1st Set - Consti1 PDF

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B.
ASUNCION
Facts:
 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with "acts
unbecoming a judge."
 Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola,
defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.
 A decision was rendered and the properties were partitioned to the hiers.
 One of the lots in the said case Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon
 On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S.
Asuncion
 On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to
"The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." where Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President
and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary.
 Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed the instant complaint alleging four causes of action, to wit:
[1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase
a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him
[2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
Issue: WON the actuation of Jude Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a civil case previously handled by
him an act unbecoming of a judge?
Held: No
 (1)WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action,
that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491. The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the
sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already
ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property"
 In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Furthermore, respondent Judge did
not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon
who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E
 (2)With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides
that:
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any
office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies
within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service.
This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor
to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
 It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of
the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship
between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
 Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the
governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. It may be recalled
that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public
officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law
Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Atty. Edgar Pascua, based on the syllabus of Atty. Montejo
Guiritan|Lao|Ng|Rañises|Sumando|Yaphockun|Golo
because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence,
political in essence.
 It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, which was extended to
the Philippines
 Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the
Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
 Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law
that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "
 There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of
Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines.
Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then
Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
 It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, however Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the
aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the
business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the
corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office.
 Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging
or having interest in any lawful business.
 In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more
discreet in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be
characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO
FACTS:
 On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel
were taking power.
 On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by
stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE: WON the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD: Yes
 The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge.
 The Court further held that the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country.
 It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. The community of nations has recognized
the legitimacy of the new government. All the eleven members of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
 The Aquino government was a resut of “direct state acton”. The entire state revolted and overthrew the government, so that
right from the beginning, the installation was already lawful and the gov’t was at all times de jure.

IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
Facts:
 In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5
(not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.
 Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the
question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-
President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being
referred to under the said Section 7
Issue: WON the provision is ambiguous?
Held: No
 The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.
 The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted
provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional
Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other
persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections.
Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first
regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution.
 Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the
judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is
in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
(Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al)
 For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no question
that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and
Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at
bar,
 ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.
LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14 November 1990.

 -The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 1980.
 -On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reogranized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to BP Blg.
129.
 -On 1984, petitoner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. Thus, he ceased to be a
member of the Judiciary.
 -After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary.
 -A Screening Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate Court and lower courts recommended
the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number 11 in the
roster of appellate court justices.
 -When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority ranking changes from number 11 to 26.

 -Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to "inadvertence" of the President, otherwise, it
would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
 -Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the
Court of Appeals.
 -The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
 -A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and Javellana who are affected by the
ordered correction.
 -They alleged that petioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where he had previously been
appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
 ISSUE: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of Appeals and Intermediate
Appellate Court exisiting before the promulgation of E.O. No. 33.
 HELD: The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to E.O. No. 33 phased
out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987 Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was established under E.O.
No. 33 is considered as an entirely new court.
 The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts existing before E.O. No. 33. It was
created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary goverment of Corazon Aqwuino in
the aftermath of the people power in 1986.
 Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who
were previously subject to it." or "as suddent. radical and fundamental change in the government or political system,
usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA
and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE
LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M.
TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L.
TOLENTINO, respondents.
 -petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal
 -petitioner de Leon received a Memorandum signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the
OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
 -respondent OIC Governor also signed a Memorandum designating other respondents as members of the Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
 -so the OIC governor in the memorandum ordered the replacement of all baranggay officials of all the baranggays in
the municipality of taytay rizal
 -petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from
taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen,
 -Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of
office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have
elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988.
 -that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace
them and to designate their successors.
 -respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution
 SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office
until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986.
 -respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners
continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired;
and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must
be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional

Constitution. So elective officials under the 1973 Constitution may continue in office but should vacate their positions
upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned.
 Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order
terminating the term of elective Barangay officials.
 ISSUE: WON the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which
ended on February 25, 1987.
 HELD: Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be
considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with
the dictates of justice.
 But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
reading.
 SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
 -1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date Provisional Constitution must be
deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on
Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
 -Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years
provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.
 -Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective
Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative.
 Thus: Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor declared to be of no legal force and effect
 Note:
 -wala na effect ang provisional constitution nung na ratify na ang 1987 consti. So 1987 consti ang mag govern na sa
kanila.
 -feb 2 1987 nag take effect ang consti (the actual date ng plebiscite) not the day of the announcement which is Feb 8,
1987.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
 -Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as well
as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and
administrative orders.
 -Respondents contended that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the
OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC.
 ISSUES: WON petitioners have legal standing? And WON various laws in question should be published to be valid and
enforceable?
 HELD: The petitioners have legal standing. The SC has already decided in various cases that a party has a cause of
action when the question posed is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty.
 -The people are regarded as the real party in interest and need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.
 -the SC also ruled that laws should be published. The clear object of such is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
 -without such notice and publication there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non
excusat”.

 -It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
 -the publication of all Presidential issuances pf a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. PDs that
provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or impose a burden such as tax and revenue measures fall
within this category. Other PDs which apply only to particular persosn or calss of persons such as AOs and Eos need
not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS (G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997)
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the outstanding shares of
Manila Hotel. Only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% shares at P41.58/share, and a Malaysian firm, at P44.00/share. Pending the declaration of the winning
bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by the Malaysian Firm which respondent GSIS refused to
accept. The petitioner posits that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony, petitioner should be preferred after it
has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm invoking Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel falls under the term national patrimony.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, WON selling mere 51% shares and not the land itself
can be considered part of national patrimony.
4. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. It is per se judicially enforceable The Constitution mandates that qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
3. Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
4. Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by the foreign firm, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the shares of MHC in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures
but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner after
the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, GSIS(respondent) is ordered to accept the matching bid of petitioner and execute the necessary clearances for
the purchase of the subject 51% MHC shares.
Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute
and contract.

Domino vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999)
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Province of Sarangani
indicating in his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2)
months immediately preceding the election. On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring
DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence
requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters declaring DOMINO a resident of the
province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City acquire the nature of res judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding the election.
3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition of DOMINO.
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes can be proclaimed as the winning candidate in the light
of DOMINO’s disqualification?
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of
Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained. It is not within the
competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceeding, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality.
The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of
voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the
ground of the voter's disqualification.
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res
judicata, it is essential that there must be between the first and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter
and identity of causes of action.
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. 25 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election
does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. 41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his
oath of office before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives. Considering that DOMINO has not been
proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a
member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over
the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him.

Pamatong vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004)
FACTS:
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign.
Petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
WON the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office" grants a constitutional right to run
for or hold public office
RULING:
No. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Also, the "equal access" provision is a
subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution. The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions 9 of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates" and outlined instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, the equal access clause is not violated.
Reasoning: There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions because
the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. Their
names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These
would entail additional costs to the government
xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to
project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim. It would be then a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, et. al., vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision, promulgated by the
Court of Appeals on 26 November 2004, denying a petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the
Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” which was issued by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on 24
May 1999.
 In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group after a series of
workshops and analyses with inputs from several consultants, program managers and technical staff possessing the
adequate expertise and experience in the health sector.
 It provided for five general areas of reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding for
priority public health programs; (3) promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective
performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the National
Health Insurance Program (NHIP).
 Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals, particularly the
collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of government hospitals.
 Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by the DOH, entitled “Guidelines and
Procedure in the Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to Achieve Fiscal Autonomy,
and Managerial Flexibility to Start by January 2001;” and Administrative Order No. 172 of the DOH, entitled “Policies and
Guidelines on the Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals in Government Health Facilities,” for
imposing an added burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for medicine and medical services.

 Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino
people as embodied in the Constitution.
 They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9,
10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article
XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical
services. This contention is unfounded.
ISSUE: WON the contentions of the petitioners are tenable
HELD:
 As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for
their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified
by the inaction of Congress.
 However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
 By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." x x x. These principles in
Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.
 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in
its enactment of laws.
 Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due
process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution.
 There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA.
 Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in
establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
 In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords
recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the
adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to
assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition.
 Petition is DENIED.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO vs. Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC. (Taas gyud kaayo ni
sya na case, guys. Gi-include na lang nako 3 issues para sure. Sorry naman)
FACTS:
 Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment.
 For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042 does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national development, but
exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-
sum salary either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause).
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest
of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
 Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract,
deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.

 Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the
time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
 Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of
his money claims.
 The LA based his (petitioner) computation on the salary period of three months only -- rather than the entire unexpired
portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract - applying the subject clause.
ISSUE (1): WON the Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way in accord with applicable decision
of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion
of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months
HELD:
 When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it
does so only when these conditions obtain:
(1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination;
(2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party and at the earliest opportunity; and
(3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case,50 otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide
the same on some other ground.
 Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving petitioner who is personally aggrieved
that the labor tribunals and the CA computed his monetary award based on the salary period of three months only as
provided under the subject clause.
 It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the
interposition of the issue in the pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings
before that competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered
on appeal.
 Nonetheless, the issue is deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA which has the competence to
resolve the constitutional issue.
 The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial function – its function in the present case is limited to
determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such
questions in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself; thus, its foremost function is to administer and
enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of its provisions.
ISSUE (2): Does the subject clause violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts?
HELD:
 NO
 Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his
employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.
 The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and
cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into
contracts and deemed a part thereof.
 Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that
would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention
of the parties thereto.
ISSUE (3): Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3,
Article XIII on labor as a protected sector?

HELD:
 YES
 To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security
and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations
should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared
the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
 Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of
classification into its legislation.
 The view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny
finds no support in American or English jurisprudence.
 There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law:
a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally
related to serving a legitimate state interest;
b) b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification
serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest;
and
c) c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the
burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
 The subject clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
 The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
 Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to
concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.
 On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA)
No. 6734 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.”
 A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
 The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.
 RA No. 9054 (entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
as Amended”) was the next legislative act passed.
o This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset
the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
 Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM – RA No. 9140[1] - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the first regular
elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001.
o It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
 RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join
ARMM on the same date.
 Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected.

 But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular
national and local elections of the country.
 With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections. The law
gave rise as well to the filing of the following petitions against its constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153.
 The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus,
have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of
RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
 The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-
reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional
HELD:
 We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.
 The Constitution mandates synchronization which is enshrined in Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
of the 1987 Constitution
 While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show
the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.
 Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is
a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
 A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in
common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails.
 Understood in its ordinary sense, the word “local” refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular
limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision.
 Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives
obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region
of ARMM.
 The records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Thus, it is
exempted with the rule on 3-readings.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission
FACTS:
 In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas.
 On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National
Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes.
 On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office.
 On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed ResolutionNo. 8 which declared with finality the victory of
petitioner.
 On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of
the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.

 On December 20, 1935, Jose A. Angara, one filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest",
alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b)
that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c)
that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period.
 The Electoral Commission denied the motion. Thus, this action in the present case.
ISSUE:
 Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly?
 HELD:
 [The Court DENIED the petition.]


 NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly.

 The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the
earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.

 The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

 [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit
the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
Philippine Coconut vs. Republic
sorry, wa jud ko kasabot. Please seek other references. :(
FACTS:
 For consideration is the Urgent Motion to Approve the Conversion of the SMC Common Shares into SMC Series 1
Preferred Shares dated July 24, 2009 (Motion) interposed by petitioners Philippine Coconut Producers Federation,
Inc., et al. (collectively, COCOFED). COCOFED seeks the Court’s approval of the conversion of 753,848,312 Class “A”
and Class “B” common shares of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) registered in the names of Coconut Industry
Investment Fund and the so-called “14 Holding Companies” (collectively known as “CIIF companies”) into
753,848,312 SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares (hereinafter, the Conversion).
 COCOFED proposes to constitute a trust fund to be known as the “Coconut Industry Trust Fund (CITF) for the Benefit
of the Coconut Farmers,” with respondent Republic, acting through the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), as trustee.
As proposed, the constitution of the CITF shall be subject to terms and conditions which, for the most part, reiterate
the features of SMC’s conversion offer, albeit specific reference is made to the shares of the 14 CIIF companies.

 Respondent Republic filed its Comment questioning COCOFED’s personality to seek the Court’s approval of the
desired conversion. Respondent Republic also disputes COCOFED’s right to impose and prescribe terms and
conditions on the proposed conversion, maintaining that the CIIF SMC common shares are sequestered assets and are
in custodia legis under Presidential Commission on Good Government’s (PCGG’s) administration. It postulates that,
owing to the sequestrated status of the said common shares, only PCGG has the authority to approve the proposed
conversion and seek the necessary Court approval.
 Jovito R. Salonga and four others assert that “the government bears the burden of showing that the conversion is
indubitably advantageous to the public interest or will result in clear and material benefit. They further postulate that
“even assuming that the proposal to convert the SMC shares is beneficial to the government, it cannot pursue the
exchange offer because it is without power to exercise acts of strict dominion over the sequestered shares.” Lastly,
they argue that “the proposed conversion x x x is not only not advantageous to the public interest but is in fact
positively disadvantageous.”
ISSUE: WON PCGG or COCOFED is authorized to seek the approval of the Court of the Series 1 preferred shares
conversion
HELD:
 The PCGG, therefore, as the “receiver” of sequestered assets and in consonance with its duty under EO 1, Series of
1986, to protect and preserve them, has the power to exercise acts of dominion provided that those acts are approved
by the proper court.
 From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that it is the PCGG—not COCOFED or the CIIF companies—that has the right
and/or authority during sequestration to seek this Court’s approval for the proposed conversion. Consequently, the
terms and conditions sought by COCOFED for the conversion are not material to the proposed conversion. At most,
COCOFED’s prayer for approval of the conversion reflects its conformity to said transfiguration.
 The Court holds that respondent Republic has satisfactorily hurdled the onus of showing that the conversion is
advantageous to the public interest or will result in clear and material benefit to the eventually declared stock owners,
be they the coconut farmers or the government itself.
 The only interest of PCGG in SMC is to protect the CIIF SMC common shares from dissipation. Even if the conversion is
approved, nothing can prevent the government from prosecuting the people whom intervenors tag as responsible for
“greasing the government and the coconut farmers of billions of pesos.”
 On the other hand, COCOFED does not stand to benefit from the conversion, because portions of the dividends or
proceeds from the redemption cannot be allocated directly to proposed beneficiaries, as this will be contrary to Sec. 2
of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 961 as amended by PD 1468. In addition, the preferred shares which will be placed in
the names of the CIIF companies, or the dividends derived from said shares, shall remain as sequestered assets until
final resolution of the ownership issue.


Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction that the courts will
DEFER to the decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by reason of their expertise and experience in the
matters assigned to them. Administrative decisions on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to
be respected and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law .
 In sum, the conversion of the CIIF SMC Common Shares to Series 1 Preferred Shares should be approved in the
best interests of everyone concerned including the government and the Filipino people.
 Once the subject conversion is accomplished, the preferred shares shall remain in custodia legis and their
ownership shall be subject to final ownership determination by the Court. In addition, the preferred shares shall be
registered in the name of the CIIF companies until the final adjudication of the issue as to the true and legal owners of
said shares. Unless and until the ownership issue shall have been resolved with finality, said preferred shares shall
remain under sequestration and PCGG management.[27]


 The preferred shares shall remain in custodia legis and their ownership shall be subject to the final ownership
determination of the Court. Until the ownership issue has been resolved, the preferred shares in the name of the CIIF
companies shall be placed under sequestration and PCGG management.
Tawang MPC vs La Trinidad

FACTS:
 Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the Cooperative Development Authority,
and organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet.
La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as
amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of
La Trinidad, Benguet.
On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of
public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC's
application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section 47
states that:
Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or
commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of
directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to
review by the Administration.

 NWRB approved TMPC's application for a CPC. NWRB held that LTWD's franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive
franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a
waterworks system.
 LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. NWRB denied. The RTC set aside the NWRB's 23 July 2002 Resolution and
15 August 2002 Decision and cancelled TMPC's CPC. The RTC held that Section 47 is valid.
ISSUE:
 WON Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid
HELD:
 Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 198 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are
exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of
franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution states that:
 No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Empahsis supplied)
 The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that, "nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive
in character." There is no exception.
 When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the
way it is worded.
 Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. What
the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President,
Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of
Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are
exclusive in character.
In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly franchises
that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD and the LWUA to create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character.

 In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is
the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to
declare void all laws that do not conform to it.
 Section 47 gives the BOD and the LWUA the authority to make an exception to the absolute prohibition in the
Constitution. In short, the BOD and the LWUA are given the discretion to create franchises that are exclusive in
character. The BOD and the LWUA are not even legislative bodies. The BOD is not a regulatory body but simply a
management board of a water district. Indeed, neither the BOD nor the LWUA can be granted the power to create any
exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution, a power that Congress itself cannot exercise.
 Sustaining the RTC's ruling would make a dangerous precedent. It will allow Congress to do indirectly what it cannot
do directly. In order to circumvent the constitutional prohibition on franchises that are exclusive in character, all
Congress has to do is to create a law allowing the BOD and the LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in
character, as in the present case.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO vs ANTONINO TOBIAS III
(2012)
FACTS:
 Tobias was introduced to Ms. Rosella santiagom OIC-Branch Head of Metrobank and thereafter opened a
savings/current account for and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months later,
 Tobias applied for a loan from METROBANK, which in due course conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias
that resulted in negative findings. METROBANK next proceeded to appraise the property Tobias offered as collateral
by asking him for a photocopy of the title and other related documents. The property consisted of four parcels of land
located in Malabon City, Metro Manila covered by TCT. Based on the financial statements submitted by Tobias,
METROBANK approved a credit line for P40,000,000.00.
 Tobias initially availed himself of P20,000,000, but took out the balance within six months. He paid the interest on the
loan for about a year before defaulting. His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months,
he again defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone
bidder. On June 11, 1999, the certificate of sale was issued in favor of METROBANK.
 When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no corresponding
original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault. Atty. Sarah Principe-Bido, Deputy Register of Deeds
of Malabon, went on to verify TCT No. M-16751 and learned that Serial No. 4348590 appearing therein had been
issued for TCT No. M-15363 in the name of one Alberto Cruz; while TCT No. 16751 (now TCT No. 390146) appeared
to have been issued in the name of Eugenio S. Cruz and Co. for a parcel of land located in Navotas.
 Thereafter, METROBANK requested the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to investigate. In its
report dated May 29, 2000, PAOCTF concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias
were fictitious. The Office of City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged him with estafa through falsification of
public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal
Code.
 In his counter-affidavit submitted during the re-investigation, Tobias averred that he had bought the property from
one Leonardo Fajardo through real estate brokers Augusto Munsuyac and Carmelito Pilapil; that the transfer of the
title, being under the account of the seller, had been processed by seller Fajardo and his brokers Munsuyac and Pilapil;
that his title and the property had been inspected and verified by METROBANK’s personnel; and that he did not have
any intention to defraud METROBANK.
 Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
 On July 20, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the
withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. Gutierrez opined that Tobias had sufficiently established his good
faith in purchasing the property.
 METROBANK moved to reconsider, arguing that Tobias had employed deceit or false pretense in offering the property
as collateral by using a fake title; and that the presumption that the possessor of the document was the author of the
falsification applied because no other person could have falsified the TCT and would have benefitted therefrom except
Tobias himself.
 On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied METROBANK’s motion for reconsideration.
 Metrobank filed a petition for certiorari before CA, however, it was dismissed. The CA stressed that the determination
of probable cause was an executive function within the discretion of the public prosecutor and, ultimately, of the
Secretary of Justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with such determination.
ISSUE:

 WON THE CA HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT AND THUS, COMMITTED PATENT ERROR IN RENDERING THE
ASSAILED DECISION DATED 29 DECEMBER 2006, DISMISSING METROBANK’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED 20 JULY 2004 AND 18 NOVEMBER 2005 OF THE HON. SECRETARY OF
JUDTICE AND IN DENYING METROBANK’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
RULING:
 The appeal has no merit.
 Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own
judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is
that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an
information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility. For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, the Court ruled that
the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he required “hard facts and solid evidence” in order to hold the
defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct
of a trial.
PEREZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2008) – this is from the notes (hehehehe!)
FACTS:
 PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Petitioner contends that the law relied upon in convicting the him and the sentence imposed is cruel and therefore
violates SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE CONSTITUTION.
RULING:
 It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in
violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law
and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is presumed
that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or
regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.
 He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus proband i to show why such law is repugnant to the
Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman,
like the stance of petitioner, must fail.
DELA LLANA VS CHAIRPERSON
Facts:
On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of government financial transactions,
albeit with certain exceptions. The circular affirmed the state policy that all resources of the government shall be managed,
expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or
improper disposition, with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of government. Further,
the circular emphasized that the responsibility to ensure faithful adherence to the policy rested directly with the chief or head
of the government agency concerned. The circular was also designed to further facilitate or expedite government transactions
without impairing their integrity.
After the change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution, grave irregularities and anomalies in the
government’s financial transactions were uncovered. Hence, on 31 March 1986, the COA issued Circular No. 86-257, which
reinstated the pre-audit of selected government transactions. The selective pre-audit was perceived to be an effective,
although temporary, remedy against the said anomalies.
With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government operations, the COA saw it fit to issue
Circular No. 89-299, the circular in issue, which again lifted the pre-audit of government transactions of national government
agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs).

The rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in management as embodied in
the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; and, second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and
improving government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and ensuring facilitation of government
transactions, while continuing to preserve and protect the integrity of these transactions.
Petitioner dela Llana wrote to the COA regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that
the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. The COA replied to petitioner, informing him of the prior
issuance of Circular No. 89-299.
On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part
of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2
of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in
government transactions have been committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-
million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.
Petitioner anchors his argument on Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which reads as follows:
Section 2.
1. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by,
or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit basis:
a. constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution;
b. autonomous state colleges and universities;
c. other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and
d. such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government,
which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.
However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt
such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
2. The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit
and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. (Emphasis supplied)
He claims that under the first paragraph quoted above, government transactions must undergo a pre-audit, which is a COA
duty that cannot be lifted by a mere circular.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the duty of the COA to pre-audit government transactions.
Held:
We find for public respondents.
The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenues and expenditures and the use of public funds and property, including the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination; to establish the techniques and methods for the review; and to
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional
mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their consumption or payment.[17] It seeks to determine whether
the following conditions are present:
1. the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority;
2. sufficient funds are available for the purpose;
3. the proposed expenditure is not unreasonable or extravagant, and the unexpended balance of appropriations to which
it will be charged is sufficient to cover the entire amount of the expenditure; and
4. the transaction is approved by the proper authority and the claim is duly supported by authentic underlying evidence.
It could, among others, identify government agency transactions that are suspicious on their face prior to their
implementation and prior to the disbursement of funds.
Petitioner’s allegations find no support in the aforequoted Constitutional provision. There is nothing in the said provision that
requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear
reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is mandated for
certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited
entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct
the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on
its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only
application.[19] Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.
HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. VS PARC
Facts:
 The hacienda comprised 6,443 has. In 1957 tabacalera sold the land to tadeco owned by the cojuancos. GSIS financed the
purchase on condition that the land will ultimately be subdivided and sold to the tenants.
 In 1980 govt filed at RTC manila case against tadeco for it to surrender the hacienda to MAR (now DAR) so the land will
be distributed to farmers. Manila RTC ruled against tadeco. Tadeco appealed to CA. In 1988 CA dismissed the appeal
subject to revival if tadeco fails to get approval of farmers of stock distribution option (SDO) and if opted by farmers
tadeco fails to implement SDO.
 In 1988 tadeco created Hacienda Luisita Inc (HLI) and tadeco bought shares of HLI in exchange of the hacienda land. The
total shares were 400,000,000 with par value of p400,000,000.00. 150,000,000 shares were for farmers and 250,000,000
shares for other stockholders. Farmers and HLI entered into stock distribution option agreement (SDOA) which provides
that farmers agree because such SDO will improve their lives and they will get greater benefits. DAR approved SDOA.
 In 1995 HLI applied to convert 500 has to industrial use. Conversion was approved. Then it transferred the 500 has to
centennary holdings inc which transferred it to luisita industrial park corp or LIPCO. LIPCO conveyed some lands to RCBC
as payment for loans. In addition to the 500 has sold to LIPCO, 80.51 has was expropriated for use of SCTEX.
 In 2003 farmer groups filed case at DAR for either renegotiation of SDOA or its revocation on ground that their lives did
not improve and they did not get fair shares in the sale of lands to LIPCO and for sctex use. DAR created task force which
recommended to parc (presidential agrarian reform coucil) that the previous order approving the SDO be revoked.
 In 2005 parc revoked the SDO and ordered the compulsory acquisition of the hacienda for distribution to farmers. HLI
went to the sc and asked for tro to stop implementation of park order. In 2006 sc issued tro. Hence the case.
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and
AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the
government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts
that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP
must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-
beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus

ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain
to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to
manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be,
over their printed names.”
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
Issues:
1. Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

2. Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
3. Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly
covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75
hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
4. Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989,
when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
5. Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since
Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the
qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they
have fully paid for the lands or not?
6. THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
Ruling:
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the
option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which
option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be
given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified
FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to
the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to
decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the
nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on
this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the
operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only
were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were
also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of
the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of
acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the
Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves
4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75
has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform
law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were
allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive –
considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-
owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per
FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be
awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of
the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is
the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda
Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare
SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The
Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of
the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when
PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural
lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a
notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno)
that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of
the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify
this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The
foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any
means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a
special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the
determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May
10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to
third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from
the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA).
Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not
the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the
option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered
nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution
under CARP.]
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the
present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is
[just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is

unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one
share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of
shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus
one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the
295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]
CANDARI VS DONASCO
Facts:
Respondents were members of the board of directors of Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative,
Incorporated (DARBCI). They were elected into office on 12 July 1998 and their terms should have ended on 12 July 2000.
However, they continued to occupy their positions in a holdover capacity until the controversy in this case arose.
Respondents instituted Civil Case before RTC of Polomolok, South Cotabato to enjoin petitioners from holding a
special general assembly (GA) and an election of officers. Respondents alleged that the process by which the GA had been
called was not in accordance with Sec. 35 of Republic Act No. 6938, otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines. Thr RTC thereby issued a 72-hr TRO to restrain petitioners from holding GA.
Despite the TRO, but without the participation of petitioners, 5,910 members – or 78.68% of the total membership of
the cooperative – went through with the GA on 26 November 2005 and elected petitioners in absentia as new members of the
board. Herein petitioners were the new elected members. Thereafter, respondents filed an Amended Complaint seeking to
enjoin petitioners from assuming office and exercising the powers conferred on directors of DARBCI.
Two more General Assemblies were held. The second GA ratified the Amended Articles of Cooperation and the
Amended By-Laws of the cooperative amending that incumbent members of the Board of Directors and various committees
who were elected into office during the November 25, 2005 (the meeting despite the TRO) special elections shall continue to
serve the cooperative until their successors have been elected and qualified into office. In the third meeting, a new set of
officers was elected by the GA.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a cause of action since the issue has already become moot.
Held:
The case was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Sec. 34 of the Cooperative Code states that the highest policy-making body of the cooperative is the GA, to wit:
The general assembly shall be the highest policy-making body of the cooperative and shall exercise
such powers as are stated in this Code, in the articles of cooperation and in the by-laws of the cooperative.
The general assembly shall have the following exclusive powers which cannot be delegated:
(1) To determine and approve amendments to the articles of cooperation and by-laws;
(2) To elect or appoint the members of the board of directors, and to remove them for cause;
(3) To approve developmental plans of the cooperative; and
(4) Such other matters requiring a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all members of the general assembly, as
provided in this Code.
In the present case, the GA has clearly expressed its intentions through the subsequent amendment of
DARBCI’s Articles of Cooperation and By-Laws and through the election of new officers.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution;
the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable
by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case
before us.
The supervening events had rendered the case moot through the voluntary act of the GA – as the highest policy-
making body of the cooperative – to declare the contested positions vacant and to elect a new set of officers. As a consequence,
respondents no longer had the personality or the cause of action to maintain the case against petitioners herein.


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BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B.

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO

ISSUE: WON the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Issue: WON the provision is ambiguous?

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

ISSUE: WON the contentions of the petitioners are tenable

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

ISSUE: WON RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

 [The Court DENIED the petition.]

Philippine Coconut vs. Republic

sorry, wa jud ko kasabot. Please seek other references. :(

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Tawang MPC vs La Trinidad

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

DELA LLANA VS CHAIRPERSON

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Whether or not it is the duty of the COA to pre-audit government transactions.

We find for public respondents.

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. VS PARC

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

1. Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

The case was dismissed for lack of cause of action.

(3) To approve developmental plans of the cooperative; and

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

Consti 1 – Sanchez Roman

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