2) Shall not engage in the practice of any profession.
Artcle IX 3) Shall not engage in any active management or control of any
Consttutonal Commissions
A. Common Provisions
Secton 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit.
Secton 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold
any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any
profession or in the active management or control of any business which, in any
way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege
granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Safeguards insuring the independence of the Commissions:
1) They are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by statute.
2) Each is expressly described as independent.
3) Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be
reduced by statute
4) The Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by
impeachment.
5) The Chairmen and members are given a fairly long term of office of
seven years.
6) The Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in
an acting capacity.
7) The salaries of the chairman and members are relatively high and
may not be decreased during continuance in office.
8) The Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy.
9) Each commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, provided
they do not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
 Though subject to disapproval by the SC.
10) The Chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications
calculated to strengthen their integrity.
11) The Commissions may appoint their own officials and employees in
accordance with Civil Service Law.
Inhibitions / Disqualifications:
1) Shall not, during tenure, hold any other office or employment.
business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his
office.
4) Shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the
Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Rotational Scheme of Appointments
 The first appointees shall serve terms of seven, five and three years
respectively.
 Afer the first commissioners are appointed, the rotational scheme is
intended to prevent the possibility of one President appointing all the
Commissioners.
1) Funa v. CSC – G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014
D: The designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the
independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the
holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions.
 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed Francisco T. Duque as
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
 PGMA then issued EO 864 designating Duque as an ex officio member of
the Board of Directors/ Trustees of the GSIS, PhilHealth, Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC), and Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF).
o This is in pursuance of the Administrative Code which provides
in Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V:
 Section 14. Membership of the Chairman in Boards.—
The Chairman shall be a member of the Board of
Directors or of other governing bodies of government
entities whose functions affect the career
development, employment status, rights, privileges,
and welfare of government officials and employees,
such as the Government Service Insurance System,
Foreign Service Board, Foreign Trade Service Board,
National Board for Teachers, and such other similar
boards as may be created by law.
 Dennis Funa filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of Duque’s
designation, claiming that violates Sec. 1 and 2 or Art. IX-A of the
Constitution.
o That the designation violates the independence of the CSC and
violates the prohibition imposed upon members of
constitutional commissions from holding any other office or
employment.
1

Issue: Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair
the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the
holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions?
Ruling: Yes.
 Art. IX-A provides:
o Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission
on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
o Section 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall,
during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither
shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which in any way may
be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with,
or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
 GR: All appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions.
o Sec. 7 (par. 2), Art. IX-B: xxx Unless otherwise allowed by law or
the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
o Exception: The President, Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
 May hold another office or employment in the
government only when authorized by the
Constitution.
 Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet
position (i.e., President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general
rule.
o He can hold any other office or employment in the Government
during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position.
 However, consistent with the Administrative Code, the CSC Chairman’s
membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the
functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board member
must affect the career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees.
o While powers and functions associated with appointments,
compensation and benefits affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of
government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate powers
and functions that are not personnel-related.
o All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-related
or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
o Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he
may exercise these powers and functions, which are not
anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as
imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions,
issuing guidelines for the accreditation of healthcare providers,
or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid
loan amortizations. The Court also notes that Duque’s
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to receive per diem, a
form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the
concept of an ex officio position by virtue of its clear
contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution.
 Ex officio
 Means "from office; by virtue of office."
 It refers to an "authority derived from
official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but
rather annexed to the official position."
 It likewise denotes an "act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of
office, and without any other appointment
or authority other than that conferred by
the office."
 An ex officio member of a board is one who is a
member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and
without further warrant or appointment.
 The ex officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said
position.
 Reason: These services are already paid for
and covered by the compensation attached
to his principal office.
Secton 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law
and shall not be decreased during their tenure.
Secton 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and
2
employees in accordance with law.
Secton 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
A. Fiscal Autonomy
2) CSC v. Department of Budget – July 22. 2005
D: The policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal
autonomy.
The CSC via a petition for mandamus seeks to compel DBM to release the
balance of its budget for FY 2002.
 CSC claims that the reason for the withholding was the “no report, no
release” policy.
DBM claims that the failure to release the fund in full is due to shortage of
funds.
W/N the “no report, no release” policy may be validly enforced against CSC?
NO. The policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal
autono my.
Being “automatic” connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and
perfunctory.
 It means that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
The justification of the DBM does not lie.
 Shortage of funds is not an excuse for not releasing the fund in full of
offices vested with fiscal autono my.
Secton 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however,
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
A. Rules of procedure
3) Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals - 227 SCRA 311
D: This is an election protest for vice mayor between the P and R. R Gatchalian
won as vice mayor in Balagtas, Bulacan so P filed an election protest. P claims
that R’s answer was filed out of the 5-day period. P contends that R’s MTD and
Motion for Bill of Particulars did not toll the period as they are prohibited by
COMELEC rules.
Is P correct? NO, constitutionally speaking, COMELEC cannot adopt a rule
prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular court – this power is
vested alone in the SC. Hence, we follow the ROC. Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of
the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after
receipt of the order denying his moton for a bill of partculars . Private respondent
(Gatchalian) received a copy of the order of the Regional Trial Court denying his
moton for a bill of partculars on August 6, 1992. Private respondent, therefore,
had untl August 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer with
Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed
tmely.
 Petitioner Aruelo & Gatchalian were rival candidates for vice-mayor in
Balagtas, Bulacan – Gatchalian won (1992 elections).
 Aruelo filed w/ the RTC a civil case protesting such elections.
 Gatchalian responde d w/ pleadings – motion to dismiss & motion for
bill of particulars – which were denied so he was only able to submit
his counter-protest & counterclaim afer 2 mos.
 Aruelo now claims that in election contests, comelec rules give
respondents only 5 days from summon to file his answer –
gatchalian’s 5 days had now lapsed.
 Aruelo further contended that his pleadings did not suspend the
running of the 5-day period as such motions are prohibited by sec 1
rule 13 of comelec rules of procedures.
Issue: Is the contention of aruelo correct? NO
Aruelo filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings
are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
 Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not
applicable to proceedings before the regular courts.
 As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the
COMELEC.
Since part 6 of the comelec rules does not provide that MTD & bill of
particulars are not allowed in election contest pending before the regular
courts.
Constitutionally speaking, comelec canno t adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular court – this power is vested alone in the SC.
Thus, pending his submission of appeals, the 5-day period is suspende d – he
filed his answer on the right time. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested in the SC.
Here, Private respondent (Gatchalian) received a copy of the order of the Regional
Trial Court denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under
3
Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
file his answer afer receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars. thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
Private respondent, therefore, had until August 11, 1992 within which to file his
answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on August
11, 1992 was filed timely. How Commissions Decide

The instant case is different from a pre-proclamation controversy which the law 5) Estrella v. Comelec – May 27, 2004
expressly mandates to be resolved in a summary proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX,
Sec. 246; COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Sec. 2; Dipatuan v. A status quo ante order was issued by the COMELEC and from the 7
Commission on Elections, 185 SCRA 86 [1990]). members only 5 participated. From the 5 participants 1 dissented.

According to the Constitution 4 will constitute the majority. However,

Lantion, one of the 4 members who agreed to the order was disallowed by
4) Macalintal v. COMELEC – 405 SCRA 614
the SC to participate because he had previously inhibited himself on the
case. The effect is that there are effectively only 4 participants and from
Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal seeking a
these there is 1 dissent.
declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Act of
2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity, such as the provision authorizing
W/N the vote of the 3 participants in the en banc proceeding can be
Congress to review IRR promulgated by the Comelec.
considered a majority vote following the case of Cua v. COMELEC (that 3 is
majority)?
May Congress assume power to review rules promulgated by the Comelec?
NO
NO
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote
Congress may not assume power to review rules promulgated by Comelec. of all its members and not only those who participated and took part in the
 By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and deliberations. Since the above-quoted constitutional provision states "all of
revise the IRR for the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress its members," without any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.
went beyon d the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress
trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independenc e of the Even former Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, questions the
Comelec. Cua ruling in light of Section 7, which says "majority of all the Members." He
thus concludes that "three is not the majority of seven.”
The phrase “subject to the approval of the Congressional Committee”, which
empowers the Commission to authorize the voting by mail in not more than 3 6) Mateo v. Court of Appeals – 247 SCRA 284
countries for the May 2004 elections; and the phrase “only upon review and
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee” are unconstitutional
Petitioners are employees of MOWAD (Morong Water District) – w/c is a
as they require review and approva l or disapprova l of voting by mail in any
quasi-public corp created pursuant to PD 198. Upon complaint by the
coun try afer the 2004 elections.
petitioners against the general manager, the BOD of MOWAD conduc ted an
 Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or
investigation – gen mgr Sta Maria was placed under preventive suspension
disapprove the coun tries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as
determined by the COMELEC. so such position was vacated – another person was designated - & was
eventually dismissed.

Secton 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any
Sta Maria filed a special civil action for quo warranto & mandamus before
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission
the RTC challenging his dismissal by the BOD.
for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
The board filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
because the case is under the jurisdiction of the CSC because it involves a
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission government employee. However, the motion was denied 4

Issue: W/n the RTC has jurisdiction over the case involving the dismissal of
an employee of a quasi-public corp?
NO
Sta Maria was an officer of a gocc – as such, his hiring & firing is governed by
the Civil Service Law.
The RTC has no jurisdiction to hear cases involving dismissal of officers
covered by the Civil Service Law.
 The Civil Service Commission, under the consti, is the single arbiter
of all contests relating to the civil service.
 RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of
officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
7) Ambil v. Comelec -344 SCRA 358
Petitioner Ambil won in an election but Commissioner Guiani, in a
decision ruled otherwise.
 Initially, Commissioner Guiani prepared and signed a proposed
resolution of the case.
 Before the same was promulgated, however, Commissioner
Guiani retired.
o He vacated his office without the final decision or
resolution having been promulgated.
Comelec resolved to promulgate such ponencia but Ambil sought
injunction for the promulgation on the ground that it has no value.
W/N this ponencia has any value?
None
It does not have any value. Before that resolution or decision is signed and
promulgated, there is no valid resolution or decision to speak of.
 A final decision or resolution becomes binding only afer it is
promulgated and not before.
Accordingly, one who is no longer a members of the Commission at the time
the final decision or resolution is promulgated canno t validly take part in that
resolution or decision. Much less could he be the ponente of the resolution or
decision.
The Supreme Court interpreted Section 7, Article 9-A of the Constitution to mean
FINAL orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
 The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en
banc, not of a division.
 The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
COMELEC.
The mode by which a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be
elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65, which requires there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by
the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc
decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
 Article IX-B, Section 3: “The Commission on Elections may sit en banc
or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.”
Secton 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided
by law.
B. Civil Service Commission
Secton 1.
(1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission
composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public
administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman
shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and
another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
5
Secton 2.
(1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit
and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to
positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical, by competitive examination.
(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law.
(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees.
(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection
as may be provided by law.
Classes of Service:
1. Career Service
 Characterized by entrance based on merit and fitness to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive
examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications.
 Opportunity for advancement to higher career positions.
 Security of tenure.
2. Non-Career Service
 Characterized by entrance on bases other than those of the
usual tests utilized for the career service
 Tenure limited to a period specified by law, or which is co-
terminus with that of the appointing power for which
purpose the employment was made.
Exempt from the competitive examination requirement:
1. Policy determining
 Where officer lays down principal or fundamental guidelines
or rules; or formulates a method of action for government
or any of its subdivisions.
2. Primarily confidential
 Denoting not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals on
confidential matters of state; or one declared to be so by
the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of
the CSC.
3. Highly technical
 Which requires possession of technical skill or training in
a supreme or superior degree.
Discretion of the appointing authority
 Has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his
best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
Secton 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the
civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
Secton 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to
uphold and defend this Constitution.
Secton 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of
government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the
responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their positions.
Secton 6. No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within one year afer
such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-
owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
Secton 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Secton 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law,
nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or
title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect
compensation.
6
A. Civil Service Commission ("CSC")
Scope
8) CSC vs. Alfonso - G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009
Alfonso, Director of the HRM Department of PUP was charged with grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and
violation of the Civil Service Law.
 The affidavit-complaint was lodged before the CSC.
The CSC finally charged him and imposed a 90day suspension.
Alfonso now argues that the CSC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative case because it is the PUP Board of Regents that has the
exc lusive authority to appoint and remove PUP employees.
W/N the CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed against
Alfonso?
YES.
As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction
to supervise the performance of and discipline if need be, all government
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters such as PUP.
Even though the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases
decided by government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a
complaint may be filed directly with the CSC.
 CSC has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may
in its discretion opt to deputize a department or an agency to
conduct the investigation, as provided in the CSL of 1975.
The SC also ruled that since the complaints were filed directly with the
CSC and the CSC had opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the
CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
9) PNOC-EDC v. Leogardo- July 5, 1989
PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of the PNOC.
On 1978, it filed with the MOLE (Ministry of Labor and Employment) a clearance
application to dismiss the services of Ellelina for a commission of a crime.
 MOLE granted the clearance but subsequently revoked it.
PNOC-EDC appealed on the ground that the MOLE has no jurisdiction over
PNOC-EDC since it is a GOCC.
W/N PNOC-EDC is governed by the Labor Code?
YES
PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under the general Corporation Law is a
GOCC whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.
 The 1973 Constitution provided: The Civil Service embraces every
branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
 Hence, employees of GOCC, whether created by special law or
formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are
governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code.
 Yet the 1987 Constitution supplanted, providing that the CSC covers
only GOCC with original charter.
The civil service system under the new Constitution covers only government
owned and controlled corporations with original charters.
 Since PNOC-EDC does not have its own charter, then it is not covered
by the CSC.
 Moreover, even if a case arose under the 1973 Constitution but it is
to be decided under the 1987 Constitution, the applicable rule is that
of the 1987 Constitution.
10) Philippine Fisheries v. NLRC – September 4, 1992
Philippine Fisheries is a GOCC created by P.D. No. 977.
It entered a contract with the Odin Security Agency for security services.
Two of the security guards filed with the Office of the Sub-Regional Arbitrator
a complaint for re-adjustment rate under Wage Order No. 6 together with
wage salary differentials.
The LA issued an Order dismissing the complaint, t h a t t h e Philippine
fisheries is a GOCC, hence it would place it under the scope and
jurisdiction of the CSC and not within the ambit of the NLRC.
W/N Philippine Fisheries is under the scope of the Civil Service or NLRC?
CSC
Philippine Fisheries is a GOCC with special charter, which places it under the
7
scope of the Civil Service.
 However the contract of services explicitly states that the security
guards are not considered employees of the Philippine Fisheries,
hence the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission may not be
invoked in the case.
Appointments
11) Santago, Jr. v. CSC- 178 SCRA 733
 Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada extended to Narciso Y. Santiago
a permanent promotional appointment from Customs Collector I to
Customs Collector III.
 Leonardo Jose, a Customs Collector II, protested, claiming that he was the
next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III.
 The Civil Service Commission revoked Santiago’s promotion. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the next-in-rank rule applies in making appointments?
Ruling: No. One who is next in rank is entitled to preferential consideration for
promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no
one else can be appointed.
 The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a
ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person.
 The power to appoint is a matter of discretion.
o The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to who is
best qualified for the position.
 To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula
on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among
those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion
and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment
 CSC Resolution No. 83-343 provides:
o Section 4. An employee who holds a next-in- rank position who
is deemed the most competent and qualified, possesses an
appropriate civil service eligibility, and meets the other
conditions for promotion shall be promoted to the higher
position when it becomes vacant.
However, the appointing authority may promote an employee
who is not next-in-rank but who possesses superior
qualifications and competence compared to a next-in-rank
employee who merely meets the minimum requirements for
the position.
 The Customs Commissioner, in giving his reason for promoting Santiago,
provided that there was no official record of any activity that
recommends Jose for promotion. In contrast, Santiago had been credited
with the seizure of millions of pesos worth of smuggled shipments, as
well as being the recipient of several citations for exemplary
performance.
 Finally, while it is true that the Commission is empowered to approve all
appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the
appropriate eligibility or required qualification, all the commission is
actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses
the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications.
o If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is
disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be
employed by the Commission when it acts on, or as the decree
says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the
proper authorities.
o It has no authority to revoke the said appointment simply
because it believed that the Jose was better qualified for that
would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion
vested solely (in the appointing authority).
12) Aquino v. CSC- 208 SCRA 240
Victor Aquino was designated as Property Inspector and In-Charge of the
Supply Office performing the duties and responsibilities of the Supply Officer.
2 years later, the Division Superintendent of City Schoo ls, Tagle, issued a
promotional appointment to Leonarda D. de la Paz as Supply Officer.
 At the time of her appointment, she was then holding the position
of Clerk II, Division of City Schools.
 The Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her appointment as
permanent.
Aquino filed a protest with the DECS Secretary questioning the
qualification and competence of de la Paz for the position of Supply
Officer I.
 DECS Secretary revoked the appointment of de la Paz.
 CSC also revoked the appointment.
SC held that CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because
it believed that another person is better qualified than the appointee for it
would constitute an encroachment on the discretion solely vested on the
appointing authority.
 It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment
the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a
completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable
right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but
also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either
8
 by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause,
and with previous notice and hearing.
13) CSC v. Salas – 274 SCRA 414
Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff
member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel.
 However, his employment was terminated for loss of confidence.
Salas appealed to the Chairman and BOD of PAGCOR, requesting
reinvestigation of the case since he was not given an opportunity to be heard,
but the same was denied.
He appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which denied
the appeal on the ground that, as a confidential employee, he was not
dismissed from the service but his term of office merely expired.
On appeal, the CSC issued Resolution No. 92-1283 which affirmed the
decision of the MSPB.
SC affirmed his status as confidential employee. Pursuant to the provisions of
Section 16(e) of Civil Service Act, which was then in force when PD No. 1869
creating PAGCOR was passed, the Pres. May declare a position as policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.
 Pursuant to this, PD 1869 declared that positions in the corp. are
exempt from CSL and shall be governed by BOD policies and all
casino employees are confidential employees.
Prior to the passage of Civil Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized
instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential:
1st: When the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner
of Civil Service, has declared the position to be primarily confidential;
and,
2nd: In the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the
functions of the office there exists "close intimacy" between the
appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
Thus, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
nature of the position which determines whether a position is primarily
confidential, policy- determining or highly technical.
Security of Tenure
14) Hernandez v. Villegas- 14 SCRA 544
 1955: Atty. Villegas, a civil service eligible was appointed
Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
 1956: He was sent by the BOC to the US for further studies
and returned to the Philippines a year afer.
 When he returned to Philippines, James Keefe was holding
the position of Acting Director for Security.
o Hence Atty. Villegas was assigned temporarily as
Arrastre Supervisor.
 1958: Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to
the President to make the current positions of Keefe and
Villegas permanent. The President approved.
o The Directorship is a confidential position.
o Arrastre Supervisor is a classified position
o Villegas was transferred from a position, which
is primarily confidential in nature, to another,
without cause.
 Atty. Villegas filed a petition for quo warranto with CFI
Manila.
 The defense of DOF and Executive Secretary is that the
Directorship is a confidential position. Hence, terminable at
the will of the appointing power.
ISSUE: WON it is valid to transfer Atty. Villegas from Director of
Security to Arrastre Supervisor?
HELD: NO!
 That Villegas' removal from the office of Director for
Security is without cause and is therefore illegal.
 There are 3 classes of positions:
1. Policy-determining
2. Primarily confidential
3. Highly Technical
o These are exempt from the rule requiring
appointments in the Civil Service to be made on
the basis of merit a fitness as determined from
competitive examinations.
 But that the Constitution does not exempt the holders of 3
positions from the operation of the principle emphatically
and categorically enumerated in section 4 of Article XII: “No
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law.”
o Appointees in the 3 positions are not terminable
at will by the appointing power.
9
 o However, for confidential position: The
termination of their official relation can be
justified on the ground of loss of confidence
because in that case their cessation from office
involves no removal but merely the expiration of
the term of office.
The distinction between competitive and non-competitive positions is
significant only for purposes of appointment. However, “officials and
employees holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as
confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be
justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involves no removal but the expiration of the term of
office – two different causes for the termination of the official relations
recognized in the Law of Public Officers.
15) Astraquillo v. Manglapus- 190 SCRA 280
Petitioners were appointed ambassadors to different countries.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, by the authority of the President, then
terminated their services.
Petitioners complained and contended that they were employed under the
career service and thus granted security of tenure.
W/N appointees to the foreign service who do not belong to the Career Corps
enjoy security of tenure like the Career Corp.?
NO
Those who are non-career “enter on bases other than those of the usual test
of merit and fitness utilized for the career service” and possess “tenure which
is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of
the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purposes employment was made.
 Political appointees in the foreign service possess “tenure which is
coterminous with that of the appointing authority.”
16) Gloria v. Court of Appeals- August 15, 2000
 Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent,
Division of City Schools, QC, by the then Pres. Cory Aquino.
 Secretary Gloria recommended to the Pres. Aquino that the Icasiano be
reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute of Science
and Technology], to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its
Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro.
o The President approved the recommendation of Sec. Gloria.
o A copy of the recommendation for petitioner’s reassignment,
as approved by Pres. Aquino, was transmitted by Sec. Gloria to
Director Rosas for implementation.
o Director Rosas, informed the petitioner of his reassignment.
 Icasiano requested Sec. Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but the
latter denied the request.
 Icasiano prepared a letter to Pres. Aquino, asking for a reconsideration of
his reassignment, and furnished a copy of the same to the DECS.
However, he subsequently changed his mind and refrained from filing the
letter with the Office of President.
 Petitioner was a permanent employe e transferred to another
permanent position without her consent.
W/N such transfer violates security of tenure? How about temporary
transfer?
YES
The transfer of a permanent employee to another permanent position
without the consent of the employee violates security of tenure.
 Reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite".
 The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Sec. Gloria for
Pres. Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private
respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an
expert in vocational and technical education."
o It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than
temporary as the private respondent has been described as
fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field.
As to temporary transfer: While a temporary transfer or assignment of
personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it
cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his remova l,
or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to
indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation.
 Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision, which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.
17) Dimayuga v. Benedicto- January 16, 2002
Secretary of Public Works and Highways Jose P. de Jesus issued a permanent
appointment in favor of Chona M. Dimayuga as Executive Director II of the
Toll Regulatory Board.
 At the time, her position was not deemed part of the career
executive service (CES), that is, until June 4, 1993, when it was
included therein. 10
Because of several administrative and criminal complaints, she was
suspended.
Afer which, she was detailed at the Office of the Sec. of the DPWH and was
later asked to report to the Legal Service of the department.
 She considered this as a demotion so she filed for a leave of
absence, during which, she was removed from office.
 She now claims security of tenure to her CES position.
NO .
During her appointment, her position was exc luded from the coverage of
the CES, so petitioner was able to occupy said position although she was not
a CES Officer.
 The subsequent inclusion of her position under the CES, however,
did not automatically qualify her for the said position as she lacked
the required eligibility.
 Security of tenure in an office is acquired only by one who has the
qualifications for that office.
Abolition of Ofice
18) Mayor v. Macaraig- 194 SCRA 672
RA 6715 was passed declaring vacant certain positions of the Commissioners,
Executive Labor Arbiters and LAs in the NLRC.
Those that were affected claimed that it undermined their security of tenure.
W/N Sec. 35 of RA 6715 is constitutional?
NO, Unconstitutional.
While abolition by law as a result of reorganization is a recognized cause for
termination of a government employee, it is not the same as a declaration that
the office is vacant.
 RA 6715 has effected no express abolition of the positions, neither an
implied abolition – an irrevocable inconsistency between the nature,
duties and functions of the petitioners’ offices under the old rules and
those under the new law, RA 6715.
Right to Organize
19) SSS Employees v. Court of Appeals- 175 SCRA 686
Petitioner SSSEA went on a strike when SSS failed to act on the union’s
demands.
 Thus, SSS filed w/ the RTC a complaint for damages & asked for a writ
of preliminary injunction to stop the strike, contending that the union
has no right to stage a strike
W/N employees of the Social Security System have the right to strike?
NO.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution points to the
understanding that the right to organize does not include the right to strike.
 While the right to organize and join unions, associations or societies
cannot be curtailed, government employees may not engage in strikes
to demand changes in the terms and conditions of employment
because the terms and cond itions of employment are provided by
la w .
Double Compensation
20) Peralta v. Mathay- 38 SCRA 296
 Petitioner Peralta, a trustee of GSIS, was granted an optional retirement
gratuity of P40k.
o Of that amount, he was not able to collect the 7k (living
allowance, incentive bonus and Christmas bonus) by reason
that such items were not passed in audit.
 Respondent Auditor General Mathay stated that such items are
considered as additonal compensaton, since a trustee’s remuneraton
is fixed by law at a per diem of P25 for every board meetng attended.
Whether an officer’s pay provided by law composed of a fixed per diem, and
additional compensation in the form of cost of living allowances as well as
incentive and Christmas bonuses are additional or double compensation?
YES except C o s t o f l i v i n g a l l o w a n c e ( COLA).
There is a distinction between “additional” and “double” compensation.
 There is additional compensation when for one and the same office
for which a compensation has been fixed, there is added to such fixed
compensation an extra reward in the form, for instance, of a bonus.
o This is not allowed in the absence of a law specifically
authorizing such extra reward. 11
  But when a per diem or an allowance is given as reimbursement for
expenses incident to the discharge of an officer’s duties, it is not an
additional compensation prohibited by the Constitution.
21) Santos v. Court of Appeals- 345 SCRA 553
Upon optional retirement from the judiciary, petitioner was fully paid of his
retirement gratuity.
5 years thereafer, he has been receiving a monthly pension.
Thereafer, he was appointed Director III of the defunct Metropolitan Manila
Authority (MMA).
Petitioner can continue to receive his pension while receiving his salary
as Director.
 The second paragraph of Section 8 means that a retiree receiving
pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or
gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which
another compensation is attached.
But upon separation from the MMA, petitioner’s separation pay does not
include his years of service in the judiciary.
 That would be would be double compensation for the same service
in the judiciary for which he has already been paid.
 The law creating the MMA does not specifically authorize payment
of additional compensation for years of government service outside
of the MMA.
22) Singson vs. Commission on Audit - G.R. No. 159355, August 9,
2010
 The Philippine International Convention Center, Inc. (PICCI) is a
government corporation whose stockholder is the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP).
 Petitioners are members of the PICCI and officials of the BSP.
 PICCI By-Laws authorized petitioners to receive P1,000 per diem each
for every meeting attended.
 Pursuant to Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 15, amended by MB
Resolution No. 34, the BSP granted additional monthly Representation
and Transportation Allowance (RATA), in the amount of P1,500.
 The PICCI Corporate Auditor issued a Notice of Disallowance,
disallowing in audit the payment of RATA as there was double
payment of RATA in violation of Sec. 8, Art. IX-B.
Issue: Whether or not there was double compensation?
Ruling: No. Aside from the RATA that they have been receiving from the BSP,
the grant of P1,500 RATA to each of the petitioners for every board meeting
they attended, in their capacity as the BOD of PICCI, in addition to their P1,000
per diem, does not run afoul the constitutional proscription against double
compensation.
 Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double
or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor
accept without the consent of the Congress, any present emolument,
office or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions and
gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect
compensation.
 The RATA is distinct from salary (as a form of compensation).
o Unlike salary which is paid for services rendered, the RATA is
a form of allowance intended to defray expenses deemed
unavoidable in the discharge of office.
o Hence, the RATA is paid only to certain officials who, by the
nature of their offices, incur representation and
transportation expenses.
 Also, what is prohibited is the dual/ multiple collection of RATA from
the budgets of 2 or more national agencies.
o When national official is on detail with another national
agency, he should get his RATA only from his parent national
agency and not from the other national agency he is
detailed to.
o RATA granted by the BSP and the additional RATA also
granted by the BSP did not constitute double compensation.
B. Commission on Electons
Secton 1.
(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. 12
 Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity.
Initatve
 The power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election
called for the purpose.
 May be for the Constitution, Statutes or Local legislation.
Referendum
 Power of the electorate to approve o r reject legislation through an
election called for the purpose.
 May be for an Act or Law, and Local law.
Qualifications and Prohibitions
23) Brilliantes v. Yorac- 192 SCRA 358
Respondent was appointed as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in view of
the vacancy in the seat.
Petitioner contended that the President has no authority to appoint
“temporary commissioners” because it would undermine the independenc e
of the Commission.
W/N Pres. Can appoint temporary commissioners?
NO
The designation by the President of a commissioner as acting chairman of
the COMELEC is invalid because Art. 9(C) prohibits the appointment of
members in a temporary or acting capacity.
 Moreover, Art. 11(A,1) provides for the independence of the
Commission.
 The choice of temporary chairman falls under the discretion of the
Commission and not exercised by the President.
24) Cayetano v. Monsod- 201 SCRA 296
Monsod was nominated by Pres. Aquino as Comelec Chairman, which was
confirmed by the CoA despite Cayetano’s objection based on the alleged lack
of the required qualification of 10 year law practice.
W/N Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years?
YES.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
 The modern concept of law practice does not only cover those that
directly relates to the practice, but also activities that are incidental
and related thereto.
Respondent’s past experiences as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-
entrepreneur, lawyer- legislator, constitute practice of law.
Secton 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction,
or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory,
and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration
of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, afer sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or
which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to
political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to
elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted,
13
 shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with
the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by
law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court
for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall
be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it
has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or
decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Powers and Functions
25) LDP v. Comelec- February 24, 2004
Prior to the May 2004 elections, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)
has been divided because of a struggle of authority between Party Chair
Edgardo Angara and Party Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both having
endorsed 2 different sets of candidates under the same party, LDP.
 The matter was brought to the COMELEC.
The Commission in its resolution, has recognized the factions creating 2
subparties: LDP Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing.
Was such resolution correct?
NO.
The broad power that has been granted to the COMELEC by the Constitution
includes the ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its
legitimate officers.
As such, SC cancelled the COMELEC’s resolution dividing the LDP into
“wings,” each of which may nominate candidates for May elective positions
and be entitled to a representation in the election committees that the
COMELEC may create.
 Court cannot help but be baffled by the COMELEC’s ruling declining to
inquire into which party officer has the authority to sign and endorse
certificates of candidacy of the party’s nominees
 By creating the two wings, the COMELEC effectively diffused the LDPs
strength and undeniably emasculated its chance of obtaining the
Commissions nod as the dominant minority party.
 COMELEC need only to turn to the Party Constitution.
o The LDP’s Constitution states that the Party Chairman is the
Chief Executive Officer of the Party, whose powers and
functions include signing documents for and on its of the
party
o The Secretary General, on the other hand, assists the Party
Chairman in overseeing the day-to-day operations of the
Party and only when empowered by the Party Chairman, is
he to sign documents for and on behalf of the Party.
o Therefore, the Sec Gen has only a delegated power, which
originally pertains to the Party Chairman.
Cases reviewable by SC: has jurisdiction over intra-party disputes i.e.
identity of political party & its officers
26) Sison v. Comelec- March 3, 1999
While election returns were being canva ssed by the QC Board of Canva ssers
and before proclamation of winners, P Sison commenced a suit before the
Comelec to suspend canvassing of votes and/or declare failure of election in
QC on the ground of massive and orchestrated fraud (no seals were
included, brought home by inspectors, missing election returns, suspicious
persons sneaking election returns in the canvassing area, among others).
 Comelec denied.
SC affirmed, no grave abuse of discretion on Comelec.
3 instances where a failure of election may be declared (BP 881):
1. The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed
on accoun t of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes;
2. The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
3. Afer the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
Since none exists, there can be no proclamation of failure of election.
27) Sambarani v. Comelec- September 15, 2004
14

In the 2002 Brgy elections, Petitioners ran for re-election as punon g barangay
in their respective barangays in Lanao del Sur.
Due to failure of elections in 11 brgys in lanao del sur, Comelec set a special
election, which did not push through .
Thus, Petitioners filed a joint Petition seeking to declare a failure of election
and the holding of another special election.
 Comelec agreed but it contended that it is no longer in a position to
call for another special election because according to the Omnibus
Election Code, special elections shall be held not later than 30 days
afer cessation of the cause of the postponement and thus ordered
the DILG.
Hence, this Petition alleging GAD on Comelec.
YES.
The prohibition on conduc ting special elections not later than 30 days from the
cessation of the cause of the failure of elections is not absolute.
 It is directory, not mandatory, and the COMELEC possesses residual
power to conduct special elections even beyon d the deadline
prescribed by law.
 The deadline cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
The COMELEC has broad power or authority to fix other dates for special
elections to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage.
 The COMELEC may fix other dates for the conduct of special elections
when the same cannot be reasonably held within the period
prescribed by law.
Officials have the right to remain in office as barangay chairmen in a hold-over
capacity until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.
 The application of the hold-over principle preserves continuity in the
transaction of official business and prevents a hiatus in government
pending the assumption of a successor into office.
28) Datu Abas Kida vs. Senate – G.R. No. 196271, February 28,
2012
These motions assail the Court’s Decision where it upheld the
constitutionality of RA 10153, which postponed the regional elections in the
ARMM and recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge to
temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the
elected officials.
Comelec then called for special election in ARMM.
Does it have such power?
NO
The Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
 Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881)
has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to
another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law.
 Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of Sections 5
and 6.
o Both Sections 5 and 6 address instances where elections
have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur
or had to be suspende d because of unexpected and
unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud,
terrorism, and other analogous circumstances.
 In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in
furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of
national and local elections.
o Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances
contemplated by Sections 5 or 6 of BP 881.
 More importantly, RA 10153 has already fixed the date for the next
ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different
election date.
29) Pangilinan v. Comelec- 228 SCRA 36
Pangilinan and Belmonte were both candidates for congressman in the 4 th
legislative district of Quezon Cit.
 Belmonte was alleged to have violated the Omnibus Election Code by
giving money and other material considerations to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters (giving sacks of rice, ticket to Hong Kong, etc).
Pangilinan filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend the Canvass and Proclamation of
Belmonte but COMELEC ignored the said motion.
 COMELEC argued that they are not able to judge on pre-proclamation
cases involving members of House of Representatives under Section 15 of
R.A. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution 2413 stating that no pre-
proclamation cases for election of President, Vice-President, Senator and 15
 Members of House of Representatives shall be allowed on matters
relating to preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation
of the election returns or certificate of canvass except for manifest errors.
 The law disallowed COMELEC’s jurisdiction over pre proclamation
controversies in the election of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Petitioner contends the unconstitutionality of the law.
Not unconstitutional.
The phrase "including pre-proclamation controversies" used in Sec. 3, Article
IX-C of the Constitution should be read in relation to Sec. 2, Article IX-C of
the same Constitution.
 Hence, it should be construed as referring only to "pre-proclamation
controversies" in election cases that fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., election cases pertaining to the
election of regional, provincial and city officials.
30) Roque, Jr. v. Comlec, GR No. 188456, September 10, 2009
 Petitioners Roque et al filed a petition seeking to nullify the COMELEC
award of 2010 Elections Automation Project to TIM and Smartmatic on
the ground that it could lead to a disastrous failure of elections.
o Petitioners argued that the contract consttutes as an
abdicaton by the COMELEC of its electon-related mandate
under the Consttuton, which is to enforce and administer all
laws relative to the conduct of elections. This is indicated in Art.
3.3 of the contract where it specifically states:
 SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the
greater track record in automated elections, shall be
in charge of the technical aspects of the counting and
canvassing sofware and hardware, including
transmission configuration and system integration.
SMARTMATIC shall also be primarily responsible for
preventing and troubleshooting technical problems
that may arise during the elections.
Issue: WON there is an abdication by the COMELEC of its Constitutional functions.
Ruling: NO
 The first function of the COMELEC under the Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code for that matter relates to the enforcement and
administraton of all laws and regulatons relatng to the conduct of
electons to public office to ensure a free, orderly and honest electoral
exercise.
 The RFP (Request for Proposal), which forms an integral part of the
automation contract, states the requirement of a complete solutions
provider which can provide effective overall nationwide project
management service under COMELEC supervision and control.
 Sec. 6.7 of the contract also states:
o Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be
issued by the Commission En Banc, the entre processes of
votng, countng, transmission, consolidaton and canvassing
of votes shall be conducted by COMELECs personnel and
officials, and their performance, completion and final results
according to specifications and within the specified periods
shall be the shared responsibility of COMELEC and the
PROVIDER.
 The role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply the goods
necessary for the automation project, such as but not limited to the PCOS
machines, PCs, electronic transmission devices and related equipment,
both hardware and sofware, and the technical services pertaining to
their operation.
o As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment, the
corporation and its operators would provide assistance with
respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec which, at
the end of the day, will be conducting the election thru its
personnel and whoever it deputizes.
31) Arroyo v. DOJ - G .R. No. 199082 , 23 July 2013 -
BAUTISTA
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint
committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of
officials from the DOJ and the Comelec.
 In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial
elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and
Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated.
 The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria
16
 Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage.
Afer the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a
resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be
filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo,
among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ
Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the creaton of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protecton
clause?
HELD: Pettons are DISMISSED.
FIRST ISSUE: The creaton of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.
POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC
Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and
functions of the Comelec.
 The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and
administration of all election laws is intended to enable the
Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and
honest conduct of elections.
 The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was
reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec.
 The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law the
authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms
of the government.
 Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged
with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting
preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated
authority given by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of
the constitutional bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of
ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an
adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal
protecton clause.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protecton
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team is in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain
persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target
only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the Arroyo
Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were
public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in
the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also
subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It
is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not
demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like
circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
DISMISSED.
32) Cagas v. Comelec - G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013 – BISNAR
 House Bill No. 4451, creating the province of Davao Occidental,
was signed into a law as RA 10360 (Charter of the Province of
Davao Occidental).
 RA 10360 provides that the date for holding the plebiscite:
o Sec. 46. Plebiscite. – The Province of Davao Occidental
shall be created, as provided for in this Charter, upon
approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters
of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and
supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of
this Charter.
17
  As RA 10360 was only published on Jan. 12, 2013, it only had until
Apr. 6, 2013 to conduct the plebiscite.
 COMELEC had suspended the conduct all plebiscites because of the
preparations for the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections.
 COMELEC then decided to hold the plebiscite simultaneously with
the Oct. 28, 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses.
 Marc Douglas Cagas IV filed a Petition for Prohibition, claiming that
the COMELEC is without authority to hold a plebiscite this coming
October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao
Occidental because Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 has
already lapsed.
Issue: Did the COMELEC act without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao
Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?
Ruling: No. The COMELEC possesses residual power to conduct special
elections beyond the deadline prescribed by law.
 The April 6, 2013 deadline cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the
people as guaranteed by the Constitution.
 The COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the power
to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law.
 The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites
should be held.
o This is in contrast with its provisions for the election of
members of the legislature in Section 8, Article VI and of
the President and Vice-President in Section 4, Article VII.
 The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
o The COMELEC has "exclusive charge of the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections."
o The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to
give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental powers
for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
 The Omnibus Election Code provides the COMELEC the power to
set elections on another date in cases of serious cause such as
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible.
 The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and
effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, coupled with the subsequent conduct
of the National and Local Elections on 13 May 2013 as mandated
by the Constitution, rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite
for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental on or before 6
April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No. 10360.
o COMELEC’s burden in the accreditation and registration
of candidates for the Party-List Elections was considered.
o The logistic and financial impossibility of holding a
plebiscite so close to the National and Local Elections is
unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force
majeure and administrative mishaps covered in Section 5
of B.P. Blg. 881.
o The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave
abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of the
plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao
Occidental to 28 October 2013 to synchronize it with the
Barangay Elections.
 The legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its
bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that
"clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy."
o In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC
should see to it that:
1. It should not be later than thirty (30) days afer
the cessation of the cause of the
postponement or suspension of the election or
the failure to elect; and
2. It should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted
in the failure to elect.
 This must be determined in the light
of the peculiar circumstances of a
case.
 Thus, the holding of elections within
the next few months from the
cessation of the cause of the
postponement, suspension or failure
to elect may still be considered
"reasonably close to the date of the
election not held."
Jurisdiction
33) Sarmiento v. Comelec- 212 SCRA 307
Several appeals on pre-proclamation controversies were heard and tried by
COMELEC en banc without being heard first by the subdivision.
18
Petitioners dispute such assumption of jurisdiction saying that such is invalid.
INVALID.
COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special
Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
 Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly
provides:
o Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such electon cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motons for
reconsideraton of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
 Thus, it is clear that election cases include pre-proclamation
controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a
Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not
have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.
 Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside.
 Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the
Commission for proper referral to a Division.
However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre- proclamation
cases pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the
term of the office involved.
34) Flores v. Comelec- 184 SCRA 484
Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the
highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance
with Section 5 of R.A. 6679.
However, his election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who
placed second in the election with one vote less.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him
as punong barangay in place of the petitioner afer deducting two votes as
stray from the latter’s total upon finding that 4 votes cast for “Flores” only,
without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered
invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio
Flores, another candidate.
RTC affirmed. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2,
demoting him to second place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the
ground that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC, based on
Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it
from the municipal trial court in barangay elections “on questions of fact shall
be final and non-appealable”.
In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance
of the petitioners appeal.
Decisions of Municipal or Metropo litan Courts in barangay election
contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC
considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679
The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more
significant ground Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited
jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore- quoted
section.
 Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the
R TC .
 Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides
that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a
barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be
declared unconstitutional
35) People v. Hon. Delgado- 189 SCRA 715
COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of
Toledo City against private responden ts for alleged violation of the
Omnibus Election Code, this resulted in the Preliminary investigation and
the filing of an information against each of the private respondents.
The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information the RTC of Toledo City.
Private respondents filed MRs on the ground that no PI was conducted.
Later, an order was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC to
conduct a reinvestigation of said cases.
The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a MR and opposition to the motion for
19
reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the SC that may review the
decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. This was denied
by the court.
SC Affirmed.
RTC has authority to review the actions of the COMELEC in the investigation
and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court.
Indeed as provided in Section 7, Article IX unless otherwise provided by law,
any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of copy.
However, under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, which applies,
states that RTCs have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code.
 Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer,
conduc ts the PI of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding
of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said
court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.
 Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be
subject to the approval of the court.
36) People v. Judge Intng- 187 SCRA 788
Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador
Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly
transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the
Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay without obtaining prior permission
or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.
 He was charged by Atty. Lituanas (Provincial Election Supervisor) for
violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code.
 Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC
Mayor.
 However, before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set
aside its order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to
determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information.
Hence, this petition.
Does a PI conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election
offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the RTC
may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether probable
cause exists?
NO
Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to
prosecute cases of violation of election laws.
 This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduc t PI in cases
involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge
determine probable cause and for filing an information in court.
 This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
 Otherwise it would seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
clear constitutional mandate.
It is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that
matters.
 As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the
same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing
power over the conduct of elections." (Corpus v. Tanodbayan)
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal assumes no role in the prosecution of election
offenses.
 If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election
offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has
been deputized by the COMELEC.
o He does not do so under the sole authority of his office.
37) Jaramilla v. Comelec- 414 SCRA 337
R Antonio Suyat and P Alberto Jaramilla both ran for Member of the
Sangguniang Bayan in Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the 2001 elections.
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed Jaramilla as one of
the winning candidates for members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
 He ranked 7th obtaining 4815 votes.
 Suyat obtained (4,779) votes and was ranked no. 9.
Upon review by Suyat, he discovered that P was credited with 73 votes instead
of just (23) votes or (50) votes more than what he actually obtained.
 If the entry were to be corrected, Suyat would have ranked 8th and
should have been one of the winning candidates in the Sangunian.
COMELEC en banc then ordered that a board of canvassers reconvene.
Does the Commission en banc have jurisdiction?
YES
Election cases including pre-proclamation controversies should first be heard
and decided by a division of the COMELEC, and then by the commission en
banc if a motion for reconsideration of the division is filed.
 However that this provision applies only in cases where the
20
 COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and
not when it merely exercises purely administrative functions.
Thus, when the case demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its
administrative functions, such as the correction of a manifest mistake in the
addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the statement of votes, the
COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional
function to decide questions affecting elections.
In this case, the issue is an error in the tabulation of the results, which merely
requires a clerical correction without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or
examining ballots, demands only the exercise of the administrative power of
the COMELEC.
Hence, the Commission en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over
the aforesaid petition. Purely administrative functions are heard en banc.
38) Buac v. Comelec- 421 SCRA 92
COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig on the conversion of this
municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by RA 8487.
The residents of Taguig were asked this question: "Do you approve the
conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in RA 8487?
"
The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the
canva ss of 64 other election returns, declared that the people rejected
the conversion of Taguig into a city.
Upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened and
completed the canvass of the plebiscite returns, negative votes still
prevailed.
PRs, alleging fraud, filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the
annulment of the announced results.
The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest, raffled to the
Second Division.
Petitioner intervened in the case and filed a MTD on the ground that
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduc t of a
plebiscite.
 He alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election
protest.
COMELEC then dismissed the case.
Buac appealed.
SC: COMELEC has jurisdiction.
Controversy on the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite "is a matter that
involves the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a
plebiscite.
 It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section
2 (1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution authorizing it to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall."
39) People v. Basilla- 179 SCRA 87
As an afermath of the May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate,
complaints for violations of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg.
881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the
private responden ts.
Provincial prosecutor, thus filed 3 information against the accused.
Judge Basilla, however, dismissed the case on the ground that the COMELEC
failed to investigate the case.
 That the contention of private respondents that the deputation by
the Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be
warranted only before the elections and only to ensure free, honest,
orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the
peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance.
Held: Dismissal was incorrect.
While Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the
Comelec, it also authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of
other prosecuting arms of the Government.
 Comelec would not be compelled to carry out all its functions
directly and by itself alone.
 The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election
offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing
`free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
 Without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their
assistants and of the state prosecutors of the DOJ, the prompt and
fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed
21
 before or in the course of elections would simply not be possible.
Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by the Comelec become
deputies or agents of the Comelec.
 The acts of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated
authority are the acts of the Comelec itself.
 The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the Comelec's
authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such
authority through administrative sanctions.
 Such sanctions-e.g., suspension or removal- may be recommended
by the Comelec to the President rather than directly imposed by the
Comelec, evidently, to pre-empt and avoid potential difficulties with
the executive department.
40) Tan v. Comelec- 237 SCRA 353
P, incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the
COMELEC as Vice Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for
the 1992 elections. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed to present the 2nd District
of Davao City in the House of Representatives. Private respondent Alterado,
himself a candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the
validity of the proclamation of
Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of
"unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canva ss. Meanwhile, the
electoral protest of private respondent Alterado was dismissed by the HRET.
The criminal complaint for "Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of
the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the OMB was likewise
dismissed on the ground of lack of criminal intent on the part of therein
respondents. Still pending is this administrative charge instituted in the
COMELEC against the City Board of Canvassers, including herein petitioner,
for "Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to
the Service."
Petitioner moved to dismiss for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC,
he being under the Executive Department. The COMELEC denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss.
SC: Has Jurisdiction
The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution
is virtually all encompassing when it comes to election matters. It should be
stressed that the administrative case in the COMELEC, is in relation to the
performance of his duties as an election canva sser and not as a city
prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct
and immediate supervision and control over officials required by law to
perform duties relative to the conduct of elections.
It is the COMELEC, being in the best position to assess how its deputized
officials and employees perform or have performed in their duties, that
should conduc t the administrative inquiry. Otherwise, it would unduly deny
to it sound exercise of such recommendatory power. However, while
COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action, it is
still the executive department to which the charged official or employee
belongs which has the ultimate authority to impose the disciplinary penalty.
41) Panlilio v. Comelec, GR No. 181478, July 15, 2009
The parties herein were 2 of the contending gubernatorial candidates in
Pampanga during the 2007 elections. The Provincial Board of Canvassers
proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected governor. Thereafer, private
responden t filed an election protest. The COMELEC issued an order giving
due course to PR’s election protest and
directed among others, the revision of ballots pertaining to the
protested precincts of Pampanga.
Petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with GAD in giving due course to
the election protest, notwithstanding that PR failed to raise her objections
first before the Board of Election Inspectors.
Does Comelec have jurisdiction?
YES.
The filing of a protest before the Board of Election Inspectors is not a cond ition
sine qua non before the COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over the present
election protest. Jurisdiction is conferred only by law and cannot be acquired
through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. The COMELEC
exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections
of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials. Since the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over petitioner’s election protest, it has the authority to issue the
assailed Orders.
Note: Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the
COMELEC en banc. Here, the assailed 2nd Division order did not completely
dispose of the case, as there was something more to be done, which was to
decide the election protest.
42) Bedol v. Comelec, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009
 Lintang Bedol was the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for
the province of Mindanao.
 Due to allegations that fraud attended the conduct of elections in
Maguindanao, the COMELEC created Task Force Maguindanao to conduct
a fact-finding investigation on the conduct of elections and certificates of
canvass from Maguindanao.
22
  Bedol was required to appear before the Task Force, but to do so.
o He also came out on national newspapers in an exclusive
interview with the ‘Inquirer’ and GMA-7, with a gleaming 45
caliber pistol strapped to his side, and in clear defiance of the
Commission posted the challenge by saying that “those that are
saying that there was cheating in Maguindanao, file a case
against me tomorrow, the next day. They should file a case now
and I will answer their accusations.”
 COMELEC held Bedol in contempt.
 Bedol questions the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to initiate or prosecute the
contempt proceedings against him.
o He claimed that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in
initiating the contempt proceedings when it was performing is
administrative functions as National Board of Canvassers -- not
its quasi-judicial functions.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to initiate or prosecute the
contempt proceedings against Bedol?
Ruling: Yes.
 COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to
its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by
virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:
o (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
 The provision gives COMELEC all the necessary and incidental power for it
to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.
 The powers and functions of the COMELEC may be classified into:
1. Administrative
 Refers to the enforcement and administration of
election laws.
2. Quasi-legislative
 Refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the election laws and to exercise such
legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to
it by Congress.
3. Quasi-judicial
 Embraces the power to resolve controversies arising
from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the
sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and
of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications.
 It is the power to hear and determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same
law.
 The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
 The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its
quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of
massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao.
 The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law on a
government institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of
the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings.
o Arnault v. Nazareno: Experience has shown that mere requests
for such information are ofen unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain
what is needed.
 To withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who
refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous
notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC’s
investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional
mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections.
43) Ibrahim vs. Comelec - G.R. No. 192289, January 8, 2013 - CHING
Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) filed his certificate of candidacy to run as
municipal Vice-Mayor. Thereafer, respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then
Acting Election Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to the COMELECs Law
Department (Law Department) the names of candidates who were not registered
voters therein. The list included Ibrahims name.
Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December 22, 2009
disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered voter of the municipality where he
23
seeks to be elected without prejudice to his filing of an opposition. It prompted
Ibrahim to file Petition/Opposition but was denied by the COMELEC en banc
through a Resolution dated May 6, 2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC declared
that the Resolution dated December 22, 2009 was anchored on the certification,
which was issued by Buagas and Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of
Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase, stating that Ibrahim was not a registered voter of
the municipality where he seeks to be elected.
On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010
had not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest number cast for the Vice-
Mayoralty race. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was
then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims proclamation. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the assailed resolutions.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Comelec
The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate for
the position of Vice-Mayor.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed resolutions,
ordered Ibrahims disqualification even when no complaint or petition was filed
against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed before the conduct of the elections, a
petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of
the OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been instituted against
Ibrahim considering that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of his
municipality disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed
misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act falling within the purview of
Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper petition
had been filed, the COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it took cognizance of a matter, which by both constitutional prescription and
jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions.
REMEDIAL LAW: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64
Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant Petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court to assail the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 of the
COMELEC en banc.
Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be reviewed
by way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. What the instant Petition
challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahims proclamation and of
the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant
Petition does not qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation
controversy.
Petition is GRANTED.
44) Jalosjos vs. Comelec - G.R. No. 205033 , June 18, 2013 - FORTES - LEUNG
Doctrine: The Cancellation of COC may be done by the Comelec en banc motu
propio in the exercise of its mandate to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election.
Facts:
· Jalosjos was convicted of 2 counts of statutory rape and 6 counts of acts of
lasciviousness
· He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal with the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
· President Arroyo commuted his sentence and was eventually discharged from
prison
· He filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of Zambaonga City
· Though there were 5 petitions asking for the cancellation of his COC, the
Comelec acted motu propio in cancelling said COC
o COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 resolving "to
CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G.
Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to
comply with the voter registration requirement
· Jalosjos: COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions’ jurisdiction by
cancelling motu proprio petitioner’s CoC through a Resolution
ISSUE: WON the Comelec en banc may motu propio cancel a COC? –YES
HELD:
· Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is
under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from
the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by
virtue of a final judgment of conviction.
· The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the
disqualification of the convict from running for public office.
· The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction.
· The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch,
24
but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment
under the law.
· COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued
Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or
resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions.
o It merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in
cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification,
the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction.
o In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions,
dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-
judicial proceedings.
Secton 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre- proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Secton 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information,
all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space ,and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
Secton 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
Secton 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the
free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.
Secton 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall
be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.
Secton 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-
list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they
shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Secton 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election
period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty
days thereafer.
Secton 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.
Secton 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses
for holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and
recalls, shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once
approved, shall be released automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the
Commission.
C. Commission on Audit (COA)
Secton 1.
(1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and,
at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified
Public Accountants with not less than ten years of auditing experience, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to
the same profession.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman
shall hold office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the
other Commissioner for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Appointment and Term
45) Funa v. COA – G.R. No.
192791, April 24, 2012
PGMA appointed Carague as Chairman of COA. Meanwhile, on Feb. 25
7, 2004, PGMA appointed Villar as the third member of the COA for a term of
7 years starting Feb. 2, 2011. Following the retirement of Carague on Feb. 2,
2008 and during the 4th year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was
designated as Acting Chairman of COA. Subsequently Villar was nominated
and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafer, on June 11, 2008,
the CoA confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as
expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on Feb. 2, 2011.
Villar insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh
term of 7 years which is yet to lapse, or until Feb. 2, 2015, or 7 years
reckoned from Feb. 2, 2008 when he was appointed as Chair.
Is his contention valid?
NO
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D):
1. The appointment of members of any of the 3 constitutional
commissions, afer the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the
first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term 7 years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and uncon stitutional. The
appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of 7 years in
case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion
of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will
likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2),
Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were
appointed for a full term of 7 years and who served the entire period,
are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission.
Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the
Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns afer serving in the Commission for less
than 7 years is eligible for an appointment to the position of
Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the
predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the
vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation,
disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
“reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to
one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman
to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a
movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to
Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in
the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity.
Secton 2.
(1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or
held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit
basis:
(a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been
granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;
(b) autonomous state colleges and universities;
(c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries; and
(d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity,
directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which
are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such
audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the
internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate,
the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary
or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct
the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the
Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining
thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations
in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish
the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government
funds and properties.
Powers and Func tions
46) Dingcong v. Guingona, Jr. - 162 SCRA 782
Atty. Praxedio P. Dingcong, was the former Acting Regional Director (RD) of
Regional Office No. VI of the Bureau of Treasury in Iloilo City. On 3 occasions,
afer public bidding, contracted, on an "emergency labor basis," the services of 26
a private carpenter and electrician on "pakyao" basis for the renovation and
improvement of the Bureau of Treasury Office, Iloilo City. This contract was
disallowed by the COA as being "excessive and disadvantageous to the
government".
W/N the disallowance of the “pakyao” contract by COA is invalid for being a
usurpation of a management function and an impairment of contract?
NO
Not only is the COA vested with the power and authority, but it is also charged
with the duty, to examine, audit and settle all accoun ts pertaining to
expenditures or uses of funds owned by, or pertaining to, the Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities. That authority extends to
the accounts of all persons respecting funds or properties received or held by
them in an accountable capacity. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, it
determines W/N the fiscal responsibility that rests directly with the head of the
government agency has been properly and effectively discharged and whether
or not there has been loss or wastage of government resources. It is also
empowered to review and evaluate contracts.
Thus, the disallowance made by COA is neither illegal nor a usurpation of a
management function. The authority of the petitioner, as agency head, to
enter into a contract is not being curtailed. What COA maintains is that the
"pakyao" contract has proved disadvantageous to the government.
Note: SC set aside the decision of COA of disallowing the pakyao contract.
SC ruled that the pakyao contract is not disadvantageous to the
government.
47) Danville Maritme, Inc. v. COA - 175 SCRA 701
Danville seeks to set aside the letter-directive of the COA disapproving the
result of the public bidding held by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC)
of the sale of its tanker-vessel "T/T Andres Bonifacio" on the ground that there
was only 1 bidder.
W/N COA has the power to interpret the meaning of “public bidding” and
what constitutes its “failure” and rule that there was a failure of bidding
when only 1 bid was submitted and subsequently ordered a rebidding?
YES
No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of government funds
and properties.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the COA committed grave abuse
of discretion. COA has clearly shown its position to the PNOC in its
questioned letter-directive advising the latter of its misgivings as to why the
award was given to the lone bidder in spite of regulations previously made
known to PNOC and to top it all, why the PNOC perfunctorily rejected a much
higher bid which appears to be more beneficial to the corporation. Rather
than condemn the COA as petitioner proposes, the COA should be
commended for its zeal and care in insuring that the disposition of the
subject vessel would be in a manner most advantageous to the government.
A rebidding removes any suspicion that may arise out of the sale of the
vessel to petitioner under present circumstances.
48) Ramos v. Aquino - 39 SCRA 256
Afer the final approval of certain vouchers by the Auditor General without an
appeal being made, provincial fiscal conducted an inquiry to determine
criminal liability for malversation through falsification of public, official and
commercial document
Was there encroachment on the constitutional prerogatives of the
Auditor General?
No encroachment.
The Auditor General is vested with the power to examine, audit and settle
all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from whatever
source, and to audit, in accordance with law and administrative
regulations" all expenditures of funds or property pertaining to or held in
trust by the government as well as the provinces or municipalities thereof.
That is one thing. The ascertainment of whether a crime committed and
by whom is definitely another.
It is obvious that Congress itself is not in a position to oversee and supervise
the actual release of each and every appropriation. That is where the Auditor
General comes in. It is the responsibility of his office to exact obedience to any
law that allows the expenditure of public funds. He serves as the necessary
check to make certain that no department of the government, especially its
main spending arm, the Executive, exceeds the statutory limits of the
appropriation to which it is entitled. That is the purpose and end calling for the
creation of such an office, certainly not the enforcement of criminal statutes.
49) Mamaril v. Domingo - 227 SCRA 206
Narciso Mamaril was formerly an Evaluator/Computer of the LTO at its San
Pablo City Branch. In the course of the performance of his duties, he committed
errors in his evaluation and computation, resulting in the under collection of
registration, license and other miscellaneous fees and penalties. Petitioner
27
availed of the Early Retirement Program under RA 6683. As a result of the
decision of the COA, holding that the amount of P44,515.90 be withheld from
petitioner’s terminal leave pay other than his retirement gratuity, he has not
received in full the benefits due him from his retirement. Petitioner contended
that he could not be held liable on the audit disallowances because he was not
an accoun table officer within the meaning of Section 101 of P.D. No. 1445
(1978) since: (a) his work was purely clerical; (b) he did not come into
possession of any money or property for which he is now asked to pay; and (c)
he did not act in bad faith or with gross negligence.
Whether or not COA has the power over non accountable officers?
YES
The responsibility for state audit is vested by the Constitution on the COA.
State audit is not limited to the auditing of the accountable officers and the
settlement of accounts, but includes accounting functions and the adoption
in the audited agencies of internal controls to see to it that the correct fees
and penalties due the government are collected. The verification of the
correctness of the evaluation and computation of the fees and penalties
collectible under the Land Transportation Law are parts of the functions of
the COA, which examines and audits revenue accounts.
When any person is indebted to any government agency , the COA may direct
the proper officer to withhold the payment of any money due such person or
his estate to be applied in satisfaction of the indebtedness.
50) Osmeña v. COA - 238 SCRA 463
A complaint for medical malpractice was filed against Cebu City Medical
Center, operated by the City of Ceby. The City of Cebu entered into a
compromise agreement with the injured party which was approved by the
court and the Sangguniang Panlungsod. However, COA refused to recognize
the compromise agreement arguing that the giving away of public funds to a
bereaved family in the form of financial assistance has definitely no casual
relation to the general welfare of the inhabitants of the community.
W/N the compromise agreement is valid?
YES
The appropriation of P30,000.00 by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu
City was considered by COA out of context; it was construed as intended only
to promote the private interests of the de la Cerna family, as merely a form
of financial assistance to a bereaved family without causal relation to the
general welfare of the community. In truth, the appropriation was a part of
the package agreed upon by
all the parties in the civil case for the amicable settlement of the
controversy; it may not be considered independently of said amicable
settlement.
The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement
of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise, are
indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation; and
a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a party, is a
perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even
encouraged by law.
It complied with the formalities. The compromise agreement was
submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which
approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure, particularly
the stipulation for the payment of P30,000.00 to the de la Cerna family.
Neither may it be disputed that since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu City
has the power to sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle or
compromise suits, as well as the obligation to pay just and valid claims against
it.
51) Bustamante v. COA - 216 SCRA 134
 Benito Bustamante was a Regional Legal Counsel of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) for the Northern Luzon Regional Center.
 He was issued a government vehicle.
 Pursuant to NPC policy reflected in Resolution 81-95, authorizing the
monthly disbursement of transportation allowance, Bustamante
claimed his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989.
o This was in addition to the use of the government vehicle.
 Regional Auditor Martha Roxana Canburian disallowed his claim.
 Bustamante’s appeal to the Commission on Audit was denied
 Hence, the present petition where Bustamante claims that:
o Under the NPC Charter (RA 6395), the NPC has the power to
formulate and adopt policies and measure for the its
management and operation.
 It is in pursuance to this, that Resolution 81-95,
authorizing the monthly reimbursement of
representation and transportation allowance, was
passed.
o Therefore, the Commission on Audit usurped the statutory
functions of the NPC to promulgate its own rules.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Audit usurped the NPC’s authority to
promulgate its own rules?
Ruling: No.
 The Constitution provides that the Commission on Audit shall have the
power and function to examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with
law and regulations, and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds
and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the 28
 Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; keep the
general accounts of the Government and, for such period vouchers
pertaining thereto; and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations including those for the prevention of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds
and property. (1973 Constitution)
 In the exercise of such power it promulgated COA Circular No. 75-6
dated November 7, 1975, regulating the use of government motor
vehicles, aircrafs and watercrafs, which, among others, provides:
o VI. Prohibition Against Use of Government Vehicles by
Officials provided with transportation allowance ––
No official which has been furnished motor transportation
allowance by any government corporations or other office
shall be allowed to use mother vehicle transportation
operated and maintained from funds appropriated in the
abovecited Decree.
o The use of government motor vehicle and the claim for
transportation allowance are mutually exclusive.
 Bustamante’s contention that the Commission, in the exercise of its
power granted by the Constitution, usurped the statutory functions of
the NPC Board of Directors, cannot be sustained for its leads to the
absurd conclusion that a mere Board of Directors of a government-
owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a resolution, can put to
naught a constitutional provision which has been ratified by the
majority of the Filipino people.
o If the Commission's power and duty to examine, audit and
settle accounts pertaining to this particular expenditures or
use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this
government-owned and controlled corporation (NPC) is not
sustained, this Constitutional Body, which has been tasked to
be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use
of the government's, and ultimately, the people's property,
will be rendered inutile.
52) Orocio v. COA - 213 SCRA 109
An accident occurred in one of the plants of NPC were an employe e of a
contractor was injured. The management of NPC released funds for the
injured party. The COA disallowed it and held liable those involved in the
release of funds. Management insists that their legal team allowed it and that
they are empowered to decide on such cases.
The NPC, as a government-owned corporation, is under the COA's
audit power.
Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions conferred upon the COA a more active
role and invested it with broader and more extensive powers. These were not
meant to make it a toothless tiger, but a dynamic, effective, efficient and
independent watchdog of the Government. In determining whether an
expenditure of a Government agency or instrumentality such as the NPC is
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable, the COA
should not be bound by the opinion of the legal coun sel of said agency or
instrumentality which may have been the basis for the questioned
disbursement; otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless tiger and its
auditing function would be a meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon lights
then should be nothing more than the pertinent laws and its rules and
regulations.
53) DBP v. COA- January 15, 2002
The hiring by the DBP of a private auditor was a cond ition imposed by the
World Bank for the grant to the PH government in early 1987 of a US$310
million Economic Recovery Loan, at a time when the government desperately
needed funds to revive a badly battered economy. One of the salient
objectives of the loan was DBP’s rehabilitation, which was then burdened with
enormous bad loans. The rehabilitation of the DBP was important in the
overall recovery of the national economy.
W/N the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit the DBP is
exclusive and precludes a concu rrent audit of the DBP by a private
external auditor?
NO
The COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. Only COA's authority
to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and
disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive. However, as the
constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA's
findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at
least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned. The findings
and conclusions of the private auditor may guide private investors or creditors
who require such private audit. Government agencies and officials, however,
remain bound by the findings and conclusions of the COA, unless such findings
and conclusions are modified or reversed by the courts.
The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not
divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private
audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings
and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. COA
does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit government
agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to
allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition
29
to the COA audit, as when there is a private investment in a GOCC, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar
when the government borrows money from abroad.
54) Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit - G.R. No.
177131. June 7, 2011.
A COA Resolution was issued whereby the COA is to conduct an annual
financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards. BSP is now questioning whether it can
be subject to thre COA’s audit jurisdiction?
Does the BSP fall under the COA’s audit jurisdiction?
YES
BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA’s audit
jurisdiction.
Fortes-Leung version:
The COA issued a resolution to audit the Boy Scout of the Philppines
(BSP) as it allege that it was created as a public corporation under
Commonwealth Act No. 111. COA also cited the case of that in Boy
Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, were
BSP was declared a "government-controlled corporation within the
meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution" and that "the BSP is
appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987
Administrative Code."
ISSUE: Whether the COA has jurisdiction over the BSP
HELD: Yes
POLITICAL LAW: Jurisdicton of COA
Afer looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and
carefully studying the applicable laws and the arguments of both parties,
we find that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to
the COAs audit jurisdiction.
The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31,
1936), entitled "An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known as
the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its Powers and
Purposes" created the BSP as a "public corporation"
There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil
Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic Act No.
7278,falls under the second classification.Article 44 reads:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2)Other corporations,institutions and entities for public interest or
purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have
been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and
distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or purpose,
is subject to the law creating it under Article 45 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 45.Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding
article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the
subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are
governed by the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it
was created in order to implement a State policy declared in Article II,
Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads:
ARTICLE II -DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.
Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public
purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of
"public corporations" defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code
and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the
same Code.
55) Dela Llana v. COA
In 2009, COA issued Circular No. 2009-002, which reinstituted the selective pre- 30
audit of government transactions in view of the rising incidents of irregular, illegal,
wasteful and anomalous disbursements of huge amounts of public funds and
disposals of public property. 2 years later, COA issued Circular No. 2011-002, which
lifed the pre-audit of government transactions implemented by Circular No. 2009-
002. Petitioner alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be
lifed by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate
enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution.
W/N the pre-audit is a constitutional mandate on the COA.
NO.
There is nothing in Sec. 2 of Article IX-D that requires the COA to conduct a pre-
audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only
clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Sec. 2, par. 1, which provides
that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state
subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is
inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a
temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence, the conduct of a
pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform.
This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the
COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.
56) Province of Aklan v. Jody King Constructon & Devlopment Corp. - G.R.
Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013 - MAGSUMBOL
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All the
proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions
rendered thereby are null and void.
FACTS: Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development
Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract for the design and -construction of the
Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The total project cost is
P38,900,000: P 18,700,000 for the design and construction of passenger terminal,
and P20,200,000 for the design and construction of the jetty port facility. In the
course of construction, petitioner issued variation/change orders for additional
works. The scope of work under these change orders were agreed upon by
petitioner and respondent.
On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent
for the construction of Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty
Port in Malay, Aklan. The contract price for Phase II is P2,475,345.54.
Respondent made a demand for the total amount of P22,419,112.96 covering the
items which petitioner allegedly failed to settle. Petitioner refused to pay. It
asserted that the sums being claimed by respondent were not indicated in Change
Order No. 3 as approved by the Office of Provincial Governor.
Respondent sued petitioner in the RTC to collect the aforesaid amounts. Petitioner
denied any unpaid balance and interest due to respondent. The RTC ruled in favor
of the respondent and issued a writ for execution.
ISSUES:
● W/N the RTC of Marikina has jurisdiction over the case? NO
● W/N the issuance of the writ of execution is proper? NO.
HELD:
Jurisdiction
COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondent’s money claims Petitioner is
not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdicton holds that if a case is such that its
determinaton requires the expertse, specialized training and knowledge of the
proper administratve bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administratve
proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well
be within their proper jurisdicton.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until afer an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before the court.
As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money
allegedly owed by petitioner, a local government unit. Under Commonwealth Act
No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the COA
which has primary jurisdiction ovear money claims against government agencies
and instrumentalities.
Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws, the COA promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Audit. Rule II, Section 1 specifically enumerated those matters
falling under COA’s exclusive jurisdiction, which include "money claims due from or
owing to any government agency." Rule VIII, Section 1 further provides:
Section 1. Original Jurisdiction - The Commission Proper shall have original
jurisdiction over:
a) money claim against the Government; b) request for concurrence in the hiring of
legal retainers by government agency; c) write off of unliquidated cash advances
and dormant accounts receivable in amounts exceeding one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00); d) request for relief from accountability for loses due to acts of
man, i.e. thef, robbery, arson, etc, in amounts in excess of Five Million pesos
(P5,000,000.00).
31
In Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, we ruled that it is the
COA and not the RTC which has primary jurisdicton to pass upon pettoner’s
money claim against respondent local government unit. Such jurisdicton may not
be waived by the partes’ failure to argue the issue nor actve partcipaton in the
proceedings.
Respondent’s collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such
money claim should have been first brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should
have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA.
Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even
afer the denial of its notice of appeal and before the CA.
There are established exceptons to the doctrine of primary jurisdicton, such as:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b)
where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively
small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when
strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. However,
none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the present case.
Propriety of Writ of Execution
Writ of Execution issued in violation of COA’s primary jurisdiction is void. Since a
judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the
creator of any obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect and the void judgment can never be final and any writ of
execution based on it is likewise void.
57) Funa v. Manila Economic Cultural Office - G.R. No. 193462, February 4,
2014 - PAJA
DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: COA has the authority to audit non-governmental
entities receiving equity or subsidy with respect to those “funds xxx coming from or
through the government. In this case, MECO was declared a sui generis entity,
which, although governed by the Corporation Code, was entrusted by the
government to collect verification fees and consular fees as its agent in Taiwan.
Thus, with respect to those fees, MECO is subject to the auditing authority of COA.
F: The Philippines formally ended its official diplomatic relations with the
government in Taiwan on 9 June 1975, when the country and the PROC expressed
mutual recognition thru the Joint Communiqué of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (Joint
Communiqué). Under the Joint Communiqué, the Philippines categorically stated
its adherence to the One China policy of the PROC. The Philippines’ commitment to
the One China policy of the PROC, however, did not preclude the country from
keeping unofficial relations with Taiwan facilitated by the offices of the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Office, for the former, and the MECO, for the latter.
Petitioner sent a letter to COA requesting a copy of the latest financial
and audit report of the MCO, invoking his constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern, alleging that MECO is under the “operational
supervision” of DTI, is a GOCC, and thus subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA.
COA replied that MECO was not among the agencies audited by any of the three
Clusters of the Corporate Government Sector.
Petitioner thus filed this petition claiming that the accounts of the MECO ought to
be audited by the COA because the former is a GOCC or government
instrumentality. Petitioner points out that the MECO is a non-stock corporation
“vested with governmental functions relating to public needs”; it is “controlled by
the government thru a board of directors appointed by the President of the
Philippines”; and it operates “outside of the departmental framework,” subject only
to the “operational and policy supervision of the DTI.” Petitioner also alleges that
MECO is controlled by the government, that the President appoints the directors of
MECO albeit indirectly and by way of “desire letters” addressed to MECO’s Board.
The MECO thus possesses, petitioner argues, the essential characteristics of a bona
fide GOCC and government instrumentality.
The MECO counters that the “desire letters” that the President transmits are
merely recommendatory and not binding on it. The MECO maintains that, as a
corporation organized under the Corporation Code, matters relating to the election
of its directors and officers, as well as its membership, are ultimately governed by
the appropriate provisions of the said code, its articles of incorporation and its by-
laws.
I: Whether or not MECO is subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA?
H: It depends.
R: The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. The fact of the
incorporation of the MECO under the Corporation Code is key. However, the MECO
was “entrusted” by the government with the “delicate and precarious”
responsibility of pursuing “unofficial” relations with the people of a foreign land
whose government the Philippines is bound not to recognize. Thus, it is a sui
generis private entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation
of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan without jeopardizing the country’s
faithful commitment to the One China policy of the PROC. However, despite its
non-governmental character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of
the “verification fees” it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the “consular fees” it
collects under Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the
accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such “verification fees” and
“consular fees” should be audited by the COA. 32

Under Section 2(1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA was vested with the
“power, authority and duty” to “examine, audit and settle” the “accounts” of the
following entities: 1. The government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities; 2. GOCCs with original charters; 3. GOCCs without original
charters; 4. Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted
fiscal autonomy under the Constitution; and 5. Non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government,
which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to the COA for audit
as a condition of subsidy or equity.
Complementing the constitutional power of the COA to audit accounts of “non-
governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity xxx from or through the
government” is Section 29(1) of the Audit Code, which grants the COA visitorial
authority over the following nongovernmental entities: 1. Non-governmental
entities “subsidized by the government”; 2. Non-governmental entities “required to
pay levy or government share”; 3. Non-governmental entities that have “received
counterpart funds from the government”; and 4. Non-governmental entities “partly
funded by donations through the government.” Section 29(1) of the Audit Code,
however, limits the audit of the foregoing non-governmental entities only to “funds
xxx coming from or through the government.”
“verification fees,” there is no consular office for the collection of the “consular
fees.” Thus, the authority for the MECO to collect the “reasonable fees,” vested
unto it by the executive order
Secton 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiaries in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
Secton 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within
the time fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and
operation of the Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental
entities subject to its audit, and recommend measures necessary to improve their
effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as may be required
by law.

Since the Philippines does not maintain an official post in Taiwan, the DOLE entered
into a “series” of Memorandum of Agreements with the MECO, which made the
latter the former’s collecting agent with respect to the “verification fees” that may
be due from Taiwanese employers of OFWs. Evidently, the entire “verification fees”
being collected by the MECO are receivables of the DOLE. Such receipts pertain to
the DOLE by virtue of Section 7 of EO No. 1022.

The “verification fees” mentioned here refers to the “service fee for the verification
of overseas employment contracts, recruitment agreement or special powers of
attorney” that the DOLE was authorized to collect under Section 7 of EO No. 1022,
which was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 1 May 1985. These fees are
supposed to be collected by the DOLE from the foreign employers of OFWs and are
intended to be used for “the promotion of overseas employment and for welfare
services to Filipino workers within the area of jurisdiction of [concerned] foreign
missions under the administration of the [DOLE].”

Aside from the DOLE “verification fees,” however, the MECO also collects “consular
fees,” or fees it collects from the exercise of its delegated consular functions. The
authority behind “consular fees” is Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s. 2001. The said
section authorizes the MECO to collect “reasonable fees” for its performance of the
following consular functions: 1. Issuance of temporary visitors’ visas and transit and
crew list visas, and such other visa services as may be authorized by the DFA; 2.
Issuance, renewal, extension or amendment of passports of Filipino citizens in
accordance with existing regulations, and provision of such other passport services
as may be required under the circumstances; 3. Certification or affirmation of the
authenticity of documents submitted for authentication; and 4. Providing
translation services. Evidently, and just like the peculiarity that attends the DOLE 33
34