PIANDIONG ET AL V.

THE PHILIPPINES
CCPR/C/70/D/869/1999
19 October 2000

FACTS:

Piandiong and Morallos were arrested on 27 February 1994, on suspicion of having participated,
on 21 February 1994, in the robbery of passengers of a jeepney in Caloocan City, during which one of the
passengers, a policeman, was killed. After arriving in the police station, Piandiong and Morallos were hit in
the stomach in order to make them confess, but they refused. During a line up, the eyewitnesses failed to
recognize them as the robbers. The police then placed them in a room by themselves, and directed the
eyewitnesses to point them out. No counsel was present to assist the accused. During the trial, Piandiong,
Morallos and Bulan testified under oath, but the judge chose to disregard their testimony, because of lack
of independent corroboration.

Counsel further complains that the death sentence was wrongly imposed, because the judge
considered that an aggravating circumstance existed, as the crime was committed by more than three
armed persons. However, this was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, counsel states that the
judge should have taken into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, since they came
with the police without resisting. Counsel further states that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses deserved
no credence, because the eyewitnesses were close friends of the deceased and their description of the
perpetrators did not coincide with the way they actually looked. Counsel also states that the judge erred
when he did not give credence to the alibi defence. Finally, counsel complains that the death penalty was
unconstitutional and should not have been imposed for anything but the most heinous crime.

On 7 November 1994, Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan were convicted of robbery with homicide and
sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The Supreme Court denied the appeal,
and confirmed both conviction and sentence by judgement of 19 February 1997. Further motions for
reconsideration were denied on 3 March 1998. After the execution had been scheduled, the Office of the
President granted a three-month reprieve of execution. No clemency was however granted and counsel
presented a communication to the Committee under the Optional Protocol. The Committee transmitted the
communication to the State party with a request to provide information and observations in respect of both
admissibility and merits of the claims. The State party was also requested not to carry out the death
sentence against Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan, while their case was under consideration by the
Committee. The Committee was informed by counsel that a warrant for execution had been issued. After
having contacted the State party’s representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva, the Committee
was informed that the executions would go ahead as scheduled, despite the Committee’s request, since
the State party was of the opinion that the Authors received a fair trial. Counsel for the Authors filed a
petition with the Supreme Court seeking an injunction, which was refused by the Court. However, Messrs.
Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan were executed by lethal injection. Counsel argues that Authors considered
resort to the President as a domestic remedy necessary for them to exhaust before presenting their
communication to the Human Rights Committee. They argue therefore that it was not improper for them to
wait until it became clear that clemency was not going to be granted. With respect to the State party’s
argument that clemency could not be granted because the crime could not be considered as poverty driven,
counsel notes that Messrs. Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan disputed the very finding of their supposed
authorship of the crime.

With regard to the State party’s argument that the Supreme Court has ruled the death penalty and
method of execution constitutional, counsel argues that the Supreme Court’s judgement deserves to be
reconsidered.
ISSUE/S:

1. The Human Rights Committee must decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol
to the Covenant.
2. Whether or not the accused were identified in Court by the eyewitnesses and that this identification was
sufficient.
3. Whether or not the courts of States parties, and not for the Committee, shall evaluate facts and evidence
in a particular case, and shall interpret the relevant domestic legislation.
4. Whether or not the crime for which they were convicted was a most serious crime as stipulated by article
6(2), and whether the re-introduction of the death penalty in the Philippines is in compliance with the State
party’s obligations under article 6(1) (2) and (6) of the Covenant.

RULING:
1. The Committee notes that the State party has not raised any objections to the admissibility of the
communication. The Committee is not aware of any obstacles to the admissibility of the communication and
accordingly declares the communication admissible and proceeds without delay with the consideration of
the merits
2. Counsel has claimed that the identification of Messrs. Piandiong and Morallos by eyewitnesses during
the police line-up was irregular, since the first time around none of the eyewitnesses recognized them, upon
which they were put aside in a room and policemen directed the eyewitnesses to point them out. The Court
rejected their claim in this respect, as it was uncorroborated by any disinterested and reliable witness.
3. The Committee reiterates that it is for the courts of States parties, and not for the Committee, to evaluate
facts and evidence in a particular case, and to interpret the relevant domestic legislation. There is no
information before the Committee to show that the decisions by the courts were arbitrary or that they
amounted to denial of justice. In the circumstances, the Committee finds that the facts before it do not
reveal a violation of the Covenant in this respect.
4. The Committee is not in a position to address these issues, since neither counsel nor the State party has
made submissions in this respect.

The Human Rights Committee of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, is of the view that it cannot make a finding of a violation of any of the articles of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In the circumstances, the Committee finds that the facts
before it does not reveal a violation of the Covenant in this respect. The Committee reiterates its conclusion
that the State committed a grave breach of its obligations under the Protocol by putting the alleged victims
to death before the Committee had concluded its consideration of the communication.