Political Accountability in Hong Kong

Law, Ka Chung

Department of Politics and Public Administration

The University of Hong Kong

December 1996
_INTRODUCTION
The topic focuses on Hong Kong's civil servants, whereas Hong Kong is quite unique in its political-

administrative system, the direct adoption of other places' approaches in discussing the issue would bound to be

inappropriate. For instance, in Mitchell's discussion he classified 16 types of accountabilities in the USA, which
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is both impossible and unnecessary for our discussion. Not only modifications but also unique approaches are

needed for the sake of precision. Definitions or interpretations of terms will first be given as they will directly

affect the later development. Then, systematic classifications will be given for description and comparison.

Given the system, explanations will be postulated for different possible cases. In the meantime practical

situation is examined for the fitting in of the postulations. Last but not least, assumptions will be stated so as to

define the scope of validity for the discussion.

_ACCOUNTABILITY
This is the most important key word in the topic. "What is accountability?" can roughly be broken down

for our discussion since it asks too broadly. Instead we ask: "why is accountability", "how is it" and "who should

be accountable to".

Why

The non-existence of accountability was the result of the unawareness of both the ruling and the ruled

classes. The HK government was colonial in nature, and the local citizens were somewhat treated unequally as
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the "lower class" . So, the practice of elitism was taken for granted by most of the people. Thus, there was no

such concept as "accountability" within the government as there was no need to. Culture shapes the attitudes of

the people. The Chinese culture was apolitical traditionally: the people did not care much about how the

government worked so long as nothing went wrong. Hence there was no demand of accountability of the

government from the people. However, this is not so nowadays. As the increase in the flow of information and

also the degree of westernization of HK, the liberal and democratic concepts become widely accepted and as

well as the accountability. This trend is just like entropy, i.e., cannot be reversed. Later we will see what happen

if accountability is not fulfilled.

How

What accountability differs from responsibility is the former has also to be observable and measurable
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objectively. That is, responsibility is only the necessary but not the sufficient condition for accountability (i.e.,

responsibility is the subset of accountability). Though indicators for measuring the (existence and extent)

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accountability are usually not very objective, we can still measure them by seeing whether some actions are

significantly present. A 2 by 2 matrix of bureaucratic accountability mechanisms given by Gilbert et al will

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give us a ruler for the measurement of accountability.

Who

Although accountability can be, and commonly be classified into five categories, namely fiscal, legal,
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programme, process, and outcome, we will not adopt this approach as this classification is structural-based.
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Remember that the topic asks "who", so we use the approach given by Jabbra and Dwivedi. Five dimensions of

accountability are considered: organizational, legal, political, professional, and moral. Even this division may

be arbitrary, i.e., it may not be exhaustive or/and exist overlapping (e.g., between organizational and legal), it is

quite suffice for our discussion.

_ACCOUNTABLE OBJECTS IN HK (extension of "Who")

Classification

Civil servants must be accountable to their superiors. Of course the whole public sector should ultimately

accountable to the governor, but he should not be treated as the only one in the object "superiors". On the other

extreme, for the lowest civil servants who accountable to their immediate head, the "immediate head" also

belongs to "superiors" although they are very low in positions. Nevertheless, both maximization and

minimization of the accountable objects will do no good in discussion. It is generally agreed that the object

"superiors" should be confined to the policy-making level, where this approach of division would be sufficient

enough for analysis. More divisions can be introduced but that will just complicate the matter. Coming the
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transfer of sovereignty, China will be the formal, though indirect superior after 1997. Even before 1997, the

shadow of China's effect over HK policies is obvious. So, accountable to the CPG even now becomes inevitable,

for the sake of smooth transition.

We now proceed horizontally instead of vertically. Needless to say, citizens are the chief object, as they

are what the government is established for. Also, do not forget the representatives of the citizens---- the Legco

members. Ideally, the three main statutory bodies, executive, legislative and judiciary should accountable to

each other. That means viewing from the executive angle only, the civil servants have to accountable to both

judiciary and legislative sectors. Nevertheless, the accountability to the former (like the court in foreign

countries) is a must but with no choice, especially in HK, an almost perfect legal system is present. It seems

there is no need to include the judiciary sector as the object, for that has no discussing value. Or put it in another

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way, accountability to the judiciary sector has already been the subset of the accountability to the superiors.

However, the object "legislative sector" (i.e., the Legco) cannot be omitted, especially nowadays. With the

clearer distinction between the Exco and the Legco, and the change in roles and nature of the Legco, tension
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among them is well known to most people.

There remains two kinds of object: professionals and generalists. This way of division is somewhat

different from those given in the above. These two systems of division (the former four and the latter two) are

self-maintained but the combine of them (six in total) is essential for completeness. Both the volume and density

of information have been expanding in a drastic rate recently. The cumulative of knowledge makes

specialization (both theoretical and technical) inevitable. Professionals are often highly valued in the society for

their functions performed. Accountability of the civil servants towards them, like consulting with them,

becomes the world trend. Quite contrast to this is the accountability towards the generalists. By this we mean

that the civil servants have to act before comparing and balancing different walks of interests, or more generally,

they have to take as many factors as possible into consideration. The generalists are those who work with

macro-policies. Notice that they do not include the superiors within the government. They may be those who

deal with social policies within non-governmental organizations, or the critics (although their pressure exerted is

informal). Comparing the two, professionals consider specific factors in depth, while generalists consider

different factors in general.

So much about the categories of accountability, we should have a round up now. There are six types and

five dimensions of accountability, we may match them as follows:

Objects: Superiors Legco China Citizens Professionals Generalists

Dimensions: Legal Political Political Moral Professional Organizational

The above table contrasts the accountable objects in HK with the formal classification. These objects may not be

mutually exclusive (e.g., both Legco and China belong to "political"), but at least they are almost exhaustive

(cover all possible walks of people). Practically speaking, the two goals, mutually exclusive and exhaustive, can

hardly be achieved simultaneously. But we prefer the latter (completeness) to the former (precision).

One more thing to note about accountability is its continuity. Strictly speaking we should ask how much

there is instead of whether there is. The concept of degree can be applied both vertically (compare the degree of

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accountability in the past and now) and horizontally (compare the degree of accountability to one object and that

to the other). But the application to the latter would be controversial due to the difference in standards of

measurement of the degrees between different objects, so we will limit the concept of degree to high, medium

and low only.

_DILEMMAS
Here "dilemma" means there exists contradiction in having accountability (either means or ends) by the

civil servants towards the different objects. The term "contradiction" can be interpreted as follows: when the

accountability to different objects are achieved simultaneously (if they can be), undesirable effect is highly

likely to be occurred. For clarity, a figure is given to illustrate the relationships. First, different relationships

among "the accountability to different objects" are examined. For each relation, there may exist dilemma with

more than one dimensions. For example, there is dilemma between accountability to the superiors and to China

(this is one dilemma relation), but the dilemma itself may consist of several factors (i.e., more than one

dimension). Of course the more the dimensions, the more serious is the dilemma. However the reverse is not

true. The seriousness of a dilemma (in total) may not be contributed by the number of dimensions (quantity)

only. The extent (quality) of each dimension (factor) should also be examined for obtaining the total seriousness

of each dilemma. Symbolically, that is:

Seriousness of dilemma of a relation = f (number of dimensions, extent of each dimension)

The dilemmas in the other relations can be constructed in a similar way. By now the accountable objects are

treated identically (like variables) for the ease of analysis. The number of combinations (relationships) is 15

( =6C2=1+2+3+4+5 ). We first tabulate the results and then to explain them one by one.

Dilemmas Superiors Legco Professional China Citizens Generalists

Superiors --     
Legco  --    
Professional   --   
China    --  
Citizens     -- 
Generalists      --

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--coexist happily; --no dilemma; --dilemma exists; --indeterminate
The above table is symmetric about the diagonal with 15 relationships on each side, the table is completely

filled for easy comparison. Since not all relationships are in dilemma, we will consider only the cases of ""

and "". The cases of "" and "" are comprehensible.

Superiors vs Legco

The relation should be "" before 1980s. In the past both the Exco and Legco members were appointed.

They came mainly from the top of the business sector. They were similar in nature, in the senses of modes of

thinking and styles of actions. As a result they coexisted happily and there was no such concept of

accountability. As the OMELCO was still existing, how could the members have dilemma with themselves?
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Nonetheless, it was not the case after the "real" political reform (direct election of Legco members) had been
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introduced in 1991 and the changes given by Patten. The effect on the whole was the independence of the

Legco relative to the Exco (superiors of the civil servants). Though the government system is still executive-led
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in nature and will be after 1997 , the superiors can no longer ignore the Legco. At least the Legco has the

veto power and the right to raise private member's bills (provided that they are not financially related). This

implies the authority of the Exco is reduced and the senior civil servants would naturally feel the barriers

introduced to their work. On the contrary, the Legco always tries to obtain more power from the Exco.
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Psychologically, the Exco would not cooperate with the Legco much. Moreover, the real attitudes between the

two are quite different nowadays. First, they come from different backgrounds. Their representatives of interests

are different, at least the Legco members have to "act as" (though they may be really are) representing the

citizens' interests for gaining support. But the superiors do not have to do this for their political survival, and

they could hardly be kicked out unless for serious mistake (golden-bowl). Second, their rationales on policies

are different. The superiors tend to emphasize on the economic term while the Legco members tend to stress on
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the livelihood. Infinite many debates between them were rooted to this basic difference. Due to this, it would

be very difficult for the civil servants to accountable to both their superiors and the Legco.

Superiors vs China

It is now still under the rule of British, and hence the loyalty of the superiors. Almost it is well known to

the world that the China and the Britain have been always arguing about the matters over the transfer of

sovereignty. Many influential policies cross between 1997, but very often consensus was not achieved
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especially in the important areas, while the broke down of the meetings were often heard. Even before 1997

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the pressure and intervention to the public sector from the CPG are obvious. Therefore, the civil servants have
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to formally accountable to their "impartial" or "pro-British" superiors on one hand, but to informally

accountable to China on the other hand. The above is the struggling within individuals. On the other dimension,

dilemma would still exist (among groups) when there are different groups of civil servants holding different

values. For instance, one group of civil servants is pro-British but another group is pro-China, conflict results.

Superiors vs citizens

There is certainly dilemma among the accountability for civil servants towards these two objects, when we

think of the criticisms to the government and the petitions given by the general citizens. The reason is straight

forward. No such phenomena existed in the other days because of the close-door government system and the

apolitical culture of the citizens. Now the these are no longer maintained and thus resulting in the increase in
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demands from the people. For those superiors who cannot catch up with this trend the lower civil servants

would be caught in this dilemma.

Superiors vs generalists

Although both groups work with macro policies, the former is the policy-makers while the latter is the

policy-reviewers. The dilemma occurs for similar reasons in the "superiors vs Legco" part, i.e., the difference in

rationale about policies (it will not be repeated here to save space). But notice some of the differences between

the accountability to generalists and Legco. First, the Legco has formal power over the superiors but not the

generalists. Therefore accountability of the civil servants to the Legco has to be formal but not for the case of
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the generalists. Second, the Legco members (those elected by EC or directly) are not necessarily generalists.

What the Legco members have is the support from the general citizens, but the generalists are expected to have

authorized status among the public. In fact many Legco members were accused of being biased in values over
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certain issues. Despite the political reasons, there is no guarantee that they did understand thoroughly the

whole picture of public matters. This does not imply that the opinion of the generalists must be correct, but to

show the difference in accountability to either of them. Nevertheless, we will see later that the accountability to

the Legco and the generalists have quite high positive correlation.

Legco vs professionals

There are about half (30) of the Legco members elected through the functional constituencies (FC). They

are the "professionals" within the Legco. However, dilemma in accountability may still arise. First, the extent of
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profession of the Legco FC members is doubted. Second, many of them are party committees (7 out of 9) .

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They have to act in line with their parties (collective responsibility), whereas the party's decision may not be
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consistent with the FC member's profession. Nevertheless, the dilemma between the accountability to the FC

members and the professionals is not sure to happen. For the accountability to other elected Legco members,

who are generally not professionals, the possibility of arising conflict is not known. Overall speaking, the

symbol "" (indeterminate) instead of "" is given.

Legco vs China

Examining the composition of the Legco we can easily find that there is major conflict between the

democratic Legco members and China. In the 1995 Legco election, the DP plus the independent members, and

the ADPL ones (so-called the pro-democracy and the quasi-pro-democracy groups respectively) obtained a large
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proportion of both the directly elected and the FC (also elected) seats (31 out of 50). However, the CPG

obviously wants to minimize the degree and the pace of development of the liberty and democracy in HK, as
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they do not want any threat to their power. Civil servants' attitudes towards liberty and democracy would

certainly affect the policy process. Since the democratic Legco members and CPG value liberty and democracy

quite differently, it follows existence of the dilemma in accountability towards the two. But do not forget that
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there is still a proportion of the Legco members who are pro-China. Of course there is no dilemma in

accountability towards the pro-China Legco members and China. So, talking about the Legco in general, the

conclusion is indeterminate.

Professionals vs generalists

Intuitively, they are the mutually exclusive groups by definition. The former considers matters in

microscopic view but in depth while the latter sees things generally but in macroscopic view. Experience tells us

that very often the two jobs cannot be satisfied simultaneously. The readers should have no difficulty in

understanding this kind of dilemma.

China vs citizens

The difficulty in comparing these two objects lies in the lack of valid evidence. We have no accurate data

about how the citizens' general political attitudes are: pro-China, apolitical, or otherwise. The sample size of

many researches on this topic are around the order of magnitudes of hundred or at most thousand, due to the

limited resources. However scientific of the researches they are, they could hardly accurately represent the six

million people. It seems the most representative data are the results of the three-tier elections (DB, MC & Legco)

between 1994 and 1995. But there is a serious problem. The pro-China members had quite good results in the

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DB election but very bad results in the Legco election. How, then, to evaluate this? Moreover, the election

results were quite affected by other "false consciousness" effects, which further makes the evaluation of people's
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political attitude difficult, almost impossible. Next, approaching 1997 people's political attitudes may change

easily. There is certainly confidence crisis about China's terrible actions. Examples are the June 4th massacre,

matters over CFA, reduction of the six Bill of Rights, black-box mechanism of the provisional legislature, etc..

Civil servants themselves vs the others

Many researches have been done to show the attitudes of the civil servants over the matters of

accountability. The tension between 1) the accountability towards different objects (usually the three: Legco,
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China and citizens) and 2) the civil servants themselves, are compared. However, if we adopt this approach for

analysis it means we have to add one more accountable object: civil servants (strictly speaking, it should be their

moral values, which are not human beings). Nevertheless, the accountability of civil servants towards

themselves is not considered here because that is non-observable. At most they can be responsible to their moral

values, but nobody except themselves can measure their degree of responsibility, which is based on their

standards. It follows the lack of objectivity. We will come back to this in the later part.

Effects in total

Back to the table now. Applying horizontal (or vertical) summation, we have the following results:

Number of Superiors Legco Professionals China Citizens Generalists Sum*

 1 2 1 0 2 2 8/2=4

 0 0 2 2 1 1 6/2=3

 4 1 1 2 2 2 12/2=6

 0 2 1 1 0 0 4/2=2

* The actual sum should be divided by 2 (i.e., 4, 3, 6, 2 respectively, 15 in total instead of 30) due to the double

counting effect.

It can be seen that civil servants are not very serious in dilemmas, the estimation is:

"++0.5" represents "no dilemma", "+0.5" represents "dilemmas exist", since "" represents

indeterminate, half is counted at each side (just assume that half is reasonable).

No dilemma = 4 + 3 + 0.5(2) = 8 ; Dilemmas exist = 6 + 0.5(2) = 7

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Without regarding the meaning of difference, we say that the extent of dilemmas faced by civil servants is not

serious (8 & 7 are near).

Accountability to the superiors would cause the civil servants paying the highest cost (sacrifice most).

There are many (4) dilemma relationships, i.e., accountable to the superiors would be caught in dilemmas with

the accountable to the other 4 objects (Legco, China, citizens and generalists).

N.B.: If you do not agree the derivations in the above two paragraphs, neglect them. Just by scanning the table

on page 5 you will get the same result.

The followings must be informed to the readers. 1) Always remember that all the above only gives the

descriptions and explanations of the actual situation, all are value-free and nothing about "should" or "should

not" has been discussed up to now. 2) All accountable objects are treated as variables with equal weight, but in

fact it is not. So, further analysis in the next two parts is needed for ranking. 3) The comparison of the degrees

of dilemmas (,,) among different pairs of object is not precise: since "" in one pair of objects (e.g.,

accountable to superiors vs to Legco) may not be exactly equal to "" in the other pair (e.g., accountable to

superiors vs to China).

_RANKING WITH RESPECT TO EFFECTS

We have examined in the above whether the dilemma exists in each pair (the presence is indicated by

""). But the seriousness of the dilemmas cannot be compared from the above section. Since we are dealing

with the dilemmas horizontally (across different pairs of objects), whereas we have no common basis for direct

comparison between different dilemma relationships, we must adopt another approach of comparison. In the

followings, we will analyze in the effects to the society when the accountability to each object is absent. Then

the effects are weighted without clear basis for comparison (a weaker approach).

Effects if not accountable to superiors

The rationale of the government system is the adherence to the hierarchy. It is out of our scope to examine

whether this is good or not. What we have to know is that it is still being practised, and will be after 1997; after

all, so far so good. Under this condition, accountable to the superiors is out of the question but a must. The

control is top-down: only the superiors can take control over the inferiors. If the latter do not have to

accountable to the former, the government is in effect dissolved. Remember the definition given (Leung, Brewer

& Lee, 1995) at the beginning, that accountability requires not only to be responsible but also to be observable.

The absence of accountability of the civil servants to their superiors means that they are neither responsible

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morally nor "pretend to be responsible (observable)". This reflects the superiors have loss control over the

inferiors, which is consistent with the words given by Day and Klein: "there is no accountability unless one
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possesses effective control over the other". Government is the largest institution in a society. Instability of it

means the instability of the society. What threats the most is that some of the civil servants have the right in the

use of power. It would be very dangerous if the order of them is not maintained.

The above deduction may be a little bit exaggerated. Even not reaching that situation, the government

cannot function well unless the accountability to the superiors is fulfilled. Another obvious result is the

inefficiency of the government. Suppose a civil servant does not accountable to his immediate head. The

immediate head has to waste time and energy in controlling him; the cooperation between that civil servant and

his colleagues cannot be achieved; and the inferiors under that civil servant would have dilemma in

accountability to him. It is seen that the effect is in full directions: upwards, horizontal and downwards. The

effect would be much serious if a group of civil servants instead of one do the same.

... to Legco
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In the past there was almost no accountability of the civil servants to the Legco. Therefore, lack of

accountability to Legco nowadays would like bringing HK back to the past. Although the effect is not very

serious, it cannot be ignored. There should be no immediate crisis, but hidden crisis presents. The culture in HK

is that the political consciousness of the general public is low, compared to other places in the world. Even with

the increase in openness of the public sector, many people still recognize that they can only have a say but not
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participation within. Some of them even do not interest in having a say. However, people's apathy does not

mean that they are satisfied. They might want the civil servants to accountable to the Legco, for the purpose of
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scrutiny. Nevertheless, they can do nothing if civil servants do not: the Legco's debate results have no

restraining power over the Exco. What they only have is the veto power. For lack of effective scrutiny,

maladministrations may occur easily. Nevertheless, people's dissatisfaction about maladministrations is

cumulative, and the tolerant limit would ultimately be reached if the situation is not improved. Were this

catalyzed by some external factors (like economic recession), riots would break out easily. Imagine, if the public

sector had not regarded the suggestion from the Legco (to stop/cut down importing workers), the people's
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dissatisfaction would certainly have been worse than today's.

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 On the positive dimension, accountability of the civil servants to the Legco would provide a good

atmosphere for cooperation. Also, it would raise both of their capacities in accepting the opponents' views. This

process of fine tuning of their values is certainly good for the society.

... to professionals

Professionals are very important in the role of policy making. If civil servants ignore the accountability to

them, maladministrations are highly likely to exist, especially in those minor but important aspects (often

neglected by common people like civil servants). Summation of minor errors can lead to serious mistakes.

Professionals have powerful eyes and are strong in spotting these. Also, it would be better for the consulting

with professionals on the policy-making level. Otherwise, the goal "effective" can hardly be achieved.

... to China

Since 1997 has yet not come, the accountability to China is not a must theoretically. It is the pressure that

forces the accountability to exist. Theoretically, the dancing and horse racing can be continued after 1997 (same

for the civil servants). However, their lack of confidence in China and hence the Basic Law can be reflected by
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many figures. The serious loss of the senior civil servants is an ironic evidence. The reason behind is simple:
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civil servants have low degree of confidence in "one country two systems" and "high degree of autonomy".

They realize that the ultimate power source after 1997 is not the Chief Executive but the CPG. Even now the

governor (ultimate power source at present) is often regarded as lame duck and his stove has almost burnt out.

This shows how powerful the CPG is. Nobody can imagine what would happen (we will not guess it here) if the

civil servants do not accountable (or even incorporate) to China after 1997. As put by a famous critic Wong

Yuk-man: "In China, the usual way of handling political problems is to solve them in legal manner, and to solve
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legal problems in political manner" . Unveiling the plot, the laws are full of flexibility in terms of
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interpretation. In order to keep the stability of both the public sector and HK, the civil servants have no choice

but to accountable to China, no matter in which dimensions.

Now, the formal accountability to China is not seen because the civil servants should not have double

loyalty. However, as developed in the above paragraph, the informal accountability (observable cooperation)

has already existed. The permeation of the China's influence into the public sector (mainly through the trade

unions) is becoming serious. The pro-China members would actively arouse the collective actions to try to

formalize the accountability to China. Peer pressure forces the other neutral members to do the same as they do,

as they might not want to be settled account after 1997.

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... to citizens

Citizens are the subject of the society, lack of accountability to them would certainly cause instability,

which is commonsensical. But the probability and degree (if there is) of instability depend on both the political

awareness, national mood and curdling power of the people. The first one is being developed now, given by the

increase in democracy. But the latter two, which are higher in levels, are still not developed. This is because the

main difference between the Chinese and Western cultures is the absence of aggressive attitude but to tolerate

and search for consensus, of the former. As a result, the dissatisfaction (due to lack of accountability towards

citizens) is not likely to lead to immediate crisis.

... to generalists

Those who deal with macro policies outside the government (generalists, like critics) might view from the

angles different from that of the government (i.e., civil servants). Accountability to them is not a must but is

better than none.

Comparison

Weighting the effects discussed above (though not scientific), we have:

Superiors & China > Citizens & Legco > Professionals & Generalists

(most serious if not accountable to) (least serious if not accountable to)

For not accountable to superiors or China, the serious effects like the instability to the society are

immediate, so they are ranked first (For the case of China, the effects may be given after 1997, but it is not long

from today). The effect of the citizens is collective but not immediate, while that of the Legco is semi-formal, so

they are ranked next. Accountability to either professionals or generalists would yield positive effect but do the

reverse (i.e., not accountable to them) would not have serious negative effect (instability is unlikely to be

happened, at most there is maladministration), so they are ranked last.

The reasons for the weakness in the above comparison are as follows. From endnote 44, there are only

one-third (32.4%) of the civil servants who do not accountable to the Legco; and the Legco is the second least

important object to the civil servants in the sense of accountability (China is the least because it is now not yet

1997). Thus, the civil servants are in fact being accountable to almost all walks of objects. So, almost all the

effects discussed above are theoretically elaborated, i.e., yet not happened. Of course the effects discussed are

logically possible, but they are not bound to be happened. Nevertheless, we cannot list all possible outcomes

since there are infinite many number of factors to be considered, and hence there are infinite many number of

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outcomes. However, we can still list those outcomes (effects) which are most likely to be occurred when the

accountability is not achieved (that is what we have done), then we compare them. After all, some is better than

none.

The second shortcoming lies in the ignorance of the degree of accountability. From the previous section it

is noted that the degree instead of whether presence should have been analyzed. But as we are making "guess",

too much precision in division of degree is useless.

_RANKING WITH RESPECT TO VALUES

The seriousness of lacking accountability should not be regarded as the only factor to be considered in

deciding who should the civil servants owe their first duty to. Morally, the civil servants should also make

decision according to their conscience. Then there is no doubt that the citizens should be ranked first, whereas
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they constitute the society. All the other objects are the subset of the set "citizens". All forms of government,

whether they practise Pluralism, Elitism, Socialism or others, the slogan held is "for the people". The only way

to guarantee this is through the means of accountability of the government to the people. Whether the

government is accountable is interpreted by the people, and the standard of measurement should be accepted by

the people. The above morale is just the world trend in the 20th century, it is not a matter of right or wrong.

Here we regard the values in the relative sense, that is, what people regard as correct is the truth.

For the time being just forget about who are the next, the third, etc., to be accountable to, for two reasons.

First, the topic question asks for the "first" only and we are now almost run out of space. Next, unlike the

seriousness which is observable and can be ranked easily, it is much more difficult to rank values in a detailed

manner (even by philosophers!).

Combining the result from the previous section (in fact the former is the ideological consideration while

the latter is the practical consideration), there remains 3 objects: either superiors, China, or citizens should the

civil servants owe their first duty to. But all the relationships ("superiors vs China", "China vs citizens" &

"citizens vs superiors") are "", i.e., in dilemmas. Disappointingly, sorry, I cannot give a definite answer

objectively, as the answer depends on which angle you view from (effects or values). Nevertheless, in my view

(what the topic question asks), I think that the citizens should be ranked first (this is consistent with many

authors). Why? I prefer ranking by values to ranking by effects.

_ASSUMPTIONS

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 "In non-democratic polities, accountability may not be to the citizens, but to a monarch or ruler, a
41
political party, or to an ideology" . It is clear that the assumption of democracy is essential for the whole

discussion of accountability. No wonder the issue of accountability of the civil servants had almost never been

discussed publicly before the introduction of elections in 1980s.

The second important assumption is the impartiality (or roughly speaking: neutrality) of the civil servants.

The discussion in the whole paper is on the basis that the civil servants put their interest aside. However, they
42
are human beings but not robot, and mankind are selfish! Even they may not think in this way, they may still

act in this way unconsciously (so-called rationalization). Only by raising the openness (like the access of

information) and introducing the scrutinizing system would improve the situation.

_CONCLUSION
According to the Oxford's Dictionary, dilemma is defined as the "situation in which one has to choose
43
between ... two courses of action ...". Choosing between two things is actually a daily-life matter. Certainly,

different people would have different decisions when facing the same dilemma. Assuming they are not crazy,

they must do their calculation and balancing before having their decisions. The difference lies in the

methodology of calculation and balancing. We have listed out two methods: ranking with respect to effects and

values. Nevertheless, these two may not be exhaustive (Do you have others? Tell me please!). Again, there is no

definite objective answer. Although the six objectives are really different, they are all important. The ranking of

the importance of them actually depends on individuals' values. Fortunately, the topic question asks for

subjective opinion instead! Throughout the discussion the term "should" is based on the interest of the society as

a whole. If it were based on civil servants themselves, they would, of course, always act in line with what they
44
should act.

ENDNOTE
1. Jerry Mitchell, "Accountability of the management of public authorities in the United States," International

Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 59 (1993), pp. 480-2.

2. Steve Tsang, Government and Politics (HK: HKU Press, 1995), Introduction.

3. Joan Y.H.Leung, Brian Brewer & Grace O.M.Lee, "Redefinition of Roles: Hong Kong's Politicians, Civil

Servants and the General Public," Hong Kong Public Administration, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Sep. 1995), pp. 205-6.

14
4. C.E.Gilbert, "The Framework of Administrative Responsibility," Journal of Politics 21 (Aug 1959), pp. 373-

407; K.Kernaghan, "Responsible Public Bureaucracy: A Rationale and a Framework for Analysis,"

Canadian Public Administration 16 (4, 1973), pp. 572-603; and I.S.Thynne and J.Goldring,

Accountability and Control: Government Officials and the Exercise of Power (Sydney: Law Book Co., 1987).

The table is reproduced as follows:

Internal External

Formal hierarchy, budgets, personnel management, legislative review, advisory committees, judicial

performance evaluation, auditing, programme action, ombudsman, review tribunals, evaluation

monitoring, code of conduct research, freedom of information

Informal personal ethics, professionalism, representative public comment, interest group pressure, peer

bureaucracy, commitment, anticipated reactions review, media scrutiny, political parties,

from superiors politicians and officials at other levels of

government

5. R.C.Chandler & J.C.Plano, The Public Administration Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Press,

1988), p.119.

6. Joseph G.Jabbra & O.P.Dwivedi, Public Service Accountability: A Comparative Perspective (West Hartford,

Connecticut: Kumarian Press Inc., 1988), p.5.

7. Many major aspects of power still lies in the hands of China, see The Basic Law.

8. 蔡子強，劉細良，周柏均，＜＜選舉與議會政治＞＞，香港人文科學出版社，1995，頁203-8。

9. The introduction of the DB and MC elections in 1980s is not regarded as "real" democracy as the democratic

ideology at that time was low. Also the promotion work was poorly done.

10. See The Policy Address, 1992, by Chris Patten.

11. 見註8，頁103-201。

12. See The Basic Law.

13. 同註8。

14. Ibid.

15. 廖光生，＜＜香港民主化的困境＞＞，允晨文化，1996，頁67-156。

15
16. 見上，頁157-72。

17. The civil servants should adhere to their working principles and loyal to the Queen of Britain before 1997.

18. Many superiors (usually the elder) are conservative and resist to changes or reforms.

19. It is not necessary to discuss the FC members as they are regarded as the professionals in the Legco. The

discussion of this group will be in the next section.

20. 見註8，頁187-90。

21. We have neither evidence to prove nor to disprove this proposition, suspicion is therefore reasonable.

22. 見註8，頁221。

23. There is no explicit evidence to show this, since those FC members would certainly not inform the public

about their professional consideration whenever there is conflict.

24. ＜＜信報＞＞第5版，19-9-1995。

25. 見註15，頁38-41。

26. Li Pang Kwong, "Elections, Politicians, and Electoral Politics", The Other Hong Kong Report 1995, pp. 51-

66.

27. 同註8。

28. Although the Legco election is regarded as more representative than that of the DB, the large number (about

346) of seats cannot be ignored as well.

29. Two examples of those researches are cited as follows:

(a) Jermain Lam, "Administrative Culture: Political Accountability of Hong Kong Senior Civil Servants",

Hong Kong Public Administration, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Sep. 1994), pp. 193-207.

(b) Jane C.Y.Lee, "Civil Servants", The Other Hong Kong Report 1994, pp. 39-59.

30. P.Day & R.Klein, Accountabilities, Five Public Services (London: Tavistock Publications).

31. See Note 3.

32. The citizens are treated as clients rather than masters of the civil servants.

33. Structurally the civil servants are not required to accountable to both the Legco and the citizens. Hardly

could the Legco members do much. See Note 29 (b).

34. ＜＜經濟日報＞＞A33版，國是港事，25-11-1996。

35. See any publications given by the mass media. For instance, TVB news has entrusted the HKU Social

Sciences Research Centre to do the research on this issue.

16
36. ＜＜信報＞＞第7版，19-1-1996;＜＜星島日報＞＞17-8-1994。

37. But there is a rise in confidence very recently, any recent researches will do, like that in note 34.

38. 黃毓民：「在中國，政治問題，法律解決；法律問題，政治解決」，於商台節目「城人知己:理所當

言」。

39. The right of interpretation of the Basic Law falls in the hands of the CPG.

40. Almost all the authors listed in the Bibliography agree with this.

41. Thomas B.Smith, "The Comparative Analysis of Bureaucratic Accountability", Asian Journal of Public

Administration, Vol. 13, No. 1 (June 1991), pp. 93-104.

42. This "idiom" is given by Prof. S.N.S.Cheung, School of Economics and Finance, HKU. It is true to a certain

extent, not only from the economic perspective.

43. The Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English with Chinese Translation, Oxford University Press,

HK.

44. The table given by Leung, Brewer and Lee (see Note 3) is reproduced here:

Accountability of HK CS to Great Extent Some Extent Little Extent Not at all

a their own conscience & ethical values 80.6 16.6 2.8 0

b their superiors in the department 65.7 31.4 2.9 0

c the general public 65.7 28.6 0 5.7

d the peers in the units 44.1 50.0 5.9 0

e the clients who are receiving the service 44.1 32.4 8.8 14.7

f the department head 43.2 37.8 19.0 0

g the governor 14.7 47.1 26.5 11.7

h the Future SAR Government 14.3 17.1 31.4 37.2

i the DB 8.6 20.0 31.4 40.0

j the professional body 6.7 46.7 26.6 20.0

k the Legco 2.9 32.4 32.3 32.4

l China 0 14.3 28.6 57.1

17
The categories (d), (h) & (i) were not discussed in this paper. While (c) & (e) belong to the "citizens" group; and

(b), (f) & (g) belong to the "superiors" group. Take a glance on the order you will notice that the reality does not

follow strictly of what "should be".

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brewer, Brian, Lee, Grace O.M. & Leung, Joan Y.H., "Redefinition of Roles: Hong Kong's Politicians, Civil

Servants and the General Public," Hong Kong Public Administration, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Sep. 1995).

Chandler, R.C. & Plano, J.C., The Public Administration Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO

Press, 1988) Mitchell, Jerry, "Accountability of the management of public authorities in the United

States," International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 59 (1993).

Cheung, Stephen Y.L. & Sze, Stephen M.H., The Other Hong Kong Report 1995, HK: The CU Press.

The Consultative Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the

People's Republic of China, 1990, The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the

People's Republic of China.

Cooper, Terry L., & Lui, Terry T., "Bureaucracy, democracy and administrative ethics: a study of public service

values in Hong Kong", International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 62, No.2 (June 1993).

Day, P. & Klein, R., Accountabilities, Five Public Services (London: Tavistock Publications).

Dwivedi, O.P. & Jabbra, Joseph G. , Public Service Accountability: A Comparative Perspective (West Hartford,

Connecticut: Kumarian Press Inc., 1988)

Lam, Jermain, "Administrative Culture: Political Accountability of Hong Kong Senior Civil Servants", Hong

Kong Public Administration, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Sep. 1994).

Lam, Jermain, "Towards a more Alienated Political Culture in Hong Kong: Implications for the Administration

in the Transition to 1997", Hong Kong Public Administration, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Sep. 1992).

Lee, Jane C.Y., "Civil Servants", The Other Hong Kong Report 1994, HK: The CU Press.

Lee, Jane C.Y., "The Problems of Accountability in the Government of Hong Kong", Hong Kong Public

Administration, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Sep. 1993).

Patten, Chris, The Policy Address, 1992, the Government Printer.

Skwarok, Lisa & Wickins, Robert, "The Evolving System of Government in Hong Kong: Executive and

Legislative Powers and the Basic Law", Hong Kong Public Administration, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Mar. 1994).

18
Smith, Thomas B., "The Comparative Analysis of Bureaucratic Accountability", Asian Journal of Public

Administration, Vol. 13, No. 1 (June 1991)

Tsang, Steve, Government and Politics (HK: HKU Press, 1995).

蔡子強，劉細良，周柏均，＜＜選舉與議會政治＞＞，香港人文科學出版社，1995。

廖光生，＜＜香港民主化的困境＞＞，允晨文化，１９９６。

＜＜信報＞＞。

＜＜經濟日報＞＞。

＜＜星島日報＞＞。

19