by and between the parties on 1954
when Chong is still a Chinese National is valid?

HELD:

The lease contract was valid, and Chong had the right to hold by lease the
property involved although at the time of execution of the contract, he was still
a Chinese national. In the case at bar it has been established that there is only
one contract and there is no option to buy the leased property in favor of
Chong. There is nothing in the record to indicate any scheme to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition.

Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from use of lands for
residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they
may be granted temporary rights, such as a lease contract which is not
forbidden in the Constitution. The only instance where a lease contract may be
considered invalid is where there are circumstances attendant to its execution
which are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition.

ROMAN APOSTOLIC V LRC

FACTS:
 October 4, 1954: Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao,
executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao Inc.(Roman), a corporation sole organized and existing in
accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual
incumbent.
 The Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, having in mind a previous resolution of the
CFI in Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60% of
the members of their corp. were Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor of
their congregation of deed of donation of a parcel of land, required it to submit a similar
affidavit declaring the same.
 June 28, 1954: Roman in the letter expressed willingness to submit an affidavit but not in the
same tenor as the Carmelite Nuns because it had five incorporators while as a corporation
sole it has only one and it was ownership through donation and this was purchased
 As the Register of the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) : Deeds has some doubts as to
the registerability, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en
consulta for resolution (section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151)
 LRC:
 In view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution,
the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of
proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino
citizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a
Canadian citizen
 ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of sale in the absence
of proof of compliance with such condition
 action for mandamus was instituted by Roman alleging the land is held in true for the benefit
of the Catholic population of a place
ISSUE: W/N Roman is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to
the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution

HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale
 A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at
a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some
legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons
they could not have had.
 In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several
chapters
 corporation sole
1. composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is
not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever
2. only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory
comprised by said corporation sole and such temporalities are administered for and on
behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole
3. has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent and ordinary has nothing to do with
the operation, management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the
citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective dioceses or corporation sole.
 Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should
be composed of Filipino citizens. (Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple)
 undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the territory
of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizens
 presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion fully covers
the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution
 fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive bequests or gifts of
real properties (which were the main source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas
during the Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts of
real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the
 legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection against the revitalization of
religious landholdings.
 as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they stand in position of
TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of trust

REGISTER OF DEEDS vs UNG SIU SI TEMPLE

GR. No. L-6776 May 21,1955

FACTS:

A Filipino citizen executed a deed of donation in favor of the Ung Siu Si Temple, an unregistered religious
organization that operated through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The Register of Deeds refused to
record the deed of donation executed in due form arguing that the Consitution provides that acquisition of land
is limited to Filipino citizens, or to corporations or associations at least 60% of which is owned by such
citizens.

ISSUE:
Whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious organization whose founder,
trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered or not.

RULING:

Sec. 5, Art. 13 of the Constitution provides that save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The Constitution does not make any
exception in favor of religious associations.

The fact that appellant has no capital stock does not exempt it from the Constitutional inhibition, since its
member are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the 60% requirement is to ensure that corporations or
associations allowed to acquire agricultural lands or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by
Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, controlling
membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.

As to the complaint that the disqualification under Art. 13 of the Constitution violated the freedom of religion,
the Court was not convinced that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession or worship.