G.R. No.

136588 July 20, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
PILAR ESTIPULAR, respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Estipular filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Title before the RTC.
She declared that she was the only surviving legal heir of the late Fermin Estipular, who
died intestate. Fermin, when he was alive, was issued a Certificate of Title by the
Registry of Deeds over a parcel of land. Said Certificate of Title, however, was
destroyed or burned as a result of burning the ROD of La Union during the WW II. As
the land was already declared and distributed to ten persons who succeeded him, the
herein respondent prayed that the Certificate of Title be reconstituted.

The RTC ordered that a Notice of Hearing be published for two successive
issued of the Official Gazette and be posted at the main entrance of the Municipal
building where the said property was located. RA No. 26, however, requires that a
petition for reconstitution of a lost or destroyed Certificate of Title must be posted at the
main entrance of the Provincial building as well, which was not complied with in the
case at bar. The petition was granted by the RTC.

On appeal,the CA ruled that there was a substantial compliance with the

provisions of the law. Hence, this recourse by the Republic.

ISSUE:

WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case through substantial
compliance with the provisions of the law.

HELD:

NO. The RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law.
It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the parties; (2) acquired, waived, enlarged
or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or (3) conferred by the
acquiescence of the courts. RA No. 26 lays down the special requirements and
procedure that must be followed before jurisdiction may be acquired over a petition for
reconstitution of title. These requirements are mandatory and compliance with them is
jurisdictional. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held:

"Reconstitution of a certificate of title, in the context of RA No. 26, denotes the

restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting
[to] the title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution is to have,
after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the
same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. Among the conditions
explicitly required by the law is publication of the petition twice in successive issues of
the Official Gazette, and its posting at the main entrance of the provincial building and of
the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. This directive is mandatory; indeed, its
compliance has been held to be jurisdictional. x x x"

In the present case, it is undisputed that the Notice of Hearing of respondent’s

Petition for Reconstitution was not posted at the main entrance of the provincial
building. Clearly, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

It must be emphasized that under the law, the publication of a notice of hearing in
the Official Gazette is not enough. The posting of said notice at the main entrances of
both the municipal and the provincial building is another equally vital requisite. The
purposes of the stringent and mandatory character of the legal requirements of
publication, posting and mailing are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land
ownership claims, to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action, and to
give them enough time to intervene in the proceeding.

G.R. No. 120158-59. September 15, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ELESEO CHENG, ALEJANDRO MALUBAY, and SALVADOR
SIOCO, Accused. ELESEO CHENG, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

Cheng, Malubay and Sioco were charged with two counts of murder. The RTC
found Cheng, herein accused-appellant, and Sioco, who later escaped from detention,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder, while Malubay was acquitted
for lack of sufficient evidence.

Accused-appellant filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that

because he was a member of the Integrated National Police on his tour of duty on the
date and time of the incident as charged, jurisdiction over the offense and authority to
hear, try, and decide the case against him is conferred on a court martial, not a civil
court. The trial court denied his motion.

On appeal, he implores that, by virtue of Sec. 1 of of P.D. 1850, the case before
the Court shall be dismissed and the decision of the court a quo be declared null and
void for want of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
WON the Court Martial, and not the regular courts, has the jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

HELD:

NO. The Court finds no merit in the contention of herein accused-appellant.

The Court held that While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
cannot be waived and may be assailed at any stage in the proceedings, even for the
first time on appeal, this ruling presupposes that the factual basis for determining such
want of jurisdiction is extant in the record of the case and is borne by the evidence.

Should there be nothing on record which may indicate lack of jurisdiction, the
Court will sustain the existence thereof.

Accused-appellant invokes Section 1, of PD No. 1850, as amended, which for

provides for the Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members
of the Armed Forces. The record reveals that on February 21, 1989, when the crimes
charged were committed, accused-appellant was undoubtedly in active service. Under
Paragraph (a) of the above-quoted provision, exclusive jurisdiction over accused-
appellant and the offense should have pertained to the courts martial save only in the
following exceptions, “… (2) court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused
military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of
his separation from active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand
unless otherwise provided by law …”

It must be stressed that the burden of proving lack of jurisdiction is upon him who
claims such. The Court significantly notes that accused-appellant presented no
competent and admissible evidence to show that as of June 6, 1989, the date of the
filing of the Informations, he was still in active service with the INP.

Thus, just like in the case of People vs. Dulos, this issue of jurisdiction may be
disposed of by stating that while it is true that Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1850,
as amended, vests exclusive jurisdiction upon courts martial to try criminal offenses
committed by members of the INP, whether or not done in the actual performance of
their official duties, accused-appellants case falls under the second exception contained
in the proviso of the section which confers upon civil courts jurisdiction over the person
of the accused where he was discharged from active service without military jurisdiction
having duly attached over him before his separation. The court, a quo, therefore had
jurisdiction over accused-appellant for the offenses charged.

Wherefore, the Court affirmed the court a quo’s conviction of herein accused-
appellant with modification on awarding of damages.

G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968

SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA
BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and
defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The spouses Tijam filed a case against the spouses Sibonghanoy to recover the
sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest, plus costs. A writ of attachment was issued by the
court against defendants’ properties, but the same was dissolved upon the filing of a
counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Surety).

The Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had
become final and executory, the Court issued a writ of execution against the
defendants.

The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of
a writ of execution against the Surety’s bond. The Surety filed its opposition on the
grounds of failure to prosecute and absence of demand for payment. Thereafter the
necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment,
the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. Upon failure
of Surety to file an answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the
corresponding writ was issued.

Surety moved to quash the writ but the same was denied. On Appeal, the CA
affirmed the order appealed from. Five days after the Surety received notice of the
decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. The CA granted the motion.

Two days later the Surety filed a MOTION TO DISMISS, among of the
contentions enumerated therein is that the CFI had no jurisdiction to try and decide the
case. The CA required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to
do so. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the Surety can raise the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first
time on appeal 15 years later after the commencement of action.

HELD:

NO. The Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea. The rule is
that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law,
and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the
case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court
is of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this
late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its
active participation.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party, it
could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI to take cognizance of
the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law
then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do
so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the
Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and
for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public

policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

Wherefore, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

G.R. No. 160719 January 23, 2006

EMILIO GONZALES LA’O, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (GSIS), Respondents.

FACTS:

The GSIS is the registered owner of three parcels of land with an area of around
821 square meters, with a five-storey building and the other improvements thereon. On
June 22, 1978, the GSIS and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), entered into a "lease-purchase" agreement.
GSIS agreed to transfer the property to the OGCC for a consideration of P1.5 million,
payable in equal yearly amortization-lease rentals of P100,000 for a period of 15 years.

On December 22, 1980, petitioner offered to purchase the property.

On May 10, 1982, GSIS and petitioner executed another "lease-purchase"

agreement. GSIS agreed to sell the same property to petitioner. Under this contract,
GSIS obligated itself to construct for the OGCC a three-storey building on the Manila
Bay reclaimed area or to make available another property acceptable to the OGCC, to
be conveyed to the Republic under the same or mutually acceptable terms and
conditions as those of the first contract. In the meantime, the OGCC was allowed to
continue occupying the second to the fifth floors of the building. Furthermore, petitioner
was entitled to lease out the ground floor and collect the corresponding rentals. On April
11, 1982, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the second contract by
scribbling on the right upper hand corner "11 April 1982 – Approved – Ferdinand E.
Marcos." On April 23, 1982, the GSIS Board of Trustees approved the same.

In 1989, after the overthrow of Marcos (in 1986), respondents filed before the
RTC a Petition for Nullification of the second contract and the forfeiture of all payments
made by petitioner to the GSIS in favor of the Republic, through the OGCC. RTC ruled
in favor of respondents which further affirmed by the CA. On appeal, petitioner asserts
that RTC has no jurisdiction over the ill-gotten wealth because the complaint involved
the annulment of a fraudulent conveyance of government property to a Marcos crony
and the recovery of such "ill-gotten wealth" by the government.

ISSUE:

WON the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

Yes. The Court finds no merit in the contention of petitioner with regards to
RTC’s jurisdiction. Petitioner argued and discussed this particular issue for the first
time in his memorandum before this Court. While it is true that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings since it is
conferred by law, it is nevertheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on
the ground of estoppel. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is improper and too late for the losing party to
question the jurisdiction of the court. A party who has invoked the jurisdiction of a court
over a particular matter to secure affirmative relief cannot be permitted to afterwards
deny that same jurisdiction to escape liability. Thus petitioner is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the courts below.

Wherefore, the Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA’s decision.

G.R. No. 167988 February 6, 2007

MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO, Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO S. GO, Respondent.

FACTS:

The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal filed
before the Labor Arbiter (LA) by herein respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair
Systems, Inc. (EHSI), and its President Lutz Kunack and General Manager Jose E.
Barin. The LA ruled that herein respondent was illegally dismissed from employment,
thus ordering EHSI, Kunack and Barin to pay the former’s backwages pay, separation
pay, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fee.

On appeal to the NLRC, Atty. Regalado was employed by EHSI, Kunack and
Barin. The NLRC set aside the decision of the LA and ruled that herein respondent was
legally dismissed. The aggrieved party then elevated the reversed decision to CA where
it reinstated the decision of the LA with modification. However, after the promulgation of
CA’s decision and prior to the receipt of the parties of their respective copies, parties
entered into a settlement which the LA approved. In view of Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim voluntarily executed by herein respondent, the instant case was dismissed
with prejudice. The compromise agreement was executed in the absence and without
the knowledge of respondent Go’s lawyer. After the receipt of CA’s decision, respondent
Go’s lawyer filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion.

Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution
finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the
said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Regalado was estopped from impugning CA’s jurisdiction by having
actively participating in contempt proceedings?

HELD:
 NO. The Court disagreed that herein petitioner was estopped from
impugning CA’s jurisdiction by having actively participating in contempt
proceedings. The Court ruled that her compliance with the appellate court’s directive to
show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of
pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial
proceedings. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could
lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.

The limitations in the exercise of the power to punish for indirect contempt are
delineated by the procedural guidelines specified under Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court. In case where the indirect contempt charge is not initiated by the courts, the
filing of a verified petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a
prerequisite. Beyond question now is the mandatory requirement of a verified petition in
initiating an indirect contempt proceeding.

The manner upon which the case at bar was commenced is clearly in
contravention with the categorical mandate of the Rules. Respondent Go filed a
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which was unverified and without any supporting
particulars and documents. Such procedural flaw notwithstanding, the appellate court
granted the motion and directed petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she
should not be cited for contempt. Upon petitioner Atty. Regalado’s compliance with the
appellate court’s directive, the tribunal proceeded in adjudging her guilty of indirect
contempt and imposing a penalty of fine, completely ignoring the procedural infirmities
in the commencement of the indirect contempt action.

Wherefore, the Court granted the instant petition and declared the CA’s indirect
contempt proceedings as null and void.

G.R. No. 46631 November 16, 1939

IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, petitioner,

vs.
ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, EUGENE ARTHUR
PERKINS, and BENGUET CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, instituted an action in the CFI of Manila

against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for dividends which was being
withheld by the company; and, for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal
of said shares, to the exclusion of all others. The company filed its answer alleging, by
way of defense, that the withholding of such dividends and the non-recognition of
plaintiff's right to the disposal and control of the shares were due to certain demands
made with respect to said shares by the petitioner herein, Idonah Slade Perkins, and by
one George H. Engelhard. The answer prays that the adverse claimants be made
parties to the action and served with notice thereof by publication, and that thereafter all
such parties be required to interplead and settle the rights among themselves. On
September 5, 1938, the trial court ordered herein respondent Perkins to include in his
complaint as parties defendant petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, and George H.
Engelhard. The complaint was accordingly amended and in addition to the relief prayed
for in the original complaint, respondent Perkins prayed that herein petitioner and
Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded
from any claim they assert thereon.

Petitioner filed her pleading entitled "objection to venue, motion to quash, and
demurrer to jurisdiction" wherein she challenged the jurisdiction of the lower court over
her person because she is a non-resident of the Philippines. Petitioner’s pleading was
overruled and her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

WON the Court of First Instance of Manila has acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the present petitioner as a non-resident defendant.

HELD:

YES. The action being in quasi in rem, The Court of First Instance of Manila
has jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident. Section 398 of our Code of
Civil Procedure provides that when a non-resident defendant is sued in the Philippine
courts and it appears, by the complaint or by affidavits, that the action relates to real or
personal property within the Philippines in which said defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding such person from any interest therein, service of summons maybe made by
publication. The Court has laid down the following rules in the case El Banco Español
Filipino vs. Palanca that the general rule is that a suit against a non-resident cannot be
entertained by a Philippine court except where the action is in rem or quasi in rem in
connection with property located in the Philippines, and its jurisdiction over the person
of the non-resident is non-essential.

The reason for the rule that Philippine courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
person of a non-resident may be found in a recognized principle of public law to the
effect that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory. When, however, the action relates to property located in
the Philippines, the Philippine courts may validly try the case, upon the principle that a
"State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated within its limits owned by
non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own citizens against them; and the
exercise of this jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State
where the owners are domiciled.
 In the instant case, there can be no question that the action brought by
respondent Perkins in his amended complaint against the petitioner, Idonah Slade
Perkins, seeks to exclude her from any interest in a property located in the Philippines.
That property consists in certain shares of stocks of the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company, organized in the Philippines with its principal office in the City of Manila and
which conducts its mining activities therein. The situs of the shares is in the jurisdiction
where the corporation is created, whether the certificated evidencing the ownership of
those shares are within or without that jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the
Court hold that the action thus brought is quasi in rem, for while the judgement that may
be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in rem, "it fixes and settles the title to the
property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of the judgment in
rem."

Wherefore, the Court denied the petition.

G.R. No. 141423. November 15, 2000

MELINA P. MACAHILIG, Petitioner,

vs.

The Heirs of GRACE M. MAGALIT, Respondents.

FACTS:

Pepito Magalit, deceased husband of Dr. Grace M. Magalit (now substituted by

her heirs), filed with the BFAR Fishpond Application No. 24400. The application was for
11 hectares of land situated in the Municipality of Batan, Province of Aklan. Bernardo
Macahilig, deceased husband of petitioner, filed with the BFAR Fishpond Application
No. 29972 for five of the eleven hectares which Magalit had previously applied for.
BFAR rejected Macahilig’s application for his failure to submit all the requirements.

Undaunted, Macahilig protested Magalit’s application contending that for a period

of 20 years, he had been in actual possession of the five-hectare area included in
Magalit’s application.

After the hearing and determination of rights of Macahilig and Magalit, the
Committee concluded that the former was merely the latter’s laborer and caretaker. The
BFAR Director rejected Mcahilig’s protest and gave due course to Magalit. It further
ordered Macahilig and other occupants to vacate the premises upon its finality.

Macahilig elevated the disposition for reconsideration to the Office of the

President but was later denied. He subsequently challenged this action via a "Petition
for Review with Prayer for an Issuance of a Writ of Injunction and/or Restraining Order."
He had filed the Petition originally with the Supreme Court, which then referred it to the
IAC but was then again denied and dismissed.

Later on, the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan granted the action filed by for the issuance of
a Writ of Execution. On appeal, the CA denied the petition for certiorari filed by
Macahilig on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the said property.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the said property.

HELD:

NO. The Trial Court has jurisdiction over the said property. It is too late in
the day for petitioner to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court. She clearly submitted
to its authority by her unqualified participation in Civil Case No. 3517. The Court cannot
allow her to attack its jurisdiction simply because it rendered a Decision prejudicial to
her position. Participation in all stages of a case before a trial court effectively estops a
party from challenging its jurisdiction.
Petitioner insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the res of Lot 4417
when it issued its September 17, 1992 Order.

Again, the Court disagrees. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of
the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though
at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of
said court.

The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the institution
of the Petition for a Writ of Execution filed by the respondents’ predecessors in interest.
Without taking actual physical control of the property, it had an impliedly recognized
potential jurisdiction or potential custody over the res. This was the jurisdiction which it
exercised when it issued the Writ of Execution directing the surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr.
Magalit.

Wherefore, the Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision and resolution
of the court a quo.