MARCH 1968 SPACE SIMULATION TESTING OF ROCKET SYSTEMS 297

existing facilities. With the possible exception of Voyager,
detect design weakness early and thereby shorten the de-
the required technology for these systems falls largely within
the current state-of-the-art. The support facilities required
for the design and development of vehicles for manned landings
on Mars and Venus will be an order of magnitude more diffi-
cult to develop and construct. The possibility of the prac-
tical application of a nuclear propulsion system for these
missions should not be overlooked.
velopment cycle and reduce the mission risk. Present facility
capabilities are marginal with respect to support of present
efforts, in terms of both environmental simulation and size.
Any proposal for a new space venture, such as the proposed
Mars landing station, must include careful consideration of the
test facilities required.

Conclusions
Space propulsion systems are so closely optimized for a
given space mission that only limited test work can be accom-
plished at sea-level atmospheric conditions, leaving the bulk of
the development effort to be accomplished in a vacuum.
Simulation of the thermal conditions to be encountered in
space is as important as the simulation of the low-pressure
environment. As more ambitious space exploration projects
are undertaken, the propulsion-system requirements will be-
come more complex and demanding. Current lunar missions
will subject the spacecraft propulsion system to near-Earth
space environments for about 2 weeks; future Mars or Venus
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References
1
Outman, V. and Wang, E. S. J., "Simulation Testing in a
Space Environment—An Assessment," Journal of Spacecraft and
Rockets, Vol. 3, No. 12, Dec. 1966, pp. 1697-1716.
2
Barnes, L. T. and Wolff, H., "Special Areas of Rocket Test-
ing," Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, Vol. 3, No. 3, March
1966, pp.289-301
3
Williams, R. B. and Fergus, J. L., Jr., "Performance and
Operating Experience of a Space Simulation Chamber Used for
Propulsion Testing," The Journal of Environmental Sciences,
Vol. 8, No. 3, June 1965, pp. 38-44.
4
Fergus, J. L., Jr. and Gall, E. S., "Techniques Used to Test
Small Rocket Engines at Near Space Conditions," Paper 64-203,

1964, AIAA, New York.

missions, for ~2 yr. New testing effects can be expected; 5
Fergus, J. L., Jr., "Recent Liquid Rocket Space Ignition-
near-real-time tests in a space-simulation facility should be Reliability Testing Experience," Paper 67-428, 1967, AIAA,
a basic part of the over-all development plan, to predict or New York.

MARCH 1968 J. SPACECRAFT VOL. 5, NO. 3

Development of a Manual Thrust-Vector-Control Mode for Apollo

0. H. LlNDQUIST*
Honey well Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.

The considerations and analysis used in making the decision to modify the Apollo Com-
mand Module's stabilization and control system (SCS) to include manual thrust-vector control
(MTVC) are reviewed. The addition of MTVC substantially improved the probability of mis-
sion success and provided a redundancy to fulfill system design criteria related to single-
point failures. Simulations involving astronauts and engineering test pilots were imple-
mented, and it was concluded that MTVC was feasible as a backup mode if vehicle rate was
damped in pitch and yaw. Starfield simulation tests showed that the astronaut could use
the spacecraft window as a backup reference. For direct control of engine gimbal position,
MTVC was shown to be adequate for single-axis control and just acceptable as an emergency
multi-axis mode. Testing employing flight hardware configurations has verified the value
of MTVC. This paper summarizes the results of systems and analytical work conducted
in the 1963-65 period.

Nomenclature Ixx) lyy, Izz = moments of inertia about the vehicle x, y, and z
axes, respectively
e.g. = center of gravity •I xy, Ix*> Iy* — products of inertia
Ih — engine moment of inertia le, IQ = distances from engine hinge point to engine e.g.
and to vehicle e.g., respectively
Presented as Paper 67-243 at the AIAA Flight Test, Simula- Ze, IL = distance from engine hinge point to sloshing-
tion and Support Conference, Cocoa Beach, Fla., February 6-8, propellant spring attachment point
1967; submitted February 20, 1967; revision received September mo = total propellant mass
5, 1967. The work reported in this paper "was performed under
Contract M3J7XA-406004 from North American Aviation Inc., mi = effective sloshing mass
Space and Information Systems Div., to Honeywell Inc., and is me) niT = engine mass and total mass, respectively
released by permission of NASA. The efforts of the many T — engine thrust
individuals on the Apollo project at Honeywell, NAA S and ID, TRJ = roll reaction jet torque
and NASA contributed to this paper. The author is especially yF, 2/L = fuel and oxidizer tank coordinates
grateful to D. C. Sederstrom of Honeywell, who was instru- 2/c.g., zc.s. = displacements of vehicle e.g. from y and z axes,
mental in the conceptual thinking and analysis of the first phases respectively
of the study reported herein, and to R. E. Oglevie and G. E. Tutt ZF, ZL = fuel and oxidizer tank coordinates
of NAA, who directed and managed the Honeywell efforts in the 5<3, SR = engine gimbal angular displacements in x-z and
manual TVC area. x-y planes, respectively
* Project Engineer, Systems and Research Division. fx = viscous damping coefficient of sloshing propellant
 298
"*-QF, ^QL = displacement of fuel and oxidizer from equilib-
rium in x-z and x-y planes, respectively
<j>, 0, $ — roll, pitch, and yaw Euler angles, respectively
Introduction
AFTER translunar injection and separation from launch
-£^- booster systems, the velocity of the Apollo Command
and Service Modules is modified by firing the service module
propulsion system (SPS). Several small mid course velocity
corrections are expected going to and from the moon. Major
velocity changes are made to provide lunar orbit insertion,
transearth injection, and abort functions.
In 1962 the stabilization and control system (SCS) did not
include manual thrust-vector control (MTVC) for reasons
which were related to stability, pointing accuracy, human
variability, and the supposed complexibility of manual TVC
equipment. The gimbaled engine and SPS were thought to
have a stability problem not amenable to manual control.
The nature of the problem can be seen in an early study of
MTVC using a mathematical "human transfer function" and
a root-locus analysis. The lightest and most difficult con-
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figuration to control was used in the analysis. For the human
transfer function, a 0.2-sec reaction time and a 0.1-sec neuro-
muscular lag were chosen. A simple human transfer function
was selected which represented the stability limits of the
human. It was assumed that the astronaut could do at least
as well as the assumed human transfer function, and could
compensate for some of the problems found in the simplified
analysis. Manual control of both rate and attitude, and
direct gimbal position system, without damping, were as-
sumed.
The root-locus technique was used because of the interest
in the transient response of the system. The general form of
the root locus for the problem under consideration is shown
in Fig. 1. One can see why fuel slosh presents a difficulty.
A locus passes from the fuel-slosh pole to the operator reaction
time zero in the right-half plane. If the open-loop pole is on
the imaginary axis (or to the right of it) any finite gain will re-
sult in a closed-loop pole in the right-half plane. With the
TAIL WAG DOG ZERO
REACTION TIME
POLE
5
REACTION TIME
ZERO
FUEL SLOSH
SINGULARITIES
NEUROMUSCULAR
LAG
Fig. 1 General form of root locus.
O. H. LINDQUIST J. SPACECRAFT
latest fuel-slosh data, which were used in this analysis, this
does not always give disastrous results. The reason probably
is that for low gains, the residues for closed-loop poles are
small; i.e., the contribution of this pole to the over-all tran-
sient response is not a major factor. However, the untrained
subject, with his natural tendency to overcontrol, raises the
gain to a level where the response quickly becomes a divergent
oscillation.
If the fuel-slosh singularities are removed, the loci from
the poles at the origin ultimately cross the imaginary axis and
terminate at the reaction time zeros. Thus, even without
fuel slosh, the man-machine combination goes unstable when
the gain is raised sufficiently. Since reducing vehicle inertia
is equivalent to raising gain, the lighter configuration is
basically more difficult to control.
HoneywelPs experimental results indicate that although
none of the quasi-linear transfer functions completely describe
the human operator, he can sometimes stabilize the
vehicle even when the open-loop fuel slosh pole is in the right-
half plane, whereas all the quasi-linear transfer functions show
the impossibility of so doing. However, such study does pro-
vide insight into the control problem and its possible solutions.
The average performance was reasonably well-described by
the transfer function used.
The next major question was whether acceptable pointing
accuracy could be achieved. A pointing error during engine
firing causes a lateral velocity buildup. Correction of atti-
tude error alone will not remove the accumulated lateral
velocity; an attitude correction in the opposite direction
must be made. The time integrals of the accelerations in
lateral directions must be made close to zero at the end of the
run. Although automatic systems provide for this integra-
tion, the mental integration capability of an astronaut was
an unknown, especially when attitude excursions were large
or fuel slosh or stability problems existed. Major initial
transients were expected because of errors in gimbal trim,
thrust misalignment, and initial miscalculation of center of
mass. This initial transient caused an immediate stability
problem and introduced a cross-course velocity. After the
initial transient, additional difficulties were introduced by
changing inertias, a moving center of gravity (e.g.) due to fuel
consumption, and the buildup of fuel-slosh forces.
The fact that no measure of human performance variability
was available for mission planning purposes was a drawback.
The problem was such as to suggest that So- deviations in
human performance would be unacceptably large.
Finally, it was believed that the equipment needed for
adequate MTVC probably would be more complex than the
SCS automatic system. It was thought that special displays,
controls, display computation, and special reference equip-
ment might be necessary; this was especially important in
early 1962 when vehicle characteristics such as body bending,
e.g. travel, and fuel slosh were not well-established. There-
fore, an automatic SCS design was defined in 1962. It
achieved TVC through either 1) a primary guidance and
navigation (G & N) mode using the vehicle's central digital
computer and inertial platform, or 2) the backup mode pro-
vided in the SCS, which used a strapdown reference system
and a simplified control concept.
The studies described herein were initiated in 1963 to in-
vestigate the value and feasibility of adding manual TVC.
It was done in four phases, which are discussed in the follow-
ing sections.
Phase I—Determination of the Value of
Adding Manual TVC
Since the SCS was already designed to accomplish the
Ay requirements, justification for an addition of MTVC had
to be based upon providing additional capability. A mission
requirement was that no single-point failure would endanger
 MARCH 1968 A MANUAL THRUST-VECTOR-CONTROL MODE FOR APOLLO
crew survival. Several such cases had been identified which
could be eliminated by other modifications; however, it was
determined that adding MTVC could provide the required
redundancy, provided that required system performance
criteria could be met. Simplicity was sought to improve re-
liability. The contributions of various MTVC concepts to
the probability mission success were estimated using the as-
sumption that MTVC could meet system performance re-
quirements.
A significant unknown factor was the G & N failure rate.
Reliabilities were estimated using parametric failure rates
appropriate to the complexity of the G & N equipment in-
volved. The total TVC mission time was assumed to be 3 hr.
It was assumed that under certain circumstances the space-
craft window could be used in lieu of the display (see next
section) and that the window could be used as a reference with
a reliability of 1.0.
Numerous combinations of automatic and manual control
were studied. Various complexities of manual mode were
postulated. It was concluded that the simplest redundant
manual system could reduce the probability of TVC failure
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by 88%. A manual system with a pitch and yaw damper
could reduce failure probabilities by 84%. This capability
improvement was sufficient to warrant the continuation of
the study.
Phase II—Preliminary Feasibility
The principal part of the feasibility study was devoted to
an experimental investigation of human capability in TVC
using an analog simulation (Fig. 2). The study was limited
to a single axis, since only a general result was sought and
time was limited. The simulation included body bending,
fuel slosh, and servo amplifier nonlinearities. The right-
hand, 3-axis hand controller was similar to that in the present
Apollo manual control. The problem was restricted to the
yaw axis. Rate, angular displacement, and attitude errors
were displayed on the Apollo flight director attitude in-
dicator (FDAI), and gimbal angle was given by the gimbal
position indicator (GPI). No components were added to
the existing SCS, except those required to sum the rotational
controller output with the gimbal position and rate signals.
Flight conditions prior to translunar injection, at the start
of transearth injection, and at the end of transearth injection
were investigated. Manual control prior to translunar in-
jection proved to be a simpler task; in contrast, at the end of
transearth injection, manual control was very difficult for
periods exceeding 20 sec. When fuel slosh was eliminated
from the problem by uncoupling it from the vehicle equations,
manual control was possible. Errors were well within system
requirements for the most suitable control stick authority;
it is significant that the errors were appreciably lower when
the control stick authority was reduced. Initially, full stick
deflection was made to command maximum engine gimbal
deflection.
The tests were conducted with no fuel-slosh damping.
When damping as low as 0.01 was added to the fuel-slosh
equations for the most difficult flight conditions, the problem,
though still difficult, was reduced to manageable proportions.
An effort was made to improve performance and ease the
operator's task with command needle "quickening" (adding
of derivative information to error signals). Performance of
subjects who were well-versed with the problem was not ap-
preciably improved by the combinations investigated; how-
ever, time did not permit optimizing the proportions. For a
student who had had no previous experience with manual con-
trol of simulated flight problems, quickening was very bene-
ficial. However, the addition of quickening would have in-
creased the complexity of MTVC, and since no appreciable
gain was obtained for trained subjects, its use was not con-
sidered advisable. This study phase employed simulation
with a fixed e.g. and constant mass and inertia.
299
VEHICLE DYNAMICS
RIGID BODY + BODY BENDING PLUS:
1. FUEL SLOSH WITHOUT DAMPING
2. NO FUEL SLOSH
3. FUEL SLOSH WITH 0.01 DAMPING RATIO
Fig. 2 Block diagram of system studies.
Attempts were made to damp the fuel slosh manually.
Limited success was attained, but the simultaneous accom-
plishment of precise manual attitude control and manual
fuel-slosh damping is exceedingly difficult. When the thrust
vector is misaligned with the e.g., there is a changing angular
velocity; superimposed on this is an oscillatory rate due to the
fuel slosh. The nature of the problem is such that the opera-
tor normally makes corrections in gimbal position, which ag-
gravates the fuel slosh.
Two other problems were very briefly investigated. A
vehicle angular-rate command system made the manual con-
trol task a simple matter. (This type of control later became
the primary MTVC technique.) When a system in which the
rotational-controller commanded engine gimbal rate was used,
the vehicle was clearly uncontrollable. No effort was made
at the time to determine what might be done to make such a
system workable.
As noted earlier, a mental integration process is involved in
the elimination of lateral velocity by introducing an opposed
attitude error. The final error (in the absence of a machine-
integrated lateral acceleration signal) depends on the ac-
curacy with which the human operator can average out the
attitude errors. If the initial misalignment is corrected
quickly, 1) there is less error to compensate for, and 2) fuel
slosh does not generally become so difficult to handle.
From the feasibility study it was concluded that single-
axis manual control is possible under the following conditions:
1) when the right-hand rotational controller commands engine
gimbal angle, 2) at all flight conditions investigated except
the end of transearth injection, and 3) at the end of trans-
earth injection when fuel-slosh damping of 0.01 is added.
Phase III—Selection of Preferred Manual
TVC Modes
The Phase I and Phase II studies were reviewed and a more
comprehensive conceptual study was authorized. Prior to
3-axis work, single-axis studies were continued to investi-
gate the effects on performance of variations in servo loop
gain, hysteresis and stiction in engine gimbal and servo,
thrust buildup characteristics, viscous fuel-slosh damping, size
of the initial disturbance, command needle quickening, and
rate needle sensitivity. These studies provided the basis for
determining which simulation refinements could be eliminated
from 2- and 3-axis studies.
The 3-axis analog computer simulation included available
information related to inertias, engine and vehicle dynamics,
control system characteristics, and all important problem
factors. The time-variable parameters of moments of inertia,
mass, and e.g. location were manually set. Figure 3 is a
 300
MANUAL
INPUT •-T^IH-S^
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block diagram of the simulation for a single axis from com-
manded gimbal angle to vehicle acceleration. The study
used the Honeywell command module mockup and early
model controls and displays.
A significant improvement in reliability was achieved by
replacing the attitude reference by a simple simulated star-
field. A picture of a starfield was mounted on the pen holder
on an x-y plotter and simply reflected by a mirror to the sub-
ject. A grid simulated marks on the window.
Subjects were given written and verbal explanations and
demonstrations of MTVC. The main body of data was
gathered using six subjects, all of whom were engineers
associated with the Apollo project, and some of whom were
active or former pilots. Attention was concentrated on the
direct MTVC (gimbal position control), the simplest hard-
ware concept. Subjects were debriefed after experi-
mentaLsessions. A series of tests was conducted to establish
optimum system parameters such as stick authority.
The preliminary results of the Phase II study were sub-
stantiated. Two- and three-axis performance is summarized
in Table 1. Dampers-off performance is not reported be-
cause, in general, control could not be consistently maintained
in this simulation. One subject was able to master the tech-
nique; his results with the use of the simulated window are
shown. The study concentrated on the difficult end-of-
Table 1 Two- and three-axis performance
Percent of allowable
automatic
system performance
No. of
Display Dampers subjects 2-axis
FDAI On 6 85%
Window On 6 102%&
Window Off 1 no%
a
The starfield did not have 3-axis capability.
b Limited tests with single superior subject.
O. H. LINDQUIST J. SPACECRAFT
Fig. 3 Single-axis block dia-
gram.
transearth injection, because better performance could be
expected in all other flight conditions. The general nature of
the problem is shown in Fig. 4, a computer trace of the
dampers-off condition.
Before practice, the subject aggravated the fuel-slosh dis-
turbances (\QL and \RL) by overcontrolling, and lost control
of vehicle attitude in pitch and yaw (6 and \}/). The cross-
course errors (V, and Vy) were uncontrolled and divergent.
After practice the subject was able to control the problem and
had small Vz, Vy errors. A mild divergence in vehicle atti-
tude and fuel slosh occurred, indicating a marginal stability
condition. When simple pitch- and rate-axis damping is
added, the vehicle becomes stable, and Vz, Vy errors usually
are further reduced. The subject's work load is dramatically
reduced.
The Phase III study led to the following results:
1) MTVC is feasible as backup in 2 axes if rate is
damped automatically. Average performance can be ex-
pected to be of the same order of magnitude as 3o- perfor-
mance in SCS AF. Control of the third axis, roll, adds little
to the difficulty of the task; manual control in roll should be
direct. MTVC is feasible in a single axis without the aid of
a rate damper.
2) The FDAI provides an adequate display during manual
control of thrusting. In 2 or 3 axes, a 100% workload results.
The window can be used as a source of attitude and rate in-
formation. A rectangular window grid is a valuable aid.
3) Gimbal position trim potentiometers ease hand strain
considerably when used to reduce rotation control bias re-
quired to balance initial thrust misalignment.
Phase IV—Measurement of Expected
3-axis Performance
85% In this phase, Honeywell prepared a simulation, and in
a
a 1964 astronauts and NASA test pilots evaluated the proposed
systems. Whereas the previous simulation had been re-
stricted to the analog computer facility and took only worst-
case conditions, the expanded simulation allowed more re-
 MARCH 1968
A MANUAL THRUST-VECTOR-CONTROL MODE FOR APOLLO
301
alism through use of the PDP-1 hybrid computer. The digital
computer simulated the variable parameters (moments of
inertia, mass, and e.g. location) in addition to spacecraft
attitudes, linear accelerations, and linear velocities. The
fuel-slosh simulation was reviewed with NASA Manned
Spaceflight Center (MSC) in Houston and was improved
A more representative set of SCS hardware related to
MTVC was assembled and calibrated to assure its fi-
delity to the then existing procurement specification. Figure
5 shows the test station used by the subjects. The controls
and displays were engineering models very similar in appear-
ance and function to Apollo production hardware. The star-
field simulation was improved by a projection technique that
provided a field of view more similar to the actual window
The x-y plotter was still used as the driving mechanism and
restricted window maneuvers to two degrees of freedom The
vehicle data were reviewed and brought up to the latest avail-
able information.
Each subject was briefed on the nature of the problem and
on the control performance he was expected to supply man-
ually. He was allowed to structure his own practice and to
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Fig. 5 View of test station.

proceed with a minimum of coaching to develop his own

technique. Practice was quite beneficial when he reached
the problem of direct control with 3<r disturbances in both
pitch and yaw axes. Practice runs were made both with and
without potentiometers to trim out thrust misalignment dis-
turbance during the runs. No instructions were given on
V 2 , FT/SEC 0-H this point, but since all of the subjects felt that the trim po-
tentiometers eased the control problems, they were used in
ail production runs.
The subjects were informally debriefed after each trial run
session, and modified Cooper scale ratings were made out
At the conclusion of all runs, each subject wrote his own an-
V v , FT/SEC 0 swers to a summary questionnaire. The results of the 'two-
ana runs are shown in Table 2. General conclusions were-
+1, ii u,° °ase did the rate-command MTVC exceed
the aUowable automatic system performance in pointing ac-
curacy In 25% of the direct runs, the error exceeded the
allowable value, the highest error being 230%.
Q/ RAD/SEC 0-
2) Control in the rate-command mode is relatively simple.
3) Manual control in the direct mode is difficult when
there are disturbances, but successful control has been ac-
complished in individual cases. Single-axis manual control
m the direct mode was managed readily within performance
0..RAD 0-
requirements.
4) The starfield as viewed through the vehicle window is
an adequate reference (better than expected) for MTVC
5) Pilot opinion indicated that a) manual control in the
rate-command mode is quite simple, b) the direct mode is ac-
R» RAD/SEC
ceptable for emergency operation," and c) in a single axis,
direct control is good.

Concluding Remarks
led to a decision to
• oo incorporate MTVC
into the bCS, and it has been introduced into both block I
and1 11 hardware. The current concept for the block II SCS
is shown in Fig. 6. Continued analytical studies using simu-
lation equipment and system verification studies using pro-
EARLY RUN
BEFORE the
PRACTICE

Fig. 4 Performance of subject 3 with simulated starfield,

More recent work has confirmed the value of MTVC for
-2-axis, 3<7 disturbance, dampers-off, flight condition 19. SS^T, in1CaS6S ?f Prfmary failure and the advantage of
MTVC for short AF maneuvers. Techniques have been de-
 302 O. H. LINDQUIST
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Fig. 6 MTVC concept for block II stabilization and
control system.
veloped for the use of the manual mode operations, and work
has been done to optimize the system and to assure stability
margins for the damper mode.
The present block II SCS provides a variety of selectable
MTVC modes, including both damper and direct modes.
Present functional requirements of the MTVC are: 1) a
simple system meeting crew survival performance require-
ments, 2) a mechanization such that a single failure in the
SCS will not disable both the manual and automatic AV
modes, 3) a capability to take over without engine shutdown
in the event of failures in automatic flight control systems,
4) an MTVC damping mode with "stick-fixed" stability
margins equal to the automatic SCS AF mode, 5) pilot
handling qualities equal to at least No. 6 on the Cooper scale
J. SPACECRAFT
Table 2 Percent of allowable system performance
(pointing accuracy)
Direct
Rate, (gimbal
Display command, % position), %
Instrument 75 90
Simulated starfield 70 100
("acceptable for emergency condition"), and 6) a system that
will permit the use of external visual attitude references as a
redundant attitude reference.
A comprehensive study of the block II MTVC mechaniza-
tion in 1965 resulted in a verification of the usefulness of the
mode. The study included astronauts and NASA and NAA
test pilots in its design. All rate-command modes were well
within mission objectives. Data have been expanded to in-
clude an estimate of 3<r values to be expected. The simula-
tions have also been amplified to include a simplified 3-
degree-of-freedom starfield. The starfield results have been
acceptable but inferior to FDAI runs; this is thought to be
due to the limited dynamic capability of the starfield simu-
lator. Recent results with direct-mode MTVC approxi-
mately match the mission pointing requirements in most in-
stances. It is regarded as a difficult but acceptable emer-
gency mode. Additional work at NAA and NASA facilities
has corroborated and expanded on this work at Honeywell.
References
1
Sederstrom, D. C. and Lindquist, O. J., "Manual Thrust
Vector Control Study—Phases I and II," Final Report, A63
760B34.1 (1), Sept. 20, 1963, Honeywell Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.
2
Sederstrom, D. C. et al., "Manual Thrust Vector Control
Study—Phase III," Final Report, A.64 760B39.2 (2), July 10,
1964, Honeywell Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.
3
Sackett, R. N. and Wingert, J. W., "Simulation Report for
SPS Modes—Manual Thrust Vector Control Study—Phase
II," 5102C-101, Aug. 2, 1965, Honeywell Inc., Minneapolis,
Minn.