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(Sp)oiling Domestic Terrorism? Boko Haram and State Response

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(Sp)oiling Domestic Terrorism? Boko

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Daniel E. Agbiboa
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Published online: 21 Aug 2013.

To cite this article: Daniel E. Agbiboa (2013) (Sp)oiling Domestic Terrorism? Boko Haram and State
Response, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 25:3, 431-438

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DOI: 10.1080/10402659.2013.816571

(Sp)oiling Domestic Terrorism? Boko

Haram and State Response
DANIEL E. AGBIBOA
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Since 1997, Africa has witnessed a significant increase in the number and
level of intensity of terrorist incidents. According to the incidents database
of the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), between
1997 and 2007 Africa recorded an estimated 522 acts of terrorism, resulting
in 8,477 injuries, and 2,614 fatalities. Tellingly, 73 percent of these terrorist
incidents were domestic while only about 27 percent were transnational, qual-
ifying Africa as a continent perpetually at war against itself. Despite the high
frequency of domestic terrorism in Africa, the many terrorism cleanup ini-
tiatives on the continent primarily concern transnational terrorism, especially
since the epochal events of 9/11.
What follows will be a Nigerian perspective of domestic terrorism in
Africa, with reference to the current terrorism of Boko Haram. Specifically,
we will examine the origins, demands, ideology, and modus operandi of Boko
Haram. In response, we will propose an alternative to the brutal, incendiary,
and counterproductive response of state security forces.

I n the African continent, defining terrorism has been a particularly difficult

task. In fact, most legal drafters avoid defining it but rather describe an “act
of terror” or “terrorist activity.” The 35th Ordinary Session of the Heads of
State and Government adopted the Organization of African Unity Convention
on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (Algiers Convention) in July
1999. Up to date, 46 of 53 African Union (AU) member states have signed
and 34 have ratified and acceded to the Convention. This seems to indicate
a level of consensus on the continent on what state actors consider to be a
terrorist act. Hence, the definition of “terrorist act” contained in the Algiers
Convention shall be employed as the working definition for this article. Thus,
according to the Organization of African Unity, “terrorist act” relates to an
“act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may
endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury
or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may
cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental

431
 432 DANIEL E. AGBIBOA

or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: Intimidate, put in fear,

force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public
or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or
abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public
or to create a public emergency; or create general insurrection in a State.”
Conceived in this way, acts of terrorism can therefore be carried out by
states, state actors, non-state actors, groups, or individuals in the attainment
of specific objectives or valued ideals. For the purposes of this essay, a brief
distinction between domestic (or sub-state) and transnational terrorism is ex-
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pedient. The former relates to those acts of terrorism that are carried out by
persons or local groups within the state that are meant to redress domestic
grievances. The latter relates to terrorist acts by persons or groups that are ex-
ternal to the affected state and whose objective is to advance an extraterritorial
cause.

T he military ruled Nigeria for nearly 30 years out of its first 40 years after
independence. Military governments were in power from 1966 to 1979
and from 1983 to 1999, with the exception of a 3-month period in 1993 that
saw an interim civilian administration. According to Aliyi Ekineh, “No other
country in Africa has been as coercively dominated for so long a period by
their own military as the people of Nigeria.” Thus, Nigeria may be properly
described as a classic example of a militarized state. Militarization consists of
the use of (or the threat of) violence to settle political conflicts, the violation
of human rights, extrajudicial killings, and the gross repression of the people.
“More often than not,” says Claude Ake, “the postcolonial state in Nigeria
presented itself as an apparatus of violence, and while its base in social forces
remained extremely narrow it relied unduly on coercion for compliance, rather
than authority.”
The culture of militarism implanted by the Nigerian state has been
reproduced by virtually all political formations or resistant movements (in
Nigeria’s history) that have developed to the point of directly pushing for
power as an immediate political project. The ongoing terrorism of Boko
Haram is a case in point. In July 2009, another radical Islamist group, Boko
Haram, emerged in northeastern Nigeria. The group, which officially calls
itself “Jama’atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda’wati wal Jihad” (People Committed
to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), has vowed to rid
Nigeria of its hopelessly corrupt and apostate ruling elite as well as institute
what it describes as religious purity. In the first 6 months of 2012 alone, Boko
Haram attacks have caused up to 1,500 deaths, according to Human Rights
Watch. The spate of attacks against churches from December 2011 through
July 2012 suggests a strategy of provocation through which the group seeks
to spark a large scale of sectarian conflict that will destabilize the country.
 (SP)OILING DOMESTIC TERRORISM? BOKO HARAM AND STATE RESPONSE 433

The term Boko Haram is derived from a combination of the Hausa word
for “book” (boko), and the Arabic word for “forbidden” (haram). Put together,
Boko Haram means “Western education is forbidden.” The group itself rejects
the designation “Western education is forbidden.” Instead, it prefers “Western
culture is forbidden.” The difference, as one of the group’s leaders clarified
and cited in Onuoha, is that “while the first gives the impression that we are
opposed to formal education coming from the West . . . which is not true, the
second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education),
for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western
education.”
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Boko Haram was first led by Mohammed Yusuf until he was killed by
state security forces just after the sectarian violence in Nigeria in July 2009,
which claimed over 1,000 lives. Yusuf was born on the January 29, 1970 in
Girgir, Yobe State, Nigeria. He received instruction in Salafi radicalism and
was greatly influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, an Islamic scholar (alim) from
Turkey. Members of Boko Haram comprise university lecturers, bankers,
political elites, drug addicts, unemployed graduates, almajiris, and migrants
from neighboring countries. The group’s members are also drawn from the
Kanuri tribe—roughly 4 percent of the population—who are located in the
northeastern states of Nigeria. In January 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan
warned that Boko Haram members and sympathizers were present at all levels
of government.

E mbedded in deep tradition of Islamism, the Boko Haram ideology is but

one of several variants of radical Islamism to have emerged in North-
ern Nigeria. Its adherents are purportedly influenced by the scriptural phrase
(TMQ 5: 44): “Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is
among the transgressors,” as cited in Thurston. Boko Haram is vehemently
opposed to what it sees as Western-based incursion that undermines and
erodes traditional values, beliefs, and customs among Muslim communities
in Northern Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf, told the BBC in 2009: “Western-
style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in
Islam.”
Boko Haram became a full-fledged insurgency following violent clashes
in 2009, between the Islamist group and the state’s security agency in Bauchi,
charged with the responsibility of enforcing a new law of wearing crash-
helmets by motorcyclists in the country. The confrontation began on June
11 in Maiduguri when the security agency and participants in a Boko Haram
funeral procession clashed over mourners’ refusal to wear motorcycle helmets.
Members of an anti-robbery task force comprised of military and police
personnel opened fire on the procession, killing 17 Boko Haram members.
Mohammed Yusuf demanded justice, but “the authorities neither investigated
the alleged excessive use of force nor apologized for the shooting.” On July
 434 DANIEL E. AGBIBOA

21, the state security forces also ransacked the group’s hideout in Bauchi and
materials for making explosives were confiscated.
Following this crackdown, the group mobilized its members for reprisal
attacks. On July 26, Boko Haram members burned down a police station in
Dutsen Tanshi, on the outskirts of Bauchi, resulting in the death of five Boko
Haram members with several injured police officers. In response, the military
and police raided a mosque and home in Bauchi where Boko Haram members
had regrouped, killing dozens of the group’s members. The police reported
that 52 Boko Haram members, two police officers, and a solider were killed
in the violence in Bauchi. Yusuf vowed revenge, saying he was ready to fight
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to the death in retaliation for the bloodletting of his followers. True to his
words, he and his followers launched coordinated attacks across Maiduguri
that night, attacking the police stations and homes of police officers.
In response, on July 28 and 29 Yusuf’s compound was shelled by the
Nigerian army and many of his followers were arrested, with at least several
dozen killed in police custody. On July 29, in Postiskum, state security forces
also raided the group’s hideout on the outskirts of town, killing at least 43 of
Yusuf’s followers. The riot was temporarily quelled on July 30 after Nigerian
forces captured, and later killed, Mohammed Yusuf. Following the death of
Yusuf, and the arrest of several of his followers, the group went underground.

F or many Boko Haram members, the extrajudicial killing of their founder

was the catalyst event that served to foment preexisting animosities to-
ward state security forces. In a video that was released in June 2010, Abubakar
Shekau—Yusuf’s second-in-command—announced that he had taken over
leadership of the group and vowed to avenge the deaths of its members.
Boko Haram followed through on its revenge mission by bombing the police
headquarters and the United Nations Headquarters (Abuja) in June 2011 and
August 2011, respectively. The group used petrol bombs, improvised explo-
sive devices, and armed assaults in these renewed violent attacks. Between
January and September 2012, at least 119 police officers were killed in sus-
pected Boko Haram attacks, more than in all of 2010 and 2011 combined.
According to Boko Haram leaders, these attacks are a direct response to the
extrajudicial killings by the police of Mohammed Yusuf and Boko Haram
members, as well as for other police abuses including “arbitrary arrest,” “tor-
ture,” and the “persecution” of its members. In a video message posted online
in January 2012, Shekau stated: “Everyone has seen what the security person-
nel have done to us. Everyone has seen why we are fighting with them.”
Following a string of Boko Haram bombings across northern Nigeria,
on December 3, 2011 President Goodluck Jonathan declared a State of Emer-
gency (SoE), which suspended constitutional guarantees in 15 areas of four
northern states. The SoE failed spectacularly to stem the tide of violent attacks
in the restive region. In fact, during the 6 months that the SoE was in effect,
 (SP)OILING DOMESTIC TERRORISM? BOKO HARAM AND STATE RESPONSE 435

the group carried out more attacks and killed more people than in all of 2010
and 2011 combined, according to Human Rights Watch. On June 21, 2012,
the U.S. State Department added Boko Haram’s most visible leader, Abubakar
Shekau, to the list of specially designated global terrorists. Khalid al Barnawi
and Abubakar Adam Kamba were also included in the list because of their
ties to Boko Haram and close links with Al Qaeda.
In the past, Nigerian officials have been criticized for being unable
to trace much of the funding that Boko Haram has received. In February
2012, however, recently arrested Boko Haram officials revealed that while
the organization initially relied on donations from members, its links with Al
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Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) opened it up to more funding from

groups in Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. The arrested officials further
divulged that other sources of funding included the Al Muntada Trust Fund
and the Islamic World Society. Also, a spokesman of Boko Haram revealed
that Kano State governor, Ibrahim Shekarau, and Bauchi State governor, Isa
Yuguda, had paid them monthly.
Boko Haram also derives its finances from robbing local banks. For
example, on January 12, 2010, four Boko Haram members attempted to rob a
bank in Bakori Local Government Area of Katsina State, according to the local
Police Commissioner Umaru Abubakar. On December 4, 2011, Bauchi Police
Commissioner, Ikechukwu Aduba, claimed that members of Boko Haram had
robbed local branches of Guaranty Trust Bank PLC and Intercontinental Bank
PLC. In addition, December 10, 2011, Mohammed Abdullahi, Central Bank
of Nigeria spokesman, claimed that, “[a]t least 30 bank attacks attributed to
Boko Haram have been reported this year.”

G iven their large-scale attacks that have spread serious ripples beyond the
shores of Nigeria, there is no doubt that Boko Haram’s activities have
generated a psychological impact that transcends the actual physical damage
caused. Boko Haram’s increasing sophistication of attacks and its adoption
of suicide car bombings may be a sign that the Islamist group is indeed
receiving tactical and operational assistance from a foreign militant group
like Al Qaeda. In association with Al Qaeda, Boko Haram could potentially
pose a threat not only domestically, but also transnationally since Nigeria is
Africa’s most populous country and the sixth largest oil-exporting country in
the world.
Unfortunately, the terrorism of Boko Haram has been fueled by the
terrorism of the Nigerian state, leaving little room for political dialogue or
maneuver. In the name of restoring order and policing domestic terrorism, the
Nigerian state established a special Joint Military Task Force (JTF) that has
been implicated in horrific human rights violations in northern communities.
In Bornu State, for example, JTF resorted to extralegal killings, dragnet
arrests, and intimidation of hapless residents. According to Solomon Hussein,
 436 DANIEL E. AGBIBOA

“Far from conducting intelligence-driven operations, the JTF simply cordoned

off areas and carried out house-to-house searches, at times shooting young
men in these homes.” These raids have become so common that parents
have advised their sons to flee as soon as they hear of an attack, based
on an interview with Ahmad Salkida. In Maiduguri, “[t]he security agents
increasingly see members of society as siding with the group.” Drawing on
its interviews with residents at Maiduguri, the Human Rights Watch reports
that: “During raids into communities soldiers have set fire to houses, shops,
and cars, randomly arrested men from the neighbourhood, and in some cases
executed them in front of their shops or houses.”
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The ironclad impunity of the Nigerian state is clearly fueling further

attacks and requires a change before the situation deteriorates any further.
According to Keller, “[a]n overreliance on intimidatory techniques not only
presents the image of a state which is low in legitimacy and desperately
struggling to survive, but also in the long run can do more to threaten state
coherence than to aid it.” To achieve sustainable peace in Northern Nigeria,
this article recommends a conflict resolution approach in northern Nigeria
that pursues a non-killing tactic of negotiation and political dialogue in lieu
of military crackdowns. This approach should also incorporate development,
security, and respect of the human rights of the citizenry. Recalling that in
the case of the Niger Delta insurgency, only a strategy of negotiation—the
Amnesty initiative—was able to douse the decades-old conflict in the region.
Finally, unless the individual is physically and socially protected within the
state, and unless the state refrains from flaunting power unjustly, sustainable
peace in northern Nigeria will remain an elusive dream.

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Daniel E. Agbiboa is a Ph.D. Scholar in the School of Sociology, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University. He is a well-published author in the field of Development Studies,
particularly its intersection with corruption, security, and development. His work has appeared in var-
ious top journals, including Third World Quarterly, Africa Today, Peace Research, Harvard Africa
Policy Journal, as well as Conflict, Security and Development. E-mail: danielagbiboa@gmail.com;
daniel.agbiboa@anu.edu.au

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