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Self-Consciousness
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/self-consciousness/
from the Fall 2017 Edition of the
Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy
Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of
themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are,
that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness
can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject
is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as
one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself.
Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of themselves as themselves; it is
manifest to them that they themselves are the object of awareness. Self-
consciousness is a form of consciousness that is paradigmatically
expressed in English by the words “I”, “me”, and “my”, terms that each of
us uses to refer to ourselves as such.
1
Self-Consciousness
is the object of the Delphic maxim. During the course of the drama
Oedipus comes to know himself, with tragic consequences. But just what
this self-consciousness amounts to, and how it might be connected to other
aspects of the mind, most notably consciousness itself, is less clear. It has,
perhaps unsurprisingly, been the topic of considerable discussion since the
Greeks. During the early modern period self-consciousness became central
to a number of philosophical issues and, with Kant and the post-Kantians,
came to be seen as one of the most important topics in epistemology and
the philosophy of mind.
This ancient and medieval debate concerning whether the mere presence
of the mind is sufficient for self-awareness is related to another concerning
whether self-awareness is itself sensory in character or, put another way,
whether the self is or is not perceptible. Aquinas has sometimes been
interpreted as offering a positive answer to this question, sometimes a
negative answer (see Pasnau 2002: ch. 11, and Cory 2014: ch. 4, for
differing views). These issues were also discussed in various Indian
(Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist) debates (Albahari 2006; Siderits, Thompson,
& Zahavi 2013; Ganeri 2012a,b), with a variety of perspectives
represented. For example, in the writing of the eleventh century Jain writer
Prabhācandra, there appears an argument very much like Avicenna’s
Flying Man argument for the possibility of self-awareness without
awareness of the body (Ganeri 2012a: ch. 2), whereas various thinkers of
the Advaita Vendānta school argue that there is no self-awareness without
embodiment (Ram-Prasad 2013). There were, therefore, wide-ranging
debates in the ancient and medieval period not only about the nature of
self-consciousness, but also about its relation to other aspects of the mind,
most notably sensory perception and awareness of the body.
Hume’s denial that there is an inner perception of the self as the owner of
experience is one that is echoed in Kant’s discussion in both the
Transcendental Deduction and the Paralogisms, where he writes that there
is no intuition of the self “through which it is given as object” (Kant
1781/1787: B408; Brook 1994; Ameriks 2000). Kant’s account of self-
consciousness and its significance is complex, a central element of the
Transcendental Deduction being the claim that a form of self-awareness—
transcendental apperception—is required to account for the unity of
conscious experience over time. In Kant’s words, “the ‘I think’ must be
able to accompany all my representations” (Kant 1781/1787: B132; Keller
1998; Kitcher 2011; see the entry on Kant’s view of the mind and
consciousness of self). Thus, while Kant denies that there is an inner
awareness of the self as an object that owns its experiences, we must
nevertheless be aware of those experiences as things that are, both
individually and collectively, our own. The representation of the self in
this “I think” is then, according to Kant, purely formal, exhausted by its
function in unifying experience.
The Kantian account of self-awareness and its relation to the capacity for
objective thought set the agenda for a great deal of post-Kantian
philosophy. On the nature of self-awareness, for example, in an
unpublished manuscript Schopenhauer concurs with Kant, asserting that,
“that the subject should become an object for itself is the most monstrous
contradiction ever thought of” (quoted in Janaway 1989: 120). Further, a
philosophical tradition stemming from Kant’s work has tried to identify
the necessary conditions of the possibility of self-consciousness, with P.F.
Strawson (1959, 1966), Evans (1980, 1982), and Cassam (1997), for
2. Self-Consciousness in Thought
One natural way to think of self-consciousness is in terms of a subject’s
capacity to entertain conscious thought about herself. Self-conscious
thoughts are thoughts about oneself. But it is commonly pointed out that
thinking about what merely happens to be oneself is insufficient for self-
consciousness, rather one must think of oneself as oneself. If one is
capable of self-conscious thought, that is, one must be able to think in
such a way that it is manifest to one that it is oneself about whom one is
thinking.
associated with accounts of the semantics of the indexical term “I” and the
nature of its counterpart first-person concept (e.g., Anscombe 1975; Perry
1979; Nozick 1981: ch. 1, §2; Evans 1982: ch. 7; Mellor 1989; O’Brien
1995a; Castañeda 1999; de Gaynesford 2006; Recanati 2007; Rödl 2007:
ch. 1; Bermúdez 2016).
on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he
was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail
became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned
on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch. (Perry 1979: 33)
As Perry points out, he knew all along that the shopper with the torn sack
was making a mess. He may also have believed that the oldest philosopher
in the shop (in fact himself) was making a mess, yet failed to check his
own cart since he falsely believed that Quine was at the Deli Counter.
Indeed, it seems that for any non-indexical term a that denotes Perry, it is
possible for Perry to fail to believe anything naturally expressed by the
sentence “I am a”. If so, it is possible for Perry to rationally believe that a
is making a mess without believing anything that he would express as “I
am making a mess”. It was only when Perry came to believe that he
himself was making a mess that he stopped the chase. Indeed, it would
seem that only the first-personal content can provide an adequate
explanation of Perry’s behaviour when he stops. If Perry had come to
believe that John Perry is making a mess then, unless he also believed that
he himself was John Perry, he would not have stopped. The first-personal
content is “self-locating”, thereby enabling action, whereas the non-first-
personal content is not. To use Kaplan’s (1977) example, if I believe that
my pants are on fire, pure self-interest will surely motivate me do
something about it. If, however, I believe that Smith’s pants are on fire,
pure self-interest will only so motivate me if I also believe that I am
Smith.
facts or states of affairs that make such thoughts true. So, whilst my belief
“I am F” is not equivalent to any non-first-personal belief, it is true if and
only if Smith is F, this being the same fact that makes true the non-first-
personal “Smith is F”. Thus, whilst first-person representations are special,
a special class of first-person facts are nowhere to be found (for views that
do accept the existence of first-personal facts, see McGinn 1983; Baker
2013; also see Nagel 1986).
Perry (1977, 1979) argues that terms such as “I” which are, as he puts it,
“essentially indexical”, pose a problem for the traditional Fregean view of
belief as a two-place relation between a subject and a proposition (cf.
Spencer 2007). Fregean senses are, according to Perry, descriptive and as
Perry has argued no description is equivalent to an essential indexical.
Consequently, no Fregean proposition can be the thing believed when one
believes first-personally. Essential indexicality, if somehow forced into the
Fregean mould, means that we must implausibly accept that there are
incommunicable senses that only the speaker (or thinker) is in a position to
grasp (see García-Carpintero & Torre 2016); cf.Evans 1981; Longworth
2013). D. Lewis goes further than this, arguing, partly on the basis of his
much discussed Two Gods example (1979), in which each God knows all
the propositions true at their world yet fails to know which of the two
Gods he himself is, that the objects of belief are not propositions at all but
rather properties (or centred worlds). That is, since they already know all
the true propositions, there is no true proposition the Gods would come to
believe when they come to realise which God they are. Essential
indexicality forces us away from the model of propositions as the objects
of belief. Further, Lewis claims that not just the explicitly indexical cases,
but all belief is in this way self-locating or, in his terminology, de se. On
this account, every belief involves the self-ascription of a property and so,
arguably, is an instance of self-consciousness (for discussion, Gennaro
1996: ch. 8; Stalnaker 2008: ch. 3; Feit 2008; Cappelen & Dever 2013: ch.
5; Magidor 2015).
relation to the capacity for action (for critical discussion, see Ninan 2016;
Bermúdez 2016: ch. 1).
it (Kaplan 1977: 491; Campbell 1994: ch. 3). “I” is thus, unlike “this” or
“that”, a pure indexical, seemingly requiring no overt demonstration or
manifestation of intention (Kaplan 1977: 489–91). SRR captures the
plausible thought that “I” is guaranteed against reference failure. Since
every token of “I” has been produced, the fact that “I” refers to its
producer means that there is no chance of its failing to pick out some
entity. This account of “I”, then, treats it as not only expressive of self-
consciousness, but also guaranteed to refer to the utterer.
Anscombe’s (1975) paper is perhaps most notable for her claim that “I” is
not a referring expression at all. Assuming that if “I” refers it must be
understood on the model of either a proper name, a demonstrative, or an
abbreviation of a definite description, Anscombe argues that each of these
kinds of referring expression requires what she calls a “conception” by
means of which it reaches its referent. This conception must explain the
seemingly guaranteed reference of “I”: the apparent fact that no token of
“I” can fail to pick out an object. However, she argues, no satisfactory
conception can be specified for “I” since either it fails to deliver up
guaranteed reference, or it succeeds but only by delivering an immaterial
soul. Since we have independent reason to believe that there are no
immaterial souls, it follows that “I” cannot be understood on the model of
a proper name, demonstrative or definite description, so is not a referring
expression (see Kenny 1979 and Malcolm 1979 for positive appraisals of
Anscombe’s position. Criticisms can be found in White 1979; Hamilton
1991; Brandom 1994: 552–561; Glock & Hacker 1996; McDowell 1998;
Harcourt 2000).
According to Evans (1982: ch. 7), the problem with Anscombe’s argument
is that it fails to appreciate that “I” can be modelled on “here” rather than
“this”. According to Evans’ account, the similarity between what he calls
“I”-Ideas and “here”-Ideas shows up in their functional role (for an
alternative broadly functional account, see Mellor 1989; for an argument
that, far from being amenable to a functional analysis, self-consciousness
poses a threat to the coherence of functionalism, see Bealer 1997). Once
we see how both “I”-Ideas and “here”-Ideas stand at the centre of
distinctive networks of inputs (ways of gaining information about
ourselves and our locations respectively) and outputs (including the
explanation of action), we can see how to model “I” on “here”, thus
escaping Anscombe’s argument. For further discussion, see the
supplement: Evans on First Person Thought.
Immunity to this sort of error should not be conflated with another sort of
epistemic security that is often discussed under the heading of self-
knowledge (see entry on self-knowledge). Some philosophers have held
that, for a range of mental states, one cannot be mistaken about whether
one is in them. Thus, for example, if one sincerely judges that one has a
pain, or that one believes that P, then it cannot turn out that one is not in
pain, or that one does not so believe. That the kind of immunity to error
described by Wittgenstein differs from this sort of epistemic security
follows from the fact that one may be sceptical of the latter while
accepting the former. That is, one may reject the claim that sincere
judgements that one has a pain cannot be mistaken (perhaps it is possible
to mistake a sensation of coldness for one of pain), whilst nevertheless
Recanati 2007: part 6; Perry 2012; most of the papers in Prosser &
Recanati 2012; Musholt 2015: ch. 1).
The idea is that, for a wide range of judgements it is possible that one
knows that something is F but wrongly supposes that a is F. That is, one
has misidentified which thing is F. For other judgements, perhaps
including the introspection based judgement that one has a headache, this
sort of identification error is not possible. After Pryor’s (1999) influential
discussion, this is typically known as immunity to which-misidentification,
or wh-IEM.
3. Self-Consciousness in Experience
Some philosophers maintain that, in addition to its manifestation in first-
personal thinking, self-consciousness is also present in various forms of
sensory and non-sensory experience (Bermúdez 1998; Hurley 1998: ch. 4;
Zahavi 2005; Peacocke 2014; Musholt 2015). After all, self-consciousness
is presumably a form of consciousness (see entry on consciousness). On
the view that experience, like thought, has representational content, this
can be understood as the view that experiences, like thoughts, can have
content that is first-personal. On the further view that the content of
experience is non-conceptual (see the entry on non-conceptual mental
content), the claim is that there is non-conceptual first-person content (for
a conceptualist response, see Noë 2002). Bermúdez also argues that there
is a non-conceptual form of self-conscious thinking that arises from non-
conceptual self-conscious experience, which he calls “protobelief”
(Bermúdez 1998: ch. 5; cf. Bermúdez 2003).
As with first-person thought, the issue is not whether one is, or can be,
conscious of what is in fact oneself. If that were sufficient for self-
consciousness then, on the supposition that one is identical to one’s body,
seeing oneself in a mirror would be a case of self-consciousness, even if
one were unaware that it was oneself that one saw. Rather, the issue is
whether one is, or can be, conscious of oneself as oneself, a form of
awareness in which it is manifest to one that the object of awareness is
oneself. If there is such an awareness then this is philosophically
significant, since one might expect it to ground certain cases of self-
knowledge, first-person reference, and the immunity to error of certain
first-person thoughts (Shoemaker 1986; see the entry on self-knowledge).
The inner consciousness of the self as F, for example, would account for
one’s capacity to refer to oneself as oneself, one’s knowledge that one is F,
and the fact that such a thought cannot rest on a misidentification of
another thing as oneself. On the other hand, the claim that there is no such
conscious awareness of the self is philosophically significant, not only
because it undermines the possibility of such explanations but also for the
reason that it plays an important role in various well known arguments: for
example, in Kant’s First Critique (1781/1787), most obviously the
Transcendental Deduction, the Refutation of Idealism, and the
Paralogisms, and in Wittgenstein’s discussion of the conceptual problem
of other minds (Kripke 1982: Postscript).
Another way in which it can be argued that the self figures in sensory
experience is in the self-locating content of perceptual experience, most
Kriegel 2015; Alsmith 2015). For example, Zahavi and Kriegel (2015; cf.
Kriegel 2003, 2009; Zahavi 2014) defend a non-reductive understanding
of the sense of ownership as a distinct aspect of the phenomenal character
of experience. By contrast, a reductive account will explain the sense of
ownership in terms of cognitive and/or experiential states whose existence
we are independently willing to endorse. For example, Bermúdez (2011:
161–166) argues in favour of a reductive account of the sense of
ownership over one’s own body, according to which it consists in nothing
more than the phenomenology of the spatial location of bodily sensations
alongside our disposition to judge the body in which they occur to be our
own (cf. Dainton 2008: §8.2; Prinz 2012). Bermúdez’s argument for the
reductive view is, in part, based on the claim that, despite appearances, the
non-reductive sense of ownership is not in fact able to explain first-
personal judgements of ownership (cf. Schear 2009; for a response see
Zahavi & Kriegel 2015).
own mind (for criticisms of the standard view, see Bortolotti & Broome
2009; Pacherie & Martin 2013; Fernández 2013: ch. 5; Billon 2013).
An account of persons that would appear to distance that notion from self-
consciousness is that offered by P.F. Strawson in chapter 3 of Individuals,
Strawson’s primary goal is to argue for the claim that the concept of a
person is primitive, a position that he contrasts, on the one hand, with
Cartesian dualism and, on the other, with what he calls the “no-ownership
view”: a view according to which we don’t really self-ascribe states of
consciousness at all, at least not with the use of “I” as subject (cf.
Wittgenstein 1953: §244; 1958: 76; Anscombe 1975; it is controversial
whether Wittgenstein ever really held this view, for discussion see Hacker
1990: chs. 5 & 11; Jacobsen 1996; Wright 1998). To say that the concept
of a person is primitive is, on Strawson’s account, to say that it is
“logically prior” to the concepts subject and body; persons are not to be
thought of as compounds of subjects and bodies. Strawson argues that the
primitiveness of the concept of a person is a necessary condition of the
possibility of self-consciousness (P.F. Strawson 1959: 98–103). His
argument is that one can only self-ascribe states of consciousness if one is
able to ascribe them to others (for more on this theme see §4.4). This rules
out Cartesian dualism, since ascribing states of consciousness to others
requires that one be able to identify others, and one cannot identify pure
subjects of experience or Cartesian egos. The condition that one must be
able to ascribe states of consciousness to others also rules out the “no-
ownership view” because such a view is inconsistent with the fact that
psychological predicates have the very same sense in their first and third
person uses.
and that
Parfit’s reductionism, and it’s relation to Buddhist views of the self, has
been widely discussed (see for example, Stone 1988; Korsgaard 1989;
Cassam 1989, 1993, 1997: ch. 5; Garrett 1991, 1998: ch. 2; Siderits 1997;
McDowell 1997; Blackburn 1997). As is the case with the “no-ownership
view” it has sometimes been argued that reductionism is incompatible
with self-consciousness so, since we are indisputably self-conscious,
reductionism must be false. Against the claim that the (continued)
existence of a person consists merely in the (continued) existence of brain,
body, and interrelated physical and mental events that do not presuppose
anything about persons as such, McDowell (1997) for example, argues
from a broadly Evansian position on self-consciousness (see the
supplement: Evans on First Person Thought) that there simply are no such
“identity-free relations” (1997: 378) to which a person’s identity could be
reducible. That is, there is no way of characterising memory and the other
psychological phenomena relevant to personal identity without invoking
the identity of the person whose memory it is. As McDowell puts it,
This belief, that she is in pain, is a self-conscious one; it is a belief that she
herself is in pain. This connection between rational behaviour and first-
person thought is, of course, the one highlighted by Perry’s (1979) case of
the messy shopper in his discussion of the essential indexical (see §2.1).
An alternative to HOT and HOP theories that still maintains the ambition
to reduce consciousness to self-consciousness is the self-representational
view (Kriegel & Williford 2006; Kriegel 2009; Caston 2002), according to
which a psychological state is conscious if and only if it represents itself.
Such accounts are higher-order views that deny that the first and second-
order states are distinct. As with both HOT and HOP, self-
representationalism can be thought of as supporting the view that a form
of self-consciousness is a necessary condition of consciousness. Kriegel
(2003) dubs this “intransitive self-consciousness”, the phenomenon
purportedly picked out by phrases of the form “I am self-consciously
thinking that P”, and distinguishes it from the “transitive self-
consciousness” purportedly picked out by phrases of the form “I am self-
conscious of my thought that P”. This is a version of the distinction
between reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness discussed in §3.2
(and the views of Fichte and Sartre mentioned in §1; cf. Kapitan 1999). If
conscious states are those that represent themselves then, it might be
argued, consciousness entails intransitive self-consciousness, since one’s
conscious states do not only represent themselves but also (in some way
implicitly) represent oneself as having them (Kriegel 2003: 104).
Aristotle, considering a version of the HOP theory, argued that the view
suffered from a regress problem since the higher-order perception must
itself be conscious and so be accompanied by a HOP, which would itself
be conscious, and so on (De Anima 3.2; Caston 2002). The standard way
to diffuse such a worry is to deny that the higher order state, be it
perception or thought, need be conscious. An alternative, of course, is to
endorse a self-representational account. There are other objections to
higher order views, however, each of which applies to one or more
versions of the view. They include worries about the possibility of
objectless and non-veridical higher order states (Byrne 1997; Block 2011),
about whether it can account for the conscious states of infants and non-
humans (Dretske 1995: ch. 4; Tye 1995: ch. 1), the complaint that the
That is, a single self must be able to “comprehend” its own experiences
together, otherwise they would not really be its own. Such
“comprehension” would seem to involve self-consciousness. As Kant
famously puts it,
On this view, it is the unity of the self that guarantees that co-conscious
experiences are jointly self-ascribable; that unity requires self-
consciousness (there is a question as to whether self-consciousness is here
supposed to explain the unity of consciousness; cf. Dainton’s strong and
weak “I-thesis” (2000: §2.3)). This Kantian picture is associated with the
claim that unified self-consciousness requires a conception of the world as
objective; as transcending the perspective that one has on it. The idea here
is that to self-ascribe an experience one must have some grasp of the
distinction between one’s (subjective) experience that the (objective)
condition of which it is an experience (these issues are explored in P.F.
Strawson 1966; Bennett 1966; Evans 1980; Cassam 1997; Sacks 2000;
also see Burge 2010: ch. 6).
consciousness in mind. As Bayne (2004) points out, the claim that the
unity of consciousness requires that one possess the concept of oneself
seems, implausibly, to imply that conceptually unsophisticated infants and
non-human animals could not possess a unified stream of consciousness
(of course, this worry applies quite generally to views that connect
consciousness with self-consciousness). The view that non-conceptual
self-consciousness is a necessary condition of the unity of consciousness
would appear to be vulnerable to the objection that it implausibly rules out
the possibility of cases such as Anscombe’s (1975) subject in a sensory
deprivation tank, a case in which the forms of experience typically classed
as forms of non-conceptual self-consciousness are lacking (for related
cases see Bayne 2004; also see G. Strawson 1999). A different worry
about the connection between self-consciousness and the unity of
consciousness is the “just more content” objection (B. Williams 1978: ch.
3; Hurley 1994; and 1998 Part I). The concern is addressed to the view
that self-consciousness is not merely a necessary condition of the unity of
consciousness but is that in virtue of which it is unified. For if the self-
ascription of experiences is taken to be that which is responsible for the
unity of consciousness, how can we account for the fact that the self-
conscious thoughts are themselves unified with the first-order experiences
that they supposedly unify? As Hurley puts it,
arguments can be found in the work of P.F. Strawson (1959: ch. 3) and
Davidson (1991; for the related Hegelian view that various forms of self-
consciousness depend on intersubjective recognition, see Honneth 1995).
Since knowledge of other minds is typically considered to be open to
sceptical doubt, and self-consciousness is not, such lines of reasoning are
transcendental arguments and so potentially open to general criticisms of
that form of argument (Stroud 1968; R. Stern 1999, 2000). Strawson’s
argument hinges on his claim that
This means, Strawson claims, that one can only ascribe mental states to
oneself if one is capable of ascribing them to others which, in turn, means
that I cannot have gained the capacity to think of others’ mental states by
means of an analogical reasoning from my own case. This, Strawson
argues, shows that others’ observable behaviour is not a “sign” of their
mentality, but is a “criterion” of it. In short, we must have knowledge of
others' minds if we are self-conscious (for the full argument, see P.F.
Strawson 1959: 105ff; for critical discussion, see R. Stern 2000: ch. 6;
Sacks 2005; Joel Smith 2011).
example, Mitchell 1993; Suddendorf & Butler 2013; Gallup, Platek, &
Spaulding 2014. For related philosophical discussion, see Rochat &
Zahavi 2011; Peacocke 2014: ch.8).
Tulving himself argues that only humans possess episodic memory, and
only when they reach the age of around 4 years (2005; also see
Suddendorf & Corballis 2007). Whilst human infants and non-human
animals possess non-episodic forms of memory such as semantic memory
(remembering that such and such is the case), they lack the “autonoetic”
consciousness of themselves projected either back or forwards in time. For
example whilst most 3 year old infants can remember presented
information, most are unreliable when it comes to the question of how
they know—did they see it, hear it, etc. (Gopnik & Graf 1988). The
suggestion here is that the development of the reliable capacity to report
how they know some fact reflects the development of the capacity to
episodically remember the learning event.
5.3 Metacognition
monitor their own level of confidence, they are to that extent self-
conscious. One common paradigm for testing metacognitive abilities
involves presenting subjects with a stimulus that they must categorise in
one of two ways. Crucially, they are also given the opportunity to opt out
of the test, with correct categorisation resulting in the highest reward,
opting out resulting in a lower reward, and incorrect categorisation
resulting in no reward. The assumption is that the opt-out response reflects
a meta-cognitive judgement of uncertainty. Evidence gathered from such a
paradigm has been taken to show metacognitive abilities in some birds
(Fujita et. al. 2012), dolphins (J.D. Smith et. al. 1995), primates (Shields
et. al. 1997), and children from the age of around 4 years (Sodian et. al.
2012).
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On the output side, as is familiar from the discussion of Perry in §2.1, “I”-
Ideas feed into our dispositions to act in a special way: my belief that I am
about to be attacked by a weasel disposes me to act in a way that a belief
that Smith is about to be attacked by a weasel does not, unless I also
believe that I am Smith. Similarly, if I believe there is a weasel here, I will
be disposed to react appropriately. On the other hand, if I believe that there
is a weasel in the Wild Wood, I will only be so disposed if I also believe
that the Wild Wood is here.
conception that one has of oneself means that one can think of oneself in
ways that are not immediately dependent on identification-free
information channels. And one can think about oneself in the sensory
deprivation tank because one’s “I”-Idea is disposed to be controlled by
relevant incoming sensory information, even though there is no actual
input available at that time (Evans 1982: 215–216 and 153, n.20; for
critical discussion, see O’Brien 1995b).
Whilst the position that Evans articulates does involve the rejection of
Anscombe’s claim that “I” never refers, it does allow that “I”-thoughts
can, on occasion, fail to refer. Evans allows that there are a number of
ways in which thoughts, including “I”-thoughts, can fail to refer (1982:
§5.4 & §7.6). One example would be a case in which the inputs, those
special ways of gaining information that control one’s “I”-thinking, derive
from a variety of different objects. If, say, one’s introspective information
derives from one person but one’s bodily experience derives from another,
then one’s “I”-Idea would fail to pick out a unique object and would
therefore lack a referent. On Evans’ view, then, one may suffer from the
illusion of first-person thought. That is, it may seem “from within” as
though one is thinking about oneself, yet one is, in fact, failing to do so
(for discussion, see Peacocke 2008: §3.3; de Gaynesford 2003).
own mental features; one cannot introspect another’s mind. It is, therefore,
difficult to see how one might know, via introspection, that a has a
headache if a is not oneself. Given this, one will not be able to misidentify
an introspectively presented subject as oneself. On the other hand, the
thought “I am happy”, based on an overheard conversation between two
therapists, is not plausibly IEM, since it is possible that one has
misidentified the person spoken about as oneself.
Actual cases vary, but it has sometimes been suggested that the
phenomena of thought insertion (Stephens & Graham 2000; Mullins &
Spence 2003), alien limb (Moro, Zampini, & Aglioti 2004), anarchic hand
(Marchetti & Della Sala 1998), “anonymous memory” (Klein & Nichols
2012), and “anonymous vision” (Zahn, Talazko, & Ebert 2008), are
counterexamples to the claims that thoughts based, respectively, on
introspection, bodily awareness, action-awareness, episodic memory, and
perceptual experience, are IEM (Campbell 1999b; Marcel 2003; Lane &
Liang 2011; Gallagher 2012: ch.7). In each of these cases, subjects seem
These actual cases differ from the fantasy cases in an important respect.
Whilst they arguably involve errors of misidentification, they seem not to
be errors of misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun, since
none involve the first-person concept. In none of the cases do subjects
judge themselves to be some way or other; quite the opposite. The subject
of thought insertion is aware of what is, in fact, their own thought, but
attributes it to someone else, failing to make the appropriate first-person
judgement. It is helpful here to distinguish between errors of self-
misidentification, in which the subject mistakenly takes a distinct thing or
person to be themselves and so mistakenly judges “I am F”, and errors of
other-misidentification, in which the subject mistakenly takes what is in
fact themselves to be some thing, or someone, else and so mistakenly
judges “a is F ”. The cases that are typically discussed in this context
usually involve mistakenly taking oneself to be someone else (or, in some
cases, simply failing to form any relevant belief as to who is F), and so are
not cases of self-misidentification, but rather of other-misidentification (cf.
de Vignemont 2012). But IEM, as typically understood, concerns an
immunity to self-misidentification. Thus, since none of these cases seem to
involve errors grounded in the false identity judgement “I = a”, whatever
it is that they do show, none obviously challenge the claim that when these
various information sources do ground self-ascriptions, those first-personal
thoughts are IEM.