int. j. math. educ. sci. technol., 2000, vol. 31, no.

6, 869– 890

A survey of mathematics undergraduates’ interaction with

proof: some implications for mathematics education

DENNIS ALMEIDA
School of Education, University of Exeter, Heavitree Road, Exeter EX1 2LU, UK

(Received 23 July 2000)

Proving is an essential activity in mathematics but there are serious

diYculties encountered by mathematics undergraduates in engaging with proof
in the intended way. This article presents an initial analysis of (i) a quantitative
study of a large sample of UK mathematics undergraduates which describes
their declared perceptions about proof, and (ii) a qualitative study of a sub-
sample of these students which analyses their actual proof perceptions as well as
their actual proof practices. A comparison is also made between their publicly
declared perceptions of proof and their personal proclivities in proving.

1. Introduction
A mathematical proof of a statement is commonly understood to have four
main functions: (i) veriŽ cation of the statement, (ii) explanation of the statement,
(iii) communication of (i) and (ii) to others, (iv) systematization of the statement
into a deductive system [1]. Mathematical proof provides a warrant [2] for
mathematical knowledge and is an essential activity in doing and understanding
mathematics.
A working dynamic for the academic mathematician naturally involves proof
and is generally held to consist of ‘intuition, trial, error, speculation, conjecture,
proof’ [3, p. 191]. In contrast the model for teaching mathematics to under-
graduates appears to be ‘deŽ nition, theorem, proof’ and this disjunction presents a
problem to the undergraduate in engaging with proof [4].
Another obstacle for UK mathematics undergraduates in coming to terms with
proof is the marginalization of proof in the school mathematics curriculum
induced by pluralistic reforms in education of the 1980s and 1990s. These reforms,
which have led to a broadening of the curriculum both at the Advanced level and in
higher education [5], have made the presence of proof in the school curriculum,
both intentional and actual, notable by its absence [6]. No doubt the process of
marginalization has been hastened by reported diYculties of even able learners
with proof [7]. This marginalization has led to widely reported concerns about
students’ poor appreciation of mathematical proof:
. . . (in Advanced level mathematics at the 16–19 yrs. phase) concerns have
been expressed about limited perceptions of precision and proof. . . . [8; p. 31].
Most students entering higher education no longer understand that (in
mathematics) logical exposition and proof play essential roles. . . [9; p. 8].
International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology
ISSN 0020–739X print/ISSN 1464–5211 online # 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
870 D. Almeida

There is a report [5] that suggests that proof activity in the mathematics lecture
room in UK universities has been reduced. Consequential concerns about the
preparedness of entering mathematics undergraduates to engage with proof have
also been reported in the UK [10, 11] and in the USA [4].
The problem may be exacerbated further by tensions between learner and
teacher. There is a tension between the views held by novice undergraduates and
their teachers, the professional mathematicians. This is the tension between the
informal proof perceptions held by beginning mathematics undergraduates and the
formal proof culture of professional mathematicians. The former may not be able
to see the relevance of formal proof apart from the practical necessity of meeting
the lecturer’ s expectations and passing examinations [4, 11]. There is also a tension
between the state of becoming of the mathematics undergraduate, whose proto-
typical proof practices are in a state of development, and the state of being that
characterizes formal proof practices of professional mathematicians. From an
educational point of view the prototypical proof practices of beginning under-
graduates, despite being imperfect, ought to be initially accommodated simply
because the learner believes in their veracity—for the student it is a proof. A
tension also arises in the process of convincing the student of the necessity of
making the transition to formal proof [4, 11].
It is against this background that this study of undergraduates’ perceptions of
proof and their proof practices was undertaken.

2. Methodology
The study was intended to be both quantitative and qualitative. In the
quantitative study two questionnaires were administered to a sample of math-
ematics undergraduates in the ‘older’ English universities. Twelve of these
institutions were originally approached to participate in the study. Five of these
universities declined to participate thus leaving seven, essentially self-selected,
university mathematics departments who distributed a ‘proof’ questionnaire (see
next section) to their year 1 students and, wherever possible, to their year 2
students. Additionally a small number (5) of year 3 students completed the
questionnaire as a result of participation in joint lectures with year 2 students.
The proof questionnaire invited students to respond to a series of statements about
proof; the structure of the questionnaire was similar to that used by Ruthven and
Coe [12] in their study of proof perceptions of sixth form students. There were 473
anonymous responses to the proof questionnaire.
In addition mathematics departments, through nominated lecturers, requested
the students who had completed the proof questionnaire to volunteer to complete a
second ‘proof preferences’ questionnaire (see the appendix). This questionnaire
attempted to measure the extent to which students had made the transition from
informal school proving to formal university mathematical proving by inviting
them to judge the eYcacy of a range of proofs, varying from the visual and
plausible to the abstract and terse. Additionally students who completed this
questionnaire were invited, in interview, to further expand on their views about
proof. This represents the comparative and qualitative aspect of the study.
As an incentive to complete the non-trivial ‘proof preferences’ questionnaire
and to volunteer themselves for interview, students were oVered the opportunity to
win a book token. Twenty-seven students completed the ‘proof preferences’
 Undergraduates’ interaction with proof 871

questionnaire and, of these, 18 volunteered to be interviewed. The interviews took

place in the students’ home institution, lasted approximately half an hour, and
were conducted informally with the discussion being allowed to develop. The
consistency of the students’ views on proof were tested by comparing their
responses (i) at the beginning and the end of the interview, (ii) in the interview
and in the ‘proof preferences’ questionnaire. The views of six students emerged as
being representative and it is these that are discussed in the qualitative section of
this paper. The qualitative analysis is to be viewed against the backdrop of views
provided by the 473 responses to the proof questionnaire.

3. Data analysis of the proof questionnaire

The proof questionnaire consisted of 16 statements (see below) for each of
which the students had to select one of Ž ve responses: strongly agree, agree, no
opinion, disagree, strongly disagree. There were 473 responses in total which are
now quantitatively analysed by assigning the Likert scale to the responses: strongly
agree ˆ 5, agree ˆ 4, no opinion ˆ 3, disagree ˆ 2, strongly disagree ˆ 1. Further, in
order to measure the students’ responses comparatively, each of the statements is
given an ‘ideal’ response; this being the response that a professional mathematician
arguably might give. Both the ideal responses and statistics from the questionnaire
survey is given in table 1.
The following convention is adopted: mean responses in the range [1.5,2.5),
[2.5, 3.5), and [3.5, 4.5) are interpreted to be ‘disagreeing’ , ‘neutral’ and ‘agreeing’ ,
respectively, and overall responses interpreted to be in agreement with the ideal
response if the diVerence between mean response and ideal response is less than or
equal to 1.5. Then in eight statements (3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 15, 16—highlighted in
bold) the students’ mean responses were inclined to agree with the ideal response.
This suggests that, in some respects, the undergraduates had been favourably
encultured about the role of proof in University mathematics. The mean response
to statement 3, ‘if a result in mathematics is proved I can be certain that it is true’ ,
was skewed by an idiosyncratic response from the 5 year three undergraduates—
nevertheless the overall mean of 3¢5 may be taken as one tending to the ideal
response of 5.
In contrast the most negative response appears to be to statement 7 (I can’ t see
the point of doing proofs: all the results in the course have already been proved
beyond doubt by famous mathematicians; overall mean 2.24 when the ideal
response is 5) and to statement 9 (If a result in mathematics is obviously true
then there’ s no point in proving it; overall mean 2.56 when the ideal response is 5).
This may suggest that the undergraduates see proofs as something that is an
external activity rather than a internal activity meant to provide insight and
understanding.
The undergraduates’ responses to the questionnaire also reveal that their
perceptions about proof remain largely unchanged from year 1 to year 2.
SigniŽ cance tests for the diVerence of two means at the 2.5% level in table 2
conŽ rm this.
As indicated by the table the occasions when the diVerence of the sample means
leads to a signiŽ cant test statistic is precisely when the mean response of the year
two students improves—that is, it tends towards the ideal response. These happen
in the cases of statement 3 (3.43 improves to 3.74 tending to the ideal 5), statement
872 D. Almeida

Mean Mean Mean Overall

response of response of response of mean of
Ideal 351 year 1 117 year 2 5 year 3 the 473
Statement response students students students students

1. A proof in mathematics is
diVerent from other kinds of
proof. 5 3.38 3.24 1.6 3.32
2. A proof in mathematics both
veriŽ es and explains. 5 3.31 3.36 2.8 3.32
3. If a result in mathematics is
proved I can be certain that
it is true. 5 3.43 3.74 2.4 3.5
4. Examples illustrating a
result do not always help me
understand why the result
is true. 3 3.26 3.32 3.8 3.28
5. Proof is essential in pure
mathematics. 5 3.91 4 3.8 3.93
6. In mathematics evidence
from examples tells you
what is true. 1 2.53 2.27 1 2.45
7. I can’ t see the point of doing
proofs: all the results in the
course have already been
proved beyond doubt by
famous mathematicians. 5 2.27 2.14 2.2 2.24
8. Proofs sometimes involve
strategies that are not at all
obvious. 5 4.26 4.32 4.6 4.28
9. If a result in mathematics is
obviously true then there’ s no
point in proving it. 5 2.59 2.45 2.8 2.56
10. I like doing proofs in
mathematics. 5 2.46 2.41 2.4 2.46
11. I am conŽ dent in my ability
to prove results for myself. 5 2.54 2.35 2 2.49
12.Working through a proof of
a result helps me to under-
stand why it is true. 5 3.65 3.66 4 3.66
13. Reading through a proof of a
result in a textbook helps me
to understand why it is true. 1 3.18 2.92 2.8 3.11
14. DiVerent proofs of a theorem
help me to understand it
better. 5 3.46 3.41 3.4 3.44
15. A proof in mathematics
depends on other mathe-
matical results. 5 3.72 4.06 3.6 3.81
16. It is easier to disprove than
to prove. 3 3.81 3.74 3.4 3.79

Table 1.
 Á Year 1 ! Á Year 2 !

Test Critical
statistic value
for at 2.5%
diVerence level
Statement Mean Variance Mean Variance of means ˆ §1:96

1. A proof in mathematics is diVerent from other kinds of proof. 3.38 1.26 3.24 1.67 1.047 485 026 Not signiŽ cant
2. A proof in mathematics both veriŽ es and explains. 3.31 1.25 3.36 1.25 70.418 927 2 Not signiŽ cant
3. If a result in mathematics is proved I can be certain that
it is true. 3.43 1.42 3.74 1.44 72.424 148 98 SigniŽ cant
4. Examples illustrating a result do not always help me understand
why the result is true. 3.26 1.37 3.32 1.45 70.470 009 67 Not signiŽ cant
5. Proof is essential in pure mathematics. 3.91 1.06 4 1.22 70.776 113 2 Not signiŽ cant
6. In mathematics evidence from examples tells you what
is true. 2.53 1.43 2.27 1.11 2.232 664 309 SigniŽ cant
7. I can’ t see the point of doing proofs: all the results in the course
have already been proved beyond doubt by famous
mathematicians. 2.27 1.26 2.14 1.31 1.069 087 451 Not signiŽ cant
8. Proofs sometimes involve strategies that are not at all obvious. 4.26 0.69 4.32 0.63 70.699 833 87 Not signiŽ cant
9. If a result in mathematics is obviously true then there’ s no point
in proving it. 2.59 1.32 2.45 1.34 1.135 039 474 Not signiŽ cant
10. I like doing proofs in mathematics. 2.46 1.35 2.41 1.21 0.419 767 578 Not signiŽ cant
11. I am conŽ dent in my ability to prove results for myself. 2.54 1 2.35 0.99 1.786 5365 51 Not signiŽ cant
Undergraduates’ interaction with proof

12. Working through a proof of a result helps me to understand why

it is true. 3.65 0.94 3.66 0.88 70.099 017 52 Not signiŽ cant
13. Reading through a proof of a result in a textbook helps me
to understand why it is true. 3.18 1.15 2.92 1 2.391 128 181 SigniŽ cant
14. DiVerent proofs of a theorem help me to understand it better. 3.46 0.92 3.41 0.95 0.482 450 641 Not signiŽ cant
15. A proof in mathematics depends on other mathematical
results. 3.72 0.76 4.06 0.59 74.004 720 5 SigniŽ cant
16. It is easier to disprove than to prove. 3.81 0.88 3.74 0.95 0.679 042 853 Not signiŽ cant

Table 2.
873
874 D. Almeida

Statement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

PMCC 70.1 0.04 0.1 70 0.04 70.1 70 0.07 70 70 0.12 70 0 0 70.1 0.06

Table 3. Product moment correlation coeYcients between year 1 students’ responses and
A level grades.

Statement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

PMCC 70.1 0.05 0.16 70.1 0 70 70 0.09 70.1 70.1 0.08 70.170.1 0.04 70.1 70

Table 4. Product moment correlation coeYcients between year 2 students’ responses and
A level grades.

6 (2.53 improves to 2.27 tending to the ideal 1), statement 13 (3.18 improves to
2.92 tending to the ideal 1), and 15 (3.72 improves to 4.06 tending to the ideal 5).
The improved response of statement 15 is notable not only for its numerical
increase toward the ideal but also for its content—the students appear to have a
deeper understanding of the deductive structure of mathematical results. Overall
this statistical test suggests that the additional experiences of the year 2 students in
undergraduate mathematics have given them a deeper understanding about proof.
Interestingly the students’ perceptions about proof do not appear to bear any
relation to ability as judged by grades achieved in A level examinations. When the
product moment correlation coeYcients (PMCC) between A level grades and
responses was computed for year 1 and year 2 undergraduates little correlation is
found as indicated in tables 3 and 4.
On the other hand there appears to be marked and idiosyncratic diVerences
from year 2 to year 3. For example, the mean response of the year 3 under-
graduates to statement 3 (If a result in mathematics is proved I can be certain that
it is true) is ‘disagree’ and is a marked change from the ‘agree’ response of the year
2 undergraduates. Due to the small sample of year 3 students we do not feel that it
is justiŽ ed to conduct any signiŽ cance tests. Further no qualitative evidence was
gathered from these students so the reasons for their responses remain unknown
but such idiosyncratic perceptions about proof have been found earlier [6].

4. Qualitative analysis of interviews

As stated earlier in the methodology, 25 undergraduates volunteered to
complete the proof preference questionnaire and to be interviewed. The 25
undergraduates who volunteered to be interviewed were asked also to discuss
the reasons for their responses in the ‘proof preference’ questionnaire. An analysis
of these responses indicates that the students’ perceptions about proof may be
categorized by four types:
Type A: The student accepts the need for working with formal proof and for
rejecting informal proof, but is unable to live up the demands of rigour in his/her
own proof practices.
Type B: The student accepts the need for formal proof but provisionally uses
informal proof practices till s/he becomes adept at formal ones.
 Undergraduates’ interaction with proof 875

Type C: The student accepts intuitive and empirical arguments as proof. Views
formal proof in terms of passing examinations.
Type D: The student accepts the need for formal proof but is generally only able to
view this as symbol manipulation. Lack of understanding leads to disaVection with
proof.
To describe these categories the interview transcripts of the four students whose
responses best approximate to these categories are analysed below.
The type A student: This student, a year 1 undergraduate, had had some limited
experiences of proof in the 16–18 phase in school. His recollections of proving at
school were expressed as follows:
It wasn’ t, you know, serious proving. . .we weren’ t actually taught formal
proofs ever, but sometimes they (the teachers) would sort of hint at it.
However his two terms of undergraduate experience had given him a perception of
proof that appeared to be formal. His position was that informal proofs were liable
to be faulty while formal proofs were immune to error. He added that, while he
had diYculties in engaging with formal proof, he saw no place for visual or
informal arguments in proofs. Interesting this did not extend to concepts and
deŽ nitions.
. . . I Ž nd it helpful to draw a few diagrams to myself, just roughly, to see
what was being explained (in the concepts and deŽ nitions)
This formal perception about proof seemed to guide his responses to the ‘proof
preference’ questionnaire (see the appendix). For example he found the formal
‘proofs’ to statements A (proof 3), B (proof 2), C (proof 2) and D (proof 1) most
convincing. However, it is his preference for the visual proof 2 for statement E
which is surprising. In the proof questionnaire he wrote that this proof was ‘clear’
and that there were ‘no possible arguments’ against it. This appeared to sit
uneasily with his view that a proof was a proof only if it was formal. When this
was brought to his attention, he explained that this type of proof worked at the
level of undergraduates but they ought to aim for the error free formal proofs as
practiced by professional mathematicians.
. . . I think that would be a proof but only on a certain level—I don’ t think, if
you had a really top mathematician who was asked to prove that, I don’ t think
that’ s the way he would do it because I think that’ s quite a basic way of doing
it, I just think that—if you do it with algebra, it’ s more certain. . .I’ m just
trying to get across the fact that if you do it with algebra, say, there’ s going to
be no error, well hopefully.
The type B student: This student had entered university with a school
experience with relatively little proving in mathematics; in her own words there
was ‘no proof at GCSE and just a little at A level’ . After two terms of under-
graduate mathematics she had been abruptly encultured into a particular way of
thinking about proof. She stated in interview that getting to grips with math-
ematical proof was one of the main transition problems she encountered on
entering university. For her mathematical proof was a new ‘concept’ that she
had to come to terms with. Despite the transitional problems, this student
appeared to have been reconciled to the idea of working with proof. She had
876 D. Almeida

developed a perception of proof that would have pleased the lecturers. A proof for
her was a series of deductions from axioms and from previously proved results;
mathematical proof was diVerent from proofs in non-mathematical domains in that
it was ‘rigorous’ . She described the aim of a mathematical proof thus:
You have a theorem, and then proof is really like a generalisation, it proves it
for all the values the theorem is valid for. That’ s the way I see it.
Like many students, she found formal proving diYcult because of the technical
diYculties involved. Another factor which appeared to make proofs diYcult for
her was the individualistic nature of mathematics as compared to other subjects.
. . . I Ž nd that in mathematics, I generally work by myself, where as some of
the other subjects I did at A level it was more beneŽ cial. To give an example,
English—we had lots of class discussions, but the way mathematics was
taught at A level and now, generally makes you individualistic, work by
yourself.
Despite the diYculties she had encountered with formal proof she felt that, in the
long run, she would be able to prove formally. However she needed to know more
mathematics, have a greater exposure to the concept of proof, and have more
practice with the diVerent ways of proving before she could overcome these
diYculties.
In the meantime, while she worked towards being proŽ cient in proving
formally, she had strong views on the role of visual aspects in proving (and in
understanding concepts and deŽ nitions). She believes that the visual proof
provided the necessary insight and motivation for her to seek out the ‘tedious’
rigorous proof.
. . . the way I learn or teach myself in my own time, I like to intuitively
understand problems. (A visual proof) would convince me intuitively and
that would motivate me to go on and actually do a proper proof . . . A formal
one—that’ s more respectable to the mathematical establishment.
Her inclination to construct visual proofs also applies to understanding proofs in
lectures and textbooks. In textbooks she felt that visual cues as well as diVerent
perspectives helped her to understand proofs. She commented:
I Ž nd that some (text books) give pictures. They give examples and perhaps
sometimes just to see another way, perhaps a concept written from a diVerent
point of view, sometimes helps.
Her current proof practices were evident in her responses to the ‘proof preference’
questionnaire. She found the visual proofs to statements C (proof 1) and E (proof
1) the most convincing. The only reason why she did not say the same for
statement B was simply because she could not understand the logic employed in
the visual proof (proof 1). She further added said she presently used visual aids and
examples because of the importance of understanding rather than accepting
mathematical knowledge.
I think just to take the theorems that a lecturer gives you, or you’ re told in a
lecture, that it’ s a bit naive, unless you’ ve actually gone through it and
understand the proofs.
 Undergraduates’ interaction with proof 877

The type C student: This second year undergraduate had come from a back-
ground of moderate proving during his ‘A’ level mathematics studies. During
interview he professed a desire to undertake teacher training upon the completion
of the degree. From his statements in interview, his view of mathematical proof
appeared not to have been in uenced, thus far, by the degree course. He seemed
not to subscribe to the idea of proof as an abstract thought experiment. He saw
very little diVerence between proof in mathematics and proofs in other domains:
. . . a proof is a proof. Once you’ ve got all the background to it, all the facts
and all, and they add up to give you what you want, then it’ s proved. It’ s just
like anything—like facts in history or something like that.
Nevertheless he did concede that there might be a danger of error with inductive
arguments in mathematics:
It could be completely wrong for another case. It maybe right for the Ž rst
couple but one or two after that, it may just completely go wrong.
However, commenting on his present experience, he was not sure that proofs were
essential in pure mathematics—he reasoned that the passive way in which the
students received the proofs of results, usually by copying them down from the
chalk board, served very little purpose except passing examinations. In contrast,
looking forward to his ambition to be a teacher, he saw that doing proofs in the
classroom would teach pupils not to just accept results on face value but to think
critically for themselves.
He was not averse to using visual arguments when proving results. He would
use diagrams to exemplify arguments on the occasions he would try to prove
formally. The simultaneous use of formal and informal practices had an idiosyn-
cratic side-eVect; when asked whether, in these instances, he would check his
formal proofs by verifying them in speciŽ c cases he replied:
I would, yes, maybe. . .a couple of values close and some far out values, I
would do this—yes.
That he had not yet, in actuality, become accustomed to the idea of proving
formally was further evidenced in his responses to the ‘proof preference’ ques-
tionnaire where he judged the visual proofs to statements B (proof 1) and E (proof
2) to be the most convincing. He did not judge the visual proof to statement C to
be so because the consideration of inŽ nity implies that ‘it does not prove the
result’ ; here he found proof 2 to be the most convincing (this proof is incorrect
precisely because of considerations of inŽ nity).
The type D student: This second year undergraduate had arrived at university
with high achievement in the Mathematics and Further Mathematics A level
examinations. He had had some proof work in the Further Mathematics course
which had prepared him a little for mathematics study at university. By the time he
arrived at university he had developed a positive attitude toward proof and
understanding mathematics:
I did further maths A level, not just the ordinary maths, and in the further
you did actually look at why the diVerential equations work, . . . I was able to
see why it was doing it. And for me, that made me feel better about it, rather
than, just blindly writing down the answer.
878 D. Almeida

Despite this he felt that he had some problems in adjusting to the new way of doing
proofs. He explained during interview that this related mainly to the new
terminology and the use of symbols. He said that, despite explanations oVered,
he could not come to terms with the use of new symbols until the second year.

That’ s another thing . . . I know that symbols like ‘for all’ and ‘there exists’
are used (in proofs). . . I kept seeing them, they kept saying what they were,
but it just took me a while for them to sink in, what they meant.

One of the possible reasons for his diYculties with the new way of doing math-
ematics appears to be his reliance on rote learning. It appeared that continual
regimented practice was his key to familiarisation with deŽ nitions and concepts. It
is revealing to describe his views on deŽ nitions with respect to the Euler
representation of the circular functions:

I’ ll have a mental picture, but I prefer to write down word for word . . . . . .
then I’ ll look at that deŽ nition I’ ve written and then recall on something in
my head as to how it looks. Like, um, we have a deŽ nition of the complex
Euler function and I will remember it word for word and then I sort of - but
in remembering it, sort of like it’ s e to the ix minus e to the minus ix over 2i
and would be sine. And I would remember it had a minus in the middle
because sine began with an s and subtract . . . . . . . . . . . . Just associate little
things like that with it, but as a deŽ nition. It’ s just something I learn, more or
less like that, parrot fashion, until it becomes not a deŽ nition but a theorem.

The development of concept images appears to have a place in his thinking but the
pace of learning appeared to subordinate this to the memorization of words. This
may have been the likely source for his diYculty with proving formally. Never-
theless he had a positive view of proofs which he maintained throughout the
interview but he felt that pure mathematics was a subject unnecessarily cluttered
with proofs. He did not doubt the need for proofs but claimed that mathematics
was really about applications. He found some of the proofs quite tedious and he
had begun to choose courses which avoided proofs.
Part of the reason why he found proofs tedious may be that, like his attitude
toward deŽ nitions and concepts, he adopted a routine rather than a process and felt
conŽ dent in being able to ‘reproduce’ a proof. When asked whether he occasionally
felt motivated to research books in the library with a view to Ž nding interesting
proofs of a result he replied in the negative:

No. It actually motivates me not to. I look at a proof; say ‘that’ s really boring’
so I won’ t actually want to do anything more with that proof. If anything it
makes me want to just forget it.

His responses to the proof questionnaire revealed that he had disagreed with
statement ‘the examples illustrating a result do not always help me to understand
why the result is true.’ Whilst discussing his response it emerged that he saw both
examples and visual aids as supporting his understanding of formal arguments:

And for me, following through that example will let me see why you get that
thing at the end. It’ ll just be following through the method again. And more
often that not, the example’ s right and the method follows the basis of the
 Undergraduates’ interaction with proof 879

proof. . .it just seems tedious to have to keep rearranging the algebra whereas
if you draw pictures, you’ ve got something to do. I know that sounds
completely stupid, but it’ s just something that appeals to my brain more.
He ended the interview by saying that, while he had got better at proving, he felt
that proofs which used diagrams were not only better for him but also ‘nicer to
learn’ . However it appears that he has kept his personal aYnities for the visual in
check and maintained a formal approach to proving in public. For example in the
proof preferences questionnaire he did not regard the visual proofs for statements
B (proof 1) and C (proof 1) as being the most convincing proofs. With respect to
statement E though he had, like almost all the students, considered the graphical
proof (proof 2) to persuasive claiming that ‘the graph gives no reason for doubt’ .
In summary, the responses from the interviews suggest that students felt that
informal arguments had a role in initiating, understanding, and constructing a
proof. Their responses to the ‘proof preferences’ questionnaire suggest that, in
some contexts, they were more convinced by visual proofs. The implications of
these Ž ndings are brie y discussed in the concluding section.

5. Commentary
From the questionnaire responses it seems that mathematics undergraduates
are keen to publicly declare their agreement with the notions of formal math-
ematical proof encountered upon entering university. On the other hand, in the
interview responses and in the responses to the ‘proof preferences’ questionnaire,
there is clear evidence that, privately at any rate, they deviate from the formal
position. Students appear to favour or not reject informal/visual methods of
proving—they appear to hold the view that these methods of arguing have a role
in developing their capacity to prove formally This inconsistent behaviour is
understandable given the lack of experience of proving at school level where the
only activity approximating to proof are inductive conŽ rmations of results [6] or
visual ‘action-proofs’ [11]. This behaviour may also be the result of the dichotomy
between the way mathematics is taught and the way mathematics is constructed by
mathematicians. We had pointed out earlier that the modus operandi for profes-
sional mathematicians tends to be: intuition ! trial and error ! speculation !
conjecture ! proof , but the way they teach undergraduates often focuses only on
the end point of the  ow. This focus may marginalize and hide from students the
inherent sense making activity in mathematics. Alibert and Thomas [13] put it this
way:
. . . (the) apparent con ict between the practice of mathematicians on the one
hand, and their teaching methods on the other creates problems for students.
They exhibit a lack of concern for meaning, a lack of appreciation of proof as
a functional tool and an inadequate epistemology. (p. 215)
880 D. Almeida

Whatever the actual diVerences between an undergraduate’ s prototypical proof

perceptions and a professional mathematician’ s idea of proof, this fact remains: the
student seeks to understand mathematics and to understand proofs. And how may
this understanding of proofs be achieved? It has been argued that more than logic
or deductive rules are required—the process may also require context bound
considerations, generic reasoning and conjectures which are cemented by logical
inferences [14]. Such considerations would be beneŽ cial to students whose proof
practices are at the formative stage (which involve informal argumentation). Such
a proposal for undergraduate instruction is not new, for Blum and Kirsch [15] and
Van Asch [16] have proposed that informal proofs (or Blum and Kirsch’ s preformal
proofs) be used in conjunction with formal proofs. However these elements are
often missing from proofs given in pure mathematics lectures.
The proposal for providing a ‘generic’ bridge to smooth the transition to
formal proof is given added relevance in the light of evidence that poor
concept images underlie some of the problems faced by students in proving
formally [4]—for there is visualization associated with good concept images [17].
Consequently the use of generic and visual argumentation prior to the delivery of
formal proofs in lectures can have the added beneŽ t of encouraging students to use
such devices in other aspects of mathematics such as concepts and deŽ nitions.
Reinforcement of concept images will, in turn, ameliorate their diYculties with
proving.

Appendix
Proof preference questionnaire
In this questionnaire a mathematical statement is followed by various ‘proofs’ .
The ‘proofs’ are not necessarily correct: some contain errors. In the space after
the proofs please do one of the following things:
a) If you have been introduced to the subject matter relating to the
statement then:
Decide which of the ‘proofs’ you Ž nd i) the most convincing ii) not convincing iii)
incorrect.
Give brief reasons for your choices. Make any additional comments you may feel
motivated to.
b) If you do not understand the subject matter relating to the statement
then write:
Do not understand this; cannot make a decision.
STATEMENT A : The sum of the angles of a plane triangle is 1808:
Assumptions/results that may have been used in the proofs:
R1. The sum of angles in a straight line about a point is 1808

b c
a d
 Undergraduates’ interaction with proof 881

a ‡ b ‡ c ‡ d ˆ 1808

R2. Alternate angles are equal

1. ‘Proof’ Consider a right angled triangle ABC

C

A B

We construct a line A 0 C parallel to AB through C

A´ C
a
c

a
A B

Using assumption R2 above, angle ACA 0 ˆ a and angle A 0 CB is a right angle.

Hence …a ‡ c† ˆ 908 (1)
Now any triangle PQR can be decomposed into two right angled triangles as show
below
P

p´ p

q r
Q R

From the above result …p 0 ‡ q† ˆ …p ‡ r† ˆ 908 ) …p ‡ p 0 † ‡ q ‡ r ˆ 1808 (2)

This proves the statement &

2. ‘Proof’ Consider the triangle ABC

C

A a b B
882 D. Almeida

Construct a triangle BCD with base BD on AB extended; label the angles d, e, and
f. Construct a line parallel to AB through C.

C
a c d
e

a b f d
A B D

The angles in bold can be labelled a and d because of assumption R2.

Using R1, …a ‡ c ‡ e ‡ d† ˆ 1808 and …b ‡ f† ˆ 1808. (1)
Therefore …a ‡ c ‡ e ‡ d† ‡ …b ‡ f † ˆ 3608. Or …a ‡ b ‡ c† ‡ …d ‡ e ‡ f† ˆ 3608 (2)
In other words 2£ sum of the angles of any triangle ˆ 3608 ) sum of the angles of
any triangle ˆ 1808
This proves the statement &

3. ‘Proof’ :
C
c

A a b B

Construct a line parallel to AB through C.

C

a c b

a b
A B

Then, by assumption R2, the alternate angles shown are equal. (1)
And by assumption R1, …a ‡ b ‡ c† ˆ 1808: (2)
This proves the statement &
 Undergraduates’ interaction with proof 883

STATEMENT B : No square number can have remainder 2 when divided by 3:

Assumption/result that may have been used in the proofs
R1 If a prime number p divides the product ab of two numbers then p divides a or
p divides b.

1. ‘Proof’ Every number n is either i) a multiple of 3; i.e. n ˆ 3k or ii) (a multiple

of 3) 1 1; i.e. n ˆ 3k 1 1 or iii) (a multiple of 3) 1 2; i.e. n ˆ 3k 1 2. The square
of the numbers in each of the cases can be shown pictorially:
i) ii) iii)
3k 3k 1 3k 2

9k2 9k2 3k 9k2 6k

3k 1 6k 4

The area of each sector is shown above

i) Total area ˆ 3…3k2 †

ii) Total area ˆ 3…3k2 ‡ 2k† ‡ 1
iii) Total area ˆ 3…3k2 ‡ 4k ‡ 1† ‡ 1
The diagrams show that area of each square never has remainder 2 when divided
by 3. This proves the statement &

2. ‘Proof’ Suppose that there is some square number n2 which has remainder 2
when divided by 3. Then
n2 ˆ 3k ‡ 2 for some positive number k …1†
Using equation (1) we have
n2 ¡ 1 ˆ 3k ‡ 1 …2†
) …n ¡ 1†…n ‡ 1† ˆ 3k ‡ 1 …3†
) …n ¡ 1†n…n ‡ 1† ˆ n…3k ‡ 1† …4†
884 D. Almeida

The left-hand side of (4) is a product of three consecutive numbers. One of these
must be a multiple of 3. So the left-hand side of (4) must be divisible by 3. But
then so must the right-hand side of (4): that is, n…3k ‡ 1† is divisible by 3. Because
…3k ‡ 1† is not divisible by 3, R1 informs us that n must be divisible by 3. But if n
is divisible by 3 then so is n2 . This contradicts (1).
The contradiction shows that no square number can have remainder 2 when
divided by 3. This proves the statement &

3. ‘Proof’ Consider the sum S of the Ž rst k odd numbers

S ˆ 1 ‡ 3 ‡ 5 ‡ ::: ‡ …2k ¡ 3† ‡ …2k ¡ 1† …1†
Reversing the order of the summation we have
S ˆ …2k ¡ 1† ‡ …2k ¡ 3† ‡ …2k ¡ 5† ‡ . . . ‡ 3 ‡ 1 …2†
Adding the corresponding terms of both expressions we get
2S ˆ 2k ‡ 2k ‡ 2k ‡ . . . ‡ 2k ‡ 2k …3†

or 2S ˆ 2k £ k: Thus S ˆ k2 …4†
That is, every square number is the sum of the Ž rst k odd numbers for some k. (5)
Further, the table below shows the remainders when the odd numbers are each
divided by 3:

Odd number 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 . . .

Remainder on division by 3 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 . . .

The table also shows that when the sum of the Ž rst k odd numbers is divided by 3
the remainder is
i) 1 when k ˆ …a multiple of 3)1 1 or when k ˆ …a multiple of 3)1 2,
ii) 0 when k ˆ a multiple of 3. (6)
In view of statement (5) and the preceding sentence we have proved the result &

4. ‘Proof’ Every integer is a product of primes.

So each integer squared is a product of primes with even powers. (1)
For example, n ˆ 2 £ 3 £ 52 implies n2 ˆ 22 £ 32 £ 54 .
The table below shows that every prime apart from 3 has remainder 2 or 1 when
divided by 3:

Table 1

prime 2 3 5 7 11 13 17 19 23 29 . . . . . .

Remainder on division by 3 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 . . . . . .
 Undergraduates’ interaction with proof 885

By squaring the remainders (or directly) we can see that the square of a prime
number has remainder 0 or 1 when divided by 3:

Table 2

prime 2 3 5 7 11 13 17 19 23 29 . .

prime squared 4 9 25 49 121 169 289 361 529 841 . .

Remainder when prime squared is divided by 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . .

Table 2 ) every even power of a prime number will have remainder 0 or 1 when
divided by 3. (2)
Statements (1) and (2) ) every square number will have remainder 0 or 1 when
divided by 3. (3)
And so the result is proved. &

STATEMENT C: …1 ‡ 1=2 ‡ 1=22 ‡ 1=23 ‡ . . . ‡ 1=2n † ! 2 as n ! 1

Assumptions/results that may have been used in the proofs: R1. If jaj < 1 then
an ! 0 as n ! 1
886 D. Almeida

1. Picture ‘proof’ : Let Sn ˆ 1 ‡ 1=2 ‡ 1=22 ‡ 1=23 ‡ . . . ‡ 1=2n .

S5 can be represented pictorially as a portion of 2 squares. S5 is 2 less a remainder
R5 as shown:

½2

1 ½

½4
½3
R5 = 2 - S5 ...... (1)

½5

Clearly the picture shows that R5 becomes smaller as n increases. That is, Rn ! 0
as n ! 1 (2)
It now follows that Sn ! 2 as n ! 1. This proves the statement &

2. ‘Proof’ : Let S ˆ 1 ‡ 1=2 ‡ 1=22 ‡ 1=23 ‡ . . . ‡ 1=2n ‡ . . . (1)

Multiplying both sides of equation (1) by 1/2 gives
S=2 ˆ 1=2 ‡ 1=22 ‡ 1=23 ‡ . . . ‡ 1=2n ‡ . . . …2†
Subtracting equation (2) from (1) gives: S=2 ˆ 1 ) S ˆ 2. This proves the
statement. &

3. ‘Proof’ : Let S ˆ 1 ‡ 1=2 ‡ 1=22 ‡ 1=23 ‡ . . . ‡ 1=2n ‡ . . . (1)

Now we can write S ˆ 1 ‡ …1=2 ‡ 1=22 ‡ 1=23 ‡ . . . ‡ 1=2n ‡ . . .† (2)
2 n¡1
or S ˆ 1 ‡ 1=2…1 ‡ 1=2 ‡ 1=2 ‡ . . . ‡ 1=2 ‡ . . .† (3)
The sum in brackets is S, so that S ˆ 1 ‡ S=2. Thus S=2 ˆ 1 or S ˆ 2. This
proves the statement. &

4. ‘Proof’ : Let Sn ˆ 1 ‡ 1=2 ‡ 1=22 ‡ 1=23 ‡ . . . ‡ 1=2n.

We have the identity …an‡1 ¡ bn‡1 †=…a ¡ b† ˆ …an ‡ an¡1 b ‡ an¡2 b2 ‡ . . . ‡ bn †
where a 6ˆ b. (1)
With a ˆ 1 and b ˆ 1=2 we have Sn ˆ …1 ¡ 1=2n‡1 †=…1 ¡ 1=2† ˆ 2…1 ¡ 1=2n‡1 †. (2)
R1 implies 1=2n‡1 ! 0 as n ! 1. Hence Sn ! 2 as n ! 1 (3)
This proves the statement. &
 Undergraduates’ interaction with proof 887

p
STATEMENT D: 6 is an irrational number.
Assumptions/results that may have been used in the proofs:
p p
R1 2 and 3 are each irrational.
R2 If a prime number p divides the product ab of two numbers then p divides a or
p divides b.
Other legitimate properties of integers and irrational numbers may also have been
used.
p p
1. ‘Proof’ Suppose 6 is rational. Let 6 ˆ m=n where m and n are integers with
no common factors.
Squaring and re-arranging gives 6n2 ˆ m2 . From this it follows that m2 is a
multiple of 6. (1)
It now follows that m is a multiple of 6. (2)
2 2 n2 2 n2
Let m ˆ 6k. Then 6n ˆ 36k . So that ˆ 6k . That is, is a multiple of 6. (3)
So n is a multiple of 6. (4)
This means that m and n have
p common factor 6 contradicting the hypothesis. The
contradiction shows that 6 cannot be rational. This proves the statement. &
p p p p p
2. ‘Proof’ : 6 ˆ 3 £ 2. By R1, 2 and 3 are each irrational. (1)
And the product of two irrational numbers is clearly irrational. (2)
p
Consequently 6 is irrational. This proves the statement. &
p p
3. ‘Proof’ Suppose 6 is rational. Suppose 6 ˆ m=n where m and n are integers
with no common factors.
Squaring and re-arranging gives 6n2 ˆ m 2 . Thus m2 is an even number. (1)
It follows that m is also even. (2)
2 2 2 2
Let m ˆ 2k. Then 6n ˆ 4k . Equivalently, 3n ˆ 2k . This means that 2 divides
3n2 . (3)
R2 implies that n2 is even. (4)
So we can conclude that n is even. (5)
888 D. Almeida

This means that m and n have common factor 2 contradicting the hypothesis. The
p
contradiction shows that 6 cannot be rational. This proves the statement. &

3x ‡ 4 p p
STATEMENT E: Given that y ˆ and 0 < x < 2: Then x < y < 2
2x ‡ 3
p
1. Students ‘Proof’ The largest possible value of x ˆ 2 which gives the largest
possible value of y. (1)
p
3 2‡4 p
So the largest y ˆ p ˆ 2. (2)
2 2‡3
p p
But x < 2 ; y < 2: (3)

3x ‡ 4
If y > x then y ˆ > x. It follows that 3x ‡ 4 > …2x ‡ 3†x as both 2x ‡ 3,
2x ‡ 3
3x ‡ 4 > 0 when x > 0. (4)
p
Rearranging the inequality gives 2x2 ¡ 4 < 0 which is true for x < 2: ; y > x is a
true statement. (5)
p
Equations (3) and …5† ) x < y < 2. This proves the statement &

3x ‡ 4 p
2. Picture ‘Proof’ Graphing y ˆ x and y ˆ for 0 < x < 2 produces this
2x ‡ 3
picture:
 Undergraduates’ interaction with proof 889
y

Ö 2

y = 3x+4
2x+3

0 x
Ö 2
p p
The graph shows that x < y < 2 when 0 < x < 2. This proves the state-
ment &

p p p
3. ‘Proof’ If x < 2 then 2 2x < 4. And then 3x ‡ 2 2x < 3x ‡ 4 (1)
p p p
If 0 < x < 2 then 0 < 2x < 2 2. This leads to 2x ‡ 3 < 2 2 ‡ 3 (2)
As both sides of the inequality (2) are positive, we now have
p
1=…2 2 ‡ 3† < 1=…2x ‡ 3† …3†
From (1) and (2) we have:
p
…3x ‡ 2 2x† …3x ‡ 4†
xˆ p < ˆy …4†
…2 2 ‡ 3† …2x ‡ 3†
3…2x ‡ 3† ¡ 2…3x ‡ 4† 1
Now dy=dx ˆ 2 ˆ : > 0. Thus y is an always increas-
…2x ‡ 3† …2x ‡ 3†2
ing function. (5)
p
p …3 2 ‡ 4† p
It follows that y…x† < y… 2† ˆ p ˆ 2 (6)
…2 2 ‡ 3†
p
(4) and …6† ) x < y < 2. This proves the statement. &

References
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[2] Ernest, P., 1991, The Philosophy of Mathematics Education (London: Falmer Press).
[3] MacLane, S., 1994, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 30, 178–207.
890 Undergraduates’ interaction with proof

[4] Moore, R. C., 1994, Educ. Studies Math., 27, 249–266.

[5] Kahn, P. E., and Hoyles, C. E., 1997, Studies in Higher Education, 22, 349–362.
[6] Coe, R., and Ruthven, K., 1994, Br. Educ. Res. J., 20, 41–53.
[7] Bell, A. W., 1979, Educ. Studies Math., 10, 361–387.
[8] Dearing, R., 1996, Review of QualiŽ cations for 16-19 year olds, SCAA.
[9] London Mathematical Society, 1995, Tackling the Mathematics Problem.
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[11] Almeida, D., 1996, Teaching Math. Applic., 14, 171–176.
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