To Explore & Propose Suitable

Monitoring Technique (CBM) For HV

Circuit Breaker(s) At CNPGS & KANUPP
Site

by

Ammara Akram

Thesis submitted to the faculty of PIEAS in partial fulfillment of

requirements for the MS Nuclear Power Engineering

Karachi Institute of Power Engineering

Karachi
November, 2019
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This page is left intentionally blank.

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Karachi Institute of Power Engineering

Karachi

Declaration of Originality
I hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis and the intellectual content of this
thesis are the product of my own work. This thesis has not been previously published
in any form nor does it contain any verbatim of the published resources which could be
treated as infringement of the international copyright law.

I also declare that I do understand the terms ‘copyright’ and ‘plagiarism,’ and
that in case of any copyright violation or plagiarism found in this work, I will be held
fully responsible of the consequences of any such violation.

Signature:

Name: Ammara Akram

Date:

Place: KINPOE
 iv

Certificate of Approval

This is to certify that the work contained in this thesis entitled

“To Explore & Propose Suitable Monitoring Technique (CBM)

For HV Circuit Breaker(s) At CNPGS & KANUPP Site”
was carried out by

Ammara Akram

under our supervision and that in our opinion, it is fully adequate, in scope and
quality, for the degree of MS Nuclear Power Engineering

Approved:

Signature: __________________________
Supervisor: Dr. Abdul Rehman Abbasi, PE

Signature: ________________________
Co-Supervisor: Dr. Qamar Saeed, DCE

Verified:

Signature: ________________________________
Director, Karachi Institute of Power Engineering
 v

Dedication
This research work is dedicated to my parents who have always supported me
since the beginning of my studies. Thank you for your unconditional support
with my studies. Thank you for providing me with a chance to prove and improve
myself through all walks of life.
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Acknowledgement
First, I thank Almighty Allah, who gave me the strength and the endurance to go
through the most challenging yet the most important period of my academic career and
allowed me to complete this project and this report. I am also very much thankful to my
supervisor Dr. Abdul Rehman Abbasi, PE, who helped me in every phase of this project.
Above all, profoundest thanks to my dear parents whose utmost devotion, love,
cooperation and commitment were the major essence in making my project a success.
May God bless them all. Ameen.

Ammara Akram
 vii

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...................................................................................................................VI
CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................................ VII
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................................IX
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................ X
ABSTRACT ..........................................................................................................................................XI
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT ................................................................................................................ 1
1.2 OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................................ 2
1.3 METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................................... 2
1.4 IMPORTANCE OF THE PROJECT .................................................................................................... 2
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................................................................... 4
2.1 SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ........................................................... 4
2.2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OPERATING EXPERIENCE WITH CIRCUIT BREAKERS ......................... 5
2.3 CIRCUIT BREAKERS .................................................................................................................... 5
2.4 FUNDAMENTALS OF HIGH VOLTAGE CIRCUIT BREAKERS........................................................... 6
2.4.1 Functions and Components of HV Circuit-Breakers ........................................................ 6
2.4.2 Arc Interruption ................................................................................................................ 8
2.5 CIRCUIT-BREAKER CLASSIFICATION .......................................................................................... 9
2.5.1 Circuit-breaker types by voltage class: ........................................................................... 10
2.5.2 Circuit-breaker types by installation: .............................................................................. 10
2.5.3 Circuit-breaker types by external design: ....................................................................... 10
2.5.4 Circuit-breaker types by interrupting medium: .............................................................. 12
2.5.5 Circuit-breaker types by operation: ................................................................................ 12
2.6 TYPES OF CIRCUIT-BREAKERS .................................................................................................. 12
2.6.1 Oil Circuit-Breakers ....................................................................................................... 12
2.6.2 Air-Blast Circuit-Breakers .............................................................................................. 14
2.6.3 Vacuum Circuit-Breakers ............................................................................................... 15
2.6.4 SF6 Circuit-Breakers ...................................................................................................... 16
2.7 MAINTENANCE METHODS OF CIRCUIT BREAKER...................................................................... 19
CHAPTER 3 FAILURES, TESTING AND ADJUSTMENTS ................................................... 21
3.1 TOP FAILURES OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS AND CAUSES................................................................. 21
3.1.1 Loose Connections ......................................................................................................... 21
3.1.2 Insulation Breakdown ..................................................................................................... 22
3.1.3 Moisture Intrusion .......................................................................................................... 24
3.1.4 Breaker Raking ............................................................................................................... 24
3.1.5 Faulty Ground Fault Protection ...................................................................................... 25
3.2 BASIC MAINTENANCE ACTIONS OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS ........................................................... 25
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CHAPTER 4 CIGRE RELIABILITY SURVEYS ....................................................................... 28

4.1 SUMMARY OF RELIABILITY SURVEYS OF HV CIRCUIT-BREAKERS BY CIGRE ......................... 29
4.2 GIS RELIABILITY SURVEYS ....................................................................................................... 31
CHAPTER 5 AGING FAILURE MODEL OF BREAKER ........................................................ 34
5.1 AGING FAILURES OF HV BREAKERS .......................................................................................... 34
5.2 AGING FAILURE MODEL BASED ON CONDITION MONITORING ............................... 35
5.2.1 Condition Monitoring Parameters .................................................................................. 36
5.2.2 Wear-Out Index .............................................................................................................. 38
5.2.3 Aging Failure Rate Model .............................................................................................. 40
CHAPTER 6 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK FOR SUBSTATION ................... 43
6.1 INCORPORATING CB AGING FAILURES IN SUBSTATION RELIABILITY
ASSESSMENT.................................................................................................................................. 43
6.1.1 Failure Model of a CB .................................................................................................... 43
6.1.2 Failure Model of Other Components .............................................................................. 46
6.1.3 Substation Reliability Assessment Method .................................................................... 46
CHAPTER 7 CASE STUDY; CALCULATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS .............................. 48
7.1 SUBSTATION CONfiGURATION ................................................................................................... 48
7.2 AGING ANALYSIS OF THE CB .................................................................................................... 49
7.3 RESULTS IN SUBSTATION RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT ............................................................... 51
7.4 RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS: ................................................................................................. 53
CHAPTER 8 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF CIRCUIT BREAKER ....................................... 56
8.1 BY VARYING TIME PARAMETERS ............................................................................................... 56
8.2 BY VARYING PRESSURE: ........................................................................................................... 58
8.3 BY VARYING MOISTURE: .......................................................................................................... 58
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................... 59
9.1 VALUE OF WORK ....................................................................................................................... 59
9.2 MODEL LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................................ 60
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 61
ANNEXURE-I ...................................................................................................................................... 64
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List of Figures
FIGURE 2-1 THE PLASMA CHANNEL OF ELECTRIC ARC [9] ......................................................................... 9
FIGURE 2-2 THE POTENTIAL DISTRIBUTION ALONG AN ARC CHANNEL ...................................................... 9
FIGURE 2-3 DEAD TANK CIRCUIT-BREAKER (SOURCE: MANITOBA, CANADA) ........................................ 11
FIGURE 2-4 LIVE TANK CIRCUIT-BREAKER (SOURCE: ABB AG, SWITZERLAND ..................................... 11
FIGURE 2-5 BULK OIL CIRCUIT-BREAKER (SOURCE: ALLIS CHALMERS LTD.) ......................................... 13
FIGURE 2-6 AIR BLAST DIRECTION: (A) AXIAL DIRECTION, (B) CROSS DIRECTION ................................... 14
FIGURE 2-7 AIR-BLAST CIRCUIT-BREAKER (SOURCE: STRATHAVEN SUBSTATION, LANARKSHIRE) ......... 15
FIGURE 2-8 CONTACTS OF VACUUM CIRCUIT-BREAKER [12] ................................................................... 16
FIGURE 2-9 ARC INTERRUPTION PRINCIPLE OF SELF-BLAST CIRCUIT-BREAKERS SOURCE: (SIEMENS) .. 18
FIGURE 3-1 INFRARED DETECTION OF HEAT GENERATION FROM A LOOSE CONNECTION ON TOP WIRE [8]22
FIGURE 3-2 LOCALIZED PARTIAL DISCHARGE FAILURE AT TERMINATION [9].......................................... 23
FIGURE 3-3 GOOD INSULATION (TOP LEFT) WITH HYDROPHILIC SURFACES WORSEN PROGRESSIVELY .... 24
FIGURE 3-4 SEVERE BREAKER DAMAGE CAUSED BY IMPROPER RACK-IN OPERATION [10] ..................... 25
FIGURE 4-1 CAUSES OF MAJOR FAILURES OF HV SINGLE PRESSURE SF6 CIRCUIT-BREAKERS................. 30
FIGURE 4-2 CAUSES OF MINOR FAILURES OF HV SINGLE PRESSURE SF6 CIRCUIT-BREAKERS ................. 30
FIGURE 4-3 CAUSES OF MAJOR FAILURES IN GIS [13] ............................................................................ 31
FIGURE 4-4 DISTRIBUTION OF CAUSES OF FAILURES OF SF6 AND MINIMUM OIL CIRCUIT BREAKERS WITH
HYDRAULIC ACTUATORS [14] ........................................................................................................ 32

FIGURE 4-5 DISTRIBUTION OF CAUSES OF FAILURES OF SF6 AND MINIMUM OIL CIRCUIT BREAKERS WITH
MECHANICAL ACTUATORS [14] ...................................................................................................... 32

FIGURE 4-6 DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROL CIRCUIT FAILURES BY COMPONENT FOR SF6 CIRCUIT-BREAKERS
[15]. .............................................................................................................................................. 32
FIGURE 5-1 METHODOLOGY OF AGING FAILURE MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND SUBSTATION RELIABILITY
ASSESSMENT .................................................................................................................................. 35

FIGURE 5-2 CLOSING COIL CURRENT OF CB ............................................................................................ 37

FIGURE 5-3 VOLTAGE JUMP POINTS OF CONTACTS A AND B IN CLOSING ................................................... 37
FIGURE 6-1 FOUR-STATE MARKOV MODEL OF A CB CONSIDERING AGING FAILURE................................ 44
FIGURE 6-2 EQUIVALENT THREE-STATE MODEL OF A CB ........................................................................ 45
FIGURE 7-1 NETWORK OF THE 220/110-KV SUBSTATION ........................................................................ 48
FIGURE 7-2 EENS CONTRIBUTION DUE TO AGING FAILURE OF CBS........................................................ 54
FIGURE 7-3 EDC DUE TO AGING FAILURE OF CBS ................................................................................... 55
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List of Tables
TABLE 2-1 CLASSIFICATION OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS BASED ON DIFFERENT.............................................. 10
TABLE 2-2 OVERVIEW OF MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES ............................................................................ 20
TABLE 3-1 MAIN COMPONENT, FAILURE MODES, INSPECTION TESTS AND MAINTENANCE OF CIRCUIT
BREAKERS...................................................................................................................................... 27

TABLE 5-1 LOWER AND UPPER LIMITS OF CLOSING ACTION TIMES ....................................................... 38
TABLE 5-2 LOWER AND UPPER LIMITS OF INSULATION PARAMETERS .................................................... 38
TABLE 7-1 LOADS SUPPLIED BY THE SUBSTATION ................................................................................... 49
TABLE 7-2 CONDITION MONITORING DATA OF CBS ................................................................................. 49
TABLE 7-3 NORMALIZED CONDITION DATA, OVERALL CONDITION INDICES AND WEAR-OUT INDICES OF
THE CBS ........................................................................................................................................ 50

TABLE 7-4 NATURAL AGES, FUNCTIONAL AGES AND WEAR-OUT INDICES AND AGING FAILURE RATES OF
THE CBS ........................................................................................................................................ 51

TABLE 7-5 RELIABILITY DATA OF COMPONENTS NOT CONSIDERING AGING FAILURES ............................ 51
TABLE 7-6 RELIABILITY DATA OF COMPONENTS CONSIDERING AGING FAILURES .................................... 52
TABLE 7-7 EENS CONTRIBUTION DUE TO THE AGING FAILURE OF EACH CB (MWH/YEAR) .................... 52
TABLE 7-8 ESTIMATED DAMAGE COST ................................................................................................... 54
 xi

Abstract
High voltage circuit breakers play a key role in safe, reliable and effective performance
of power system. High voltage circuit breakers (CBs) in nuclear power plants (NPPs)
are one of the costly equipment and their importance can never be underestimated. They
play key role in exporting and importing electric power. So, their maintenance should
be carried out periodically and when it is necessary. Otherwise, their inadvertent
operation may result in huge revenue loss of NPPs and may also jeopardize safety of
power system. Sulphur hexa-fluoride (SF6) circuit breakers are the most common type
of circuit breakers which are being used for protection of high voltage systems. Several
maintenance strategies for maintenance of high voltage CBs are available i.e,
predictive, preventive and corrective maintenance. Condition based monitoring (CBM)
which is a sub category of predictive maintenance have gained huge importance
recently due to its advance features. This research explores several condition based
monitoring models for High voltage CBs at NPPs and suggest suitable model for
carrying out effective maintenance. This research work presents a circuit breaker (CB)
aging failure model based on condition based monitoring. This model is further inserted
into a basic Markov model of CB and substation reliability is assessed through it. This
model successfully incorporates wear-out status and functional age of high voltage
circuit breakers installed at 11kv substation. The results obtained by applying the
proposed model suggest that due to incorporation of ageing failures, 29000 $/year
(approximate value for most critical circuit breaker at given substation) can be saved.
 1

Introduction

Safety and reliability are the terms associated with Nuclear Power Plants. Efforts are
being made to maintain supply to safety systems for its safe and reliable operation. The
supply to safety systems is made possible through electrical equipment like circuit
breakers which play its part in protection of circuit. Being most important component
of protection and control apparatus, greatly influence the system’s reliability and need
special maintenance attention. The service interruption and down times are not tolerable
especially for the Nuclear power plants. For NPPs, supply to safety systems is provided
by any means and any cost. Here maintenance of circuit breakers is a critical issue to
ensure system availability. Also it is required to improve the reliability and efficiency
of the system to survive in competitive industrial market. The reliability and availability
can only be improved by avoiding the abnormal and faulty situations and if such
conditions occur, may not persist longer and are cleared as soon as possible. Scheduled
and planned maintenance procedures may reduce failures by increasing components
life time. But probabilistic maintenance models may be too costly with the little
maintenance results. So cost benefit analysis is desirable to arrive at an optimal
maintenance strategy selection.

1.1 Problem Statement

Significant concerns at any production facility:
 Equipment failure at a critical time
 Production and reliability of system
 Safety
 And the Maintenance Cost

At NPPs, (KANUPP and CNPGS), ample number high voltage breakers are there,
and so are the maintenance issues. Goal is to propose suitable condition based
monitoring model to reduce maintenance cost and prevent operation failure of
components by extending their lifetime and increased availability. To develop a highly
desired CBM approach including the effects of maintenance on reliability that ensures
smooth and economic operation.
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1.2 Objectives
1. Detailed study and inspection of various maintenance strategies of HV circuit
breakers (preferably at KANUPP and CNPGS).

2. Analyzing the statistical and in house data obtained and developing a

recommender model.

3. Reliability assessment of the HV breakers at facility (substation etc.).

4. Proposing the suitable model by comparison of results and cost benefit analysis.

1.3 Methodology
The objectives are met via developing the aging failure model with the methodology as
mentioned below,
 Study of the literature relevant to HV circuit breaker maintenance techniques
and possible modes of failure
 Identification of the problem from the studied literature.
 Statistical and in-House data collection for the adopted methodology.
 Assessing condition monitoring parameters and their boundary values for high
voltage circuit breakers.
 Calculations of wear-out indices and related parameters and Model
development
 Incorporating aging failures of breakers in facility’s reliability assessment via
Markov model.
 Assessing estimated energy not supplied due to breaker failures.
 Cost benefit analysis (estimated damage cost calculations) by comparing the
results.
 Sensitivity Analysis framework for reliability enhancement of circuit breakers
at Nuclear Power Plants.

1.4 Importance of the Project

The project will give us more insight in the understanding of various CBM strategies
for high voltage circuit breakers, their pros and cons and implementation of approach
best suitable for entities. It will also open up more venues of understanding of all failure
modes of circuit breakers and reliability assessment of breaker. The project will also
 3

serve as a recommender system for maintenance of HV circuit breakers at NPPs

(CNPGS and KANUPP).
 4

Literature Review

2.1 Safety and Reliability of Nuclear Power Plants

In an electrical power system and especially a nuclear power plant (NPP), transportation
and utilization of power is carried out through a two way mechanism in which power
is supplied to grid normally and in case of plant shutdown or emergency, may be taken
back for the station auxiliaries. The ever expanding growth of nuclear industry has
raised concerns for both power utilities as well as the general public regarding safety of
the power plants, operational availability and reliability. The idea of building more
nuclear power plants for electricity generation arise from global warming issues.
Nuclear power is a carbon free energy source but it brings serious safety concerns
with itself. The lessons learned from every accident in nuclear history is to ensure ‘This
never happens again’. In the recent years, focus has been shifted more towards
improving the reliability and efficiency of system. Intelligent Protection which is safe
for both system and personnel is the requirement of ever expanding complex electrical
system. Reliability demands devices to function consistently in case of fault
occurrences, regardless of possibly being idle for months or years. Without this
reliability, costly damages to the system may occur. Proper Maintenance scheduling is
required to avoid the unplanned outages, to ensure systems availability and smooth
operation which is economical and reliable as well. Power systems have protective
gears and equipment to isolate the faulty network and restore the power availability.
Circuit breakers holds an important place in protection scheme in any power plant
but for a nuclear power plant ,safety and reliability concerns have made it critical for
maintaining connection between supply and safety systems of a nuclear power plant .
Safety and security can never be guaranteed but serious efforts have been made in recent
years to maximize safety and reliability of Nuclear Power Plants through exchange of
information and emulation of best practices. Continuous efforts and practical measures
are taken into account for the performance improvement and strengthening nuclear
safety and security. Maintenance, inspection and monitoring programs are carried out
in this regard to ensure safe and reliable operations of nuclear power plants. Reliability
 5

engineering application tries to explore what causes an equipment to fail and helps
designers and operators to find ways to eliminate these causes. Different statistical
approaches have been developed to evaluate the reliability of nuclear power plants and
suggest means to enhance the plant safety and reliability. The RAMS (Reliability,
Availability, Maintenance, and Safety) Analysis economizes maintenance cost
minimizing the no of forced outages.

2.2 Nuclear Power Plants Operating Experience with Circuit

Breakers
Throughout the world, nuclear power plants are provided with ample number of circuit
breakers in their safety and non-safety systems. The criticality of Medium and Low
Voltage circuit breakers cannot be ignored in a Nuclear Power Plant especially for the
safety systems and proper maintenance and monitoring is required for such breakers to
ensure their maximum availability. These breakers are mostly located in distribution
rooms or electrical power equipment rooms.
Nuclear Power Plant Operating Experiences guide from IAEA/NEA Incident
Reporting System (1996-1999) [1], shared the experience of operation with circuit
breakers at a Nuclear Power Plant where explosion of oil-air mixture lead to failure in
an electrical system circuit breaker. The event caused a significant damage to the space
housing of the breaker. Failure of single breaker is a Designed based Accident (DBA)
but if the single failure lead to common cause or multiple breaker failures then it a
serious safety concern. Event cause was the improper opening of circuit breaker causing
the overheating of housing leading to an event of housing failure .This opened up an
insight that internal explosions are also possible and could be a challenge for fire
protection of nay plant. Re-evaluation of safety case circuit breakers is required at other
plants as well to avoid such unexpected incidents. The components life and
maintenance cost greatly influence the maintenance policies and proper and optimal
maintenance scheduling reduces this cost significantly by increasing components
lifetime and availability.

2.3 Circuit Breakers

Circuit breaker is a switching device that operates automatically to protect an electrical
circuit used to isolate the faulty part of circuit from damage caused in case of abnormal
conditions like short circuit no load and overload conditions. Unlike fuses circuit
 6

breakers are resettable and once tripped due to an over load condition or short circuit,
the unit can be reset back to normal operation. Circuit breakers are in various sizes
protecting low currents residential appliances to large high voltage switch gears.

2.4 Fundamentals of High Voltage Circuit Breakers

2.4.1 Functions and Components of HV Circuit-Breakers
HV circuit-breakers are very important equipment in power systems. They are
Used as interrupting devices both in normal operation and when fault occurs.
HV circuit-breakers are expected to be operated in any applications without problems.
Moreover, it is expected that they should be operated at any time, even after when they
are in non-operational state for a long period of time. The main functions of HV CBs
are categorized as follows:
 Switching-off operation currents
 Switching-on operation currents
 Short-circuit current interruption
 Secure open and closed position
In addition to the main functions, they should fulfill the following physical
requirements:

 Should behave as a good conductor during a closed position and as a good

isolator/insulator during an open position.
 Change their position from open to close or vice versa in short period of time.
 Generate minimum over voltages during switching operation.
 Keep maximum reliability during its operation.

More details on HV circuit-breaker functions and specifications can be reviewed in [2],

[3] and [4].
Components of HV circuit-breakers according to basic functions can be divided into
five groups [5]:
1. Insulation
2. Current carrying
3. Switching
 7

4. Operating mechanism
5. Control and auxiliary function

1. Insulation:
The electric insulation of HV CBs is done by a combination of dielectric materials
comprising gaseous, liquid and solids. The failure of insulation of CB may result into
flashover between phases, to ground or across the opening poles which may result in
major repair or replacement. In order to avoid such failures, insulation must be well
maintained and properly monitored. For instance, the quantity of insulating media must
be monitored continuously; the quality of insulation must be checked periodically by
diagnostic techniques and the insulation distance should be properly monitored using
visual inspection and position transducers.
2. Current carrying:
Current carrying parts of CBs are significant components because they assure the
flowing of current when it is in closed position. Failure of these parts may result in
catastrophic events such as severe deterioration of the insulation system and contact
welding. However, it is found that contact degradation process takes several years until
it reaches the final states. Practically, periodic diagnostic testing prevents the most
contact problems. The current carrying testing techniques can be carried out by
monitoring or diagnostic testing of contact resistance, load current, temperature of
contacts and contents of gas decomposition.
3. Switching:
During operations of HV circuit-breakers, they may be subject to electrical, mechanical
and thermal stresses. It is required that HV CBs should be able to make and break large
amounts of power without any failure. The parameters that are used to diagnose and
monitor switching consist of position of primary contacts, operating time, contact travel
characteristics, arcing time, arcing contact wear and pole discrepancy in operating
times. Most widely used parameters in periodic testing, in order to investigate the
contact movement are the contact travel characteristics.
4. Operating mechanism:
The operating mechanism part is used to move contacts from open to closed position or
vice versa. The operating mechanism failures may account for a large proportion of
total HV circuit-breakers failures. For instance, leakage of oil and gas in the pneumatic
 8

and hydraulic systems is very common but that can be handled without any interruption
in the system. On the other hand, shafts, springs and rods breakdown can lead to serious
failures which results in interruption of systems.
5. Control and auxiliary functions:
Control and auxiliary components are the parts which are controlled by 110-220 volts
D.C. The signal is sent to the coil to open a valve or move a latch which leads to release
of energy a mechanical drive. The control and auxiliary parts which are composed of
electrical circuits and values or latches may be exposed to failures which are relatively
frequent as per reliability surveys. Typical failures in such parts are failing to close or
open on demand as well as delayed operation. Coil voltages, current, circuit continuity,
status of auxiliary switches and the environment of the control cabinet are the
parameters that relate to control and auxiliary systems which must be properly
monitored.

2.4.2 Arc Interruption

The role of switching arc is much significant in the interruption process, as it is the
element that changes its state from the conducting to non-conducting state. An arc is
established between the breaker contacts which is surrounded by extinguishing medium
such as air, oil or Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The moment at which the contacts are
going to be apart, the connecting surface is very small. As a result, the current density
at that point is very high which can melt the contact material. After that, the melting
contact explodes which leads to the gas discharge.
The electrical arc is mainly in the form of metal vapor or hot air (in case of air circuit-
breakers). For oil circuit-breakers (OCBs), heat within the arc decomposes some oil,
thus gases are generated. When contacts are separated, these gases and metal vapors get
ionized. At this moment, the current can still flow through the arc. The arc interruption
can be carried out by cooling the arc, increasing the length of arc or splitting it into a
number of arcs in series through arc chutes. The plasma channel of the electric arc can
be represented in Fig. 2.1 and the temperature distribution is shown in Fig. 2.2
 9

Figure 2-1 The plasma channel of electric arc [9]

Figure 2-2 The potential distribution along an arc channel

The voltage drop near cathode region is around 10-25 volts normally, while near anode,
the voltage drop is around 5-10 volts. The voltage drop in the arc column depends on
the type of gas or dielectric medium used, the magnitude of arc current, gas pressure
and the length of column.

2.5 Circuit-Breaker Classification

According to different criteria, circuit-breakers can be classified into different groups
as follows:
 10

Table 2-1 Classification of circuit breakers based on different

Circuit Breaker Classification

Current Type Rated Voltage Type Service Type Operating Mechanism Arching Media

AC DC

Spring Operated Pneumatic Hydraulic

Low Voltage Medium Voltage High Voltage Oil C.B

𝑆𝐹6 C.B
Indoor Outdoor
Air C.B

Vacuum C.B

2.5.1 Circuit-breaker types by voltage class:

According to voltage circuit breakers can be divided into two groups: low voltage
circuit-breakers which are rated up to 1000 volts and high voltage circuit breakers with
rated voltages of 1000 volts and above. High voltage circuit breakers, can be further
subdivided into two groups: circuit-breakers with rated 75 kV and below which are
classified as medium voltage CBs and those with rated 123 kV and above.

2.5.2 Circuit-breaker types by installation:

In terms of installation, CBs can be classified into two types: indoor and outdoor
installations. Practically, the only differences between those two types lies in the
packaging and their enclosures.

2.5.3 Circuit-breaker types by external design:

With respect to structure design, outdoor circuit breakers can be classified into two
types: dead and live tank types CBs. Dead tank circuit-breakers are the circuit-breakers
whose enclosures and interrupters are grounded and are located at ground level, as
 11

shown in Fig. 2.3. These circuit-breaker are widely used in the United States. Live tank
circuit-breakers are circuit-breakers which are equipped with the interrupters above the
ground level, as shown in Fig. 2.4. Their interrupters do have the potential.
Dead type circuit breakers are usually used in areas/countries which are geographically
located where there is increased probability of earthquakes.

Figure 2-3 Dead tank circuit-breaker (Source: Manitoba, Canada)

Figure 2-4 Live tank circuit-breaker (Source: ABB AG, Switzerland

 12

2.5.4 Circuit-breaker types by interrupting medium:

The interrupting media is the main factors in designing of circuit-breakers. The
technology of oil and air interrupting mediums for circuit-breakers was first developed
100 years ago. These types of circuit-breakers are still in operation but there is no
further development, as they cannot fulfill the higher ratings of power systems these
days. In addition, there are issues as environmental problems and relatively low
reliability. The new generation of interrupting media is focused on vacuum and sulfur
hexafluoride (SF6). Vacuum circuit breakers are predominant in medium voltage
levels, whereas SF6 circuit-breakers are more likely to be used in high voltage levels.

2.5.5 Circuit-breaker types by operation:

The main purpose of HV circuit-breakers is interrupting the abnormal conditions.
Different applications of HV circuit-breakers should be taken into account. The
applications of HV circuit-breakers are classified as follows:
- Capacitance switching (capacitor banks and unloaded cable switching)
- Line closing (overhead transmission line switching)
- Shunt reactor switching
- Transformer switching
- Generator switching

2.6 Types of Circuit-Breakers

According to interrupting media, circuit-breakers can be classified into four categories:

2.6.1 Oil Circuit-Breakers

Oil circuit-breakers are the most fundamental circuit-breakers. They were first
developed in 1900s. The first oil circuit-breaker was developed by J. N. Kelman in the
United States. Oil has an excellent dielectric strength which enables it to not only to be
used as an interrupting medium but also as insulation within the live parts. The
interrupting technique of oil circuit-breakers is called “self-extinguishing”, since the oil
can produce a high pressure gas when it is exposed to heat that results from arc. In other
words, arc can be cooled down by the gas which is produced proportional to arc energy.
During the arc interruption, the oil forms a bubble comprising mainly hydrogen. It is
found that arc burning in hydrogen gas extinguishes faster than other type of gases.
However, hydrogen cannot be used as interrupting medium because it is not practical
 13

to handle. Oil circuit-breakers are divided according to methods of arc interruption into
two types: bulk oil and minimum oil type circuit breakers.

2.6.1.1 Bulk oil type

In this type of breaker, main contacts and live parts are immersed in oil which serves
as an interrupting medium and also insulates the live parts. Plain-break circuit-breakers
are considered as bulk oil type, because the arc is freely interrupted in oil. This type of
circuit-breaker contains a large amount of oil and thus requires a large space. It can
cause environmental problems after an explosion. It is therefore limited to the low
voltage levels. An example of a bulk oil circuit-breaker with its components is
represented in Fig. 2.5.

Figure 2-5 Bulk oil circuit-breaker (Source: Allis Chalmers Ltd.)

1. Bushing 6. Plunger guide

2. Oil level indicator 7. Arc control device
3. Vent 8. Resistor
4. Current transformer 9. Plunger bar
5. Dashpot
 14

2.6.1.2 Minimum oil type

This type of oil circuit-breaker was first developed in Europe, due to requirement to
reduce the space utilized by it and cost of oil. In comparison to the bulk oil type breaker,
for the minimum oil type, the volume of oil is reduced and is used only in an explosion
chamber. The other difference from the bulk oil type is of the insulation, which is
usually made of porcelain or solid insulating material. Single-break type minimum oil
circuit-breakers are used in the voltage levels of 33-132 kV. When higher ratings are
required, the multi-break type breaker is then applied with a combination of resistors
and capacitors. These resistors and capacitors are provided in order to provide
uniformity to the voltage distribution.

2.6.2 Air-Blast Circuit-Breakers

The arc interruption of air-blast circuit-breakers takes place by introducing the high
pressure air flow in axial or cross directions as shown in Fig. 2.6. In axial type, the arc
is cooled down in an axial direction until the ionization lowers down to zero level. The
Current is interrupted at this point. In contrast to the axial type, the cross type
compresses the air and blow it into an arc-chute compartment.

Figure 2-6 Air blast direction: (a) axial direction, (b) cross direction

The performance of air-blast circuit-breakers is dependent on many factors, for

example, operating pressure, interrupting current and the nozzle diameter. The
advantages of air-blast circuit breakers are listed as follows [6]:
 Cheap interrupting medium
 15

 Reduction of erosion of contacts from frequent switching operations •

 Chemical stability of air
 Short arcing time
 Operation at high speed
 Reduction of maintenance frequency
 Being able to be operated in fire hazard locations
 Consistent breaking time
The disadvantages of air-blast circuit-breakers are that they produce high-level noise
during the operation and also require the air to remain dried. Similar to oil circuit-
breakers, resistors and capacitors are needed when we use air-blast circuit-breakers in
very high voltage levels. The serious problem that occurs during small current
interruption is a chopping current because the velocity and pressure of air-blast circuit-
breakers are independent of current interrupted. An example of air-blast circuit-breaker
is shown in Fig. 2.8.

Figure 2-7 Air-blast circuit-breaker (Source: Strathaven substation, Lanarkshire)

2.6.3 Vacuum Circuit-Breakers

The dielectric strength of vacuum is higher than other interrupting mediums
considerably. Hence, a contact separation of around 1 cm is required to withstand high
voltages. Consequently, the power to open and close contacts is reduced significantly
with other types of circuit-breakers. In addition, the rate of dielectric recovery of
vacuum is much faster as compared to air. The interrupting technique of vacuum circuit-
 16

breakers (VCBs) is different from other types of circuit-breakers. The arc extinguishing
process is controlled by a metal surface phenomenon when their contacts part away. In
other words, the arc is not extinguished by a dielectric medium but through the metal
vapor. The vacuum arc can be cooled down through a magnetic field by which arc
moves over the contact surfaces. For this purpose, the contacts are manufactured with
spiral segments as shown in Fig. 2.8. This technique also prevents contact erosion.
Nowadays, vacuum circuit-breakers are mostly predominant in medium voltage levels.
VCBs also considered as maintenance-free circuit-breakers because of their simple and
reliable design.

Figure 2-8 Contacts of vacuum circuit-breaker [12]

2.6.4 SF6 Circuit-Breakers

SF6 gas and its characteristics were discovered in 1920s. The development of SF6 gas
as an interrupting medium for circuit-breakers began in 1940s. However, the SF6 circuit
Breakers, for the first time came to the market in 1960s. The properties of SF6 gas are
better than other interrupting mediums as follows:

 High dielectric strength. For instance, SF6 gas at absolute pressure has dielectric
strength double of air and at 3 bar it is in comparison to oil.
 High thermal conduction and short thermal time constant which is 1000 times
shorter than air which results in better arc quenching.
 It has low arc voltage characteristic that results in reduced arc-removal energy.
 17

 At normal conditions, SF6 is inert, non-corrosive, non-flammable, non-toxic

and odorless. However, at the temperature above 1000°C, SF6 decomposes to
various gases including S2F10 which is very toxic. Fortunately, the
decomposition products abruptly recombine after when arc is extinguished
(when the temperature goes down).
The problem of moisture from the decomposition products should be considered. The
moisture gets absorbed by a mixture of soda lime (NaOH + CaO), activated alumina
(dried Al2O3) or molecular sieves. The other problem is that of condensation of SF6 at
high pressures and low temperature. For instance, at a pressure of 14 bars, SF6 gets
liquefied at 0°C. In the areas, where there is low ambient temperature such as in Canada,
Scandinavian countries and Russia, gas heaters must be used. The other solution is
through gas mixtures such as nitrogen (N2). Although the gas mixture of SF6/N2 can be
used in the low temperature, the dielectric withstand capability and arc interruption
performance is reduced. For example, the short-circuit capacity rating of 50kA is
lowered to 40kA. The types of SF6 circuit breakers can be represented as follows:
2.6.4.1 Double-pressure SF6 circuit-breakers
This is developed using principles similar to that of air-blast circuit-breakers. Their
contacts are found inside the compartment filled with SF6 gas. During the arc
interruption, the arc is cooled through compressed SF6 from a separate compartment.
After the interruption, SF6 gas is pumped back into the compartment. This
compartment must be equipped with heaters to ensure that the SF6 will not liquefy.
However, failures of heating equipment can result in malfunctioning of circuit-
breakers. This type circuit-breaker is rarely used in the market nowadays because its
failure probability is quite high.
2.6.4.2 Self-blast SF6 circuit-breakers
The interrupting chamber of this type of circuit-breaker has two main compartments
with the same pressure (around 5 atm). During the arc interruption, the gas pressure in
the arcing zone gets high. This high pressure gas from the other compartment then blasts
into the arcing zone and in the same time cools the arc column. Finally, the arc gets
 18

extinguished. This type of circuit-breaker is normally used in high voltage levels which
are up to 123 kV. The interruption principle and its structure are shown in Fig. 2.9.

Figure 2-9 Arc interruption principle of self-blast circuit-breakers Source: (SIEMENS)

1. Terminal plate 5. Nozzle
2. Contact carrier 6. Contact cylinder
3. Main contact 7. Base
4. Arcing contact 8. Terminal plate
2.6.4.3 Puffer-type SF6 circuit-breakers
The principle of this type of breaker is to generate compressed gas during the contacts
opening process. The moving contacts move the piston and thus compress the gas in
the chamber. As a result, the compressed gas flows along the arc channel and thereby
extinguishes the arc. The development of puffer-type SF6 circuit-breakers can be
classified into two generations: first and second generations. The principle of arc
interruption in both generations is similar but the second generation concentrate on the
better design, arcing contact lifetime, improvement of short-circuit rating, and the
material of the nozzle [7].
Since the gas needs to be compressed, this type of circuit-breaker should have a strong
mechanism of operation. For example, when interruption of large current such as three-
phase fault takes place, the opening speed of circuit-breakers gets slowed down because
of thermal pressure. The operating mechanism should have enough energy to move the
contacts apart. Consequently, the reliable operating mechanisms dominates over the
costs of circuit-breakers.
 19

At present, SF6 circuit-breakers are mainly used in high voltage levels with the high
short circuit capability up to 63 kA. They are used as dead tank circuit-breakers, live
tank circuit-breakers and in gas insulated substation (GIS).

2.7 Maintenance Methods of Circuit Breaker

Circuit breakers require special maintenance and monitoring for their proper operation
as lack of maintenance can cause equipment damage and service interruption if a
breaker fails to clear fault. But the need of maintenance is often not obvious as circuit
Breaker may not show any obvious signs of degradation leading to sudden and
catastrophic failures. Probable cause of breaker failure are:
 Internal mechanisms jammed due to girt, dust etc.
 Internal mechanisms jammed due to corrosion.
 Internal mechanisms worn at pivots and latches.
 Contacts Welded due to excessive current / voltage or reduction in contact
force.
 Excessive Sparking and arching due to inductive loads and unsuitability of the
design for such loads.
 Bad contacts between connecting wires and breaker terminals.

Breaker Failure is associated with the heavy cost replacement without maintenance.
So proper maintenance inspection and scheduling is required keeping in view the
importance of circuit breakers in power networks and especially for nuclear power plant
systems. But the maintenance procedures are costly and so an optimization of the
maintenance is the need of hour .Also because of the cost considerations there are
different practices being followed by industry. Maintenance strategies are broadly
classified as preventive, condition based and reliability-centered maintenance. The
purpose of maintenance activity is to reduce sudden outages, increased availability and
extending components life in a cost effective way .But for the power system equipment,
it is very challenging task to develop an optimal maintenance strategy. A brief review
 20

of these maintenance strategies is given in the Error! Reference source not found.
below,

Table 2-2 Overview of maintenance strategies

Corrective Maintenance
 ‘Run it till it breaks’ maintenance mode.
 No actions or efforts are taken to maintain the equipment
 Increased cost due to unplanned downtime of equipment.

Preventive Maintenance
 Actions performed on a time- or machine-run-based schedule
 aim of sustaining or extending its useful life through controlling
Maintenance degradation to an acceptable level

Strategies Condition based Maintenance

 Measurements that detect the onset of system degradation
 Incorporates actual condition of circuit breaker
 Does not take into account how system is affected by component

Reliability -Centered Maintenance

 Facility’s equipment and resources to best mate the two and result
in a high degree of facility reliability and cost-effectiveness.
 Technical condition of equipment is considered
 Importance of equipment in the network
 Prioritize the equipment need for maintenance

The thesis develops a technique to ensure the service availability and

replacement cost balanced in order to get an optimal maintenance strategy. The
technique is based on sorting and prioritizing the maintenance strategy best available,
keeping in view the industrial standards considered for maintenance jobs.
 21

Failures, Testing and Adjustments

3.1 Top Failures of Circuit Breakers and Causes

Over the past few years, efforts have been made in exploring the equipment failure and
their probable causes. This is not only useful to eliminate the failure rates of equipment
leading to improved reliability while restoring service. Much of the insight into the
equipment failure has been gained through field experience of the maintenance
personnel. Based upon the maintenance personnel experience available in the literature
and reported failure events, probable circuit breaker failures, their causes and
prevention methods are enlisted.
3.1.1 Loose Connections
Increased resistance at localized points can be a result of loose and faulty connections.
By the famous Ohm’s law (P = 𝐼 2 R), an increased resistance meaning an increased heat
produced at that point. The rapid heat production accelerates leading to a complete
thermal failure. This immense heat production can also cause nearby insulation failure
resulting in fault occurrence. It has been estimated that loose connections may be a
cause of approximately 25 percent of total electrical failures for the circuit breakers.
Suggested Remedy (Infrared inspection)
Regular Infrared Inspection of switchgear is solution to such type of breaker failures.
Corona cameras can also be installed to monitor partial discharge activity and corona
inspections .Medium –voltage switch gears are mostly installed with infrared viewing
ports.
Infrared inspections for electrical equipment and machine parts can find
hotspots caused by faulty and defective connections. Excessively heated areas by the
increased resistance are spotted by infrared thermography and problem is rectified
before the occurrence of any failure. This failure not only leads to equipment damage
but also creates safety hazard for the maintenance personnel and results in production
loss and service unavailability. Heat Generated from a loose connection on the top wire
 22

detected by infrared thermography is shown in the Error! Reference source not

found. below,

Figure 3-1 Infrared detection of heat generation from a

loose connection on top wire [7]

Since excessive heating is a failure sign so infrared is suggested to be best diagnostic

tool for finding hot spots and connections .Infrared detects the degeneration even in the
early stages and so has gained popularity due to the protection it offers to equipment,
personnel and facility.
Conditions Detectable by Infrared Inspection
The conditions detectable by infrared thermography are listed below [7],
 Loose / deteriorated connections
 Overloads
 Open circuits
 Unbalanced loads
 Inductive heating
 Harmonics
 Defective Equipment
Benefits of Infrared Inspection
 Benefits offered by infrared thermography inspection are,
 Reduction in unplanned outages
 Enhanced equipment lifetime
 Reduced Repair and maintenance costs
 Reduced service interruption
 Reduced loss and increase in profits

3.1.2 Insulation Breakdown

Insulation failure is another main culprit of circuit breaker failure. The purpose of
insulation is to prevent the current flow between different potential points in an
electrical system. Medium Voltage switchgear insulation faces more stresses than low
 23

voltage and this is the reason why medium voltage circuit breakers insulation system is
more complex. Overstressing causes an initial failure over a small region of insulation
but with the time it escalates leading to a complete failure. There are a number of areas
with the insulation breakdown problems. In circuit breakers 21 percent of breaker
failures are due to insulation breakdown problems. Terminations can lead to localized
partial insulation breakdown failure as shown in Error! Reference source not found.
below,

Figure 3-2 Localized Partial discharge failure at termination [8]

Main reasons for insulation failure are [9]

 Natural deterioration due to aging

 Accelerated by excessive heat and moisture
 Heat, moisture and dirt are main causes of insulation failure.
 Chemical deterioration
 Mechanical damage
 Transient recovery Voltage (TRV)
 Excessive voltage stresses

Suggested Remedy (Partial Discharge Detectors with Ultrasonic Detectors)

Low voltage insulation checks includes the insulation to be kept dry, clean with the
sufficient available clearances. Partial Discharge test is the suggested technology for
the breaker insulation breakdown problem in high voltage. Partial Discharge detects the
voltage problems associated with the breakdown and generation of partial discharges.
These discharges gradually reduce the insulation strength of the break.
 24

3.1.3 Moisture Intrusion

Natural disasters and accidents can be a cause of water intrusion and can create
complications namely,
 Short circuits
 Metallic component corrosion leading to elevated heating
 Partial Discharge
 Potential for flashovers
 Insulation breakdown
Highly humid conditions result in moisture absorption to medium voltage exposed
switch gear components. Under such conditions, voltage stresses are generated on water
absorption and create voltage stresses. The stresses attack the hydrophobic insulation
surfaces as theses surfaces are to prevent from moisture absorption.

Figure 3-3 Good insulation (Top left) with hydrophilic surfaces worsen progressively
(lower right) [8]
Suggested Remedy
Partial Discharge test is suggested to prevent moisture- related insulation faults in
longer run. Infrared cameras can monitor abnormal heating spots from corroded
connections.
3.1.4 Breaker Raking
Raking in circuit breaker may cause severe personal injuries and death along with
equipment damage when the bus is energized and breaker is in close position.
 25

Figure 3-4 Severe breaker damage caused by Improper Rack-in operation [8]
Breaker may also face other complexities in raking operation and may not line
up properly and other such problems. These problems may lead to catastrophic failures.
Traditional act of manual breaker racking by personnel is a danger to the one itself.
Suggested Remedy
Remote circuit breaker racking device is suggested to be installed for ensuring
personnel safety. Proper service and inspection of cell components is suggested. Also
make sure the proper functionality of all mechanical and electrical interlocks.

3.1.5 Faulty Ground Fault Protection

A defective ground fault protection equipment can be a cause of failure. The equipment
does not cause any faulty situation. In fact, it would not offer protection services from
arcing ground faults which are common failure modes in 480Y/277V solidly-grounded
switchgear [8].

Suggested Remedy
The problem is required to be solved by manual testing the ground fault protection
system by current injection. Attention must be provided in proper installing of
equipment. Verification of the appropriate neutral and ground connections and proper
sensors location for the proper detection of fault current.

3.2 Basic Maintenance Actions of Circuit Breakers

Basic Maintenance performed on electrical equipment like circuit breakers and
transformers can help in reduced catastrophic failures and component replacement.
Also it is helpful in increasing the components lifetime. Various basic Maintenance
 26

actions for any type of circuit breaker, considered and suggested are summarized as
[11]:
Operating Mechanism

 Cleaning of insulation parts to remove any dust and smoke.

 Cleaning and lubrication of operating mechanism by applying suitable grease
for rollers, bearings and sliding surfaces.
 Adjustment of operating mechanism for breaker by following the procedures
mention in the manufacturer’s instruction book.
 Proper tightening of nuts, bolts, washers to be ensured.
 Ensure the proper opening and closing movement of contacts upon servicing.

Contacts

 Alignment of contacts for breaker by following the procedures mention in the

manufacturer’s instruction book.
 Keep a check on contact wear and corrosion attacks by environmental factors.
 Check if the contacts meet the travel time specifications.

Insulating Media and Arc Extinguishers

 Keep a check on leaks and remove any water content.

 Keep a check on required pressure for governors and compressors.
 Filtering and reconditioning of oil if required.

A summary of Circuit breakers main components, failure modes, and inspection test
and maintenance actions is described in the Error! Reference source not found. below
[11],
 27

Table 3-1 Main component, failure modes, inspection tests and maintenance of circuit breakers
Comparison Aspect Circuit breakers

Main Components Contacts, interrupter, insulating medium, control circuit, mechanism

which includes cam, latches, springs, bearings, coils, compressors,
charging motors etc.
Particles produced by Ageing Oxides, arc by products such as carbon, water, partial discharge

Failure Modes •Fails to open on command

• Fails to close on command
• Fails to conduct continuous or momentary current (while already in
use)
• Fails to maintain the insulation
• Fails to contain insulating medium
• Fails to indicate condition or position
• Fails to provide for safety in operation
Inspection Tests • Contact travel time measurement
• Vibration Analysis
• Control circuit monitoring
• Contact Resistance Test
• Contact temperature monitoring
• Dielectric strength
• Partial Discharge
Maintenance Basic maintenance: lubricating mechanism components, check for
compressor pressure and dielectric strength of oil, adjusting all
components and contacts as per manufacturer’s instructions, check for
control circuit connections.
 28

CIGRE Reliability Surveys

Maintenance is a critical concern in improving the operational capabilities of any power

utility. And so selection of optimal maintenance strategy plays a great role in proposing
a cost effective and efficient maintenance solution to the problem .This could also bring
long term benefits to the company in terms of cost and reliability. Rapidly growing
maintenance significance has brought an interest in developing the optimal
maintenance strategies by minimizing the system failures and cost reduction.
Maintenance jobs are especially carried out for the components, the failure of which
can severally effect the service continuity. Since circuit breaker is the critical
component in any power utility interconnecting supply and demand, also it holds a
special place in safety systems of any nuclear power plant (NPP) where service
interruption is considered inevitable. The major problems power units are facing today
are,
 Lack of proper annual maintenance procedures.
 Constraints in selecting an optimal maintenance strategy.
 Selection of proper maintenance criteria.
 Need of implementing an integrated model from available options and criteria.

Also there is a need to consider specialists opinion while selecting an optimal

maintenance strategy.
Maintenance need is to improve machine performance while considering safety,
environmental, cost, budget and staff constraints in any power company. Proper
maintenance scheduling is a key to safe, economical, and reliable power system. The
problems discussed above require a maintenance model based on multi criteria method
of decision making where expert opinion is the top priority. In this strategy, both options
and criteria are accepted by experts and after examination, different models are selected
to propose an optimal maintenance strategy.
A circuit breaker system can be divided into following components:
 29

• Components at service voltage, i.e., auxiliary resistors and capacitors,

main and arcing contacts, main insulation to earth (oil, bushings and
SF6).
• Control and auxiliary circuits, i.e., auxiliary switches and relays,
command coils, heaters and the thermostats, fuses, and lockout devices.
• Other components, i.e., mechanical transmission components, actuator
and damping devices, motors and compressors, pumps, pipe work and
fittings, and energy storage elements.

4.1 Summary of Reliability Surveys of HV Circuit-Breakers

by CIGRE
Excellent insights has been provided by CIGRE [12] to the failure statistics of circuit
breaker components. The most common causes of failures are shown in Table 1. Mostly
circuit breakers failures are observed in the field of mechanical problems and auxiliary
control circuits. More specifically, 43 to 44% of the major failures are because of a
mechanical nature, 20 to 29% occurs due to auxiliary and control circuits, and current
path interrupters cause the failure up to 21 to 31%.
Table 4.1 Causes of Major Failure and Defective Components of Single Pressure SF6 Circuit
Breakers at 63 kV and above [12].
Component Percent Percent
Compressors, pumps 13.6–18.7%
Energy storage 7.2–7.6%
Other Control elements 9.3–11.6% 43–44%
Components Actuators, damping devices 5.1–8.9%
Mechanical transmission 1.4–3.8%
Trip/close circuits 1.5–10%
Control & Auxiliary switches 2.1–7.4% 20–29%
auxiliary circuits Contactors, heaters 5.4–7.6%
Gas density monitors 4.0–10.7%
Service voltage Interrupters 9.4–14.0%
components Auxiliary interrupters, resistors 0.6–1.3% 21-30%
Insulation to ground 0.6–1.3%
Other causes 5.4–6.8%
 30

These statistics can be further used as a guideline for the selection of components and
parameters to be monitored.
Table 4.1 shows major and minor failures and their causes [12]. A complete failure of
a circuit-breaker is the called to be major failure which results in losing of one or more
of its fundamental functions. This major failure will result in an immediate change on
the conditions of operating system, or in mandatory removal of the circuit-breaker from
service for non-scheduled maintenance. Other than this failure, remaining are
considered as a minor failure. In the Figure 4-1, we can see only 7% of major failures
are due to the leakage of SF6 gas. On the other hand, in Figure 4-2, 40% of minor
failures originate in the SF6 gas insulation systems.

Figure 4-1 Causes of Major failures of HV single pressure SF6 circuit-breakers

Figure 4-2 Causes of Minor failures of HV single pressure SF6 circuit-breakers

 31

4.2 GIS Reliability surveys

Gas-insulated systems (GIS) are in service for about 40 years, and are proved to be
highly reliable. However, some in-service failures of circuit breakers are considered
because of GIS defects. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the main failure causes in
GIS. Assuming the sufficient use of sensitive partial discharge (PD) in detection
system, failures are due to foreign particles and moisture (about 27% of the total) could
have been predicted. Figure 3 shows that circuit breakers that are using hydraulic
actuators suffer significantly from motor current, their storage position and level of oil,
and oil leakage problems. A very high percentage of such failures can be detected
visually, leading to the conclusion that periodic visual inspection is very efficient
monitoring method for circuit breakers. On the other hand, the most efficient diagnostic
parameters for SF6 and minimum oil circuit breakers using mechanical actuators are
mechanical operation (including contact position, damping etc.), oil leakage and visual
observation (Figure 4-3).

Figure 4-3 Causes of Major failures in GIS [13]

 32

Figure 4-4 Distribution of causes of failures of SF6 and minimum oil circuit breakers
with hydraulic actuators [14]

Figure 4-5 Distribution of causes of failures of SF6 and minimum oil circuit
breakers with mechanical actuators [14]

Figure 4-6 Distribution of control circuit failures by component for SF6

circuit-breakers [15].
 33

A survey [15] has shown that major failures occurs by almost 100% of coil failures.
Major components can also be fail by auxiliary switch failures, caused by mechanical
maladjustment or environmental effects. Faulty signaling can give result in spurious
minor failures and improper operation of the other network equipment. Relays highly
contribute to overall failure of the control system, often due to a hostile control cabinet
environment. Most failures are related to relay hardware, e.g., contact problems. Energy
sensors include two main problem components, the one is pressure gauges of the
hydraulic actuators and the other is limit switches of the mechanical actuator’s spring.
Wiring defects can also cause a minor problem.
 34

Aging Failure Model of Breaker

5.1 Aging failures of HV breakers

In present time, it is a great challenge for power system engineers and asset managers
to deal with equipment aging. The substation configuration reliability evaluation and
economic analysis of asset management is greatly affected by the use of aged
equipment. In past studies substation reliability assessment methods are discussed [16]–
[21] without giving consideration to equipment aging effects. An over-optimistic
estimations of system reliability shall results if equipment age is not accounted. It is
founded that past literature [22]–[24] has discussed aging failure influence of
transformers in system reliability evaluation. However this literature is less for
integrating aging failures of circuit breakers (CB) in substation or transmission system
reliability evaluation [25]. As the physical structures and aging mechanisms of a CB is
different from that of a transformer and other equipment so the aging process of CBs is
also different. It is also studied that past literature [15]–[28] regarding CB aging models
are based on historical statistical data. Such statistical data reflects the aging process to
some extent but cannot precisely represent the wearing status of a CB. However,
different characteristic parameters and the application of condition monitoring
techniques identify wearing status of CB. In comparison with historical statistical data,
condition monitoring measurements can better evaluate the rate of CB wear-out.
Reference [29] presents analysis of the condition monitoring data of CBs and a
probability distribution model for a healthy CB index. A strategy for general
maintenance of power equipment is based on condition monitoring [30].
To the best of our knowledge, an aging failure model of a CB based on condition
monitoring has not been addressed yet. Our work presents a CB aging failure rate model
based on condition monitoring, modifies Markov model to include CB aging failure,
and integrates CB aging failure effect in substation reliability evaluation. This research
work contains the following two major contributions:
 The conventional model of aging rate based on historical statistics presumes
that the aging failure rate increases with natural age. Validity of this assumption
is generally applied to a group of same type equipment but may not be valid for
a single equipment. The wear-out process depends on how each equipment is
 35

used and hence on its actual health condition. It is not necessarily true that an
older CB in terms of age have a higher aging failure rate than a younger CB.
The model presented in this paper helps to overcome this demerit based on
condition monitoring measurements.
 The proposed CB aging failure model is integrated in a basic Markov reliability
model of a CB to capture the aging failure effect in substation reliability
evaluation. If conventional method of substation reliability evaluation that
does not account the CB aging process, integrating the aging failure
considerations provide the results closer to reality and can be used to avoid
underestimation of the substation configuration unreliability which can results
into imprecise planning or maintenance decisions.

5.2 AGING FAILURE MODEL BASED ON CONDITION

MONITORING

Figure 5-1 Methodology of aging failure model development and substation reliability assessment
 36

The research work is structured as follows. Chapter 5 includes the CB aging failure
model based on condition monitoring. Chapter 6 includes the method used to integrate
the process of aging of CB in substation reliability evaluation. Chapter 7 includes a case
study based on an actual substation layout. Section V includes conclusions.
There are two characteristics on the basis of which wearing status of a CB can be
evaluated.

 Mechanical performance
 Insulation condition

The aging condition of the CB can be objectively assessed by obtaining these two
characteristics. For obtaining these characteristics parameter measurement through
sensors are done. Aging failure model formation process consists of two steps: first,
a wear-out index showing the aging status is formed by using condition monitoring
measurements; second, on quantitative basis this index is related to the aging failure
rate, which represents the functional age of each single CB.

5.2.1 Condition Monitoring Parameters

A survey on reliability of CBs are conducted in 1978–1991. According to this
survey, mechanical failures are the main causes of CB failure [31]. It is accounted
that total of all failures 64.8% failures are operational mechanical failures. While
evaluating a CB's wear-out status, it is therefore necessary to closely monitor the
operational mechanical structure. The operating mechanical structure consists of
two parts:

 mechanical drive system

 secondary elements including control and auxiliary circuits

It is generally accounted that condition monitoring parameters such as the operating

time points of contact terminals and coil current can be used to represent the
mechanical attributes status [29]. The voltage jump points of emergency
connections can be used to show the operating times of the CB connections. Contact
a and b represent two emergency connections of a circuit breaker. When the primary
connection of breaker is opened or closed, the statues and voltages of the emergency
 37

connections a and b are changed. The time points obtained from the waveform of
the direct current passing through the electromagnet coil and the voltage jump
points of emergency connections, which represent the state of a CB, are shown in
Figs. 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.

Figure 5-2 Closing coil current of CB

Figure 5-3 voltage jump points of contacts a and b in closing

Closing operation initiation time is represented as t1; t2 is the time at which the coil
picks up the current; t3 is the time at which the coil after saturation dips the current,
showing that the iron core has fulfilled its purpose and started to slow down; the coil
current drops off at time t4; the time at which contact is closed is t5, and t6 is the time at
which contact is closed. Typical boundary values of t2, t3, t4, t5 and t6 are presented in
Table 5.1 [29].
The aging failure and the insulation status of CB are closely related. Gas is the arc-
extinguishing medium with stable chemical properties, high arc-extinguishing
properties and good dielectric power to protect the connections from catching fire,
based on reliable performance. Sulphur hexafluoride abbreviated as SF6 is a chemical
substance chiefly served as insulation medium in circuit breakers. However, the
presence of moisture will slow down the performance of the insulation medium [26].
 38

The arc-extinguishing properties are closely related to the gas pressure. CB cannot
extinguish an arc properly if the gas pressure is not sufficient. For the representation of
the insulation status the quantity of moisture and the gas pressure are used as condition
monitoring parameter.
The typical boundary values based on the specifications of manufacturers in China for
moisture and gas pressure are shown in Table 5.2.

Table 5-1 Lower and Upper Limits of Closing Action Times

Monitored Lower Upper limit

time limit (ms) (ms)
t2 0.0 5.5

t3 9.8 16.4

t4 26.0 43.4

t5 49.9 67.5

t6 62.0 75.8

Table 5-2 Lower and Upper Limits of Insulation Parameters

Parameter Lower Upper

Limit Limit
Moisture (ppm) 0.0 150
Gas pressure P (Mpa) 0.5 0.6

5.2.2 Wear-Out Index

Section 5.2.1 represents monitored parameters each with different unit and different
specific range. The unit of the emergency connection operating times t2, t3, t4, t5 and t6
is milli seconds, and the units of the moisture and gas pressure parameters are measured
in ppm and MPa, respectively. To evaluate the overall wear-out condition of a CB, it
has to combine the effects of these parameter to normalize the numerical values of the
 39

obtained parameter measurements [31]. Gaussian expression is used to normalize the

transformation
𝟐 /𝒔𝟐
C = 𝒆−(𝒙−𝒓) (1)
Where, C represents the normalized parameter of measurement, x denotes the observed
parameter value, and r and s are calculated as follows
r = (H+L)/2
and
s = (H-L)/2
where H and L represents the upper and lower limits of a normal range of the measured
parameter respectively,
Basically, equation (1) is used to calculate scale change of the measured parameters
with different units and values range. The merit of using (1) for normalization is such
that each normalized parameter has become a value without unit and between 0.0 and
1.0 regardless of its real unit and numerical magnitude. If a normalized parameter is
close to1.0, the condition represented by this parameter is good; when it is near to 0.0,
it shows that the condition is bad. Another merit is that all normalized parameters have
the like boundary values for both upper and lower limits despite of their original units
and boundaries. When r is equal to the upper limit (H) or lower limit (L), (1) becomes
𝟐 /𝒔𝟐
CR= 𝒆−(𝒙−𝒓)
𝟐 /(𝑳−𝑯/𝟐)𝟐
CR= 𝒆−(𝑯−𝑳/𝟐)
𝟐 /(𝑯−𝑳/𝟐)𝟐
CR= 𝒆−(𝑳−𝑯/𝟐)
CR= 𝒆−𝟏 (2)
CR denotes the boundary of the normal limits. CR can be taken as a criteria to show if
the condition represented by a normalized parameter is in the normal state or not. The
observed parameters can be normalized to the same criterion, even if these have
different ranges. If a normalized parameter shows value below CR, it indicates that the
condition represented by this observed parameter measurement is not in the range of
either the lower or upper limit.
Let {Ci, i = 1,2,…..,N} represents the set of all recorded parameters after normalization.
The overall condition index of CB is explained as follows:
If all Ci > CR ,the final condition index is defined by
 40

𝑸 = ∑𝑵
𝒊=𝟏 𝑾𝒊 𝑪𝒊 (3)
If there is at least one parameter present Ci < CR, the complete condition index is
defined by

𝑸 = ∑𝑴
𝒊=𝟏 𝑾𝒊 𝑪𝒊 (4)
here N represents the number of all normalized parameters; M denotes the number of
normalized parameters Ci that are smaller than the limit CR; and 𝑊𝑖 represents the
weighting factor showing the relative significance of the parameters. N is always a fixed
number, whereas M varies with the observed data. 𝑊𝑖 surely meet ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖 𝐶𝑖 = 1 or

∑𝑀
𝑖=1 𝑊𝑖 𝐶𝑖 = 1. There is no literature founded on the monitoring parameter that is more

significant than the others. The case study of this report represents that all the monitored
parameters (t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, pressure and moisture) are equally significant and have the
same weight so that 𝑊𝑖 = 1/N in (3) and 𝑊𝑖 = 1/M in (4).
It can be observed from the definitions that the overall condition index is the average
of all the normalized parameters. All conditions shown by the observed parameters are
in the normal state, whereas it is obtained by taking the average of the abnormal
normalized parameters when one observed parameter should be in an abnormal state.
When there is only one abnormal parameter, the overall condition index is just an
abnormal parameter.
The wear-out index from calculations is defined by
WI= 𝟏 − 𝑸 (5)
here Q is the overall condition index. If WI is also a value without units and lies between
0.0 and 1.0.The value 1.0 represents the unfavorable wear-out condition, whereas 0.0
represents the prime condition.
5.2.3 Aging Failure Rate Model
Results obtained from different experiments and investigations depict that there is an
approximate exponential function relationship among the degree of polymerization
(i.e., observed condition parameter) and the aging process [32]. It is therefore
concluded that the index WI (which is obtained from the normalized monitored
condition parameters) and the CB operating time (age) follow an approximate
exponential function relationship, named as
𝑾𝑰 = 𝑨𝒆𝑩𝒕𝒇 + 𝑫 (6)
 41

Here WI represents wear-out index, tf represents the age of the CB, and A, B, and D are
represented as three coefficients, and can be accounted by a nonlinear parameter
estimation method from the values obtained from observed condition parameter
measurements and the ages of a group of the same category of CB historical statistical
data. After these coefficients are accounted, the index for a specific CB observed at the
present time or at a time point in the future can be used to evaluate the age of the CB
correlate to that time point by
𝟏 (𝑾𝑰−𝑫)
𝒕𝒇 = 𝑩 𝒍𝒏 (7)
𝑨

The age of CB is calculated by equation (7). The measured index WI represents the
actual wear-out state of the CB so it generally varies from it actual age. When the value
of calculated tf comes out greater than its actual age, it means worn out rate of CB is
faster than the natural age. If the value of calculated tf is comes out smaller as compared
to the natural age, it shows that it worn out at slow pace than the natural age. The
functional age of the specific CB is the calculated value of tf. The monitored WI index
shows the wearing condition of CB.
The modeling of aging failure can be done by using A Weibull distribution. [7],[8],[18].
The definition of the Weibull distribution is defined as the cumulative failure
probability distribution function and failure rate for aging wear out are calculated as
follows:
𝒕𝒇 𝜷
𝑭𝒂 (𝒕𝒇) = 𝟏 − 𝒆− ( 𝜼 ) (8)

𝜷 𝒕𝒇 𝜷−𝟏
𝝀𝒂𝒈 (𝒕𝒇) = 𝜼 ( 𝜼 ) (9)

here tf represents the age; 𝛽 represents the shape parameter; and 𝜂 represents the scale
parameter. The method of finding the shape parameter 𝛽 and the scale parameter 𝜂
using Weibull distribution can be recapitulate as follows (see more details in [7]):
1) Historical statistics is used to find the aging failure numbers of same type of CB each
year.
2) The cumulative failure probability for each age year is calculated from the failure
density probability is used to find the cumulative failure probability at each age. As the
failure density probability of CB can be found by dividing aging failure by total number
of working CBs in each age year.
3) A cumulative failure probability correlated to the age and CB age includes to form a
data pair. Historical statistics also includes many data pairs.
 42

4) For estimation of the shape parameter 𝛽 and the scale parameter least squares method
is used. The data in Step 3 is usedin (8) to produce
𝒕𝒇𝒊 𝜷
𝒍𝒏(𝟏 − 𝑭ai) = − ( 𝜼 ) + 𝒆𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2,3, … . , 𝑛)

(10)
here 𝑒𝑖 denotes the error among the data and the model of Weibull distribution (8), and
n represents the number of data pairs. The L function can be written as for showing the
sum of the squares of all errors;
𝒕𝒇𝒊 𝜷
𝑳 = ∑𝒏𝒊=𝟏[ 𝒍𝒏(𝟏 − 𝑭ai) + ( 𝜼 ) ]^𝟐 (11)

The shape parameter 𝛽 and the scale parameter 𝜂 can be found as followss
Ձ𝑳
=𝟎
Ձ𝜼
and
Ձ𝑳
=𝟎
Ձ𝜷
The functional age for a specific CB is calculated from equation (7) using its WI index
based on condition monitoring. The rate of aging failure 𝜆𝑎𝑔 is calculated by (9).
 43

Reliability Analysis Framework for

Substation

6.1 INCORPORATING CB AGING FAILURES IN

SUBSTATION RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT

6.1.1 Failure Model of a CB

Traditional substation reliability evaluation is done by a popular three-state model for
the components of substation. [22], [24], [34]. This model is based on different states
such as normal operation, repair and switching states, as shown by states 1, 2, and 3 in
Fig. 3. The aging failure state can be directly added to the typical three-state model as
shown by state 4 in Fig. 3. It is so suitable to combine the aging failure state and the
typical three-state model as aging failure is a new failure state because it is independent
of the conventional reparable active and passive failure states [16].
In Fig. 6-1, up state of the CB is shown as state 1, State 2 represents the repair state;
State 3 represents the switching state, aging failure state is the state 4; λ ag represents
aging failure rate. Failure rate is calculated by using the condition monitoring method.
It is based on aging failure rate model presented in Section 5.2; the aging failure is
replaced by the replacement rate µag ; the passive failure rate is λp; µ sw represents the
switching rate; λ a represents the active failure rate; µ represents the repair rate.
The frequency balance approach [34] is used in the state space model in Fig. 6-1:

𝑷𝟏 λ ag = P4 µag
𝑷𝟏 λ a = P3 µsw (12)
𝑷𝟏 λ p + P3 µsw = P2 µ
𝑷𝟏 + 𝑷𝟐 + 𝑷𝟑 + 𝑷𝟒 = 𝟏
 44

Figure 6-1 Four-state Markov model of a CB considering aging failure

The probabilities of the four states can be written as below;

µ µ𝐬𝐰. µ𝐚𝐠
𝐏𝟏 =
µµ𝐬𝐰µ𝐚𝐠 + (𝛌 𝐚 + 𝛌 𝐩 )µ𝐬𝐰. µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌 𝐚 . µ. µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌 𝐚𝐠. µ. µ𝐬𝐰
(𝛌 𝐚 + 𝛌 𝐩 )µ𝐬𝐰. µ𝐚𝐠
𝐏𝟐 =
µ. µ𝐬𝐰. µ𝐚𝐠 + (𝛌 𝐚 + 𝛌 𝐩 )µ𝐬𝐰. µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌 𝐚 . µ. µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌 𝐚𝐠. µ. µ𝐬𝐰
𝛌 𝐩 . µ. µ𝐚𝐠
𝐏𝟑 =
µ. µ𝐬𝐰. µ𝐚𝐠 + (𝛌 𝐚 + 𝛌 𝐩 )µ𝐬𝐰. µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌 𝐚 . µ. µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌 𝐚𝐠. µ. µ𝐬𝐰

𝛌 𝐚𝐠. µ. µ𝐬𝐰
𝐏𝟒 = (13)
µ. µ𝐬𝐰. µ𝐚𝐠 + (𝛌 𝐚 + 𝛌 𝐩 )µ𝐬𝐰. µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌 𝐚 . µ. µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌 𝐚𝐠. µ. µ𝐬𝐰

According to principle, each state probability can be applied directly to the state
enumeration method for reliability assessment of substation. In some situations when
an automatic switching safety scheme is equipped for the completion of immediate
switching, States 2 and 3 acts as a single combined state so the calculation burden is
lessen in the method of state enumeration. In these cases, the four-state model is
assumed equal as the three-state model, shown in Fig. 6.2.
 45

Figure 6-2 Equivalent three-state model of a CB

Each state probability in the equivalent three-state model is denoted by subscripted

probability. State 1 represents the up state of the CB, the equivalent non-aging state is
State 2; and State 3' represents the aging failure state; λ represents the equivalent non-
aging failure rate. Using (14), the state probabilities in the equivalent model are
represented as follows:
µ µ𝐚𝐠
𝐏𝟏′ =
µ µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌 𝐚𝐠 µ
𝛌 µ𝐚𝐠
𝐏𝟐′ =
µ µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌 𝐚𝐠 µ
𝛌 𝐚𝐠 µ
𝐏𝟑′ = (14)
µ µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌µ𝐚𝐠 + 𝛌 𝐚𝐠 µ
State 2' of the equivalent model comprised of state 2 and state 3 in the four-state model
and therefore

𝐏𝟐′ = 𝐏𝟐 + 𝐏𝟑 (15)

By putting P2′ in (14) and P1and P2 in (13) into (15), 𝜆 can be written as follows:

µ
𝛌 = 𝛌 𝐚 µ𝐬𝐰+ 𝛌 𝐚 + 𝛌 𝐩 (16)

The repair time is greater than switching time, which gives µsw ≫ µ , by ignoring first
term. From (16) it is observed that by ignoring first term, the switching state and the
repair state is merged. An equivalent will not create an effective error when automatic
switching protection scheme is used. The original four-state model should be directly
used when error is our main concern.
 46

6.1.2 Failure Model of Other Components

The typical three-state model (up state, switching state and repair state) can be used to
operate other components. There is a need of equivalent two-state model the repairing
state and switching state is combined to form one equivalent state. While accounting
the aging failure of a component (such as a transformer), four-state or equivalent three-
state model comprised of an aging failure state can be applied. As the aging failure
model based on state monitoring varies from one component to another (such as
transformers). It is different for circuit breakers as emphasized in the paper. The
estimated parameters totally varies and must be modeled differently [24]. The current
case study focuses the aging failure model of only CBs. The impact of the aging failure
of each single CB in substation reliability assessment is observed during this research
work.
6.1.3 Substation Reliability Assessment Method
The state enumeration method is applied for assessing the substation reliability.[24].
The main steps are highlighted as follows:
1) A three-state or equivalent two-state model is applied to for non-aging failure
components (such as transformers, buses, and those CBs whose aging failures are not
considered) a three-state or equivalent two-state model is utilized, and a four-state or
equivalent three-state model is used for the CBs whose aging failures are to be focused.
2) The probabilities of individual component states is derived by solving the state
space equations of each component.
3) For the selection of substation system states the state enumeration technique is used.
4) The examination of connectivity between the source points and the load points in a
chosen substation system state by a simple network. The system state is identified as
failed if a load point is disconnected from all sources, for this the curtailed load is
recorded. A linear programming model is applied to calculate the curtailed load at each
load point when the connectivity cannot be identified for a complex network [34], [35].
5) Following equations are used for evaluating the reliability indices at individual load
point:
a) Load curtailments probability (PLC) is given as follows:
 47

𝑵𝒌

𝑷𝑳𝑪𝒌 = ∑ 𝑷𝒊𝒌 (17)

𝒊=𝟏

here PLCk is the PLC index at load point k, Pik denotes the probability of the ith failure
state corresponding to the load point k, and Nk represents the number of the failure
modes in which the load point k has to be curtailed at load point

b) Expected energy not supply (EENS, MWh/year)

𝑵𝑲

𝑬𝑬𝑵𝑺𝑲 = ∑ 𝑷𝒊𝒌 . 𝑳𝑪𝒊 . 𝑻 (18)

𝒊=𝟏

here EENSk is the EENS index at load point k,LCi (MW) at load point k is the curtailed
load in the ith failure state, and T is the time period recorded (usually one year with
8760 h)

c) Expected damage cost ($/year)

𝑬𝑫𝑪𝑲 = 𝒃 ∗ 𝑬𝑬𝑵𝑺𝑲 (19)
here EDCk is the EDC index at load point k and b is the average damage cost in $/MWh.
The reliability indices for the system (i.e., the entire substation configuration) can be
calculated similarly by the use of same method.
 48

Case Study; Calculations and Observations

7.1 Substation Configuration

The configuration of electric power company substation in the southwest of China, as
shown in Fig. 7-1, is used to illustrate the presented techniques. This substation consists
of two 220/110-kV transformers (model: SFSZ10-H-150000/220 GYW), eleven110kV
CBs (model:LW25-126/T3150-40), two bus divisions, two power supply connections,
and eight load points. The double bus section structure, which is very well-known in
the substation layout design, is selected for configuration of substation. The link breaker
B7 is normally founded open among the two bus sections and the eight loads are
approximately equally assigned to the two bus divisions is present in the normal
operation state. B3 and B8 are the two incoming branches of CBs, whereas the other
eight CBs are the outgoing circuit breakers. If there is a fault in any equipment’s (a
transformer, a CB or a bus section) incoming path. An immediate automatic switching
protection scheme provides the different paths to the load.

Figure 7-1 Network of the 220/110-kV substation

 49

Table 7-1 Loads supplied by the substation

LD 1 LD 2 LD 3 LD 4 LD 5 LD 6

Load(MW) 8.46 7.35 10.87 36.61 13.45 19.76

Table 7-2 condition monitoring data of CBs

Breaker Condition monitoring data

no. P Moisture
t2(msec) t3(msec) t4(msec) t5(msec) t6(msec) (MPa) (ppm)
B2 0.756 16.023 27.132 66.422 66.654
0.5942 145
B3 0.742 15.543 41.365 66.378 62.543
0.595 144
B5 1.215 8.854 34.028 56.944 61.285
0.5908 142
B8 2.629 16.023 31.955 66.527 67.013
0.5742 110
B9 0.976 13.987 32.371 65.136 65.352
0.57 103
B10 0.868 12.5 32.693 58.16 68.229
0.5488 103

7.2 Aging Analysis of the CB

The coefficients A, B and C observed by using the MATLAB curve fitting toolbox from
wear-out indices and ages in historical statistical data. In this case A, B and D were
evaluated as 0.1439, 0.03850, and 0.15, respectively. Weibull distribution is used to
estimate the shape parameter 𝛽 and the scale parameter 𝜂 shape parameter 𝛽 and the
scale parameter 𝜂 using the method in Section II-C. 𝛽 = 3.458 and 𝜂 = 48.002 in this
case.
Aging failures of six CBs (B2, B3, B5, B8, B9 and B10) are accounted in the analysis.
The condition monitoring data for the six CBs are presented in Table IV. These data
are from [16]. The state monitoring data is normalized using (1). The normalized data
are shown in Table V. The complete states indices (Q) are calculated using (3) or (4)
and the wear-out indices (WI) are calculated using (5). The Q and WI indices for the six
CBs are also given in Table 7.3.
 50

Table 7-3 Normalized condition data, overall condition indices and wear-out indices of the CBs

Normalized condition data Overall Wear-

condition out
Breaker index
t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 P index (Q)
no. (WI)
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (Mpa)
0.5911 0.4563174 0.4692122 0.4630 0.8994 0.4577
B2 0.5364 0.4635
0.5867 0.5780767 0.5560500 0.4670 0.4279 0.4448
B3 0.4985 0.5014
0.7322 0.1909944 0.9940515 0.9609 0.2958 0.5138
B5 0.2434 0.7565
0.9980 0.4563174 0.9052436 0.4533 0.9279 0.7911
B8 0.76234 0.2376
0.6595 0.9303011 0.9308436 0.5857 0.7676 0.8521
B9 0.799453 0.2005
0.6260 0.9674825 0.9481735 0.9962 0.9905 0.9994
B10 0.913977 0.0860

The functional ages of the CBs are evaluated by using equation (7) and then their aging
failure rates are evaluated by using equation (9). The natural ages, functional ages,
wear-out indices and aging failure rates of the CBs are given in Table 7-4
From Table 7-3 it can be seen that the natural age and functional age varies for
individual CB. The functional age can be evaluated from (7) accounts the wearing
condition of each individual CB, which is presented by its wear-out index. If the
functional age of a CB is older than its natural age, it shows that the aging degradation
of the CB is at fast pace than its natural age, as B5. If the functional age of a CB is more
than its real age, it shows that the aging degradation of the CB is at slow than that is
shown by its original age, such as B9. The functional age depends on the wearing state
which is the collection of multiple factors including operational states, operating
environment and maintenance history. Therefore, the functional age can better show
the aging process of a CB than its original age.
 51

Table 7-4 Natural ages, Functional ages and wear-out indices and aging failure rates of the CBs
Breaker Natural age Functional Wear-out Aging failure
no. tn (years) age tf (years) index rate (f/year)

B2 44 37.66491713 0.463523104 0.039690946

B3 36 39.22380568 0.501472466 0.043851403
B5 40 47.8070524 0.75658984 0.071322987

B8 20 25.74052783 0.237660104 0.015571697

B9 30 23.1266714 0.200547235 0.011968186
B10 15 12.85219185 0.086022703 0.002824257

7.3 Results in Substation Reliability Assessment

The substation configuration is shown in Fig. 5. The six circuit breakers (B2, B3, B5,
B8, B9, and B10) are indicated using the model including aging failures presented in
Section 5.2, whereas the rest of CBs and other components (transformers and bus
sections) are represented using the conventional model that eliminates aging failures.
The reliability data are mentioned in Tables 7-5 and 7-6, respectively. It is noted that
the repairable failure data are average values based on historical failure records which
can be obtained from a reliability database effectiveness.

Table 7-5 Reliability data of components not considering aging failures

Failure rate
Component
Active Passive Repair time
(failures/year) (failures/year) (hrs/year)

B1 0.0033 0.0007 24.6

B4 0.0011 0.00033 22.5
B6 0.00412 0.00011 100.8
B11 0.00131 0.00012 98.2
Transformer 0.0891 0.0021 500
Bus section 0.0912 NA 25.2
 52

Table 7-6 Reliability data of components considering aging failures

Repairable failure Non-repairable failure
Component Repair time Failure rate (f/year) Replacement Aging
(hrs/repair) time failure rate
Active Passive (hrs/repair) (f/year)

B2 98.4 0.0072 0.0008 190.3 0.0406

B3 97.7 0.0023 0.00023 185.3 0.046
B5 97.3 0.00213 0.00019 182.4 0.072
B8 92.1 0.00092 0.00007 175.5 0.016
B9 94.5 0.00129 0.00014 181.4 0.0118
B10 93.2 0.00112 0.00011 182.8 0.0029

The state enumeration method in Section 6.1.3 is used to estimate the EENS indices.
The impact of each single CB's aging failure on the substation reliability is assessed.
Two EENS assessment cases are considered for the calculation of aging failure. In the
first case, which is called the base case. For this case any aging failure rate is not
considered. In other words, modelling of only reparable failures of all components are
done. In the second case, which is also known as the aging failure case, the aging failure
rate of a CB is also accounted along with the reparable failures of all components. The
difference in the EENS among the two cases is due to the aging failure of that CB. The
results are accounted in Table 7-7.

Table 7-7 EENS contribution due to the aging failure of each CB (MWh/year)

Base case Aging Failure case Difference

B2 aging failure only 41.5309 98.63 57.1221

B3 aging failure only 41.5309 45.1725 3.6416
B5 aging failure only 41.5309 531.7893 490.2584
B8 aging failure only 41.5309 42.7571 1.2262

B9 aging failure only 41.5309 85.6882 44.1573

B10 aging failure only 41.5309 42.4371 0.9062
 53

7.4 Results and Observations:

The following observations are concluded:

• There are two main reasons because of which B5 has the greatest influence on
substation reliability. Firstly, B5's functional age is 48.37 years but its original age
is 40 years. This means that B5 not only has reached the end of life but also
becomes faster than the condition represented by its original age, which presents a
high aging failure rate. Secondly, B5 represents outgoing branch breaker that is
joined to the largest load (LD4). Therefore, more attention should be paid for
attention and maintenance strategy by B5.
• B2 and B9 are both outgoing branch breakers. By Comparing to B2 with a
functional age of 38.10 years, B9 is with younger functional age of 23.4 years,
which is known as diminish wearing condition. As B9 is connected to a larger load
(LD6=19.76 MW) as that of B2 (LD2=7.35 MW), the EENS is produced by the
aging failure of B9 (44.41MWh/year) is smaller than the EENS produced by the
aging failure of B2 (54.76MWh/year). This indicates that the aging failure varies
greatly in the reliability influence of outgoing branch breakers.
• B10 shares a very small value of EENS even though B10 is also an outgoing branch
breaker. Firstly, the load share to B10 is small. Secondly, B10 is in a non-aged
condition and its functional age is just 13.15 years. It can be observed from Table
VIII that the aging failure rate and repairable failure rate of B10 are of the same
magnitude. If resources for maintenance are limited, low priority of B10 can be set.
• In the substation configuration B3 and B8 are the two incoming branch breakers.
Compared to the outgoing branch breakers, failures of the ingoing branch breakers
usually have much low influence on substation system reliability because of the
dual-bus section structure. The merit of the dual-bus section structure is its high
reliability in the incoming paths. The bus section will not curtail the load when one
bus section or one transformer fails, unless another order failure event happens.
Therefore, the aging failures of B3 and B8 shares very small EENS values.

Calculations of the expected damage costs caused by the aging failures of CBs are done
by using [20] and shown in Fig. 6. The average unit damage cost is estimated to be
60$/MWh. The aging failure of B5 produces the highest expected damage cost,
 54

followed by the aging failures of B2 and B9. Therefore, it is needed to focus on the
maintenance of B5, B2 and B9 in the maintenance plan.

Figure 7-2 EENS Contribution due to aging failure of CBs

Table 7-8 Estimated Damage Cost

EENS for each CB EDC ($/year)

57.1221 3427.326

3.6416 218.496

490.2584 29415.504

1.2262 73.572

44.1573 2649.438

0.9062 54.372
 55

Figure 7-3 EDC due to aging failure of CBs

In Comparison of EENS and EDC indices for the complete substation, accounting
among the aging failures of the six circuit breakers (B2, B3, B5, B8, B9, and B10) and
not considering aging failure at all, are shown in Figs. 7-2 and 7-3, respectively. It can
clearly observed that there is a great difference between the results considering and not
considering aging failures. It can be concluded that aging failures of CBs cannot be
ignored in substation reliability assessment and that ignoring aging failures of CBs will
result in important underestimation of substation unreliability.
 56

Sensitivity Analysis of Circuit Breaker

Sensitivity analysis is also known as what-if analysis. The analysis shows how the
dependent variable value is affected by the change in independent variables under
certain assumptions and specifications. In other words, sensitivity analysis is the
measure of sensitization of output with the change in one input factor while keeping
other parameters or factors constant. Similarly sensitization or the changes in output
can be observed by varying all other input factors. The principle of sensitization is
“Observing the output behavior while changing the model parameters”. The noticeable
parameters of sensitivity analysis are,
 Experimental design
 What to vary
 What to observe
Sensitivity analysis is carried out by first defining the base case output. All values
other than one are kept constant and the value for the output is calculated at a new value
of the input .The percentage change in output and the percentage change in input is
calculated. Then finally sensitivity is found by dividing percentage change in output to
percentage change in input. The higher the sensitivity value, the more sensitive the
output is to the change in input.
Sensitivity analysis would be helpful in finding the reliability increase to an
acceptable value.

8.1 By varying time parameters

Sensitivity analysis is performed assuming ±1% and ±2% error in the raw monitored
parameter measurements. Results are as follows:
 98% of normal values:
Initially t2 has value 0.756 (which is close to its lower limit of 0.0), so a negative error
will bring its value farther away from its original condition monitoring parameter
measurement, which would result in increasing the value of wear-out index from 0.4634
to 0.472409.
 57

t3 initially has value of 16.023 (which is closer to its upper limit of 5.5), so negative
error would bring its value away from upper limit, resulting in decreasing of wear-out
index value from 0.472409 to 0.461129.
t4 initially has value of 27.132 which is close to its lower limit, so a negative error will
bring its value farther away from its original condition monitoring parameter
measurement, which would result in increasing the value of wear-out index from
0.461129 to 0.468117.
t5 initially has value of 66.422 which is close to its upper limit, so a negative error will
bring its value farther away from its original condition monitoring parameter
measurement, which would result in decreasing the value of wear-out index from
0.468117 to 0.450358.
t6 initially has value of 66.654 which is close to its lower limit, so a negative error will
bring its value farther away from its original condition monitoring parameter
measurement, which would result in increasing the value of wear-out index from
0.450358 to 0.469309.
So, overall wear-out index has been increased from 0.4634 to 0.469309. It means most
of the parameters were at their lower limit.

 102% of normal values:

Initially t2 has value 0.756 which is close to its lower limit (of 0.0), so a positive error
will bring its value farther away from its original condition monitoring parameter
measurement, which would result in decreasing the value of wear-out index from
0.4634 to 0.455297
t3 initially has value of 16.023 which is closer to its upper limit (of 5.5), so positive error
would bring its value closer to upper limit, resulting in increasing wear-out index value
from 0.455297 to 0.465644.
t4 initially has value of 27.132 which is close to its lower limit, so a positive error will
bring its value farther away from its original condition monitoring parameter
measurement, which would result in decreasing the value of wear-out index from
0.465644 to 0.458104.
t5 initially has value of 66.422 which is close to its upper limit, so a positive error will
bring its value farther away from its original condition monitoring parameter
 58

measurement, which would result in increasing the value of wear-out index from
0.458104to 0.474972.
t6 initially has value of 66.654 which is close to its lower limit, so a positive error will
bring its value farther away from its original condition monitoring parameter
measurement, which would result in decreasing the value of wear-out index from
0.474972to 0.462852.
So, overall wear-out index has been decreased from 0.4634 to 0.462852. It means most
of the parameters were at their lower limit.

8.2 By varying Pressure:

 98% of normal value:
Initially pressure has value of 0.5942 which is closer to its upper limit. 98% of this
value means drifting away from upper value which would result in decreasing of value
of wear-out index from 0.4634 to 0.436719.
 102% of normal value:
102% of normal value means now the value of parameter is closer to its upper limit
which would lead in increased wear-out index value from 0.4634 to 0.48913.

8.3 By varying Moisture:

Considering breaker B2, initially it has following values of time parameters:
 98% of normal value:
Initially moisture has value of 145 ppm which is closer to its upper limit. 98% of this
value means drifting away from upper value which would result in decreasing of value
of wear-out index from 0.4634 to 0.460428.
 99% of normal value:
99% of normal value means drifting away from lower value which would result in
increasing value of wear-out index from 0.4634 to 0.490669
 101% of normal value:
102% of normal value means now the value of parameter is closer to its upper limit
which would lead in increased wear-out index value from 0.4634 to 0.503621.
 102% of normal value:
102% of normal value means now the value of parameter is closer to its upper limit
which would lead in increased wear-out index value from 0.4634 to 0.467769.
The complete table of results of sensitivity analysis is attached in Annexure-I.
 59

Conclusion and Recommendations

This report proposes a CB aging failure model based on condition monitoring.

Compared to the traditional aging model that only considers the natural age of CBs, the
proposed model can reflect the aging degree represented by the wearing status of a CB.
The natural age of a CB cannot accurately represent its aging condition. The functional
age that is estimated from the proposed wear-out index can be used to more objectively
describe the wearing process of CBs. Impacts of CB aging failures are not considered
in a traditional substation reliability assessment. The proposed aging failure rate model
can be added to the traditional Markov reliability model of a CB and CB aging failure
influences can be incorporated into substation reliability assessment. The results in the
case study indicate that the aging failures of CBs in their end-of-life stages have great
impacts on substation reliability. The differences in the EENS indices between
considering and not considering aging failures of CBs are significant and therefore
aging failures of CBs should not be ignored in substation reliability assessment. Aging
failure influence analysis of CBs and sensitivity analysis of condition monitoring data
can provide important information in condition monitoring and equipment maintenance
decision-making.
Sensitivity analysis of CB shows that a positive error or negative error can increase or
decrease the estimates in the wear-out index and functional age, depending on whether
the dominant original condition monitoring parameter measurement is closer to its
lower or upper limit. If a monitoring parameter measurement is closer to its lower limit,
its positive error will bring it closer to its lower limit and therefore has an effect on
decreasing the wear-out index. If a monitoring parameter measurement is closer to its
upper limit, its positive error will bring it further closer to its upper limit and therefore
has an effect on increasing the wear-out index.

9.1 Value of work

This research work provides an excellent frame work for developing aging failure
models of circuit breaker.
 60

 It overcomes demerits of traditional aging failure rate model

 Incorporating AF considerations brings results closer to reality
 Aging failures considerations bring substation reliability improvement

9.2 Model Limitations

As discussed earlier, aging failures of circuit breakers have been long ignored, therefore
while modeling, various problems related to data are faced.
 Availability of little data on aging failures effects results fitness.
 Non availability of weighting factor values also lead to a compromise in results.
 61

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 64

Annexure-I
Brea Parameter Lower Upper Normal WI corresponding to different variation %ages of parameter
ker limit limit value measurements
no.
98% 99% 100% 101% 102%
t2 (msec) 0.0 5.5 0.756 0.4693 0.467969 0.4634 0.463186 0.45873

t3 (msec) 9.8 16.4 0.4563 0.456241 0.462005 0.4634 0.473095 0.478346

t4 (msec) 26.0 43.4 27.132 0.474691 0.471202 0.4634 0.464004 0.460317

B2 t5 (msec) 49.9 67.5 66.422 0.449695 0.458786 0.4634 0.476086 0.484009

t6 (msec) 62.0 75.8 66.654 0.486781 0.476499 0.4634 0.460637 0.455872

P (MPa) 0.5 0.6 0.5942 0.468048 0.45389 0.4634 0.481183 0.492843

Moisture 0.0 150 145 0.488464 0.490669 0.4634 0.494983 0.497089

(ppm)
t2 (msec) 0.0 5.5 0.742 0.509594 0.50927 0.505209 0.501142 0.500812

t3 (msec) 9.8 16.4 15.543 0.489951 0.495704 0.505209 0.507206 0.512858

t4 (msec) 26.0 43.4 41.365 0.48984 0.495663 0.505209 0.50722 0.512861

B3 t5 (msec) 49.9 67.5 66.378 0.483332 0.492517 0.505209 0.510034 0.51807

t6 (msec) 62.0 75.8 62.243 0.520248 0.511299 0.505209 0.490951 0.479988

P (MPa) 0.5 0.6 0.5950 0.472857 0.487399 0.505209 0.514447 0.525897

Moisture 0.0 150 144 0.497083 0.499292 0.505209 0.503621 0.505737

(ppm)
t2 (msec) 0.0 5.5 1.215 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659

t3 (msec) 9.8 16.4 8.854 0.769146 0.763025 0.75659 0.749837 0.742764

t4 (msec) 26.0 43.4 34.028 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659

B5 t5 (msec) 49.9 67.5 56.944 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659

t6 (msec) 62.0 75.8 61.285 0.793845 0.770052 0.75659 0.712143 0.678556

P (MPa) 0.5 0.6 0.5908 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659

Moisture 0.0 150 142 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659 0.75659

(ppm)
 65

Brea Parameter Lower Upper Normal WI corresponding to different variation %ages of parameter
ker limit limit value measurements
no.
98% 99% 100% 101% 102%
t2 (msec) 0.0 5.5 2.629 0.237579 0.23742 0.237287 0.23718 0.237099

t3 (msec) 9.8 16.4 16.023 0.225777 0.231599 0.237287 0.242801 0.248105

t4 (msec) 26.0 43.4 31.995 0.243754 0.240391 0.237287 0.234466 0.23195

B8 t5 (msec) 49.9 67.5 66.527 0.219589 0.22876 0.237287 0.246132 0.254052

t6 (msec) 62.0 75.8 67.013 0.255435 0.245698 0.237287 0.23174 0.22826

P (MPa) 0.5 0.6 0.5742 0.207373 0.216625 0.237287 0.241476 0.255441

Moisture 0.0 150 110 0.234572 0.236101 0.237287 0.239247 0.240859

(ppm)
t2 (msec) 0.0 5.5 0.976 0.201411 0.200979 0.200547 0.200116 0.199685

t3 (msec) 9.8 16.4 13.987 0.195347 0.197728 0.200547 0.203774 0.207377

t4 (msec) 26.0 43.4 32.371 0.206447 0.20335 0.200547 0.198059 0.195906

B9 t5 (msec) 49.9 67.5 65.136 0.182569 0.191489 0.200547 0.209544 0.218299

t6 (msec) 62.0 75.8 65.352 0.22314 0.211614 0.200547 0.190407 0.181657

P (MPa) 0.5 0.6 0.5700 0.183589 0.190645 0.200547 0.212593 0.225983

Moisture 0.0 150 103 0.198068 0.19929 0.200547 0.201838 0.203162

(ppm)
t2 (msec) 0.0 5.5 0.868 0.086796 0.086409 0.086023 0.085636 0.08525

t3 (msec) 9.8 16.4 12.5 0.090548 0.088109 0.086023 0.084307 0.082975

t4 (msec) 26.0 43.4 32.693 0.091376 0.088539 0.086023 0.083848 0.082033

B10 t5 (msec) 49.9 67.5 58.16 0.086749 0.083798 0.086023 0.0815 0.082211

t6 (msec) 62.0 75.8 68.229 0.092596 0.08608 0.086023 0.080689 0.082125

P (MPa) 0.5 0.6 0.5548 0.090176 0.084484 0.086023 0.082998 0.087309

Moisture 0.0 150 103 0.079554 0.080776 0.086023 0.083324 0.084648

(ppm)

Results of Sensitivity Analysis of aging parameters