Davao Sawmill v.

Meralco

Facts:
o DS = holder of a lumber concession from PI Gov
o DS operated a sawmill on a land in Davao
o Land BELONGED to another person
o DS erected a building on land and housed machinery in it, machinery = personal property
o CT of lease bet DS and Land owner
 Improvements + buildings erected by DS goes to original owner without him paying any
amount
 If DS abandons land before time stipulated, orig owners gets everything as if time expired
 Machineries and accessories are not improvements which will pass to orig owner
o Davao light and power Co V. DS
 DL won --> writ of execution issued and prop levied upon as personality by sheriff
 DS took possession of the machinery
o DS treated machinery as personal prop --> issued chattel mortgages (ART 334 CC P1, 5 = real
property)

Issues:

1. What is the nature of the property on the land leased by DS? Personal, movable property
o Machinery involved was not intended by the original owner for the use of the land --> Intended by
DS (lessor) for the building that they erected, land to be returned to lessee
o US SC --> machinery that is movable in its nature only becomes immovable if original owner places
it in the land
o Things are immovable either by their nature or destination --> movable machinery only becomes
immovable if placed in the land by original owner --> DS only had temp. right to land

(BK) Berkenkoter v. Cu Unjieng (CU)

Facts:
o (MS)Mabalacat Sugar Co.Inc. = owner of sugar central in Pampangga
o MS obtained a loan from CU --> secured by a 1st mortgage of two parcels of land including
buildings, imporvements etc. + whatever forms part or is a necessary complement of the sugar-cane
mill
o MS wanted to increase the capacity of its sugar central by buying additional machinery and
equipment (wanted 250 tons instead of 150 tons) --> m and e = Php 100k
o BA Green = President of MS proposed to BK to advance the needed amt. for the m and e --> BA said
he'll reimburse BK as soon as he got add'l loan from CU --> BK agreed
o BK gave BA Php 1,710 (totalling BA debt to Php 25, 750 + unpaid BK salary of Php 22k --> MS
bought m and e
o BA applied to CU for an add'l Php 75k loan, offering the add'l m and e as security, which was
already installed in the sugar central after the execution of the original mortgage --> CU DECLINED
o 1877 CC + Bischoof v Pomar
 Mortgage of Real Estate includes improvements and fixtures --> in the mortgage of real
estate, improvements of the same are included (all objects permanently attached)
 Machinery only excluded if explicitly stated in mortgage

Issues:
1. WoN add'l m and e as an improvement are subject to the mortgage deed? YES
o BK: installation of m and e was not permanent bec. BA said that if he fails to obtain the add'l Php
75k loan from CU, M and E would be security for this loan and BA cant mortgage or encumber said
m and e until BK fully reimbursed
o BA = owner of m and e, thats why he could offer this as security
  334 CC p5: character of real prop. given to machinery etc. intended by owner for use in
connection with any industry being carried out on the land
o Installation of M and E in sugar central converted it to real prop, now permanent in character
because it is essential to the principle elements of a sugar central
o BA bound himself to BL to hold said M and E as security
 nothing could prevent him from doing so bec. BA was wner
 BK only had the right of redemption
 this did not alter the permanent character of the m and e
 sale of M and E to BA, using BK capital did not vest BK with ownership, only right to redemption

Lopez v. Orosa

Facts:
o Enrique Lopez (EL) did business under trade name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill
o Vicente Orosa (VO) invited EL to make an investment in the theater business for a corporation to be
known as Plaza theater inc.
o EL refused but agreed to supply lumber for the construction and said that payment for said
materials would be on an on demand basis --> verbal agreement
o Total cost of mtrls = Php 66,255.85 --> VO only paid P 20,848.5 leaving P 41,771.35 bal
o VO acquired Plaza theater land on sept 25, 1946 for P6K
o EL pressed VO to pay bal -> VO and Belarmino Rustia (BR = Pres. of corp.) promised to obtain a
bank loan to satisfy the bal
o EL didnt know that they already obtained a P30K loan from PNB with Luzon Surety as surety -->
executed a mortgage on land and building for Luzon Surety, land registered on Nov 16, 1946 with
OCT 0-391 showing no encumberance on it
o VO executed a deed of assignment of his 420 shares of stock to Plaza theater (P100 per share =
P42K) for EL --> OB still unsettled, EL filed complaint in CFI for VO and Plaza theatre to be solidarily
liable for the bal owed to him
 If they cant pay, either land and building or 420 shares to be sold in a public auction to
satisfy the credit
 lis pendens annotated on props
o VO and Plaza Theater --> materials were purchased and recieved on personal account, no lien on
land to secure payment of bal, 420 shares were not assigned to EL as collateral but as security for
payment of debt
 420 shares = personal property of VO --> EL cant recover deficiency if sale in public auction
is not enough to pay bal
 EL did not claim materials within 30 days, lost all rights
 PT incorporated on 0ct 14, 1946, could not have any ob prior to this date
o Luzon Surety filed a pet. for review for the registration of said land to annotate the rights and
interests of the surety
o EL opposed because the bal owed to him = preferred lien, LS was guilty of negligence when it failed
to present an opposition to the application
o CFI ruled for EL --> VO and PT solidarily liable for bal
 EL had materialman's lien over the building only bec. land was not yet owned by corp in
may, 1946
 EL lien = superior to that of luzon surety

Issues:
1. WoN materialman's lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the
building attaches to the building only and not the land? NO
o EL: lien created in his favor also extends to the land on which building rests upon (1923
Spansih Civil Code)
o Real Estate = land + building, but inclusion of building separate from land in 1923
enumeration makes building immovable property
 o Building = immovable regardless of whether or not building + land belongs to the same
owner
o lien attaches only to the immovable prop of which the obligation was incurred

Tumalad v. Vicencio

Facts:
o Alberta Vicencio and Emiliano Simeon (VS) issued in favor of Gavino and Generosa Tumalad (GT) a
chattel mortgage over their house of strong materials (Quezon Boulevard, Manila 6-B, 7-B) --> lots
were being rented from Madrigal and Co. Inc
o Mortgage done to guarantee a loan of P4800 (P150 monthly payable in 1yr with 12% int), default in
any payment makes unpaid bal due and payable, Chattel Mortgage is enforceable, sheriff can sell all
mortgagors prop to settle their debts
o VS defaulted in payment, house sold in public auction, GT = highest bidders
o GT filed civil case in MTC praying house be vacated + VS pay P200 rent from 1956 till time
possession was surrendered --> MTC ruled for GT
 VS impugned legality of chattel mortgage --> said they were still owners of house
o VS did not pay rent, house demolished --> CFI same decision as MTC

Issues:
1. WoN MTC had jurisdiction to adjucate? YES
o VS: Chattel Mortgage = void ab inition bec. their signitures were obtained through fraud + subject
matter of mortgage is a house of strong materials aka its immovable thus it can only be the subject
of a real estate mortgage and not a chattel mortgage --> nothing on record that shows that
mortgage was anulled
 Fraud charge = allegations only, not evidence
 VS: only personal properties can be subject of a chattel mortgage
 Lopez v Orosa: building = immovable prop regardless if owner of land is the same
 Manarang v Ofilda: parties to a contract may by agreement treat real prop as
personal prop
 SC: House belonging to a person stands on rented land belonging to another person
may be mortgaged as personal prop
 House on rented land here is expressly designated as chattel mortgage + provides that VS
cedes, sells and transfers prop and leasehold rights to GT
 House is personal prop bec. it stood on rented lot which VS only had temporary rights
2. WoN VS bound by law to pay rentals? NO
o Mortgaged house was demolished in 1957, court thus sentenced VS to pay P200 monthly rent from
Jan 14, 1956 (Chattel Mortgage foreclosed + house sold) till Jan 14, 1957
o VS: they were entitled to remain in possession without any ob to pay rent until March 27, 1957
o Chattel Mortgage Law s14: mortgagee can mortgage prop at a public auction provided that reqs of
law relative to notice and reg are complied with --> parties in this case said that mortgage will be
enforceable accdg to act 3135
 VS may at anytime within 1 yr after the date of auction sale redeem the prop sold at extra
judicial foreclosure
 Purchaser (GT) may obtain from court the possession of prop during redemption period
 Reyes v Hamada: rentals recoverable from tenants, do not belong to the latter but still
pertain to the debtor of mortgagor --> done to secure for the benefit of the debtor or mortgagor the
payment of redemption amount
o VS occupied house at time of sale --> can remain in possession during period of redemption (1 year
from March 27, 1956)
 Period of redemption not yet expired when action was instituted

Associated Insurance v. Iya

Facts:
 o Adriano Valino and Lucia Valino = owned and possessed a house of strong materials on Lot 3 in
Grace Park Subdv in Caloocan Rizal
o Spouses bought it from PI Realty Corp on an installment basis
o Lucia, to purchase credit rice from Naric filed a P11K subscribed by Associated Insurance and
Surety Co. --> Counter-guaranty, Valino executed allege "chattel mortgage" on house,
encumberance was noted under Chattel Mortgage Law
o Land was still under the name of PI realty at this time
o After completing payment to PI realty on lot, Valinos secured TCT 27884
o To secure a P12K debt, Valinos executed "real estate mortgage" over house and lot for Isabel Iya --
> noted on OCT
o Lucia failed NARIC OB., PI Surety compelled her to pay pursuant to the bond --> Spouses failed to
pay, PI Surety foreclosed mortgage over house
o House sold to PI surety through a public auction --> house declared in its name for tax purposes
o PI discovered real estate mortgage over lot along with its improvements --> instituted civil case in
CFI against spouses
 Surety Co. wanted house excluded from real estate mortgage + wanted to declare and
recognize its ownership over it
 Iya: bec. of real estate mortgage, she acquired a real right over the land and the house aka
public auction should be null and void for non-compliance with form required by law
o Iya filed action against spouses and surety co.
 CT of real estate mortgage --> Valino spouses pay P12K loan with interest at 12% per
annum (P120 a month), debt payable in 4 yrs
 To secure payment, Valinos mortgaged the house and lot
 default in payment of interest entitles Iya to foreclose the same
 Valinos failed to pay for 6 months
o AIC surety said it had a right to the building
 House constructed did not belong to Valinos at start of chattel mortgage (personal prop
only)
 Valino: admitted to real estate mortgage but said building was not included
o CFI: chattel mortgage for AIC was supperior to real estate mortgage for Isabel Iya
 Valinos not registered owner of the land when building was constructed at time of chattel
mortgage
 When real estate mortgage done, building became real property

Issues:
1. WoN Chattel Mortgage should receive preference over Real Estate Mortgage? NO
o CFI: Valinos were not owners of the land when building was first created --> building = personal
prop, can be subject of chattel mortgage
 Building = immovable regardless of whether or not it belongs to the same owner of the land
 Why? bec. the contrary brings confusion, creates a sitch where permanent fixture changes
its nature or character as ownership changes hands
o Chattel Mortgage = invalid because building is not a personal property
o AIC did not obtain ownership

Makati Leasing v. Wearever

Facts:
o Wearever Textile Mills (WM) assigned receivables to Makati Leasing (ML) under a Receivable
Purchase Agreement to obtain a loan
 Security: Chattel Mortgage over raw materials and machinery Artos Aero Dryer Stentering
Range
o WM defaulted, Sherriff enforced the seizure order of the lower court and removed the main drive
motor of the machinery
o CA: Ordered the return of the motor because it is real property under 415 CC --> only way to
remove is to destroy concrete floor
Issues:
1. WoN Machine = real or personal prop? Personal prop.
o Stipulated by the parties to be personal
o WM characterized machinery as chattel --> this is indicative of its intention to make prop. Personal
Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Meralco

Facts:
o PI commission enacted Act 484 --> Municipal Board of Manila can grant a franchise to construct,
maintain, and operate an electric street rail way, and electric light, heat, and power system -->
Charles Swift won the bid
o Manila Electric Co. became the owner of the Franchise
o Meralco constructed 40 steel towers in QC using land it owned, 3 inspected by LC
 1st Tower: 8ft, with 1 meter diameter opening, had two parallel steel bars attached to the
leg at the bottom of the post to prevent mobility, no foundation but there was an adobe stone
underneath
 others the same
o City Assessor: declared towers as real prop. Taxed Meralco P11, 651
o Court of Tax Appeals Cancelled this
 Steel Towers = poles, except under par 9 Act 484

Issues:
1. WoN Steel Towers falls under term poles? Yes
o Poles = long, cylindrical piece of wood or timber, wherein something is affixed/supported
o Steel posts were there to support electrical wires
o Just because its not wood doesnt mean it isnt a pole
2. WoN Steel Towers = real prop? NO, movable, personalty
o Art 415 Immovable Property
 P1 NO: Not buildings or constructions adhered to soil
 P3 NO: Not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner
 P5 NO: Not machineries, receptacles, not intened for industry or works on land
o Posts are easily removable, just attached to square metal frames by bolts (can be unscrewed)

Meralco Securities v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals

Facts:
o Pipeline Concession under Petroleum Act of 1949 (RA 387): Meralco installed a pipeline system
from Batangas to Manila
 cylindrical pipes joined together and buried not less than 1 meter below the surface
 pipes for white oil products = 14 inch diameter by 36 ft with 75k max capacity
 pipes for fuel and black oil = 16x48 ft with 100k max cap.
o Pipes embedded in soil and welded together to prevent breakage/damage
o Valves welded to pipes to make one single piece of property
o To repair, replace, remove, transfer segments of pipeline --> pipes have to be cold-cut by rotary
hard-metal pipe-cutter after digging them out aka permanently attached to land
o Meralco: pipe segments can be moved (permit by sec. of public works --> gov. has right to require
removal/transfer of pipes at meralco's expence if they affect any road repair/improvement)
o CA 470 (Assessment Law) --> provincial assessor of Laguna treated pipeline as real prop, taxed it
 Meralco appealed to Board of Assessment Appeals (ruled it was subject to realty tax

Issues:
1. WoN Pipeline system is Real Property? Yes
o Central Board of Assessment Appeals: Yes they should be taxed bec. pipes = machinery/
improvement contemplated in CA 470
  415-16CC has no app.: pipes are constructions adhered to soil and attached to land in a
fixed manner
o Meralco: pipeline is not real prop under 415,
 Real prop should not be taxed under CA470
o Meralco pipeline does not fall within classes of excempt real prop enumerated in CA470
o Pipeline system cannot be separated from soil without dismantling steel pipes
o Pipeline system = machinery within Real Property Tax Code
 Uses valves to maintain flow of oil
2. WoN Pipeline system should not be subject to realty tax? No
o Meralco: Yes bec. realty tax is local tax not tax of general application
o Yes bec. it is enforced throught the PI

Meralco V. Central Bd of Assessment

Facts:
 Meralco installed two storage tanks on a Batangas lot leased from Caltex
 The lots are within the Caltex refinery compound --> Total Capacity = 566K barrels, used for storing
fuel oil for Meralco's power plants
 Meralco --> Storage Tanks are personal property
o Tanks supported underneath by a circular wall made of Concrete 18 inches thick to prevent
tank from sliding
o Not attached to foundation, not welded to the concrete
o Only sits on foundation
 Hearing of Central Bd of Assessment Appeals --> Tanks are taxable improvements
o Area where two tanks are located is enclosed with earthen dikes w/ electric steel poles on
top of it
o Divided into two parts as site of tank --> both sides have two separate concrete steps
leading to the foundation of each tank
o Tank 2 supported by concrete foundation with asphalt lining about an inch thick
o Pipelines installed on the sides of the tank and connected to the Pipelines of Meralco
 Assessment --> Meralco pays realty tax on two tanks totaling to P431K
 Bd of Appeals --> tanks together with everything that surrounds it = Taxable improvements
 Meralco --> no, not within 415 and not attached to the land
 Meralco filed special civil action

Issues:
W/N Tanks are taxable improvements? YES
 Assessment Law, CA 470, Real Property tax Code, PD 464 --> Real property tax levied, collected,
assessed and collected on real property....and other improvements affixed/attached to the real
property
 Improvements = valuable addition made to property, amounts to more than repairs/replacement of
wastes, intended to enhance value etc. for new or further purposes
 Tanks = improvements --> enhances its utility and renders itself useful to the oil industry
 Installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the oil of Meralco
 For taxation, real prop may include things that are generally regarded as personal property
 Bd of AA V. Meralco --> not valid here, poles exempt from realty tax

Caltex v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals

Facts:
o Caltex installed MandEs in its gas stations located on leased land
 MandE's = underground tanks, elevated water tanks etc, gas pumps, air compressors
  City Assessor: Tank is dug 6ft deep to prevent conflagration, connected with a steel pipe to
the gasoline pump (under the shed), footing of pump is cement pad (imbedded in pavement under
the shed)
o MandE's loaned by Caltex to gas station operators under lease agreements --> shall be returned to
Caltex upon demand, lessor does not become owners
o City Assessor of Pasay CIty said MandE's are taxable P4541.1 annually
 MandE's are real prop according to Real Property Tax Code
 415-16 not applicable
o Caltex: MandE's not subject to realty tax

Issues:
1. WoN MandE's are subject to realty tax? Yes
o Assessment Law: Realty Tax is due on real property, including land, buildings, machinery and
other improvements
o MandE's are necessary for the operation of the gas station --> taxable under Assessment Law and
the Real Prop. Code

Benguet Corp. v. Central Bd of Assessment Appeals

Facts:
o Provincial Assessor of Zambales assessed properties of BC and said they were taxable
improvements
 Agreed upon by the Board of Assessment Appeals and Central Board Assessment Appeals
(Tailings of dam = improvement)
 They considered the dam as real property within 415CC (cannot be separated or detached

Issues:
1. WoN Tailings Dam = improvement? Yes
o BC: NO
 Tailings: no value separate from mine, integral part of mine, can serve as irrigation facility
after use, dam stripped prop. of any commercial value, environmental pollution control device,
requirement
o BC admitted that tailings dam = realty within 415, but it isnt an improvement
o SG: Improvement bec.
 enhances value and utility of mine (dam gets and hold water and lets BC impound water for
recycled use of the plant)
 Improvement under CA470 (Assessment law) --> subject to realty tax
o Even without tailings dam, BC mining operation can still be carried out
o Improvement = depends upon degree of permanence intended in its construction and use

LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION VS RAMOS (2004)

Facts:
o On July 25, 1987, Corazon Aquino issued EO No. 279 authorizing the DENR
o Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign
investors for contracts of agreement involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of
the Secretary, the President ma execute with the foreign proponent.
o On March 3, 1995, Fidel V. Ramos approved RA No. 7942 to “govern the exploration, development,
utilization and processing of all mineral resources.” RA No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral
agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval,
assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms.
o The law prescribes the qualifications of contractors and grants them certain rights, including
timber, water, and easement rights, and the right to possess explosives. The Act restricts the
Conditions for exploration, quarry and other permits. It likewise specifies grounds for the
cancellation, revocation and termination of agreements and permits.
o Shortly before the effectivity of RA No. 7942, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP
covering 99, 387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato.
o Then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 96-40 or the
IRR of RA No. 7942. Counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the
DENR stop the implementation of RA No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40. DENR did not respond or act on
the letter.
o Thus petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus. They allege that at the
time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an area of
8.4 million hectares, 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a
total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over
offshore areas. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
o They pray that the Court 1)permanently enjoin respondents from acting on any application for
FTAA, 2) declare RA 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void, 3) declare the IRR contained in the
DENR AO as unconstitutional and null and void, 4) cancel the FTAA issued to Western Mining
Philippines, Inc.
o WMCP is owned by WMC Resources International Pty., Ltd. (WMC), a wholly owned subsidiary of
Western Mining Corporation Holdings Limited, a publicly listed major Australian mining and
exploration company. By WMCP’s information, it is a 100% owned subsidiary of WMC Limited.
o WMCP, through a manifestation, alleged that WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines,
Inc., a corporation organized under Philippine laws. WMCP was subsequently renamed “Tampakan
Mineral Resources Corporation.”
o WMCP claims that at least 60% of the equity of Sagittarius is owned by Filipnos and/or Filipino-
owned corporations while about 40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, an Australian company.
It further claims that by such sale and transfer of shares, WMCP has ceased to be connected in any
way with WMC.
o By virtue of such sale and transfer, the DENR Secretary approved the transfer and registration of
FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. WMCP also points out that the original claimowners of the major
mineralized areas included in the WMCP FTAA are all Filipino-owned corporations, each of which is
a holder of an approved Mineral Sharing Agreement.

Issues:
W/N the WMCP FTAA is unconstitutional. YES.
The WMCP FTAA is unconstitutional. According to Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution, FTAAs should be limited to technical or financial assistance only. The WMCP FTAA,
however, allows WMCP, a fully foreign- owned mining corporation to extend more than mere financial
or technical assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of the
mining activity. WMCP nevertheless submits that the word “technical” encompasses a broad number of
possible services, perhaps, scientific and/or technological in basis. It thus posits that it may well include
the area of management and operations. The Court is not persuaded. Casus omisus pro omisso
habendus est –a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. Moreover, the management or operation of mining activities by foreign
contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of
the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate.
Respondents insist that “agreements involving technical or financial assistance” is just another term for
service contracts. The proceedings of the CONCOM indicate that the members used the terms
interchangeably. The Court is likewise not persuaded. While certain commissioners may have
mentioned the term “service contracts”, they may have been using the term loosely and not in the
context of the 1973 Constitution. Also, the phrase “service contracts” has been deleted in the 1987
Constitution’s Article on National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the
concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply adapted the old
terminology instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms (“agreements... involving either technical
or financial assistance”).
The UP Law Draft and Article XII, as adopted, uses the same terminologies. And the UP Law draft
proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of beneficial ownership of
the country’s natural resources to foreign owned corporations. While, in theory, the State owns these
natural resources –and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries –service contracts actually vested
foreigners with the right to dispose, explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same. This
arrangement is clearly incompatible with the constitutional ideal of nationalization of natural
resources. But the proponents nevertheless acknowledged the need for capital and technical know-how
in the large-scale exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources. Hence, they proposed
a compromise –technical or financial agreements.

WON RA No. 7942 is unconstitutional. NO.

NO, insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Financial or technical agreements as contemplated
in Art. XII, sec. 2 shall refer to financial agreements and/or technical agreements only and not to service
contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase “financial and technical agreements”, it actually
treats these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors
contrary to fundamental law.

Labugal v. Ramos Motion for Reconsideration --> 3rd one agrees totally with previous 2

Facts:
o DENR issued AO9640 pursuant to RA7942 (PI Mining Act of '95) + PI entered into Financial and
Technical assistance agreement with WMCP Inc.
o P. Cory Aquino issued EO 279 --> Authorized DENR Sec. to accept, consider, and evaluate proposals
from foreign owned corps/investors for contracts involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale operation etc. for the economic growth and welfare of the PI
 Large-scale mining = proposals for contracts/agreements for mineral resources exploration,
development, and utilization
o P. Ramos approved RA7943 --> defines modes of mineral agreements etc. + qualifications for
contractors and grants them their rights + restricts conditions for exploration etc. + regulates
transport, sale, and processing of minerals + promotes development of mining communities etc.
o P. Ramos entered into FTAA with WMCP covering 99837 hectares of land in South Cotabato , Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato
 DENR AO 9640 = IRR of RA 7943
o Pets. sent letter to DENR demanding that they stop the implementation of RA and AO --> pet. for
prohibition + mandamus, said that 100 FTAA apps have been filed covering 8.4 hectares (64 apps
owned by foreign co. + 1 foreign mining co. --> 5.8 hectares

Issues:
W/N FTAA is constitutional? NO
o Pets: Accdg to Consti A12 S2 --> FTAA = should be limited to technical or financial assistance only
 They say that FTAA allows foreign co. WMCP to manage and operate every aspect of mining
activity aka HOLD IT
o WMCP: EO 279 contained word "technical" help --> includes areas of management and operation
o Service Contract --> agreement for engaging in the exploitation and development of natural
resources + Gov agency allows another party (service contractor) to do the same provided they give
technical/financial assistance etc.
 CONCOM wanted to do away with this, they are not synonymous with technical or financial
assistance agreements
 If Government unable to finance operations --> contractor furnishes service, tech, financing
+ once resources discovered contractor operates field on behalf of gov.
 For technical/financial assistance agreements, PI is still owner of natural resources, foreign
co. = pure contractor ONLY
o RA 7942 is invalid because it treats agreements as service contract
 Gov may only enter into technical or financial assistance agreements with foreign entity
 Foreign contractors are allowed under this law to operate or manage all aspects of the
mining operation
 Allows WMCP to conduct mining operations etc.
o WMCP FTAA = service contract
 Granted to WMCP the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize, process and dispose of all
Minerals products and by-products provided they give financial + technical assistance
 Give WMCP ownership over natural resources belonging to PI

Chavez v. PEA

Facts:
o Gov through Commissioner of Public Highways signed contract with Construction and Development
Corp. of the PI to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas in Manila Bay
o P. Marcos tasked PEA to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas + lease and sell any
and all kinds of land
o PD 1085 transferred to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of Manila Bay
o Marcos Memo: Ammended PEA CDCP contract = all works here will be funded and owned by PEA
o Special Patent 3517 issued by P. Cory Aquino granted and transferred to PEA the parcels of land so
reclaimed under the contract (1,915,894 sqm)
o PEA entered into JVA with AMARI (private corp) to develop Freedom islands as well as the
reclamation of 250 hectares of submerged areas
 Amari entered into JVA negotiation without public bidding
o Senate President Maceda said JVA was a scam --> Senate investigation showed that 1.) Reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI = Lands of public domain not classified as alienable lands so
they cant be alienated 2.) Certificates of title void 2.) JVA illegal
o Chavez filed pet. For Mandamus with prayer for TRO --> said that sale of lands to AMARI violates
CONSTI A 12 S3 (prohibits sale of alienable lands of public dominion to private corps.)

Issues:
W/N JVA is constitutional? NO
o JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares --> only 157.854 has been reclaimed, 592.15
hectares still submerged forming part of Manila Bay
 AMARI reimburses to PEA P1.8B for the partial reclamation and shoulders all future
reclamation costs
 AMARI will acquire and own 70% of the area (367.5 hectares)
o CONSTI A 12 S2 and S3 --> Private Co. cannot own alienable lands of public domain except by
lease
o PEA: admitted that lands are alienable/disposable lands of public domain --> but statutes gave
rights of ownership to PEA so they can dispose of said lands --> CONSTI PROVS DONT APPLY
TO THIS??
o Wrong! Foreshore areas and submerged ones are part of public domain. Reclamation by PEA
does not auto. convert this into alienable/disposable land --> Law or Presidential proclamation
must classify this (CA 141 S8)
 That is exactly what PD 1085 did and thus Freedom Islands are disposable lands of public
domain
o JVA covers not only Freedom Islands but also the additional 592.15 hectares still submerged in
Manila Bay --> no legislative or Presidential Act classifying these areas yet thus they are outside
the commerce of man and are inalienable
 Lands must be reclaimed first before they can be classified
 E0 525, which declared that all lands reclaimed by PEA shall be owned by PEA does not
automatically classify inalienable lands as alienable
 PEA needs authorization from DENR before undertaking reclamation projects in Manila Bay
etc. --> decides whether reclaimed PEA lands should be classified as alienable
o Law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the government --> PEA says thats
exactly what PD1085 and EO525 are
 No authority under this for PEA to sell reclaimed lands
 PD1085 = only transfers ownership and administration of lands to PEA
  EO 1084 says that PEA should dispose of the lands in accordance with PD 1084 (PEA
charter) --> Charter allows PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable ones aka
Consti Ban does not apply to PEA
 PEA can sell to private parties and individuals BUT NOT to private corporations because
legislative authority only benefits individuals (PD 1085 does not apply to Corps.)
o PEA has to conduct public bidding to sell (CA 141 S63 and S67)
 AO654: Allows PEA to specify mode of payment but does not exempt them from public
bidding, same as PD 1445 S79 (Government auditing code)
 Only when public auction fails is negotiation allowed, COA must approve selling price
 In Public Auctions, only PI individuals allowed, private corps. arent
o No one submitted bid in PEA auction so they sold it through negotiation
 But JVA contained not only Freedom Islands and addl 250 hectares BUT ALSO 350 hectares
given to AMARI
 JVA enlarged area to 750 hectares, Public Auction only specified 407.84 hectares --> not
valid
o PD1529 did not give PEA authority to sell to private corps.

Motion for Reconsideration: Chavez v. PEA

Facts:
o Same Facts as Above
o Amari now says that decision should be applied prospectively, and not retroactively to cover
amended JVA --> assuming that PD 1084 AND 1085 AND EO525 654 = inconsistent with consti (De
Agbayani v. PNB)
 They said that a new doctrine of Court cannot apply retroactively if it impairs vested rights
especially since they relied on it in good faith (Sps. Benzonan v.CA)

Issues:
W/N Amari is correct? NO
o Cases dont apply because prevailing doctrine at the time of JVA was NOT that private corps could
acquire alienable lands of public domain
o Since the effectively of the '73 Consti, private corporations were banned from holding, except by
lease, alienable lands of public domain
o Prevailing law during JVA is '73 Consti --> That’s why De Agbayani is wrong
o Sps case is wrong bec. it was overruled by Manila Electric Co. V. Judge Castro-Bartolome -->
emphasized Consti ban
 If lands private before '73 Consti because corp. possessed it openly, continuously,
effectively, and adversely fro at least 30 yrs from June 12, '46 or earlier the corp can apply for
judicial confirmation of its imperfect title
 If land remained public after effectivity of '73 Consti then sorry you cant
o Law disregards consti DQ of buyer if land subsequently transferred to proper party
o No Good Faith on AMARI bec. when JVA signed in'99, there were already cases questioning AMARI's
qualifications in '98 --> they assumed all risks involved with transaction
o AMARI has not paid PEA full reimbursement costs + they havent even initiated any reclamation of
the submerged 592.15 hectares of land
o PEA says its similarly situated as the BCDA, which under RA 7227, is allowed to sell portions of the
Metro Manila military camps and reservations
 WRONG --> PEA is central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects.
BCDA is different because it is ordered by law to sell specific government lands long declared by
proclamations as military reservations (military is end user)
o Gov. owned lands as long as they are patrimonial property, may be sold to private parties whether
Fils/private corps. Reclaimed alienable lands of public domain if sold to corp become patrimonial
prop
 To allow reclaimed lands of public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands =
violation of consti ban
  PEA can just transfer reclaimed lands to private corp. and they can be sold to corps and
individuals under the guise of PEA
o PEA says the reclamation project is too expensive aka they need help --> financial assistance is
okay, just dont give them the land

Usero V. CA

Facts:
o Lutgarda Samela and Nimfa Usero = owners of lots 1 and 2 respectively in Block 5, Golden Acres
Subdv, barrio Almanza, Las Pinas City
o Sps. Polinar = owner of land behind lots of Samela and Usero
o Between lots, there's a low-level strip of land, with a stagnant body of water filled with floating
water lilies; perpendicular to Samela and Polinar lots --> this land is the perimeter wall of Pilar
Village Subdv
o Every time storms happen, water in this land rises and strong current passes through Polinar house
and causes damage --> Polinar errected concrete wall on bank of land 3meters from their house
because of this
o Usero and Samela said they owned that land and told Sps. to stop, but they didnt because they
thought land was part of a creek --> they offered to pay for it though but U and S didnt want
o US filed complaints for forcible entry against Polinars --> S produced TCT as evidence, Polinar's
gave TCT too (brgy. cert. as to existence of creek)
o TC and MTC found for US
o Appealed to CA --> confirmed existence of creek, because of this US cannot claim ownership
because creek forms part of public dominion, cant stop them from trying to protect their property

Issues:
W/N Strip of land is part of public domain? YES
o Existence of Creek is evidence by --> brgy cert, cert from 2nd Manila Eng. District (Western Portion
of Pillar Village is bounded by Talon Creek), photos of water lilies in strip of land (Fact that water
lilies thrive in that strip mean that there is a permanent stream of water/creek there)
o Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership --> CC A420 (Property of public
dominion = creek is included (recess or an arm of a river) thus creek is not susceptible to private
ownership

Manotok v. Heirs of Barque

Facts:
o Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La
Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of
the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar Land.)
o The subject parcel “Lot No. 823” is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in QC.
o On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government pursuant to the
Friar Lands Act. The certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT No. 614. The Estate
was placed under the administration of the Director of Lands.
o Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions of the
Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the Register of
Deeds.
o In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT No.
372302 covering Lot No. 823 with an area of 342,945 square meters à GRANTED à TCT No. RT-
22481 (372302) was issued in 1991.
o In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In support
 of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owner’s duplicate of the TCT, real
estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property.
o MANOTOKs opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.
o Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging to Lot No. 823, TCT
No. 210177 actually involves 2 parcels with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while TCT
No. RT-22481 (372302) pertains only to a 1 parcel of land, with a similar area of 342,945 square
meters.
o 1997 – Barques’ petition was DENIED. à Lot. No. 823 already registered in the name of the
Manotoks. --> Barques MR was denied à They appealed to the LRA à LRA Reversed.
o LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. Hence, it ordered the Barque
title to be reconstituted. BUT cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction of
the 1991 Manotok TCT.
o The LRA denied the Manotoks’ MR and the Barques’ prayer for immediate reconstitution. Both the
Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the CA.
o In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal of the cases
claiming ownership of the subject property.
o 2002 and 2003 à 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to cancel the
Reconstituted Manotok Title and to reconstitute the Barques’ “valid, genuine and existing” TCT No.
210177.
o Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered consolidated on
August 2, 2004.
o December 12, 2005, SC First Division à affirmed both decisions of the CA. à Manotoks filed MR à
Denied in April 2006 Resolution.
o Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with their MR attached. à
Denied in June 2006 Resolution. Eventually entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of
Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the meantime, the Barques filed multiple motions with the First
Division for execution of the judgment, while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion
for Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral arguments). à Case was
referred to the En Banc in July 2006.
o On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to
which was attached their petition in intervention. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest,
Valentin Manahan, was issued Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No. 823 and attached the
findings of the NBI that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to
be. Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended to the Director of the
LMB the reconstituted Manotok Title should be reverted to the state.
o Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.
o 2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1st division decision and entry of judgment recalled
and the CA’s Amended Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed and set aside.
The En Banc remanded the case to the CA.
o The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON the Manotoks can trace
their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which
was a Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the Maotoks should be annulled.
o CA’s findings à None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 from the
government in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the “Friar Lands
Act”. Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce as required by Section 18 of the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the
factual allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the purchase of Lot 823 by the
predecessors-in-interest of the claimants revealed badges of fraud and irregularity.

BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:

Manotoks --> Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. They have since occupied
the land, built their houses and buildings on it. The subject land is now known as Manotok Compound.
Barques --> Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta who had a TCT in his
name.
Manahans--> The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought by his wife. They had
a caretaker on the property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they just declared the property
for taxation to protect their rights.

Issues:
Who has the better right over Lot No. 823? NO ONE! It belongs to the National Government.

o From the proceedings in the CA, it was established that while records of the DENR-LMB indicate the
original claimant/applicant of Lot 823 as a certain Valentin Manahan, only the Manotoks were able
to produce a sale certificate in the name of their predecessors-in-interest, certified by the LMB
Records Management Division. In addition, the Manotoks submitted photocopies of original
documents entitled Assignment of Sale Certificate dated 1919, 1920 and 1923.
o Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the Secretary of
the Interior. The Certificates of Assignment of Sale contained only the signature of the Director of
Lands. The Manotoks belatedly secured from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932, which likewise lacks the approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the Director of Lands.

Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of friar lands shall be valid only
if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).

o In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the original Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204, sourced from the National Archives, shows on the second page a poorly
imprinted typewritten name over the words “Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources”,
which name is illegible, and above it an even more poorly imprinted impression of what may be a
stamp of the Secretary’s approval.
o The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of the RD’s task in
issuing the TCT in the Manotok name. The Manotoks contend that “we can assume that the Manotok
deed of conveyance was in fact approved by the Department Secretary because the register of
deeds did issue TCT No. 22813 in the name of the buyer Severino Manotok.” FURTHER, the
Manotoks assert that even if we were to ignore the presumption of validity in the performance of
official duty, Department Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October 27, 2005 by then DENR
Secretary Michael T. Defensor, supplies the omission of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources in deeds of conveyances over friar lands.
o NO! These arguments fail.
o Citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club which applied the rule in the Solid State and Liao Casesà the
absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale certificate and
assignment of sale certificate made the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no
valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment.
o SC in the MR of the Alonso case underscored that the approval is a MADATORY requirement.
Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts
since the law is explicit in its mandate. Petitioners have not offered any cogent reason that would
justify a deviation from this rule.

o DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks and the Manahans, states that
some Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices of the LMB do not bear the Secretary’s
signature despite full payment for the Friar Land. They are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by
this Memo provided that the applicant really paid the purchase price and complied with all the
requirements under the Friar Lands Act.
o The CA opined that the Manotoks cannot benefit from the above department issuance because it
makes reference only to those deeds of conveyance on file with the records of the DENR field
 offices. The Manotoks’ copy of the alleged Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 issued in 1932, was
sourced from the National Archives.
o Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the Government ceases
reservation of its title once the buyer had fully paid the price. (They were claiming that they fully
paid!) Their basis is SECTION 15[2] of the Friar Lands Act.
o Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention however, the new rule
Pugeda v. Trias, à “the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called
certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory
condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full.
o Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of sale that vests title
and ownership to the purchaser of friar land. Such certificate of sale must, of course, be signed by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as evident from Sections 11[3], 12[4] and the
2nd paragraph of Section 15[5], in relation to Section 18.

CONCLUSIONS
o Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid certificate of
sale issued to them by the Government because their Certificate lacks the signature of the Director
of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
o The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property taxes and
construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks miserably failed to
prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of Severino Mantotok after the latter
had paid in full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only
copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its issuance can be
found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it
simply described the copy presented as “DILAPIDATED” without stating if the original copy of TCT
No. 22813 actually existed in their records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of
registered owner.
o As we stressed in Alonso: Prescription can never lie against the Government.
o RE: MANAHANS--> No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can be found in the records of
either the DENR-NCR, LMB or National Archives. Although the OSG submitted a certified copy of
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria de
Guzman, there is no competent evidence to show that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his
successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared the land for tax purposes, or paid the
taxes due thereon.
o Even assuming arguendo the existence and validity of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 and
Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 presented by the Manahans, the CA correctly observed that
the claim had become stale after the lapse of 86 years from the date of its alleged issuance. Citing
Liao v. CA “the certificates of sale x x x became stale after 10 years from its issuance” and hence
cannot be the source documents for issuance of title more than 70 years later.”

Laurel v. Garcia

Facts:
o Subject property = 1 of 4 Japanese props acquired by PI gov. under reparations agreement with
Japan in '56. --> Roppongi property
o Roponggi property --> listed for use for the government sector, consists of land and building for the
Chancery of the PI embassy
 Gov had no funds to develop it
 Jap ambassador presented a proposal to P. Aquino to make property subject of lease
agreement with Kajima Corp. --> consideration = to lease one of the buildings constructed on it to a
foreign corp. and two buildings in the other properties
 After lease, all 3 buildings shall be occupied by PI gov
 PI gov. retains title
o Pres. issued EO 296 --> entitled non-Fil citizens/entites to avail of separations' capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease, or disposition --> Ropponggi prop was mentioned
 o Executive branch was pushing for the sale --> up for public bidding twice
o Pets. Assert that property is classified as one of public dominion --> outside commerce of man
 Property is intended for public service, no ownership can be attached to it
 Property still intended for necessary service --> cant be appropriated
o Respondents --> prop. is not governed by CC but by Japanese laws (lex situs)
 Not part of public dominion anymore and is now patrimonial property because of intention
of Executive Dep and Congress to covert it for private use + 13 yr idle period

Issues:
W/N Roponggi prop is alienable property? NO
o Roponggi prop. is one for public service --> not subject to appropriation accdg to CC A419-421 -->
Property belonging to state and intended for some public service
 Even though not used for a long time, not auto converted to patrimonial property --> only
happens when property is withdrawn from public use
 This only happens if there is a definite formal declaration from the government
 Transfer of PI embassy to Nampeidai is not this --> done only bec. no funds
o E0 296 --> Not an authority to sell, just makes property available to foreigner and not Fils only in
case of sale, lease, or disposition
o Civil Code is applicable law
 No conflict of law here --> happens only in the ff. dispute over title/ownership of
immovable, foreign law on land ownership and its conflicts with domestic law --> none in this case
o Authority to sell issued by Aquino was premature --> needs approval of Congress through a law
passed (Revised Admin Code'17 S79 (f) + Revised Admin Code'87 S48 Book 1)

Tantoco V. Muicipal Council

Facts:
o Widow of Tantoco sued municipal court of Iloilo for P42,966.4 (purchase price of 2 strips of land,
which municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening of the street --> CFI of Iloilo sentenced
the municipality to pay the amount claimed
o Municipality was unable to pay because of lack of funds --> Widow had a writ of execution issued
against the property of the Mun., Sheriff attached various vehicles
o Notice of sale made --> provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed motion in CFI, saying that action done was
illegal and violate of rights of municipality

Issues:
W/N props is exempt from execution? YES
o CC A343 divides property of provinces and towns into those for public use and patrimonial
property --> roads, streets, public improvements etc = public use --> Provision applicable to
municipalities
o Property for public use are exempt from attachment and execution --> property owned by a
municipality, not used for public use but for private use may be subject to execution
o Movable and immovable property of a municipality needed for government purpose may not be
attached and sold for payment of a judgment against the municipality

Zamboangga V. City of Zamboangga

Facts:
o Municipality of Zamboanga (MC) used to be provincial capital of Zamboanga Province --> CA 39
approved and converted MC in Zamboanga City (S50 = all buildings and props will be acquired and
paid for by the ZC at price fixed by auditor general
o 50 props with buildings --> some schools, hospitals, burleighs, hydro-electric sight etc.
o Capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog --> RA 286 made Municipality of Molave
and made it capital of ZP
o Appraisal Committee with AG valued props at P1,294,244
 o RA 711 --> divided Zamboanga to del Norte and de Sur --> (S6: props divided equitably between the
two) --> AG: 54.39% to ZDN and 45.61% to ZDS
o Executive Secretary held that ZDN had vested right as owner of props mentioned in CA 39 and is
entitled to its price
o Sec. of Finance allowed CIR to deduct an amt. equal to 25% of regular internal revenue allotment
for ZC --> ZDN credited with P57,373.46 partial payment for what was due
o RA 3039 --> Props transferred to ZC for free, SOF ordered CIR to stop making payments to ZDN and
to return amt. credited to ZDN (P40K already returned)
o ZDN filed complaint --> RA 3039 unconsti for depriving ZDN of property without due process and
just compensation etc. --> LC found for ZDN

Issues:
W/N lands are of public or patrimonial nature? PUBLIC
o Nature of 50 lots and buildings --> if owned by municipality in its public or governmental capacity =
Congress has absolute control over it, if privately owned = patrimonial, Congress has no control,
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and just compensation
o CC A 423-424 --> all props can be classified as patrimonial, jurisprudence shows that schools,
hospitals etc. = patrimonial property
o Other norm: enough that property be held for government purpose = public property
o RA 3039 valid as it affects lands of public property aka Congress controls
o However RA 3039 cant be applied to deprive ZDN of its share in value of other lots --> they are
registered aka private proper, ZDN still entitled to collect compensation

Sales V. Jarencio

Facts:
o CFI of Manila acting as a land registration court declared the City of Mania the owner of a 9,689.8
parcel of land --> issued OCT but sold subject land to Villanueva and had TCT issued for buyer
o Municipal Board of Manila presided by Vice-Mayor Villegas: asked Pres. to look into feasibility that
property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets be considered patrimonial
property of City of Manila for purposes of reselling the lots to its actual occupants
 HB 191: it is being done bec. its in the best interests that property may be used one way or
another
 HB 1453: Sought to convert land reserved as communal property into disposable or
alienable property, and to provide its subdivision and sale to its occupants
o Bill approved and became RA 4118 --> Mayor of City of Manila told Land Authority that it would not
object to said law but changed his mind and filed action for injunction against them

Issues:
W/M property is public or patrimonial? public
o City of Manila has not shown any evidence that land owned is private
o Originally, the city did not own patrimonial property except those given by the state
o City can acquire property in its private capacity (City has dual character= public and private) -->
but no showing of land title here
o General Rule: Possession of land by municipality, except those acquired with its funds, is held in
trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants
 No proof that City acquired land through its private funds
 Why did City request that Pres. make reps to leg. to declare land public if it was patrimonial
anyway?
o RA 4118 does not violate Consti provs banning getting props without due process and just
compensation --> only purpose was to confirm character of property

Cebu V. Bercilles

Facts:
 o Parcel of land sought to be registered = portion of M. Borces St, Mabolo, Cebu City
o Resolution 2193 --> declared it as abandoned road not part of the development plan
o Resolution 2755 --> Authorized Acting City Mayor to sell land through public bidding = awarded to
Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co.
o Co. filed for application to have its title registered but Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed motion to
dismiss saying that land was intended for public use aka out of commerce of man

Issues:
W/N Land is of public use? NO
o City of Cebu has power to close/abandon road accdg to Revised Charter of Cebu City S31
o They declared it abandoned --> became patrimonial property capable of being sold (CC A422)
o Revised Charter also stated that abandoned roads may be conveyed

San Mig V. Fernandez

Facts:
o CFI of Bulacan held Municipality of San Miguel liable to private respondents
 Ordered Deed of Donation in favor of Municipality signed by deceased Carlos Imperio
partially revoked
 Pay respondents P64,400 covering rentals on property and the restoration of its ownership
o Respondents moved for writ of execution on judgment but Municipality filed motion to quash on
ground that its funds are all public funs exempt from execution --> Judge denied saying that
Municipality treasurers have more than enough money to pay

Issues:
W/N funds of Municipality are public funds exempt from execution? YES
o Public funds are not subject to levy and execution because they are held in trust for people (Mun. of
Paoay v. Manaois & Tantoco V. Municipal Council of Iloilo)
o PD 477 (The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration): No money paid out from treasury exept in
pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority
o ROC R39 S15 Not followed

Government of PI V. Cabangis

Facts:
o Lots 36, 39, and 40, block 3035 were formerly part of a large parcel of land belonging to the
predecessor of the Cabangis claimants
o 1896 land began to wear away due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay
o By 1901 lots were completely submerged until 1912 when Government undertook the dredging of
Vistas Estuary to facilitate Navigation --> Lots were gradually formed again
o Nobody was declaring Lot 39 for taxation --> only Dr. Pedro Gil declared lot 40
o Lots were adjudicated in favor of Cabangis claimants --> appealed by Government

Issues:
W/N Cabangis claimants own said lots? NO
o CC A339 and Law of Waters A1: Shores etc. are of public domain
o When seas encroach upon land and land becomes submerged land becomes part of eminent domain
o When dredged by Gov. lots became public domain --> Claimants didnt do anything to protect their
land aka they abandoned it
o Law of Waters A5 --> State works to reclaim submerged land, it becomes public domain

Heirs of Santiago V. Heirs of Santiago

Facts:
 o Lot belonged to Vicente Santiago and Magdalena Sanchez --> kids = 5 including Pablo --> dad of
Simplicio and Marta --> Mom of Jose
o Petitioners = Heirs of Simplicio Santiago initiated complaint against Mariano Santiago, son of Jose
Santiago
o Pets: Lot 2344 (574sqm)= acquired by Simplicio from his dad and brother, constructed a house on
in in '68 --> Before he died, he applied for free patent and got it --> '83 Mariano constructed a house
on a portion of the lot
 Nestor Santiago (son of one of the children of Simplicio) = said that Mariano house was
there since he attained age of reason
 Mariano: Lot was subdivided into 3 parts --> A (168sqm), B (349sqm), C (57 sqm), said that
Pets only owned AB and C was fraudulently included
 Mariano: He and his sis bought LOTA from Simplicio for P5K as evidenced by deed of sale +
constructed a house immediately after, said Simplicio got free patent without them knowing for
entire lot
 Mariano: inherited LOTC from grama Marta
o Mariano testimony corroborated by Socorro Ocampo, 1st cousin of Simplico
o TC --> Found for pets, no basis for Mariano claim bec. defense = collateral attack against Torens title
o CA --> Found for Marian, LOT2344 =Private land, cannot be subject of Free Patent

Issues:
W/N Mariano has claim over the land? YES
o Free Patent cannot be issued over the land because it is private
 Tax declarations are proof of this
 Private land is not affected by the issuance of free patent because Public Land law only
applied to lands of public domain
o Mariano has been openly and continuously possessing land A and C for more than 70 yrs
 Evidence showing that house where Mariano lived was already up when they were kids
 When LOTC was declared for tax purposes by Simplicio, he did not disturb possession of
Mariano
 Mariano did not declare LOTC for tax purposes bec. he was advised that it was tax exempt
bec. it was too small
 Validity of Deed of sale to Mariano was not overcome by pets

Hilario V. Salvador

Facts:
 Hilario family filed complaint in RTC against Allan Salvador
o HF = said they were co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Salvador of a parcel of land
in Romblon
 Prop was hereditary share of their dad Brigido when he was still single
o 1989: AS built his house on property of HF without their consent or knowledge
o HF demanded that he vacate  AS said that he has consent of his grama Mazo Salvador
o HF said it has caused them shame, humiliation etc.
o RTC ruled in their favor
 AS: Filed motion to quash, said RTC had no jurisdiction + Complaint had lack of ground accdg to
BP129, RA7691 S3(3)
o Complaint failed to state value of land  not shown in allegations, not more than P20K
o Did not sufficiently identify and describe parcel of land
 HF: Land had total value of P3.5M, RTC said it was not capable of pecuniary estimation
o Showed tax certs  Assessed Value = P5950
o Rtc ruled for HF
 CA  Action was for recovery of ownership and possession of real property, MTC had jurisdiction
(RA 7691)

Issues:
W/N RTC had jurisdiction? NO
 HF: Yes, it was an accion reinvndicatoria (object for the recovery of possession of the right to
possess, ejectment suit filed after expiration of 1 yr after the occurrence of the cause of
action or from unlawful withholding of possession)  falls with RTC
o Said land was valued at P3.5M and asked for damages P20K aka within RTC jurisdiction
 Action was one of accion publiciana (recovery of possession of real property, recovery of right
to possess)
o No claim of ownership here, they admitted they were all co-owners
o RA 7691
 Jurisdiction of MTC: Value of prop not more than 20k
 Jurisdiction of RTC: Value of prop more than 20k, (more than 50k if mnl)
o Jurisdiction of court depends upon assessed value not market value
 Assessed vaule  fair market vale: tolentino definition
 HF said it was P5950 but did not show assessed value in 1996 when they filed
complaint
 Even if same before, MTC still had jurisdiction (CA findings), Tax declaration
have presumption of regularity
 HF say damages they were entitled to were more than 20k  RTC had jurisdiction (BP129)
o Only applicable to all other cases other than an action involving title to or possession of real
property  assessed value is controlling factor here
 Action filed in RTC is null and void

Sampayan V. Vasquez

Facts:
 July 8, 1992  Siblings Vasquez filed complaint for forcible entry against Cesar Sampayan
o Said he entered and occupied their land and built a house on it, without their knowledge
and consent
o Said their mom Cristita Quinta was owner of the land, and they became co-owners when she
died  ‘84
 Alleged that CQ possessed land openly since ‘57
o ’92 They were absent from the lot and CS built his house on it, told him to leave but he
refused
 CS: Given permission by Maria Ybaez, who is the overseer of true owners spouses Terrado
o Declared for taxation purposes by spouses Oriolo in ‘70
o They sold ½ to ST in ’70 and the other half to spouses Occida
 Proof of SV: Tax Declarations, Certificates, Affidavits of Gatillo that said that he sold it to CQ etc.
 Proof of CS: Tax Declarations, Deed of Absolute sale executed by SO, Affidavits of Noynay and
Occida saying CQ never possessed the lot
 Case pending it MTC: Judge conducted ocular inspection
o Found house of CS, House of Sicon, and Houses of Noynay
o Improvements could not have been intro’d by CQ but by the vendees only
o Found coconut trees, fruit bearing trees, star apple trees
o Confirmed that ½ bought by SO
 MCTC  Found for CS
 CA  Ruled for SV

Issues:
W/N CQ ever had right to the land? NO
 In action for forcible entry  must be proven that plaintiff was in prior possession of the land
o Exceptions to findings of fact 5 and 11 are here
 Findings of fact conflicting
 CA overlooked certain relevant facts
 MCTC had jurisdiction
 o For MCTC to have jurisdiction over forcible entry cases, enough for compliant to aver that
the plaintiff had prior physical possession and he was deprived  aka here in the case
 Judge ocular inspection proves that CQ never possessed the land
o Sworn affidavit of Noynay: resided their since ’60, never possessed by SV or CQ
 CA attached too much significance onto fact that CQ was oppositor in Cadastral case
o Does not establish physical possession because not all oppositors are actual possessors

Santos V. Ayon

Facts:
 Ruben Santos filed in MTCC a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses Ayon
o RS is registered owner of 3 lots in Davao as shown by TCTs
o SA = registered owner of lot beside his  built a building which straddled both lots, SA used
it as a warehouse
o SA said the building was on his land and he merely tolerated it, until ’96 when he needed
the entire portion of the lot
o SA refused to vacate, made improvements
 SA: MTCC has no jurisdiction because there is no lessor-lessee relationship
o Not occupying due to tolerance, they own it
 MCTC  Ruled for RS, AFFIRMED by RTC
 CA
o Proper remedy = accion publiciana before RTC not unlawful detainer
 SA already possessed lot when RS bought the rest  no evidence of tolerance

Issues:
W/N RTC had original jurisidiction? NO
 Forcible entry ROC R70
o Action to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is
illegal
 Unlawful detainer MTCC ROC R70
o Action for recovery of possession from defendant whose possession of property was
inceptively lawful by virtue of express or implied contract
o This is proper remedy here  tolerance aspect, RS needed it back
 Possession by tolerance is lawful but becomes unlawful when possessor by tolerance refuses to
vacate upon owner’s heed (Roxas v CA)

Ganila V. CA

Facts:
 Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment complaints before MCTC
o Said she owns lot 1227 in Guimaras with area of 43k sqm
o Inherited lot from her parents and she only tolerated Gabila and Co. to build houses without
rental
o ’96 she wanted lot back but they didn’t wanna leave despite money assistance
 GC: Lot was a shoreline which they developed, that it was on a different lot, that it was a social
forest
 Relocation survey of geodetic engineers during preliminary conference
o The GC houses were within lot 1227
o GC failed to comment
 MCTC  Decided for VH
 RTC  VH has produced better evidence that she had better right over the lot
o Position paper, affidavit, tax declarations supported her
o Sketches showed that GC occupied her lot
o GC showed no evidence
o Affirmed by CA
Issues:
W/N VH had better evidence? YES
 GC: VH should have filed action to recover possession not complaint for ejectment
o Bec. They possessed land in good faith for 30yrs
o No withholding of possession because VH was not in prior possession of lot
 Unlawful detainer was proper remedy, VH was right
o Prior physical possession is not needed for this action, better right is all that’s needed
o GC not entitled to remain in possession just because they are in possession
o Jurisdiction is with MTC
 Unlawful detainer v Accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria
o UD: Limited to questions of possession, UD and FE are two actions under it
o AP: Right to possession
o AR: Recover ownership
 Tax declarations, report, sketch plans prove that VH has better right
o Not conclusive evidence but good indication of possession
o No one would pay taxes for what is not theres

Labrador V. Bugarin

Facts:
 Lilia Labrador filed case for recovery of possession and ownership with MTC in ‘96
o Said she was owner of lot 2650 measuring at 400sqm in Zambales
o Bought it from spouses Pronto in ’76, issued Tax declaration in ‘77
o ’90 DPWH built a road, traversed 108 sqm of the land  issued another tax declaration
o ’94: Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of 108sqm land  LL filed complaint
 SB: land was within his lot, which he has openly possessed since ‘55
o MTC ruled for SB  LL did not prove prior physical possession and ownership

Issues:
W/N LL had better right to the land? NO
 Action to institute proceedings when a person is deprived of land should be instituted anytime
within 1 yr of deprivation in proper MTC ROC R70 S1
o After lapse of 1 yr, proper action is accion publiciana for recovery of right to possess in RTC
 Forcible entry is proper action  LL alleged prior physical possession since she had it since ‘76
o Filed it 2yrs after deprivation  MTC had no jurisdiction, RTC had
o Juridiction matter cannot be waived, case should be dismissed outright
 Even if MTC had jurisdiction  case dismissed because LL failed to prove that 108sqm parcel of
land was within her lot
o LL never saw Cadastral Map and relied only on survey notification card
o No survey caused by LL after construction of road
o He who denies must prove  not proven by LL

Ross Rica Sales Center V. Spouses Ong

Facts:
 RR filed ejectment case against SO
o RR said that they owned 3 parcels of land covered by TCTs
o RR said that Elizabeth Ong owned them before they did
 Mandaue Prime Real Estate bought lands from SO in ‘94
 TCTs and Deed of Absolute Sale sought to be annulled by SO  Still pending
resolution
o MM told SO that RR intended to use land na  RR had been tolerating their stay
o SO refused to vacate aka unlawfully withholding possession
 MTC  Ordered SO to vacate
  RTC  Affirmed MTC
 CA  MTC had no jurisdiction because there was no contract between the two parties

Issues:
W/N MTC had jurisdiction? YES
 CA said no because they said there were two requirements for unlawful detainer cases
o Deprivation of possession by force
o Contract express or implied
 Jurisprudence shows that presence of contract express or implied in unlawful detainer cases is not
needed
o Withholding of possession is enough (Javelosa v CA) (Barba v CA)
o Unlawful withholding = possession was legal in the beginning, having no other source than
a contract express or implied and which expired
 RR = Tolerated SO stay, wanted it back  basic element for unlawful detainer case
 SO said that RTC had jurisdiction not MTC bec accion reivindicatoria was the action on the ground
that they were constantly claiming ownership
o AR = Recovery of ownership of real property
o AP = Right of possession is issue
o Accion interdictal = material possession is issue
 UD  Question of possession is essential (AP)
o SO sought to recover physical possession of the property, just cause they claimed ownership
does not deprive MTC of jurisdiction
o If what is prayed for is ejectment/recovery of possession  claim for ownership does not
matter (Ganadin v Ramos)
 Ownership cannot be subject to collateral attack  should be instituted in a different proceeding

Serina v Caballero

Facts:
 Dr. Jesus Serina and his wife Enriqueta filed a complaint for quieting of title against Victor
Caballero
o Said they were absolute owners and have been in actual possession of the land for 35 yrs
 March ’82  Spouses Serina discovered that Caballero was claiming ownership over the land and
offering it for sale
o Also found out that Donelas was occupying the land
o SS said that their dad Dr Serina bought the land from Lucia Vda. De Marbella who inherited
it from her dad Ramon Neri
 Deed of Sale showed sale
 Tax declarations showed they’ve been paying taxes since from 1947
 Cadastral Lot showed that it was in Mantadia Opol
 VC: He was lawful owner and had actual physical possession
o Part of Cadastral lot #3533
o Eustaquio Caballero declared whole land for tax purposes before war (Tax Declarations)
 Showed land was in Pontacon Iponan CDO
o Emiliana Ibarat (Sis of VC)  Land was divided among EC 3 kids, inherited by VC
 Land surveyed and was only 23k sqm
 RTC  Land was not shown that DS bought it
o No showing that LV bought it from EC (Orig owner)
o Land in DOS of DS and LV showed it was 5 hectares and the land claimed was only 2.5
hectares
o Boundaries of land did not coincide with DOS

Issues:
W/N DS owns land? NO
 CA  DS failed to establish that parcel of land subject of complaint was the same as VC’s
 o Boundaries were different
o Land in complaint was different from land in DOS
o Prop in complaint was 2.5 hectares but DOS says its 5 hectares
o No showing that Tax declarations of EC cancelled  Presumption that DS tax decs didn’t do
this
 DOS and TD should not be compared to EC TD and CS because the former only refers to a portion of
the latter
o SO? DS didn’t provide evidence to identify land claimed
o Beo v CA
 Person who claims ownership of real prop is dut bound to identify land
 Proof of ownership + identity = basic rule
 DS failed to do Beo rule
 Acquisitive prescription not recognized
o DS only proved 7yrs of actual possession
o Identity not proven, this cant be accepted too

Perez v Mendoza

Facts:
 Land originally belonged to a bigger track of land owned by Estanislao Montalbo
o He died  props passed to his kids (Petra, Felisa, Pedro  dead)
o PF divided amongst themselves the land
 Land litigated belonged to F
o F exchanged the land with her aunt Andrea Montabo (Sis of EM)
o AM donated it to the municipality (northern part only ½) for use as a school site
o Donated the rest to her daughter Margarita Macalalad when she married Nicolas Mendoza
o NM submitted a deed of exchange of property to transfer tax declaration under his name
 Done by F and AM in presence of Rafael Manahan municipal secretary
 Basilo Perez found out about DOE
o Discovered RM signature was forged  filed crim complaint against AM and NM for
falsification of private doc
 Acquitted  No proof of forgery
 BP  1934 deed of partition of props of EM executed between P and heirs of F, Land divided
equally
o Husband of F sold their ½ share to spouses Petra Montalbo and BP
 DOS lost after a year
o BP leased props to Mendoza’s
 Made them leave but they didn’t so they filed an ejectment suit
Issues:
W/N BP owned said land? NO
 Crim Case  DOE was found to be falsified
o But shown that Donation was valid
o Inferred that DOE was consummated
o No res judicata applied bec. Parties were different in crim case and civ case
 Exchange bet AM and F was done
o Donation was done for Margarita
 Possessed land since 1927
 BP only filed unlawful detainer case in 1952
 Agreement of partition not proof that prop belonged in common to P and heirs of F
o AM was owner openly and continuous
 NM claim was proven
o School site was part of bigger land owned by EM
o NM showed that AM wanted to donate the said and (donation propter nupitas to her
daughter was not disproved either)
 Authorities dealt with NM for widening of road
 o Land covered in complaint consisted of 2 lots
o Authorities wanted to give them compensation for the widening of the road
o BP was not dealt with at all for road widening
o Showed that NM was in possession of the land
 NM has possessed land since 1927
o Built a house, even before the war
 Disproved BP claim that they were lessees
o Ejectment case only done in ‘52
 Possession indicated ownership and possessor is presumed to own the thing
(433CC)
 If possession cannot be recognized due to 2 diff personalities, present possessor is
preferred, if there are two, one longer is preferred (538CC)
o NM presently in possession of props
 No finding in crim case that DOEs did nottake place
 Deed of partition  BP did not say that AM signed deed
o Burden of proof of showing this was on BP, not done
o AM was 3rd party
 Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet  A transaction between two parties
ought not to operate to the prejudice of a third person or stranger

Dizon v CA

Facts:
 Spouses Hilario Galang and Martina Laxamana owned two lots in Pampangga
o Had 6 kids
o Mortgaged lots to Camilo Angeles
o Resps (Heirs of Galang’s sis’)  Dionisio Galang got the lands in his own name, despite the
fact that he used sis’ funds
o Cadastral survey showed that it was under the name of DG
 Resps  HG and 5 sis partitioned the lands
o Galang sis’ built their house  Generations of Galangs lived here
o Not disturbed until pets told them that lots under DG’s name were partitioned
 Pets subdivided the lots despite Resps demanding extra judicial settlement
 Pets  Cadastral case is proceeding in rem, biding upon the whole world
 Resps didn’t raise objections for 61 yrs (1922-1983)
 TC  Ruled for pets
o Action prescribed already for resps
o Presence of house is not proof of ownership because no proof that they had the right to
occupy
 CA  Co-ownership existed between resps and pets

Issues:
W/N Dizon’s owned the props? YES
 DG ownership over the lots was judicially confirmed in Cadastral Case
o In rem and binding
o And prescribed because it took resps 61 years to claim co-ownership
 DG affidavit  Got payment from sis P106
 Affidavit had no reference to lots
o Does not support alleged partition
o Only referred to a certain land which DG inherited
 Resps did not establish relationship to predecessors  No COA
o Only showed they were related through various degrees
o No connection

US v Causby
Facts:
 The Causbys owned 2.8 acres of land near an airport outside Greensboro, North Carolina. There
was a house and some buildings for raising chickens on the property.
 One of the airport's runways is 2220 feet from the Causbys' barn and 2275 feet from their house
(i.e., NEAR). Airplanes - mostly US Air Force war planes - gliding to the runway would pass directly
over the property and cause great noise during the day and bright glare (from aircraft lights) during
the night.
 As a result, the Causbys had to give up their chicken raising business because the noise and glare
were making the chickens panic and fly into the walls, causing their deaths. Ultimately, the number
of planes flying over the property destroyed its capacity to be used as a commercial chicken farm.
The Causbys themselves were frequently deprived of sleep.
 The Court of Claims held that there was an unlawful taking of property in violation of the 5th
amendment ("...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation") and
ruled in favor of the Causby family.
 The US contended that there is no taking of property when flights are made within navigable
airspace without physical invasion of private property below such airspace.
o Relied on Air Commerce Act of 1926 as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
 US has complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space over this
country
 Navigable airspace = airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed
by the Civil Aeronautics Authority
o Flights were within minimum safe altitudes, no physical invasion of property

Issues: In flying its planes over the Causby property, did the US commit unlawful taking of property in
violation of the 5th Amendment? YES

 Although airspace is considered a public highway, the landowner must have exclusive control of the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere if he is to have full enjoyment of the land.
 There is a common law principle dictating that ownership of the land extends to the rest of the
"universe" around it. This means that whoever owns a piece of land would own the air above it as
well. The Court held that such a doctrine no longer has any place in the modern world, because
Congress had declared that the air is a public highway. IF the common law doctrine were still in
effect, all flights would be subject to countless trespass suits.
 However, this general principle does not apply to the current case. The US conceded that if flights
over the Causbys' property rendered it uninhabitable, there would be taking in violation of the 5th
amendment. The owner's loss is the measure of the value of the property taken, not the taker's gain.
 It does not matter that the planes never touched the land itself, because constant flights had already
destroyed the Causbys' right to possess and exploit the land as its beneficial owners. Use of airspace
above the Causby's land effectively limited its utility and caused a dimunition of its value.
 While the owner does not physically occupy the airspace, he uses it in a way similar to spaces left
between buildings for the purposes of light and air. Since the planes fly so low to the ground,
continuous invasion of the airspace has affected the use of the land.
 Airspace, apart from immediate reaches above the land, remains public domain. Flights over private
land do not constitute a taking of property, so long as they do not interfere with the use and
enjoyment of the land.

Lunod v Meneses

Facts:
 Residents of Bulacan  owned farm lands in Maytunas and Balot near lake Calalaran
o Higino Meneses owned a fishpond and land in Paraanan
 Connected the lake on one side and Taliptip river on the other
 20yrs before 1901  statutory easement existed that allowed the flow of water over Paraanan
o Water collected in resident lands and Calalaran Lake flowed through Paraanan into Taliptip
 o HM converted Paraanan into a fishpond
 Built a dam and bamboo net, prevented free passage of water
 Plantations destroyed
 Residents filed complaint
o HM  No easement existed
o RTC  Ruled for Residents, ordered dam to be destroyed

Issues:
W/N Dam should be destroyed? YES
 Dam impeded the outlet of waters that flood the fields of residents during rains  detriment to
growing crops
 530CC
o Dominant Estate --> Easement imposed upon one estate for the benefit of another, realty in
favor of easement
o Servient Estate  one charged with easement
o Lands of Paraanan are lower
 Subject to easement of receiving and giving passage to water (SE), statuatory in
nature
 552CC, 563 CC
o Owner of lands cannot erect works that will impede or prevent easement imposed by law
for the benefit of higher lands
 HM had no right to construct the works
o Caused damage and floods
o 338CC allows enclosure
 Limited by easement
o Under OB to respect easement charged upon his property

Bachrach v Seifert

Facts:
 Dead EM Bachrach left no heir except widow Mary McDonald Bachrach
o Will  All fruits and usufruct of the remainder of all his estate after payment of expenses
given to her
o Upon her death, ½ of estate divided between legal heirs except his brothers
 Estate of EB owned 108k shares of Atok Big Wedge Mining Co
o Got 54k shares = 50% of stock dividend on 108k shares
o MM as usufructuary or life tenant of estate asked the LC to authorize People’s bank
(Administrator of estate of EB) to give her the said shares
 MM said that dividend is fruit or income and belonged to her
 Heirs Seifert said no: Divs = capital and belonged to remainderman
 Yes its income but its only an addition to invested capital

Issues:
W/N MM entitled to divs? YES
 Pennsylvania rule  All earnings of corp made prior to death of stockholder belong to corpus of
estate, earnings declared as divs made during lifetime of usufructury or life tenant
o All divs go to life tenants
o Hite v Hite  Divs = income on capital invested, property of life tenant
 Sec 16 Corp Law  No corp may make or declare any dividend except surplus profits
o 471CC  Usufructury entitled to all natural, civil, industrial fruits of prop in usufruct (474-
475CC)
 108K stock is prop of usufruct
o Rep profits and delivery of stock covering divs = payment of profits

Bachrach v Talisay Silay

Facts:
 Complaint filed by Bachrach Motor Co against TS Mining Co for delivery of P13,850
o Bonus in favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma
o PNB filed 3rd party complaint saying it has preferential right to amt
 Entitled to civil fruits of land mortgaged by ML through TS by virtue of deed of
assignment (Bonus)
 TS: ML Credit of P7.5K belonged to Cesar Ledesma
o CL bought it
o CL  said he bought said credit, which is part of total amt
o BM  Credit against ML was prior and preferential to PNB
 Parties recognized CL purchase

Issues:
W/N Bonus may be considered a civil fruit? NO
 PNB  Bonus is civil fruit of lands which owners mortgaged
o If it wasn’t civil, then bonus in favor of ML was null and void for being fraudulent due to no
intent in executing the deed
 Cause was wrong because it was based on presumption that Bonus was civil fruit
 Bonus
o TL indebted to PNB
o Induced its planters (ML) to mortgage their land to PNB
 Gave them credit as consideration (2% of their debt)
 Civil fruits
o Rents of buildings
o Proceeds from leases of land
o Income from perpetual or life annuities
 Bonus not one of 1st two, is it income?
o NO under 355CC  Bonus not obtained from land, but from something else
 Bonus has accidental relation to land
o Granted as compensation for risk of having land subjected as lien in favor of PNB
o Income arising from risk
o Not civil fruits/income from mortgaged prop bec it has nothing to do with it

Bernardo v Bataclan

Facts:
 CT of sale executed by Pastor Samonte of ownership of 90 hectare land in Cavite
o Bernardo instituted civ case to secure possession of land  Affirmed for B by SC
 When he went to land, Catalino Bataclan, authorized by former owners to clear land in 1922
o Declared possessor in good faith
o B pay him P1K for imporvements
 B had choice of making CB pay rent, or paying for improvements
o Chose rent of P200/Hectare or P18K  CB could not pay
o Land sold in public auction at instance of B to Toribo Teodoro for P8K

Issues:
W/N CB entitled to stay in land? NO
 Accession  owner of property owns what it produces and what is united to it either naturally of
artificially (353CC)
o Improvement in land belong to owner 358CC
 Planter etc. built in good faith  becomes forced co-ownership
o Owner either pays for expenses or makes him pay rent (appropriation) 361CC
o Owner has option because he is entitle to fruits by principle of accession
 CB says he is a possessor in good faith
 o Yes but when he stated he couldn’t pay for rent  lost right of retention
o Law requires owner to just choose either option

Ignacio v Hilario

Facts:
 Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres were legal owners of whole property
o TC said that Ignacio family were possessors in good faith
 Built houses and granaries (361CC)
 ED prayed for writ of execution saying they neither chose to pay IF for improvements or sell them
the land
o Prayed that court restore them the possession of the lot

Issues:
W/N ED has this option?NO
 361CC  Owner’s right to appropriate or pay indemnity
 453CC  Expenses refunded to every possessor in good faith
 Owner of land only has two options
o Here ED chose neither  Not allowed unless IF cant pay for property
o Removal of buildings improper  null and void

Depra v Dumlao

Facts:
 Francisco Depra owns Lot 685, which is beside Lot 683 owned by Agustin Dumlao
o AD built his house and his kitchen encroached 34sqm of FD property
o Depra filed case for unlawful detainer
 MTC  AD = Builder in good faith
o FD did not accept payment of rentals of Dumlao
 Filed complaint for quieting of title against AG in CFI
Issues:
W/N FD can choose neither option? NO
 448CC = 361 Spanish CC  Right to appropriate or Right to indemnity option
o Favors owner of land
o When conflict arises between owner of property and owner of buildings while they are in
good faith
 Just solution = 2 options
 TC
o FD has 15 days to exercise either option
 If he chose appropriation but AD rejects  Court leases land

Technogas Phils v CA

Facts:

Tecnogas purchased a parcel of land from Pariz Industries, together with all the buildings and
improvements, including the wall existing thereon which became the cause of dispute. On the other hand,
Eduardo Uy owned lots adjoining the lot of Tecnogas. It was then discovered that portions of the building
and the wall of Tecnogas were occupying a portion of Uy’s land. Tecnogas offered to buy land but Uy
refused. Later, an agreement was reached whereby Tecnogas would demolish the part of wall that
encroached. Meanwhile, Uy filed a case against Tecnogas but was dismissed. Also, Uy dug a canal along the
wall, a portion of which collapsed. Tecnogas filed a case for malicious mischief against Uy and his wife. Uy’s
wife was convicted. At the same time, Tecnogas filed with the Court a formal proposal for settlement of the
case. Uy ignored such. RTC ordered Uy to sell the portion of land to Tecnogas. But Court of Appeals
reversed RTC since it held Tecnogas to be in bad faith because it is “presumed to know the metes and
bounds of his property.”

Issues:

1. Whether Tecnogas acted in bad faith or good faith.
2. Considering that Tecnogas was not the builder of
the structures, whether Art. 448 or Art. 450 of the Civil Code applies.
3. Whether or not Uy may demand
the removal of the encroaching structures.

Held:

1. Good faith. There was good faith because no one can determine the precise extent or location of his
property by merely examining his paper title. Tecnogas merely purchased the land from Pariz
Industries and it may be assumed that it was Pariz that built those structures. Art. 527 of the Civil
Code presumes good faith and no proof exists so as to show that bad faith exists. The good faith of
Pariz was passed on to Tecnogas. The encroachment was caused by only a very slight deviation of
the erected wall which was supposed to run in a straight line.
2. Since Tecnogas was in good faith, Art. 448 applies. Upon the delivery of the property by Pariz to
Tecnogas, the buyer stepped into the shoes of the seller with regard to all rights of ownership over
the immovable sold including the right to compel Uy to exercise either of the two options under Art.
448. Such article provides that when the builder is in good faith, instead of being automatically
ejected from the land, he can compel the landowner to either (1) appropriate the building by paying
the appropriate indemnity or (2) sell the land to the builder.

3. No. He cannot ask for the removal of such. As aforementioned, the landowner has only two choices.
He cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel the owner of the building to remove it from
the land. As held in the case of Ignacio v. Hilario which was affirmed by Sarmiento v. Agana, the
choice to have the structures removed would only be available when the landowner chooses to sell
the land at a reasonable price but the builder fails to pay such price.

Briones v Macabagdad

Facts:
 Spouses Macabagdad bought from Vergon Realty Lot 2-R (325sqm in Vergonville Subdv)
o Spouses Briones are owners of Lot 2-S, Beside Lot 2-R
 ’84  SB after obtaining building permit and Vergon approval, built a house on Lot 2R, which they
thought was Lot 2S
o SM demanded that they demolish house and vacate property  SM filed action to recover
ownership
 SB: That was the lot that was constantly pointed out to them by Vergon agents over 7yr period of
payment
o Buyers in good faith  RTC ruled for SM, Demolish house
 CA  Affirmed RTC, Good faith defense cant be used

Issues:
W/N SB is buyer in good faith? YES
 Choice of appropriation or paying price of improvement  Accessory follows principal
o Owner of property must choose one  Only when owner chooses to sell, and builder fails to
pay may owner remove improvements
 SB have right to be indemnified for necessary and useful expenses they may have made on property
o 546CC 548CC
  SM have right to appropriate or pay indemnity
o Unless value of price of land is considerably more than value of structures  Pay rent
instead
o Depra v Dumlao  Remand to RTC to assess values

Ortiz v Kayanan

Facts:
 Lot was formerly subject of Homestead Application of Martin Dolorico II
o Bartolome Ortiz continued cultivation and possession of property without filing application
to acquire its title
o MD named his uncle Martin Dolorico I as his heir in HA
o MD executed affidavit relinquishing rights to property to Comintan (grandson) and Zamora
(son in law)
 Requested Director of lands to cancel HA
 BO filed protest  Said he should be given preference to purchase the lot bec he was actual
occupant and has been in continuous possession of the same
 Prop sold at public auction  C was only bidder
o BO filed civil case against C and Z
 RTC  Ruled for C
o If BO not winning bidder, CZ reimburse BO the improvements on said property (P13K)
 SC  Deliver to CZ land
o Let CZ file a bond of P13K
 BO has been collecting tolls from property in place where he hasn’t intro’d improvements
o Vehicular traffic diverted here from 1969-1970
o Entitled to P13K improvements for prop
o Not disputed by SC
 But they said tolls belong to C because they were collected in land where
improvements not intro’d
 MFR  C entitled to possession of land and enjoyment of tols

Issues:
W/N C entitled to tolls? YES
 BO  Since judgment showed he was possessor in good faith he is entitled to payment of
improvements on whole prop
o Bond filed by CZ not payment which would entitle them to possession
o All fruits including tolls (P25K) belong to him not C
 CZ  Paid bond already, remaining balance to be paid to BO if he loses bid to lot (Bond evidenced
by cert of COC)
 BO not entitled to tolls
o Possessor in good faith is entitled to fruits
 Possession in good faith interrupted when defects of title are made known to
possessor by evidence  not entitled to fruits anymore
o Even after good faith ceases possessor may retain prop until paid for necessary expenses
(546CC)
 Right of retention = pledge (1731CC)  Any person who has performed work upon
a movable has right to retain by way of pledge until paid  See 597CC, 594CC
 Extinguished OB
o BO cannot appropriate tolls for his own benefit
 His duty under law after deducting necessary expenses to apply amount to payment
of the interests and the balance of payment of OB
 Tolls belong to C  Owner of land which toll road passed
 Bond already in court given by CZ

Germiniano v CA
Facts:
 Suit for unlawful detainer
 Lot with 314sqm area was originally owned by Paulina Geminiano (Mom of Federico Geminiano)
o 12sqm  stood FG’s unfinished bungalow which they sold on Nov 1978 to Spouses Nicolas
for P6K
 There was alleged promise to sell the part of the lot where FG house stood
 They executed a CT of lease over 126 sqm including portion where the house stood
in favor of SN for P40 on Nov 15, 1978 for 7yrs
o SN executed add’l improvements and registered house in their name
 When lease ended in ’85, PG stopped accepting rentals
 Lot was subject of a suit  resulted in Maria Lee acquiring it in ‘72
o ML sold it to Lily Salcedo,who sold it to Spouses Dionisio in ‘84
o SD executed quitclaim over the lot in favor of PG  Lot registered under their names
 PG wrote to SN to vacate and pay rentals in arrears  refused
o Filed in MTCC
 PG not owner of lot during ’78 lease
 AKA no lease or renewal
 Implied renewal was not for the period stipulated , but only on a month-to-
month basis (1687CC)
o PG not accepting rent = refusal to receive rent
 Lessees were not builders in good faith
 Knew that their occupation would only continue during life of lease
 Governed by 1678  Allow reimbursement of up to ½ of value of useful
improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse
 House +Improvements was P180K
 RTC  Affirmed MTCC, Made SN vacate
o CA affirmed

Issues:
W/N SN = Builders in good faith? NO
 Land was originally owned by PG
o Gotten by ML but never got writ of possession  PG retained possession
 Relationship between SN and PG = lessor lessee
o SN estopped from denying landlords title
o Knew their occupation was only for duration of lease
 448 only applies to possessor in good faith  Not one here
o Alleged promise to sell not proven  No CT
 Sole right of SN = Remove improvements because 1678 only arises if PG opts for appropriation of
improvements

Pleasantvill Dev Corp v CA

Facts:
 Edith Robillo bought from PDC a land designated as Lot 9 in Bacolod City Subdv
o Eldred Jardinico  bought rights of ER
o EJ secured TCT from register of deeds  found out that Wilson Kee had made
improvements and taken possession of it
 WK bought Lot 8 on installment from CT Torres Enterprises (Real Estate agent of PDC)
o Possessed lot even before completion of payment
o WK paid relocation fees for the preparation of the lot plan
o CT employee Octaviano accompanied WK wife to inspect lot 8
 POINTED OUT LOT 9 INSTEAD
 WK built his house and improvements on the said lot
 EJ confronted him  amicable settlement failed, EJ filed in MTC a complaint for ejectment
 o MTCC  Delivery of lot 9 to WK was due to fault of CT
 Recession of CT of WK and PDC already affected because he has not paid
installments
 WK had no right over the land anymore, cannot claim reimbursement for
improvements
 RTC  PDC +CT not at faul
o No evidence to show that they participated in giving WK lot 9
o WK in bad faith  guilty for usurping property
 CA  WK in good faith
o Unaware of mix-up, fault of CT

Issues:
W/N WK in good faith? YES
 All to to mistake of CT
o Improbable that purchaser would knowingly build something on what is not his
o WK = prudent, ascertained that lot was his
 Not versed in technical description of property so sought help of CT
 Had no reason to doubt CT findings
 Good faith = belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect
or flaw in his title  WK in good faith
 PDC no because of ff
o Par 22  WK had to give notice to PDC +CT of construction
o Par 26  Prior approval of PDC and CT needed
o THESE HAVE NO BEARING ON WK GOOD FAITH
 State of mind that hes building on his lot
 WK CT rescinded?  SO? Does not negate negligence of PDC
 Par 13 CT of sale  WK personally examined the lot etc,
o Subject matter is change of location
o Provides that vendee examined the lot and agrees to shoulder expenses

Felices v Iriola

FACTS:

Felices: grantee of a homestead of over 800 hectares in Cam Sur. A month after issuance of his patent, he
conveyed in conditional sale a portion of more than 4 hectares to Iriola for P 1,700. Terms: the sale was
subject to the provisions of Sec. 119 of Act 141, as amended, and to the prohibitions spread on the vendor's
patent; and that after the lapse of five years or as soon as may be allowed by law, the vendor or his
successors would execute in vendee's favor a deed of absolute sale over the land in question.

2 years after sale, Felices tried to recover land, but Iriola refused unless he was paid P 2,000 (1,700 + value
of improvements introduced).

TC: the trial court held that Iriola was in bad faith and not entitled to reimbursement because he made
improvements after being informed by Felices that the latter intended to recover the land.

ISSUE: May Iriola recover or be reimbursed the value of his improvements on the land in question?
HELD:
NO.


RATIO:

(1) The sale is null and void.

Sale was executed within the five-year prohibitive period under section 118 of the Public Land Law.

Consequently, appellee never lost his title or ownership over the land in question, and there was no need
either for him to repurchase the same from appellant, or for the latter to execute a deed of reconveyance in
his favor. The case is actually for mutual restitution, incident to the nullity ab initio of the conveyance.

(2) Even if the sale is null and void, and assuming that both parties knew of the illegality of the sale and that
both parties acted in bad faith, CC 453 will not apply.

Even if both parties were in bad faith, CC 453 does not apply. This is because the improvements in question
were made on the premises only after Felices had tried to recover the land in question from Iriola, and even
during the pendency of this action in the court below. Felices could no longer be regarded as having
impliedly assented or conformed to the improvements thereafter made by appellant on the premises. Upon
the other hand, Iriole,recognizing as he does Felice’s right to get back his property, continued to act in bad
faith when he made improvements on the land in question after he had already been asked extra-judicially
and judicially, to surrender and return its possession to appellee; and as a penalty for such bad faith, he
must forfeit his improvements without any right to reimbursement therefor. "He who builds, plants or
sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses that is built, planted, or sown without right to indemnity" (CC
449).

JUDGMENT: TC affirmed.

Pecson v CA (1993)

Facts:
 PP filed a complaint to annul the sale at a public auction conducted by City Treasurer Regis
o Due to non-payment of real estate taxes + sale was made without prior notice to PP
o PP  not notified of his right to redeem the property
 Property transferred to Nepomuceno
 TC  Sale by Regis was valid
o Notices of auction sale was published in a newspaper (Notices)
o Notices also sent to #79 Paquita St Instead of #1009 Paquita St Sampaloc Manila
o Building is not part of sale though

Issues:
W/N Notice of sale requirement was met? YES
 Notices sent to #79 address + published in Times Journal
o Final notice was again sent to #79 but not redeemed after 1 yr period  Final bill of sale
attached in favor of Nepomuceno
 PP admitted that dates of notices were mailed to his former address in Manila but in QC
o PD 464 Real Property tax Code
 Notices of sale of the public auction may be sent to the delinquent tax payer either in
address as shown in tax rolls or property tax records of the municipality or city OR
at his residence, if known to such treasurer
 PP  Notices should have been sent to his #1009 QC address even if he was no longer residing
there since letters sent to him at said address were forwarded to him by one of the new occupants
o Appeared in records of office of city of treasurer that address of PP was transferred in 1009
in ‘82
o Employees should not be faulted for relying on tax records
o CFI of QC sent him notices
 PP should have known of the consequences of his tax delinquency
o PP never displayed interest in paying interest taxes, even intro’d improvements on it
Pecson v CA (1995)

Facts:
 Pedro Pecson was owner of commercial lot in Kamias
o Built a four-door two story apartment building
o Failed to pay realty taxes (P12K)  LAND sold in a public auction to Spouses Nuguid for
P103K)
 PP challenged validity of the sale
o RTC  Building not included in the sale
 CA  Building not included
o Only land was sold, building was not mentioned in any of the documents of sale
 SN filed a motion with the trial court for delivery of possession of the lot under 546CC
o PP = builder in good faith, SN offered to pay cost of construction
 Cost of construction was more that of the lot
o PP  3 doors of apartment being leased
 Rents should be paid to SN
 CA  SN opted to appropriate the improvements made by PP
o PP should be reimbursed for the cost of the building
 PP has right to retain until paid costs

Issues:
W/N 448 and 546 should be applied? NO, only 546
 PP = Builder in good faith
 448  Refers to land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has made
works on it
o Does not apply where owner of land = BSP
o Does not apply here  PP was former owner
 546  Applied if BSP acted in good faith
o Objective is to administer justice
o Rivera case  Market value of improvements should be basis for reimbursement

NOTE: Since the private respondents have opted to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner is
thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper
indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This is so because
the right to retain the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or
possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. The petitioner not having been so paid,
he was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.

Sps Nuquid v CA

Facts:

Pedro Pecson owned a commercial lot located at 27 Kamias Road QC, on which he built a 4-door 2-storey
apartment building. For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at a public auction by the City Treasurer
of QC to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it to spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.

Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale and the RTC upheld the spouses’ title but declared that
the 4-door 2-storey apartment building was not included in the auction sale. By virtue of the Entry of
Judgment of the Decision, the Nuguids became the uncontested owners of the 256-square meter
commercial lot. The Nuguids moved for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building.

Relying on Art. 546 of the Civil Code, the RTC ruled that the spouses Nuguid should reimburse Pecson for
his construction cost and that they were entitled to immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the lot
and improvements. RTC also ordered Pecson to pay the same amount of monthly rentals to the Nuguids as
paid by the tenants occupying the apartment units and allowed the offset of the amount due from the
Nuguids against the amount of rents collected by Pecson.

RTC issued a Writ of Possession, directing the deputy sheriff to put the Nuguids in possession of the subject
property with all the improvements thereon and to eject all occupants therein. Pecson filed a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. The CA affirmed the order of payment of construction
costs but rendered the issue of possession moot. Because of this Pecson filed a petition for review and the
Court ruled that “the current market value of the apartment building should be made as basis of
reimbursement and that the Nuguids should pay the amount to Pecson otherwise Pecson shall be restored to
the possession of the apartment building until payment of the required indemnity.”

Pecson filed a Motion to Restore Possession and a Motion to Render Accounting praying for the restoration
of his possession over the subject lot and for the Nuguids to be directed to render accounting under oath, of
the income derived from the apartment.

Issue:

WON the spouses Nuguid are liable to pay rent over and above the current market value of the
improvement

Held:

It is not disputed that the construction of the 4-door 2-storey apartment was undertaken at the time when
Pecson was still the owner of the lot. When the Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the lot, by virtue
of entry of judgment of the Court’s decision, the apartment building was already in existence and occupied
by tenants.

Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the improvement as his own
upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Also,
Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and
useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made. As we earlier
held, since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as June 1993, when
they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not include the apartment
building, they could not benefit from the lot’s improvement, until they reimbursed the improver in full,
based on the current market value of the property.

Despite the Court’s recognition of Pecson’s right of ownership over the apartment building, the petitioners
still insisted on dispossessing Pecson by filing for a Writ of Possession to cover both the lot and the
building. Clearly, this resulted in a violation of respondent’s right of retention. Worse, petitioners took
advantage of the situation to benefit from the highly valued, income-yielding, four-unit apartment building
by collecting rentals thereon, before they paid for the cost of the apartment building. It was only 4 years
later that they finally paid its full value to the respondent. Given the circumstances of the instant case
where the builder in good faith has been clearly denied his right of retention for almost half a decade, we
find that the increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable and equitable. The petitioners had
reaped all the benefits from the improvement introduced by the respondent during said period, without
paying any amount to the latter as reimbursement for his construction costs and expenses. They should
account and pay for such benefits.
We need not belabor now the appellate court’s recognition of herein respondent’s entitlement to rentals
from the date of the determination of the current market value until its full payment. Respondent is clearly
entitled to payment by virtue of his right of retention over the said improvement.

Coleongco v Regalado

Facts:
 Before Sept ’44  Pedro Regalado was the owner of a lot in Bacolod of which Lot 157 was a portion
thereof
o On this lot, a building was erected which in Sept ’44 was occupied by forces of the Japanese
Army
o PR sold lot to Vicente Coleongco who became owner of the lot
 Lot = 1000sqm and land occupied by house was 245 sqm
o Assessed value = P1,156 (L0T) P4.5K (House)
 VC = House on lot was included in sale of property when city of Bacolod was liberated
o VC got rents for occupation
o After American forces vacated the house  PR occupied it
 VC instituted Civil case
o CFI  Improvement (building) was property of PR
o CA  Affirmed
 PP Sold house to Leonor Montilla who was duly appraised that the other case was pending against
PP
o LM assumed any OB which might arise and liberated PR from case
o VC wanted the portion of the building because he wanted to occupy the house

Issues:
W/N 361 applied? NO
 Ejectment case was instituted on ’47 before appeal of Civil case (Held: VC not owner of house) 
Not a bar to depart from his stand + institute proceedings so defendants vacate the lot + remove
building, demand rentals for occupancy until building is removed
o LC  Pay rents starting from ’45 when PR occupied
 Action originally was an ejectment case
o Prop presently owned by LM and that the building was constructed in good faith
o 361 Old CC  448 New CC
o 453 Old CC = Right of retention
o 454 old CC 448CC Owner may remove improvements if it wont be destroyed
 Right of owner of the lot to have it vacated from any improvement belonging to another built in
good faith = Subordinated and without prejudice of whatever rights the owner and builder in good
faith of the improvement may have
o VC not entitled to ejectment because it would be a disregard to defendants right to pay
acquisition or paid value of building
o 361 not applicable
 PR constructed his house on his own land before he sold it to VC
 Article only applies to cases where a person constructs a building on the land of
another in good or in bad faith
 This case  Person constructs a building on his own land, no question of
good or bad faith on part of builder

Mecado v CA

Facts:

Lolita C. Bulaong, Florentino Agulto, Severino Salaysay, Susana Bernardino (the Bulaong Group),
from 1956 to 1972, have been individual lessees of stalls in the public market of Baliuag, Bulacan. The
market was destroyed by fire on 17 February 1956; the members of the Bulaong Group constructed new
stalls therein at their expense; and they thereafter paid rentals thereon to the Municipality of Baliuag. In
1972, the members of the group sub-leased their individual stalls to other persons: Paz Mercado, Carolina
S. Chico, Luciana Cabrera, Joaquin Ignacio, Elmer Flores, and Avelina C. Nucom (the Mercado Group). After
the Mercado Group had been in possession of the market stalls for some months, the municipal officials of
Baliuag cancelled the long standing leases of the Bulaong Group and declared the persons comprising the
Mercado Group as the rightful lessees of the stalls in question, in substitution of the former. The municipal
authorities justified the cancellation of the leases of the Bulaong Group by invoking the provisions of
Municipal Ordinance 14, dated 14 December 1964, which prohibited the sub-leasing stalls by the lessees
thereof, as well as a 29 May 1973 directive of the Office of the President requiring enforcement of said
Ordinance 14. Recognition of the Mercado Group’s rights over the stalls was subsequently manifested in
Municipal Ordinance 49, approved on 5 July 1973.

The members of the Bulaong Group sued. They filed several individual complaints with the CFI seeking
recovery of their stalls from the Mercado Group as well as damages. Their theory was anchored on their
claimed ownership of the stalls constructed by them at their own expense, and their resulting right, as such
owners, to sub-lease the stalls, and necessary, to recover them from any person withholding possession

Issues:
W/N Lesses can be builders in good faith? NO
The members of the Bulaong group were admittedly lessees of space in the public market; they therefore
could not, and in truth never did make the claim, that they were owners of any part of the land occupied by
the market so that in respect of any new structure put up by them thereon, they could be deemed builders
in good faith (in accordance with Article 526 of the Civil Code). To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is
essential that a person assert title to the land on which he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of
owner, and that he be unaware “that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it. It is such a builder in good faith who is given the right to retain the thing, even as against the
real owner, until he has been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses but also for useful
expenses. On the other hand, unlike the builder in good faith, a lessee who “makes in good faith useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or
substance of the property leased,” can only claim payment of “one-half of the value of the improvements”
or, “should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, remove the improvements, even though the
principal thing may suffer damage thereby.”

Republic v CA

Facts:
 Private respondents Tancinco, Reyes, Imperial are registered owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan,
bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue Rivers
o They filed an app for the registration of 3 lots adjacent to their fishpond property
 Lot 1 (33,937 sqm)  Bounded by both rivers
 Lot 2 (5,453 sqm)  Bounded by Meycauayan River
 Lot 3 (1,985 sqm)  Bounded by Meycauayan River
 Assistant provincial fiscal Vicente opposed registration
 o PRs withdrew reg of Lot 3
 LC  Lots were accretions to PRs fishpond
 CA  Affirmed

Issues:
W/N Said lots were natural accretions within the ambit of 457CC? NO
 RP  PRs transferred their dykes further down the river bed of MR
o Accretion was man made and not the result of gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by
the waters
 PRs  Relied on testimony of Virginia Acuña
o Lots 1 and 2 were already dry almost at the level of Pilapil of property of Dr Tancinco
o New Pilapil was established on boundaries of L1 and L2 and soil from old Pilapil was
transferred to the new Pilapil in 1951
o New lots were converted into a fishpond and water was two meters deep here
o Accretion without human intervention
 Requisites for accretion (457)
o Deposit be gradual and imperceptible
 Gradual alluvial deposits must be due to the effects of the river’s currents
o Made through the effects of the current of water
o Land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the river
 Deposit should be due to the effect of the current of water
o No evidence this happened in this case
o SG  Impossible that 4 hectares of land came into being due to both rivers
 VA testimony unreliable  Said she noticed accretion in 1939 + said that she
observed an increase in the area of the original fishpond in the same year
 Evidence shows that alluvial deposits were man made  Transfer of dykes
 457 done to compensate riparian owner for natural causes
o Lots not included in 1940 survey and 1958-1960 Cadastral survey
o Not declared for tax purposes until 1972  33 years after it had been allegedly formed

Grande v CA

Facts:
 Pets Grande are owners of 3.5 hectare land in Isabela  Inherited it from their mom Patricia Angui,
who inherited it from her parents
o It is L1  Surveyed for purposes of registration in 1930 and showed that its NE side was
bounded by the Cagayan River
o Gradual accretion took place due to the river’s current  Bank receded about 105 meters
and developed an alluvial deposit of 1.9hectares
 Pets instituted action in CFI to quiet the title of respondents Calalung
o Pets  Possessed land peacefully until Cs entered land and claimed ownership in 1948
o Resps  Possessed land since 1933, undisturbed till now
 CFI  Ruled for pets
o Accretion was formed by deposit of Cagayan river (Navigable)  Started on 1931
o Accretion formed completely on 1948 (Declared by Cs for tax purposes here)
o Ownership of piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation
 Gs own accretion because it was part of their registered land
 457 does not require acts of possession  they become owners as soon as deposit
becomes manifest
o C’s cannot acquire accretion by prescription
 Even if they could, action commenced Jan 25, 1958, they occupied land Sept, 1948 
Below 10yr prescription period
 CA  Ruled for Cs
o By accession, land pertains to original estate
  Within purview of Act 496 S46  No title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
o Accretion does not auto fall within protection of rule of imprescriptabillity
 Would cause confusion because are is beyond what was originally registered
 Registration does not entitle accretion to all rights in Land registration Act
o Domingo Calalung said he occupied land in 1934  Land gradually increased and was
declared for taxation in ’46 and ‘48
 Pets never declared them for tax purposes, only Resps did even if they knew
accretion was in their land

Issues:
W/N Pets are rightful owners of accretion? NO
 Pets are lawful owners of alluvial prop because they are registered owners of the land
o Ownership is different from registration under Torrens system
 Imprescriptabillity only applies to Torrens system
 Land must be placed under this law
o Accretion never became registered prop  Not imprescriptible
 Resps acquired it through prescription
o Had physical possession, openly, since 1933

Cureg v IAC

Facts:
 PRs Apostol, Gerardo, and Maquinad filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against Pets
Carinyan
o PRs are legal heirs of Domingo Gerardo  Since July 26, 1984, they have been in actual,
open, peacefull, and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership and
adverse to all claimants of a parcel of land  Motherland
 2.5 hectares bounded by Cagayan River
 Declared for tax purposes under the name of Francisco Gerardo
 Upon his death, ownership and possession of the land went to Domingo Gerardo
 1979  Gerardos sold land to Apostil through “Extra-Judicial Partition with
Voluntary Reconveyance”
 At this time, land already showed signs of 3 hectare accretion on the north
due to the movement of the Cagayan River
o Last week of Oct 1982  PRs were about to cultivate mother land, they were prevented
from doing so by Pets
 Piece of land owned by Antonio Carinyan in Isabella (2790 sqm)
 AC revised his tax declarations over this land and increased the area to
4,584  making boundary in the North Cagayan river
o Nullified Original boundary of DG
 Pets  mother land does not exisit
 AC owned subject land which was an accretion + they possessed it
 TC  PRs had right to land
 IAC  Affirmed TC

Issues:
W/N Carinyan’s had right to subject land? YES
 Pets claimed to be riparian owners of the land, which was an accretion to their registered land
o PRs claim of ownership anchored on 4 tax declarations  Not sufficient to prove ownership
o Pets  Showed OCTs  Clearly showed that boundary of Pets land on the north is Cagayan
River, not motherland
 Ferrer-Lopez v CA  OCT shows true and legal ownership of registered owners
o Tax declaration of earlier date cannot defeat OCT
  Decree of registration bars all claims and rights which may have existed prior to
registration
 Evidence also shows that Pets have been in possession of subject land
 Tried to have it surveyed but never followed through because it was subject
to app for homestead act etc
 PRs claim that they possessed motherland was not proved
o Subject land is alluvial deposit created by Cagayan River

Brothers Meneses v CA

Facts:
 Darum then District Land officer of laguna issued to Pablito Meneses 2 Free Patents and OCTs
covering Lots 1585, 190 in Laguna
o PM got them from Silverio Bautista through Deed of Waiver and Transfer of rights
 For SB’s love and affection and for monetary OBs
o PM took possession and intro’d improvements
o SB acquired 900sqm lot from aunt and occupying it since 1956
 Quisimbing fam  Ciriaca Qusismbing was issued OCT in 1919 covering 859 sqm lot in Laguna,
which is bounded by Laguna de Bay as its north western boundary
o Heirs of Q instituted action publiciana in CFI for recovery of possession from Villamor and
Lanuzo  CFI and CA ruled for Q’s
o LRC case  Qs applied for reg and confirmation of title with add’l area of 2,387 sqm 
Gradually accrued due to natural action of Laguna De Bay
 Surveyed and confirmed
 Q’s filed civil case against Bros Meneses
o Free patents and OCTs issued to them were fraudulent  Lorenzo Meneses used PM as
puppet
 TC  Lands of Ms belong to Q’s as riparian owners
 CA in civil case  Laguna de Bay = body of water formed in depression of
the earth (lake)
o Art 84 law of waters  Accretions deposited gradually upon land
contiguous to creeks etc. by accessions or sediments from waters
thereof belong to the owner’s of the lands
o Even if area where LV house is located is not included in title  Still
belongs to q’s because it is an accretion upon their land
 Free patents issued were fraudulent (No consideration, No authority, LM exercised
rights to ownership etc)
 TC ruled for Q
 SB  convicted M’s, they filed appeal to civil case

Issues:
W/N Lands are accretion lands? YES
 BM’s  No because prop belonged to natural bed of LDB and what had to be determined was
whether said prop was covered by water when lake was at its highest depth, Wrong
o RP V CA  LDB is a lake, alterations of high tides and low tides, could not account for rise of
water level in LDB
 Rains bring about the inundation  Water level which causes the submersion of
land occurs during a shorter period, than the level of water which the land is
completely dry (highest ordinary depth)
 Land sought to be reg’d is not part of LDB  Submersion in water of a portion of
land was due to rain, not due to flux and reflux of tide so not foreshore lands
 3 reqs for accretion  See RP V CA above
o Lands are accretion lands, but TC did not examine w/n they satisfy reqs  Lands belong to
Q’s who own prop beside land in controversy
Heirs of Emilian Navarro v IAC

Facts


In 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease over a 17ha tract of foreshore land in
Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. This was denied. 
Emiliano Navarro filed a fishpond application for 25ha of
foreshore land in the same area. The Bureau of Fisheries denied the application on the ground that the
property formed part of the public domain. However, upon motion for reconsideration, the application was
granted, but only for 7ha. 
In 1960, Sinforoso filed an application to register and confirm his title to a 146
611 sq m parcel of land in Sibocon. This parcel was allegedly an accretion to his property located in Barrio
Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, which is bounded in the east by Talisay River, in the west by the Bulacan
River, and in the north by Manila Bay (REMEMBER THESE COORDINATES. IMPORTANT LATER). Sinforoso
claimed the accretion as the riparian owner. 
The Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry opposed
the application because the land was part of the public domain. The lower court issued an order of general
default excepting the two Directors. 
In 1961, Emiliano caused the order to be lifted. He filed an opposition
to the application, claiming that: 


1. the land was part of the public domain because it was part of the Manila Bay foreshore area
2. he was a
lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property because of his fishpond permit, and that

3. he had already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond

The lower court ruled that the parcel was foreshore land and therefore cannot be the subject of land
registration proceedings.

The Court of Appeals reversed and granted the application. Although the parcel faced Manila Bay, it was
sandwiched between the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, which bring down considerable amounts of soil and
sediments during floods every year. Sinforoso planted PALAPAT and BAKAWAN trees on the land to serve
as boundaries and/or strainers whenever flood occurred. The accretion brought by the rivers extended
well past these boundaries.

Issue

Is the disputed parcel of land foreshore land part of the public domain, or is it an accretion?

Held

It is foreshore land. SC reversed CA.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate
fronting the river bank; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. The alluvium, by mandate of
Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil
deposit can be seen but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
(1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the
result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of the river.
The land in question lacks the third requisite of accretion. If it were indeed a product of accretion, the
alluvium should have been deposited on the eastern and western sides of the land, and not on the northern
side which is adjacent to Manila Bay.

The land is thus an accretion on a sea bank, which is not covered by Article 457, but by Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters:
"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea
and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the
coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

The palapat and bakawan trees planted by Sinforoso in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea water and
at the same time a kind of block to the strained sediments from being carried back to the sea by the very
waves that brought them to the former shore at the end of the dike, which must have caused the shoreline
to recede and dry up eventually raising the former shore leading to the formation of the land in question.

In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and bakawan trees, the
withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the drying up of its former foreshore, and
the regular torrential action of the waters of Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the
northern boundary of private respondents' own tract of land

Baes v CA

Facts:
 1962  Gov dug a canal on a private parcel of land covering an area of 33k sqm to streamline the
Tripa de Galina Creek
o Lot here was acquired by Felix Baes who registered it under this name and subdivided it
into 3 lots
 LotB of this lot was occupied by the Canal
o Gov gave FB a lot with exactly the same area as compensation through “Deed of Exchange of
Property”
 Near LotC of FB orig ownership and registered under FB name
 Soil displaced by canal was used to fill up old creek
 FB had lot A and C resurveryed and subdivided
o Found there were errors in respect to bearings and distances
o Resurveyed plan approved by CFI of Pasay
 New TCTs issued  LOT1A, 1B, C1, C2
 Gov found out that Lot B  FB made an apartment building here was unlawfully enlarged
(Increased area of 2,770sqm)
o Filed a pet for the cancellation of TCTs  Original lot should be reverted back to its status
before resurveyed subdivision

Issues:
W/N Lot 1-B belongs to FB? NO
 FB relied on 461CC  Abandoned river beds due to natural change in course of water belong to
owners
o Tolentino  Refers to natural change
 If change in course was due to works by gov through concessioners, then it belongs
to concessioners
 If not it belongs to owners
 Riparian owner entitled to compensation for loss of prop due to natural causes
o Same for change in course of river due to artificial means
  Done by gov here to improve flow of Tripa de Galina Reef
 FB already compensated  fair exchange, cant not ask for addl compensation because this = unjust
enrichment

Binalay v Manalo

Facts:
 Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land in Isabela (20hectares)
o Western portion of the land was bordering on Cagayan River has an elevation lower than
that of the eastern portion which borders on the national road
o WP would be submerged under waters of Cagayan River during rainy season  re-appears
during dry season (Jan-Aug)
 Guillermo Manalo got 8.65 hectares of that land from daughter of JT, Faustina Taccad
 GM bought another 1.8 hectares from Gregorio Tagbua  Total = 10.45 hectares
 Cadastral Survey conducted during rainy season consolidated both parcels into one lot
o Became Lot 307  Portion of which was under water
 Sketch Plan  Cagayan River ran from north-south and forks at a certain point to form two
branches (Western and Eastern), then unites at other end to form a narrow strip of land
o Eastern branch cuts through land of GM and is inundated with water during rainy season
o Bed of eastern branch is submerged (unsurveyed portion)
o Narrow strip of land looked like an island
 22 hectares  Lot 821 and 822
 Separated from Lot 307 only during rainy season
 Portion of land bought by GM from Taccad by way of accretion
 Binalay possessed lot 821, said they cultivate it  GM filed two cases for forcible entry against
them but both were dismissed
o Filed complaint for quieting of title
 CFI  Ruled for MG
 CA  Ruled for MG

Issues:
W/N Lot 821 belongs to MG? NO
 CFI  Lot was an accretion
o During dry season, body of water separating land 821 becomes marshy
 SC  Owner of riparian land, which receives gradual deposits from alluvion does
not have to make express acts of possession
 CA  Lot 821 is not an island
 PI Gov v CSJ
o Ordinary depth  highest depth of waters of Laguna de Bay during dry season
o Extra-ordinary depth  that which transcends general rule of ordinary depth
 Highest ordinary level in this case = during dry season in western side of Lot 821
 A70 Law of Waters is law applicable
o Natural Bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its waters during highest
floods
o Highest floods in eastern branch of Cagayan River occur during rainy season
 Depressed portion of Lot 821  River bed
o GM admitted it in open court
o Sketch plan showed that Lot 307 is separated from Cagayan River by a large tract of land
(Lot 821 and eastern branch of Cagayan River)
o Pics of GM showed the depressed portion as a river bed
 420CC  Prop of public dominion
o GM did not acquire ownership over river bed even if it was included in DOAS he got
o Rivers = the running waters, the bed, the banks
 Claim of GM has no basis
 o Intrusion of eastern branch of Cagayan River into GM’s prop prejudiced GM BUT this is a
common occurrence because the land bordered rivers aka exposed to floods
 No evidence to show that Lot 821 was an accretion to Lot 307
o 457cc  Accretion as a mode of acquiring prop requires the concurrence of 3 reqs
 Deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible
 Result of the action of waters of the river
 Land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the river or coast
o Lot 821 lies on the bank of the river not beside but directly opposite to Lot 307 across the
river
 No findings in LC or CA that GM got an alluvium from the action of a river in a slow
and gradual manner
 LC mentioned several floods that caused land to reapprear
 Not an alluvial process
o Lot 821 = 11 hectares  slow accretion would not have doubled size of GM 10 hectare lot
 GM only proved possession of Lot 307
o 477CC plaintiff for action of quieting of title must at least have equitable title or interest in
the real property which is the subject matter of the action
 None here

Siari Valley Estates v Lucasan

Facts:
 SV started raising live-stock on its 950 hectare ranch in 1921 with 7 native cattle
o Got 30 native cattle and two indian bulls in 1923
o Intro’d native stock into its herd through a native black bull  Male offspring were
castrated
 Before jap occupation, premises was well secured
o 1943  Portion of it was destroyed and some cattle went ranch of Lucasan
 L took advantage of it, willfully and deliberately drove many animals to its land
 Jesus Pandi (Farmer)  saw men of L driving 30 cattle to their ranch
 Eriberto Garrovillo (foreman of SV)  L told SV that their cattle was mixing
with L cows,
 John Roemer (President of SV)  Friend of l, L told him 250 cattle were in
his pasture land and L allowed him to get it but JR’s wife protested
 Francisco Martinez  Red cross committee asked help from JR for funding
o JR offered 30 cattle’s, they were able to get 78 from L’s land
 SV filed action to recover 200 cattle
o TC  All cattle in L land were SV’s

Issues:
W/N SV owned said cattle? YES
 Computation showed it was impossible for L to have 800 cattle
o L started raising 53 cattle in 1939  30% increase per year = 417 cattle in 1951
o He still had 400 after disposing 230  Excess of 700 (Where did this come from?)
o SV had a total of 1768 cattle from 1941-1945
 925 in total now but only counted 102
 No evidence that they were taken by L but not wrong to believe that they were in Ls
land
 322 Cattle of L were impounded and inspected
o majority were mestizos  Impossible for L to have them because all of his orig stock were
native
 Possible for mestizos to have resulted from intermingling
o US rule  Good mingled which cannot be properly identified, loss resulting from confusion
is on party who occasioned it
  Wrong intermingling goods of another such that it results into no evidence for
distinguishment  Bad Faith party cannot recover his own proportion
o L in bad faith  his men rounded up the cattle
 Threatened SV men when they tried to retrieve them

Santos v Bernabe

Facts:
 Urbano Santos deposited in warehouse of Jose Bernabe 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay
o Pablo Tiongson deposited 1026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay
 PT filed in CFI a compliant against JB to recover 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay
o Writ of attachment issued  924 cavans and 31 ½ kilos of palay found in JB warehouse sold
at a public auction, proceeds delivered to PT
 US intervened  Does not appear that things deposited in JB warehouse were separated or
identifiable from each other
o US  PT cannot claim what he got because in asking for writ of attachment, he
acknowledged that it belonged to JB
o PT  US deposited in JB warehouse 1, 026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay

Issues:
Who owns the proceeds? Both do proportionately
 That which belongs to US mixed with that which belongs to PT
o No means of separating them because they cant be separated
o Applicable law  381 CC: If by will of the owners, two things of identical or dissimilar
nature are mixed/ accidentally mixed, and cannot be separated without injury, each owner
shall acquire a right to the mixture proportionate to that part belonging to him, according to
the value of the things mixed and commingled
 Number of kilos of cavan not determined
 US gets 398.49 cavans, PT gets 525.51

Oliviga v CA

Facts:
 1950  Land was still forrest land when Eutiquio Pureza (12yo) and his dad cleared and cultivated
it
o Introduced improvements  trees, fruits etc
o Area seized for disposition  Bureau of Lands surveyed it in the name of EP
o Land known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision
 Godofredo Olviga, son of Jose Olviga protested the survey but not the part about th ½ hectare
portion
o Admitted it belonged to EP except the half claimed by him
 1960  EP filed homestead app over lot, transferred his rights to Cornelia Glor
o ’67  JO got a registered title for the lot in a cadastral proceeding, in fraud of the rights of
the other two parties
o CG was sickly and his wife unschooled  never knew there were proceedings happening
o Jo falsely omitted that there were other persons claiming possession of said land
 Civil Case filed in RTC by Angelita Glor Ruled against Olviga
o CA  Affirmed
 W/N action is really for quieting of title that does not prescribe? YES
 BUT even if it did prescribe  COA should have accrued from the time that
the plaintiff’s learned of such title

Issues:
W/N action prescribed? NO
  Before an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in 10 yrs  Point of reference = date of registration of the deed of the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property
o Rule only applies when plaintiff is not in possession of the property
o If he is in actual possession of it, right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe
 Sapto v Fabiana  No enforcement of the contract is needed since the delivery of possession of the
land sold had been consummated
o Action accrued only when appellants initiated suit to recover land
 Faja v CA  One who is in actual possession of a land claiming to be the owner of it may wait until
his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right
o Undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
determine the nature of an adverse claim of a third party
 This case  private respondents were in actual possession of the prop since 1950
o Undisturbed possession gives them continuing right to seek aid from court of equity from
GO who disturbed in 1980

Pingol v CA

Facts:
 Vicente Pingol is owner of Lot#3223 in Caloocan
o Sold it to Francisco Donasco through a deed of Absolute Sale
 DOAS, Feb 17, 1969
o Price = P 20,530  P2K to be paid as partial payment, P257,36 monthly for 71 months
o In case of default of payment  earns rate of legal interest
 FD paid P2K and P8369 in total installments and left P10,161 balance before he died
o Immediately took possession of the land and constructed a house o it
 Heirs filed an action for Specific performance and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injuction
o Spouses Pingol didn’t wanna accept their payment for the balance  Asked for an exorbient
amt
o SP  Action prescribed, DOAS = conditional sale which requires full payment, FD breached
CT of obligation, sale cancelled
 TC  DOAS = Contract to sell, cancelled from the moment of failure to pay, title did not pass to FD,
COA for specific performance already prescribed since complaint filed on Oct 19, 1988  more than
10yrs had passed already
o CA  Reveresed
 DOAS valid  clear intention on VP’s part to sell land
 HD action imprescriptible because it is akin to an action to quiet title

Issues:
W/N Action of HD imprescriptible? YES
 CT was CT of sale
o Title passes to vendee upon delivery of thing sold
o Vendor lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless CT rescinded
o There was clear intention here that VP absolutely sold the property
 Dignos v CA  No stipulation in deed that prop is reserved to seller till full payment, CT of sale
o Acts of parties after showed it was too
 Ownership fully vested to FD
 Land segregated from mother land etc.
o Constructive delivery done when deed of sale executed
 VP Cannot recover unless CT resolved or rescinded 1592CC
 Action has not prescribed
o Action of HD was actually one to quiet title
  Bucton v Gabar  no enforcement of the CT needed since the delivery of possession
of the land sold consummated thae sale
 To remove the cloud upon the appellee’s ownership by refusal of the
appellants to recognize the sale made by predecessors (quiet title)
o Cloud cast here  SP Did not wanna accept tender of payment
 Action to quiet title to property in one’s possession is imprescriptible
 Person may wait until possession is invaded to vindicate his right
 They pay legal interest though

Titong v CA

Facts:
 Mario Titong filed an action to for quieting of title in RTC Masbate
o RTC  Ruled for Spouses Laurio and declared them true and lawful owners of disputed
land (20k sqm)
 Affirmed by CA
 MT  Owner of unregistered 2.28 hectare parcel of land surveyed as lot 3918 and declared for tax
purposes under his name
o Said that SL, with their laborers forcibly entered there land containing 2 hectares of land
and began plowing it because they claimed they were owners
 SL  Said they bought this land from Pablo Espinosa in 1981
o MT said PE was he adjoining owner  No problems until PE sold Lot 3479 to SL
 Boundary between MT land and PE sold land is Bugsayon river
 SL  Area and boundaries of disputed land were unaltered
o MT declared it for tax purposes and this showed that the land had 5.5 hectares
o Said that MT sold in to Concepcion vda de Cabug  TD 5339 issued in her favor
o MT reacquired it through a sale and again declared it for tax purposes  Sold it to PE
 Prop became part of estate of PE’s wife
 Her heirs sold it through an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous
Sale to SL
 Areas and boundaries remained the same as 1st MT TD
o Said that MT is one of 4 heirs of his mom, who left 3.6 hectares for her kids
 MT only entitled to 0.9 hectares, encroached upon SL prop
 2 Surveys made
o MT Survey  claimed 5.9 hectares, left only 4 hectares for PE instead of the 5.5 hectares
sold to PE

Issues:
W/N MT owns disputed land? NO
 Action to quiet title cannot prosper under 476
o Claimant must show that there is an instrument etc. that casts doubt upon owner’s title
 Ground for complaint must be this instrument Ground here was that SL forcibly
entered property
o Should be an action of forcible entry or a boundary dispute
 MT probed that it was actually a boundary dispute through his evidence showing
what he considered the boundary of his property, which SL said encroached upon
theirs
 In action to quiet title, determination of boundaries would lead to awarding
one of the parties the disputed prop  Issue in quiet action is w/n
instrument is a cloud
 Not proper proceeding for boundary dispute
 Sale  CT transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold
o MT renounced his rights when he sold the land to SL predecessor-in-interest
o 1134+1117  To acquire land through acquisitive prescription (20yrs) it must be held in
good faith
  MT in bad faith here  he admitted to converting boundary line into a rice field and
claimed ownership
 Good faith  Reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing
was owner thereof and could transmit his ownership
o 1137  No need for good faith to acquire land through acquisitive prescription if possessed
for 30 yrs
 MT alleged possession in 1962-1983 (SL entered prop) = 21 yrs only
 Survey  Act by which a parcel of land is ascertained and also a paper containing a statement of
courses and distances, and quantity of land
o Must be approved by Bureau of Lands for it to be more than private writing, NOT DONE
HERE
 Tax declarations  Not persuasive evidence of ownership
o Just and indicium of a claim of ownership
o Incompatibility over MT survey and Commissioner report  Had 8, 585 discrepancy
 SL survey had a more proximate equivalent in Commissioner’s report
o Nothing in commissioner’s report that substantiates MT claim that the land was in his
property

Sps Portie v Cristobal

Facts:
 Spouses Alcantara and Edrosalam were original owners of parcel of land with 3 door apartment in
Valenzuela City
o Sold it to Spouses Portic with the condition that SP assumes the mortgage executed over the
property in favor of SSS
 SP defaulted in the payment of monthly amortizations due in the mortgage
o SSS foreclosed prop and sold it through a public auction  SSS highest bidder
o Before end of redemption period, SP sold the prop to Anastacia Cristobal for P80K
 P45k of which paid to SSS
 AC executed deed of mortgage whereby AC constituted a mortgage over the prop to secure P 150K
debt in favor of SP  TCT issued for AC
 SP demanded payment of P50K unpaid balance
o AC refused to pay
 SP filed action to remove cloud created by AC TCT
o SP  Sale void because AC did not pay balance within period stipulated
o AC  Her ownership was indefeasible because the true agreement was embodied in the
deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage
 RTC  Ruled for SP
 CA  MOA = Real agreement, Deeds were executed to secure the rights over the property
o MOA  AC did not pay full purchase price
 BUT prescription set it bec it was filed beyond reglementary period
o They said the agreement between the parties was valid and AC title supported by evidence

Issues:
W/N action is one of quieting of title? YES
 Suits to quiet title = proceedings quasi in rem
o Individual named as defendant BUT judgment is binding only between the parties
o Registered owner of property is proper party to bring an action to quiet title
 But remedy may also be availed of by other persons because 476 does not refer to
OCT or TCT only
 CT here = CT to sell
o Sale subject to suspensive condition of full payment of purchase price
  Failure to pay is not a breach of obligation but an event that prevents the effectively
of the OB of the vendor to convey the title  Vendor retains ownership until full
price paid
o TCT of AC did bot give her ownership nor did it validate absolute purchase of lot
 Registration was only evidence of title and does not vest ownership
 1544  reg enough to acquire title if good faith present
 AC has not fully paid price, no good faith here
 SP have been in continuous possession of prop  Action has not prescribed

Rumarate v Hernandez

Facts:
 Spouses Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance of real property and/or quieting of title against
spouses Hernandez and Zoleta
o Teidulo Rumarate  Lot 379 was possessed and cultivated by godfather Santiago Guerrero
 Before moving to Quezon, SG orally left his rights over said lot to TR  SG gave TR a
copy of the decision of CFI of Tayabas, which recognized SG rights over said lot
 SG executed quitclaim in 1960 ratifying the transfer of his rights
 TR and his wife and 11 kids possessed land from 1929, and declared it for tax
purposes in 1961
 1970  TR discovered that HZ’s heirs were able to obtain a title over Lot 379
 Was advised to just continue paying taxes and remain on land
 HZ  SG sold the lot to them for P9K
o In CFI Tayabas decision, SG was not issued a title
 HZ filed a motion to re-open the case  declared that the decision was proof that SG
possessed the lot since 1925 or more than 30 years
 CFI  issued OCT for HZ
 H planted trees etc. with his caretaker  1970 caretaker wanted to leave
bec. Someone was telling him to stop cultivating
o HZ died  Heirs of HZ executed deed of partition over the lot and were issued TCT in lieu of
their parent’s OCT
 Joaquin Hernandez  accompanied H to inspect the lot
 Visited in 1966 and 1970 , they’ve been paying taxes since 1966
 Fam planned to convert land into grazing land but stopped bec of ops of NPA
from 1965-1970
 TC  Ruled for SR
o SR possessed land in the concept of an owner since 1929, they became owners by
acquisitive prescription
 SG sale to HZ  SH had no right to sell, bec SR had right to prop
 CA  Reversed
o TR did not acquire land bec donation of SG was void  Must have a donation and an
acceptance embodied in a public instrument
o None here  proves that TR never possessed land in concept of an owner (element of
acquisitive prescription)

Issues:
W/N SR own that land? YES
 Action to quiet title  Court tasked to determine rights of parties so that complainant may be free
from danger of hostile claim
o 477 Plaintiff must have legal title to prop or interest in it
o 2 reqs for quieting of title to prosper  Plaintiff has legal title or interest in real property
subject of action, deed claimed to be casting a cloud must be shown to be invalid
 Evangelista v Santiago  title to real property refers to that upon which ownership
is based
 TR’s continuous and open possession of lot for more than 30 yrs vested him ownership
 o Applicable law at that time 48(b) CA141 (Public Land Act)
 FF. who have imperfect titles may apply to CFI for confirmation of their claims and
issuance of Cert of Title under Land Registration act
 Those who have been in open and continuous possession and occupation of
agricultural lands for more than 30 yrs
o TC  Gave credence to TR testimony that he had been possessing land for more than 30 yrs
 Occupied since 1929
 Filed homestead app in 1957
 From 1929-1960  SG never questioned his possession
 SG executed quitclaim shows this
o While donation was void  years long occupation of TR gave him possession of the land
(Bautista v Poblete)
 Said Donation may serve as a basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength
of it, the done has taken possession of the prop adversely and in the concept of an
owner
 SG had no right to sell to HZ
 Director of Lands v IAC  Possession and occupation
o Occupation highlights the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph b of CA 141 48, his
possession must not be mere fiction
o Ramirez v Director of Lands  mere fact of declaring land for taxation purposes and
visiting it from time to time are not acts of possession
 SG visits and paying tax did not give him ownership after he gave prop to TR
 HZ not possessors in good faith
o SG sold it to them when he was 81, land was still cultivated  they should have asked who
cultivated, would have known TR owned land
 SR had possession of land  Action imprescriptible
o HZ barred by laces (failure for an unreasonable length of time to exercise due diligence)
 Elements
 Conduct of a party on the basis of which the other seeks a remedy
 Delay in asserting rights
 Lack of knowledge on the part of a party that the person against who laches
is imputed would assert the right
 Injury or prejudice on the party asserting laches if suit prospers
o SR continuous possession  HZ never filed action
 They were gonna cultivate after NPA left but they didn’t
 Payment of taxes  does not vest ownership

Pardell v Bartolome

Facts

Plaintiff Vicenta Pardell and respondent Matilde Bartolome are the natural daughters of Calixta Felin.

Calixta made her 4 children (Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta and Matilde) the sole heirs of all her property.
Manuel and Francisca died, leaving Vicenta and Matilde the only existing heirs.

Since the properties were physically indivisible, they were considered pro indiviso ("for an undivided
part"). Pro indiviso properties, due to their indivisibility, bring about co-ownership between or among the
owners.

In 1888, while Vicenta and her husband Ricardo were in Spain, Matilde and her husband Gaspar took over
the administration and enjoyment of the properties without judicial authorization or extrajudicial
agreement. They collected the rents, fruits and products of the said properties to the detriment of Vicenta's
interest. One of the properties the Bartolome spouses occupied was the top floor of a house on Calle
Escolta, Vigan.

Among other things (not relevant to the syllabus topic), the Pardells wanted the rents derived from the
Calle Escolta house.

Issue

Is Vicenta entitled to rental money derived from the top floor of the Calle Escolta house from her co-owner
Matilde?

Held

No, Vicenta is not entitled to rental fees from Matilde. However, she is entitled to rental fees from Matilde's
husband Gaspar because the latter is not a co-owner.

Article 394 of the Civil Code (Article 486 today) prescribes:
Each coowner may use the things owned in
common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the
interests of the community nor prevent the coowners from utilizing them according to their rights.

As co-owner of the house, Matilde had every right to occupy the upper storey without having to pay rent to
her sister. There is no evidence that shows that she caused any detriment to the interest of the co-owned
property by occupying the top floor. Furthermore:

1. Rooms on the lower floor were rented to third persons and such rents were accounted for and duly made
to Vicenta.
2. One of the living rooms and a storeroom on the upper floor were being used to store
property commonly owned by the sisters.

In occupying the upper floor with her husband, Matilde did not injure the interest of her co-owner and
sister Vicenta, because she was merely exercising her legitimate right as co-owner of the property.

However, Gaspar must pay rent (P16) to Vicenta because he used a room on the lower floor of the house as
an office for the justice of the peace, to the detriment of the latter's interest. He had no right to use the room
on the lower floor gratuitously because he did not co-own the property with his wife or his sister-in-law.

Lawful and just for VO to pay her sister P1.5K for her share in the house questioned for the repairs after the
earthquake. The repairs made the house worth 9k after repairs  Lawful for her to do this bec. Of costs of
repairs

Husband of Matilde not entitled to renumeration. He was a voluntary administrator of the co-ownership
between the two sisters  Law does not entitle him to renumeration. He is only entitled to reimbursement
for necessary expenses.

Collection of P910 (difference between assessed value of undivided real properties and the price of the
same as determined by trial judge)

 Co-owners of a pro indivisio property, subject to division or sale is entitled to petition for its
valuation  Not prejudicial to their joint owners but is beneficial for their interests
 Improper to claim difference because the increase in price redounded to the benefit of both parties

Note
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance
with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership
or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership
may be changed by agreement, express or implied. (394a).

Gatchalian v Collector

Facts:
 Jose Gatchalian and Co. are residents of Bulacan
o They pulled there own money together in order to buy a P2 sweepstakes ticket
o Ticket registered under the name of Jose Gathcalian and Co.
 Ticket won 1 of 3 prizes in the sweepstakes  P50K
o Check of money drawn against PNB
 Collector of Internal revenue ordered JG to file and pay income tax return covering said prize
o Requested P1, 499.95 in his assessment and gave them until Jan 20, 1935 to pay
o JGC requested exemption from tax  Denied
 JGC refused to pay, CIR issued warrant of distrait and levy against the props of JGC
o JGC paid P600 under protest  CIR told the to file usual bond to pay the balance
o JGC protested first payment but CIR denied
 JGC failed to pay bond’s monthly installments
o CIR issued same writ
o JGC paid P1.2K under protest representing unpaid balance of income tax and penalties
 JGC demanded refund of total sum of P1.8K but CIR refused

Issues:
W/N JGC have to pay income tax? YES
 A2833 s10, Amended by 3761
o Tax of 3% on net income of every taxable corp, joint-stock company, partnership etc.
o If JGC was a community property without personality of its own  not liable for tax
 JGC = partnership
o Partnership of civil nature
o Each of them put up money to buy the ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the
prize they may win
o Upon winning JG appeared in the office of PI Charity Sweepstakes in his capacity as co-
owner to collect the prize
o All these repel the idea that they form community property
 Tax should be paid as a partnership (as a whole) not individually

Punzalan v Boon Liat

Facts:
 Moro by the name of Tamsi saw from Cawit-cawit shores a big bulky object, which turned out to be
a whale
o 22 men in 3 boats proceeded to bring the whale into shore
o Found that its abdomen had a great quatity of ambergris (Wax like substance, used in
perfume manufacture)
o Filled up 2 sacks, half filled 3rd with said substance
 All agreed that they were to be sole owners of the two full sacks and that no one could sell it
without the consent of the rest
o Half sack  Sold in Zamboanga in order to ascertain its market price (P2700, distributed
among all co-owners)
o Offered to sell other 2 sacks for P12K to chinamen  kept them in safe keeping in house of
maharaja Butu
 Word spread about the location of the 2 sacks
 o Henry Teck sent info to Master of revenue, who transmitted it to Collector of Mindoro that
contraband opium was in there
 Boon Liat assisted him
 Done to have master at their disposal
o When Master searched the house he found a black substance with bad odor (thought it was
opium)
 Owner said it was Ahamad (one of the 22 who found it), who owned it
 Proceeded to bring two sacks to Zamboanga at Ahamad’s request
 During voyage, Mr Teck offered to but amber, Ahamad refused because he
knew he couldn’t sell it without other co-owner’s consent
 MT said he would protect him  bought for 7500, got 2500 as part payment,
balance paid later
 Other moros got back and found out about sale
o Filed action for replevin and prayed for the return of P60K, value of 80 ½ kg of amber

Issues:
W/N moros had right to get value of amber? YES
 Amber was undivided common property
o Acquired by occupancy (609, 610CC)
o No one co-owner, had the right to sell without the consent of the others
 Ahamad sold it under his name despite this condition
 Action was actually one for recovery of title
o Recovery of what each co-owner has been deprived of in the co-ownership
o May be exercised against co-owners, and strangers
 Done against co-owners when 1 acts as if he has exclusive ownership which is
prejudicial to the right of the community
 MT did not act in good faith  shown in evidence, that he offered to protect Ahamad from his co-
owners

Twin Towers Condo Corp v CA

Facts:
 TT  Manages common areas of TT condo
o Membership in corp is limited to registered owners of their units
o ALS mgt and dev corp is owner of unit 4a
 President Antonio Litonjua resided there
 TT collects quarterly assessments and dues as authorized by its Master Deed and Declaration of
restrictions
o ALS failed to pay dues from 1986-1988  Total with interest = P118K
 ALS  TT cannot claim from AL because natural person occupying space of ALS does not get OB of
Juridical person (ALS)
o Claimed damages bec. TT started not letting them use condo’s facilities
 SEC Hearing
o Ordered ALS to pay assessment dues and TT to pay ALS damages  Appealed
 Appeal  No intra-corporate relationship bet TT and AL, who is not a registered owner of unit
o Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot be used by TT
o Remanded case to hearing officer to determine what was deprived from ALS and its value
 SEC  Value can be deducted from unpaid assessments due to TT
 CA
o No ground to pierce corporate veil  Same reason as Sec
o No bad faith of ALS and AL just because they failed to pay  not guilty of fraud, which
would warrant piercing
o No evidence for value of unpaid assessments claimed by TT
 TT not allowed by master deed to stop delinquent members from using facilities
Issues:
W/N TT has authority to assess dues? YES
 Condo Act  Master deed authorizes TT to collect reasonable assessments to meet authorized
expenditures
o Owners may be assessed separately for their share in the expenditures
o S20  Assessments made in accordance with duly registered declaration of restrictions
o S4  Assessments: Each unit owner is proportionately liable for the common expenses of
the condo project, which shall be assessed against each owner in the project
 Regular assessments = amt necessary to meet operating expenses of condo corp
 TT had right to collect assessments
o As a member of TT corp, ALS had compulsory OB to share in common expenses of Condo
o OB does not depend on use or non-use of member of the common areas
o TT started not allowing ALS to use common areas when it stopped paying assessments
 By that time, ALS was guilty of delay as it had the reciprocal OB to pay assessment
dues (1169CC)  The fact that ALS was disallowed from using facilities is not a
ground for them to stop paying assessments
 House Rule 26.3  Owners with delinquent accounts, shall not be allowed the use of all facilities of
the condo
o TT  Done for the purpose of managing common areas of condo
 Master deed allows them to use this rule in order to protect member’s interests
o ALS  Rules is ultra vires, binds no one
 Even if it was intra vires  it is iniquitous, unconscionable etc.
o Rule is valid
 Ultra Vires  Act outside, beyond corporate powers
 Corp code  Act outside powers conferred by this code or articles of
incorporation, or powers beyond what is necessary
 Intra Vires  Within the powers of, within corps scope of authority
o Condo Act S9  TT has power to promulgate said house rule
 Gives them the power to enforce provisions of the declaration of restrictions, for the
maintenance and service of condos common areas
 S3  TT has power to enforce Condo acts provisions in accordance with its by-laws
 S2 P2 TT by laws  promote rules and regulations concerning the use,
enjoyment and occupancy of the units and common areas
 HR 26.3 within its powers
 S7 Master deed  TT has power to do things which may be necessary, incidental
and convenient to the accomplishment of said purposes
o ALS has no right to reduction of assessments and dues to the extent of non-use and no right
to damages
 IT VIOLATED ITS CT
o Case remanded back to proper RTC to determine value which ALS is liable for (RA 8799: Sec
jurisdiction)

Resuena v CA

Facts:
 Junanito Borromeo Sr = co-owner and overseer of certain parcels of land in Cebu as Lots 2587,
2592
o JB owns 6/8 of Lot 2587, Spouses Bascon own 2/8
o Lot 2592 is owned in common by JB and Heirs of Nicoloas Maneja  Partition yet to be
determined
 Resuena and co resided in upper portion of Lot 2587 under acquiescence of spouses Bascon
o Eutiquia Rosario occupied portion of Lot 2592, with permission of Heirs of NM
o JB  All have been residing under his tolerance
 JB wanted to develop portions of both lots into Borromeo Beach Resort
o Demanded that RC vacate props but they refused
 o Filed a complaint for ejectment in MTC
 MTC  JB had no preferential right over portions occupied, since both lots not yet partitioned
o JB and SB = Owners in common of lot 2587, not yet partitioned (Admitted by JB)
 RTC  487CC: Any co-owner may bring action for ejectment, since it is instituted for the benefit of
all co-owners
o RC can resume occupation once partition done
 CA  Affirmed RTC

Issues:
W/N JB has right to eject RC? YES
 RC  JB agreed with co-owner Basilisa Maneja on the portions each were to occupy in lot 2587
o Agreement pertains only to Lot 2587  JB has right to eject ER because ER has presented
no basis for her claim
o BM relied on this agreement when it assigned upper portion of Lot 2587 to RC
 Consummated by verbal agreement
 JB has right to eject RC
o Palarca v Baguisi  Action for ejectment must be brought by all co-owners
 Favorable decision benefits them
 Adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights
o JB action for the benefit of all co-owners, RC unable to prove that they are authorized to
occupy lot
 Those bound by implied promise should vacate upon demand (Summary ejectment
is proper remedy)
 JB testimony as regards the verbal partition with SB does not establish a definite
partition
 Even if there was a verbal contract of partition, does not detract from the
fact that common ownership over said lot had become inchoate and
undivided
 Doubt as to capacity of SB to assign said portions
 RC needs legal basis for continued occupancy
 1358CC  Extinguishment, modification of real rights over immovable must
appear in public instrument
 Not done here

Acabal v Acabal

Facts:
 Villareal Acabal’s parents owned a parcel of land in Negros Oriental
o 18.15 hectares, TCT 15856
o By deed of absolute sale, his parents transferred ownership of said land to him, while he
was married to Justiniana Lipajan
 For P2K
 JL died  VA executed a deed conveying said property to Leonardo Acabal
o Appeared to be a deed of absolute sale witnessed by Bais trial court clerk Carmelo Cadalin
and his wife Lacorte
o VA claimed that what he signed was a Lease Contract  Leased land to LA for P1K/hectare
for 3 years, witnessed by 2 women employees of Judge Villegas of Bais city
 VA filed complaint in RTC Dumaguete against Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas to whom Leonardo
conveyed the property to for the annulment of the deed of sale
o VA  Signed lease contract, DOAS was inserted under it, that why he signed in
o LA  DOAS was for 10k consideration, he became absolute owner of said property, sale to
RN was valid
o CC  VA forced him to prepare DOAS
 After signing VA got money from LA
o Complaint amended to include 8 kids of LA and JL
 o RTC  dismissed complaint
 CA  Reversed, DOAS of LA and VA was simulated and fictitous

Issues:
W/N sale of VA to LA was valid? NO
 Burden of proof lies on party who makes allegations (ei incumbit probation, qui dici non qui negat;
cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit  Must be proven by competent
evidence
o VA was not able to prove that he was deceived into signing DOAS
 Presented Atty Real, who notarized doc
 Didn’t even know VA until he started making him kulet after notarization 
Not convincing proof
 2 witnesses saw him sign the deed  Not presented
 P10K was unusually low? Not convincing
o VA was not able to show fair market value of land at time of the sale
o Ocular inspection showed that land was inadequate for agricultural purposes (Rocky,
uncultivated)
o Recent purchase of a 6 hectare prop adjoining subject property was sold for P4.8K
 Prop here was 18 hectares  P10K more than reasonable
o Inadequacy must be grossly inadequate/shocking to conscience such that a reasonable man
would not consent to sale
 VA says that sale to Nicolas’ violated RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act)  Fails
o S6 Retention limits  Retention of agricultural land shall not exceed 5 hectares, Any sale in
violation of this act is void
o S70  Sale in violation of this act is void
o Only those private lands suitable for agriculture are covered  This land is not, No violation
of this act
 Soil was full of limestone, sugarcanes lean
 VA and LA in pari delicto  Not entitled to alternative relief, must come to court with clean hands
o Courts should not lend their help to wrongdoers, no judicial relief to wrong doer helps stop
illegality
o For principle of public policy (Ex dolo malo non oritur action)
o 1146  in pari delicto not absolute, exception REQS, None here bec prohibition is not for
protection of plaintiff but for benefit of farmers
 When acts are merely prohibited
 Prohibition is for protection of plaintiffs
 Public policy is enhanced thereby
 VA not in good faith bec he was merely a co-owner of land
o Held it together with heirs of JL
 A160CC  Prop of marriage is part of conjugal partnership
 Prop here acquired during VA and JL marriage
o VA had interest in ½ portion of it originally
 When JL died he got addl 1/9 portion, which is the same as what his kids got bec he
was also an heir
 Total portion of VA in said land = 10/18
o Though he holds 10/18 of prop  Not partitioned yet so he has not definite portion of
community property yet
 493 CC  Co-owner, has right to sell his undivided interest in the property BUT he
cannot alienate the shares of others
 VA sold entire property without consent of other co-owners
 Binding force of CT must be recognized as far as legally possible so sale of
VA’s share pro indiviso is valid
 Transferee only gets VA’s share
o Sale here of entire prop is void
 Only rights of VA are transferred to buyer, making buyer the new co owner
 o Proper action is one of division of common property as if it continued to remain in
possession of co-owners
 Legally called Partition (R69 ROC)
o Cruz v Leis  Good faith, Bad Faith of buyer only comes up when prop sold is registered
land
 If unregistered, buyer buys at his own peril

Cruz v CA

Facts:
 Adoracion Cruz = Mom of Cruz kids, including Arnel Cruz
o They were co-owners of a parcel of land in Rizal, covered by TCT
o Registered only in the name of Arnel Cruz
o Prop was inherited upon the death of her husband
 Group executed Deed of Partial Partition
o Distributed their shares consisting of several lots owned in common
o Arnel was given subject land
 After this, they entered into Memo of agreement
o Agreed to share equally in the proceeds of the sale of props they had subdivided
 Thelma Cruz discovered that a new TCT was issued over subject property in favor of Summit
o Arnel had executed Special Power of Atty in favor of Nelson Tamayo
 Authorized him to obtain a loan (P104K) from Summit
 Real Estate mortgage resulted into TCT in order to secure said loan
o Loan remained outstanding upon maturity
 Summit instituted extra-judicial foreclosure over prop
 AC and kids filed complaint against Arnel and Summit
o Said that they co-owned prop as evidenced by MOA  Mortgage void because they did not
consent to it
o RTC  MOA = Indication to keep co-ownership
 Summit negligent for failure to inquire about limitations of Cruz’s title
 Only undivided share of Arnel was transferred to Summit
 CA  Reversed RTC
o Defendants  MOA done to share proceeds of sale of properties
o CA: MOA has no prescription against mortgage
 Adoracion (another co-owner) had executed two other real estate mortgages over
other lands  Not opposed by co-owners

Issues:
W/N Arnel had right to mortgage subject property? YES
 Co-ownership terminated upon partition of properties
o Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-owners is deemed a
partition
o This is exactly what deed of partition did
 Shares of co-owners were determined and distributed between them
 Nothing in deed which state that parties intended to continue co-ownership
o Co-owner  One who must have a spiritual part of a thing which is not physically divided
 Dela Cruz v Dela Cruz  portions determined and identifiable, denied prayer for
legal redemption
o Deed of partition not questioned  AC owned disputed land, he was the absolute owner of
it
 Nothing in MOA, which diminishes Arnel’s right to alienate the property
 Parties only bound themselves here to share in the proceeds of the sale of
properties
 It does not direct reconveyance to reinstate co-ownership
  DOP: titled individually names of co-owners to prop
 Other co-owners sold their prop too as absolute owners

Lavadia v Cosme

Facts:
 Object of litigation: a gold crown, choker, belt, bracelet, necklace, all made of gold and encrusted
with diamonds and precious gems in the possession and custody of 6 religious ladies of the
municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna namely Martina, Matea, Isabel, Paula, Pia, and Engracia, all
surnamed Lavadia. By agreement, they decided to entrust the safekeeping of the jewelry to Pia
Lavadia (depositary).
 Pia died in 1882, so the safekeeping of the jewelry passed on to her sister, Paula.
 Paula died, her husband Pedro Rosales took over. à Pedro died, their daughter Paz Rosales took
over. à Paz died, her husband Baldomero Cosme took over.
 Rosario Cosme de Mendoza
 Jewelry is kept at a BPI safety deposit box in the name of Rosario
 Cosme de Mendoza (defendant)
 In 1889, the 6 ladies used their own money to have the jewelry
 made specifically to adorn the image of the Lady of Guadalupe, the patron saint of the municipality.
In effect, they are the co- owners of the jewelry
 On February 9, 1938: Rosario, in her capacity as administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme,
announced that she would be making a formal delivery of the jewelry to the Bishop of Lipa, but the
plaintiffs objected and filed a suit to retain possession and custody of the same.
 CFI-Laguna ruled for the plaintiffs, since they constituted 4/6 of the majority, and ordered Rosario
to deliver the jewelry to one of the original owners, Engracia Lavadia.

Issues:
Whether Rosario can act as agent of the other co-owners and dispose of the jewelry despite objection from
the other co-owner. NO

 CFI declared that the 6 ladies were co-owners of the jewelry in question, and that when they
entrusted the safekeeping to Pia, a deposit was constituted as defined in Art. 1758 of the Old Civil
Code (now Art. 1962).
 As depositary, Rosario is obliged to return the jewelry to the depositor (the original owners) – Old
Civil Code Art. 1766 (now Art. 1972).
 Ruling: CFI decision affirmed.
 Relevant part of this case under Co-Ownership: Art. 492, par. 2:
 “There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by the co- owners who represent the
controlling interest in the object of the co- ownership.”
 In this case, the plaintiffs constituted the majority, since they represent 4/6 of the original owners.
Defendants only represent 2/6.

Melencio v Dy Tiao Lay

Facts:
 4k sqm parcel of land owned by Julian Melencio
o Died 1905 leaving his widow Ruperta Garcia and 5 kids (Juliana, Ramon, Ruperta, Pedro R,
Emilio Melencio(Died before 1905)
o Ruperta, Pedro, Juliana, and Ruperta (kid) executed CT of lease over the land for Yap Kui
Chin
 Jose and Ramon were not mentioned in lease
 20yr lease, extendible at option of lessee
o Lease transferred a couple of times and ended up wit Dy Tiao Lay
 Ramon Melencio died in 1914  Liberta Macapagal (administratrix of his estate)
 o 1913  Land registered under torrens system, not mentioned that there was a lease
o 1920  Heirs of Julian Melencio made an extra judicial partition of the land for inheritance
 Subject land fell to the share of children of Ramon Melencio
 LM had been collecting rent from the lease land
 She was informed by DTL that he was entitled to an extension of the lease at
original rental
 Heirs of Ramon said they never had knowledge of the said lease, executed
without their consent = void CT
 DTL  Said he occupied land since 1905 through CT with Ruperta, Pedro, Juliana, and Ruperta
o LM recognized CT of lease
 Heirs of Ramon  Ruperta Garcia was not among the co-owners of the land
o Person who signed CT never represented themselves as sole owner
o CT null and void for being without consent
 TC  Ruled CT was valid, hence Heirs appealed

Issues:
W/N CT was valid? NO
 Majority of the co-owners of the property executed the lease for the 12 yr term
o Registrar denied this when lessess presented the lease for inscription because the term was
for more than 6yrs and needed a unanimous vote
 It was a real right subject to registry
 Dirreccion General
o Decision of the SC of Spain (June 1, 1909): The power of the majority (of co-owners of an
indivisible property) would be confined to decisions touching the management and
enjoyment of the common property and would not include acts of ownership, such as a
lease of 12 years w/c gives rise to a real right, which must be recorded and which can be
performed only by owners of the property leased.
 Further, SC of Spain stated: Where the contract of lease may give rise to a real right in favor
of the lessee (constituting a sundering of the ownership which transcends mere
management)then the part owners representing the greater portion of the property held in
common have no power to lease the property for a period longer than 6 years w/o the
consent of all co-owners.
 In this case, the fact that the lease was for 20 years amounted to an act of rigorous
alienation and NOT a mere act of management, thus necessitation the consent of ALL
co-owners.
 398, 1548, 1713CC
o CT of lease null and void
o Prescription cannot be invoked because no proof the Ramon Melencio ever knew of CT prior to
1926
 Burden of proof on defendant to prove this

Tuason v Tuason

Facts:
 Sisters Angela, Nieves and bro Antonio Tuason held a 64k parcel of land in Manila
o NT wanted and asked for a partition of the prop, failing to do this, she offered her 1/3
portion up for sale
 NT sold it to Gregorio Araneta Inc  3 co-owners agreed to have parcel subdivided,
and small lots sold + Proceeds to be divided among them
 Atty Araneta acted as atty in fact of 2 co-owners +BOD of GA
 CT
o 9: CT full force and effect until property fully sold by GA
o 11: GA given full power and authority to sign on behalf of all co-owners all deeds of sale
 o 15: No co-owner etc, shall alienate etc. his ownership or interest without 1st giving
preference to other co-owners to purchase the same
 3 co-owners agreed to improve the prop
o GA was to finance the whole thing
 Prepare schedule of prices and conds of sale subject to approval of the other 2
 Had authority to sell the lots and execute deeds of sale
 Pay real estate tax and expenses of surveying
 Give other two copies of subdivision plans and monthly sales and rents
 GOT 50% of gross selling price
 AT revoked the power given to Antonio Arantea
o Said he breached MOA and abused powers granted to him
o Sought recession of CT
 AT filed case against AA
o Case dismissed, hence this appeal

Issues:
W/N 400CC applies in this case? NO
 AA complied with his OBs substantially
o It was AT who didn’t wanna receive data given by AA and conds of sale + amts due to her
 Showed that she didn’t wanna deal with them anymore
 AA didn’t sell during Jap Occ bec he knew Jap military notes would be used to pay
o Recession not proper remedy
 Breach here was slight and casual  This remedy only for substantial breaches of
CT
 400: No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at any time,
demand the partition of the thing held in common.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not exceeding
ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement.
 400 not applicable
o CT forbids co-owner from being obliged to remain a party to the community
 Purpose: Dissolution of co-ownership by selling parcel held in common
 OB to preserve co-ownership is incidental to main object of dissolution
 CT here is one of partnership, which is the best means to dissolve co-ownership
 No ground for partition
o Remaining area unsold = 1600 sqm
o Partnership is in the process of being dissolved, and is about to be
o Even if 400 applicable, no fear that remaining portions could not be disposed within 4yrs
left of 10yr period

Mariano v CA

Facts:
 Francisco Gosiengfiao was the owner of a residential lot in Cagayan (1,346 sqm)
o Covered by TCT and recorded in register of deeds
 Lot mortgaged several times to Rural Bank of Tuguegarao
o FG died, survived by his wife Antonia and 10 kids
o Loan from bank unpaid  Bank foreclosed the lot and held a foreclosure sale
 Bank was highest bidder
 Amparao (one of Fgs kids)  redeemed the property by paying P1.3K and P423
o Antonia on her behalf and that of heir minor kids executed “Deed of Assignment of the Right
of Redemption” in favor of Amparo Gosengfiao-Ibarra
o AI sold the prop to Leaonardo Mariano who established a residence therein
o Deed of sale was signed by Amparo, Antonia, Carlos, Severino  Not all heirs signed
 Grace G. (one of FG kids)  Found out about the sale and confronted LM, No settlement reached
o LM sold prop to his kids
  GG filed a complaint for recovery of possession and legal redemption with damages against the
Marianos
o Gosengifao kids who didn’t sign Deed claim they’re co-heirs and co-owners of said lot and
have the right to recover their respective shares
 Said they didn’t sell it
o Mariano  GK have no COA
 Money used to redeem lot = personal funds of AI, who became the sole owner of the
property, making the sale to LM valid
 Right of redemption of GK barred by 1144CC, or laches
 RTC  GK has no right of ownership or possession
o AI redeemed the property on her own behalf and she became the sole owner of it
 CA  GK were co-owners of the property
o Property was mortgaged by FG  Co-ownership existed among heirs during redemption
period
 Redemption of co-owner of whole property did not vest him with sole ownership 
It inures to the benefit of the community
 Redemption is not a mode of terminating co-ownership

Issues:
W/N GK had a right to the property? YES
 Distinction between 1088 and 1620
o Sale consists of an interest in some particular property of the inheritance  Right of
redemption arises in favor of the other co-heirs (1620)
o Sale is hereditary (of or relating to inheritance) without specifying any particular object
(1088)
 Conejero v CA  Giving a copy of a deed = notice required by law in legal redemption
o No written notice of sale was ever given to GK
o Grace Gosengfiao in her testimony said that she was never given a copy
o Written notice is only kind of notice allowed  Castillo v Samonte
 Done to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms, and its validity and to quiet
any doubt
 Consignation not required to preserve right to repurchase
o No effect that GK failed to consign in court full redemption price after tender was rejected
by the Marianos

Verdad v CA

Facts:
 Macaraia Atega contracted two marriages and owned a 248sqm residential lot in Butuan City
o 1st = Angel Buerdos
 Heirs  Ramon Buerdos and her daughter Felicidad Buerdos, who had a daughter
named Estela Lozada
o 2 = Canuto Rosales
nd

 Heirs  David, Justo, Romulo, Aurora

 Heirs of Ramon Buerdos (widow Manuela and kids Felicidad and Ramon)  Sold the land to
Zosima Verdad
o P55k but it would appear it was only PP23K, ZV said that 2nd deed (23k) was only done to
save on tax on capital gains
 Socorro Rosales (Daughter in law of MA) discovered the sale
o Married David Rosales on March 30, 1987
o Tendered P23K to ZV to redeem the property but ZV refused because he said it was much
less that the lot’s current value of P80K
 SR filed a case for legal redemption with preliminary injunction against ZV in RTC Butuan
o RTC  SR had the right to redeem the property
 CA  Reversed RTC
Issues:
W/N SR had the right to redeem the property? YES
 SR = daughter in law of MA
o Not MA’s intestate heir but her right to the property stemmed from the fact that she was the
legal heir of David Rosales, whose estate has a claim to MA’s inheritance
o MA’s estate passed on to her surviving kids including David, heirs became co-owners of the
property
 DR’s estate included his undivided interest over the property
 Passed on to SR due to laws on succession

Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and

illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001.

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.


 SR became a co-owner of the property because she was a co-owner

 When interest of property sold to ZV  Right of redemption arose (1619-1620)
o Right was timely exercised by SR  No written notice of sale was given by RB to the co-
owners (1623)
 30 day period of redemption had yet to start when SR sought to use said right on
March 31, 1987, when she discovered sale, or when case was initiated on October
16, 1987
o Written notice is mandatory
 Done to remove all uncertainties about the sale

Halili v CA

Facts:
 Simeon De Guzman = American  Died 1968 and left real props
o Heirs = Wife Helen, Son David Rey  Both American
 Helen executed deed of quitclaim assigning, transferring and conveying all her right, titles, and
interests over the 6 parcels of land to DR
o Subject land = in Bulacan, 6695 sqm, TCT issued for DR
o DR sold the land to Emiliano Cataniag who had a new TCT issued under his name
 Celso and Arthur Halili owned the lot adjoin subject property
o Filed complaint in RTC to questioning the constitutionality of the conveyance of Helen and
the sale of DR
o Claimed ownership based on Right of redemption
 RTC  Dismissed complaint
o Helen conveyance was just to allow DR to dispose of props according to the consti
o Land was urban no right of redemption under 1621
 CA  Affirmed RTC
o Two conveyances were invalid according to consti but subsequent sale to EC cured it

Issues:
W/N CAR has right of legal redemption? NO
 Subject land is Urban  all the roadsides along its national highway are line up with residential,
commercial, industrial establishments
o Commercial stores, warehouse of Pepsi, Hospital, gasoline stations etc
o Community is a commercial area with only a short portion of a road vacant
 o Tax declaration of Helen  Said it was agricultural
 Land Regulatory board said in letter addressed to EC that it was commercial
 No right of legal redemption because land is urban
o 1621  Both lands adjoining each other must be rural to claim right
 Done to favor agricultural development
 Sale to EC was valid
o Kivenko v Register of deeds
 A 12 S2 of consti must be read together with S5 of the same article
 S2  Natural resources shall not be alienated, public agricultural lands may
only be alienated to Fils
 S5  No private agricultural lands may be transferred to unqualified
persons
 Ong Ching Po v CA  Capacity to acquire private land is dependent upon capacity to
acquire or hold lands of public domain
 Non-Fils cannot acquire private lands or public domain except by way of
legal succession
o Helen conveyance cured by DR sale
 United Church Board of world ministries v Sebastian  Defect in will was rectified
by subsequent transfer
 Aim or purpose of prohibition not thwarted by lawful acquisition from unqualified
aliens

Francisco v Boiser

Facts:
 Adalia Francisco and 3 of her sisters were co-owners of a parcel of land wherein the 10
commandments building in Caloocan city stands
o They sold 1/5 of their undivided portion to their mom Adela Blas for P10K making her a co-
owner
o AB sold said interest without the knowledge of her co-owners to Zanaida Boiser who is
another sis of AF
 Aug 8, 1986, AF got summons filed by ZB demanding her share of the rentals from the tenant of the
building
o AF said the was exercising her right of redemption  Deposited P10K in Clerk of court
 AF filed Civil Case in RTC
o Said that her 30 day period for redemption had not yet prescribed because AB (vendor)
never informed her of the sale to ZB
o ZB: AF new of the sale as soon as May 30, 1992 because she wrote AF a letter informing her
about the sale
 Had deed of sale with it
 Letter was also sent to the tenants of the building asking them for 1/5 of monthly
rentals
 AF told tenant to disregard
o RTC  Claim of AF dismissed
 1623 does not prescribe any form of notification to co-owners about the sale
 No written notice given by AB, but AF said that she got letter in 1992
 Substantial compliance with notice requirement  30 day period counted
from June 8, 1992 when AF told tenants to disregard ZB letter
 AF failed to redeem property
 CA  Affirmed RTC

Issues:
W/N ZB letter to AF notifying her of the sale by vendor AB was a valid notice? NO
 Etcuban v CA  Written notice has no particular form or method of notification to
redemptioner
 o So long as co-owner is informed of sale in writing, 30 day period starts
o Follow this doctrine
 Salatandol v Retes  Notice must be given by the vendor
o PI legislature deliberately selected a particular notice by the vendor
 Purpose  seller of undivided interest is in best position to know who are the co-
owners under law, who must be notified of sale
 To remove all doubts on sale
 Reaffirmation of sale
 By not immediately notifying co-owner, vendor may delay or prevent right of redemption
o Sale took place in ’86 but was kept secret till ’92 when ZB asked for rents
o Unjust to delay AF right of legal redemption by requiring notice be given by AB before
exercising her right
 May delay her right
 Letter of summons given to AF by ZB = actual knowledge  Period starts Aug 5,
1992, has until Sept 4, 1992
o Same ruling as Alonzo v IAC

Ramirez v Ramirez

Facts:
 Jose Maria Ramirez brought action against defendants Jose Eugenio Ramirez etc. along with Manuel
Uy and Sons, Estate of late Jose Vivencio Ramirez repd by BPI (Judicial administrator), and Angela
Butt
o For the partition of a parcel of land in Manila, which pro indiciso owned by both parties
o 1/6 by JR and others for defendants
 MUS said okay to partition if it doesn’t prejudice interests of parties, same with AB
o Other defendants said no because it was “materially, and legally impossible” + Would harm
and prejudice co-owners
 Court referred matter to Commission to determine w/n it may be partitioned
o Gawaran  Clerk of Court, Chairman
o Valencia  P of Manila Board of Realtors (AR)
o Cuervo  P of Perpetual Investment Corp (D)
 Court  Yes to partition, followed Valencia
o Appealed

Issues:
W/N prop may be partitioned w/o prejudice? YES
 No evidence that partition would harm co-owners
o Prop is real estate susceptible for commercial purposes
o Even if JR share partitioned  1,301 left for others
o Prop is at the heart of manila, JR share is inconsequential in comparison with the rest
 Defendants have no right to force the sale to them accdg to 495CC
o They again assume inestimable damage to be suffered by them
o 2 buildings on prop  Commercial and Residential
 No evidence that shows that after partition, the remaining portion would be
unserviceable
 Plan of Cuervo not used by court
o He recommended that JR’s share be given a frontage of 6.14 lineal meters at Plaza Sta Cruz
o D’s  Valencia plan: Left behind the portion awarded to JR which would have to be divided
in case of future segregation + JR was willing to buy their remaining shares
 No proof that JR offer was not taken into consideration  D’s said NO
 Disadvantage of Valencia plan offset by the fact that the remaining portion given to
Ds was the most valuable one (Frontage of 24.13 meters on Escolta Street)
o Cuervo plan would require the partition of the residential building
 Would make it unserviceable, its indivisible
 Aguilar v CA

Facts:
 Virgilio and Senen Aguilar are brothers
o They bought a lot in Paranaque where their dad, Maximiano Aguilar could stay and enjoy
the rest of his life
o 1st agreement: VA had 2/3 share and SA had 1/3
 Written memo amended this  Said their shares were equal, with SA assuming the
mortgage obligation of the original owners with SSS in exchange of his possession
and enjoyment of the house
 VA DQ’d from getting SSS loan
o DOS executed in the name of SA in the mean time, while he took care of his dad bec VA lived
in Cebu
 MA died  VA demanded SA to vacate lot so they could sell the property, SA refused
o VA filed action to compel the sale so that proceeds may be divided on the basis of the 1 st
agreement  SA said memo should be followed
 TC  SA and VA co-owners
o VA deprived of his enjoyment to the house and lot
o Upheld VA’s right to demand partition
o Bec shares couldn’t be agreed upon  sell to 3rd person
 CA  Reversed RTC

Issues:
W/N VA has a right to partition? YES
 VA and SA are co-owners of the lot in equal shares
o Either one may demand sale at any time  Proceeds divided equally
 SA refused to pay rents and to vacate lot
o VA  Prejudiced him, hinders lot’s disposal
 TC  Sell to 3rd party + SA pay VA P1.2K monthly rental
o 494CC  No co-owner obliged to remain in a co-ownership
 When thing is indivisible, and co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of
them who shall indemnify others = Sell and proceeds distributed
 Done when right to partition invoked bec prop cannot be subdivided or that
its subdivision would prejudice co-owners’ interests and No agreement on
co-owners as regards to whom among tem shall be allotted the entire
property upon proper reimbursement
 SA has right to use house without paying compensation as long as he uses it for the purpose it was
intended for and his use does not prejudice co-owners’ interests
o VA decided to enforce his right to partition and end co-ownership
o SA has not refuted that he has been preventing the sale  He should pay rents from the
time trial court ordered him to vacate

Perpertua Vda De Ape v CA and Generosa Cawit Vda Lumayno

Facts:
 Cleopas Ape = registered owner of a parcel of land in Negros Occidental covered by OCT
o When he died, prop passed to his wife Maria Ondoy and their 11 kids
 March 15, 1973  Generosa Lumayno and her husband Braulio filed a case for specific performance of a
deed of sale with damages against Fortunato (One of CA’s kids) and his wife in the CFI of Negros Occidental
o GL  Said that she and FA entered into a contract of sale of land for P5K
 F agreed to sell his share to the subject lot
 Recipt  Said that F received P30 from GL as advance payment
 GL wanted to register sale and demanded DOS from F
o F Aand B  Denied sale, said her signature in receipt was forged
  Counterclaim  GL said they had a CT of lease with F: 5yrs with annual rental P100
o FA assailed GL’s continued possession  said that he was invoking the right to redeem and prayed
that CT would be annulled
o GL  Bought the land from them na, they aren’t co-owners anymore
 Showed annotation of adverse claim on title of lot
 Surveyed lot after sale with F present
 Said that FA didn’t wanna renew lease and they agreed to a CT o f sale
 FA  Lot not subdivided
o Wanted to collect rentals on land but only got P30  GL made her sign alleged receipt
o Said that B was illiterate and only learned how to write to be employed in the sugar central
o Said that she has not gotten notice of sale to GL
 CFI No proof of sale
o GL has not shown that she paid purchase price
o F has no right of redemption
 They were informed by GL of sale when they filed complaint in this case on March 14, 1973
 GL showed that they had possession of land before doc evidence presented
 Period prescribed na
 CA  Reversed CFI
o CT was valid
 Best proof was P5K, purchase price of FA’s share, showed that DOS was valid and binding
 FA’s had not right or redemption
 FA’s receipt of 2nd OCT containing adverse claim of GL = compliance of notice rule

Issues:
W/N FA still had right of redemption? NO
 Butte v Manuel  Notice given by vendor to co-owners is valid notice
o Vendor is in best position to know who the co-owners are
 Modified by De Conejero v CA  No particular form of notice, or distinct method of notice in 1623
o As long as redemptioner is notified in writing of the sale  Redemption period starts to run
 Salatandol v Reyes Modified and went back to Butte doctirce
o Justice Mendoze  Clear that written notification should come from vendor
 FA cannot invoke her right to redeem from GL bec this right pre-supposes the existence of a co-ownership
at the time conveyance is made
o Co-ownership exists when ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different person
o Co-owner cannot point to a specific portion of the property owned in common as his own
o Legal redemption done to minimize co-ownership
 LOT HERE WAS ALREADY SUBDIVIDED
o Portions of heirs of CA have already been ascertained, they already had possession of their
respective parts
o FA was already possessing a specific portion of the land
o Partition already done but it was informal (Hantal Hantal basis)
 Each co-owner took possession of a specific portion of the land and improved on that
specific portion
 CT of sale was invalid
o Consensual CT which needs the consent of parties
o Upon perfection  Parties may reciprocally demand performance
o Consent = acceptance of offer, concurrence of minds
 Intelligent, with exact notion of what’s happening
 Vitiated by fraud etc
 Free
 Spontaneous
 He who alleges fraud has burden of proof of proving it
o Exception (1332)  One of the parties is unable to read, understand, person enforcing CT must
show terms were fully explained
o GL seeks to enforce so she must prove  Failed to do
  B was illiterate and was not able to understand CT bec GL did not explain, he didn’t know
how to understand Enhlish

Pamplona v Moreto

Facts:
 Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were married and had acquired lots 1495, 4545, 1496, in Calamba,
Laguna during their marriage
o They had 6 kids  All except Leonardo died na. The rest left heirs except Pablo
o MM died in 1946
 July 30, 1952: After MM died, FM sold lot 1495 for P900 to Geminiano Pamplona before any liquidation of
their conjugal partnership
o GP built their house on easter portion of lot 1496 bec it was pointed out by FM at time of sale
 Their son Rafael Pamplona also built his house within lot 1496
o The family thought that 781 sqm portion which was subject matter of sale was lot 1495 but really it
was 1496
 They even expanded and built a piggery corral at the back of their house
 FM died in 1956  Heirs brought action against spouses Pamplona
o Said that FM had no right to sell because the property belongs to the conjugal partnership of FM
marriage
o Sale executed without their consent + GP refused to vacate
o Sought the declaration of nullity of sale
o GP  Sale was valid, they were purchasers in good faith
 After relocation of lots, the parties found out there was a mutual error between FM and GP
o Lot sold = 1495, but real intention was to sell 1496
o LC  Salle of eastern portion of lot 1496 (781 sqm) void but eastern portion of lot 1496 (390.5
sqm) valid
 CA  Affirmed

Issues:
W/N GP entitled to whole prop or only half? Whole
 Conjugal partnership between FM and MM dissolved when MM died
o Not yet liquidated, settled, and subdivided (Not liquidation, extra-judicial partition)
o Estate became property of community (Co-ownership)
 Every co-owner has ownership of his part, and its fruits and benefits derived therefrom 
May alienate, assign or mortgage it etc unless personal rights are in question
o Prades v Tecson  Surviving husband as administrator of community prop has authority to sell it
without kids consent
o Sale and GP house etc stood on land from 1952-1961 (complaint filed)
 Heirs even lived as neighbors as their house was adjacent to GP
 ESTOPPED from claiming half the prop in dispute, which was GP’s = void
 There was partial partition of co-ownership at time of sale
o FM pointed out location of 781sqm he wanted to sell
o Conjugal partnership owned 3 parcels of land contiguous with one another as each is bounded on
one side by the other (2, 346 sqm) ONE BIG LAND
o At the time of the sale, co-ownership covered these lands
 FM had right to ½ of entire share (1,173) he could legally dispose 781 sqm
o Sale was valid for whole prop not just half
 FM had the legal right to sell his interest
 It may have been pro-indiviso in title but the moment a co-owner as a vendor points out its
location, indicates its boundaries without objection from other co-owners = implied
acquiescence
 Heirs duty bound to comply with sale accdg to 1485, 1498

Castro v Atienza
Facts:
 Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de Castro leased to Gregorio Atienza a fishpond (26 hectares) in Bluacan
o It formed part of a bugger piece of land wherein TC and AC were co-owners in equal shares of the
property
 CT of lease
o 5 yrs from Jan 24, 1956  P5K/yr rental
 TC died
o GA and AC signed an agreement to annul CT of lease  Agreement signed by them
 Wife of TC, Felisa Castro was intended to be made a party to this agreement
 Cond # 2 of agreement  AC and FC give back P2.5K to GA
 FC refused to be party of agreement
 Testimony of AC showed that he was the one who wanted to cancel CT of elase
o Appellate Court  Could not invoke his failure to obtain FC signature to elude his OB to refund
 Concurrence of FC to cancel CT is not a condition to it

Issues:
W/N AC could validly lease his ½ interest and cancel the said lease pertaining to his interest? YES
 Lease of ½ interest to 3rd person by co-owner results into a partnership between lessee and lessor (owner
of undivided half)
o If lease can be entered into as such, then it can also be cancelled partially without the other co-
owner’s consent (493CC)

Estoque v Pajimula

Facts:
 Leonara Estoque based her complaint for legal redemption on claim that she is a co-owner of Lot 802
o Bought 1/3 of it when Cripina Aquitania sold it to her
 Elena Pajimula acquired 2/3 of subject land from CA
o When LE bought her portion, which was indentified and segregated = no co-ownership, hence no
legal redemption
 Subject lots was owned by spouses Perez who had 4 kids (Ricardo dead)
o CA (Kid) sold her 1/3 right to said lot to LE
o Remaining kids CA, Lorenzo, Emilia (widow of Rosendo Perez) executed extra judicial settlement
wherein rights to remaining portion were assigned to CA
 CA sold remaining portion to EP
 Action based on co-ownership claim
o 1/3 portion of LE identified and bounded, same as 2/3 portion of EP
o LE  CA was a co-owner and had no right to sell a definite portion of the land until partition done
 When CA sold her remaining share to EP  LE had the right to redeem under 1620
 LC  Dismissed, no co-ownership because LE and EP lots different

Issues:
W/N LE has the right of legal redemption? NO
 DOS to LE clearly specified object sold
o Southeastern portion 1/3 of Lot 802 (840 sqm)
o CA could not sell this bec it was owned in common with her brothers  Does not follow that she
intended to sell to LE 1/3 share, NOTHING IN THE DOS that says this
 Sale to LE  Ineffective for lack of power of CA to sell
o However day after, CA acquired entire interest of remaining co-owners becoming the co-owner of
said prop (1434CC)

When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor
acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee."
 o LE became actual owner of her part but she never acquire undivided interest in lot 802, nor a right
to redeem said prop when CA sold 2/3 to EP

Diversified Credit v Rosado

Facts:
 Lot 62-B in Bacolod belonged to 13 co-owners, including Luz Rosado, wife of Felipe Rosado
o LR signed DOS together with 13 other co-owner to DC
 FR built a house on it without partitioning said lot
o Title of prop transferred to DC upon registration with office of register of deeds
 DC demanded that spouses Rosado vacate said lot but they refused
o FR  It was a conjugal house subject to 158CC and on the view of equity his wife LR got an aliquot
(portion) share
 Didn’t give his consent to DOS
 DC filed an action in Municipal Court of Bacolod for spouses to vacate said prop and restore possession to
them
o CFI  Rejected FR claim of ownership, CA affirmed

Issues:
W/N House constructed became conjugal prop of spouses Rosado? NO
 158CC
Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses through
advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the
conjugal partnership.
Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of
the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse
who owns the same.
 FR  Building the house at the expense of the conjugal partnership converted the 1/13 undivided share of
his wife into community property
o DOS to DC void with regard to the 1/13 share because LR didn’t owned said share when house was
built
o Need for FR, as manager of conjugal partnership to give consent
 No individual owner may claim title to any definite portion until partition
o Before partition, he only has an ideal or abstract share of the entire thing  no right to sell divided
part of the real estate owned in common (Lopez v Ilustre)
o Mercado v Liwanag  Co-owner may not convey a physical portion of the land owned in common
 Share of wife never physically determined  House constructed on said land cannot claim to be under the
protection of 158CC because said article does not apply
o Bec LR only had an undivided share, no house could have been erected

PNB V CA

Facts:
 Property was owned by spouses Inigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver as their conjugal property
o Cadastral proceedings led to the issuance of title under their names
 Before issuance  IB died, survived by his wife and his kids
o 1 year after, RV mortgaged the entire property to PNB for P500
 Mortgage doc registered under Register of deeds, however, said lien was not annotated on
books of ROD when OCT issued
 Allowed PNB to have possession of prop and do other acts needed in case RV fails o perform
her part of mortgage
 RV defaulted in her OB with Manila Trading company
o MTC levied her share in subject lot  RV’s interest sold in a public auction wherein MTC was
highest bidder
  MTC sold it rights to Salvador Sambrano  ½ of prop given to them
 RV failed to settle OB with PNB  PNB sold WHOLE lot in a public auction wherein PNB was winner
o OCT of RV was never delivered to it
 PNB filed petition asking for OCT and issuance of new title
o Sold prop to Felizardo Reyes  New OCT duplicate issued for him
 MTC v RV case  Prop was sold to MTC through an auction sale
o Issued at the back of Certificate of title
 CFI  Ruled for RV
o Prop is conjugal prop, ½ share must go to Inigo Bitanga (Heir)
o ½ to RV, Mortgage to PNB was not an existing lien because it was not mentioned in decree of
registration
 Sale to MTC and SS valid
o FR not purchaser in good faith
 OCT issued for him void
 Appealed to CA
o Affirmed CFI

Issues:
W/N mortgage to PNB was valid? NO
 Mortgage executed by RV was valid formally  Intrinsically invalid
o Co-ownership established when IV died between RV and their Heirs
 RV could not have validly mortgaged whole lot to PNB
o 2085CC  Essential requisite of Mortgage CT = Mortgagor must be absolute owner
o 493CC  Each co-owner may alienate his part of the property
 PNB acquired RV’s ½ share of the property  Other hald was owned by IB
o Law at that time: usufructuary rights owned by RV  She could not alienate, dispose of objects
included in usufruct (no mortgage)
 Tax declarations do not alter conjugal character of said lot  Not evidence of title
W/N mortgage was no longer subsisting? No longer subsisting
 Torrens title system
o S38: A decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered, and be binding upon the land after
hearing finds that application is proper for registration
o S39: Every person holding title of decree of registration shall hold the same free of all encumbrance
except for
 Liens
 Taxes
 Public Highways
o S47: OCT shall be received as evidence as to all matters contained therein
 Decree of registration, after lapse of one yr period from its entry becomes indefeasible and conclusive
o Justice Dizon: They are in rem proceedings and binding upon the land
o Snyder v Provincial Fiscal of Cebu
 Decree of registration cannot be altered by reason of absence of any person…may only be
modified within 1 yr after entry of decree
 Clean title issue fro RV and IB  1yr period lapsed na and its incontestable
o Torrens title system registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer
o Purchaser in good faith acquires good title
 MTC and SS = in good faith  Both had no knowledge of PNB mortgage
W/N RV and IB estopped and laches applied from contesting mortgage? NO
 PNB mortgage was void  Lapse of time could not validate it
 Heirs signed the mortgage as instrumental witness
o Not aware of contents of doc, only knows the subject matter of deed
o Different from one who signed as witness of deed mortgage who knows contents of deed
 Guilermo Bitanga not estopped because he signed deed as witness
o No proof that he was aware of its contents
 RV  Mortgaged entire lot on basis of tax declarations
 o Person invoking estoppel must have been influenced and relied of representations of person sought
to be estopped
o No deliberate intention of RV to mislead here
 The fact that Atty Rabago was lawyer of Bitanga family and administrator of their estate cannot affect
interests of heirs
W/N Acquisition of interveners bears earmarks of validity, thus mortgage was valid? NO
 Mortgage only existed for ½ of said lot  whole lot still sold in this case

Goldcrest Realty v Cypress Gardens Condominium

Facts:
 GR is the developer of Cypress Gardens (10 story building in Legaspi Village Makati)
o GR executed “Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions”  Made CG into a condo project and
incorporated Cypress Gardens Condo Corp to manage it and hold title to all condo areas
 GR had ownership of two-level penthouse unit in 9th and 10th floors and controlled
management and administration of condo until 1995
 Administration turned over to CC
o CC discovered that certain common areas of CC were being encroached upon by BR
o CC filed complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board seeking to compel GR to
vacate common areas
 Removed door it built between 8th and 9th floor stairway
 Remove door it built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby
 GR  Said it was given exclusive use of the roof decks in S4C of Master Deed
o Did said constructions for privacy and security purposes
 HLB Arbiter San Vicente conducted two ocular inspections
o GR enclosed and used common area as storage room  Encroached 68.01sqm of roof deck
common area
o GCR failed to secure alteration approval for said permanent structure
o Arbiter ruled for CC
 GR remove structures, vacate roof deck common areas
 HLB Special division  CC has no COA regarding the use of roof deck area because only GR can use it
 CC appealed to office of the president
o OP  Dismissed appeal, CC appealed to CA
 CA  GR under S4C Master Deed has the exclusive use of easement covering the portion of the roof deck
o NO UNRESTRICTED RIGHT TO BUILD STRUCTURES ON IT OR LEASE IT TO 3RD PERSONS

Issues:
W/N GC built structures on encroached areas? YES
 S4C Master Deed
o Limited Common Areas  Exclusive Easement for the use of the portion of the roof deck
 CA found that GR built an office structure on roof deck limited common areas
o Ocular inspection showed this
o 2nd ocular inspection was meant to measure encroached area
o GR fined for building said structure
o GR didn’t deny structure existed
W/N GR impaired the easement on portion of roof deck? YES
 GR ‘s act of building said office structure impaired the easement  Violated S22 PD 957
o Owner of dominant estate cannot violate any of the following restrictions on its rights on servant
estate
(1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the
easement;
(2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally
contemplated;
(3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established;
 (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and
preservation of the easement
(5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome;
(6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient
estate; and
(7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the
least convenience to the owner of the servient estate.
o GR’s acts showed that it breached a number of said restrictions
 Construction and lease of roof deck was not necessary for its use and preservation
 Weight of office structure strained condo’s foundation  Made easement more burdensome
and adding safety risk to all condo owners
 Construction of structure went beyond intendment of easement because it illegally altered
condo plan and violated S4 of Condo Declaration of restrictions

Sunset View Condo v Judge Campos

Facts:
 SS = Condo corp
o Has a registered Master Deed with declaration of Restrictions of SS View Condo Project in Roxas
boulevard, Pasay
 1st case  Aguilar-Bernares Realty: Sole proprietorship
o AB was an assignee of unit Solana in SCP with La Perla Commercial Incorporated as assignor
 LP bought unit from Tower Builders Inc. on installment
o SS filed for collection of assessments levied on unit against AB
 JC  AB pursuant to S2 RA4726 = a holder of a separate interest aka shareholder of SS
Condo corps
 Case should be filed in SEC, which has original jurisdiction over controversies
arising between shareholders of a corp
 2nd Case  SS filed complaint for collection of overdue accounts on assessments and insurance premiums
and interest against Lim Siu Leng
o LS was assigned unit Alegria of Sunset through “Contract to Buy and Sell” with TB
o LS filed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Amt being collected was an assessment
 Because she is a purchaser of a condo unit, LS claimed to be a shareholder pursuant to S2 of
RA4726 AKA SEC again has jurisdiction
 SS both parties have not fully paid for unit, thus they are not holders of separate interest, which would
make them a stockholder
o Case dismissed  SS appealed, hence this pet for certiorari

Issues:
W/N AB and LS are shareholders despite not paying full purchase price? NO
 AB and ls  Every purchaser is automatically shareholder regardless of w/n they paid full purchase price
WRONG
o S5 RA 4726  Not every purchaser of a condo unit is a shareholder of the corporation
 Leaves it to Master Deed to determine when shareholding will be transferred (S4 RA 4726)
 Amended Master Deed registered in Register of deeds S6 P1
o Shareholding in SS is inseparable from unit ownership
o S6 P1A  Purchaser of a unit shall acquire ownership subject to terms conveying unit to purchaser
 Contract to Buy and Sell of AB and LS  Ownership only given upon full payment
 Purchaser of a unit who has not paid full price is not a share holder
o S10 RA 4726  Only an owner of a unit is a shareholder of the corp
 LS and AB have not paid full purchase price and are thus not shareholders
o Since they are not shareholders, this is not an intracorporate or partnership dispute wherein the
SEC has original jurisdiction
o Regular courts have jurisdiction over this matter
Captile v De Gaban

Facts:
 Fabian Correjado inherited from his dad Santos Conrejado 2 parcels of land
o FC died intestate (No will) and had 4 kids: Julian, Zacarias, Francisco, Manuel Conrrejado
 Julian occupied and cultivated subject lands after FC death until he died
o Had 3 kids (Respondents)  Heirs of Julian
o Francisco died and Zacharias died  Leaving heirs FZ Heirs
 FZH filed complaint for partition of property in RTC La Carlota City against HJ
o FZH  FC had two marriages
 Brigada Salenda  Mom of JC
 Maria Catahay  Mom of ZC, FC, MC
o Prop was undivided at time of JC death but his kids enjoyed said prop anyway and refused to
deliver FZH share
o HJ  Proceedings intestate of great grandfather Santos Correjado, FZH were not given any share in
prop for MC
 Said that MC was just FC’s mistress and FC, ZC, MC were illegitimate kids, who were not
entitled to inherit under Spanish Civil Code of 1889
 RTC  Dismissed complain on ground of Laches
 CA  Affirmed RTC
o HJ were unable to prove that FC and ZC were illegitimate kids and that FZH were unable to prove
that they were legitimate
o CA presumed that there was a lawful marriage with MC and FC making their kids co-owners with JC
of props
 However, prescription and laches have set in
 Possession of a co-owner is like a trustee  Not adverse to other co-owners but
beneficial for them all, Other co-owners may demand the partition of the common
prop any time aka the action to demand partition is imprescriptible
 However, acquisitive prescription may set in when one co-owner openly and
adversely occupies prop without recognizing co-ownership
 Elements of adverse possession by co-owner against another
 That he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the cestui que trust or other co- owners;
 That such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que
trust or the other co- owners; and
 That the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing
 FZH were co-owners of said land but acquisitive prescription set in when HJ did
unequivocal acts of repudiation
 HJ intro’d improvements to prop and JC paid realty taxes as sole owners
 After JC died, HJ arrogated unto themselves the exclusive use and enjoyment of prop
 Rogelia’s testimony (Daughter of ZC)
 MFR of FZH  Said that A19 of CC now applied, CA found this misplaced
Issues:
W/N prescription set in? YES
 Rights of inheritance  2263 CC
o ART. 807, Spanish Civil Code of 1889
 ART 807. The following are forced heirs:

 Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
 In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
 The widower or widow, natural children legally acknowledged, and the father or the
mother of the latter, in the manner and to the extent established by Articles 834,
835, 836, 837, 840, 841, 842, and 846.
o ART. 939, Spanish Civil Code of 1889,
  ART. 939. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, the natural children
legally acknowledged and those legitimated by royal concession shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased.
 Prescription  1134, 1137 CC
 From the moment JC occupied props in 1919 and claimed to be the exclusive owner of them until his death
in 1950
o Question is not of partition but of ownership where imprescriptitbility of action of partition which
cant be used any more
o JC held land for 67 years  prescription already set in
 Estoppel by laches = creation of equity
o Laches cannot interfere with prescription absent estoppel
o Prescription already set in for FZH action  Laches not applied between near relatives + FZH never
benefitted from props for 67 years

Cavile v Heirs of Clarita Cavile

Facts:
 Bernardo Cavili had 3 marriages and acquired 6 props during his life
o Inues Dumat-ol  Simplicia = kid
o Orifa Colalho  2 kids, Fortunato and Vevencia
o Tranquilina Galon  3 kids, Castor, Susana, and Benedicta
 Heirs of BC in 1st and 2nd marriages filed a complaint for partition against his heirs in 3rd marriage
o 12 said that they along with 3 were co-owners of the props of BC
o Upon BC death, Castor Cavil took possession of his prop and when he died, his kids did the same
o 3 refused partition
 3  Presented Deed of partition as evidence, TC dismissed complaint and said that lands were already
partitioned
o Division was already made, and doc was ratified by Notary Public
o Signed by Simplica, Tranquilina and 2nd marriage kids
o Parcels of land acquired during 3rd marriage were divided into two parts
 1st part to 12 kids
 2nd part to 3rd marriage kids
o Conjugal props of TG sold to Castor for P166  Took immediate possession and exercised acts of
ownership
 CA  Reversed TC
o Deed of partition not proved to be authentic
o Thumbmark of SC was only an inkblot

Issues:
W/N CA was wrong in not admitting said deed into evidence? YES
 Lawful heirs of BC had already divided his props among themselves as shown in DOP
o DOP was acknowledged before Notary Public Iluminado Golez and recorded in his notarial book
o It was a public doc which are admissible in evidence and enjoy the presumption of regularity
 12 kids failed to overcome presumption of regularity
o Even though testimonies presented by 12 that Simplica resided in Mindanano from 1934-1947 So
she couldn’t sign doc
 Does not preclude possibility that she could have traveled
 Filomena Pareja, granddaughter of SC said that SC was healthy and mobile and there was
available transpo going to Negros Oriental
o Examination of COP shows that inkblot is actually a thumbmark

Sps Castro v Miat

Facts:
  Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought 2 parcels of land, 1 in Paranaque, and 1 in Paco, Manila during
their marriage
o CM died and left 2 kids  Romeo and Alexander
 While in Dubai, MM agreed to give both porps to his sons
o When he got back, he renegotiated the agreement and got the Paranaque prop for himself and left
the Paco prop to his 2 sons
o Spouses Miat bought the Paco prop on installment basis  Balance paid in 1984 when MM got back
 Secured the title over the property in his name  R: Violation of their agreement that said
prop would be under their name
 MM gave owners duplicate title to R
 RA lived in Paco prop and paid its taxes and fire insurance
o A left for personal reasons and sold his share of the prop to R for P42K
o A got P6K partial payment from R but never executed the deed of assignment because he had a
lot of work to do
 1988  In his godmother’s wedding, R learned that Rosalina Castro had given MM P30K as down payment
for the sale of the Paco prop
o R was brought by Virgilio Castro (Son of RC) to chambers of Judge Anunciacion of MTC Manila to
discuss status of Paco prop
 R informed that prop was sold to VC by MM for P95K
o Ceferino Miat (bro of MM)  Before death of CM, there was an agreement that prop would go to
their 2 sons
 Reiterated in front of extended Miat family members when MM got back
 MM confirmed that he bought the Paco prop on installment basis
o Paid P12K balance in installments, last one in 1984
o R borrowed title to mortgage prop to his friend Leandro
 MM ran to financial difficulties
o Mortgaged prop for P30K to parents of VC
o Informed RA that he would be forced to sell props if they would not redeem mortgage
o Accompanied his kids to said judge wherein Sps Castro were present
 A  After sale, MM got 1/3 of proceeds while he got 2/3
o R got right to Nueva Ecija prop
o From his share of the proceeds, A intended to return P6K DP to R, which he considered a personal
debt
 VC  Informed R that MM was selling prop
o R said “bahala siya”
o Informed R again when he brought him to said Judge  R was told that prop was given to him, and
VC admitted that he knew this
 R filed action to nullify MM and RC sale
o Rtc Declared sale valid
 CA  Reversed, sale invalid

Issues:
W/N prop is conjugal? YES
 Family Code not in effect at this time so CC applies
 Art 153 (1)
The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses
 Paco prop acquired by onerous title during marriage of SM from a common fund  Clearly conjugal prop
 A 160CC  All prop of marriage presumed to be conjugal
o Does not require proof prop was acquired with funds of partnership, presumption applied
regardless
 Paco prop bought during marriage, MM didn’t bring it into marriage unlike Lorenzo v Nicolas
 MM and CM executed a Deed of Sale with mortgage  title was gained during conjugal partnership unlike
Jovellanos v CA, wherein title obtained during 2nd marriage, not 1st
W/N oral partition between MM and his sons was valid? YES
 Ceferino Miat supported the stance that there was such an agreement
o Extended to Miat Family members through Sinumpaang Salaysay
o Consideration was expressed by MM in his letter to R  For all the faults MM had to them
 Partition not covered by Statute of frauds
o A already accepted P6K DP for purchase of his sale of the prop
o CM testimony questioned by Sps Castro
o Pada-Kilario v CA
 No law requires partition to be in writing
 R74 S1 ROC  Partition must be in a public doc
 Serves as a constructive notice to others
 Intrinsic validity of partition not in jeopardy if not done accdg to formalities when
no creditors are involved
 No creditors  Any form okay
 1358CC  Said agreement must appear in a public doc
 Only for convenience
 Non-complaince does not affect the validity of acts of parties
 1403 SOF does not apply
 Partition among heirs is not a conveyance of real prop
 Does not transfer prop  Just a ratification of title
W/N Sps Castro are buyers in good faith? NO
 Good Faith  One who buys prop and pays fair and full price before any notice of someone’s other claim to
it
o Buyer of real prop must be wary and investigate the rights of those in possession
 VC knew that prop was given by MM to his sons
 Even consulted Judge to ascertain who had a right to the prop  MM or R
 CA  Sps had knowledge of adverse claim of R
o VC talked to R about supposed sale and together with MM and A they went to a judge to find out
w/n R had a right to prop
o R told him that he had right to prop through oral partition and assignment
o VC knew R possessed prop they being neighbors

Ramos v Director of Lands

Facts:
 Restituto Ponce gained possession of a tract of land in Nueva Ecija in 1882
o Used Royal Decree of Feb 13, 1894 to obtain possessory info to the land
o Registered it as parcel 1
 Sold it to Cornelio Ramos in 1907
o CR tried to institute appropriate proceedings to register his title  Opposed by Director of Lands
 DR said that CR has not acquired good title from Spanish Gov and Director of Lands bec land was forest
land
o TC agreed

Issues:
W/N CR was entitled to the title of land? YES
 SG: To come under protection of Maura Law  Must be shown that land was cultivated for 6 years and that
it was not land which pertained to the zonas forestales
o Lands was forestall since 1894
 Public Land Law  Persons and their predecessors having been in open and continuous possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands against the gov for 10 years shall be entitled to title
o Actual possession  manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property
 CR has cultivated only ¼ of entire tract of land
  Doctrine of constructive possession  Possession and cultivation of a portion of land under
claim of ownership of all is constructive possession of all
 CR has color of title, acted in good faith, openly possessed the land
 Possession does not mean man has to have his feet on every square meter
o Agricultural public land
 Philipine Bill  termed it as “Public Land”, “Mineral Land”, “Timber land”
 Determined w/n land is more valuable for agricultural or forest use
 Jones v Insular Gov  termed it as those lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or
mineral lands
 Determine by exclusion if land is forestal mineral  If not then its agricultural land
 Forest accdg to lexicographers  Large tract of land covered with a natural growth
of trees and underbrush; a large wood
 BE Fernow in Economics of Forestry  Organic whole in which all parts, although
heterogeneous jumbled together by accident as it were an apparently unrelated
bear a close relation to each other and are as interdependent as any other beings
and conditions in nature
 Director of Forestry  Forest lands in the sense of what was needed to protect, for
the public good waste lands without a tree have been declared more suitable for
forestry
o Timber  Wood suitable for some purpose
o Timber lands = Forest lands
 Bureau of Forestry inspected lands through a series of questions to determine w/n
they are for agricultural or forest purposes
o For growth of what agricultural products is the land suitable?, State what
portion is wooded etc.
o When inspection made, certificate forwarded to Director of lands
 If made on a private land and inspection shows it to be more for
forest purposes, Director of Forestry requests Atty General to file
opposition
o If claimant shows title issued by prop authority the he complied with
requirements of law  land not public domain
o If gov really sees land to be a forest, they must submit proof it is not
agricultural

Director v CA

Facts:
 Land registration case involving 128 hectares of land in Isabela
o Applied for by Bruno Cabanatan  Declared alienable
 BC appears in list of terminated cases in the files of division archives
o Applicants have not produced any evidence of composition of title  Allegedly burned in the house
of Pepe Buraga during the war
o Boundaries of 138 hectares of land of BC not known
 SG  Land must be identified in order for there to be a claim of possession
o BC died during Spanish regime and is survived by his heirs
o Leon, BC bro ahd a son named Onofre who got 1921 tax declaration for 138 hectares for said land
 Emilio Cabauatan, son of O, said that Miguel Binag (lawyer) proposesd to used TD in the
land reg proceeding
 EC also claimed land of BC is in Sito Malini
 Judge Rosauro issued Decree for reg of parcel of land with 25 hectare area under the names of BC heirs
o Land bounded on NE and S by public lands, on E by another owner, and in W by another owner
 1934  Land was surveyed, showed that land had area of 154 hectares, not 138
o Land consisted of 7 contiguous/adjoining lots claimed by 6 other owners (Aggbao, Bangug,
Gumiran, Deray, Magbayad, Flores) through several homestead apps
 2nd reg case filed in 1937 based on this survey
 o BC heirs  Claim land, said that land was administered by BC son, Salvador, 40 tenants working
during Spanish regime, BC kids got 1/3 products during this time
 Paid taxes since 1921
 Cultivated land during American regime too
o Homestead apps
 Showed that the other claimants were cultivating the land separately too since 1917
 Planted rice corn etc , paid taxes
 TC  Granted BC heirs app
o BC heirs had been in possession of 25 hectares = constructive possession, provided that the same is
not in adverse possession of another person

Issues:
W/N BC heirs are entitled to whole portion? NO
 Constructive possession does not apply  Major portion of 128 hectare land has been in adverse
possession of other claimants, and is still part of public domain until patents issued
o Area claimed in excess was in position title, which was lost
 Contents not porved
 Location was not proved by BC heirs

Kasilag v Roque

Facts:
 Respondents Rafaela Rodriguez, Urbano Roque, Severo Mapilisan, and Ignacio Del Rosario are heirs of
Emiliana Ambrosio
o Commenced civil case to recover from Marcial Kasilag the possession of land and its improvements
granted to ER through a homestead app under patent
o MK  Said that he was in possession of land and he was getting fruits by virtue of a mortgage
contract between him and EA, which was ratified in notary public
 EA and MK public deed  said that EA was registered owner of a parcel of land in Bataan
o Had improvements of 4 Mango trees, 110 hills of bamboo trees etc.
o For P1K, with 12% interest, EA mortgaged the improvements to MK
o EA had to pay loan back 4 ½ years after to void mortgage
o EA pays all taxes and assessments on land and improvements during agreements
o Clause 8 of 1st CT  EA executes for MK absolute deed of sale for P1K if she fails to redeem
 EA defaulted  entered into a verbal CT with MK
o Conveyed possession of land to MK, with cond that he would not collect interest on the loan
o He would pay taxes, and benefit from the improvements
 CA  Verbal CT was one of absolute purchase of land and its improvements
o Voided both contracts
o EA pay P1K to MK

Issues:
W/N CT was void? YES
 Intention of CTing parties should prevail
o If clear  use ordinary meaning
o If not  Intention of parties prevail
 1 CT  Words used clearly show that they intended to enter into a CT of loan for P1K with 12% interest
ST

w/ accessory CT of mortgage of the improvements

o Terms contrary to law, morals, public policy should be separated from valid ones
 Separation can be made when they are independent of valid CT, and expresses the will of
the CTing parties (Manresa)
 1st CT was one of loan with accessory CT of mortgage  Not against the law
o Authorized by S116 Act 2874
o Clause 8 of 1st CT  modified after expiration of term
  MK took possession of land and benefited from its fruits on cond that EA doesn’t have to pay
interest
 Done after mortgage entered into  CT of antichresis, void for being a real
encumberance
W/N MK was in good faith? YES
 Possession of MK of land and its fruits are integral elements of a CT for antichresis  void for being a lien
and expressly prohibited by S116 A2874
o CA  MK acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land
 CC 433  Every person unaware of any flaw in his title, or in manner of its acquisition, by
which it is invalidated shall be deemed possessor in good faith
 CC 1950  Good faith on the part of the possessor consists in his belief that the person from
whom he got the thing was the owner of the same
 GF  Ignorance of law can be a basis
o MK was unaware of any flaw in his title
o Manresa said that ignorance of the law can be a basis of GF as long as its not gross and inexcusable
o MK is not conversant with the law bec he is not a lawyer  proceeded on well-grounded belief that
he was not violating any law
 He did not know when he was taking possession of the land and when he was enjoying the
fruits that this was an antichresis prohibited by S116 A2874

PRINT OUT SEPARATE OPINIONS

Banco Espanol Filipino v James Peterson

Facts:
 CT entered into between BEF and Francisco Reyes
o BEF loaned FR P141K adding to his outstanding debt of P84K  Totaling to debt to P226K
o Entire loan was at an interest of 8%
o Security of payment  FR by a public instrument, mortgaged in favor of BEF personal property
(wine, liquors, canned goods etc. worth P90K)
 Deed of pledge
 Property was stored in warehouses of FR in Manila  goods were liable for the payment of P90K
 Deed of pledge  BEF and FR agreed that the goods were to be delivered to Ramon Garcia for safe-keeping
o FR gave the goods to RG by giving him the key to the warehouse where they are kept
 2nd CT between FR and BEF  Goods in possession of depositary should only be liable for P40K
o Luis Sierra replaced RG
 Juan Garcia (other defendant) brought action in CFI of Manila against FR, claiming the sum P15K
o Sheriff JP at the request of JG levied the props of FR  Took the props in his possession, depriving
FR of possession
o W/O BEF authority, FR could not dispose of the goods  FR had not paid his debt to the bank at
this point
o JP  Levied the goods for the purpose of satisfying judgement of JG
 CFI  Dismissed BEF action

Issues:
W/N CT of pledge was valid? YES
 Complies with the requisites of 1857CC
o Property pledged to secure a debt
o Terms of pledge and prop pledged appeared in a public doc, prop pledged placed in hands of
depositary, under supervision of bank
 Defect  FR (Debtor) continued possession of prop pledged, never parted with prop, creditor never
possessed prop
o 3rd person, at common consent of both parties, was in possession of goods  No showing that FR
continued possession after pledge
 o First RG then LS
 CT was a perfected CT of pledge under 1857 and 1863CC  pledgee took charge of goods through
depositary
o Fact that it remained in FR warehouse does not affect its validity  both parties agreed to it
 Bank, as pledgee, was the only one authorized to dispose of goods
o Fact that FR got purchasers and made arrangements for sale does not affect the validity of CT
 He was still owner of goods
o Reservation in CT  Referred to rent of prop mortgaged to bank, not to the prop
 Does not nullify CT
 No evidence pledge was fraudulent

Macaset v Macasaet

Facts:
 Teresita married Ismael Macasaet, whose parents are Vicente and Rosario Macasaet
o 1ST Degree relatives
 VRM filed ejectment suit against TIM
o VRM  Said they were owners of 2 lots in Lipa City
 By way of verbal lease agreement, TIM occupied the lots and used them as their residence
 TIM failed to pay P500/Wk rent
o TIM  No lease agreement
 VRM invited them to live on the lots so they could live near each other
 Said that it was their advance grant of inheritance
 Improved the lot through renovations
 MTCC  Ruled for VRM
o TIM occupied through tolerance of VRM
 TIM bound by implied promise to vacate upon demand
o Inheritance to parcels of land were inchoate rights
 RTC  Upheld MTCC
o Allowed VRM to appropriate the building and other improvements intro’d by TIM (448CC)
 CA  Upheld findings of MTCC and RTC
o Calubayan v Pascual  TIM status was that of a lessee, whose term of lease had expired and still
occupied land bec of tolerance
o TIM has right to be reimbursed for improvements

Issues:
W/N TIM should be ejected? YES
 Not tolerated possession
o Toleration  act or practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly approved off
o Sarona v Villegas cited Tolentino
 Toleration  acts by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of a prop allows his
neighbor to do
 No material injury to owner, nor prejudice to him
 Not a basis for acquisitive prescription
 Not every case of knowledge and silence = tolerance
o TIM was able to establish that VRM invited them to live on parcels of land
 TIM accepted invitation = meeting of minds, agreement regarding possession arose
 Did not arise from Neighborliness or familiarity
 Done due to invitation  arose out of familial love and solidarity
 Right to use lots terminated  No period fixed (1197CC)
o Court can fix duration of period (1197CC)  Does not apply here bec parties did not intend for
there to be a period
 TIM invited by VRM out of love  No period intended
 They were to stay in lots as long as both parties mutually benefited from arrangement
o When VRM took away this right  TIM had no right to possess anymore
  Love and solidarity ceased
 TIM had no right to maintain possession
o Had an inchoate right to prop only
 TIM had right to be paid for improvements  448 applies
o Del Campo v Abesia  448 applied to one whose house, despite having been built at the time he
was still co-owner, overlapped with the land of another
 448 applied to cases where building constructed improvements with consent of owner
o VRM consented to improvements  knew about them
 Javier v Javier  son was builder in good faith, with knowledge and consent of father
o Structures built by TIM were useful improvements  They increased the value of the lots
 VRM has the right to appropriate the building and improvements but after refunding TIM of
expenses or paying the increase in value acquired by the props by this reason
 Depra v Dumlao  Case must be remanded to TC to determine proper app of 448

Cuaycong v Benedicto

Facts:
 The Cuaycong group were the owners of a group of haciendas between southern boundary of Hacienda
Toreno
o Some other parties leased part of their haciendas
o For more than 20 yrs, C group,their predecessors in interest, and the public have been using the
Nanca-Victorias road, which crosses Toreno openly, publicly, and continuously with the knowledge
of the owenrs of the hacienda
 Transported supplies using this road because there was no outlet to a public road from the
hacienda occupied by Cuaycong
 Cuaycong used this road to convey their products to the nearby town of Victorias, shipping
porty for the products of HT
 No public funds have been used to maintain the road
 From time to time, laborers of HT worked on it
 Defendants closed the road and refused to let CG continue using the road
 CG filed a motion for preliminary injunction against the defendants
o Defendants  Road was their private property
 Did not stop CG from using it, just made them pay tolls
 TC  Road was public, public had acquired a right to use it by immemorial prescription
o There was proof that the road has existed for 40 yrs
o Public freely passed on it

Issues:
W/N Land was public? NO
 No proof that the road was ever been used by the public in general
o CG even originally filed a complaint on the basis that they acquired prescription by easement
o When the defendants started requiring toll for the use of the road in 1911  There was no
prevention done by CG until they commenced this action
 No protests ever done
 No evidence that the road was ever conveyed to the government or to any of the former owners of HT
o Public roads = those constructed by the state and as provincial and town roads, those born out at
the expense of the said towns or provinces
 No expense was ever taken by the gov to repair the road
 Spanish law required each able bodied citizen to work for services of general utility
 People from the town of Victorias were never made to work on the road
 Repairs were done by the owners of the estate who benefited from the road 
Voluntary
o Their use of the road is not based upon any easement of way aka their use
was only tolerated by the owners of the road
  Owner of a land, who accommodates its use for the public does not divest him of the ownership of the land,
nor does it establish an easement
o Possession of real property is not affected by acts of possessory character merely tolerated by the
true owner  does not divest owner of ownership
 Possession is the basis of prescription, with no kind of prescription possible, acts of
tolerance cannot be the basis of prescription (Cortes v Yu)
o Possession must be based on claim of title and must be done adverse
 Acts tolerated by the owner do not start the running of the period of prescription (Roman
Catholic Archbishop of MNL v Roxas)

Yu v Honorado

Facts:
 Carlito Refuerzo purchased 42 metric tons of scrap engine blocks worth more that P4K from Marcelo Steel
Corp
o Used a check with a sum of P61K  Dishonored for insufficient funds
o CR sold the engine blocks to Soledad Junk Shop
 Detective Carlos Nuestro filed an app for a search warrant which was granted by the judge
o Seized 42.8 metric tons of engine block from SJS
 Spouses Yu filed an order for the return of the search warrant, which MSC opposed

Issues:
W/N SY was entitled to the goods? YES, they were buyers in good faith
 The acquirer and possessor in good faith of a chattel or movable property is entitled to be respected and
protected in his possession, as if he were the true owner thereof, until a competent court rules otherwise
(Chua Hai v Kapunan Jr.)
o SY bought the goods in good faith from the swindler CR without any notice that the goods were
obtained under false pretenses or by means of a bouncing check
 Sale was covered by a sales invoice and was made in the ordinary course of business
 Fact that search warrant was issued does not mean MSC can retain the goods
o 105 RPC  Restitution made whenever possible even though it may be in the possession of a
person who got it lawfully
 Exception: No restitution if the thing acquired by a 3rd person lawfully, bars an action for its
recovery  Absence of adjudication to the civil liability, MSR has no legal basis to recover
 Done to distinguish cases such as these from robbery or theft
o Both MRS and SY acted in good faith, which of them suffers loss from the acts of CR?
 The party who made the result possible by his act of confidence bears the loss (Eliason v
Wilborn)  MRS

Cordero v Cabral

Facts:
 Gregorio Ocampo of Meycauayan, Bulacan = husband of Felipa Cordero and father of the plaintiffs
o Died on May 17, 1958 and left several properties, which the plaintiffs inherited
o Subject land  Lot 5 in barrio Saluysoy, municipality of Meycauayan
 Registered in accordance with the Land Registration Act in the name of GO
 After GO death, plaintiffs took possession of all his properties including the Subjectland, which was a rice
land
o Southern portion (4,303 sqm) of said land was possessed by Victoria Cabral, who claimed to be the
owner of said portion
o Plaintiffs demanded VC and company to surrender possession of the portion of land and vacate it
but VC didn’t
o Plaintiffs had land relocated in the presence of the defendants reps and it was found that said land
was part of plaintiffs land but VC still dint wanna leave
o Cost plaintiffs harvest of at least 10 cavanes of palay
  Defendants  VC and her predecessors are the real owner of the subject land, who have been in actual,
adverse, peaceful, and continuous possession of the land
o GO and plaintiffs admitted that VC was the real owner
o GO and plaintiffs recognized the boundary between their respective properties to be a barrio road
o VC = owner of Lot-B, which was fraudulently included in title of GO
 Plaintiffs  They are real owners of Lot B , which is included in Lot 5
o VC never owned said land and does not have possession of any title, or any doc, either public, or
private to show her ownership, don’t even have tax declarations
o Antonio Rodriguez, the original owner of the land beside the plaintiffs, sold his land to Segunda
Prodon, the sale did not include subject land because it did not belong to AR
 SG did not acquire subject land and could not have transferred it to VC
o VC possession was not adverse, nor continuous
 When GO bought Lot 5, he took possession of whole land
 1935  AR asked him to sell subject land to him, GO agreed
 Proposed sale never happened
 AR never possessed the land as an owner, if ever he possessed it it was only as a
prospective owner  AKA Not adverse possession
 VC cannot say she possessed said land for more than 50 yrs  prescription has not
attached, land registered under Act 496 aka imprescriptible
o Never acknowledged VC as true owner, they deny that there is a boundary between subject land
and their prop
o GO only tolerated the possession of VC
o Subject land not fraudulently included in GO title
 TC  Not clear w/n subject land is included in GO TCT BUT land is VCs
 CA  GO had oral contract of sale with AR
o Became binding on GO
o The fact that GO title was not cancelled cannot annul the agreement
o Even if DOS not issued by GO, agreement was still binding
o This made land VC’s

Issues:
W/N VC owned the land? NO
 Oral CT of sale was never an issue
o Not mentioned in the pleadings
o TC silent on issue
o Plaintiffs did not mention this issue when they appealed to CA
 Subject land is included in TCT issued to GO
o Not vitiated by fraud or error
 GO “sale” to AR was not a sale
 Defendants admitted that they possessed the subject land
o No evidence that they were possessors in bad faith
o Their good faith became bad faith when they were served with the summons of the plaintiff’s
complaint
 Because they are now possessors in bad faith, they shall reimburse the fruits received and
those which the legitimate possessor could have received (549CC)

Fabie v David

Facts:
 Josefa Fabie = UF of income of certain houses in Binondo
o Based on 9th clause of will of dead Rosario Grey
 Owner of Santo Cristo prop = Juan Grey
o JG, and owners of Ongpin prop and JF entered into litigation  Suit decided as followes
 UF collects rents on both Ongpin and SC props
  UF, at her own cost and expense shall pay all real estate taxes, special assessments, and
insurance premiums + make all needed repairs on each props
 If UF defaults  owners have the right to make needed payments
 This agreement will be in effect during the term of the usufruct, and shall be binding on the
successors and assignes of each of the aprties
 JF filed action for unlawful detainer against Ngo Boo Soo, who was occupying SC premises on rent
o NBS without JF consent, and contrary to their agreement, subleased the prop to another Chinese
national
o JF refused this  Needed the property bec her house had burned down due to the Japanese
 Told NBS to leave but he refused
o NBS  Rented prop from its owner JG
 JF is only UF of the income therefrom, and has no right to eject tenants
 JF never had possession of prop  NBS had lease CT for 5yr period w/ a renewal option at
the end
 NBS tried to make a written offer to compromise with JF but it was rejected
 JF only wanted the prop bec she wanted to lease it to another person for a higher rent
o JG intervened  said he was the owner of the premises
 JF could only get rents, but she had no authority to administer the premises or evict tenants
 Only owner could do this
 CFI  NBS vacate
 Appealed to Judge David
o Said that court had no jurisdiction bec issue was w/n JF was entitled to administer prop  beyond
powers of municipal court

Issues:
W/N action is one for UD or action involving title? UD
 JF = UF, had right to collect rents, and make repairs
o She had the right to manage the property aka select tenant, fix amts of rent
 AKA she has right to control and possess prop regardless of title
 Action is purely possessory and not one involving title
W/N JF had right to evict NBS? Yes
 Agreement bet JF and JG  JG collected rents as an agent, and delivered it to HF after deducting taxes,
repairs, insurance premiums etc. expenses
o UF refused this agreement, which led to litigation, resulting into present scheme
 UF now collects rent, and preserves prop  acts of administration
o JG cannot say he is the administrator  he cannot manage prop after all acts of management were
given to JF, the UF
 To let JG choose tenant, etc. aka acts of admin would place UF at his mercy
 UF here would have said right, w/o power to protect, enforce, and fully enjoy it
 JF has right to choose herself, and anyone else as tenant as long as she fulfills her OB to pay taxes, and
conserve prop

Board of Assessment Appeals of Zamboanga del Sur, Placido Lumbay (Provincial Assessor of ZdS) v Samar Mining
Co. In., Court of Tax Appeals; 1971
FACTS:
- SMCI a domestic corporation engaged in mining industry
o Claims and mill located inland at a great distance from the loading point of the pier = decided to build a
42km gravel road to haul its ores from the mine site in Buug to the pier area in Pamintayan, ZdS
 Filed with Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forestry a miscellaneous lease application for a road right
of way on the public lands under the jurisdiction of the bureaus  given a temporary permit to
occupy and use
 Built the road: Samico road finished in 1959 and has since then been used by SMCI in hauling its
iron
 Lease application approved 7 Oct 1965 but execution held in abeyance
 - Received a letter from PA of ZdS assessing the 13.8km road it constructed for real estate tax purposes =
1,117,900php
o SMCI appealed to BOAA contesting the validity of the assessment:
 Road was constructed on public land so it can’t be considered an improvement subject to tax within
the meaning of Sec 2 CA 470
 Bislig Bay Lumber Co. v Provincial Government of Surigao
o BOAA affirmed validity of the assessment but held in abeyance its enforceability until lease contracts were
executed
- SMCI moved for reconsideration = denied and modified to become immediately enforceable + taxes SMCI has to
pay accrues from 1959  SMCI appealed to CTA
o Pets assail jurisdiction of CTA to take cognizance of the case as SMCI failed to 1st pay the realty tax imposed
before it appealed
o CTA: has jurisdiction and reversed the BOAA resolutions
 Road built on public lands such that it’s an integral part of the land and not an independent
improvement + upon termination of the lease the road automatically becomes owned by the national
government = SMCI exempt from paying real estate tax
ISSUES:
W/N SMCI should pay realty tax on the assessed value of the road it built on alienable/disposable public land leased to it by
the government. NO
- Pets: road is an improvement and therefore taxable under Sec 2 CA 470 (Assessment Law) which says that except in
chartered cities, there shall be levied, assessed, and collected, an annual, ad valorem tax on real property including land, buildings,
machinery, and other improvements not hereinafter specifically exempted
- SC: yes, the road is an improvement BUT whether such is taxable = NO
o Bislig Bay Lumber Co. Inc. v Provincial Government of Surigao raised a similar issue
 Timber concessionaire required to pay realty tax for a road it built at its own expense w/in territory
of the lumber concession
 Sec 2 CA 470 authorises levy of real tax on lands, buildings, machinery + improvements
 Issue: for whose benefit?
 PGS: for BBLCI’s own benefit even if built on public land
 BBLCI: exempt b/c road belongs to the national government via accession + road belongs
to removed/separated from the land on which it’s constructed therefore part and parcel of
the land + evidence shows road built also for benefit and use of the general public
 SC agreed on the points of accession since the road’s inherently attached to the land leased and b/c
upon expiration of the concession it would become the government’s (Art 440, 445 CC) + privilege
of use and enjoyment initially for BBLCI but it’s not exclusive (can be used by general public since
under the lease contract the gov’t employees and public may use it also) = gov’t practically reserved
right to use the road  road not considered as an improvement belonging to BBLCI = exempt
o Municipality of Cotabato, et al. v Santos, et al.: lessee who introduced improvements (consisting of dikes,
gates, guard-houses, converting the swamp to fishponds) on a swamp leased by the Bureau of Fisheries =
exempt from paying realty taxes
 Integral improvements which can’t be taxes
- Pets: Bislig case not applicable b/c the land there was indisposable public land, here it’s alienable
o SC: no merit as Bislig case doesn’t say that it was exempt because of the type of land the improvement was
built upon but because the improvement was integral to the land + actually owned by the gov’t via accession
o Sec 3.a CA 470: all properties owned by gov’t without any distinction are exempt from taxation
W/N CTA has jurisidiction. YES
- Pets: Sec 54 CA 470 (no court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessment under ‘this Act until the taxpayer shall
have paid under protest the taxes assessed against him)
- SC: Sec 7 par 3 + Sec 11 RA 1125: CTA exclusive jurisdiction to review by appeal decision of prov/BOAA in cases
involving assessment and taxation of real property and other CA 470 issues
o Congress intended to give CTA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases involving legality of real property
tax assessment  if need to pay 1st before able to file would render it nugatory
o Even so, no demand was made for the payment of the realty tax
o Only thing required is that the aggrieved party file appeal to CTA within 30D from receipt of BOAA decision

Baluran v Navarro
Facts:
 Spouses Paraiso were owners of a 480 sqm residential lot in Ilocos Norte
o Entered into a Barter Agreement with Spouses Baluran for SB’s 223 sqm unirrigated rice land in the
same locality in exchange for their residential lot
 Provisions of Barter agreement 1964
o SP and SB shall enjoy material possession of their respective properties
 SP reaps fruits of rice land
 SB has right to build their house on lot
o If any kids of Natividad Obencio, daughter of SP, chooses to reside in the residential lot, SB entitled
to return lot with damages incurred
o Neither partner, may encumber, alienate, or dispose of prop without the consent of the other
o Props not yet in accordance with Spanish Mortgage Law Act 496  deed registered in Register of
Deeds, Ilocos Norte
 Antonio Obencio filed in CFI complaint to recover the residential lot from SB
o Said he was the rightful owner  acquired it from NO, needed it so he could construct a house on it,
wanted SB to vacate, improvements built by SB done in bad faith
 SB  Barter agreement transferred ownership to them in exchange for the unirrigated Riceland
o AO COA prescribed
 Pre-trial  Residential lot donated by NO to AO in 1974
o Since SB in possession, they paid taxes on prop
o AO owner of residential lot
o SB appealed

Issues:
W/N Barter agreement transferred ownership to SB? NO
 Nature of the contract not bound by its title but by principles of law
o Barter does not control the agreement
o Stipulations of agreement show that there was no intention to convey ownership, only material
possession was conveyed  akin to a usufructuary right
o Stipulations subject to the resolutely condition  when NO kids chooses to reside on lot, SB has to
give it back
 Not contrary to law, morals, and good customs so its legal (1306CC)
 AO proper owner
W/N AO COA had prescribed? NO
 SB  Yes because 4yrs had lapsed since date of execution of barter (Feb 2, 1964)
o Wrong  1606CC: Conventional redemption applies here
o Agreement was the conveyance of material possession not ownership
 Usufruct may be constituted for any period, subject to the parties’ agreement
o Manner of terminating usufruct depends on agreement of parties
 AO could not demand the recovery of possession until he acquired the right of ownership from NO  Done
only in Oct 4, 1974
o Even if SB argument was followed, AO filed action to recover barely several months after property
was donated to him
W/N SB entitled to damages? NO
 579CC  SB doesn’t have to forfeit improvement, they may remove it without causing damage to the
property
 SB is still owner of unirrigated rice land and is now entitled to its possession bec of the happening of the
resolutory condition  UF now extinguished
 Both parties are now duty bound to transfer respective properties

NHA v CA

Facts:
  P. Marcos issued Proclamation 481  set aside 120 hectare portion of QC land owned by National Housing
Authority as reserved property for the site of the National Government Center
o PM issued Proclamation 1670  removed 7 hectare portion from NGC reserved property and gave
Manila Seedling Bank Foundation UF rights over the segregated portion
 For MSBF use in its operation and projects, subject to private rights, and to future survey,
under the administration of the Foundation
 Parcel of land determined by future survey based on technical descriptions of P481
 MSBF occupied their designated area  exceeded the area over the years, now 16 hectares occupied
o Bounded by EDSA to the west, Agham Road to the east, Q ave to the south, and a creek to the North
o They leased a portion of the area to Bulacan Garden Corporation
 4,590 sqm facing EDSA
 P. Corazon Aquino issued MO 127  revoked reserved status of 50 hectares out of the 120 hectares of NHA
prop reserved for NGC
o Authorized NHA to commercialize the area and sell it to the public
o BGC had 10 days to vacate occupied area, any structures left would be demolished
 BGC filed complaint for injunction in TC
o TC  P1670 gave MSBF right to conduct survey to establish 7 hectare area covered by MSBF UF
rights
 MSBF did not act seasonably on this right
 Previous surveys conducted by MSBF covered 16 hectares  now inappropriate to
determine 7 hectare area
 Allowing MSBF to determine the area would be grossly unfair to grantor of usufruct
 Allowed NHA to demolish BGC facilities
 Said the 2 surveys presented by MSBF were self-serving
 CA  Reversed TC
o Due to P1670, MSBF had right to determine the location of 7 hectare area covered by its UF rights
 MSBF asserted this right by conducting 2 surveys and erected its main structures on the
area of its choice
 NHA filed MFR, which was denied by CA

Issues:
W/N Petition now moot bec NHA demolished BGC facilities? No
 BGC lost interest but MSBF didn’t bec it had a direct effect on MSBF’s UF rights
o Exact location of 7hectare MSBF area not yet located
W/N Premises leased by BGC from MSBF is within 7 hectare area that P1670 granted? Cannot be said, New survey
needed to determine the area
 Entire area occupied by MSBF = 16 hectares, when P1670 only gave the UF rights over 7 hectares
o BGC leased portion is along EDSA
o Usufruct may be for a specified term based on agreement of parties
 UF may lease object
 NHA cannot evict BGC from portion it leased from MSBF if portion it occupies is within MSB
7 hectare area
 Owner must respect this lease as long as usufruct exists
 NHA has right to evict if BGC if it occupies area outside MSBF 7 hectare UF allocation
 MSBF survey  BGC is within 7 hectare area NHA survey  shows otherwise
o MSBF  starts measurement from Q ave going northward along EDSA up until the creek (northern
boundary of the land)
 Ben Malto (surveyor) based his survey on fact that MSBF main facilities are within this area
 Lucito Bertol (GM of MSBF) presented a map with a yellow shaded portion to indicate the 7
hectare area occupied by MSBF
 Clear from here that MSBF knew it exceeded its UF area
 BM constructed the survey used to construct map of LB
 LB authorized 2 surveys  ’84 and ‘86
o BM surveyed 16 hectares not just 7
o In ’86 survey, BM was told to determine 7 hectare area
 o NHA  Determined 7 hectare portion by starting measurement from Q ave to Agham road
 Inobaya (surveyor) used MSBF’s gate as a starting point
 MSBF occupied 16 hectare area
 565CC  Rights and OBs of UF shall be those provided in the title of the usufruct
o P1670 is the title in this case
 7 hectare area to be determined by future survey of MSBF aka MSBF has discretion to
determine location of its area
 MSBF conducted 2 surveys before lease to BGC
o Authority to conduct survey + fact that P1670 did not state location of area = MSBF may chooses
location
o Main structures of MSBF are in area of MSBF survey  NHA’s survey only covers 4 hardening bays
and a display area  not essential for MSBF
 Inobaya said that he used Agham Road as starting point bec the gate was there  not
enough basis to be a starting point
 NHA survey strips MSBF of its main facilities
 MSBF exceeded its area  UF has duty to protect owner’s interests (601CC)
o Usufruct has the right to enjoy the prop of another while preserving its form and substance unless
title or law states otherwise
 MSBF exceeding the area given to them gave birth to this confusion
 MSBF must vacate area not part of its usufruct
o Area now not determinable bec of various structures in the area  Need for new surver
 605CC  Limits usufruct in favor of a corp/association to 50 years
o Usufruct meant only as a lifetime grant  Unlike natural person, corp/assc may be extended
indefinitely
 Usufruct would then be perpetual
 P1670 issued 1977  MSBF has 22yrs left for its UF rights

Moralidad v Reyes

Facts:
 Mercedes Moralidad taught in Davao  Continued her studies in UPenn USA
o While there, she was offered to teach at the Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese  Did this for 7yrs
o Worked in UPenn Mental Health Dep for next 17 yrs
 MM would go back to Davao during her 2 month summer vacay  stayed in Mandug, Davao with her niece
Arlene Pernes (daughter of her younger sister Rosario)
o 1986  MM found out NPA rebels infested Mandug, many women and kids were victims of
crossfire between gov troops and NPA
 Sent money to Araceli, older sis of AP, so that she could look for a lot in Davao city where
they could move and live
 MM acquired the lot so that AP could move to Davao but later she made it available to any of her kins, who
wished to live in Davao
o July 21, 1986 document
 Conveyed prop to Mr and Mrs Diosdado Pernes
 Anyone of her kins who wishes to stay in prop should maintain an atmosphere of
cooperation, libe in harmony, and must avoid bickering with one another
 Anyone of her kins may enjoy the privilege to stay and avail of its use provided that the
same is not inimical to the purpose
 Anyone of her kins who do cannot conform to this may look for their own property
 Proceeds or income from prop shall be allotted to the kins who have less in life in greater
percentage and lesser percentage to those who are of in standing
 MM came back in 1993 after her retirement  stayed in AP house
o Relations soured
 Pernes family became annoyed at MM suggestions to change practices concerning matter of
health and sanitation
  Myco Pernes (eldest son of AP)  cleched his fist and swore at MM when she
corrected him, AP soon did the same
 MM filed complaint with local brgy lupon against the Pernes family
 Lupon made Pernes fam vacate premises after being reimbursed for the value of the
house  could not be agreed upon
 Violent confrontations started  MM sustained cuts and wounds when AP pulled her hair
and hit her
 MM filed complaint in office of ombudsman charging PF, both gov employees of conduct unbecoming of
public servants
o MM filed in MTCC case for unlawful detainer against PF
 PF  Resided in prop with full knowledge and consent of MM
 Built house in good faith
 MTCC  PF cannot invoke bona fides as valid excuse for not vacating
 Possession of PF became unlawful when MM told them to vacate bec MM only
tolerated their stay
 PF appealed in RTC
o Reversed MTCC  Possession was not because of tolerance but with consent
 1678CC not applicable bec this was not a lease agreement
 448 556CC Apply
 PF = builders in good faith, have right to retain prop
o They have right to be reimbursed of costs of improvements
 MM appealed to CA
o Premature to apply 448 556 bec issue of w/n PF had right to possess not resolved
 MM gave PF UF rights over the prop
 Duration = how long PF would like to occupy prop
 MM demand to vacate did not extinguish UF bec PF still wanted to reside on prop
o Law of usufruct governs this situation

Issues:
W/N PF had right to continued possession of prop? No
 Law on usufruct governs their relations + UD action is proper and not premature
 562 CC  UF has obligation preserve form of prop
o UF had right to fruits and use temporarily
o Only owner has power to alienate
 MM doc gave PF UF rights over prop  jus utendi and fruendi
 UF extinguished by 603CC
o Doc says UF must maintain peaceful and harmonious relations among the kin
 This was indispensable cond for continuance of usufruct
 Loss of atmosphere of cooperation  resolutory cond which extinguishes usufruct
 Facts and circumstances showed that their relationship deteriorated to almost an
irretrievable level
 Animosity bet the parties terminated the usufruct
 Builder = UF  rights governed by 579 580 CC
o PF ordered to vacate premises w/o right of reimbursement
o They may remove/destroy improvements if it does not cause damage to prop

North Negros v Hidalgo

Facts:
 NH = Owner of a site where its sugar central is located
o Had a factory building and a residence for its employees and laborers  known as mill site
o Owns adjoining sugar plantation known as Hacienda Begona
 NH built a road across its props connecting the mill site with the public highway
 o Allowed vehicles to pass for P.015 toll
o Allowed public to use it for free
 Hacienda of Luciano Aguirre known as Hacienda Sangay adjoined mill site
o Serafin Hidalgo had a billard hall and a tuba saloon
o SH used to pass through NH road bec it was the only way he could access HS
 Every time he drove his car on the road with a cargo of tuba, NH gate keeper would stop
him and prevent him from passing on the road
 SH deviated from road and used fields of HB to go to HS
 NH filed for preliminary injunction against SH
o Granted only when a right sought to be protected exists and the facts shown violate this right
o Indispensable that it be proven that he who seeks the remedy is entitled to it
 NH not entitled to PI
 NH said that
o SH caused trouble among peaceful people of the palce when he passed on road
o NH prohibited SH from using road but SH still used it  Disturbed public order and molested NH
employees and their fam
 NH obtained PI but after eliminated the allegations they made against SH
o Allegations were indispensable to PI action
o Amended complaint no longer contains the allegations
 NH complaints do not state how SH use of the road caused damages to his property rights
o Road was open to public in general

Issues:
W/N NH entitled to PI? NO
 Real damage NH seeks to avoid does not consist in SH taking tuba with him while traversing NG prop
o No relation between the act, which causes damage to NH  Public is free to use prop
o Not Shown that SH caused damage when he used the prop
o SH sale of tuba in HS = Legit business and no real damage to 3rd persons arose from it
o Possibility that NH laborers might become drunk bec of the Tuba does not violate NH prop rights 
NH remedy is in their hands and not in the courts
 If NH cannot enjoin SH from selling tuba in HS, it cant obtain PI to prevent him from passing road as long as
he is ready to pay transit fees
o Private road has been thrown in for public use  No action for trespass may prosper against any
person who desires it
 Private roads used by the public are public roads in the sense that they are open to those
who use them  immaterial that road has gates or bars
 Whenever gatekeeper prevented SH from using the road  SH carried tuba across
lands of HB to HS
o NH wants to enjoin SH from using this as well  Shocking to the
conscience It is SH who has right to action
 NH not entitled to PI  SH never brought or sold tuba in its mill site
o NH has not come to court with clean hands
 They made untrue allegations against SH
 On one occasion  Ankerson, accountant and auditor of NH kicked and accused SH of
blasphemy, spilled their tuba
 SH tried to claim its value but NH never entertained this
o Peaceful citizen who passes through private road open to public is not trespassing
W/N NH may stop SH from using road? NO
 Voluntary easement under 531 and 594CC
o Established for the benefit of a community
o Owner of estate may burden it with easements as he deems fit as long as not against public order
 This easement does not violate public order
o In cases of voluntary easement  owner given liberty to establish it
o NH considered it desirable to open this road to the public without cond save for the P0.15 toll
 Cannot go back against this
 o Not contractual in nature but act of the owner  any person willing to pay may use the easement
 The road as an easement has been used by the public in general  had to pay fees in the case of motor
vehicles
o Charged with public interest  NH may not establish discriminatory exceptions against any private
person (Duty to serve without discrimination)
 If use is dedicated to the public  any member of the public may demand service without
discrimination
 Owner devoting his business to public use grants public interest in the use
 Subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest
o Toll = price of the privilege to travel over the highway
 Done bec costs of construction done by private co with authority from the state
 Public roads in a limited sense bec there is still a private proprietary right
o NH conditioned the sue of the road for vehicles upon payment of P0.15
 If this right is free to all citizens, then it is of public interest

Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo v Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro; 1916

FACTS:
- Counsel for municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo petitioned with CFI for registration of 6 parcels of land it claimed to be
absolute owner thereof situated in barrio of Balabag of pueblo of Dumangas, Iloilo
o Description and boundaries given in detail
o 41, 815 sq.m. total
o Acquired by possession from time immemorial
o Occupying one of the parcels as public market and the rest unoccupied
- Opposed by Director of Lands, private parties, Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro
o RCBJ objected to registration of Lot 2 and Lot 1 parcel 4: lots absolutely and exclusively belonged to the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, in quiet and peaceable possession since time immemorial
- During hearing MD requested registration of some be stricken out  all oppositions regarding to such withdrawn
except RCBJ wrt Lot 1 parcel 4
- CFI ruled for MD: ordered inscription in registry of property in the name of MD corporation of Lot 3 parcel 3, Lot 2
parcel 5, and Lot 1 parcel 4 + disallowed adverse claim of objector wrt last parcel
o RCBJ appealed
ISSUES:
W/N MD is entitled to have inscribed in its name registry of Lot 1 parcel 4. YES
- Lot 1 parcel 4: total area of 2,183 sq.m., adjoined in NE by lands of Roman Catholic Church, SE by lands of same
church and Crisostomo Divinagracia, SE and NW by streets without names
- Record proves Lot 1 parcel 4 adjacent to same wall forming the side of the church of the pueblo of Dumangas where
a side door through which worshippers pass to enter and exit the church, compelling them to cross the land
- RCBJ claims to be owner because:
o Has been exercising acts of ownership
o Church built on edge of the land belonging to it, leaving no reasonable space for use of the worshippers (who
are used to passing the side door)
o Since it owns the lands on the other side of the church it’s logical that it built the church in the middle of the
land
- MD claim supported by evidence
o MD in possession for >30Y and during which has performed acts of indisputable ownership
 Erecting flagstaff, using land as corral for branding cattle, public square, place for posting lists of
people called for military conscripts, place for recognition/identification of malefactors killed by
guardia civil, on holidays where small mortars are placed for firing salutes, built building (theatre then
school then cockpit)
 None of the occasions did the church object or oppose such acts during the Spanish and American
regimes
o Occupied by billiard hall (erected by concessionary who obtained permit from MD) and houses belonging to
private parties who pay rent to MD
o Testimonies of Quintin Salas (44yo) and Celestino Dominado (52yo) that MD owns it
- Priests consented to such acts without protest shows they didn’t consider that it had the right to the land they now
claim
- Church built 1887 according to record and wall on SE side adjoins building of lot in question
 o Since construction, side door in the wall where worshippers pass to enter and leave, crossing the land
o Presumed side door also carried with it use by the Catholics of the municipal land over which they pass in
order to gain access to the church = use of land continuous so church acquired right to use by prescription
 Time elapsed since building during which MD didn’t prohibit passage
- Grounds to believe that in apportioning lands at time of establishment of pueblo and in designating land adjacent to
church as public square, the square was impliedly encumbered with easement of right of way to allow public to enter
and leave the church
o 567 CC
o MD never built anything/executed any work to obstruct said passage and access to the church
o Public enjoying right of way for immemorable length of time
o Easement of right of way acquired by church and public
- HELD: so judgment CFI affirmed but burdened with the easement

Severo Amor v Gabriel Florentino, et al.; 1943

FACTS:
- >50Y ago, Maria Florentino owned a house and camarin (warehouse) in Vigan, Ilocos Sur
o House has 3 windows in the upper story and a 4th window on the ground floor on the north side, receiving
light and air from the lot where the warehouse stands
- 6 Sep 85: MF made a will: house and land to GF and Jose Florentino (dad of other respondents) + warehouse and lot
to Maria Encarnacion Florentino
o Upon her death in 1882, none of the devisees did anything wrt the windows
- 14 Jul 1911: MEF sold the lot and warehouse to SA
o DOS stated MEF inherited it from aunt MF
- Jan 1938: SA destroyed old warehouse and began to build a 2-storey house
o 1 Mar: resps filed action to prohibit him from building higher than original structure and from executing any
work that would shut off light and air received by the windows
- CFI denied: construction almost completed
ISSUES:
W/N CC applies. YES
- 541 CC (existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be
considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the
time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or
the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed) applies in the case
o When MF died in 1892, ownership passed to resps while dominion over warehouse and its lot to MEF (later
bought by SA)
o When devisees took possession of their portions, none of them renounced use of the windows either by
stipulation or actually closing them = didn’t do anything about them  they actually exercised the right of
receiving light and air through the windows
 MEF didn’t object nor demand they be closed
 Easement was created from time of death or original owner  so when SA bought it, burden of
easement continued as it was acquired according to 534 (easements are inseparable from the estate to
which they actively/passively pertain)
o 541 applies to a division of property by succession
 SA: MF died in 1885 so Law of Partidas should be applied, not CC
 But that would reject the facts found by CA that MF died in 1892
 Based on testimony of Gregorio Florentino during trial in 1983 (he was 58yo since he was
born 1880)  he would’ve been only 5yo when MF died if following SA and court said it’s
reasonable to believe a 58yo can’t remember facts of inheritance if he was only 5yo
 Raised on appeal = not allowed
 SA never tried to check the burial certificate/gravestone to support such contention before
appeal
o Easement of light and view + easement not to build higher (altius non tollendi) necessarily go together = 2
sides of the same coin
 Easement of light and view requires owner of servient estate to not build to a height that will
obstruct
 Light and view is (+) and easement to not build higher is (-)
  Clemente de Diego: when 538 talks of time of commencement of prescription for negative
easements, it refers to those resulting from others that are positive
o Modes of establishing easements:
 536: easements are established by law or by will of the owners
 Acquisition of easements is by title or its equivalent or by prescription
 Title in 540 and 541:
o Deed of recognition by owner of servient estate
o Final judgment
o Apparent sign between 2 estates established by owner of both
 Cause of 541
 Sanchez Roman: supletoria del titulo constitutive de la servidumbre; the
visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterises its
existence
 In the case: 4 windows had for all legal purposes the same character and
effect as title of acquisition of the easement of light and view upon death of
MF, where its con-comitant and concurrent easement to not build higher
also constituted when MEF didn’t object to their existence  implied
contract between the owners that the easements should be constituted
 Easement isn’t created until division of property inasmuch as
predial/real easement is one of the rights in another’s property
(jura in re aliena) and nobody can have easement over his own
property  when MF opened her windows she was exercising
right of dominion; but when she died, easement of light and view
and altius non tollendi were constituted (requisite that 2 proprietors
must exist, 530)
 Manresa: concealed easement becomes visible and is revealed when
ownership of the estate/portions which respectively should play
the role of servient and dominant is divided  not fully accepted
since before division, only a service in fact, not easement in the
juridical sense
 Cortes v Yu-Tibo: opening of windows through one’s own wall doesn’t in itself create an easement
(merely tolerated by owner of adjoining lot, who may freely build on his land to the extent of
covering windows, 581); negative easement acquired by prescription by counting from time from
date when owner of the dominant estate formally forbids the owner of the servient estate from
obstructing the light (not done by plaintiff)
 Cortes involved acquisition via prescription; Amor is via title or its equivalent under 541
o Formal prohibition not necessary since existence of the apparent sign when MF
died was sufficient title in itself to reate the easement
 Cortes involved 2 owners; Amor began with only 1
o Each in Cortes was merely exercising rights of dominion while in Amor the
existence of the apparent sign upon death of original owner ipso facto burdened the
land belonging to MEF (SA’s predecessor in interest) with the easement by virtue of
541
 “active” (enjoyment of light) presupposed on the part of the owner of dominant estate a
right to such enjoyment arising from the voluntary act of the original owner of the 2 houses,
by which he imposed upon one of them an easement for the benefit of the other
o Act respected and acquiesced by new owner of servient estate since he bought it
without making any stipulation against the easement’s existence
o Principle of law: upon a division of a tenement among various persons absent any
mention in the contract a mode of enjoyment different from that which the former
owner enjoyed, easements as necessary for continuation of such enjoyment are
understood to subsist
o “active enjoyment” involves an idea directly opposed to enjoyment resulting from
mere tolerance of the adjacent owner; considered passive in character since not
based on absolute, enforceable right
  Cortes decided on theory of ngative easement altius non tollendi; Amor based on idea of
positive easement of light and view (541)
o Manresa: easement whose positive aspect appears tied with negative aspect when the
ownership of these estates is divided, the easement of light/view and with it
easement of altius non tollendi  without the later, former cannot exist
- Granting arguendo MF died in 1885 as alleged by SA, principle in 541 already an integral part of Spanish law prior to
CC so ruling still the same
o Under Law 14 Title 31 Partida 3, easement was constituted by implied contract
o Granting arguendo not by implied contract, Partidas provision not inconsistent with the principle – gap in the
Partidas SC of Spain filled from Roman Law and modern CCs by recognising such kind of easements
o Law 17 Title 31 Partida 3, extinguishment of easement didn’t prohibit the easement in the instant case so
adhere to the decisions of SC Spain maintaining the easement under Spanish law prior CC
o Other considerations show principle of apparent sign as announced by Supreme Tribunal of Spain not
incompatible with Partidas
 537 CC: continuous and apparent easements acquired by title or prescription (title includes contract)
 546.1 CC: by merger of 2 estates in same owner, easement is extinguished + 541: apparent sign as
title for easement  coexist under CC so effect of apparent sign can stand with Partidas (also
declares extinguishment of easement by merger)
 546.1 CC: extinguish by merger so if estate divided by purchase easement isn’t automatically revived
 same as provision in Partidas
- Other support for upholding easement
o Acquired by prescription
 Original heirs succeeded 1885 (or 1892) and SA bought in 1911
 Resps action brought in 1983
 Prescriptive period under any legislation that may be applied (Partidas or CC) elapsed without
necessity of formal prohibition on owner of servient estate
 537: continuous and apparent easement acquired by 20Y
 Sec 40 and 41 CCP: 10Y
o SA not innocent purchaser for value + should’ve known existence of easement
 Duty bound to inquire into the significance of windows since DOS stated MEF inherited from MF
 Establishment of easement was an act which in fact was respected and acquiesced by new owner
since he bought without making any stipulation against easement existing, acquiesced in the
continuance of apparent sign
 Purchasers of lands burdened with apparent easements don’t enjoy rights of 3rd who acquire property
though burden isn’t recorded
o Justice and public policy
 When MEF accepted the warehouse and lot, she couldn’t have received such benefit without
assuming the burden of the legacy – service of fact during lifetime of original owner that became true
upon death
 Scaevola: there’s a tacit contract
 They filed action to stop construction but SA continued to build anyway so when CFI ruled, it was
almost done = can’t complain now that he has to remove all the obstructions
 Windows visible when SA bought from MEF so he should’ve asked about them  didn’t

Leogario Ronquillo, et al. v Jose Roco (administrator of Vicente Roco y Dominguez, et al.); 1958
FACTS:
- LR in continuous and uninterrupted use of road traversing the land of JR and their predecessors in interest in going to
Igualdad St. and market place of Naga City from their houses for >20Y
- JR and tenants of VR long receognised and respected private legal easement of road right of way of LR
- 12 May 1953: JR through his co-defendants Raymundo Martinez and their men built a chapel in the middle of the
right of way on the property of late VR with malice and purpose to obstruct the private legal easement, actually
impeding, obstructing, and disturbing the continuous exercise of right of way of LR
- 10 Jul 1954: Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras Jr. (defendants) with approval of JR and help of their men and
labourers, planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire, closing hermitically the right of way by means of force,
intimidation, threats, illegally and violently, against protest and opposition of LR
- complaint of LR: claimed to have acquired easement of right of way through prescription by continuous and
uninterrupted use of the land as road in going to Igualdad St. and public market from their houses
ISSUES:
W/N easement of right of way can be acquired by LR via prescription. NO
- SC: dismiss because although right of way may be apparent, it’s nevertheless discontinuous/intermittent therefore
can’t be acquired through prescription but only by virtue of title
- Old and New CC: easements may be continuous or discontinuous/intermittent and apparent or non-apparent
o Discontinuous: being used at more or less long intervals depending upon acts of man (532 and 615, Old and
New respectively)
o Easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription
 1959 OCC: prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property excludes therefrom the
exception established by 539 (discontinuous easements such as easement of right of way)
- Manresa and Sanchez Roman: easement of right of way is discontinuous
o Exercised by acts of man therefore have to be broken because it’s physically impossible to use continuously
o Not possible for man to continually pass along the road, sidewalk, path in question
o Ways to enjoy easements: discontinuous and continuous
 Continuous – use is/can be incessant, without intervention of any act of man (i.e. lights)
 Discontinuous – intervals of use are more or less long and depend on acts of man (i.e. path, career,
others of the same kind)
- Cuayong v Benedicto
o Issue: w/n vested rights in a right of way can be acquired through user from time immemorial
o Court: no vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired at the time the CC took
effect…under 539 CC no discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event
o But rule: no discontinuous easement (like easement of right of way) may be acquired under 539 may have
been changed by provisions of Code of Civil Procedure relating to prescription
 But not availed in the case since term of prescription for acquisition of right in real estate is fixed by
Sec 41 Act 190 at 10Y  their period was interrupted when a toll gate was built before 10Y lapsed
- Municipality of Dumangas v Bishop of Jaro
o Court: continued use by public of path over land adjoining church going to and from church through its side
door gave church right to use such by prescription + use by public, an easement of right of way over the land
acquired by prescription not only by the church but also by the public which was without objection/protest
of the owner and continually availed
- Tolentino: under CCP relative to prescription, even discontinuous easements like right of way may be acquired
through prescription
o Act 190: even discontinuous servitudes may be acquired via prescription if it can be shown that the servitude
was actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right, adverse to all other
claimants
- Minority: can be acquired via prescription
o Act 190 Sec 41: makes no distinction as to real rights subject to prescription
o No valid reason why the continued use of right of way by the party (especially by the public) for >10Y, not
by mere tolerance of owner but through adverse use, cannot give vested right of way to such party via
prescription
o Uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession doesn’t
require the use thereof every day for the statutory period  simply the exercise of right more or less
frequently according to nature of the use
- Majority: under present law unless or until such is changed/clarified, easement of right of way may not be acquired
through prescription
OPINIONS: Concurring, Reyes
- Essence of easement (servidumbre de paso) lies in the poswer of dominant owner to traverse the servient tenement
without being prevented by its owner
o Servitude = a limitation of the servient owner’s rights of ownership since it restricts his right to exclude
others
o But such limitation only exists when dominant owner actually crosses  if he doesn’t, servient owner’s right
of exclusion is perfect and undisturbed
o Since dominant owner can’t continually and uninterruptedly cross (only in intervals) =
intermittent/discontinuous nature
- Possession of a right consists in enjoyment of it and enjoyment consists in exercising it, possession is intermittent and
discontinuous
o Prescription requires possession to be continuous/uninterrupted (1941 OCC, 1118 NCC)
 - CCP doesn’t change that
o Sec 41 qualifies conferring of prescriptive title by “uninterruptedly continued for 10Y” which is the same
condition of continuity in CC
- Municipality of Dumangas v Bishop of Jaro
o Ratio decidendi lies in the application of 567 OCC (when an estate acquired by purchase, exchange, partition
is enclosed by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner; the latter shall be obliged to grant a right of
way without indemnity in the absence of an agreement to the contrary)
o When Spanish crown apportioned land occupied by the church it impliedly burdened the neighbouring public
square without an easement of right of way to allow public entrance and exit to the church  otherwise, why
would they build a church?
o Implied grant of right of way = unnecessary to justify the existence of easement via acquisitive prescription
o “prescription” not adverse possession of 10/30Y but “immemorial usage” under previous law as one of the
ways servitude of right of way may be acquired
- New CC repealed prior legislation  only title, not adverse possession (usucapio)
o Except servitudes acquired before NCC

Tomas Encarnacion v CA, Intestate Estate of the Late Eusebio de Sagun, Heirs of the Late Aniceta Magsino Vda. De Sagun;
1991
FACTS:
- TE and heirs are owners of 2 adjacent estates in Buco, Talisay, Batangas
o TE owns dominant estate of 2,590 sq.m.
 Boundaries: N by Eusebio de sagun and Mamerto Magsino, S by Taal lake, E by Felino Mateinzo, W
by Pedro Matienzo
o Heirs co-own 405 sq.m. servient estate
 Boundaries: N by national highway Laurel-Talisay Highway, S by TE, E by Mamerto Magsino, W by
Felipe de Sagun
 Stands between TE and national road
- Prior 1960 before heirs land not yet enclosed by concrete fence, people going to the highway just crossed heirs land at
no particular point
o 1960 they built a fence around the estate, a 25m longx1m wide roadpath made to provide access (1m width
taken from heirs and other 1m part from Maamerto Magsino: no compensation asked so none given)
 TE started his plant nursery on his estate and used the pathway as passage to the highway for his faily
and customers  it flourished and became more difficult for him to haul garden soil and plants
using pushcarts
- Jan 1984: TE bought a jeep to transport the plants and soil but it couldn’t pass through the roadpath = requested
heirs’ predecessors Sagun to sell to him 1½m of their property to add to the roadpath so the jeep could fit  they
refused
- TE filed action with RTC Batangas seeking issuance of writ of easement of right of way over additional width of at
least 2m over the De Sagun’s 405 sq.m. land
o During trial, found that another exit 80m away from dominant estate existed
- RTC dismissed: 2 outlets so TE has an adequate outlet via dried river bed where his jeep could fit + reasons for
asking for increased width resulting in the diminishing of De Sagun’s land to 332.5sq.m. just because nearer and more
convenient are not among conditions in 649 to entitle him to right of way
- CA affirmed: necessity claimed by TE not enough to justify interference with heirs’ property rights + dried river bed
ISSUES:
W/N TE entitled to additional easement of right of way. YES
- River bed grossly inadequate access
- Generally: right of way may be demanded when 1) absolutely no access to a public highway and 2) when even if there
is one, it’s difficult/dangerous to use or grossly insufficient
o River bed route traversed by a demi-concrete bridge and no ingress/egress from the highway
 For the jeep to get to the highway, it would need to jump 4-5m up
 During rainy season, river bed impassable due to floods  can only be used for part of the year
o Inherent disadvantages of the river bed = as if not outlet at all
- Where private property has no access to public road, it has right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter
of law
- Convenience of TE vs. property rights of heirs
o Regardless, TE has real and compelling need for the servitude in his favour
 o 651: width of easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate,
and may accordingly be changed from time to time
 Needs of the dominant property ultimately determines the width of the passage, which may vary over
time
o To force TE to leave his jeep on the highway exposed to elements and risk of theft because it can’t pass
through is sheer pig-headedness on the part of heirs + counter-productive for all concerned
o TE shouldn’t be denied passageway wide enough to accommodate his jeep = reasonable and necessary aspect
of his plant nursery business
o Additional 1½m will reduce heirs’ property to 342.5 sq.m. BUT TE willing to exchange equivalent part of his
land to compensate the loss
 Unless such option considered, law decrees indemnification (also to Mamerto Magsino)
- Amount of indemnity
o Since it’s continuous and permanent in nature = value of the land occupied + amount of damage caused to
servient estate
o 649.2: should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs
of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate

Sps. Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria, Florcerfida Sta. Maria v CA, Sps. Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo; 1998
FACTS:
- Sps. ARF: registered owners of Lot 124 of Obando Cadastre consisting of 1,043 sq.m. at Paco, Obando, Bulacan
covered by TCT
o Acquired under a DOAS (6 Feb 92) from Pedro Sanchez, et al.
o Surrounded by other immovable:
 NE: fishpond
 SE: Lot 126 owned by Florentino Cruz
 SW: Lot 6-a (537 sq.m.) and part of Lot 6-b (537 sq.m.) owned by CRS and FS
 NW: Lot 122 owned by Jacinto family
- 17 Feb 92: ARF filed complaint against CRS and FS for an establishment of an easement of right of way
o Their lot is surrounded by properties belonging to other people
o No adequate outlet to the provincial road so an easement of right of way passing through either alternative
defendants’ properties directly abutting the road would be the only convenient, direct, and shortest access to
said road
o Their predecessors in interest have been passing through CRS/FS properties going to and from the lot
o Alternative defendants despite request for right of way and referral of dispute to the barangay officials refuse
to grant easement
- CRS/FS didn’t file and answer but a motion to dismiss on the basis of no jurisdiction since it didn’t go through the
barangay lupon first in accordance with PD 1508  denied on finding of substantial compliance of law
o Appealed to SC who denied + denied reconsideration
- CRS/FS answer: easement would cause them great damage and inconvenience + there’s another route through FC’s
property likewise abutting the road which was up for sale
- Court directed an ocular inspection
o No other way through which ARF could reach the road except through CRS/FS property
o No significant structure except a wall/fence 3ft high would be adversely affected
o Sufficient vacant space of 11m between CRS and FS houses
o It would provide the shortest route from the road to ARF property
- TC granted the easement
o CRS/FS appealed
- CA affirmed TC: sufficiently established 4 requisites for compulsory easement but modified the property valuation
(from 50 to 2k per sq.m.)
1. Surrounded by other immovables owned by other individuals as shown in ocular inspection
2. Isolation not due to their own acts as it was already surrounded by other immovables when they bought it
3. Shortest way which would cause the least prejudice because no significant structure would be injured
4. ARF willing to pay corresponding damages provided by law for right of way to be granted
o CRS/FS appealed to SC
ISSUES:
W/N compulsory easement of right of way could be established on CRS/FS property. YES
 - Requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the CC:
1. Dominant estate surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (649.1)
 Ocular inspection shows: they’re completely surrounded by adobe fence without any point of egress
and ingress to the national road + CRS/FS properties have a house of wood and hollow blocks and
an impressive house of modern vintage of strong materials respectively
 Sketch Plan also shows completely isolated
 Existing passageway (daang tao) behind CRS/FS property to the road can’t be considered an
adequate outlet for purposes of establishing an easement
 651: width of easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the
dominant estate and may accordingly be changed from time to time  needs of ARF
(dominant estate) determines the width of the easement
 Larracas v Del Rio: not necessary to content oneself with a footpath and deny oneself the
use of an automobile  when cars are a necessity, he has a right to demand a driveway for
his car and not a mere pathway/lane
2. Payment for proper indemnity (649.1)
 ARF testified on direct examination that they’re willing to pay corresponding damages
3. Isolation not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (649.last)
 Not due to their own acts
4. Right of way claimed is least prejudicial to servient estate and shortest distance from the public highway (650)
 Twin elements complied with as found by lower courts
 When there are several tenements surrounding a dominant estate, the easement may be established
on ANY
 If the 2 elements don’t concur on a single tenement, way which will cause LEAST DAMAGE even if
not shortest
 If conditions on all tenements the same, all adjoining owners should be cited and EXPERTS will
determine where
 Ocular inspection shows 3 options where no significant structure would be adversely affected:
 Directly through CRS/FS property: shortest, 20-25m from the road, 11m vacant space
available between the houses (4m-adobe wall-7m)
 Purchase right of way from adjoining FC property on the left, quite circuitous
 Negotiate with Jacinto family on the right, very circuitous and longer (50 yards = right 35
yards, left 15 yards before road)
 CRS/FS option = shortest distance + least prejudicial (no significant structure injured)
- CRS/FS: FC and Jacinto properties also options so no need to go through ours + daang tao
o FC and Jacinto don’t have existing passage ways for ARF to use
o Ocular inspection shows suggested alternative ways are longer and more circuitous than CRS/FS
o Sketch Plan shows FC and Jacinto lots only adjacent, unlike CRS/FS which is directly in front
- 650: easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to servient estate and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from dominant estate to the public highway is shortest
o Several tenements: shortest and least damage

Valderrama v North Negros

Facts:
 Several hacienda owners in Manapala, Occidental Negros entered into a “milling contract” with Miguel
Osorio
o MO agreed to install a sugar central with a minimum capacity of 300 tons for grinding and milling
sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners
o Hacienda furnished the central with all the cane they produced for 30 yrs from the execution of the
contract
o North Negros Sugar Co. obtained MO rights and interests
 Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, and Santos Urra made other milling contracts with N, similarto the
1st one
 o SU transferred her interests to Auzmendi, and later to Echarri
o All contracts allowed an easement of way 7 meters wide for 50 yrs from the date the contracts were
established
 Hacienda owners could not furnish enough can for milling
o NN made other milling contracts with hacienda owners of Cadic, ON to obtain needed cane
 1 Hacienda owners filed a complaint  easement of way established was only for the transpo through
st

each hacienda of the sugar cane of its owner

o NN  No, it had the right to transport to its central all canes, regardless of owner
 For 50 yrs, without any restriction as regards the ownership of the cane
 CT was never annulled or modified
 TC  NN had no right to pass through lands of 1st owners with sugar cane not produced by them

Issues:
W/N NN had a right to pass through the easement with sugar canes owned by others? YES
 1st owners said the terms of the contract were ambiguous  gives them the right to introduce extraneous
evidence (Sec. 258 Code of Civil Procedure)
o No CT is clear
o Had it said “easement of way” only then there might have been doubt  here clear that its for 7
meters wide, and for 50 yrs
 Object of the contract was to obtain mutual benefit from sugar cane production
o This did not happen
o Easement was created for the benefit of the corporation  Done voluntarily by the 1st hacienda
owners
 Once roads constructed, it was exposed to view by the rails, which reveal the use and
enjoyment of the easement
 NN could cause wagons to pass on road as many times as needed  Unjust to say they
couldn’t find other sources of cane to maintain its business (nothing in CT that prohibited
this)
 1st Hacienda owners  Cadiz hacienda owners would alter the easement and make it more burdensome
o Nothing of such kind happens when NN transports Cadiz canes on its wagon using the easement
o No intention between the parties to limit the use of the railroad
 Duration of milling CT = 30 YRS, Easement = 50YRS
 End of 30yrs, NN could still use easement even if 1st hacienda owners didn’t wanna renew
CT.

CARIDAD ONGSIACO, et.al., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
EMILIA ONGSIACO, et.al., defendants-appellees

G.R. No. L-7510 – March 30, 1957 - Reyes, J.B.L., J.

SUMMARY: Upon dissolution of their partnership, the partners divided their share in a hacienda. Each of the 3
partners then distributed their share amongst their family members. This case involved the family of one of the
partners. The share of the partner was divided among the mother and the 8 children. Later, the mother donated
her share to her children on the condition that the land will be held in usufruct for their father and that the
children will support their father with a pension. Sometime in 1937-38, two children who occupied the
catchbasin areas built dikes which prevented the natural flow of rainwater, and stopped supporting their father.
This led the mother to revoke the donation as to them without judicial declaration. In 1951, one of the children
sued the “prodigal” siblings, to revoke the donation and compel them to provide an easement of drainage. The
lower court dismissed the case for prescription of cause of action. The SC upheld this decision, holding inter
alia that a continuous easement, as defined, does not depend upon acts of man. Continuous easements such as
that of drainage are extinguished by non-user for 10 years. If they were really prejudiced by the dikes, the
plaintiffs should have filed their action much earlier, considering that they waited for 13 years before filing the
present action.
FACTS: The partnership Ongsiaco, Lim y Cia. owned 1/3 of the Hacienda Esperanza in Nueva Ecija. On Mar.
25, 1929, the partners agreed to dissolve the partnership and divide their share among themselves. 4/9 went to
the Ongsiacos and the Lims while 5/9 went to the Santoses. Later the Ongsiacos and Lims divided their 4/9
share among themselves. In said partition, plaintiff-appellant Caridad received Lot 7 with 565 ha. while
defendant-appellee Emilia got lots 9 and 9A with 826 ha. On Jul. 31, 1929, the mother of herein parties, Doña
Gorgonia Ongsiaco executed a deed of donation, turning over her whole 3/18 interest in the Hacienda to her
heirs, on the conditions that: it will be held in usufruct in favor of their father Don Lucio Ongsiaco; and that
each of the heirs must give their father a 1000-peso annual pension. Titles to the subdivided lots were
subsequently issued.
On July 7, 1941, Doña Gorgonia rescinded the donation as to two of her children (Ramon and Emilia) for
flooding the land of their sister Caridad by building dikes on their own lands and not contributing to the
monthly pension. In the same deed, Doña Gorgonia adjudicated the land to Caridad and the other 6 children.
According to the record, Emilia was not notified of the deed. No action for revocation of donation was filed
even after Doña Gorgonia died on Nov. 6, 1950.
On April 25, 1951, Caridad and her husband filed the present action before the Nueva Ecija CFI against Emilia
et.al., alleging the following causes of action: 1) violating the conditions of the deed of donation; 2) violating
the legal easement of drainage by building dikes which prevented water from flowing off Caridad’s land (which
was higher in elevation than that of Emilia’s); and 3) depriving Caridad of 27 ha. of land by manipulation and
fraudulent changing of boundary markers by Emilia’s husband. Emilia et.al. moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the causes of action had been barred by extinctive prescription. The CFI ruled in favor of Emilia
et.al., hence this appeal.

ISSUES (HELD)
1) Has the action for revocation of donation prescribed? (YES)
2) Has the cause of action for violation of the legal easement of drainage been barred by prescription? (YES)
3) Did defendants illegally and fraudulently deprive plaintiffs of land by altering boundary markers to include
public lands? (NO, but the cause of action has been barred by prescription anyway)

RATIO
1) Jurisprudence interpreting NCC 647 has held that a donor may revoke a donation unilaterally only if such
revocation is approved by court judgment or by consent of the donee; and that the action to revoke a donation
prescribes in 10 years. In this case, Emilia’s consent was not obtained; and no court judgment has been issued to
affirm the revocation even long after the donor died. Actions to revoke a written contract prescribe in 10 years.
The cause of action in this case accrued from the date of first violation, that is, on Sep. 30, 1930; hence the
filing of the action on Apr. 25, 1951 is long overdue. The subsequent instances of violation of the conditions did
not constitute new causes of action so as to extend the prescriptive period.
To circumvent the prescriptive period, plaintiffs assert that: a) their action is for recovery of land inherited by
Caridad through the 1941 deed, therefore the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years (of adverse possessors in
bad faith) and b) Emilia held the property in an implied trust subject to the donor’s rights.
a) Caridad cannot lay claim to the land through the 1941 deed, because the donation was never revoked in a
proper court action. Thus, the applicable prescriptive period is still that for revocation of donation for breach of
stipulations, which is 10 years. The claim that the applicable period is that for adverse possessors in bad faith is
incorrect, since Emilia remains the lawful owner of the property until the donation is properly revoked.
b) The implied trust contemplated in NCC 1456 refers to property acquired through mistake or fraud. Emilia
acquired the property legally; and her subsequent violation of the conditions of the donation did not taint her
previous acquisition.

2) Emilia received a larger share in the partition because the land assigned to her served as catchbasin for the
higher areas, such as that assigned to Caridad. It was found that Emilia built dikes on her land between 1937
and 1938. Such act is covered by the provision on legal easement of drainage of rural lands, OCC 552. Such
easement does not depend upon acts of man but upon the natural flow of rainwater from higher to lower areas.
It is thus a continuous easement which is extinguished by non-user for 10 years (20 years under the Old Code;
the period was reduced by Act 190). The cause for action therefore arose in 1937 or 1938 and has already
prescribed when the present suit was filed.
The dikes cannot be considered a nuisance as plaintiffs assert, first, because their complaint does not adduce
facts in support of such allegation. Second, because assuming that the dikes were a nuisance, in this case the
nuisance arises from the interference of plaintiffs’ right to drainage and the action for easement against such
nuisance has also prescribed by 1951 (NCC 631, which is an exception to the general rule of NCC 698 that
lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance). The Philippine law on nuisance is derived from US law, which
holds that private nuisances can prescribe.

3) This allegation is unsupported by the record. The plaintiffs have not objected to the original 1929 partition
and kept their title. Caridad’s husband is an “attorney of note” and should have known if they were being
cheated with respect to the partition. It was also proven that Caridad was able to receive government lots in
Manila through exchange of 5 of their lots, including those now claimed by them to public land. These
circumstances evince the lack of equity in appellants’ position. Furthermore, assuming that there was fraud, the
action has prescribed. This cause of action accrues from the date of partition in 1929. Granting that a case filed
against Emilia’s husband for appropriation of lands in 1937 stemmed the running of the period, the action
remains prescribed since the case was dismissed in 1939 by agreement of the parties. The plaintiffs’ action was
filed simply way too late.

DISPOSITION: In view of the foregoing, the order dismissing the complaint is affirmed. Costs against
plaintiffs-appellants.

Floro v Llenado

Facts:
 Simeon Floro = owner of a piece of land named “Floro Park Subdv” in Bulacan
o Has its own ingress and egress to and from MacArthur Highway  Road Lot 4 and the PNR Level
Crossing
 Orlando Llenado owned 2 parcels of land known as Llenado Homes Subdv owned originally by Soledad
Ortega (named it Emmanuel Homes Subdv)
o Did not have any passage to MH
o Proposed access road traversing the idle Riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been approved though
 OL was granted permission by SF to use RL4 and 5 as passageway to MH
o 2 Months after, SF barricaded RL5 with rocks to prevent its use
 OL requested the reopening of the road but was denied  filed a complaint for injunction in RTC
o Granted  SF filed for MFR but it was denied, so he filed an appeal in the CA  granted, closed the
case
o OL died and was sub’d by his wife
 TC  Lifted injunction
 Wife appealed to CA  granted easement, and ordered its reopening

Issues:
W/N a voluntary easement existed? NO
 SF granted OL verbal permission to use the road without compensation as a neighborly gesture so that OL
could install stone monuments on their land
o No CT of easement of right of way  conditions were still being drawn up by SF lawyer, no
compensation agreed upon
 SF laid down his conds  OL said they were onerous
 Dionision Ortiz  right of way expired when no agreement met, use of easement was due to their tolerance
o SF tolerated OL use  they were just preparing the papers, and let OL use it for awhile

W/N a compulsory easement of right of way established? No

  649CC reqs  dominant estate surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to public
highway, after payment of proper indemnity, isolation not due to acts of the proprietor of dominant estate,
right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to servient estate
o Burden of proof is on owner of dominant estate to prove
 OL said there was an absence of any road as means for exiting and entering his prop
o Omitted proposed access road through Ipapo prop
 Ravello (engineer)  access road through LHS should have come from MH through the
Ipapo prop, required SO to submit a written right of way clearance from Ipapo, done so app
for LHS approved
 OL adopted this plan when he bought prop from SO  applied for new development permit
and license to sell, only crossed out SO names and Emmanuel home subdv
 OL filed with the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission for the amendment of the Subv
plan, which was approved
 Converted Lot 14 block 6 into a road lot to connect RL5 of FHS
 Closed both ends of RL3 and converted it into residential lots
 Ravello  prereq for approval for HSRC app = existence of an access road (dirt road
enough)
 PD 957 S29  Right of way to public road
 There was an existing right of way in Ipapo prop  1st req out
 Talisay-Silay Mining v CFI  Prepayment = delivery of propery indemnity for damage might be incurred by
servient estate
o No proof here that OL complied with this req
 Isolation of LHS was due to OL
o LHS plan, which showed that a right of way over Ipapo prop was procured was just to get approval
 No Proof work done on actual road
 Llenado admitted Ipapo prop was not cultivated and fence was constructed on it
o Instead of developing the road, OL applied for the conversion of L14 B6 into a road lot to connect to
RL5 of FPS
 Need to have a real need for easement, not just for convenience
 Ramos v Gatchalian  road of right of way even if undeveloped and inconvenient is still a
right of way
o Ipapo prop = inconvenient right of way bec of need to traverse several rice lands belonging to diff
people + its impassable during rainy season
 OL didn’t develop it, his fault
 OL allowed to pass through subject road without any agreement on compensation  roads damaged due to
trucks and heavy equipment
o SF entitled to indemnity for this

Quimen v CA

Facts:
 Anastacia Quiment together with her bros and sis inherited property in Bulacan
o Agreed to subdivide the prop equally among themselves
 Anastancia, Sotero, Sulpicio, and Rufina Shares were next to the municipal road
 AQ Lot = 1  Bounded to the right by Sotero’s lot 2
 Soter’s prop was adjoined to the right by 3, 4  props owned by Rufina and Sulpicio
 R and S props acquired by Catalina Santos
 Lot of Antonio, was behind AQ and Sotero lots
 Divided into two parts  A and B
 A behind AQ lot, and B behind Sotero Lot
 Yolanda Oliveros, daughter of Sotero bought A from Antonio, through AQ, who was acting as an
administratrix
o YO  When AQ offered her the prop, it had no access to a public road
 AQ told her that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining prop for P200/Sqm
o YO built a house on the lot  used AQ passage way to the public highway
  When she offered to pay AQ  AQ refused, barred her from passing
 YO bought B from Antonio, who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house
o 19 meters from lot of YO, behind Sotero’s sari-sari store, and AQ fence
o Store made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot (4m x 9m)
o Leads to municipal road but not enough for ingress and egress  road cannot be reached bec the
store obstructs the path, need to pass through back entrance, and the façade of the store to reach
the road
 YO filed action for right of way through AQ prop
o Occular inspection  right of way was at extreme right of AQ prop facing public highway,
unobstructed except for avocado tree
o TC  More practical to extend existing pathway to public road by removing portion of store that
blocks
 YO appealed to CA  YO entitled to right of way through AQ prop bec it would cause least damage and
detriment to servient estate

Issues:
W/N YO entitled to right of way over AQ prop? YES
 Issue is now moot bec voluntary easement in favor of YO has become a legal easement
o YO was reluctant to buy lot bec there was no egress leading to the road  assured by AQ that she
would provide that at P200/sqm
o This right of way is the shortest, least onerous one and has been used by predecessors from
inception
o Isolation of YO prop was not caused by her  this right of way was least prejudicial to the servient
estate  Ocular inspections proved this
 650CC  test of which right of way to choose
o General rule: shortest distance and least prejudicial to servient estate
 Least prejudice prevails over shortest distance (longer distance may be free from
obstructions but shortest distance may not be)
 Vacant space at the left back of the sari-sari store, which was made of strong materials was available
o AQ right of way 1m x 5m was the least prejudicial one bec using the other one would mean
destroying the sari-sari store

Chan v CA

Facts:
 Pacita David-Chan was the owner of a property in Pampangga (635sqm)
o Delineated on its north and west sides by business establishments
o The prop of the Pineda fam adjoined the south side of her prop
o North-east boundary of her prop was another lot owned by Phil Rabbit Bus lines
 Between her prop and MacArthur Highway
o AKA surrounded completely by other immovable and cut her off from the highway
 Only access was a very small opening (2x4 inches wide) through prop of Pineda Fam
 Prospective subservient estate of PRB was 7,239sqm, formerly owned by Singian Brothers Corp and was
sold to them without the knowledge and consent of DC
o Prevented her from exercising legal redemption
o PRB was making a fence, which would deprive her from the right of way
 DC filed petition for injunction in TC
o PRB  parents and relatives of DC were never tenants or lessees of SB
 They were actually found to be illegally occupying the props by the MTC
 Aka they were not obliged to inform her of the sale  which was free from all liens and
encumbrances
o SB  Easement was apparent and discontinuous , could not be acquired by prescription

Issues:
W/N DC entitled to easement? NO
  649CC reqs  dominant estate surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to public
highway, after payment of proper indemnity, isolation not due to acts of the proprietor of dominant estate,
right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to servient estate
o DC had adequate outlet to public highway
 It was her who built a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her prop to separate it
from prop of Pineda fam
 Closed 28 inch clearance, which she could use to reach the highway  if she wanted a
bigger opening, she could destroy the portion of the fence, that obstructs her passage
o Pineda fam could not make fence on their prop bec DC had fenced to separate the two props
 She caused her own isolation by closing her access through Pineda prop  Owner cannot
by his own act isolate his prop from highway and then claim easement through adjacent
estate
o DC had not even made a valid tender of payment
 Her praying that PRB sell her the prop is not this
 DC  Fil values of pakikisama and pkikipagkapwa tao should apply BULL SHIT FUCK YOU
o Based on equity  only applied in the absence of law, not the case here

La Vista v CA

Facts:
 Mangyan road = 15 meter roadway part of tract of land owned by Tuasons in QC and Marikina
o 1949  Tuason’s sold to PI Building Corp 1.2M sqm of their land through a Deed of Sale with
Mortgage
 P3  Boundary line bet the prop sold and adjoining prop of Tuasons shall be a 15 meter
wide road
 ½ of this taken from Tuasons, and PBC prop
o PBC acting for Ateneo in buying props from the Tuasons sold subject land through a deed of
assignment with mortgage with consent of Tuasons
 Ateneo assumes mortgage
 Tuasons developed a part of the estate of adjoining prop sold to PBC into La Vista
 Ateneo sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the land adjacent to Mangyan road
o MK built a wall in middle of 15 meter roadway making ½ of MR as part of its school campus
o Tuason’s objected  filed a complaint in CFI for the demolition of the wall
 Amicable settlement  MK removed the wall and restored MR to its original state
 Tuason’s developed its 7.5 meter share of 15 meter wide boundary
o Ateneo deferred to improve and erected an adobe wall on entire length of its boundary
o Ateneo informed La Vista of its intention develop its prop along MR into a subdivision
 LV President Manuel Gonzales  MR was an easement of right of way (1/2 on LV
portion for Ateneo and ½ on Ateneo portion for LV)
 MG to Pres of Ateneo Jose Cruz  offered to buy prop Ateneo intended to develop
(not accepted by Ateneo)  Ateneo offered to sell the prop to the public subject to the
cond that the right of use of the 15 meter road way will be transferred to vendee who
will negotiate with the involved parties
 Solid Homes won the bidding  Ateneo executed a Deed of sale for them
o Cond: Vendor continues to enjoy right of way privileges
 SH developed LGV on their prop and claims to have an easement of right of way along MR, which they have
access to Katipunan Ave
o MG informed SH that LV could not recognize the right of way over MR bec PBC and Ateneo never
complied with their OB to provide Tuasons with 7.5m right of way over their portion + prop was
purchased for commercial purposes  Right of way was established exclusively for Ateneo
only
 LV built a 1 meter high cylindrical concrete post chained together in the middle and along
entire length of MR  Prevented residents of LGV from passing through
 Put security guards there too
 SH filed case in CFI for preliminary injunction directing LV to stop blocking the easement
 o RTC  Recognized and affirmed the easement of right of way, Issued the injunction
 LV appealed to CA
o Trial court already granted the injunction  issue now moot
 2ND DIV of CA  Affirmed trial court rulings

Issues:
W/N a compulsory or legal easement was created on MR? YES
 4 REQS
o Estate surrounded by other immovable without adequate outlet to a public higway
o Payment of proper indemnity
o Isolation not due to proprietors own acts
o Right of way claimed at point least prejudicial
 Apparent that parties and their predecessors in interest intended to establish an easement over MR for
their mutual benefit both as dominant and servient estates  voluntary easement
o Shown in P3 of DOS
o Tuasons and Ateneo agreed to include the obligation to contribute 7 ½ meters of their property for
the easement
o Tuasons filed case against MK and Ateneo for Breach of contract and the enforcement of the
reciprocal easement
o LV president MG admitted that MR = road taken from Ateneo and LV props
o LV acknowledged the existence of the contractual right of way bet Ateneo and La vista
o Pres. Quimson of La Vista acknowledged that ½ length of road belongs to one and the other half
belongs to the other
 CA  Right of way was properly appreciated along MR
o Contractual stipulations of DOS bet Tuason and PBC  cannot be extinguished except by voluntary
recession of CT by the dominat estate
o Free ingress and egress along MR created voluntary agreement bet Ateneo and Solid Homes 
legally demandable, servient estate cannot obstruct
o Court did not create one, just declared that it exists
 LV  there are other routes other than MR  Opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish
legal easements but not voluntary ones
 No CT between LV and SH
o So?  When PBC transferred its rights to Ateneo, Tuasosns consented to it  easement was
established by CT and parties made provs for its preservation

Baltazar v CA

Facts:
 Daniel Panganiban = owner of 117sqm land in Bulacan (Lot 1027)
o In front = Lot 1026  owned by Loreto Vda. Baltazar and her son Nestor Baltazar
 Brauli St. (Provincial Road) runs along its frontage
o Behind  Sta Ana River
o Both sides  Lot 1025 and 1028 of Ricardo Calimon and Jose Legaspi
 Brauli St. (Provincial Road) runs along its frontage
 DP filed a complaint against Baltazars for the establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of
right of way for him to have access to the provincial road
o B  There are two other right of ways adjacent to DP’s prop, which DP abandoned
o Occular inspection of court
 Vda Baltazar lot  along side this prop is 1 1.2x 10.4m wide passageway, which let DP pass
to go to the provincial road (Baltazars prevented him from using this)
 2 other passageways
 Alongside the concrete fence of props of DB and B, over the props of Loreto
Bernardo, and Jose Legaspi  ends in a gate = point of entry into or exit from DP
prop
  Passageway alongside opposite concrete fence of props of DP and B over props of
Encarnacion Calimon and Ricardo Calimon  ends in a gate leading to DP prop
(presently used by DP)
 DP appealed to CA  Reversed
o Only accessible road from DP prop is Braulio St
o Shortest, and most convenient way to gain access to this is to pass through B servient estate
o Lot 126-B = Strip of land, which is a portion of B prop has been recognized, tolerated, and used by
DP as a right of way for 30yrs
 Closed by B when it closed the gate and planted plants
o Discrepancies bet CA and previous court
 PC  B prop is least prejudicial and shortest right of way but bec of strained relations bet
parties, easement cannot be granted
 Since two passageways still existed  right of way over B prop cannot be granted
too
 CA  Two passageways were temp, which DP requested from his neighbors when B closed
easement

Issues:
W/N DP entitled to compulsory easement? YES
 4 REQS (Locsin v Climaco)
o Estate surrounded by other immovable without adequate outlet to a public highway
 Established by Previous Court that DP prop is surrounded by immovables
o Payment of proper indemnity
 Francisco v IAC  Proper indemnity needs to be fixed in addition to creating the easement
 CA  Remand case to lower court to fix indemnity
o Isolation not due to proprietors own acts
 DP established that surroundings not due to his own acts
 CA  Lot 1026-B has been used by DP for 30 years
 Closed by B
o Right of way claimed at point least prejudicial
 Passageway claimed by DP had shortest distance to BS
 B not inconvenienced by passageway bec it is separate and distinct from its
residence

De La Cruz v Ramiscal

Facts:
 Olga Ramiscal = owner of land at corner of 18th ave and Boni Serrano Ave, QC
o Sps De La Cruz occupied 85sqm land at back of OR prop  Registered in the name of Concepcion de
la Pea, mom of pet. Alfredo De La Cruz
 Subject land  1.1m x 12.6m strip of land owned by OR, which is being used by DC as their pathway to and
from 18th ave to BS
o DC enclosed this with gate, fence, and roof
 OR leased her prop w/ building to Phil Orient Motors
o POM owned prop adjacent to OR’s
o POM sold its prop to San Benito Realty
 Relocation survey, and location plan done  OR found out about the pathway occupied by
DC
 Wanted DC to demolish the structure  unheeded, no amicable settlement could be
reached
 OR filed complaint in RTC seeking the demolition of the structures
o Said that DC had an existing right of way to a public highway other than her prop
  TCT covering Lot1-B in the name of CP  showed that a portion of this lot is being occupied
by DC
 Subdivision survey for CP showed that an existing 1.5m wide alley on CP prop serves as a
passageway to BS Ave
o DC  Admitted to using subject land (nearest to public highway)
 Use was with knowledge of OR
 1976  DC opposed the construction of the perimeter wall by OR and POM bec it would
render their prop w/o ingress or egress outlet
 Asked OR to give them an easement on the eastern side of her prop  didn’t want
thing, but gave DC subject land on norther part of her prop
 DC made to sign a doc that waived their right to ask for an easement
 RTC  Ruled for OR
 CA  Dismissed appeal by DC for failure to file brief during reglementary period

Issues:
W/N DC entitled to legal/voluntary easement? NO
 Not entitled to voluntary easement  DC, and their tenants Spouses Bondoc, and Carmelino Masangkay
failed to show evidence of agreement bet OR, and her foreman Mang Puing to use subject land as an
easement
o No doc of agreement  transaction involving sale or disposition of real prop must be in writing
o Only MP talked to them about subject land as an easement
 OR never consulted about this  MP had no authority to bind OR to easement
 MP gave agreement to QC Engineers office, in connection with app for building permit? SO?
 DC should have asked for subpoena duce tecum from court to compel QCE to produce the
doc
 Not entitled to legal easement
o 4 REQS
 Estate surrounded by other immovable without adequate outlet to a public highway
 Records show that CP had provided DC with adequate ingress, and egress to BSA
o TCT covering prop lot 1B showed that there was 85sqm portion was
occupied by DC
o Subdv plan of CP showed that there was a 1.5m alley as passageway
 Payment of proper indemnity
 No indemnity ever paid by DC
 Isolation not due to proprietors own acts
 RTC  Isolation of prop was due to acts of CP
o Constructed a house on her prop on the 1.5 m wide alley
o CP obliged to give occupants right of way bec of this
 Right of way claimed at point least prejudicial
o Owner only one who by virtue of a real right may cultivate and use the immovable surrounded by
other immovable
 DC has not proven they are owners
 Lot still under CP name  iT is her who are real party in interest
 Laches cannot be used against OR
o 4reqs
 Conduct on the part of the defendant giving rise to situation complained of
 Delay in asserting complainant’s rights
 Lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that complainant will assert the right on which he
bases the suit
 Injury to defendant if relief given to complainant
o OR only found out in 1995 during relocation survey

Cortes v Yu-Tibo

Facts:
  #65 Calle Rosario = prop owned by wife of Maximo Cortes
o Has windows, which receive light and air
o Windows open on adjacent house #63 of the same street
o Windows have been existing since 1843
 Jose Palanca Yu-Tibo commenced work, which raised the roof of 63
o Deprived 65 windows of air and light
 TC  No formal act by MC that prohibited YT from making any improvements
o MC  Constant use of windows for 59 years allowed him to acquire easement by prescription
 Has right to restrain YT from making any improvements, which may be prejudicial to the
easement
 Easement is positive  period for acquisition of prescription starts from date when
enjoyment started
o YT  Easement is negative
 Prescriptive acquisition starts from date owner of dominant estate prohibited by a formal
act the owner of a servient estate from doing something about the existence of the easement

Issues:
W/N easement of light and view may be acquired by prescription? NO it is a negative easement
 When a person opens windows in his own building = act of ownership
o Does not establish any easement bec this is an exercise of dominion, not of easement
o Law 13 title 3, 3rd partida  “should not use what belongs to him as if it were a service only, but as
his own prop”
o Adjacent prop owner may cover up windows by building on his own land etc.
 Use of windows opened in a wall of ones own prop in the absence of any agreement = act of tolerance on
part of owner of adjacent prop
o Not a waiver of adjacent owner’s right to freely build on his land
o Easement consists in the ff
 OB to not impend the light (ne luminibus officatur)
 OB to not increase height of building (altius non tollendi)
 Decisions of Spain SC
o Prescription does not take place unless there has been some act or opposition on part of person
attempting to obstruct easement’s enjoyment
 Facts: 2 props originally owned by 1 person, then conveyed to others
 Orig owner imposed easement of light and view on servient estate for 35 years
 Owner of dominant estate had not performed any act of opposition, which starts
prescriptive acquisition
 SC  Easement here was positive bec of the existence of a sign of an easement between the
2 tenements established by orig owner  sale included the title for the active and passive
continuance of an easement, unless contrary expressed
 “Active”  owner of dominant estate obtained right to enjoy the easement bec of
acts of orig owner, which imposed the easement
 Respected by owner of servient estate when he bought the land without any
stipulation to the contrary
o Negative easement  cannot be acquired by prescriptive title, even if exercised continuously
o Use does not confer right to maintain lateral openings to the prejudice of owner of adjacent
tenement
o Opening, which overlook land of another exist by mere tolerance, in absence of agreement to
contrary, and cannot be acquired by prescription
 Law 15 title 31, 3rd partida  if anyone opens a window through which the light enters his house =
prescriptive title of easement of light and view after 10 yrs
o Refers to cond to the commencement of the running time of prescriptive acquisition
o He must be prohibited from exercising right to build before period starts
 2 classes of easements
o The right to pierce the wall of one’s neighbor to open windows through which light enters
(easement of luminum Roman)
 o The easement which one house enjoys over another, whereby the latter cannot raise to a greater
height his house from the time the easement was established (Ne luminibus officatur partidas)

Purungganan v Paredes

Facts:
 Emilio Purugganan = owner of residential lot subdivided into 2 in Abra
o Adjacent to and bounded on the north by lot of Felisa Paredes
o Lots of EP subject to an easement of drainage in favor of FP through an amicable settlement
 Amicable settlement in CFI (Decree of Registration)
o FP withdraws opposition to registration of two EP lands but EP agrees to respect an easement or
servitude over a portion of EP lots (8 ½ meters in length) from lot two to lot one
 So that rain water coming from the roofing of a house to be constructed by FP, which ruins
her brick wall shall fall into land of EP
 FP made her house in such a manner that the southern side of their house is on the brick wall (demarcation
line bet FP and EP demolishing said brick wall, and building the southern wall of their house with 3
windows)
o House made by FP is 2 ½ m longer than the length of the roofing allowed in the registration
 Outer roofing = 1.2m, protruding over the prop of EP, which is .2 wider than allowed in reg
 Rain water from the FP rood falls 3 meters inside lots of EP
o FP also placed 3 windows each on 1st and 2nd floors
o From time of construction, EP has been demanding that FP be in accordance with the easement, and
never closed their windows
 Prohibited EP from making a party wall
 FP  brick wall belongs to them only, inherited by FP from time immemorial
o House of FP was constructed long before decree of reg  which they say was never violated
 TC  Ruled for EP, ordered FP to reconstruct roofs

Issues:
W/N roofing constructed by FP was longer than that allowed by decree of reg? YES
 After Ocular inspection of trial court  FP conformed to the findings made by the commissioner
o SC  FP made a mistake in applying the distances prescribed in Decree of reg to roofing of the
house
o Failed to comprehend “servidumbre de vertiente de los tejados”  easement of receiving water
falling from roof, which is an encumbrance imposed on land of EP
o Distances in DOR  Should not correspond to width and length of rood of FP, but to the distance of
rain water falling inside land of EP
 Encumbrance is on rain water falling on EP prop, not roof length
 DOR lengths pertain to rain water falling (8 1.2 meters long and 1 meter wide)
o Subject to easement of receiving water falling from roof
o Report of commissioner  easves of house of FP = 8mx20CM in length
 Rain water falls within 1m of ordinary boundary line of EP prop, and during heavy rains
more than 1m
 FP acquired easement of right of way
o TC said no bec land not reg’d
o Act 492 s39  But if there are easement or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of reg land which
for any reason have failed to be reg, such easement or rights shall remain so appurtenant
notwithstanding such failure, shall be held to pass with the land until cut off or extinguished by reg
of servient estate

Pacifico Garcia v Benjamin Gozon, et al.; PNB v CA, Carolina Lapuz-Gozon, et al.; 1980
FACTS:
- 9 Aug 1918: DOS for 2 parcels of land E &G of Hacienda Maysilo in Malabon, Rizal covered by OCT 983
was executed in favour of Ismael Lapus, the bona fide occupant
o Executed pursuant to an order of CFI Rizal in a partition proceeding
 o 15 Jan 1920: DOS presented for registration and recorded as Primary Entry 7710, containing entries
showing that it was annotated on the back of OCT 983
 Contrary to such entries and official routine and SOP, DOS wasn’t annotated on OCT 983
and such title wasn’t cancelled (why? They dunno)
 Result of registration of DOS: TCT 4910 issued to IL for the 2 parcels E & G and TCT
4911 issued for the remaining 5 lots covered by OCT 983
 Both TCTs contain entries saying: transfer from OCT 983 originally registered 28
Jan 1917 in Book A-9 p215 of Province of Rizal
- IL mortgaged the 2 parcels to secure obligations to PNB, the government, and PH Trust Co.
- 1951: IL died
o 2 parcels inherited by daughter Carolina Lapuz-Gozon – became registered owner
 She subdivided them into 55 lots and sold some of the lots to her co-respondents-appellees
 IL and his successors-in-interest have been in possession even before 1910 (>70Y)
- 1962: alleged heirs (Riveras) of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal filed motion in land registration cases
with CFI Rizal allegeing deprived of participation in Hacienda Maysilo and since OCT 983 unencumbered,
all land covered by OCT 983 should be adjudicated to them
o CFI granted the motion
o OCT 983 appears to be uncancelled despite sale to IL
o Riveras never set foot on the property
- 7 Jun 1963: OCT 983 definitely cancelled and TCT 112236 issued to Riveras
o Lots 5 & 7 (corresponding to E & G sold to IL in 1918) were assigned by Bartolome Rivera to
Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia, TCTs 112743 and 112742 issued to SC and PG respectively  2
sets of TCTs covering same lots (5:7=E:G)
- 1964:
o 22 Oct: PG subdivided Lot 7 (G) into Lots A & B, retaining Lot A and obtained TCT 134958 for it
 5 Nov: assigned Lot B to Antonio Muñoz  TCT 112742 cancelled and TCT 134957 issued
to AM
 1965: AM mortgaged Lot B to Associated Banking Corp. to secure a 200k loan
o 17 Jul: SC sold Lot 5 (E) to Santiago Go  TCT 112743 cancelled and TCT 131329 issued to SG
 23 Dec: SG mortgaged it to PNB to secure a 50k loan (later increased to 60k)
- AM and SG didn’t pay their mortgage debts = ABC and PNB foreclosed
o 4 May 1967: PNB acquired via auction sale, a notice of lis pendens annotated already on the title
o ABC was issued TCT 212163 and PNB was issued TCT 236881
- CLG later learned Riveras and their successors-in-interest acquired the land
o CLG lawyer and surveyor told her E & G were identical to 5 & 7 conveyed to SC and PG
o CLG registered adverse claims on the titles
- 27 Dec 1965: CLG and persons to whom she transferred parts of E & G filed with CFI Rizal in Caloocan
City against Riveras, SC, PG, AM, ABC, PNB, and others in an action to quiet title and damages
o 25 Jan 66: notice of lis pendens on AM, SG, PG titles annotated
o 13 Dec 1969: notice of lis pendens annotated on PNB title when sale in its favour was registered
o 30 Jul 1875: CFI ruled for CLG and her co-plaintoffs, voiding TCTs issued to Riveras and all titles
and transactions emanating therefrom
 Riveras to pay plaintiffs 20k atty’s fees
 AM to pay ABC if bank gets evicted
 SG to pay PNB if bank gets evicted
- 25 May 1978: CA affirmed CFI decision
o SG, PNB, ABC appealed (but ABC didn’t file its petition for review)
 SG: titles of IL and his successors-in-interest lost their right to the lots due to their
negligence and inaction
ISSUES:
W/N 1920 title of IL should prevail over 1963 title of Riveras. YES
 - IL an innocent purchaser for value, who validly transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title
of ownership over the disputed lots
o Should not be nullified/defeated by issuance of title 43Y later to other persons due to failure of
ROD to cancel the title preceding IL’s
o IL and his successors-in-interest remained in possession of the lots and rival claimants never did
- General Rule: in case of 2 COT regarding the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land
comprised in the latter be wholly/only in part of the land comprised in the earlier
o In successive registrations when more than 1 certificate is issued in respect of party estate/interest in
land, person claiming under prior certificate is entitled to estate/interest
o In case of double registration, owner of earlier is the owner of the land applies to successive vendees
of the owners of such certificates
o Maxim: prior est in tempore, est in jure (he who is 1st in time is preferred in right) is followed in land
registration
- SG: mere entry of document in the day/entry book without noting it on the COT isn’t sufficient registration
(La Urbana v Bernardo)
o Superseded by later 6 cases of Levin v Bass
 Voluntary v involuntary registration (as in registration of attachment, levy upon execution,
notice of lis pendens, etc.)
 Involuntary: entry thereof in day book is sufficient notice to all persons even if
owner’s duplicate COT isn’t presented
 Voluntary: innocent purchaser for value becomes registered owner and holder of
COT the moment he presents and files duly notarised and valid DOS and the same
is entered in the day book + same time surrender/present owner’s duplicate COT +
pay registration fees
o Levin v Bass not applicable
 DOS for IL judicially authorised, entered in entry book, and new title was issued to him
 DOS for IL contains notation that it was annotated on back of OCT 983
 Title issued to IL contains usual notation that it was a transfer from a previous title
 DOS of IL and titles issued to him and his successors-in-interest and the mortgage to PNB
are all matters of public record
 Legarda and Prieto v Saleeby: record is notice to all the world…all persons are
charged with the knowledge of what it contains…the purchaser is charged with
notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact the
record discloses
 Rule of notice: presumed purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title…presumption is irrefutable
 J. Johnson: presumption can’t be overcome by proof of innocence/good faith,
otherwise the purpose and object of law requiring record would be destroyed
- PNB: mortgagee and purchaser in good faith and for value
o CA: should’ve made an on-the-spot investigation…failure to do so precludes bank from being
considered mortgagee in good faith and for value
o CFI: not in good faith since bought SG lot with notice of lis pendens already annotated on title

Hermogena Santos v Miguel Robledo, et al.; 1914

FACTS:
- HS filed complaint with CFI: Santiago Herrera and his wife Basilia Tolentino deeded to HS a building lot
with 3 warehouses in an instrument ratified before a notary (1 Mar 1905)
o HS entered into possession without opposition/interruption and collected rents until 28 Jan 1913
o MR (creditor of SH) prayed for execution of judgment
o Sheriff seized the lot after publication of notice and sold it at public auction on instigation of MR
o HS deprived of property and rents accruing from 28 Jan – date of complaint + suffered onsiderable
damage since she missed opportunity to sell the lot for 1.2k
 - Deputy sheriff:
o No personal interest in complaint or remedies sought
o Only took part in action brought by MR against SH to execute orders of court  levied on lot and 3
warehouses of SH and sold them to MR (only bidder for 1k)
o HS affidavit claimed to be owner but proceeded to sell the property b/c of bond furnished by MR
since it was registered in SH’s name free of all encumbrance
- MR and Azarraga
o HS no legal capacity and her action’s improper
o Judgment in separate case ordered SH to pay MR 1,170 with interest and in executing such
judgment, sheriff of Manila levied upon the lot and all its improvements exclusively owned by SH
o 1st inscription of the property recorded in registry Aug 1901 in SH’s name free of all charge and
encumbrance
o writ of execution on the property and 3 warehouses sold at public auction to MR for 1k and
recorded in registry, COS issued
o MR took possession in good faith and now peaceably holding the same
o Conveyance made to HS by SH and BT effected with intent to defraud creditors cannot prevail
against creditor MR
- MR supplementary answer
o SH conveyed and sold to him his right to redeem the property in litigation w/in 1Y from 17 Fb
1913 (date of auction) through public instrument for 85p
- CFI ruled for respondents: HS hadn’t established any right to relief sought
o HS appealed by bill of exceptions from judgment
ISSUES:
W/N levy and sale of the lot and improvements can prevail against right of ownership of HS via gift made by
SH/BT. YES
- If lot belonged to HS and not SH, land can’t be levied upon for payment of debt of SH that didn’t concern
HS (who isn’t a debtor of MR)
- Property acquired by HS via gift made by SH/BT in instrument ratified before notary Eugenio de Lara (1
Mar 1905)
o Parties mutually agreed to live separately and to divide the conjugal partnership property inventoried
and appraised at 2,494p
o SH/BT stated in par 3 that they convey to HS lot and warehouses with express condition
proceeds/rents derived should be collected by BT as long as she lived
o Value of lot and warehouses should be deducted from total value of CP to be divided between 2
spouses amounting to 2,200 (1,100 each)
- 618 CC: a gift is an act of liberality by which a person disposes gratuitously of a thing in favour of another
who accepts it
o SH/BT freely and gratuitously disposed of the lot and improvements to HS
o BUT no showing HS accepted in the manner provided by law
- 633 CC: to be valid, a gift shall be made in a public instrument stating the property bestowed and amount of
charges the donee must satisfy…acceptance may be made in the same instrument or a different one but it
shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the donor…if made in a different instrument the
acceptance shall be communicated to the donor in an authentic manner and proceeding shall be recorded in
both instruments
o No acceptance = not a valid gift, without effect whatsoever
o 629 CC: gift doesn’t bind the donor nor produce any effect until formally accepted by donee in
accordance with law
- SH owed MR 1,170 with interest when the instrument was executed
o No showing donors reserved sufficient funds/property to satisfy the debt nor that they possessed
other properties  conclusion: conveyance/gift to HS for the purpose of defrauding creditor MR
by preventing him from collecting on credit
 o 643 CC: no stipulation as to payment of debts, donee shall be liable for them if gift made to defraud
creditors…gift always presumed made to defraud creditors when at time of bestowing the donor
hasn’t reserved to himself property sufficient to pay debts
o When demand made SH unable to pay so lot levied upon and sold in satisfaction of the debt
o Debt contracted during marriage and before they gave the property away, its payment is a charge
against the CPG (1408 CC)
- HS said she was a minor so her mom Gregoria Tolentino accepted it before notary for her and since
execution, her mom’s been in possession and collecting rents
o Unfounded
o No showing mom accepted for her
o Verbal acceptance not sufficient
- Testimony of SH: signed conveyance on being told it was wrt conjugal separation (doesn’t know how to
read/write)
o Presumption that such instrument framed by BT without consent of SH

Mariano Avila, Madgalena Avila v Hon. Lauro Tapucar (CFI Agusan del Norte and Butuan City), Julito
Bahan, et al.; 1991
FACTS:
- Sps. Pedro Bahan and Dominga Exsaure acquired parcel of land in Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del
Norte
o Coconut land, 1.8340 has (reduced to 1.3485 due to road), covered by Tax Declaration 270,
bounded N by Anastacio Luyahan, E and S by Tabangao Creek, W by Tomas Colon, assessed value
330p
o Inherited by respondents
- MA bought land in Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del Norte of 4,371 sq.m. from Luis Cabalan and
wife under DOAS of Unregistered Land and under TD 3055
- JB and 10 persons alleged to be members of Free Farmers Federation gathered coconuts from the land MA
bought but intercepted by Chief of Police of Tubay, Agusan del Norte
- Bahans filed action for quieting of title and damges with CFI Agusan del Norte and Butuan City
o Successors-in-interest of coconut land of 1.8340 has (no 1.3485)
o In 1968 discovered NW part of 1/3 has already in possession of MMA who were harvesting fruits
of 40 coconut trees
- MMA
o MagA bought land in Tubay, Agusan del Norte, 4,371 sq.m. from LC and from then on have been
in open, continuous, public, peaceful, uninterrupted possession
- Bahans took advantage of MMA absence from property and gathered 345 fruits (300p)
- MMA filed motion for preliminary injunction praying Bahans be enjoined from gathering fruits and uproot
7 young seedlings newly planted by Bahans until termination of the case
- Bahans application for free patent approved for 6.9027 has and FP issued
o OCT issued in name of heirs of PB represented by JB, transcribed in registration book for Province
of Agusan del Norte pursuant to Sec 41 Act 496
- J. Vicente Echaves Jr. granted MMA motion for injunction but didn’t prohibit uprooting the 7 seedlings
upon filing of 1k bond by MMA
- MMA filed administrative protest against Bahans before Bureau of Lands, filed 11M after issuance of patent
and 7M3D after registration of COT in registration book of ROD
- Bahans filed motion for dissolution of writ of preliminary injunction alleging that pursuant to court order
where MMA were granted extension within which to terminate admin protest (condition: if not yet
terminated, case will be decided and claim dismissed to uphold exercise of ownership of plaintiffs), MMA
failed to secure any such order from BOL
- BOL order:
o Free patent for Bahans is erroneous insofar as it embraces and includes portions rightfully belonging
to Hernando Bigas, MMA, Lily Mijares as shown in sketch
o Cancellation/amendment of patent and COT
 - MMA filed opposition to motion for dissolution of writ of preliminary injunction invoking BOL order +
supplemental manifestation alleging issuance of free patent being erroneous couldn’t be considered as
documentary evidence for Bahans
- J. LT issued order: dissolving the injunction and directing clerk of court/any person in custody of the 1k
bond to deliver it to counsel/plaintiffs, set continuation of trial
- Atty. Jose Gonzales (counsel for Bahans) withdrew from office of clerk of court CFI Agusan del Norte the
cash bond posted by MMA
- MMA motion for reconsideration denied
ISSUES:
W/N order dissolving preliminary injunction tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of/in excess
of jurisdiction necessitating certiorari. YES
- Bahans successors-in-interest of coconut land of 1,834 sq.m. at Tabangao, Victory, Tubay, Agusan del
Norte
- MMA purchasers for value of 4,371 sq.m. for lot in same place and are in possession of such property since
1960
- WPI issued to enjoin Bahans from harvesting coconuts until final determination of suit for quieting title
- Subsequent erroneous approval of free patent for Bahans does NOT call for dissolution of WPI already
issued since property in possession of MMA would be placed in Bahans’ hands, pending final outcome of
action  pre-determinative of main case
o TC judge abused discretion in dissolving WPI by relying on mere presentation of OCT by Bahans
- Sole objective of PI whether prohibitory or mandatory: preserve the status quo until merits of the case can
be heard
o Status quo: last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy
o Resorted to by litigant for preservation/protection of his rights/interests and for no other purpose
during pendency of principal action
o Granted only when party asking for it is clearly entitled
- J. LT pronouncements that Bahans’ title indefeasible and incontestable is a prejudgment and uncalled for
since trial still in progress
- While land registration is proceeding in rem and binds the whole world, simple possession of COT under
Torrens system doesn’t necessarily make holder a true owner
o If such title includes by mere oversight land which can no longer be registered, he doesn’t by virtue
of COT alone become owner of lands illegally included
- Evidence shows free patent issued is erroneous as includes lands belonging to MMA
o Subsequent registration doesn’t make Bahans owners
o Cadastral court has no authority to award property to person who hasn’t put claim to it and never
asserted any right of ownership; COT issued then is null and void subject to right of innocent
purchasers for value
- Registration doesn’t vest title, merely evidence of it
o Doesn’t give holder better right than what he actually has especially if registration done in bad faith
o Effect: as if no registration made at all
- Rule: grant/denial of WPI rests upon sound discretion of court EXCEPT on clear case of abuse  as in
this case

Lucia Embrado, Oreste Torregiani v CA, Pacifico Cimafranca, Marcos Salimbagat, Eda Jimenez, Santiago
Jimenez; 1994
FACTS:
- Lot 546 is 366 sq.m. lot in Dipolog City originally owned by Juan, Pastor, and Matias Carpitanos
o Venta Definitiva notarised document written in Spanish was executed by the Carpitanos, selling the
lot to Lucia Embrado
 Provided that even if deed prepared and signed 2 Jul 1946, effects would retroact to 15 Apr
1941 (date the lot and its improvements were actually sold to LE)
  Registered and TCT issued in LE’s name alone who was married to OT by then (since 1943)
 court order of CFI Zamboanga del Norte noted “single” in TCT and cancelled and
replaced it with “married to OT”
 LE/OT made their conjugal home on the lot and built a residential/commercial building
(1958)
- In an ADOS dated 1 May 1971, LE sold the lot described as her own paraphernal property to adopted
daughter EJ for 1k  TCT cancelled and new one issued in EJ’s name (who was married to SJ)
o EJ sold 65 sq.m. of the lot to MS for 6.5k and conveyed 301 sq.m. to PC for 30k  both annotated
on TCT
- 25 Sept 1972: LE/OT instituted with CFI Zamboanga del Norte action for declaration of nullity of
contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance, damages against sps. EJ/SJ, MS, and PC
o Sale of the lot by LE to EJ was void for lack of consideration and b/c OT didn’t consent, which was
necessary since the lot was conjugal property
o LE misled into signing DOS, believing the lot was merely intended as security for a loan EJ/SJ were
negotiating with 1st Insular Bank of Cebu
o Since EJ/SJ didn’t acquire valid title, subsequent sales to MS and PC without legal effect
- CFI ruled for LE/OT
o Sale of the lot to EJ and subsequent transfers to MS and PC (buyers in bad faith) were void and no
effect
o Cancel the TCT in EJ’s name
o EJ/SJ ordered to return price paid by MS and PC with interest and for PC to pay LE/OT rents he
collected from the lessees of the 1st floor with interest
- CA reversed
o Since LE agreed with original owners Carpitanos to buy the lot when she was not yet married, the
lot was paraphernal property since sale is perfected the moment parties agree on object and cause
o MS and PC buyers in good faith since contrary not proved
ISSUES:
W/N Lot 564 paraphernal property of LE. NO
- LE and original owners agreed in 1941 to the purchase and sale = ownership acquired by LE at that
moment
o 1496 CC: ownership of the thing sold is acquired by vendee from moment it’s delivered to him in
any of the ways specified in 1497-1501 or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to vendee
o 1498 CC: when sale is made through public instrument, the execution shall be equivalent to delivery
of the thing object of the contract, if from deed the contrary doesn’t appear/cannot clearly be
inferred
- Venta Definitiva executed when LE marriage to OT already subsisting
o Ownership acquired during marriage and presumed conjugal BUT presumption overcome by terms
of VD containing positive assertion of exclusive ownership
- 1958 construction of residential/commercial building was made  part leased to 3rd persons and part
serving as LE/OT conjugal dwelling
o No evidence on source of funds for construction  LE/OT nevertheless enjoy the presumption
that the funds were conjugal
o 158 par 2 CC: buildings constructed at expense of partnership during marriage on land belonging to
one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to
the spouse who owns the same
 Land becomes conjugal upon construction of the building without awaiting reimbursement
before/at liquidation of the partnership upon concurrence of: a) construction of the building
at expense of partnership and b) ownership of land by one spouse
 Conditions fully met here = lot is conjugal
W/N EJ sale valid. NO
- LE: misled into signing DOAS thinking it was to help them get a loan  didn’t consent to sale nor intended
to convey/transfer title to EJ + never received alleged 1k consideration
 - Notarised document is admissible evidence without proof of execution and is conclusive as to truthfulness
of contents = not absolute and may be rebutted
- EJ/SJ had no means of livelihood and were totally dependent on LE for support
o Price was fictitious and EJ couldn’t have paid since she was financially incapable of doing so
o EJ didn’t prove how she obtained the money to pay
- Even if LE signed knowing it was a DOS, it’s still void ab initio being contrary to law since OT didn’t
consent
o 172 CC: wife can’t bind conjugal property without husband’s consent except in cases provided by
law
o LE couldn’t have sold it so EJ couldn’t have acquired ownership
 TCT in her favour didn’t vest ownership nor did it validate an alleged purchase 
registration doesn’t vest title, only evidence of such
- Since EJ had no valid title, no title could be conveyed by her to MS and PC
W/N MS and PC are buyers in good faith so sale to them is valid. NO
- MS and PC haven’t proven status as buyers in good faith and for value
o Burden of proving status of buyer in good faith and for value rests on he who asserts it
o Ordinary presumption of good faith not enough
- MS and PC bought with knowledge of facts and circumstances which should’ve prompted them to inquire
and investigate possible defects of title of EJ
o Purchaser can’t close his eyes to facts which should put reasonable men on guard and claim he acted
in good faith  mere belief of lack of defect/wilful closing of his eyes to possibility of defect won’t
make him innocent purchaser for value
o PC close relative of SJ and godfather to one of his kids = knew of personal circumstance and
financial standing of EJ/SJ
 SJ 22yo, working student earning 6p/D with a wife and 3 kids
o MS resident of Dipolog for 30Y and his daughter’s renting part of the building >1Y prior to EJ sale
to MS
 Daughter’s lease commenced while LE still owner and prior to alleged sale by LE to EJ
 His daughter was aware of factual background of the property and personal circumstances of
the owners since they all occupy the same building
 He should’ve asked his daughter and presumed he has some knowledge of the facts and
circumstances since they’re not total strangers
- MS and PC allegedly asked office of ROD about genuinesness of COT of EJ and from clerk of court of
CFI Dipolog City if it was involved in any litigation
o But they failed to ask EJ/SJ if they really owned it
- Rule: buyer of real property which is in possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should
investigate the rights of those in possession…otherwise, without such inquiry, buyer isn’t in good faith
o 1st duty before buying is to read public manuscript  look and see who is there and what are his
rights
o Need of caution and diligence an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise
making purchases
- Fact LE resides there + young age and meagre financial standing of EJ/SJ = PC and MS should’ve checked

Bonsato v CA

Facts:
 Dec 1, 1949  Domingo Bonsato, already a widower at that time, signed two notarial deeds of donation in
favor of his bro Juan Bonsato and his nephew Felipe Bonsato
o Transferred to them several parcels of land in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos in
Pangasinan
o Both accepted the acts and documents
 Josefa Utea and other heirs of DB and his wife Andre Nacario (dead) filed a complaint in CFI for the
annulment of the donations
 o Said that DB was induced and deceived into signing the docs
o Said that the donations were mortis causa and void for not following the formalities required
o JB and FB  Donations were voluntarily executed by DB in consideration for their past servces to
him
 CFI  Donation done voluntarily without force and intimidation
o Donations were inter vivos without any cond making their validity and efficacy dependent on death
of donor
o Since props were presumably conjugal, only DB’s ½ share could have been validly donated
 CA  Donations were mortis causa and invalid bec they had not been executed with the formalities
required for testamentary dispositions

Issues:
W/N donations were mortis causa or inter vivos? Inter vivos
 Documents of donations to be mortis causa should have the ff. characteristics
o Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor or what amounts
to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
prop while alive
o Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutuml but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the props conveyed
o Transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee
 These characteristics are discernable in deeds of donation
o DB only reserved for himself during his lifetime, the owner’s share of the fruits of the props
 No need to reserve this if ownership remained with him
o DB never put any stipulation that he could revoke the donations
 Deeds clearly declare them to be irrevocable
 Last par.  “that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall be effective”
 Should be read in conjunction with the rest of the par  after DB death, donees
become absolute owners of the prop free from all liens and encumbrances aka they
get the fruits too
 Court Decisions held to be transfers mortis causa and declared invalid for not being executed with the
formalities  None in this case
o Carino v Abaya
 Props not to be given until 30 days after death of donor + donees described as those who
had been mentioned to inherit from us (clear they only get props after death of donor)
o Bautista v Sabiniano
 Donor reserved right to dispose props at any time before his death = retained ownership
until death
o David v Sison
 Props couldn’t be disposed by donee without consent of donor  lacks essential requisite of
ownership (jus disponendi)
 Fact that donor donated props due to his affection for the donees is immaterial to the issue
o Corroborates the irrevocability of the transfers absent any reservation of the donor

Gestopa v CA

Facts:
 Spouses Danlag owned 6 parcels of unregistered lands, and executed 3 deeds of donation mortis causa
o on March 4, ’65  for Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil for parcels 1 and 2
o 2nd deed was for parcel 3
o 3rd deed was for parcel 4
o All deeds had reservation of the rights of donors to amend, cancel, or revoke the donation during
their lifetime + sell, mortgage, encumber the props donated during their lifetime if deemed
necessary
  Jan 16, 1973  Diego Danlag, with his wife’s consent executed deed of donation inter vivos covering the
same parcels of land and added 2 other parcels in favor of MDP
o 2 Conds  SD continues to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime
o Donee can not sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the spouses without their consent
and approval
 SD sold parcels 3 and 4 to Spouses Gestopa
o Executed a deed of revocation covering the 6 parcels of land in donation inter vivos
 MD filed in RTC pet to quiet title of SG and SD
o Said that she was the illegitimate daughter of DD and she lived and rendered incalculable service to
DD and his mom Maura
o DD executed donation inter vivos in her favor as recognition of her services
o She accepted donation in same instrument, and openly excercised rights of ownership
o Through machination, intimidation, and undue influence, DD persuaded husband of MD, Eulalio
Pilapil to by 2/6 parcels of land
o Complied with all conds of donation, DD had no legal basis to revoke it
o SD, SG  ’73 DOD was void bec it was obtained through machinations and undue influence
 Even if valid, it took effect after death of donor, bec if not, it left DD with no props
 RTC  DOD revoked
o Reservation clause in all deeds showed that DD did not make donation
 Purchase of MD of 2/6 parcels showed this
o MD failed to rebut allegations of ingratitude and machinations
 CA  Reversed
o Reservation by donor of lifetime usufruct indicated MD had ownership of props
 Right to sell belonged to her, SD only had right to give consent
o Fact that SD changed DOD from MC to IV
 Transfer of tax declarations of props showed this, MD did not purchase lands

Issues:
W/N DOD was MC or IV? IV
 ’73 DOD  DD donated props out of love and affection for MD
o Mark of IV
 Reservation of lifetime usufruct indicated SD transferred naked ownership of props
o No need for reservation if SD intended to remain owners
 DD reserved sufficient props for his maintenance in accordance with his standing in society
 Doee accepted donation
o Alejandro v Geraldez  acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is IV, it is a requirement in IV
 “Donee hereby accepts the donation”
o For MC being in the form of a will, acceptance not required during donor’s lifetime
 MD had right to dispose props
o SD right to consent was only done to protect usufructuary interests
o Alejandro  limitation on the right to sell during the donor’s lifetime implied ownership had
passed
 SD intended to transfer ownership to MD
o Prior to DOD IV  SD already executed 3 DOD MC
 They were aware of the diff bet the two donations, if they didn’t want to donate IV they
wouldn’t have done the IV
 Tax declaration  presumption of regularity, not proven to be void
 It was MD’s husband, EP who bought land
o Done without MD consent bec purchase of husband of props would make them conjugal 
disadvantage to her
o EP was manipulated
 Revocation not valid
o Valid only when there is an account of officiousness, failure of donee to comply with conds,
ingratitude
 Not invoked by donors at any time
 o No evidence that MD prohibited SD from gathering coconuts from their trees  even if true, not
covered by 765CC

Magat v CA

Facts:
 Basillisa Comerciante = mom of 5 kids  Rosario, Consolacion, Apolinaria Austria-Magat, Leonardo (died in
WW2), and Florentino Lumubos
o BC bought a parcel of residential land in Cavite with its improvements
 BC executed doc “Kasulatan Kaloobpala” (donation)  Notarized by Atty. Carlos Viniegra
o Donated the prop to Rosario, Consolacion, Apolinaria, , Florentino
o Gave it and said, “ hindi na mababawi”  Irrevocable
o The doc will be “magkakabisa simula sa araw na ako’y pumanaw”
o Cond The land will be lessened to cover for the expenses of her funeral and whatever is left will
be equally divided among the 4 kids
o Kids accepted it
 BC and her kids executed another doc “Kasulatan”, attached to the DOD
o Could not dispose of land while BC was alive
o Title stays with BC while she lives
 BC executed Deed of Absolute Sale of the house and lot for AAM for P5K
o TCT issued for AAM
 Heirs of Consolacion, and Rosario, together with Florentino filed in RTC of Cavite a pet for annulment of
TCT of AAM
o RTC  Donation = MC bec it takes effect upon death of BC
 BC reserved the right to revoke the donation = feature of MC, must comply with formalities
of will
 Did not comply with formalities that’s why its void
 Sale by BC to AAM valid bec she remained absolute owner of it
 CA  Reversed
o Donation was intervivos  due to “ Hindi mababawi” prov which showed the irrevocability of the
conveyance (characteristic of IV)
o Kasulatan  the land would not be disposed of while BC lived (irrevocability again)
 This prohibition was a recognition of ownership over the house of the donees for only
owners can dispose of props

Issues:
W/N DOD was MC or IV? IV
 W/N MC or IV depends on w/n donor intended to transfer ownership over props upon execution of deed 
Bonsato reqs for MC
o Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor or what amounts
to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
prop while alive
o Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutuml but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the props conveyed
o Transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee
 Donation was irrevocable
o Cuevas v Cuevas  when DOD provides that the donor will not dispose of prop  IV
 DOD = IV
o Irrevocability is the standard
o “ Takes effect only upon death of BC?”  Accdg to Bonsato, this just makes donee’s absolute owners
at the time of BC death
 Provs here are only assurances that during BC lifetime, she enjoys possession of prop, but
naked ownership is given to donees
 Prohibition to dispose applies to donor and donees
 If BC intended to have full ownership of prop until she died, she would have reserved her right to
o
dispose
 Subsequent and contemporaneous acts of donor showed it was IV
o Domingo Comia  grandson of BC: delivered title of prop to him, showed that donees owned prop
o Atty Viniegra said that when BC sold the prop to AAM  She disregarded prohibition, knew it
covered her
o Acceptance of Donees made it IV too
 DOD not validly revoked when Consolacion violated the prohibition to alienate
o Mortgaged it to Baby Santos  BC asked Domingo to redeem prop, which he did
o Act of selling to AAM not a valid act of revocation
o Revocation must be pursuant to 764CC  action must be brought within 4 yrs of non-compliance
with conds in donation
 No auto revocation bec DOD does not have a provision for this  need to filed within 4 yrs
of non-compliance

Vitug v CA

Facts:
 Earlier case involved the probate wills of the late Dolores Vitu, who in NY in ‘80
o Court named Rowena Corona executrix and upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special
administrator of DV estate with her husband Romarico Vitug
 RV filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real prop
belonging to the estate  Needed P667K, which he claimed as personal funds to pay for estate tax,
deficiency of estate tax
o RV said he withdrew P518K , and P9OK from savings acct in Bank of America, MM
o RC opposed saying the funds withdrawn were part of conjugal partnership, no ground for
reimbursement
o RV said funds were his exclusive prop pursuant to “survivorship agreement” he executed with his
wife in ‘70
 Agreed that money deposited by them in their joint savings acct with the bank were props
of both of them and payable, and collectable by either of them during their lifetime
 After the death of either, it becomes sole prop of the survivor
 Any receipt or check issued by either of them = sufficient for bank to release funds
 TC  Upheld agreement between the spouses
o Proceeds were personal funds of RV
 CA  Agreement was a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with formalities of law (805CC)
o If it was IV it was a prohibited donation under 133CC

Issues:
W/N Agreement was Donation IV or MC? Neither
 Not MC  which should be embodied in a will (personal, solemn, revocable, and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his prop”  device pertains to testator
o Money in savings acct were part of conjugal prop of spouses
o Rivera v PBT  survivorship agreement purports to deliver the joint holdings of the spouses
 Spouses vitug jointly owned the prop
 Macam v Gatmaitan  agreement is binding between them
o No showing here that funds exclusively belonged to one party  presumed conjugal
 Not IV  Bec it was to take effect after the death of one of the aprties, and it involved no conveyance of a
spouse’ prop to the other
o SA involves no modification of conjugal partnership
o Spouses opened savings acct and put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture
 They could not dispose it in favor of another
 Since funds were conjugal, neither of spouses could have been pressured into placing his or
her funds there
  SA was really a contract with a term (2010CC)
o Uncertain event or happens in an indeterminate time = death of either of the spouses
 SA = under uncertain event  element of risk is the death of the parties
o May violate the law if it is a cloak to defraud creditors, defeat legitime of heir
 No proof of this here

Hemedes v CA

Facts:
 Subject Land  Lot 6, 21k sqm, in Laguna
o Owned originally by Jose Hemedes, dad of Maxima Hemedes, and Enrique Hemedes
 JH executed deed of donation Inter Vivos w/ Resolutory Conds, conveyed prop to his 3rd wife Justa Kauapin
o Conds  Upon death of JK, prop shall revert to any of their kids, or heirs expressly designated by Jk
in a public doc + If no designation made, title reverts to legal heirs of JH in common
 JK executed “Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Property by Reversion”
o Conveyed prop to MH
o Conds: She maintained usufurctuary rights over prop until she died
o MH filed an app for confirmation of title wherein OCT was issued in her favor
 R & B insurance  MH and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the prop as
security for P6K loan
o RB extra judicially foreclosed mortgage since MH failed to pay loan when it became due
o Prop sold at a public auction wherein RB was highest bidder
 MH didn’t redeem it during redemption period
 UF rights of JK was maintained in RB title
 Despite 1st conveyance, JK executed Kasunduan  transferred same prop to EH, pursuant to same
resolutory conds
o EH obtained 2 declarations of props, paid taxes on prop, had prop issued under his name through
cadastral survey and through records of ministry of agrarian reform
 EH sold prop to Dominium Realty and Construction Corp
o JK executed an affidavit which confirmed the conveyance to EH, and denied the conveyance to MH
o DRC leased prop to Asia Brewery, which constructed two warehouses on prop
 RB found out about this and informed them of their ownership over the prop and said it had
the right to appropriate bec AB was builder in bad faith
 Parties failed to reach an amicable settlement
 DRC and EH filed a complaint in CFI for the annulment of RB TCT
o Said that DRC was absolute owner, and that JK never transferred land to MH
o TC  Ruled for DRC
 CA  Affirmed decision

Issues:
W/N prop was conveyed to MH or EH? MH
 Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Prop by Reversion is not spurious as argued by EH
o Grounded only on mere denial of JK  party cant just deny execution to avoid compliance
o It was a perfect and binding CT which may only be annulled due a proven defect
o Records do not show evidence that JK thumbmark was not the one used in this Deed
 JK repudiation defective bec she is a biased witness
o Admitted by both JK and EH that JK was dependent on EH financially
o JK was 80yo at time of Kasunduan and suffered from physical infirmities and was completely
dependent on EH  EH could have easily influenced her
 1332 does not apply  need to explain terms, if language not understood, assumes consent of contracting
party was vitiated, does not cover situations with absence of consent
o JK here says she did not have knowledge of Deed of Conveyance
 Said she first found out about it in the hearing
o Absence is defense here, 1332 not applicable
 RB insurance was buyer in good faith
 o Person dealing with registered land may rely on correctness of cert of title issued and no law
obliges him to go behind this to determine cond of prop
o UF rights of JK does not oblige RB to investigate validity of mortgagors title

Lagazo v CA

Facts:
 Civil Case filed by Tito Lagazo sought to recover from Alfredo Cabanlit a parcel of land
o TL  Got it from his gramma by donation
o AC  When alleged donation executed, he already acquired prop by Deed of Assignment from a
transferee of TL gramma
 Catalin Reyes = gramma of TL
o Awarded a 60.1m lot, which was a portion of Monserrat Estate (public land owned by Manila and
distributed for sale to bona fide tenants under the land for the landless program)
o CR constructed a house here
 Before she left for Canada, CR executed special power of atty in favor of her son in law Eduardo Espanol
o Authorized him to execute all docs needed for the final adjudication of her claim as awardee of the
lot  He failed to do this so CR revoked power
o Executed another POA in favor of TL
 CR executed DOD in favor of TL
o TL checked w/ register of deeds and found that prop was in the delinquent list
 Paid installments in arrears and the remaining balance on lot, declared prop in name of CR
o TL sent demand letter to AC asking him to vacate
 AC claimed ownership
 TL instituted complaint for recovery of possession
o AC proof
 DOAS executed by CR in favor of Eduardo Espanol
 Deed of Assignment executed by CR in favor of EE
 DOA executed by EE in favor of AC
 TC  Ruled for TL
o AC never took action to have house registered under his name  unnatural for owner of prop
 CA  Reversed
o TL did not show that he accepted CR donation  renders donation null and void
 Even if he paid for amortizations due  no effect, bec this was not a cond to the donation

Issues:
W/N Donation was simple or onerous? Simple
 Simple v Onerous
o Simple Cause is pure liberality (no strings attached)
o Onerous  imposes a burden, charges, future services equal or more in value than thing donated
 733CC governed by rule on contracts, formalities of simple donation not applicable
 TL  Burdens etc need not be stated in DOD
o Thus, although DOD did not state this, donation was onerous bec he had to pay for aforementioned
amortizations
o Being onerous, his acceptance may be express or implied (1320CC)
 Does not have to comply with 749CC
 Payments show his acceptance
 Donation was simple
o Payment was never imposed by donor
 DOD said that prop was free from liens and encumbrances, and charges
o Payments made by TL were voluntary  he testified that he never claimed any burden any charge
was imposed by CR
o Even Power of Atty did not state this
 CC provs on simple donations applicable (734, 746, 749)
o Agreement was essential, donation perfected upon acceptance – Justice Vitug
  If acceptance done in separate instrument, donor should be notified in authentic form
 Same said by Tolentino
o DOD does not show that TL accepted the gift
 No proof shown by TL
 Acceptance must be done during lifetime of donor
 Must be proved that donor received acceptance
 Supervening event  City of MNL granted TL request for transfer of his name in the lot
o Immaterial bec DOD void for not being accepted by him
 AC does not own prop despite invalidity of DOD
o He also failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence his ownership of the lot

Sumipat v Banga

Facts:
 Placida Tabo-Tabo and Lauro Sumipat were married and acquired 3 parcels of land during their marriage,
they had no kids
o LS had 5 illigetimate children from an extra-marital affair with Pedra Dacola
 Lydia, Laurito, Alicia, Alejandro, Lirafe all surname sumipat  defendant-appellees
 LS executed a Doc “ Deed of Absolute Transfer and or QuitClaim over Real Properties” in favor of DA
covering the 3 parcels of land
o Signature of his wife PT was indicated to give her marital consent
 When DAT was executed, LS was already very sick and bedridden
o Lydia had to guide his hand when he signed the doc
o PT signed the doc with haste (she was unlettered, couldnd read or write), Lydia didn’t explain to
her what doc was about
 LS died  PT and Das administered the props jointly, divided the produce 50:50, until later wherein PT no
longer received any
o Title of land was transferred to DA’s
 PT filed complaint for declaration of nullity of DAT
o RTC  Ruled for DA’s
 Said that DAT was not contested by PT upon its execution, it transferred ownership to DAs
absolutely
 Props were conjugal, but since PT signed doc and failed to question its genuineness, entire
prop, not just half of LS was transferred
 CA  PT unlettered, DA’s had burden of proof of showing that they explained it to her, they failed to do this
o PT didn’t understand the deed bec it was never explained to her
o Judge Garcia, to whom the DAT was acknowledged, didn’t identify PT as having appeared  only LS
appeared
 JG was under the impression that props were his only
o Annulled DAT as regards PT share but not LS’

Issues:
W/N DAT validly transferred title to Das? NO
 Deed was a gratuitous disposition of prop (donation) although LS imposed the cond that PT and LS shall be
entitled to ½ of all the fruits or produce of the lands for their subsistence and support as seen in
preliminary clause of deed
o Being a donation of immovable prop  749 applies
 Acceptance must be done in the same public doc for it to pass to donee
 If not made in the same doc, it must be made in another doc
 If acceptance fails to be shown  DOD void
 Donees acceptance not manifested in DOD or another deed  thus its void
o Also there is an absence of proof of filing of the necessary return, payment of donors taxes on
transfer, or exemption from payment thereof as provided by National Internal Revenue Code of
1977
  These reqs are also mandatory, for an individual who makes a transfer of a gift, within 30
days of date gift was made
o DOD was not a sale, barter or oneroys conveyance
 Due to absence of valid cause or consideration, and consent completely given
 PT testimony claims that there was total absence of her consent, not just vitiation
 Never explained to her
 Didn’t know how to read or write
 She was hurried, and she signed it without knowing what it was
 Baranda v Baranda  signed deeds without knowing what they are = void DOD
 Thus since her consent was absent  DOD was a patent nullity (void CT), whose
action to void it does not prescribe (1410CC)

Calicdan v Cendana

Facts:
 Subject Land  760 sqm unregistered land in Pangasnan
o Originally owned by Sixto Calicdan who died intestate on Nov 4, 1941
 Survived by his wife Fermina and 3 kids Soledad, Jose, Benigno
 Aug 25, ’47  FC executed DOD IV, conveyed land to Silveio Cendaa
o SC made a house in 1949, where he lived until his death in 1998
 Soledad Calicdan through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo filed a complaint alleging the DOD was void
 June 29, 1992
o Said the SC took advantage of her incompetence in getting the land, allowed him to live there
through her tolerance
o SC  He has been living publicly, peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession for 45 yrs
 SolCal barred by prior judgement
 In special proceedings for the Inventory of Props of Incompetent SolCal, subject land
was not in her inventory of props
 TC  Ruled for SolCal
 CA  Reversed
o SolCal lost ownership of prop by prescription

Issues:
W/N DOD IV was valid? NO
 When Sixto died, Spanish Civil Code was the law
o Surviving spouse had UF rights over the estate of the deceased spouse
 SC derived his rights from that of FC’s only acquired UF rights, which FC could convey
 No proof that DOD was valid
o Even SC said that he had no personal knowledge of whether sixto purchased the land from
Felomino Bautista
 People v Guittap  ROC R130 S36: Witness may only testify on facts personally known to
him, otherwise, it would be mere hearsay
W/N Sol Cal lost ownership by prescription? YES
 Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over an immovable
o Possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse
o Ordinary  W/ good faith = 10yrs + Extraordinary  Regardless of good faith = 30 yrs
 Good faith = reasonable belief that the person from whom he got the things was owner and
could transmit ownership
 SC has been in adverse possession of land for 45 years, both OP and EP apply
 Cultivated fruits, paid taxes ( good indica, but not proof of ownership)
 DOD IV was void bec it was executed by FC who was not the owner
o May be used to show exclusive and adverse character of SC possession
 Maningding v CA
 It could still constitute legal basis for adverse possession
  Still circumstance which may explain adverse and exclusive character of possession
(Pensader v Pensader)

Shoppers Paradise Realty and Development Corp v Efren Roque

Facts:
 Dec 23, 1993  SP rep’d by its President Veredigno Atienza entered into a 25yr lease with Dr Felipe
Roque over a parcel of land (2036sqm) in Novaliches QC
o Covered by TCT in the name of FR
o SP issue a check to FR for P250K by way of reservation of payment
o FR and SP entered into a memo of agreement for the construction, development, and operation of a
commercial building complex on the prop
 SP issued another P250K check as downpayment to FR
 CT of lease and Memo of agreement were both notarized, and were to be annotated in the TCT within by
Feb 23, 1994
o FR died on Feb 10, 1994  SP had to deal with ER, FR kid, negotiations broke down due to
disagreements
 ER told SP to desist from attempting to enforce CT of lease and Memo
 ER filed a case for annulment of CT of lease and Memo with prayer for issuance of
Preliminary Injunction in RTC
 ER said he was the absolute owner of prop due to DOD IV executed by his parents in
his favor on Dec 26, 1978
o Donation was made in a public instrument acknowledged by donor spouses,
before a notary public, and accepted by ER on the same day on the same
deed
o Title to prop remained under FR name and was only transferred to ER on
May 11, 1994
 ER said he only gave his dad power of administration over the prop, and he only
found out about SP CT and Memo when FR died
 TC  Ruled for SP
o DOD need not be reg’d in order for it to be valid
 Need to be reg;d for it to be binding against 3rd persons
 When FR entered into SP CT, ER could not assert the unregistered DOD and say that FR was
not absolute owner of prop
 Reg of DOD after execution of lease CT did not affect the lease, unless FR had
knowledge of this at time of registration of CT  Not established by ER
o ER even met with officers of SP before he caused reg of DOD
o Lease unregistered but still valid bec no 3rd persons involved
 ER not 3rd person bec he is successor-in-interest of FR
 1311 CTs take effect between parties and their assigns, and
heirs  ER bound by CT, agreements perfected bec of P500K
payment of SP
 CA  Reversed TC
o SP not purchaser in good faith bec it had prior knowledge of donation to ER
 This knowledge had the effect of registration of DOD in so far as SP was concerned
 VA testimony showed he knew land was donated to ER

Issues:
W/N ER was owner of the land? YES
 Existence of unregistered DOD is undisputed
o DOD = mode of acquiring ownership, donation is an effective transfer of title over prop from donor
to the donee
o Donations of immovable prop  law requires that it should be contained in a public doc specifying
prop to be donated, and the value of charges donee must satisfy
  CC  Title of ownership, or other rights over immovable prop, not annotated in Registry of
Land shall not prejudice 3rd persons
 Enough bet parties of a donation of an immovable that the donation be made in a
public doc, for it to be binding on 3rd persons, donation must be registered in
registry of prop (PD 1529: Prop registration Decree S51)
 Person dealing with registered land may rely on correctness of Cert of title
o Not required to go beyond this cert to determine cond of prop  HOWEVER, if this party had
knowledge of prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired right to prop, this
knowledge would have the effect of reg towards him
o CA found that SP had knowledge of donation at time it entered into 2 agreements with FR
 During negotiations, SP was appraised of the fact that prop belonged to ER
 Not shown that FR was agent of ER
o Acts of agent in rep of another is with consent of the other
o 1878: Special power of atty needed to lease any real prop for more than one year
 ER not guilty of laches (failure for an unreasonable length of time to do what should have been done
earlier)  only found out about agreements when his dad died
 ER not estopped for repudiating CT  No showing that he intended to conceal facts concerning prop, SP
not shown to be unaware of real ownership of prop
o Estoppel in pais reqs
 Clear conduct amting to false rep or concealment of material facts
 Intent that this conduct influences other party
 Knowledge of the real facts
o Party claiming estoppel reqs
 Lack of knowledge of truth of facts
 Good faith reliance on conduct of party to be estopped
 Action or inaction based on such character

Eduarte V CA

Facts:
 Pedro Calapine was registered owner of a parcel of land(12k sqm) in San Pablo City, covered by OCT
o PC executed Donation inter vivos over ½ portion to his niece Helen Doria
 He executed another deed ceding the whole prop to HD, OCT cancelled, TCT issued in HD’s
favor
 HD donated 157 sqm to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church  TCT issued for this portion
o HD sold to spouses Eduarte the remaining portion of the land donated to her, save for the 700 sqm
portion where HD house was  TCT issued for SE
 PC claimed that his signature in the DOD was a forgery + HD unworthy of her liberality
o PC brought suit against HD, CC, SE to revoke donation made for HD
 SE  Denied knowledge of DOD, said that PC signature was genuine
 CC  Willing to reconvey to PC prop given to them
o PC died, sub’d by his nephews
 TC  Declared dod VOID
 Ca  Affirmed TC
o Gave more credence to expert witness NBI doc examiner Bienvenido Albacea
o HD committed an act of ingratitude when she falsified PC signature (765)

Issues:
W/N HD performed an act of ingratitude? YES
 SE  No bec ingratitude only for crimes against persons
o Wrong  Tolentino says all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for
revocation
W/N Doc examiner should be followed? YES
  Value of opinion of a handwriting expert depends upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out the
distinguishing marks and characteristics, and discrepancies which ordinarily escape notice of an
unpracticed observer
o NBI examiner was more exhaustive accdg to CA in contrast with SE witness from PCCL
 PCCL flaws  did not make through examination of all the signatures, they admitted that
they overlooked the examination of 3 standard specimen signatures of PC
W/N SE builders in good faith? YES
 Possession cannot defeat title of a holder of reg’d torrens title of a property
o Forged title can be the root of a valid title
 When SE bought prop from HD, it was already covered under HD TCT
 Although TCT was fraudulently secured, this cannot prejudice the rights of SE bec there was
no showing that they knew about this
 They are not obliged to go beyond the TCT which appeared valid on its face

Noceda v CA

Facts:
 Aurora Directo, Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo = daughter, grandson, and widow of the late Celestino
Arbizo (died in 1956)
o Extrajudicially settled a parcel of land in Zambales said to have an area of 66, 530 sqm, Lot 1121
 AD got 11k, RN got 13k, MA got 41k
 AD donated 625 sqm of her land to RN, who was her nephew aka son of her dead sis
o Another extrajudicial settlement was made over the same lot, with the same parties
 3/5 went to MA, 1/5 each to RN, and AD
 Said parcel of land only had 29k sqm
 RN constructed his house on the land donated to him by AD
o AD fenced the portion allotted to her in the EJS, excluding the land donate, and constructed 3 huts
on her land
 RN removed the fence, and occupied the 3 hots and fenced the entire land of AD without her
consent  AD told him to stop and vacate but he refused
 AD filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of prop and annulment of donation against RN
o TC ordered a relocation survey by Edilberto Quejada (Geodetic Engineer from Bureau of Lands)
 Area of Lot 1121 was actually 127k sqm
 EQ subdivided the lots
 Lot A (12k sqm)  RN
 Lot C (12Ksqm)  AD
 Lot B (38K sqm)  MA
 RTC  Declared EJS valid, DOD revoked
 RN appealed to CA, which affirmed TC

Issues:
W/N 1121 contains an area in excess of that stated in its tax declaration? NO
 Both parties were given a chance to have prop resurveyed
o AD suggested EQ, not opposed by RN
 EQ survey conducted in the presence of both parties taking into consideration the 2nd EJS, and DOD
executed by AD for RN
o Report of EQ was approved by TC, and survey was done with the conformity and presence of both
parties
 3 persons were not prejudiced by the judicial determination
rd

o RN  Name of Cecilia Obispo was also declared in subject lot, and free patent was issued in her
name
 Fact that CO has TD’s in her name and other persons occupied the lot did not make them
indispensable parties
 No evidence that CO possessed or claimed possession of 1121 (TD’s are not proof of
ownership)
  AD requested the appearance of CO but despite court notice, she failed to appear to
protect her alleged interests
 Occupants of 1121 need not be impleaded  issues in this case are of the usurpation of RN
in AD land, and the revocation of the DOD
 Not indispensable parties bec the subject matter of the case is distinct, and divisible
from their interests
 AD is only claiming a portion of 1121 not the entire area
W/N 1121 should be partitioned in accordance with the 2nd EJS? YES
 Discrepancies bet 2 EJS only meant that the 2nd one would supersede the 1st
 Signature of RN in 2nd EJS showed his conformity to the new one
o Fact that he occupied the portion allotted to him in the 2nd EJS, as well as that which was donated to
him by AD showed his knowledge of the boundaries allotted to him
 Statement in 2ND EJS that 1121 was 29k sqm is not conclusive bec it was found that lot was actually bigger
W/N Allotting Lot C as appearing in survey plan of EQ was mistaken to give it to MA? NO
 RN is in effect denying that MA was the 3rd wife of CA, and that Agripina is her half sister
o In EJS  MA is named one of the co-heirs of RN being the widow of his grandpa CA
 Names of Agripina, and Anacleto do not appear in EJS bec accdg to RN, they sold their shares
to MA
o MA is one of the signatories to the EJS
 RN knew that MA was the widow of CA, and he knew of the sale of the share of Anacleto
Arbizo, as well as that of Agripina
 RN was already 41 yo when he signed to EJS
o If he did not know these facts, then he would not have agreed to EJS
W/N EN usurped area of AD and w/n DOD may be revoked? YES
 Relocation survey of EQ was based on 2nd EJS, and the actual possession of the parties, and technical
description of 1121
 Survey plan  portion denominated as Lot C was being occupied by AD, and it was shown that it is lot C
where 625 donated prop is located
 Co-ownership among heirs was intestate succession
o When there are 2 or more heirs, whole estate of the decedent is before partition owned in common
by the heirs
 Partition extinguishes co-ownership, when parties agreed to EJS, this was a partition
o Lots now specifically delineated in survey plan, no co-ownership when portion owned is
identifiable, though not technically described
 Established that RN occupied the portion donated to him as well as the fact that he fenced the whole area of
lot C, which belongs to AD
o Did without her consent, act of usurpation, and considered an act of ingratitude by the donee
against the donor
 Right to enforce has not prescribed
o RN says yes bec as admitted by AD, RN usurped her prop in 1st week of Sept 1985 and filed action
on Sept 16, 1986 aka more than 1yr  Wrong
 769CC 
 Donor must file the action to revoke donation within 1 yr of knowledge of the
ingratitude of the donee
 Must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the action within the
same period
 These 2 reqs were not shown by RN
 He said that 1yr period started on 1st week of Sept 1985, not from time of
knowledge of AD
 No showing that AD had knowledge of usurpation at that time
o Action to revoke by reason of ingratitude reqs
 Prescribes within 1 yr counted from the time
 Donor had knowledge of fact
 Provided that it was possible for him to bring action
  Incumbent upon RN to show proof of concurrence of 2 conds so that 1yr period may start

Yulo and Sons v Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo

Facts:
 CJ Yulo and sons inc donated to RC a parcel of land in Laguna
o CRC = Religious corp engaged in humanitarian Christian Work in Laguna and elsewhere
 Educated and formed the young, cared for the infirm and the aged
 CJ recognized the need for an institution that will care for the homeless and destitute old
people  Willing to help by donating land necessary for housing, as well as an area where it
may raise crops for the support of its residence
 RJ willing to accept CJ help
o CJ donated land and a Green Belt 15 meter wide to separate land from highway
 Green belt devoted by RJ for the raising of agricultural crops for the consumption of the
residents of the home
 Crops may be used to defray costs of running the home
 Should area become fully urbanized  it is to be put to commercial use by RJ by
leasing it for socially acceptable activities
o Rentals should meet home expenses
 RJ recognized generosity of Yulo fam especially Jose Yulo Sr
 Except with prior consent of CJ, RJ shall not sue the land except for the purpose state
 Cant sell or dispose of land, or convey any portion of it except in lease for
commercial use
 If this not followed, prop reverts back donor
o TCT of CJ cancelled and replaced by one for RJ
 1980  For the purpose of generating funds to build the perimeter fence on donated prop and the
construction of a nucleus building for the aged and infirm RJ leased a portion to Martin Gomez
o MG planted sugar cane on it
o Done without consent of CJ
 1986  RJ leased a portion to Jose Bostre who used the area as a ranch
o RJ did this to protect premises from vandals, and for the electrification of the nucleus building
o Named as Casa dela Merced
o Done without consent CJ
 Leased a portion to Rudy Caballes who used it as a fattening area for his castles
o Done to raised funds for the completion of CDM
o Done without consent of CJ
 Miguel Yulo (President of CJ) said that CJ was revoking the donation due to RJ non-compliance and material
breach of the conditions stipulated
o RJ through Bishop Bantigue  Denied material breach, refused to turn over prop
 CJ filed complaint in RTC alleging non-compliance, and violation of RJ of conds
o Due to non-construction of the home for the aged despite lapse of reasonable time
o Present land use of the area is a cattle farm due to lease
o No prior consent of CJ has been obtained for the use of the prop
 RJ  Said it was doing its best to comply with OBs
o Leased portion were with the express, unwritten consent of Jesus Yulo
 TC  Ruled for CJ
 CA  Reversed and ruled for RJ

Issues:
W/N Donation may be revoked? NO
 CA  Donation is onerous bec RJ burdened with establishment on donated prop of a home for the aged
o There was a violation of the terms and conds of DOD when land was leased thrice
o Prescriptive period to revoke donation is 10yrs (1144CC) , not 4trs (764)  action not barred by
prescription
o Breaches were only Casual
  Republic v Silim
o Silim donated a parcel of land to Bureau of Public Schools with the cond that the prop should be
used for school purposes only
o BPS exchanged the donated prop for a bigger one so that funds for the Bagong Lipunan School
would be released
 4 types of donations
o Simple/Pure  cause is pure gratuity
o Renumeratory/Compensatory  for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past services that do
not amount to a debt
o Conditional/Modal  made in consideration of future services or where donor imposes conds,
limitations, charges on donee, the value of which is inferior to that of donation given
o Onerous  Imposes upon donee reciprocal OB, donation for a valuable consideration equal or more
in value than thing donated
 Donation here is onerous
o Validity of rights and OBs of parties is governed by law on contracts (733)
o RJ committed only casual breaches  did not detract from purpose of donations
 CT that imposed a reciprocal OB may only be breached by a substantial breach that defeats
the purpose of the reciprocal contract
 Right to rescind not absolute (UFC v CA)
 Not permitted for slight/casual breach, only for substantial ones
o In Salim, the donee did not violate the cond when it exchanged the land for a bigger one
 Still done for the purpose of the construction of the school
o In this case  3 lease CTs done for the purpose of the donation
 Lease authorized by CJ by express prov in deed, with prior consent of donor
 Lack of consent here = casual breach, does not warrant recession
 Prior written consent of donor not needed by donee when it leases
o Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v CA  Donation transfers full ownership to donee,
prohibition against alienation of prop for an entire century is unreasonable (impossible cond)
o Written consent cond  Done to achieve purpose of donation
 Cond okay
 As long as CT of lease is for purpose of donation, complained acts of donee not substantial
breach
 RJ did not abandon idea for the home for the aged
o Bishop just expressed his concern that surrounding area was to be re-classified as an industrial
zone, where factories are to be put up
 Disadvantageous to health of old peeps
o Bishop asking for a possible exchange or sale of prop okay bec it still fulfills donations purpose
 Silim  Not a breach of conds of donation

Chua v Victorino

Facts:
 Case originated from 2 civil cases for ejectment filed by Mutya Victorino, owner of commercial units in
Isabella against Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian
o LC = current occupant of oen unit, HT = heirs of 2 units
o Not 1st ejectment cases  there was one before them that ended in a compromise agreement
between the parties
 Compromise Agreement
o Present rental of leased premises increased by 100%
o Rent increases shall be reviewed every 4 yrs based on prevailing rental rates at commercial
establishments
 No more than 25% increase
o LC and HT pay MV respective accrued rental differentials within 1yr period to be covered by
postdated checks
 o This CA amends 1ST CA and all terms and conds not inconsistent with this CA shall remain and
continue to be in full force and effect
 Sept 1994  MV made a rental survey and decided to increase rent by 25%
o LC and HT refused to pay increase  MV filed UD case against both parties
 Dismissed by MTC and RTC
 Reversed by CA  Ordered LC and HT to vacate
 Writs of execution issued ordering ejectment
o LC, HT filed motion to quash writs saying supervening events rendered
writ’s execution unjust
 AKA cause they accepted increase and paid it to MV
 MTCC found that they did pay even before decision of CA
 Offered to pay as early as Jan while cases were pending in RTC
o Payments accepted by MV without reservation
 MTCC quashed writs
 MV assailed quashal of writs to SC via certiorari
o Dismissed on procedural grounds
o LC and HT remained in possession of props
 Oct , 1998  MV wrote a letter to LC and HT informing them of her intention to increase rents from P6,
551.25 to P15K
o Parties refused to pay saying that this was beyond allowable rental increase in CA
o MV filed case seeking their ejectment
 MTCC dismissed cases for lack of merit, RTC affirmed
 CA reversed  Said that CA set a definite period of 4 yrs for the lease contract was
abrogated when parties refused to pay increased rentals
 Judicial relation between the parties was severed
 When MV accepted payments, an new CT of lease was entered into
o Payment of rent now on a monthly basis (1687CC), period of CT was
monthly
o Upon execution of every month, MV could increase rents and demand that
parties vacate premises upon non-compliance
 Gave lessees extension of 1 yr to vacate premises

Issues:
W/N New CT of lease was produced upon lessee’s non-payment? YES
 Lessees  NO CA was not changed
o Contend that 2nd clause of CA still governs (only 25% increase every 4 yrs allowned)
o Increase demanded by MV was more than allowable, invalid
 Right of rescission governed by 1191CC, aside from this, 1659CC also gives guidelines for rescission of CT
of lease
o Aggrieved party may 1.) Ask for rescission of CT 2.) Rescission and indemnification for damages 3.)
Indemnification for damages only, allowing CT to remain in force
o Payment of rent = statutory OB of lessee, upon their non-payment, lessor had right to avail of any of
the 3 remedies
o Obligee’s remedies upon breach of an OB are judicial in nature
 Failure of lessees to comply with increase in rental does not ipso jure produce rescission of
CT or lease
 Even if MV did not resort to judicial action to avail of 3 remedies  does not mean CT of lease remains in
force
o Availability of extrajudicial remedies for lease agreements 1673CC
 Lessor may judicially eject lessee in the ff
 Period agreed upon expires
 Lack of payment of price stipulated
 Violation of terms of Contract
 Lessee devotes thing leased to any use or service not stipulated, which cause
deterioration, or does not observe req of #2 1657CC as regards the use thereof
  Read with R70 S2 ROC  Demand to pay and vacate premises is cond for institution of
ejectment suit
 Vda. De Pamintuan v Tiglao  Lessor has option of extra judicially terminating CT of lease
by serving written notice upon lessee
 Lessor may elect to treat CT as rescinded and determine right of lessee to continue
possession
 Dio v Concepcion
 Rescission of lease CT does not require independent actions
 When lessees refused to pay rentals and when MV initiated suit  judicial bond bet parties terminated
o No more lessor-lessee relationship + CA agreement ceased
o New CT of lease did not have a period  1687 applied
 Payment of rentals now made on a monthly basis, CT of lease was on a monthly term
 MV had right to increase rental each month, subject to existing laws
 When lessees refused to pay  CT terminated, MV has right to demand them to
vacate
o CA agreement did not fix a 4yr term for CT of lease
 CA primarily dealt with amt and frequency of rent of the leased premises, not the duration
of the lease
 Par 4 CA  Lessees not allowed to unilaterally change lease CT
 SC  At first, did not state w/n CA continued to be valid
 Not valid anymore bec MV exercised right of aggrieved lessor when lessees refused
to pay

Viray v IAC

Facts:
 Subject Premises  Residential premises, Apt 1 at 1836 Sulu St Sta Cruz Mnl
o Apr 1, 1981  Owner Benjamin de Asis leased it to Rustico Victor
 Term: 3 month lease, impliedly renewable from month to month, under same terms and
conds unless revised by parties in writing, and with notice to each other of at elast 15 days
 Repossession: If lessee fails to comply with terms and conds, lessor has right upon 5 day
written notice to lessee or if he is absent, posted at the entrance of premises, to enter
and take possession of premises
 Need to take inventory of premises under presence of a witness
 RV and his wife left for Canada in Oct 1983
o Did not return until Feb 1985  Left apt in the care of their son Ramon Victor
o B. De Asis thought they abandoned the apartment bec they were away for more than a year
 Ramon was an unauthorized stranger  BDA brought action in MetC to evict him but
Spouses Victor came back and said they didn’t mean to give up the apartment, which led to
that case’s dismissal
 Despite this, RV did not re-occupy the apartment, left it in the care of their son Ramon
o 2nd week of Oct, 1985  Ramon left for Canada, and asked Roldan (bro) to look after the place
 Roldan never moved in, just installed a padlock at the main door, visited place once a week,
slept their occasionally
 Dec 1985  BDA learned about the state of affairs of the apt
o Went to see apt and saw nobody there  could not get inside bec apt was locked
o BDA caused the cutting of electrical and water service
o POSTED ON MAID DOOR OF APT NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF LEASE on ground of
abandonment and failure to pay rentals
 Could not serve notice of rentals directly bec he didn’t know where tenants were
 1ST Wk of Jan 1986  BDA returned to apt, termination notice was not there anymore
o Posted another notice  announced that he would repossess the place after 5 days to secure it
 Inventory of lessee’s things would be claimed in BDA QC house
o BDA wrote to local brgy capt asking for his presence
 Wanted him there when he intended to repossess apt on jan 5 1986
  On this date, BDA had door of apt opened and hauled tenants things after making inventory
 Repaired apt (P13, 108) and leased it to Cresencio Viray
 Roldan Victor on behalf of his dad RV filed an action for forcible entry against BDA +CV in MeTC
o Ruled for RV  RV did not abandon premises, even if he had premises could not be repossessed
without judicial action
o Repossession Clause void for being against public policy
 RTC  Directed immediate return of prop
 CA  Affirmed

Issues:
W/N BDA could forcibly repossess prop? YES
 The lease was for a definite period  may be terminated by notice at the end of any given month
o BDA posted termination of lease at doorway of apt  noted and removed by lessee’s
representative
 This type of notice of termination is valid under ROC R70 S2, if no person is found in
premises
o Lease licitly terminated  RV obliged to surrender apt but they did not, weren’t even present
when BDA repossessed prop
 Repossession stipulation allowing BDA to forcibly repossess prop is not contrary to public policy
o Allowed too in Consing v Jamandre
o Resolutory cond  upon exercise of lessor of his right to take possession of prop, contract
terminated
o American Law  when lease provides that if tenants hold over after expiration of term, landlord
may forcibly enter premises
 This cond is valid
 BDA terminated the lease and acquired an affirmative right of action to eject lessee after giving them
notice to vacate
o Fatal to any action by tenant to recover possession
o Apundar v Andrin  tenant cannot maintain an action to put landlord out bec this would allow an
ousted tenant to be restored in possession
 Affirmative right of action for landlord = defense against any maintenance action of tenant
(Circuitus est evitandus; et boni prejudices est lites dirimere, ne lis ex lite oriatur)( Ubi jus
ibi remedium, the converse of which is of course equally true, namely: Nullum jus nullum
remedium.)

Chua Tee Dee v CA

Facts:
 Agricom development corporation inc. owned a rubber plantation in Davao with an area of 132 hectares
o They planned to lease the plantation
 Chua Tee Dee, married to Amando Dee did business under the name of Pioneer Enterprises
o President of Agricom, Manuel Alba met with AD
 Discussed lease of contract
 July 22, 1985  Final contract of lease was signed before a notary public
o Agricom through Alba, Agricom stock holder Carriedo, and CTD for Pioneer all signed
 Term was for 15 years counted from the date of execution of the contract, Gives Pioneer
peaceful and quiet possession
 May be renewed for another 5 years
 Agricom turns over all inventoried machineries, equipment, and inmprovements to Pinoeer
 Pioneer returns them at end of lease
 Pioneer pays shall pay Agricom within the first 10 days of the current month
 P45K/Month for first 3 years of lease
 P60K/Month for 2nd 3 years
 P75K/Month for third 4 years
 P90K for last 5 years
  Non-payment of rentals by Pioneer entitles Agricom to an interest of 2% per month as a
penalty
 Non payment for 3 months auto terminates lease
 Pioneer, upon signing the contract pays Agricom P135K as deposit
 Sept 1  Pioneer again pays P135K
 Pioneer has the option to select Farm Personnel to retain
 Those not selected are terminated by Agricom, who pays tem separation pay
 Agricom through its representatives may enter the premises during normal business hours
with due notice to Pioneer
 May also use rest house with 2 day advance notice
 If Pioneer chooses to sell premises  Agricom would have the first option to buy the
premises
 If Pioneer comes into an agreement with a 3rd party, Pioneer has 30 days from
notice to match offer
 Upon expiration of lease or earlier termination for violation of terms  Pioneer binds
itself to peacefully turn over possession of the prop
 If Agricom has to resort to court action to protect its rights, Pioneer would have to
answer for damages aka 25% of atty fees
 Alba met with employees and updated them of their impending termination due to the CT of lease
o AD paid P270 K pursuant to lease contract (P135+P135)
o Agricom confirmed termination of employees through letters and informed them that their
separation pay shal be paid
 Employees then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal  LA rules for them, ID
 Pioneer was dragged into the labor disputes because of this  suggested a conference to Agircom to settle
labor case otherwise it would deem Ct of lease rescinded
o Aside from labor case, Pioneer through AD was being pestered by some persons who claimed that
some portions of subject land were their prop + death of Pinoeer’s foreman Elicano Apolino
exacerbated the labor problem
 Stockholders of Agricom sent notes to AD demanding payment of long overdue rentals
o Pioneer  complained of facts that disrupted operations in the plantation
o Agricom investigated and said Pioneer’s claims were unfounded  demanded back rentals for June,
July, and august 1990
 Pinoeer still was unable to pay
 Sept 1990  Agricom filed civil complaint for sum of money in RTC Davao
o Agricom  Pioneer regularly paid rent from 1985-1989
 Started delaying during 1st 6 months of 1990
 As of Aug 1990  Pioneer has balance of P120K
 Agricom made several demands for payment but Pioneer refused to pay  Compelled
Agricom to resort to services of counsel (Pioneer has to pay 25% of atty fees)
o Pioneer through CTD  Agricom has no COA
 It was Agricom who failed to comply with terms of contracts due to labor dispute
 No queit and peaceful possession
 RTC  Ruled for Pioneer
o Labor dispute prejudiced Pioneer’s operations
 Agricom filed MFR to appellate court
o Court  ordered Pioneer to pay defaulted rentals during the time case was pending
o Pioneer  1658CC said that CTD has the right to suspend payment because of Agricom’s failure to
give her pc possession
 Pioneer filed MFR in CA  Denied

Issues:
W/N Pioneer is justified in suspending the pay of rentals? NO
 Pioneer  Yes
o No peaceful and quiet possession (violated terms of contract)
o Labor case force them to pay P306K and P10K as bond premiums and atty fees
 o Agricom misrepresented itself as owner bec a lot of people were claiming parts of the land as their
own
o CTD said that the company paid rentals up to June 30, 1990 AND SUSPENDED PAYMENT AFTER
 Cause of a CT of lease is the use or enjoyment of a thing
o CTD is a lessee of Agricom, and Agricom had the duty to maintain this possession for her
Art. 1654. The lessor is obliged:
(1) To deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to render it
fit for the use intended;
(2) To make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to keep it
suitable for the use to which it has been devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary:
(3) To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire
duration of the contract.
 Peaceful and adequate enjoyment = warranty for lessee that he be not disturbed of his legal possession
o Goldstein v Roces  ruled for lessor and denied lessee’s claim for damages which resulted from the
opening of holes in the roof bec the lessor allowed it
 No proof that lessor failed to maintain peaceful enjoyment
 Lessee continued to enjoy his status despite this
 Would have been disturbed if it affected the way he possessed the premises but this
was never proven
 Pioneer stated that numerous persons claimed the land for themselves and fenced of their respective
premises
o But they did not file a court action  right to sue intruders (1664CC)
 Thus it cannot be said that Agircom violated terms
 No proof that Pioneer suffered loss due to labor dispute
o Paid rentals from 1985-1989
o Stopped after labor case was resolved
o NLRC case did not stop them from paying either