PEDRO DE GUZMAN VS.

CA & ERNESTO CENDANA

Topic: Common Carriage

FACTS:
1. Respondent Cendana was a junk dealer who would bring used bottles and scrap metal from
Pangasinan to Manila. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles
with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to differing establishments in
Pangasinan, and charged freight rates lower than commercial rates.
2. Petitioner de Guzman, an authorized dealer of General Milk in Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a
warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal, to petitioner’s establishment in Urdaneta.
3. 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by respondent himself, while 600 cartons were
placed on board the other truck which was driven by his driver and employee.
4. Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner. The other 600 boxes never
reached petitioner, since the truck which carried these boxes was hijacked somewhere along
the highway by armed men who took with them the truck, its driver, his helper and the cargo.
5. Petitioner commenced action against private respondent in the CFI of Pangasinan for the
lost merchandise.
6. RTC DECISION: In favor of de Guzman and found respondent to be a liable common carrier.
7. CA DECISION: Reversed and held that respondent had been engaged in transporting return
loads of freight “as a casual occupation” – a sideline to his scrap iron business and not as a
common carrier.

ISSUE 1: WON private respondent was a common carrier

RULING: YES, as Article 1732 makes no distinction between carrying of persons or goods on
a permanent or principal capacity and on a temporary or occasional basis.

1. THE CA HELD that respondent had been engaged in transporting return loads of freight “as
a casual occupation” – a sideline to his scrap iron business and not as a common carrier.
2. (PLEASE SEE ART.1732, Civil Code) The above article makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity or sideline.
3. It also carefully avoids making any distinction between a regular or scheduled basis and one
on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
4. Neither does it distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public and
only to a narrow segment of the general population.
5. So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide
neatly with the notion of "public service," under Section 13 paragraph (b) of the Public
Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements
the law, wherein a carrier is defined as someone “with general or limited clientele, whether
permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes.”
6. It appears that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even
though he merely “back-hauled goods for other merchants, although such back-hauling
 was done periodically rather than regularly, and even though private respondent’s
principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others.
7. CA WAS WRONG when it concluded that he was not a common carrier for having no
certificate of public convenience. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for
incurring liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. The liability
arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier. Otherwise, it would be
offensive to sound public policy, and reward respondent precisely for failing to comply with
applicable statutory requirements.

ISSUE 2: WON private respondent is liable as a common carrier

RULING: NO, the undelivered merchandise was lost because of an even entirely beyond
private respondent’s control.

1. PETITIONER INSISTS that private respondent had not observed extraordinary diligence in
the care of petitioner’s goods and that in this case, he should have hired a security guard
presumably to ride with the truck carrying the 600 cartons of Liberty filled milk.
2. Common carriers “by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy” are held
to a very high degree of care and diligence (extraordinary diligence) in the carriage of goods
as well as of passengers, unless the same is due to the causes listed in Article 1734 (PLEASE
SEE ARTICLE 1734).
3. Article 1734 is a closed list. Causes falling outside the list, even if they appear to constitute a
species of force majeure, fall within the scope of Article 1735 where a carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently; however, this may be overthrown by
proof of extraordinary diligence.
4. Under Article 1745(6), a common carrier is responsible – and will not be allowed to divest or
to diminish such responsibility – even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, EXCEPT
where such thieves acted “with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.”
5. IN THE INSTANT CASE, armed men held up the second truck which carried petitioner’s
cargo. An information for robber in band was also filed against the robbers and the decision
shows that the accused therein acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence or force,
and were even armed with firearms. They even kidnapped the driver and helper, detaining
them for several days. They were all convicted of robbery, though not in a band.
6. SC DID NOT BELIEVE PETITIONER THAT THE STANDARD OF EXTRAORDINARY
DILIGENCE REQUIRED RESPONDENT TO RETAIN A SECURITY GUARD to ride with the
truck and engage brigands in a firelight at the risk of his own life and the lives of the driver
and his helper.
7. SC HELD that the occurrence of the loss must reasonable be regarded as quite beyond the
control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. Common carriers
are not absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, AND ARE NOT
HELD LIABLE FOR ACTS OR EVENTS WHICH CANNOT BE FORESEEN OR ARE
INEVITABLE, PROVIDED THEY SHALL HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE RIGOROUS
STANDARD OF EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE.