The Ways Things Look

(Abstract)

Richard Price, All Souls College, Oxford University

D.Phil, Trinity Term, 2006

Philosophers have often raised the question what kind of information is available to vision. For
instance, Berkeley argued that one could not see depth, Hume argued that one could not see necessary
connections and, according to Paul Guyer, Kant held that there is no perception of change, but only
change of perception (Guyer 2004).

Recently philosophers have asked what kinds of properties visual experience represents.
According to sparse views, visual experience represents a sparse range of properties, for instance just
colours, shapes, positions and sizes (see McGinn 1982, Burge 2003, Millar 2000). According to rich
views, visual experience represents a rich range of properties, for instance properties such as being a
tomato, and being sad (see Peacocke 2003, Siegel 2006, Searle 1983, McDowell 1998b).

In this thesis I discuss some questions arising from the above debate. Instead of using the
terminology of what properties visual experience represents, I define a kind of looking, phenomenal
looking, which is individuated in terms of differences in visual phenomenal character, and I raise the
question what kinds of properties objects phenomenally look to have.

A summary of the thesis is as follows:

(1) I argue that objects phenomenally look to have only colours and positions. Furthermore, I argue
that the colour properties include only shades of colour, and not determinables such as being red.
Thus I defend a very sparse view about the properties that objects phenomenally look to us to
have.

(2) I argue that objects do not phenomenally look to the left and to the right of me, and that objects
do not phenomenally look to bear visual angles to me.

(3) (2) raises a puzzle about what kinds of position properties objects do phenomenally look to have.
I defend primitivism, according to which the position properties that objects phenomenally look to
have are sui generis, absolute, properties, and thus are not relations to observers or other objects.

(4) I argue that necessarily, objects do not have the position properties that they phenomenally look
to us to have, and that necessarily, objects do not have the colour properties that they
phenomenally look to us to have.

(5) I argue that the position properties that objects phenomenally look to us to have include x, y and z
coordinates, and not merely x and y coordinates. That is, I argue that we see in 3D rather than in
2D.

(6) I raise the question what kinds of colour and location properties objects would phenomenally look
to beings with more coarse-grained discriminatory abilities than us. I reach no firm conclusions
about this topic, but discuss some ways in one might approach it.