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Arrest
*Rule 113, Rules of Court

GERONIMO v. RAMOS
G.R. No. 192793: February 22, 2011
PERALTA, J.:

Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed winner for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010 Automated
Elections for the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon. The proclamation was based on the
COC, but without the official signed Certificate of Canvass for Proclamation (COCP). This was done with
the approval of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) Chairman. Subsequently, private respondent
Nicasio Ramos, who was also a mayoralty candidate in the same election, requested the COMELEC to
conduct a manual reconciliation of the votes cast.
Issue: Whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

Held:
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall
be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision
of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly,
petitioner erred in invoking this Court's power to issue said extraordinary writ.
The petition is dismissed.

Pagandaman v. Casar
G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988
NARVASA, J.:

Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners
assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John Does” transgressing
the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or
things to be seized.

Issue: Whether said warrant is valid

Held: No. Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom the witnesses
to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs
long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as “totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject.”[30] Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
describe the person or persons to be seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
voided.

Soliven v. Mckasiar
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
PER CURIAM:

Facts: Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel
by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others.
Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from
suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president
would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and
conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the
president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for
contempt.

Issue: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.

Held: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure
the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s
time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf.

People v. Barros
[GR 90640, 29 March 1994]
Feliciano (J)

Facts: members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bound for Sabangan,
Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both,
who were seated at the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself
on seat 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching
Sabangan, before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton
under seat 18, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the owner of
the carton was but nobody answered.

Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the moving vehicle,
resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver.

Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable". Hence,will be inadmissible in evidence "for
any purpose in any proceeding." Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles without
need of a warrant, In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are
limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected
to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection.

Morano v. Vivo
G.R. No. L-22196 June 30, 1967
SANCHEZ, J.:
Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines to visit her cousin,
Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both
minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun,
her minor son also by the first marriage.. Born to this union on September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.
To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The
last extension expired, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun,
to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will
issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.

Issue: Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional.

Ruling: Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-
immigrant.
Warrants of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only for the purpose of carrying
out a final finding of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or an order of contempt, and not for
the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution. It is also held that the requirement of probable cause is
not applicable in deportation proceedings, which are not criminal in nature. The order of deportation is
purely administrative, its purpose being not punishment but the return to his country of the alien who
has violated the conditions for the admission to the local state.

HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO 162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988

Facts: The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard
Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission
Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being
live-in for some time now.
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of
suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Warrants
of Arrest were issued.

Issues:
1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of existence of probable cause.

Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the
state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of the youth. The arrest
of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles
were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore, the articles are admissible evidences.

CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA 77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977

Facts:
Petitioner questions the validity of the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City
Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioner’s counsel, there was
jurisdictional infirmity. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner
posted the bail bond, thus obtaining her provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree
with the judge’s investigation, and agreed with the complaints filed.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit.

Held: Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, “where the accused has filed bail and waived
the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary
examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest”. In the case at bar, it is futile for the
petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, because she posted the bail
bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary investigation.

2. Privacy of Communication and Correspondence

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA
G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla

Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license
and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence.
Issue:
1. W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence.

Held:
No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No.
4200.

Felipe Navarro vs Court of Appeals

FACTS: Enrique Lingan and Stanley Jalbuena, both radio reporters went to a police station to report for a
blotter. During the course, a heated argument arose between police officer Navarro and the two
reporters. Navarro then poked his cocked firearm on the face of Jalbuena. Lingan interfered, this then
irked Navarro and then and there hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. This
caused Lingan to fall on the floor bloodied.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an aggravating circumstance against Navarro due to the fact that he
committed such crime in the police station?
HELD: A police station is a place wherein public authorities such as policemen are engaged in the discharge
of their duties. Since Navarro, who is a cop, committed the crime inside the police station, an aggravating
circumstance is appreciated against him.as a result, there is an aggravating circumstance against Navarro
due to the fact that he committed such crime in the police station.

Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin


(253 SCRA 699)
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996

Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin.
Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting
of diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her
Wife and his alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta
filed the papers for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice
of medicine against her husband.
Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible intrusion and from unlawful means are
admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

Ruling/Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
“the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because
it is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

Alejano v. Cabuay, GR 160792, August 25, 2005

FACTS: A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel
under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas
corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return of the writ and
to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the
detainees are already charged of coup d’etat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’
confinement is under a valid indictment.

ISSUE: What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus?

HELD: The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the
propriety of the remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of
detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived
of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person.
If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of
habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
3. Freedom of Expression, Right to Assembly and Academic Freedom

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

FACTS:
, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the conversation discussed “rigging”
the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press
conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc
recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings
as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been “spliced” to make
it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.However, Bunye backtracked and stated that the
woman’s voice in the compact discs was not President Arroyo’s after all

ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11
June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

RULING:
the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the
Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however,
courts have carved out exceptions to this rule .The exceptions, when expression may be subject
to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of expression, namely:
pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.

Soriano vs. La Guardia


G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009

Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but
almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then
a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art. III.

Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect
of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his
duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three
months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue
curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. There
are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

GMA NETWORK, INC., ET AL. vs. JESUS G. BUSTOS, ET AL.


G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006

FACTS: A Petition for Mandamus filed by the unsuccessful examinees of the physician’s licensure
examinations before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-check
and reevaluate the test papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous
checking of answers to test questions vitiated the results of the examinations. As news writer and reporter
of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from courts, among other beats, its co-petitioner
Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition.
.

ISSUE:
Whether the said news report was within the ambit of privileged communication

HELD:
Yes. The disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations in the said Petition
for Mandamus filed by the medical examinees making the same fall within the protected ambit of
privileged communication. GMA and Vidal cannot be held liable for damages claimed by respondents for
simply bringing to fore information on subjects of public concern.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable
regardless of the existence of malice in fact.

G.R. No. 170643 September 8, 2006


JEJOMAR C. BINAY, for and in behalf of his minor daughter, JOANNA MARIE BIANCA S. BINAY,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GENINI V. FACTAO and VICENTE G. TIROL

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

Facts:
In the April 15-21, 2001 issue of Pinoy Times Special Edition, an article entitled" ALYAS ERAP JR."
was published regarding the alleged extravagant lifestyle of the Binays and the assets that they acquired
while in public office. Paragraph 25 of the article reads:
Si Joanne Marie Bianca, 13 ang sinasabing ampong anak ng mga Binay, ay bumibili ng
panty na nagkakahalaga ng P1,000 ang isa, ayon sa isang writer ni Binay. Magarboang pamumuhay
ng batang ito dahil naspoiled umano ng kanyang ama.

Based on this article, Elenita S. Binay, mother of the minor Joanna Marie Bianca, filed a complaint
for libel against private respondents VPetitioner claims that the article is defamatory.
Issue:
The issue to be resolved is whether there is prima facie evidence showing that the subject article
was libelous.

Held:
Yes. The court cannot discern a legal, moral, or social duty in publishing Joanna’s status as an
adopted daughter. Neither is there any public interest respecting her purchases of panties worth P1,000.
Whether she indeed bought those panties is not something that the public can afford protection against.
With this backdrop, it is obvious that private respondents’ only motive is to embarrass Joanna before the
reading public.

G.R. No. 203335, 11 February 2014


Disini, et al.
v.
The Secretary of Justice, et al.,

FACTS
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the latest
jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction.
Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of
Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyber libel affected the
requirement of “actual malice” as opposed to “presumed malice” as basis for conviction of libel.

RULING
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where
such element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the
statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure,
as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National
Conference on Land Transportation). But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution
need not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the
defamatory character of the assailed statement.

G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985


JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS, LINO BROCKA, JOSE F. LACABA, and DULCE Q.
SAGUISAG
Vs.
CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW KATIGBAK, GENERAL WILFREDO C. ESTRADA (Ret.), and THE BOARD OF
REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION (BRMPT)
Facts: In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October 23, 1984, a permit to exhibit
the film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions
enumerated was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the
classification of the film "For Adults Only" was without basis. 4 Then on November 12, 1984, respondent
Board released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 October 1984,
the Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee and an examination of the film, resolves
to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-committee.

Issue: Whether the rating made with grave abuse of discretion

Held:
Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex
in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works,
is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press.
But, sadly, there were not enough votes to maintain that there was grave abuse of discretion. The
supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for young people.

MTRCB v. ABS-CBN
G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005
J. Sandoval Gutierrez

Facts:
Respondent abs-cbn aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV program “The Inside Story”
produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to
enable them to pay for their tuition fees. PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved
and the façade of the PWU building served as the background of the episode. This caused upsoar in the
PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the MTRCB.

After hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, MTRCB investigating committee
ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the program MTRCB affirmed the ruling
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC.

Issue:
Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “Inside Story” prior its exhibition
or broadcast by TV.

Held:

The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to screen, review and examine
ALL TV PROGRAMS *LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not exempt
something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.
Thus, when the law says “all TV programs”, the word all covers all tv programs whether religious,
public affairs, news docu, etc. It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the
power to review it.

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC.


VS.
JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION
FACTS:
Published under the by-line of one Marichu Villanueva and titled “Judiciary worse than PNP,” an
item in the June 17, 1993 issue of the Manila Standard, a metropolitan daily, reported that the results of
the latest opinion polls conducted by the Ateneo Social Weather Station, as Social Weather Stations, Inc.
(or SWS) is also known, showed the Judiciary to have an even lower satisfaction rating that the Philippine
National Police. The item went on to state that the President and his Cabinet had been briefed on the
results of the survey by Professors Mahar Mangahas and Felipe Miranda of the SWS, and that Malacanang
had expressed concern over the Judiciary’s law standing.

ISSUE:
Whether the Order dated 17 June 1993 is violative of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and freedom from prior restraint.

HELD:
No. What was clearly implicit in the newspaper report about the results of the SWS poll - in the
words of Judge Asuncion, “that the people have more confidence with the police than with the judges” –
in light of the fact, of which judicial notice is taken, that said report came out at a time when there already
was widespread publicity adverse to the judiciary, there can be no doubt of its clear tendency to degrade
the administration of justice. Thus, Judge Asuncion can hardly be faulted for what, at a minimum, he must
have felt duty-bound to doing the circumstances.

Blo Umpar Adiong


vs.
Commision on Elections
(G.R. No. 1013956, March 31, 1992)

FACTS:
Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails that the Comelec’s
Resolution which prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury
with his prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his
last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in May 11,1992 elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Comelec may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places,
public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

RULING:
The portion of Section 15(a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Comelec providing that “decals and
stickers may be posted only in any authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof”
is declared NULL AND VOID. The Comelec’s probation on posting decals and stickers on “mobile” places
whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the Comelec itself is also NULL AND
VOID on constitutional grounds.

Pablito Sanidad
vs
Commission on Elections

73 SCRA 333

Facts:
Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum for the Citizens Assemblies to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly. On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential
Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold,
and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscit.Petitioners contend the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has
no constitutional or legal basis.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is
especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals
of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms
of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim
National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and
the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto
the prerogative of the regular National Assembly .
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000

Facts:
ABS-CBN raised a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the
poll body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups,
its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman
to issue the same.
The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as
well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL).

Issue:
Whether or not the assailed resolution is valid.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the absolute ban imposed by the COMELEC cannot be justified.
It does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information
obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means
to achieve the COMELEC end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about
by exit surveys.
A specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional survey groups may
be allowed to conduct the same.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing
business as MANILA STANDARD vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001

Facts:
Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social development,
and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof.
On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard,
a newspaper of general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information including election
surveys Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act).

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of
freedom of speech, expression, and the press.

Ruling:
What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of Section 5.4. The
United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: A
Government regulation is sufficiently justified when [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms of speech, expression and press is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content neutral
regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the review of such laws."

GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

Facts:
The five petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political
parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable
broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right
to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming
elections.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates freedom
of expression, of speech and of the press.

Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political
parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
The adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits leveling the playing field
does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and
programs of government.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE
BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION
OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

Facts:
petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
“IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH)
Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

Ruling:
No.
The Court held that the churches doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this
court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech
with political consequences and not religious speech.

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015

Facts:
the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A.
No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections.
Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda.

The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the
public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or
terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section
18 (n) of these Rules.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
are constitutional.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being
repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe
on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom
of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference,
through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with
them.

Social Weather Stations vs COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research
institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: “Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election”.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
speech, expression and the press.

Ruling:
Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the
press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint
on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III

Facts:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986
by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breast milk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breast milk substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of
the Child.
Issue:
Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued
by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
Ruling:
YES. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in the
same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into
force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into
domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land
that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Ermita


488 SCRA 226, April 25, 2006

Facts:
BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed. Petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a
peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police.
KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the
policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that
on a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them and
forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They were then forcibly dispersed,
causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

Issue:
Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

Ruling:
No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the
right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of
the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to
“lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes;
otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection..

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Mayor Lito Atienza


613 SCRA 518

Facts:
In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit with
the office of Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola
Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage their rally at the
Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.
IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled rally.
Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did was only a
partial grant which was alleged to be a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and
a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Atienza.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case filed against him
Ruling:
1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in this
certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the criminal
proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the
said criminal case. The determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made
at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from
the civil action.

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA


348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000

FACTS:
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were
subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed
before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually
explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a
written statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants,
instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have
the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the
defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

HELD:
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the
right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of
students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the
freedom of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their
students.

Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in
the Supreme Court.”

Facts:
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares
against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In said
case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers
of the executive department to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from the
Japanese government for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War
II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is
presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?

Held:
No. A reading of the show cause resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the court nor that they had charged one of its members of
plagiarism that motivated the said resolution. Respondents who are neither parties nor counsels in the
vinuya case, have expressed their opinions in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the
proper disposition and consideration of the court that gave rise to the said resolution. The show cause
resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the court considered excessive and uncalled for
under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication and letter submission to this court of the
UP law faculty’s restoring integrity statement.

4. Freedom of Religion

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC


618 SCRA 32 (2010)

FACTS:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However,
due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary
to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised
Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC.
AngLadlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
HELD:
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OFAPPEALS


[259 SCRA 529; G.R. NO. 119673; 26 JUL 1996]
FACTS:
Petitioner has a television program entitled" Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every
Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner’s religious
beliefs, doctrines and practices often times incomparative studies with other religions. Petitioner
submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV
program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing
on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of
religious exercise and expression.

HELD:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden
of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of
the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom
of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. “attack” is different from “offend “any
race or religion. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by
protecting it against an attack by another religion.

ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR


[492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006]

FACTS:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well.
Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution.
As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing
its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a
free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts
to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.

5. Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement


Marcos vs. Manglapus,
[G.R. # 88211 September 15, 1989]

FACTS:
Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon
Aquino’s ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos
loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has
stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for
mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines.

HELD:
Petition Dismissed. The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of
constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

Gudani vs. Senga


498 SCRA 671 (2006)

FACTS:
Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security to
shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen.
Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing,
President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
approval.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before
a legislative inquiry?

HELD:
1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-
chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under
military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to
seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that
a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief.
Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations
and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests
the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the
position.

Right to Information

Tanada, et al. v. Tuvera, et al.

FACTS:
Petitioners Senator Lorenzo Tañada, Atty. Abraham Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys
for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a
number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise
provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees. The Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect.
ISSUE
Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

RULINGS:
Yes, a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all,
since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code
provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity.

In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court officials and employees
as witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various letters for the Impeachment
Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012 (sulat mo to lahat)

Facts:
During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the prosecution Panel
manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses which included Justices of the
Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees who will testify on matters internal to the Court and
almost a thousand documents.
Letters were sent to the SC asking for the examination of records, and the issuance of certified
true copies of the rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations of various cases decided by the
SC for purposes of the -Impeachment Complaint.
Issues:
1. Whether or not court records are accessible as a policy of transparency.

Ruling:
The right to information, by its very nature and by the Constitution’s own terms, is not
absolute. In line with the public’s constitutional right to information, the Court has adopted a
policy of transparency with respect to documents in its possession or custody, necessary to
maintain the integrity of its sworn duty to adjudicate justiciable disputes. This policy is embodied
in terms of Court Rules.
The rule grants access to court records to any person, subject to payment of fees and
compliance with rules; it is not necessary that the request be made by a party to the case. This
grant, however, is not as open nor as broad as its plain terms appear to project, as it is subject to
the limitations the laws and the Court’s own rules provide.

RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND
PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY. 672 SCRA 27 A. M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012.
Facts:
Rowena Paraan, Research Director of the PCIJ, sought copies of the SALN of the Justices of the
Supreme Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet of the Justices
of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials.

Issues:
1.Can the SALN of justices be accessed via the right to information?
2.What are the limitations on the constitutional right to information?

Ruling:
1.Yes. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service
2.The right to information is not absolute. It is further subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to that right:(1) national security
matters and intelligence information;(2) trade secrets and banking transactions;(3) criminal matters;
and(4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially known to
public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public as well as
diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of
Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

VILLANUEVA VS. JBC, (En banc)


G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015 (Decision)

FACTS:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) applied for the vacant position of Presiding
Judge in Regional Trial Courts (RTC’s) but was not included in the list of candidates for the said position
because of the Judicial and Bar Council’s (JBC) long standing policy of opening the chance for promotion
to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for
at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded
from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before
they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
No. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in
choosing recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The
JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate
applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to determine
proven competence which may be measured by experience, among other factors.

Antolin v. Abelardo T. Domondon, Jose A. Gangan, and Violeta J. Josef (1st Div.)
623 SCRA 163 July 5, 2010 (Decision)
Del Castillo, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Hazel Ma. C. Antolin took the 1997 CPA Board Exams but failed, receiving failing grades
from four out of seven subjects. Convinced that she deserved to pass, she wrote to respondent Abelardo
Domondon, Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-
corrected. Her answer sheets were shown but these consisted merely of shaded marks. She requested for
copies of the questionnaire, their respective answer keys, and an explanation of the grading system used
in each subject. Respondent denied the request.

Issue:
Whether or not Antolin has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers.

Court:
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. Section 28, Article 2 of the Constitution provides that
the State may adopt policies in the disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest while Section
7, Article 3 provides the right of the people to information on matters of public interest. It is clear that the
people’s right to information is limited to matters of public concern and subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law. The Court, nonetheless, conceded that the CPA Board Exams are matters of public
concern. The examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent
administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the
accounting profession.

6. Right of Association

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), V. COURT OF APPEALS


Cortes, J.:

FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS
Building preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting
business with the SSS that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor – Management Council,
which ordered the strikes to return to work, that the strikers refused to return to work, and that the SSS
suffered damages as a result of the strike.
ISSUE:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

RULING:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights provides that the State
“shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities including the right to strike in accordance with law” (Art. XIII, Sec. 31). Resort
to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or association only without including
the right to strike.

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