Constitutional Interpretation

[Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary]

G.R. No. 83896

“It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be
separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections
bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose
of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the
two can be made to stand together.”

FACTS:

 The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides that:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition
to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations
and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc
bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

 The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII
which declares:

The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

 The petitioners maintained that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” used in Section
13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution.

 Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned. The provision relied upon by the respondents provides:

Sec. 7. . . . . .

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE:

Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in
general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?

No.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official
family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office
or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive
officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure
when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7,
Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only
to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a
member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided
under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

RELATION TO THE TOPIC:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to
be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers
of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in
order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public
officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices
in government was strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the
number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to
their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations,
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Definition of a State, Elements of a State
[Collector of Internal Revenue v. Antonio Campos Rueda]
G.R. No. L-13250
The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal from a decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals as to whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be
necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a “foreign country” to fall
within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

FACTS:
• Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. De Cerdeira (Maria Cerderia) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage
to a Spanish Citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death in January 2,
1955. At the time of her demise she left intangible personal properties in the Philippines.
• Antonio Campos Rueda, petitioner was the administrator of Maria Cerderia’s estate. He filed a provisional
estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. Petitioner paid tax liabilities
amounting to P369,383.96. An amended return was filed on November 17, 1955 wherein intangible
personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were claimed exempt from taxes.
• Rueda’s request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
• Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption. However,
respondent denied this request on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was, moreover]
a mere principality, not a foreign country.
• Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression “foreign country” used in the last proviso of Section
122 of the NIRC, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person
in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible personal properties
of our citizens not residing therein, or whose laws allow a similar exemption from such taxes. It is,
therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle
the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition
of an international personality, must be satisfied for a “foreign country” to fall within the exemption of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

HELD:
• Supreme Court affirmed Court of Tax Appeal’s Ruling.
• If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound’s formulation that it be
politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of
nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a
regime of law.
• It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under
a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.
• The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized,
exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and
maintaining its separate international personality.
• State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its
allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover, it would point out to
the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions
of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisite
satisfied, international law does not exact independence as a condition of
statehood.

Citizenship: Modes of Acquisition; Citizen of the Philippines

[Carlos T. Go Sr. v. Luis T. Ramos]
G.R. No. 167569, 167570, 171946
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos against Jimmy
T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself
as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. Luis argued
that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the
document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the
other entries were typewritten.
Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other
records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued
by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.”

Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are
Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten
while all the other entries were typewritten.

He also averred that in September 1989, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover
up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure
a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis
was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. He alleged
that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625
(Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having
executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950.

Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late
registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955
elections. He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father
has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born
and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.
With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is “FChinese,” he maintained that such was not
of his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrar’s Office who might have
relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted that the said office has control
over his birth certificate; thus, if his father’s citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed
when the employees of that office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino.

As regards the entry in his siblings’ certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father
is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his
father.

In a Resolution dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the
complaint for deportation against Jimmy. She affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation tasked
to investigate the case that Jimmy’s father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the
1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy,
making him a Filipino as well.

On March 8, 2001, the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos’ election of
Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by
reason of his father’s questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the
appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.

On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating provisions
of The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as SCA No.
2218, seeking to annul and set aside the March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge
Sheet, and the proceedings. In essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the
deportation proceedings.

In the interim, the Board issued a Decision ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy.

In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a supplemental petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a writ
of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the
April 17, 2002 Decision. Later, however, the trial court dissolved the writ in a Decision dated January 6, 2004 as
a consequence of the dismissal of the petition.

Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied.
Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to
the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually
dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.

Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the Resolution denying their motion
for reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
85143. They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that
what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge
sheet.

The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition. It did not find merit in their argument that the issue of citizenship
should proceed only before the proper court in an independent action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board
has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens.
The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.

Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been denied, Carlos and
Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Bureau of Immigration
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation which resulted in the apprehension and
detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China.

On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency
of his appeal and his release on recognizance.

In an Order, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed
of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved
for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied by the trial court.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue of his citizenship
is settled with finality by the court.
ISSUE:
Did we adopt the jus soli or jus sanguinins principle? Does the principle of res adjudicata apply to decisions on
citizenship?

HELD:
We adopted the jus sanguinis principle. The doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. The
doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s citizenship. However, the Supreme
Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since then, said doctrine
only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on
the mistaken application of jus soli.
In citizenship proceedings, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. Res judicata may be applied in
cases of citizenship only if the following concur: 1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where said person is a party; 2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active
part in the resolution thereof; and 3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.