Aboitiz Shipping Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
(179 SCRA 95)
Facts: On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded M/|V Antonio
from Occidental Mindoro bound for Manila. Upon arrival on May
12, 1975, the passengers therein disembarked through a
gangplank connecting the vessel to the pier. Viana, instead of
disembarking through the gangplank, disembarked through the
third deck, which was at the same level with the pier. An hour
after the passengers disembarked, Pioneer stevedoring started
to operate in unloading the cargo from the ship. Viana then went
back, remembering some of his cargoes left at the vessel. At
that time, while he was pointing at the crew of the vessel to
where his cargoes were loaded, the crane hit him, pinning him
between the crane and the side of the vessel. He was brought
to the hospital where he died 3 days after (May 15). The parents
of Anacleto filed a complaint against Aboitiz for breach of
contract of carriage.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Then both Aboitiz
and Pioneer filed a motion for reconsideration, upon which the
trial court issued an order absolving Pioneer from liability but not
Aboitiz. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court ruling. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not Viana is still considered a passenger at
the time of the incident?
Held: Yes. The La Mallorca case is applicable in the case at
bar.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues
until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination
and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once created,
the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger
has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the
carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave
the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the premises
a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his
baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger
relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person
transported has been carried to his destination if, for example,
such person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his
baggage.
The reasonableness of the time should be made to depend on
the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of
common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the
place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of
the time element per se without taking into account such other
factors.
Where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.
This gives rise to an action for breach of contract where all that
is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of the contract of
carriage and its non-performance by the carrier, that is, the
failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his
destination, which, in the instant case, necessarily includes its
failure to safeguard its passenger with extraordinary diligence
while such relation subsists.
La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. L-20761, 27 July 1966, 17 SCRA 739)
Facts: Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three
minor daughters (Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years
old and Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at San
Fernando Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga.
Such bus is owned and operated by the defendant.
They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing
their personal belonging. The conductor of the b us issued three
tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child
Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both
were below the height which fare is charged in accordance with
plaintiff’s rules and regulations.
After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao where it
stopped to allow the passengers bound therefore, among whom
were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. Mariano Beltran,
carrying some of their baggage was the first to get down the
bus, followed by his wife and children. Mariano led his
companion to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the
road about four or five meters away from the vehicle.
Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his
paying, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter
followed him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano Beltran
was on he running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to
hand him his bayong which he left under one its seats near the
door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading
suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip,
notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still attending to
the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when
the bus was again placed in a complete stop, it had traveled
about 10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately
jumped form the running board without getting his bayong from
conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost board in
front of the shaded place where he left his wife and his children.
At that time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body
of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and
without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel,
who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together
her parent.
For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit
against the defendant to recover from the latter damages.
Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of
the bus involved in the incident, and therefore, the contract of
carriage was already terminated?
Held: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is
concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which
was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier
between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. The
relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease
where the latter, after alighting from the car aids the carrier’s
servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.
It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not
cease the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s
vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of
destination but continues until the passenger has had a
reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier’s premises.
The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which
was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel must
have followed her father. However, although the father was still
on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to
hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even
he had jumped down from the moving vehicle. It was that this
instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over
and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the
carrier’s agent had exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very
cautious person” required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be
observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation
to transport safely its passengers. The driver, although stopping
the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started to
run the bus even before the conductor gave him the signal to go
and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggage of
the passengers Beltran and family. The presence of the said
passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are,
therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier,
entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Private respondents filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result
of a vehicular accident which occurred on March 25, 1985 at
Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Petitioner Theodore M.
Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner
corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without
due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to persons
and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat.
Petitioners alleged that they had observed and continued to
observe the extraordinary diligence and that it was the victim’s
own carelessness and negligence which gave rise to the subject
incident.
RTC pronounced that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent, which
negligence was the proximate cause of his death. However,
Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the lower court, and
ordered petitioners to pay private respondents damages due to
negligence.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court
and in finding petitioners negligent and liable for the damages
claimed.
HELD: CA Decision AFFIRMED
The testimonies of the witnesses show that that the bus was at
full stop when the victim boarded the same. They further confirm
the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the bus
when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the
rear right tires of the vehicle. Under such circumstances, it
cannot be said that the deceased was guilty of negligence.
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt
to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An
ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt board
the moving conveyance under the same or similar
circumstances. The fact that passengers board and alight from
slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both
the driver and conductor in this case could not have been
unaware of such an ordinary practice.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons
of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all
the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a
contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding
of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it
responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By
contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation
to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe
extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the
passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of
the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that
negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon
the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence
as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
Bacarro vs. Castano
(GR L-34597, 5 November 1982)
FACTS:
Respondent Castano boarded a jeep driven by Petitioner
Montefalcon who thereafter drove it at around 40 kilometers per
hour. While approaching Sumasap Bridge at the said speed, a
cargo truck coming from behind, blowing its horn to signal its
intention to overtake the jeep. The jeep, without changing its
speed, gave way by swerving to the right, such that both
vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around 20 meters.
Thereafter as the jeep was left behind, its driver was unable to
return it to its former lane and instead it obliquely or diagonally
ran down an inclined terrain towards the right until it fell into a
ditch pinning down and crushing Castano’s right leg in the
process.
Castano filed a case for damages against Rosita Bacarro,
William Sevilla, and Felario Montefalcon. Defendants alleged
that the jeepney was sideswiped by the overtaking cargo truck.
After trial, the CFI of Misamis Oriental ordered Bacarro, et.al. to
jointly and severally pay Castano. It was affirmed by the CA
upon appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a contributory negligence on the
part of the jeepney driver.
2. Whether or not extraordinary diligence is required of the
jeepney driver.
3. Whether or not the sideswiping is a fortuitous event.
HELD:
1.) Yes. X x x. The fact is, petitioner-driver Montefalcon did not
slacken his speed but instead continued to run the jeep at about
forty (40) kilometers per hour even at the time the overtaking
cargo truck was running side by side for about twenty (20)
meters and at which time he even shouted to the driver of the
truck.
Thus, had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the
time the truck was overtaking it, instead of running side by side
with the cargo truck, there would have been no contact and
accident. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was
running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the
road was getting narrower the truck would be to close to the
jeep and would eventually sideswiped it. Otherwise stated, he
should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right
to give way to the truck because the two vehicles could not
cross the bridge at the same time.
2.) Yes. x x x [T]he fact is, there was a contract of carriage
between the private respondent and the herein petitioners in
which case the Court of Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733,
1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code which require the exercise of
extraordinary diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon.
Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand
extraordinary diligence. A common carrier is vested with public
interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead of being required to
exercise mere ordinary diligence a common carrier is exhorted
to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide "using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the
course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination
safely, the carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault.
3.) The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault
upon respondent court in not freeing petitioners from any
liability, since the accident was due to a fortuitous event. But,
We repeat that the alleged fortuitous event in this case - the
sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck, was something
which could have been avoided considering the narrowness of
the Sumasap Bridge which was not wide enough to admit two
vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon
contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.
PAL vs. CA and ZAPATOS
G.R. No. L-82619 September 15, 1993
Facts: Private respondent was among the 21 passengers of
Flight 477 that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz City. The
routing of this flight was Cebu-Ozamiz-Cotabato. The pilot
received a radio message that Ozamiz airport was closed due to
heavy rains and inclement weather and that he should proceed
to Cotabato City instead.
Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed
the passengers of their options to return to Cebu on the same
day and then to Ozamiz, or take the next flight to Cebu the
following day, or remain at Cotabato and take the next available
flight to Ozamiz City. Flight 560 bound for Manila would make a
stop-over at Cebu to bring some of the diverted passengers;
that there were only 6 seats available.
Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but was not
accommodated because he checked-in as passenger No. 9 on
Flight 477.
He was forced to stay at Cotabato City despite the local war
between the military and the muslim rebels. He tried to ferry the
Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel but said pick-up vehicle
did not accommodate him. The personnel of PAL did not secure
his accommodation in Cotabato City.
He received a free ticket on a flight to Iligan, but chose to buy
his own. He lost his personal belongings, including a camera.
Issue:
1. WON PAL can properly invoke the defense of fortuitous
event of bad weather in Ozamiz to exempt itself from paying
damages to the PR? NO
PAL remissed in its duty of extending utmost care to private
respondent while being stranded in Cotabato City.
PAL’s diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a
fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not
terminate PAL’s contract with its passengers. Being in the
business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the
country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in
the case at bar. The relation of carrier and passenger continues
until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and
has left the carrier’s premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would
still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the
comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers
until they have reached their final destination. PAL grossly failed
considering the then ongoing battle between government forces
and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private
respondent was a stranger to the place.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. Because of the
relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of
the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty.
Since part of the failure to comply with the obligation of common
carrier to deliver its passengers safely to their destination lay in
the defendant’s failure to provide comfort and convenience to its
stranded passengers using extra-ordinary diligence, the cause
of non-fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to fortuitous
event, but due to something which defendant airline could have
prevented, PAL becomes liable to plaintiff.
2. WON the exemplary damages was properly awarded by
the appellate court? NO
The award of moral damages was excessive and was reduced
by the Court. There was no clear basis that PAL failed to
entertain the plaintiff and answer its queries. In fact, the
manager accommodated him in his office. Moral damages are
not intended to enrich the private respondent. They are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
has undergone by reason of the defendant’s culpable action.
The plaintiff’s claim on loss of business opportunities was based
only on pure speculation. It must depend on competent proof.
Tiu vs. Arriesgado
G.R. No. 138060, September 1, 2004
Facts: At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck
marked "Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise"
bearing plate number GBP-675 was loaded with firewood in
Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies,
Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck passed over a
bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio
Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national
highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at
a nearby shop, about 700 meters away. Pedrano left his helper,
Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle, and
instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away
behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming
vehicles. The trucks tail lights were also left on. It was about
12:00 a.m., March 16, 1987.
At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus with plate
number PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspiñas was cruising
along the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion,
Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus was also bound for
Cebu City, and had come from Maya, Daanbantayan, Cebu.
Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado
and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side
of the bus, about three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat.
As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspiñas saw the
stalled truck, which was then about 25 meters away. He applied
the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the
truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the trucks left
rear. The impact damaged the right side of the bus and left
several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost
consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. His
wife, Felisa, was brought to the Danao City Hospital. She was
later transferred to the Southern Island Medical Center where
she died shortly thereafter.
Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for
breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorneys fees
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, against
the petitioners, D Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and
his driver, Virgilio Te Laspiñas on May 27, 1987. The
respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was
cruising at a fast and high speed along the national road, and
that petitioner Laspiñas did not take precautionary measures to
avoid the accident.
The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complaint
against the following: respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and
Insurance, Inc. (PPSII), petitioner Tiu’s insurer; respondent
Benjamin Condor, the registered owner of the cargo truck; and
respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the truck. They alleged
that petitioner Laspiñas was negotiating the uphill climb along
the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, in
a moderate and normal speed. It was further alleged that the
truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in
the middle of the highway, and that no early warning device was
displayed. Petitioner Laspiñas promptly applied the brakes and
swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite
his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical injuries on
the passengers, the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo
truck’s left rear.
HELD: The rules which common carriers should observe as to
the safety of their passengers are set forth in the Civil Code,
Articles 1733, 1755and 1756. It is undisputed that the
respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the
destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of contract, only
the existence of such contract, and the fact that the obligor, in
this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination are the matters that need to be proved.
This is because under the said contract of carriage, the
petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the
respondent and his wife to their destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all
circumstances. Any injury suffered by the passengers in the
course thereof is immediately attributable to the negligence of
the carrier. Upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes the
duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It must be
stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of
diligence from common carriers and in creating a presumption
of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the
recklessness of their drivers. While evidence may be submitted
to overcome such presumption of negligence, it must be shown
that the carrier observed the required extraordinary diligence,
which means that the carrier must show the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight can
provide, or that the accident was caused by fortuitous event. As
correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to
conclusively rebut such presumption. The negligence of
petitioner Laspiñas as driver of the passenger bus is, thus,
binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger
bus engaged as a common carrier.
Necessito vs. Paras
(104 Phil 75)
Facts: On January\y 28, 1954, Severina Garces and her one
year old son, Precillano Necesito boarded passenger auto truck
bus of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines at Agno, Pangasinan.
After the bus entered a wooden bridge, the front wheels
swerved to the right. The driver lost control, and after the
wrecking the bridge wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side
into a creek where water was breast deep. The mother,
Severina was drowned and the son Precillano was injured.
Issue: Whether or nor the carrier is liable for manufacturing
defect of the steering knuckle?
Held: It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the
passenger’s safety. His liability rest upon negligence, that his
failure to exercise utmost degree of diligence that the law
requires.
The passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in
the selection and use of the equipment and the appliances in
use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the
manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the
passenger has no remedy against him, while carrier usually has.
It is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not an insurer of
the safety of his passengers, should nevertheless be held to
answer for flaws of his equipment if such cause were at all
discoverable.
Roberto Juntilla V. Clemente Fontanar
G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985
FACTS: Jeepney was driven by Berfol Camoro from Danao City
to Cebu City. It was Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned
by defendant Fernando Banzon.
When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire
exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Roberto Juntilla was
sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle.
Upon landing on the ground, he momentarily lost
consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found that he
had a lacerated wound on his right palm. He also injured his left
arm, right thigh and on his back.
Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City
but on the way, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch
worth P 852.70 was lost. Upon his arrival in Danao City, he
immediately entered the Danao City Hospital to attend to his
injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to proceed
immediately to the place of the accident and look for the watch.
Roberto Juntilla filed for breach of contract with damages
Respondents: beyond the control since tire that exploded was
newly bought and was only slightly used
RTC: favored Roberto Juntilla
CA: Reversed since accident was due to fortuitous event
ISSUE: W/N there is a fortuitous event
HELD: NO. CA reversed, RTC reinstated.
passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the
accident at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch
when its right rear tire blows up passenger jeepney was
overloaded 3 passengers in the front seat 14 passengers in the
rear caso fortuito presents the following essential
characteristics:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or
of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be
independent of the human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes
the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible
to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was not independent of the human will. The
accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver
or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers
should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to
exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct
measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety
of passengers at all times
the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of
carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with a due regard for all the circumstances. The records
show that this obligation was not met by the respondents.
Respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover
any amount for failure to prove such damages during the trial
findings of facts of the City Court of Cebu
Maranan vs. Perez
FACTS
- Rogelio Carachea rode a taxi owned and operated by Pascual
Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon
Valenzuela
- Valenzuela was found guilty for homicide in the CFI
- While appeal was pending in CA, Maranan (Rogelio’s mom)
filed an action in CFI to recover damages from Perez (taxi
owner) and Valenzuela for her son’s death
- Perez and Valenzuela assert that Rogelio was killed in self-
defense since he first assaulted driver from behind. Perez also
claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the
carrier was not liable.
- CFI ruled in favour of plaintiff Maranan
- CA affirmed
ISSUE: WoN Perez, taxi owner and operator, should be held
liable for the death of the taxi passenger? YES.
Perez relies on the ruling in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co.
where it held that the carrier is under no absolute liability for
assaults of its employees upon the passengers.
HELD
1. In the Gillaco1 case, the passenger was killed outside the
scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. In this
case, the killing was done by the driver of the taxi transporting
the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the
duty of executing the contract of carriage. Unlike in the Gillaco
case, the passenger’s killing here happened in the course of
1
When the crime happened, the guard had no duty to discharge in connection with
the transportation of the deceased….
duty of the guilty employee and within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the Civil Code
of 1889 provisions, which (unlike the new Civil Code) did
not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the
safety of the passengers against wilful assaults or
negligent acts committed by their employees. Unlike the old
Civil Code, the new Civil Code expressly makes the
common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by
its employees upon its passengers under Art. 1759 CC.
The Civil Code provisions on common carriers were taken from
Anglo American Law which based the common carrier’s liability
for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers on either:
(a) the doctrine of respondeat superior OR
(b) the principle that it is the carrier’s implied duty to transport
the passenger safely.
Under (a) the doctrine of respondeat superior, the carrier is
liable only when the employee’s act is within the scope of his
authority and duty. BUT under the (b), it’s not enough that the
assault happens within the course of the employee’s duty.
The carrier’s liability is absolute such that it practically
secures the passengers from assaults committed by its
own employees.
Under Art. 1759 CC, Philippines follows (b) the principle that it is
the carrier’s implied duty to transport the passenger safely. The
rule is based on 3 reasons:
(1) the carrier’s special undertaking requires that it furnish its
passengers full measure of protection afforded by the
exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by law
from violence and insults from strangers, passengers and
most especially from its owns employees charged with
passengers’ safety
(2) It is the result of the carrier’s confiding in the employees’
hands the performance of his contract to safely
transport the passenger, delegating the duty of protecting
the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law
(3) The carrier must bear the risk of wrongful acts or
negligence of the carrier’s employees against
passengers since it has the power to select and remove
them
It is the carrier’s strict obligation to select its drivers and
similar employees with due regard not just to their
technical competence and physical ability but also to their
total personality, behaviour, moral fiber and social attitude.
De Gillaco v. MRR
Liability for acts of others
Facts: Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the plaintiff, was a
passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad
Company from Calamba, Laguna to Manila. When the train
reached the Paco Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train guard
of the MRR happened to be in said station waiting for the same
train which would take him to Tutuban Station, where he was
going to report for duty. Emilio had along standing personal
grudge against Tomas. Because of this, Emilio shot Tomas with
the carbine furnished to him by the MRR for his use as such
train guard upon seeing him inside the train coach. Tomas died.
Emilio was convicted of homicide. A complaint for damages was
filed by the victim’s widow. Damages were awarded to the
plaintiff, hence the instant petition. Appellant's contention is that,
no liability attaches to it as employer of Emilio because the
crime was not committed while the slayer was in the actual
performance of his ordinary duties and service and that no
negligence on appellant's part was shown.
Issue: Whether or not MRR could be held liable for the acts of
its employee.
Held: No. While a passenger is entitled to protection from
personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees,
since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to
transport a passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility
of the carrier extends only to those acts that the carrier could
foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and
diligence required of it. In the present case, the act of the train
guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the
passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the
latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforseeable
by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain
or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably
forsee every personal rancour that might exist between each
one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of
eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in question
was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of Art. 1105 of
the old CivilCode (which is the law applicable), being both
unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances;
and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of the
company's contract of safe carriage with the deceased was
excused thereby.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN,
versus MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR
NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY
FACTS:
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station
after purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the fare).
While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT
tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached him. A misunderstanding or an altercation between
the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who,
between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later
fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an
LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming
in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously. The widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along
with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito
Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of
her husband. Trial court ruled in favor Navidad’s wife and
against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin .
LRTA and Rodolfo Roman were dismissed for lack of merit. CA
held LRTA and Roman liable, hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a perfected contract of carriage
between Navidad and LRTA
HELD:
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award
of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo
Roman is absolved from liability
Contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment
Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and
protection under a contractual relation. The appellate court had
correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad
in failing to exercise.
In affirming the LRTA’s liability and exonerating Roman, the
Supreme Court ruled that a common carrier, both from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is
burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in
ensuring the safety of passengers. The Civil Code requires
common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety
to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of
the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises
and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of
carriage. In case of death or injury, a carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of
injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the
fault or negligence of the carrier to prove that the injury is due to
an unforeseen event or to force majeure.
Marchan vs Mendoza
Facts: Between 9:00 and 9:30pm, passenger bus of Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines being driven by petitioner Silverio Marchan fell
into a ditch while on its way to Manila.
Respondents Arsenio Mendoza, his wife and child, boarded this
bus bound for Manila and paid their fares. The bus was
travelling at a high rate of speed so much so that one of the
passengers had to call the attention of the driver to slow down
but this request was not heeded. On the contrary, Marchan
even increased his speed while approaching a 6 by 6 truck
which was parked ahead in order to overtake the parked truck
and to avoid an incoming vehicle (according to the driver, he
wanted to overtake because if he would apply the brakes he
would bump the truck).
However, when Marchan tried to veer his bus to the right to
resume to their normal lane, the rear tires of the bus skidded
because of their speed. They then fell on a ditch.
As a result, respondents Arsenio Mendoza, his wife and child
were thrown out to the ground. Arsenio Mendoza damaged his
vertebrae causing paralysis of his lower extremities. The
physician who treated Arsenio opined that he may never walk
again.
Thereafter, the driver of the bus, Silverio Marchan, was tried
and found guilty for slight physical injuries resulting from
reckless imprudence.
Respondents Mendoza sought to recover damages from
Marchan as driver, and from Bienvenido Buan and Natividad
Paras who are the administrator and administratix of the late
Florencio Buan doing business under the name Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines. The basis for recover of damages was the
breach of contract and the criminal negligence of the driver.
The CA affirmed the P40K compensatory damages, and
modifying the exemplary damages to P30K and sustaining the
attorney’s fees in the amount of P5K.
Issue: 1) Whether there was a contract of carriage?
2) Whether there award of damages was proper?
Held: YES to both!
It is undisputed that Marchan was at the steering wheel
of the bus. The riding public is not expected to inquire before
they board the bus if the person at the steering wheel was
authorized to drive, or was acting within his authority and
observing the existing rules of the management.
To hold otherwise would be to render nugatory the civil
code provision that common carriers cannot escape liability for
the death or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willfull acts of the employees, although they have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of orders. (no mention
of any allegation that Marchan was not authorized to drive)
Compensatory damage: the P40K is proper given the
circumstances. This is to consider that Mendoza had suffered
paralysis on the lower extremities which will incapacitate him to
engage in his customary occupation. If we take into account that
Mendoza was only 26yrs old at the time of the accident, and
given the average life span of a Filipino, he may be expected to
live for 30yrs or more, and his income was almost P100/month
from the business of his father in law as assistant supervisor of
small fairs and another income of P100 as a professional boxer.
Exemplary damages: it is argued that the court was
without jurisdiction to award this since there was no allegation
nor prayer, nor proof in the complaint to adjudicate exemplary
damages. However, the complaint stated, “prayed for such other
and further relief.” When plaintiffs prayed in their complaint for
such other relief and remedies, the court is called upon to
exercise and use its discretion whether the imposition of
exemplary damages even though not specifically prayed for is
proper or not.
In the case of Singson vs Aragon, it was held that
exemplary damages cannot be given as a matter of right and
are only given in addition to other damages. The amount of
exemplary damages depends upon the amount of
compensatory damages awarded. Hence, if the amount of
exemplary damages need not be proved, it also need not be
alleged since it is merely incidental or dependent on the
compensatory damages awarded.
Doctrine: A general prayer for damages is sufficient to grant the
court a right to exercise discretion in awarding damages (in this
case, exemplary damages).
Bachelor Express vs. CA (GR 85691, 31 July 1990)
Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur
Fact:
On 1 August 1980, Bus 800, owned by Bachelor Express, Inc.
and driven by Cresencio Rivera, came from Davao City on its
way to Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan City. While at
Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City,the bus picked up a passenger.
About 15 minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion
suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and
panic among the passengers. When the bus stopped,
passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found
lying down the road, the former already dead as a result of head
injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which
caused her death later. The passenger-assailant alighted from
the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by the police.
Thereafter, the heirs of Ornomino Beter and Narcisa Rautraut
(Ricardo Beter and Sergia Beter are the parents of Ornominio
while Teofilo Rautraut and Zotera Rautraut are the parents of
Narcisa) filed a complaint for “sum of money” against Bachelor
Express, its alleged owner Samson Yasay, and the driver
Rivera. After due trial, the trial court issued an order dated 8
August 1985 dismissing the complaint.
Upon appeal however, the trial court’s decision was reversed
and set aside. The appellate entered a new judgment finding
Bachelor Express, Yasay, and Rivera jointly and solidarily liable
to pay the Beters and theRautraut the amount of P75,000.00 in
loss of earnings and support, moral damages, straight death
indemnity and attorney’s fees to the heirs of Ornominio Beter;
and the amount of P45,000.00 for straight death indemnity,
moral damages and attorney’s fees to the heirs of Narcisa
Rautraut; with costs against Bachelor Express, et. al. Hence,
the petition for review.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and affirmed the
decision dated 19 May 1988 and the resolution dated 1 August
1988 of the Court of Appeals.
1. Liability of Bachelor Express, et. al. anchored on culpa
contractual. The liability, if any, of Bachelor Express, Yasay, and
Rivera, is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of
carriage.
2. Article 1732 NCC. Article 1732 of the Civil Code provides that
“Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.”
3. Article 1733 NCC. Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides that
“Common carriers, from the nature of their business andfor
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods andfor the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
4. Article 1755 NCC. Article 1755. of the Civil Code provides
that “A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.”
5. Article 1756 NCC. Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
“In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.”
6. Bachelor Express a common carrier, bound to carry
passenger using utmost diligence of very cautious persons
Bachelor Express, Inc. is a common carrier. Hence, from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy Bachelor
Express, Inc. is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
7. Bachelor Express presumed to act negligently for death of
passengers. Herein, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut
were passengers of a bus belonging to Bachelor Express and,
while passengers of the bus, suffered injuries which caused
their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil
Code, Bachelor Express is presumed to have acted negligently
unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence
in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil
Code.
Proximate cause of incident; Sudden act of passenger who
stabbed another passenger within context of force majeure.
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause
of the incident as it triggered off acommotion and panic among
the passengers such that the passengers started running to the
sole exit shovingeach other resulting in the falling off the bus by
passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The
sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in
the bus is within the context of force majeure.
18. Bachelor Express negligent. The negligence of the common
carrier, through its employees, consisted of the lack of
extraordinarydiligence required of common carriers, in
exercising vigilance and utmost care of the safety of its
passengers, exemplified by the driver’s belated stop and the
reckless opening of the doors of the bus while the same was
travelling at an appreciably fast speed. At the same time, the
common carrier itself acknowledged, through its administrative
officer, Benjamin Granada, that the bus was commissioned to
travel and take on passengers and the public at large, while
equipped with only a solitary door for a bus its size and loading
capacity, in contravention of rules and regulations provided for
under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (RA 4136as
amended.). Bachelor Express, et. al. have failed to overcome
the presumption of fault and negligence foundin the law
governing common carriers.
19. Defense of carrier not insurers of passengers not given
merit due to failure to observe required diligence.
Bachelor Express’ argument that they “are not insurers of their
passengers” deserves no merit in view of their failure to prove
that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due to
force majeure and not to their failure to observe extraordinary
diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their
destinations as warranted by law.
Fortune Express vs. CA (GR 119756, 18 March 1999)
Facts: Fortune Express Inc. is a bus company in northern
Mindanao. On 18 November 1989, Fortune Express’ bus figured
in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,
resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney,
including two Maranaos. Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field
agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit (X), conducted
an investigation of the accident. He found that the ownerof the
jeepney was a Maranao residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte
and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on
Fortune Express by burning some of its buses. Generalao
rendered a report on his findings to Sgt. Reynaldo Bastasa of
the Philippine Constabulary Regional Headquarters at Cagayan
de Oro. Upon the instruction of Sgt. Bastasa he went to see
Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of petitioner, at its main
office in Cagayan de Oro City. Bravo assured him that the
necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property
would be taken. At about 6:45 p.m. on 22 November 1989, 3
armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers, seized a
bus of Fortune Express at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its
way to Iligan City. Among the passengers of the bus was Atty.
Talib Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos, identified as one
Bashier Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan,
to stop the bus on the side of the highway. Mananggolo then
shot Cabatuan on the arm, which caused him to slump on the
steering wheel. The none of the companions of Mananggolo
started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the
passengers at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo then ordered
the passengers to get off the bus. The passengers, including
Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and went behind the
bushes in a field some distance from the highway. However,
Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the
overhead rack. At that time, one of the armed men was pouring
gasoline on the head of the driver. Cabatuan, who had
meantime regained consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong
pleading with the armed men to spare the driver as he was
innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to make a
living. The armed men were, however, adamant as they
repeated their warning that they were going to burn the bus
along with its driver. During this exchange between Atty.
Caorong and the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left
window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite side
of the highway. He heard shots from inside the bus. Larry de la
Cruz, one of the passengers, saw that Atty. Caorong was hit.
Then the bus was set on fire. Some of the passengers were
able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush him to
the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but he died while
undergoing operation. Paulie Caorong, the widow of Atty.
Caorong, and their minor children Yasser King, Rose Heinni,
and Prince Alexander brought a suit for breach of contract of
carriage in the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City (BranchVI). In
its decision, dated 28 December 1990, the trial court dismissed
the complaint, and the corresponding counterclaim; without
costs.
On appeal, however, and on 29 July 1994, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court, and rendered another
one ordering Fortune Express to pay the Caorongs (1)
P3,399,649.20 as death indemnity; (2)P50,000.00 and P500.00
per appearance as attorney’s fees; and costs against Fortune
Express. Hence, the appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals with modification that Fortune Express is ordered to
pay Paulie, Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander
Caorong (1) death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; (2)
actual damages in the amount of P30,000.00; (3) moral
damages in the amount ofP100,000.00; (4) exemplary damages
in the amount of P100,000.00; (5) attorney’s fees in the amount
ofP50,000.00; (6) compensation for loss of earning capacity in
the amount of P2,121,404.90; and (7) costs of suits.
Fortune Express negligent; No precautions was undertaken
Herein, it is clear that because of the negligence of Fortune
Express’ employees, the seizure of the busby Mananggolo and
his men was made possible. Despite warning by the Philippine
Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were
planning to take revenge on Fortune Express by burning some
of its buses andthe assurance of petitioner’s operation manager,
Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be
taken, Fortune Express did nothing to protect the safety of its
passengers. Had Fortune Express and itsemployees been
vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors
had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the
circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the
safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets
such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could
have been employed without violating the passenger’s
constitutional rights. As the Court intimated in Gacal v.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., a common carrier can beheld liable for
failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code (Fortuitous event defined); Yobido
vs. CA, when unforeseen event considered a force majeure
Article 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an
occurrence which could not before seen or which though
foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, the Court
held that to be considered as force majeure, it is necessary that:
(1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the occurrence must be such
as to tender it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in
a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of
participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The
absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would
prevent the obligor from being excused from liability.
Deceased not guilty of contributory negligence, let alone
recklessness
Herein, Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. The intended
targets of the violence were Fortune Express and its employees,
not its passengers. The assailant’s motive was to retaliate for
the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision
between Fortune Express’ bus and the jeepney in which the two
Maranaos were riding. Mananggolo, the leader of the group
which had hijacked the bus, ordered the passengers to get off
the bus as they intended to burn it and its driver. The armed
men actually allowed Atty. Caorong to retrieve something from
the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help
the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was playing the
role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot be
considered an act of negligence, let alone recklessness.
GACAL vs. PAL
G.R. No. L-55300 March 15, 1990
Facts: Plaintiffs Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon M.
Gacal along with three others were then passengers boarding
defendant’s BAC 1-11 at Davao Airport for a flight to Manila, not
knowing that on the same flight were members of the MNLF
armed with grenades and pistols.
Ten minutes after take off, the MNLF announced the hijacking of
the aircraft and directed its pilot to fly to Libya. With the pilot
explaining to them of the fuel limitations of the plane, the
hijackers directed the pilot to fly to Sabah. So they landed in
Zamboanga Airport to refuel.
At the Zamboanga Airport, there ensued hostilities between the
military and the hijackers. As a result of such faceoff, the wives
of Gacal and Anislag suffered injuries. Several
Now, plaintiffs are claiming for damages averring that PAL
exercised negligence, finding basis on its breach of contract of
carriage. There was a failure to frisk the passengers adequately
in order to discover hidden weapons in the bodies of the
hijackers. Despite the prevalence of skyjacking, PAL did not use
a metal detector which is the most effective means of
discovering potential skyjackers among the passengers.
PAL invokes the defense of force majeure or caso fortuito.
Issue: WON PAL can invoke caso fortuito to exculpate itself
from paying damages to herein plaintiffs? YES
Held: The existence of force majeure has been established
exempting respondent PAL from the payment of damages to its
passengers who suffered death or injuries in their persons and
for loss of their baggages.
The source of a common carrier’s legal liability is the contract of
carriage, and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide. There is breach of this obligation if it fails to exert
extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of the
case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person.
The failure to transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila
was due to the skyjacking incident, all members of the MNLF,
without any connection with private respondent, hence,
independent of the will of either the PAL or of its passengers.
Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the
skyjacking incident which could have been avoided had there
been a more thorough frisking of passengers and inspection of
baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But the incident in
question occurred during Martial Law where there was a military
take-over of airport security including the frisking of passengers
and the inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding
domestic and international flights.
The security checks and measures and surveillance precautions
in all flights, including the inspection of baggages and cargo and
frisking of passengers at the Davao Airport were performed and
rendered solely by military personnel who under appropriate
authority had assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the same in all
airports in the Philippines.
Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL
to perform its obligations in a nominal manner and obviously it
cannot be faulted with negligence in the performance of duty
taken over by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the
exclusion of the former.
Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals
180 SCRA 546
Facts: On September 16, 1971, Jose Pilapil boarded
defendant’s bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City at
about 6:00PM. Upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City
City, an unidentified man ( a bystander) hurled a stone at the left
side of the bus, which apparently hit petitioner above his left
eye. He was then immediately brought by private respondent’s
personnel to the provincial hospital in Naga City.
Issue: Whether or not the nature of the business of a
transportation company requires the assumption of certain risks
and the stroking of the bus by a bystander resulting in injury to
petitioner-passenger is one such risk from which the common
carrier may not exempt itself from liability?
Held: The Supreme Court held that while the law requires the
highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of
negligence against them, it does not however, make the carrier
an insurer of absolute safety of its passengers. A tort,
committed by a stranger which causes an injury to a passenger
does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier.
The negligence for which a common carrier is responsible is the
negligent omission by the carrier’s employees to prevent the tort
from being committed when the same could have been foreseen
and prevented by them. Further, it is to be noted that when the
violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as
in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised
by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only
that of a good father of the family.
Mapa v. CA
October 2, 1992 / Davide, Jr., J.
Facts
• High Peak Mining Exploration Corporation (“High Peak”),
through its duly authorized corporate officers Encarnacion C.
Tittel and Juergen Tittel (“the signatories”), borrowed various
sums of money from the private respondent Land Bank of the
Philippines (“LBP”).
• The loans are evidenced by three promissory notes
executed on different dates, signed by the said signatories.
• High Peak failed to pay the said loans.
• LBP sent demand letters to High Peak, which ignored the
same, prompting LBP to take legal action.
• LBP first filed a complaint for the recovery of the first
note, intitially suing only High Peak. The complaint was later
amended to implead as additional defendants petitioner Tomas
Mapa (“Mapa”), in his personal capacity and as Chairman of
High Peak's Board of Directors, and the signatories to the
promissory notes. (“Civil Case 1”)
• As to the second and third notes, a separate complaint
for recovery of sum of money was filed by LBP against High
Peak, Mapa (in his personal capacity and as Chairman of High
Peak's Board of Directors) and the signatories. (“Civil Case 2”)
• The complaints for both civil cases allege that the
defendants could be served with summons at the Second Floor,
First Midland Condominium Bldg., Gamboa St., Legaspi Village
Makati, Metro Manila.
• The sheriff’s return of service of summons for both civil
cases state that defendants were served copies of summons on
the same day, thru Susan Dela Torre (“Dela Torre”), “a person
of suitable age and discretion working therein [First Midland
Condominium], who claims to be the person authorized to
received processess (sic) of this nature and who acknowledged
the receipt thereof.”
• In Civil Case 1:
o TC declared defendants in default for failure to file an
answer and allowed LBP to present evidence es parte.
o Thereafer, TC rendered a decision in Civil Case 1,
against the defendants, finding them jointly and severally liable
for the amound adjudged
o Mapa filed a Motion to Dismiss and Set Aside Judgment
assailing the vailidity of the service of summons as to him.
o TC denied this motion as well as the MR.
o CA affirmed, finding that the substituted service of
summons pursuant to Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
was properly effected. MR was also denied.
• In Civil Case 2:
o Defendants were also declared in default for failiure to file
an answer.
o TC thereafter declared defendats jointly and severally
liable on the notes.
o Mapa filed a Motion to Dismiss and Set Aside Judgment,
also assailing the validity of service of summons upon him.
o TC set aside the decision, ruling that jurisdiction was not
acquired over both Mapa petitioner and High Peak. The court
held that there is no showing that efforts were exerted by the
sheriff to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner and
instead immediately resorted to substituted service. LBP’s MR
was denied.
o LBP went to CA on certiori. CA granted the petition and
set aside the TC decision. Mapa’s MR was denied.
Issues/Held:
1. WON there was valid service of summons upon Mapa.
NO.
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court explicitly requires
personal service of summons which is accomplished "by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." However, if
personal service cannot be effected within a reasonable time,
substituted service, as provided for in Section 8 of the
abovementioned Rule 14, may suffice.
This provision is a reproduction of Section 8, Rule 7 of the 1940
Rules of Court except that the word "promptly" was changed to
"within a reasonable time". "Within a reasonable time"
contemplates a period of time longer than that demarcated by
the word "prompt", and presupposes that a prior attempt at
personal service, within a justifiable time frame as would be
necessary to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of the
court, had failed.
In this case, the returns do not show that prior attempts at
personal service were made by the Sheriff and that such
attempts had failed, prompting the latter to resort to substituted
service.
Nevertheless, the absence in the sheriff's return of a statement
about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively
prove that the service is invalid. Proof of prior attempts at
personal service may be submitted by the plaintiff during the
hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the substituted
service. Unfortunately in this case, the LBP failed to present to
prove that substituted service of summons was indeed effected
in strict compliance with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
Thus, there was neither a valid personal nor substituted service
of summons effected on the petitioner in both Civil Cases.
2. WON there was valid service of summons upon High
Peak. YES.
Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that “”if the
defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines or a partnership duly registered, services may be
made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or
any of its directors.” The rule is meant to bring home to the
corporation notice of the filing of the action.
In his separate motions to dismiss, while petitioner categorically
admits that this Susan O. dela Torre is an employee of the
corporation, he does not disclose her specific duties and
responsibilities. He does not even deny the statement, made in
the said returns, that Susan is "authorized to receive processess
(sic) of this nature." Until rebutted by competent evidence, the
returns would have to stand in the meantime for they enjoy the
presumption of regularity. Susan O. dela Torre may thus be
deemed an agent of High Peak for purposes of the aforesaid
Section 13 of Rule 14. It is then logical to presume that she
delivered the copies of the summonses and complaints to the
corporation, considering especially the fact that she was
working in the office of the said corporation as indicated in the
complaints. This latter presumption has not likewise been
rebutted. Accordingly, even if Dela Torre may not strictly be
considered as the proper agent for purposes of the aforecited
Section 13, there was, nonetheless, substantial compliance
therewith.
China Airlines vs. Chiok
G.R. No. 152122. July 30, 2003
Facts: Daniel Chiok purchased from China Airlines a passenger
ticket for air transportation covering Manila-Taipei-Hong Kong-
Manila. The said ticket was exclusively endorsable to PAL.
Before Chiok his trip, the trips covered by the ticket were pre-
scheduled and confirmed by the former. When petitioner arrived
in Taipei, he went to CAL to confirm his Hong Kong- Manila trip
on board PAL. The CAL office attached a yellow sticker
indicating the status was OK.
When Chiok reached Hong Kong, he then went to PAL office to
confirm his flight back to Manila. The PAL also confirmed the
status of his ticket and attached a ticket indicating a status OK.
Chiok proceeded to Hong Kong airport for his trip to Manila.
However, upon reaching the PAL counter, he was told that the
flight to Manila was cancelled due to typhoon. He was informed
that all confirmed flight ticket holders of PAL were automatically
booked for the next flight the following day.
The next day, Chiok was not able to board the plane because
his name did not appear on the computer as passenger for the
said flight to Manila.
Issue: Whether or not CAL is liable for damages?
Held: The contract of air transportation between the petitioner
and respondent, with the former endorsing PAL the segment of
Chiok’s journey. Such contract of carriage has been treated in
this jurisprudence as a single operation pursuant to Warsaw
Convention, to which the Philippines is a party.
In the instant case, PAL as the carrying agent of CAL, the latter
cannot evade liability to respondent, Chiok, even though it may
have been only a ticket issuer for Hong Kong- Manila sector.
American Airlines vs. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. 116044-
45, March 9, 2000
FACTS: Private Respondent purchased from Singapore Airlines
in Manila conjunction tickets for Manila-Singapore-Athens-
Larnaca-Rome-Turin-Zurich-Geneva-Copenhagen-New York. In
Geneva, private respondent decided to go straight to New York
and in the absence of a direct flight in his conjunction ticket for a
one-way from Geneva-New York from the petitioner airline.
Petitioner issued its own ticket to the private respondent in
Geneva and claimed the value of the unused portion of the
conjunction ticket from the IATA 2 clearing house in Geneva. In
1989, petitioner filed an action for damages before the RTC of
Cebu for the alleged mental anguish and embarrassment he
suffered from at the Geneva airport when petitioner’s security
officers prevented him from boarding the plane, detained him for
about an hour and allowed him to board the place only after all
the other passengers have boarded.
ISSUE: Does RTC of Cebu have jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the action for damages filed by private respondent against
petitioner in view of Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention?
HELD: Yes. The Warsaw Convention to which the Philippines is
a party and which has the force and effect of the law in this
country applies to all international transportation of persons,
baggage or goods performed by an airline gratuitously or for
hire. Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides: An action
for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the
court of the domicile of the carrier of his principal place of
business or where he has a place of business through which the
contract has been made, or before the court at the place of
destination.
The contract of carriage between the private respondent and
Singapore Airlines although performed by different carriers
under a series of airline tickets, including that issued by
petitioner, constitutes a single operation. Members of the IATA
are under a general pool partnership agreement wherein they
act as agent of each other in the issuance of tickets to
contracted passengers to boost ticket sales worldwide at the
same time provides passengers easy access to airlines which
are otherwise inaccessible in some parts of the world. Thus,
when the petitioner accepted the unused portion of the
conjunction tickets, entered it in the IATA clearing house and
undertook to transport the private respondent over the route
covered by the unused portion of the conjunction tickets, it
tacitly recognized its commitment under the IATA pool
arrangement to act as agent of the principal contracting airlines,
Singapore Airlines, as to the segment of the trip the petitioner
agreed to undertake. As thus, the petitioner thereby assumed
the obligation to take the place of the carrier originally
designated in the original conjunction ticket.
The third option of the plaintiff under Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw
Convention e.g., to sue in the place of business of the carrier
where the contract was made , is Manila, and Philippine courts
are clothed with jurisdiction to try this case. While the case is
filed in Cebu and not in Manila the issue of venue is no longer
an issue as the petitioner is deemed to have waived it when it
presented evidence before the trial court.