Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS (GR No. 122156) - YES.
- YES. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
DOCTRINE:
- Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract.
- other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
FACTS:
- Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated
8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of respondent MHC(Manila Hotel Corporation).
- The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/ reservation system, and financial support
to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
- In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner
and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS
dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
manager’s check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs.
Renong Berhad, which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
- Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the
nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people, becoming a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner
also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of
the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned
and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any
transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the
term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution,
applies. (preference to Filipinos for rights, privileges, and concessions covering
National Economy and Patrimony)
- It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner
should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the
bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the shares should be awarded to Manila Prince, a Filipino Corporation
RULING:
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates.
- It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes
the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded.
- The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all
determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by
the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is
null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.
- Sec 10, Par 2, Art XII of the consti, (preference to Filipinos for rights, privileges, and
concessions covering National Economy and Patrimony) is self-executing. It appears
non self-executing as mere matter of style. The 1st and 3rd paragraphs are non self-
executing but the 2nd paragraph is complete in itself with positive commands
which make it judicially enforceable per se. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part, but not in the other.
- The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only
to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers
to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only
our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or
faculty of our people.
- Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately
evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930’s. It was the site of the festivities during
the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who
are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.
- The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and
inimical to the common good.
- In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to
be made between a "qualified foreigner" and a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be
chosen over the former."
- It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet
the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall
only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared
the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor
are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the
awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution
the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
interested parties.
- Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by
respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
 Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which
violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Angara vs Electoral Commission (GR No. 45081)
DOCTRINE:
- The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. The judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and
hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
FACTS:
- In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas;
- That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner
as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the
most number of votes;
- That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
- That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed a
resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election
protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
- That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein
petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent
be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas,
or that the election of said position be nullified;
- That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph
6 of which provides that it will not consider any election protest that wasn’t submitted
on or before December 9.
- That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion
to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest",
alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which
protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the
aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of
said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
- That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to
the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision
barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National
Assembly after confirmation;
- That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to
the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
- That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a
resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the
Protest."
- Petitioner claims that the supreme court and the electoral commission does not yet
have jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE/s:
1) Whether or not the sc has jurisdiction over the Electoral commission and the subject
matter of controversy
RULING:
1) YES. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.
- The judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
- The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in
what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary
in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the governments of the government.
- In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3,
1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other
hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935,
fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the
petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the
power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3,
1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral
Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
- Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a
grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand,
and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the
republican government established in our country in the light of American
experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to
refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to
 determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by
the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the
judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. The framers of our constitution
adopted the American type of constitutional government where the written constitution
is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department.
- In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies
created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy,
who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and
undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which
may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these
questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in
our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the
opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy
for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly."
Marbury vs Madison 5 US 137 (1803)
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
- In the Presidential election in 1800, Thomas Jefferson became the third President of
the United States, defeating then President John Adams. However, Adams and the
6th Congress remained in power until the assumption of office of Jefferson on March 4
, 1801 following the finality of the decision of the election on February 17, 1801.
During the lame duck session of the Adams Presidency, Congress passed the
Judiciary Act of 1801 ( Organic Act ) which modified the Judiciary Act of 1789
establishing ten new district courts, expanding the number of circuit courts from three
to six, and adding additional judges to each circuit, giving the President the authority
to appoint Federal judges and justices of the peace. Said act also reduced the number
of Supreme Court justices from six to five, effective upon the next vacancy in the
Court.
- Just before his term ended, on March 3, 1801, by virtue of the Judiciary Act of 1801,
Adams appointed 16 Federalist circuit judges and 42 Federalist justices of the peace
to offices in the Washington and Alexandria area. One of these “ Midnight Judges “
was a prosperous financier and ardent federalist from Maryland, William Marbury, who
was appointed as Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia. As such, he was
vested with a five year term coupled with the authority to hold courts and cognizance
of personal demands of 20 dollar value."
- The appointments were altogether approved by Senate on the following day but the
commissions had to be delivered to the appointees to formally take effect. Then Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court and Secretary of State John Marshall was given said
task. He sealed the commissions but being unable to deliver all commissions, he
assumed that the new Secretary of State James Madison would ensure said delivery
since "they had been properly submitted and approved, and were, therefore, legally
valid appointments.
- As Jefferson was sworn into office on March 4, 1801, he ordered Levi Lincoln, who
was the new Attorney General and acting Secretary of State not to deliver the
remaining appointments. Without the commissions, the appointees were unable to
assume the offices and duties to which they had been appointed. Jefferson refused to
honor said commissions. In Jefferson's opinion, the undelivered commissions, not
having been delivered on time, were void.
- Displeased, Petitioner William Marbury applied a writ of mandamus directly to the
Supreme Court invoking that Jefferson’s Secretary of State, herein defendant James
Madison, to effect delivery of the commissions. Under the Judiciary Act of 1783, the
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or
persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
ISSUE/s:
1) Whether or not Marbury had a right to the commission.
2) Whether or not the laws of the country give Marbury a legal remedy.
3) Whether or not the Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and
determine its unconstitutionality and its being void.
4) Whether or not Congress can expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution
5) Whether or not invoking a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court was the correct
legal remedy
RULING:
- On February 24, 1803, the Court rendered a unanimous (4-0) decision, resolving that
Marbury had the right to his commission though the court did not have the
power to force Madison to deliver the commission. Chief Justice Marshall wrote
the opinion of the court.
1) YES. Marbury has a right to the commission.
- The grant of the commission became effective when John Adams who was clearly still
the US President during the time it was granted , affixed his signature. The order
granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of
appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act
required from the person possessing the power has been performed, in this case, the
signing by President Adams.
2) YES. The law grants Marbury a remedy.
- The essence of civil liberty is the exercise of every individual’s right to claim the
protection of the laws whenever he receives injury. One of the first duties of
government is to afford that protection
- Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the
performance of that duty and the individual who considers himself injured has a right
to resort to the law to seek remedy. The President, by signing the commission,
appointed Marbury as a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of
the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of
the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal
right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission and refusal to deliver
it is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
3) YES. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine
whether they are unconstitutional and void.
- It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and
interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on
the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the
Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution,
and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
- The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme
Court "to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of
law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the
United States."
- The Secretary of State, being a person, holding an office under the authority of the
United States, is precisely within the letter of the description, and if this Court is not
authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law
is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the authority and
assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.
- The Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one
Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time,
ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising
under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be
exercised over the present case, because the right claimed is given by a law of
the United States.
- In the distribution of this power. It is declared that "The Supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other
cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction."
- It has been insisted at the bar, that, as the original grant of jurisdiction to the
Supreme and inferior courts is general, and the clause assigning original
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court contains no negative or restrictive words, the
power remains to the Legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that Court in
other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited, provided
those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States.
- If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the
judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that
body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have
defined the judicial power and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The
subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage -- is entirely without meaning -- if
such is to be the construction. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court
appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be
original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be
appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without
substance.
- Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those
affirmed, and, in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or
they have no operation at all.
- It cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without
effect, and therefore such construction is inadmissible unless the words require it.
- If the solicitude of the Convention respecting our peace with foreign powers induced a
provision that the Supreme Court should take original jurisdiction in cases which might
be supposed to affect them, yet the clause would have proceeded no further than to
provide for such cases if no further restriction on the powers of Congress had been
intended. That they should have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases, with such
exceptions as Congress might make, is no restriction unless the words be deemed
exclusive of original jurisdiction.
- When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system divides it into one
Supreme and so many inferior courts as the Legislature may ordain and establish,
then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them as to define the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by declaring the cases in which it shall take original
jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction, the plain import of the
words seems to be that, in one class of cases, its jurisdiction is original, and not
appellate; in the other, it is appellate, and not original. ,If any other construction would
render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other
construction, and for adhering to the obvious meaning.
4) No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction
beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution.
- The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a
state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction.”
- If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the
judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that
body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning.
- If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction
where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction
made in the Constitution, is form without substance.
5) NO. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus.
- To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of
appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate
jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and
corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case.
Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to
an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original
action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
- It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a
variety of forms, and that, if it be the will of the Legislature that a mandamus should be
used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true; yet the jurisdiction must
be appellate, not original.
- It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although,
therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer
for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that
paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.
Neither is it necessary in such a case as this to enable the Court to exercise its
appellate jurisdiction.
- The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court by the act establishing the
judicial courts of the United States to issue writs of mandamus to public officers
appears not to be warranted by the Constitution, and it becomes necessary to inquire
whether a jurisdiction so conferred can be exercised.
- The court denied the application for writ of mandamus and resolved that that Marbury
does not get the commission.
Ratio Decidendi :
The case of Marbury vs. Madison is the single most significant case of the Supreme Court, a
struggle that would end in a future altered by fate. This landmark case established the
constitution as "Supreme law" of the United States and developed the power of the Supreme
Court, enhancing its independence and proving it a nonpartisan instrument. It established the
precedent for the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of laws, through the principle of
judicial review.
Imbong vs Ochoa (GR No. 204819)
DOCTRINE:
- The Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial
review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz :
o (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
o (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
 o (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and
o (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota(cause or motivation of
a legal action) of the case.
FACTS:
- Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012.
- Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the
said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
- Respondents claim there is no actual case or controversy and therefor the issues are
not yet ripe for judicial determination.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the court can exercise the power of judicial review over the
controversy
RULING:
- YES. OSG asserts that the court should submit to the legislative and political wisdom
of Congress.The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation
like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to
implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments,
in particular, with Congress. It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in
Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of
the legislature.
- Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper
considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners,
and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are
abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a
speech-regulating measure.
- It is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due
respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation
of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere
- The Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-
equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same
time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific
point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are
null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, while the
Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it
may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished
rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
- In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may
be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may
be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The
reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is
not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the
Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort,
then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.
- Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
o Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
- Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
- The Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every
claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the
power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz :
o (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
o (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
o (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
o (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota(cause or
motivation of a legal action) of the case.
- ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY – Respondents claim that there is no actual
case or controversy because the RH Law is yet to be implemented and no one has
been charged with violating any of its provisions and there is no showing that any of
the petitioners’ rights has been adversely affected by its operation.
- An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that
courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be
justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.
- In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry
out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but
also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
- Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under
the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
- LOCUS STANDI - The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file
their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the
petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied
against them, and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices
that are abortive.
- The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.
- Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest
in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
 sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
- In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own
rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is
also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
- TRANCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE - Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine
that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."
- The transcendental importance of the issues involved in a case may warrant
that the court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over
the petition at bar. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
- In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public,
but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of
all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to
life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive
health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the
Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the
right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not
wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
- The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the
life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.
Garcia vs Executive Secretary (GR No. 157584)
DOCTRINE:
- An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not
be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice.
- Lis Mota - the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial
review - means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality,
although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground,
such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to
show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised
is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative.
FACTS:
- For the second time, petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (petitioner Garcia) asks this
Court to examine the constitutionality of Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8479 (R.A. No.
8479), otherwise known as the Oil Deregulation Law of 1998) through this petition
for certiorari. He raises once again before us the propriety of implementing full
deregulation by removing the system of price controls in the local downstream oil
industry — a matter that we have ruled upon in the past.
- After years of imposing significant controls over the downstream oil industry in the
Philippines, the government decided in March 1996 to pursue a policy of deregulation
by enacting Republic Act No. 8180 (R.A. No. 8180) or the "Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996".
- R.A. No. 8180, however, met strong opposition, and rightly so, as this Court concluded
in its November 5, 1997 decision in Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy. We
struck down the law as invalid because the three key provisions intended to promote
free competition were shown to achieve the opposite result; contrary to its intent, R.A.
No. 8180's provisions on tariff differential, inventory requirements, and predatory
pricing inhibited fair competition, encouraged monopolistic power, and interfered with
the free interaction of market forces.
- Notwithstanding the existence of a separability clause among its provisions, we struck
down R.A. No. 8180 in its entirety because its offensive provisions permeated the
whole law and were the principal tools to carry deregulation into effect.
- Congress responded to our Decision in Tatad by enacting on February 10, 1998 a
new oil deregulation law, R.A. No. 8479. This time, Congress excluded the offensive
provisions found in the invalidated law. Nonetheless, petitioner Garcia again sought to
declare the new oil deregulation law unconstitutional on the ground that it violated
Article XII, Section 19 of the Constitution. He specifically objected to Section 19
of R.A. No. 8479 which, in essence, prescribed the period for removal of price control
on gasoline and other finished petroleum products and set the time for the full
deregulation of the local downstream oil industry.
- Petitioner Garcia contended that implementing full deregulation and removing price
control at a time when the market is still dominated and controlled by an
oligopoly would be contrary to public interest, as it would only provide an opportunity
for the Big 3 to engage in price-fixing and overpricing. He averred that Section 19
of R.A. No. 8479 is "glaringly pro-oligopoly, anti-competition, and anti-people", and
thus asked the Court to declare the provision unconstitutional.
- On December 17, 1999, in Garcia v. Corona (1999 Garcia case), we denied petitioner
Garcia's plea for nullity. We declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 19
of R.A. No. 8479 as we found the question replete with policy considerations. The
1999 Garcia case ruled: “The issue, quite simply, is the timeliness or the wisdom of
the date when full deregulation should be effective. In this regard, what constitutes
reasonable time is not for judicial determination.”
- Undaunted, petitioner Garcia is again before us in the present petition
for certiorari seeking a categorical declaration from this Court of the unconstitutionality
of Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the court can rule on its constitutionality
RULING:
- NO. The court dismissed the petition.
- In asking the Court to declare Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 as unconstitutional for
contravening Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioner Garcia invokes the
exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review, which power is expressly
recognized under Section 4 (2), Article VIII of the Constitution. The power of judicial
review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts for
their conformity with the Constitution. Through such power, the judiciary enforces and
upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. For a court to exercise this power, certain
requirements must first be met, namely:
o (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
o (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
o (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and
o (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
- ACTUAL CASE CONTROVERSY
SUSCEPTIBLE OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
- The petition fails to satisfy the very first of these requirements — the existence
of an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power. An
actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case
must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Stated otherwise, it is not the
mere existence of a conflict or controversy that will authorize the exercise by the
courts of its power of review; more importantly, the issue involved must be susceptible
of judicial determination. Excluded from these are questions of policy or wisdom,
otherwise referred to as political questions:
o if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as
matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government
or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political
question. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on the one question.”
- Petitioner Garcia's issues fit snugly into the political question mold, as he insists that
by adopting a policy of full deregulation through the removal of price controls at a time
when an oligopoly still exists, Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 contravenes the
Constitutional directive to regulate or prohibit monopolies under Article XII, Section 19
of the Constitution. This Section states:
o The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so
requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed.
- Read correctly, this constitutional provision does not declare an outright prohibition of
monopolies. It simply allows the State to act "when public interest so requires"; even
then, no outright prohibition is mandated, as the State may choose to regulate rather
than to prohibit. Two elements must concur before a monopoly may be regulated or
prohibited:
o 1. There in fact exists a monopoly or an oligopoly, and
o 2. Public interest requires its regulation or prohibition.
- Whether a monopoly exists is a question of fact. On the other hand, the
questions of (1) what public interest requires and (2) what the State reaction
shall be essentially require the exercise of discretion on the part of the State.
- Stripped to its core, what petitioner Garcia raises as an issue is the propriety of
immediately and fully deregulating the oil industry. Such determination essentially
dwells on the soundness or wisdom of the timing and manner of the
deregulation Congress wants to implement through R.A. No. 8497. Quite clearly,
the issue is not for us to resolve; we cannot rule on when and to what extent
deregulation should take place without passing upon the wisdom of the policy
of deregulation that Congress has decided upon.
- To use the words of Baker v. Carr, the ruling that petitioner Garcia asks requires "an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion"; the
branch of government that was given by the people the full discretionary authority to
formulate the policy is the legislative department.
- Directly supporting our conclusion that Garcia raises a political question is his
proposal to adopt instead a system of partial deregulation - a system he presents as
more consistent with the Constitutional "dictate." He avers that free market forces (in a
fully deregulated environment) cannot prevail for as long as the market itself is
dominated by an entrenched oligopoly. In such situation, he claims that prices are not
determined by the free play of supply and demand, but instead by the entrenched and
dominant oligopoly where overpricing and price-fixing are possible. Thus, before full
deregulation can be implemented, he calls for an indefinite period of partial
deregulation through imposition of price controls.
- Petitioner Garcia's thesis readily reveals the political, hence, non-justiciable, nature of
his petition; the choice of undertaking full or partial deregulation is not for this Court to
make. By enacting the assailed provision - Section 19 - of R.A. No. 8479, Congress
already determined that the problems confronting the local downstream oil industry
are better addressed by removing all forms of prior controls and adopting a
deregulated system.
- The court finds that there is no justiciable controversy that would justify the grant of
the petition.
- LIS MOTA
- Lis Mota - the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake
judicial review - means that the Court will not pass upon a question of
unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of
on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law.
The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless
the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the
rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.
- Petitioner Garcia argues against full deregulation implemented through the lifting of
price control, as it allows oligopoly, overpricing and price-fixing. R.A. No. 8479,
however, does not condone these acts; indeed, Section 11 (a) of the law expressly
prohibits and punishes cartelization, which is defined in the same section as "any
agreement, combination or concerted action by refiners, importers and/or dealers, or
their representatives, to fix prices, restrict outputs or divide markets, either by products
or by areas, or allocate markets, either by products or by areas, in restraint of trade or
free competition, including any contractual stipulation which prescribes pricing levels
and profit margins." This definition is broad enough to include the alleged acts of
overpricing or price-fixing by the Big 3. R.A. No. 8479 has provided, aside from
prosecution for cartelization, several other anti-trust mechanisms, including the
enlarged scope of the Department of Energy's monitoring power and the creation of a
Joint Task Force to immediately act on complaints against unreasonable rise in the
price of petroleum products. Petitioner Garcia's failure is that he failed to show that he
resorted to these measures before filing the instant petition. His belief that these
oversight mechanisms are unrealistic and insufficient does not permit disregard of
these remedies.
Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission (GR Nos. 192935 & 193036)
DOCTRINE:
- Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as
contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest."
 - Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."
Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
- is subject to limitations, to wit:
FACTS:
- Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
- PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts
if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of information in our courts of law.
- Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
o (a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
o (b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority
of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to
create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the
“Truth Commission.”
o (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested
the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
o (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets
for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
- Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:
o 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and se led
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
o 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds
because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress.
o 3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of
the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a
quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the
latter’s jurisdiction.
o 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the requisites for a valid exercise of its power for judicial review are
present
RULING:
- YES. Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review
o (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power;
o (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
o (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
o (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
- Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at
issue.
- As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in
danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation
of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that
may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over
presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v.
Arroyo explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:
- Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest"
rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest."
- Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the
relief sought.
- The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a
"citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
- Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in
public actions.
- However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any
official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of
governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court
laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt. The same Court
ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity
of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct
injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general
interest common to all members of the public.
- This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases..
- Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter
of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."
- The Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be
 allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of
judicial review.
- The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by
the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not
only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the
guidance of all. Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the
status of the President’s first effort to bring about a promised change to the country.
The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political
undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court
stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies
with overreaching significance to society.
Salonga vs Pano (GR No. 59524)
DOCTRINE:
- The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
- The fact that a case is moot and academic should not preclude the Supreme Court
from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the
part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution
FACTS:
- A series of bombings occurred in Metro Manil in the months of August, September,
and October of 1980, in YMCA building Manila because of a certain Victor Lovely Jr.
Among the other bombed places were Rustan’s Supermarket, Philippine Plaza,
Century Park Sheratone, Manila Peninsula, and in the Philippine International
Convention Center after the President had finished delivering his speech.
- News article linked petitioner Jovito Salonga to theb ombings
- Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act
after he was implicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the series of
bombings in Metro Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of
subversive organizations for two reasons (1)because his house was used as a
contact point; and (2) because of his remarks during the party of Raul Daza in Los
Angeles. He allegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the
Philippines if reforms are not instituted immediately by then President Marcos.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not there was prima facie evidence against the petitioner
RULING:
- NO. The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of
inconsistencies.
- The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in
Los Angeles where Senator Salonga was a guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated
by the petitioner, in his many years in the turbulent world of politics, he has posed with
all kinds of people in various groups and various places and could not possibly vouch
for their conduct. Commenting on the matter, newspaper columnist Teodoro Valencia
stated that Filipinos love to pose with important visitors and the picture proves nothing.
- It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's
stature can expect guests and visitors of all kinds to be visiting his home or office. If a
rebel or subversive happens to pose with the petitioner for a group picture at a
birthday party abroad, or even visit him with others in his home, the petitioner does not
thereby become a rebel or subversive, much less a leader of a subversive group.
More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for an indictment.
- The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could
positively link the petitioner to any proscribed activities of the Movement for Free
Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint.
- Furthermore, the alleged opinion of the petitioner about the likelihood of a
violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted, assuming
that he really stated the same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of
thought and expression. No man deserves punishment for his
thoughts. Cogitationis poenam memo meretur. And as the late Justice Oliver W.
Holmes stated in the case of U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, " ... if there is any
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than
any other it is the principle of free thought not free thought for those who agree
with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."
- We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and,
therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. The
primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of
our constitutional system.
- The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open
and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. The
right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would
be to transgress constitutional due process.
- (BASICALLY HE COULD NOT BE CONVICTED AND THE CASE WAS DROPPED,
PENDING THIS PETITION I THINK) (IMPORTANT PART FOLLOWS)
- The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment
had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and
separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz
granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion
case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the
prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner
Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned
resolution.
- We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to
withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to
place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further deliberations.
- Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion
charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the
action of the prosecution.
- Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, however, that he is not
precluded from filing new charges for the same acts because the petitioner has not
been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply. in that sense, the case is not
completely academic.
- Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known
aspect of the Supreme Court's functions.
- The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State
authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as
constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of
Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions.
- The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees.
- In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00
bail bond as excessive and, therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the
provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his
escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision and stated: The fact that the case is
moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower
 court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive
bail shall not be required.
- In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the
Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by
Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's
legislative powers under martial law. Stan, this Court discussed the constitutional
mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity.
(Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
- In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the
pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew
his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion,
and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic
did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating
one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
- In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution
evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner, either
as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an
officer or leader of any subversive organization. They have taken the initiative of
dropping the charges against the petitioner. We reiterate the rule, however, that this
Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence
against the petitioner found in the records.
- Dismissed for being moot and academic.
David vs Macapagal-Arroyo (GR No. 171396)
DOCTRINE:
- The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if:
o first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
o second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved;
o third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
o fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
- It was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure
of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern.
- The following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
that the following requirements are met:
o (1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
o (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
o (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;
o (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
o (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained
of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
- Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,"
but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government."
- "judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s
decision is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard
laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
FACTS:
- On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency, thus:
o NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic
of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7
of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever
it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-
Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
- This was President GMA’s response to an alleged conspiracy by the NDF-CPP-NPA
to overthrow the government.
- On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national
emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017
through PP 1021.
ISSUE/s:
1) Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic
2) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
3) Whether or not the SC can review the factual bases of PP1017
RULING:
1) NO. The power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting
capacity." Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are
present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to
raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
- Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall
limit our discussion thereon.
- An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;" a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. The Solicitor General refutes
the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions
were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.
- Such contention lacks merit.
- A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over
such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
- The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the
present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was
operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in
implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify
these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the
present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it
 confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal
contemplation, inoperative."
- The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
- All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being
raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to
freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the
duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It
has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present
petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable of
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
2) YES. Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as
contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own
right to the relief sought.
- The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a
"citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in
the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer”.
- Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in
public actions. It was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category
from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of
the public concern.
- "In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is at
least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public
offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied."
- With respect to taxpayer’s suits, "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain
an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury
cannot be denied."
- However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any
official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of
governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court
laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test. The same Court ruled that for a
private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive
or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a
result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest
common to all members of the public.
- This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. It is held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."
- However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may
be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949
Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, where the "transcendental
importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was
neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court resolved to pass upon
the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition
notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to
file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been
observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to
prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and
rulings
- By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this
Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
o (1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
o (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
o (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;
o (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
o (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained
of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
- It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the
bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet
of the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP
No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to
the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now
waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The
petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance"
doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP
1017 cases."
- This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
3) YES. While the Court considered the President’s "calling-out" power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion."
- This ruling is mainly a result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987
Constitution, which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate
action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of
judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government."
- The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the
courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of
the political departments of the government. It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in
terms of power but also of duty.
- As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, "judicial
inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s
decision is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the
standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
- This Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of
 proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings."
- Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by
issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of
the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also
the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army
showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
- Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected
to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs COMELEC
DOCTRINE:
- The Court had occasion to reiterate that it also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees.
FACTS:
- Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-1419 dated April 21,
1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body:
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other
groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the
Honorable Chairman to issue the same.
- The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to
conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . .
vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice
President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."
- The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec
count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free
Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner
ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
- On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by
petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from
implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto,
if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without
any difficulty or problem.
- The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the
May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no
longer any actual controversy before us.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the petition is moot and academic, therefore there is no more
controversy
RULING:
- NO. The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to
the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom
of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a
basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is
tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only
postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.
- In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Paño, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it
"also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench
and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees." Since
the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we
have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the
holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.
- The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for
petitioner's failure to exhaust available remedies before the issuing forum, specifically
the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
- This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be
glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle
of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be
set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the
only adequate and speedy remedy available.
- The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21,
1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold
of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly
enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in
time or the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the
Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court
through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.
Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
DOCTRINE:
- Courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the
issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist,
and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
- Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be
no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any
other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
FACTS:
- Executive Order No. 626-A was signed by President Marcos, which prohibits the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying
with the requirement of EO No. 626. The violation of the interprovincial movement of
carabaos would result to the confiscation and forfeiture of the carabao by the
government.
- The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure.
- The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering
the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court
also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by
the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the court has the authority to rule on the constitutionality of the law
RULING:
 - This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty
in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from
resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal.
- We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify
or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final
judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of
such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
- And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not
by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear
showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to
make the hammer fall, and heavily," to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning.
Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they
should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another
distinguished jurist, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
- Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be
no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any
other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
- The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential
decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It
was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No.
6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was
unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate
action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law.
- As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary
power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive
order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have
been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted
discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a
more appropriate occasion.
Garcia vs Drilon (GR No. 179267)
DOCTRINE:
- -It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, this
authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law."
- The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court,
but in all RTCs. (subject to the review of the SC of course)
FACTS:
- On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, a verified petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a
victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result
of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support.
- Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the
former was eleven years her senior. They have three children.
- She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic
violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
- The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions
set forth by the said TPO by continuing to deprive them of financial support, private-
respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on
why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “exercise in
futility.”
- Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process
and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an
unwanted product of an invalid law.”
- The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition
for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court
and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted collateral attack on said law.
- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
ISSUE/s:
1) Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
2) WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
RULING:
1) NO. As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the
trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. Courts will
not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it.
- In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of
Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and
jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality." We
disagree.
- Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute.
- At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same
level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family
Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of domestic violence against women and children. In accordance with
said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional
Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.To
achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides
that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In
the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed
in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
the complainant.
- Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds
 of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.
- It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, this
authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law."
- The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court,
but in all RTCs.
- We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates
that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of
any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts
in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
o SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
o xxx
o 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
o a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
o xxxx
- Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262
could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine
the same, subject to the review of this Court.
2) NO. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.
- Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive
power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.
- The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive
function.
- functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and... assistants may do so
DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, GR No. 184740,
2010-02-11
Facts:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H.
Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC)
Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under
Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo,
Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer,
filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista's appointment/designation,
which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment
Issues:
Petitioner argues that Bautista's concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC
is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
He points out that while it was clarified in Civil Liberties Union that the prohibition does not apply
to those... positions held in ex-officio capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex-
officio to the post of DOTC Undersecretary
The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment naming her as OIC of MARINA shows that
she does not occupy it in an ex-officio capacity since an ex-officio position does not require any
"further warrant or appoint.
Petitioner further contends that even if Bautista's appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA
was intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing
constitutional prohibition
Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility between the posts of DOTC Undersecretary and
MARINA Administrator... respondents submit that the petition should still be dismissed for being
unmeritorious considering that Bautista's concurrent designation as MARINA OIC and DOTC
Undersecretary was... constitutional. There was no violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution because respondent Bautista was merely designated acting head of MARINA on
September 1, 2008. She was designated MARINA OIC, not appointed MARINA Administrator.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of
MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which
she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple... offices
for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
Ruling:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members
of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of... the armed forces, are proof
of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself
and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition
on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with
respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during... their tenure, the
exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section
13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple... government offices or employment.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered
by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the
exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another... office is allowed
by law or the primary functions of the position.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista
as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent
capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is... hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore, NULL and VOID.
Principles:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,... directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including... government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or... their
subsidiaries.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the... person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in
the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the
Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the
Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that... appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of
the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the... implication is
that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the... person named.
Imbong vs Ochoa
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
FACTS:
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning
it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and
lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the controversy, as presented
in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized
and refined them to the following principal issues:
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
Right to Life
Right to Health
Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
The Family
Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
Due Process
Equal Protection
Involuntary Servitude
Delegation of Authority to the FDA
Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
RULING:
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the
Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once
a controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and
control between them.” To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation.
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority
to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule
that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also
known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the
right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. In
this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating
free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain
the supremacy of the Constitution.
The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the
issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This
is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Considering that it is the right to life of the mother
and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away
before taking action.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is well-settled that the “one title-one
subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed
of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to
cripple or impede legislation.” In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane
to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
Belgica v. Executive Secretary (Ochoa)
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers
for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone
into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer
For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of
2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such
as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null
and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue
a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease
and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino)
and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential
Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern
the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the
principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that
must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of
powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide
latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO
SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH
ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE
SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A
―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT
WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.
CAMP JOHN HAY VS. LIM G.R. No. 119775 MARCH 29, 2005 Taxation, Tax exemption
FACTS:
Petitioners filed their Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief assailing
(1) the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420 and
(2) the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement previously entered
into between public respondent BCDA and private respondents.
Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of
no legal force and effect.
Intervener Camp John Hay Development Corp. (CJHDC) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene
alleging that it, together with its consortium partners, entered into a Lease Agreement with
respondent BCDA for the development of the John Hay SEZ; and that it “stands to be most
affected” by this Court’s Decision “invalidating the grant of tax exemption and other financial
incentives” in the John Hay Special Economic Zone (SEZ) since “[i]ts financial obligations and
development and investment commitments under the Lease Agreement were entered into upon
the premise that these incentives are valid and subsisting.”
CJHDC, proffering grounds parallel to those of public respondents, prays that: (1) it be granted
leave to intervene in this case; (2) its attached Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention be
admitted; and (3) this Court’s Decision of October 24, 2003 be reconsidered and petitioners’
petition dismissed.
CJHDC’s Motion for leave to Intervene was granted and noted its Motion for Reconsideration in
Intervention.
ISSUE:
Whether the tax exemptions and other financial incentives granted to the Subic SEZ under Section
12 of R.A. No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), are applicable to the John
Hay SEZ.
RULING:
CJHDC’s argument that the President’s “power to create Special Economic Zones carries with it
the power to provide for tax and financial incentives,” does not lie. It is the legislative branch which
has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions.
Paragraph 4, Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution is crystal clear: “[n]o law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.”
Hence, it is only the legislature, as limited by the provisions of the Constitution, which has full
power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation. The Constitution
itself may provide for specific tax exemptions or local governments may pass ordinances providing
for exemption from local taxes, but, otherwise, it is only the legislative branch which has the power
to grant tax exemptions, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.
There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7227 which can be considered a grant of tax exemption in
favor of public respondent BCDA. Rather, the beneficiaries of the tax exemptions and other
incentives in Section 12 (the only provision in R.A. No. 7227 which expressly grants tax
exemptions) are clearly the business enterprises located within the Subic SEZ.
Contrary to public respondents’ interpretation, the Decision of October 24, 2003 does not “tie the
hands” of executive or administrative agencies from implementing any present or future legislation
which affords tax or other financial incentives to qualified persons doing business in the John Hay
SEZ or elsewhere. The second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was declared null
and void only insofar as it purported to grant tax exemptions and other financial incentives to
business enterprises located in John Hay SEZ. However, where there is statutory basis for
exemptions or incentives, there is nothing to prevent qualified persons from applying for and
availing thereof.
Lacson v. Perez
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed mob assaulting and attempting
to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion
in NCR. She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the
rebellion. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" followed.
Aggrieved, 4 related petitions were filed before the Court. The case at bar is for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction). Petitioners assail the declaration
of a state of rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof,
as having no basis both in fact and in law.
On May 6, 2001, PGMA ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro
Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to
petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to
justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to
arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion."
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the petitioners.
HELD:
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests
of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if
the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on
the declaration of a "state of rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger
of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of
mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition and mandamus is
improper
at this time.
As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null
and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject
hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the country
in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated
for that purpose.
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is
to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very
day. Petition is DISMISSED. However, respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting
for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required
judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of
Malacañang
Tañada v. Angara G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997
Petitioners: Wigberto Tanada, et al.
Respondents: Edgardo Angara, et al.
Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the World Trade Organization
for being violative of provisions which are supposed to give preference to Filipino workers and economy and on
the ground that it infringes legislative and judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on “most favored nation”
and national treatment, require that nationals and other member countries are placed in the same footing in
terms of products and services. However, the Court brushed off these contentions and ruled that the WTO is
constitutional. Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) should be read in relation to
Sections 1 and 13 (promoting the general welfare). Also, Section 10 is self-executing only to “rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony” but not every aspect of trade and commerce. There
are balancing provisions in the Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify the WTO agreement. Also, the
Constitution doesn’t rule out foreign competition. States waive certain amount of sovereignty when entering into
treaties.
Facts:
 This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the World Trade
Organization, particularly when President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of Ratification and the
Senate concurring in the said treaty.
 Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in Bretton Woods to discuss global
economy. This led to the establishment of three great institutions: International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), International Monetary Fund and International
Trade Organization.
 However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the General Agreement on Trades and
Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round of the GATT that the WTO was then established.
 The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the reduction of tariff and
barriers.
 Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods.”
 It is petitioners’ position that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement
“place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render
meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
Issue 1: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES!
In seeking to nullify the Senate’s act as being unconstitutional, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. It becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute
Issue 2: Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Section 19, Article II and Section 10 & 12, Artilce
XII of the 1987 Constitution? NO!
Petitioners’ Contentions:
 Petitioners argue that the “letter, spirit and intent” of the Constitution mandating “economic
nationalism” are violated by the so-called “parity provisions” and “national treatment” clauses
scattered in parts of WTO Agreement
o This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MFN) of the TRIMS (trade-related
investment measures), TRIPS (Trade Related aspects of intellectual property rights),
Trade in Services, and par. 4 of Article III of GATT 1994.
o “shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin”
 Sec. 19, Art II:The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
 Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
 Sec. 12, Art XII: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.”
Ruling:
 These provisions are not self-executing
o Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.
 Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said
article, especially Sec. 1 and 13:
o A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
o A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
o An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
 The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather,
the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow
the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
 WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
o Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the
Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality,
with each member’s vote equal in weight.
 Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
o Tariff reduction – developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6 years, developing
24% in 10 years
o Domestic subsidy – developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6) years, developing
countries at 13% in 10 years
o Export subsidy – developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing countries, 3/4ths of
36% in 10 years
 Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
o Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets
 The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an
economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate
committed grave abuse of discretion
Issue 3: Does the text of the WTO and its Annexes limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by
Congress? NO!
 A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.
 While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: limitations imposed by the nature of membership in the family of
nations & limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.

IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora et al. case brief summary
FACTS: President Joseph Estrada ordered the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the
Philippine National Police (PNP) in visibility patrols around Metro Manila to stem the tide of rising
violence and crime. In response to such order, the PNP through Police Chief Superintendent
Edgar B. Aglipay issued Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 02/2000 which detailed the joint visibility
patrols called Task Force Tulungan. This was confirmed by a memorandum Pres. Estrada issued
dated 24 January 2000. On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000 arguing
that the deployment of the Marines is unconstitutional and is an incursion by the military on the
civilian functions of government as embodied in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the
1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: (1) Does the IBP have legal standing in the case at bar?
(2) Is the president’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces subject to
judicial review?
(3) Is the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP?
RULING: In the first issue, the IBP has failed to provide the requisites for legal standing in the
case at bar in that it has failed to conclusively prove that such deployment would harm the IBP in
any way. It’s contention that it is fighting to uphold the rule of law and the constitution is insufficient,
too general and too vague. As to the second issue, the Court disagrees with the contention of the
Solicitor-General that the president’s act is a political question beyond the authority of the Court
to review when the grant of power is qualified or subject to limitations, the issue becomes whether
the prescribed qualifications have been met, then it becomes a question of legality and not
wisdom, so is not a political question. It is then subject to the Court’s review power. As to the third
issue, the Marines only assist the PNP, the LOI itself provides for this. In fact, the PNP Chief is
the leader of such patrols and in no way places the over-all authority in the Marines.
Petition is dismissed.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GR No. 160261, 2003-11-10
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution... which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the... manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint[4] (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices[5] of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes."[6] The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,[7] and was referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 2003[8] in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was "sufficient in form,"[9] but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient
in substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October
23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint [11] was filed with the
Secretary General of the House[12] by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District,
Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the... alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
of the House of
Representatives.[13]
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that
"[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year."
Issues:
Issue no. 1
Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
Issue no. 2
Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI
of the Constitution.
Issue no. 3
Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development
Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
Issue no. 4
Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
Issue no. 5
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court
has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make
a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is... a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an
intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two
of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact,
an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that... the framers
could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their
clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.[114] Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to
decide a non- justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under
Section 1, Article VIII.
Principles:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,... and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an... elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments
of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its... power to determine the law, and
hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained.
A Republican form of government rests on the conviction that sovereignty should reside in the
people and that all government authority must emanate from them. It abhors the concentration of
power on one or a few, cognizant that power, when absolute, can lead to abuse, but... it also shuns
a direct and unbridled rule by the people, a veritable kindling to the passionate fires of anarchy.
MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO
FACTS: On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s
EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001,
respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an
ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his
capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law
Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and
her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail
of employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6,
2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She
also filed an administrative and criminal complaint16 with the Law Department17against Benipayo,
alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent
administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant
petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions
on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of
the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment
prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING: We find petitioner’s argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies
in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They
were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee
Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs.
Bautista.35 The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed
by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent"36, this provision
should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that
the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to
make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution.
Laude v. Judge Ginez-Jabalde, et al
FACTS: This involves the celebrated case of Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) killed at the
Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine
L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s
sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Office of the City Prosecutor which
Information was later filed with the RTC in Olongapo City.
On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge and was later
arraigned. On the same day of Arraignment petitioner Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender the Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. The motion was scheduled on 22 December 2014, 2PM.
According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through
registered mail. In any case, they claim to have also “furnished a copy of the [M]otion personally
… at the hearing of the [M]otion. On 23 December 2014, the Urgent Motion was denied, as well
as its motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Are the averments of the petitioner, that the 3-day notice rule should be should be liberally
applied due to the timing of the arrest and arraignment, tenable?
HELD: NO. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the
adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply
with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse
party’s right to procedural due process.
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a
mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the
court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due
process rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him
or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule
must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby
depriving him of his right to procedural due process.
Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
only during the hearing. They attempt to elude the consequences of this belated notice by arguing
that they also served a copy of the Motion by registered mail on Pemberton’s counsel. They also
attempt to underscore the urgency of the Motion by making a reference to the Christmas season
and the “series of legal holidays” where courts would be closed. To compound their obfuscation,
petitioners claim that the hearing held on December 22, 2014, attended by Pemberton’s counsel
sufficiently satisfied the rationale of the three-day notice rule. These circumstances taken together
do not cure the Motion’s deficiencies. Even granting that Pemberton’s counsel was able to
comment on the motion orally during the hearing, which incidentally was set for another incident,
it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the
issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-J abalde was correct to deny the Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo
City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to prejudice
Pemberton’s rights as an accused.
REPUBLIC V. CA (Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality)
The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned by
the private respondents for the widening and concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section,
Philippine-Japan Highway Loan (PJHL) road. While the right of the Republic is not now disputed,
the private respondents, however, demand that the just compensation for the property should be
based on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which
fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the
owner, whichever is lower. The Regional Trial Court ruled for the private respondents. When
elevated to it, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.
In Export Processing Zone Authority ("EPZA") vs. Dulay, etc., et al.,[1] this Court held the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain to be a judicial function, and it thereby
declared Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree
No. 1533, to the contrary extent, as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of
judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now conceded by the Republic, was reiterated in subsequent
cases.[2]
The petition for review, despite the aforesaid pronouncement by this Court, has been given due
course upon the pleas of the Solicitor General to have us address the following concerns:
I. EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PD 1533 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID;
UP TO WHEN RETROACTIVELY; EFFECT ON A PENDING APPEALED CASE WHERE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PD 1533 NOT ASSAILED BEFORE COURT A QUO.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN EPZA VS. HON.
DULAY, ETC., ET AL. (G.R. NO. 59603, APRIL 29, 1987) DECLARING PD 1533
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID, BE APPLIED IN THIS CASE.
III. WHETHER OR NOT VALUATION OF LAND SOUGHT FOR EXPROPRIATION AS
APPEARING ON THE TAX DECLARATION BE USED AS PRELIMINARY BASIS FOR THE TEN
PER CENT (10%) DEPOSIT REQUIRED UNDER RULE 67 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT, AS AMENDED BEFORE PLAINTIFF IS PERMITTED ENTRY THEREON.
The last item is not in issue; being merely provisional in character, the matter has not been
questioned by the private respondents.[3] We will thus limit ourselves to the first two issues which,
in turn, really boil down to whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question should only have
prospective, not retroactive, application. The petitioner proposes the affirmative.
Instructive is the brief treatise made by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, whose words we quote -
"There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute.
The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is
therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the
parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no
one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is,
in other words, a total nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court in passing upon the
question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the
Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such
statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law, but
the decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion or
reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar cases, but
it does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul
the statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but not one else is bound.
The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing that "when the courts
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. x x x"[4]
The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as being, for
all legal intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if it had never existed. Here, of
course, we refer to the law itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution. It is not always the
case, however, that a law is constitutionally faulty per se. Thus, it may well be valid in its general
import but invalid in its application to certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise valid
law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate retrospectively such as,
in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive
application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of contracts. [5]
A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and
consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in our decisions on
the moratorium laws,[6] we have been constrained to recognize the interim effects of said laws
prior to their declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise been unable to simply
ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play. So also, even as a practical matter, a situation
that may aptly be described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further inquiry, let alone
to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of a governing statute.
The instant controversy, however, is too far distant away from any of the above exceptional cases.
To this day, the controversy between the petitioner and the private respondents on the issue of
just compensation is still unresolved, partly attributable to the instant petition that has prevented
the finality of the decision appealed from. The fact of the matter is that the expropriation cases,
involved in this instance, were still pending appeal when the EPZA ruling was rendered and
forthwith invoked by said parties.
In fine, we hold that the appellate court in this particular case committed no error in its appealed
decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
Agbayani vs PNB [G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971]
FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944,
secured by real estate mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan
remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both alleging that the mortgage sought
to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB
on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from
March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the
subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be
deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the
recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit
in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law before
the same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration of
Unconstitutionality of a law)
HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular
conduct, private and official.” 4
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because
of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive
in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944, when
her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by
appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was
tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953,
when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and
eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage
obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.