BPXC Policy for Well Integrity Assurance

Policy for Well Integrity Assurance
Version 1.2 April 1998
BP Exploration Colombia
Version 1.2 Authorised :A Nelson/C Portela
BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey
Policy Authorisation
Drilling Department
Alan Nelson
Drilling Manager
……………………………………………………………………………Date……………….
Well Engineering & Operations Department
Carlos Portela
Well Engineering & Operations Manager
……………………………………………………………………………Date……………….
Prepared by
Tim Bailey
Well Engineering Manager
……………………………………………………………………………Date……………….
Page 2
Table of Contents
1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 6
2.0 The Meaning of and the Need for Well Integrity ................................................................ 6
3.0 BPXC Plugging Policy........................................................................................................ 8
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 8
3.2 Policy Statement ............................................................................................................ 8
3.3 Deviation From Policy .................................................................................................... 8
3.4 Clarification of Barriers ................................................................................................... 9
3.5 Drill-By.......................................................................................................................... 12
3.6 Heavy Lifts.................................................................................................................... 12
3.6.1 Protection of Wellheads for SIMOPS .................................................................... 13
3.7 Xmas Tree or BOP Removal (including well handed over to Drilling for Work-Over)... 14
3.7.1 Xmas Tree Removal .............................................................................................. 14
3.7.2 BOP Removal ........................................................................................................ 14
3.8 Well Handed Over from Drilling to Well Operations (Prior to Perforating).................... 15
3.9 Well Handed Over from Drilling to Well Operations (with open perforations) .............. 15
3.10 Examples of Mechanical Barriers............................................................................... 15
3.11 Drawings of Wellhead and Xmas Tree....................................................................... 21
4. Pressure & Integrity Testing.............................................................................................. 22
4.1 Pressure Testing Requirements for Well Completion .................................................. 22
4.1.1 Summary ............................................................................................................... 22
4.1.2 Pressure Testing Philosophy ................................................................................. 22
4.1.3 Completion Tubing Pressure Test ......................................................................... 23
4.1.4 Completion Annulus Pressure Test ....................................................................... 23
4.1.5 Production Casing Pressure Test (including liner laps not exposed to production)24
4.1.6 Production Liner Pressure Test (including liner laps exposed to production) ........ 24
4.1.6.1 Liner ................................................................................................................ 24
4.1.6.2 Fraccing .......................................................................................................... 24
4.1.6.3 Liner Lap ......................................................................................................... 24
4.1.7 Future Well Conversions ....................................................................................... 24
4.2 Pressure Testing Requirements - Well Tubulars.......................................................... 25
4.2.1 Basic Pressure Testing Requirements................................................................... 25
4.2.2 Production Casing, Drilling Liners and Production Liners ...................................... 26
4.2.3 Liner Laps - not exposed to Production ................................................................. 26
4.2.3.1 Production Liner Laps ..................................................................................... 26
4.2.3.2 Drilling and Scab Liner Laps ........................................................................... 26
4.2.4 Liner Laps exposed to Production ......................................................................... 27
4.2.4.1 Oil Producer .................................................................................................... 27
4.2.4.2 Gas Injector..................................................................................................... 27
4.3 Wellhead and Xmas Tree Testing................................................................................ 27
4.3.1 Installation.............................................................................................................. 27
4.3.2 Xmas Tree & Wellhead Maintenance .................................................................... 28
4.3.3 SSSV Testing ........................................................................................................ 29
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4.4 Notification of Integrity Failures .................................................................................... 29

5. Measures to Ensure Integrity ............................................................................................. 31
5.1 Production Casing Integrity .......................................................................................... 31
5.1.1 Steps to Take to Reduce the Risk of Integrity Problems with Production Casing.. 31
5.1.1.1 Casing Wear ................................................................................................... 31
5.1.1.2 Casing Deformation ........................................................................................ 31
5.1.1.3 Cement bond quality - First & Second Stages ................................................ 32
5.1.2 Re-Establishing Integrity of Production Casing...................................................... 32
5.1.2.1 Additional Liner Lap ........................................................................................ 32
5.1.2.2 Scab Liner ....................................................................................................... 32
5.2 Liner Lap Integrity......................................................................................................... 33
5.2.1 Steps to Take to Reduce the Risk of Integrity Problems with Liner Laps .............. 34
5.2.2 Re-Establishing Integrity of Liner Laps .................................................................. 34
5.3 Liner/Reservoir Cement Bond ...................................................................................... 34
5.3.1 Cement Bond Evaluation ....................................................................................... 34
5.4 Change of Well Service................................................................................................ 34
6.0 Annulus Integrity & Pressure Limitations ......................................................................... 36
6.1 “A” Annulus Integrity..................................................................................................... 36
6.1.1 Failure of the Production Packer, PBR or Liner Lap. ............................................ 36
6.1.2 Failure of the Production casing ............................................................................ 37
6.1.3 Failure of The Production Tubing .......................................................................... 37
6.1.4 Failure of the Tubing Head Seals .......................................................................... 37
6.2 “B” Annulus Integrity..................................................................................................... 38
6.2.1 Effect of Pressure on the “B” Annulus ................................................................... 38
6.2.2 Carbonera C7 Overpressure.................................................................................. 38
6.3 Annulus Pressure Monitoring & Recording................................................................... 39
6.3.1 Well Operations ..................................................................................................... 39
6.3.2 Drilling.................................................................................................................... 40
6.4 Bleed off of Annulus Pressures .................................................................................... 40
6.5 Annulus Action Decision Trees .................................................................................... 41
7.0 Well Suspension and Abandonment................................................................................ 45
7.1 Well Suspension .......................................................................................................... 45
7.2 Well Abandonment....................................................................................................... 48
8.0 Roles & Responsibilities .................................................................................................. 52
8.1 Well Pads Engineers & Supervisors............................................................................. 52
8.2 Field PEs and PE Supervisors ..................................................................................... 52
8.3 Well Management Team Leader.................................................................................. 52
8.4 Wells/Flowlines Superintendent ................................................................................... 52
8.5 Production Technologists (including Fraccing & Production Technology).................... 53
8.6 Drilling Technologists (including Fluids, Cementing & Well Design) ............................ 53
8.7 Completion Engineers and Team Leader..................................................................... 53
8.8 Drilling Engineers .........................................................................................................53
8.9 Cusiana, Cupiagua and Piedemonte Senior Drilling Engineers ................................... 53
8.10 Drilling Supervisors..................................................................................................... 54
8.11 Drilling Superintendents ............................................................................................. 54
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8.12 Field Manager ............................................................................................................ 54

8.13 Well Engineering Manager ......................................................................................... 54
8.14 Drilling Manager ......................................................................................................... 55
8.15 Operations and Asset Managers................................................................................ 55
8.16 Dispensations Requirements Summary ..................................................................... 56
8.16.1 Drilling.................................................................................................................. 56
8.16.2 Well Operations ................................................................................................... 57
9.0 Appendix.......................................................................................................................... 58
9.1 Acceptable SSSV and Annulus Leak Rates................................................................. 58
9.1.1 Liquid Leak - Oil Producers ................................................................................... 58
9.1.2 Gas Leak - Gas Injectors ....................................................................................... 59
9.2 Buenos Aires A-23 “B” Annulus Pressure Example ..................................................... 61
9.3 Relevant Abstracts for Colombian Decree No 1895 September 15th 1973 Pertaining to
Well Integrity, Suspension and Abandonment ................................................................... 65
9.3.1 Chapter IV - Drilling of Oil and Gas Wells in Concessions, In Contribution and In
Private Property Areas.................................................................................................... 65
9.3.2 Oil and Gas Production Methods........................................................................... 66
9.3.3 Control of the reservoir .......................................................................................... 66
9.3.4 Oil and Gas Conservation...................................................................................... 66
Index………………………………………………………………………………………………69
Page 5
1.0 Introduction
The BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy sets out the requirements for well integrity from a
Drilling and Well Operations perspective from the time the Production casing * has been set
through to field operation of the well for its productive life and eventual suspension or
abandonment. It also sets out the requirements to determine operational safety criteria for
wells with annulus pressure.
This policy follows requirements as defined in the new BPX Wells Policy (ref. D-Draft #3
October 1997).
It is to be used as the basis for all BPXC operational programmes and should be referenced
in all field drilling, work-over, completion and well operations manuals.
This policy has been discussed and agreed with all BPXC operations teams and has been
accepted by the Production Forum.
Any deviation from this policy must be addressed in terms of a request for dispensation from
the appropriate departmental or line manager **, supported by the reasons for dispensation a
detailed risk assessment, HSE and Cost impact analyses and sign off by the relevant
technical authorities (as indicated in the specific sections).
* Production casing shall mean the last full string of casing set/tied back to the surface wellhead and
through which the completion shall be run.
** Details of who can provide dispensations and under what criteria are given later in the document (under
section 8).
2.0 The Meaning of and the Need for Well Integrity

In conducting our operations, we are obliged to provide and maintain a product which is
secure and does not compromise risks to personal safety and the environment. Additionally
the well should be delivered fit for purpose to allow operation over its productive life to deliver
optimum production for the asset.
We must design wells to ensure that there is adequate isolation between a hydrocarbon
bearing reservoir and the surface. We must test the component parts of the well during
installation to ensure that these design parameters are met.
The fundamental requirement is for a minimum of two barrier isolation between the reservoir
and the surface , either from the Xmas tree, or if removed, from the reservoir to the wellhead,
and for sufficient integrity of these barriers to allow for production and stimulation of the well
throughout its productive life.
Page 6
Isolation is achieved by a combination of permanent barriers such as well tubulars (liners and
casing strings), packers, wellheads, valves such as SSSV (Sub Surface Safety Valves) and
surface Xmas tree valves. There is a requirement for some of the valves to be fail-safe *
such that they will close automatically in the event of a catastrophic mechanical failure
downstream of these valves. To ensure that this fail-safe system remains operable, regular
integrity tests (as defined in section 4.3) must be performed throughout the life of the well. If
any of these barriers fail in any way, they must be repaired as soon as possible (ref. section
4.3) to ensure that two barriers are maintained in place.
Our barrier and plugging policy ensures that in the event of one barrier failure, there is
always a back-up which will contain well integrity and allow effective repairs to be made -
either through non-rig or rig intervention.
This policy also ensures that we will construct, deliver, and maintain wells to allow optimum
well performance through an ability to stimulate, isolate, draw down and maintain production
without compromise to well integrity.
* In the case of BPXC wells the Sub Surface Safety Valve (SSSV), the Upper Master and the Wing valve
are fail-safe and remotely controlled during the production life of the well.
Page 7
3.0 BPXC Plugging Policy
3.1 Introduction
The BPXC Plugging policy sets out the plugging policy in specific terms, particularly in
relation to drilling, completion, work-over and non rig well activity, or any activity that involves
heavy lifts over wells.
Drilling activity shall include drill-by (risk of well collision) where the well in risk of collision
requires shut in, and removal of the BOP for any reason.
Unless otherwise stated, wells refers to oil or gas wells that are capable of flowing naturally.
Water wells that are not capable of flowing to surface are considered as a separate category.
Integrity considerations affecting only water injection wells are mentioned by exception.
3.2 Policy Statement
The BPXC Plugging Policy requires that there must be a minimum of two mechanical
barriers to flow fitted in all wells. Such barriers must be capable of containing flow to surface
before undertaking the removal of any pressure control equipment. Kill weight fluid may be
considered as a barrier under certain circumstances (see 3.4 Clarification below). As a base
case there should be 2 mechanical barriers and kill weight fluid in place.
i) In each flow path (the tubing string(s) and the tubing/casing annulus) there must be two
tested mechanical barriers isolating flow from the reservoir to the surface - see examples
in section 3.10. (“reservoir” shall mean any formation capable of sustaining flow of
hydrocarbon liquids, or flow of water capable of imparting pressure due to imbalance of
hydrostatic control)
ii) Within the requirements specified in i) above, each flow path (the tubing string(s) and the
tubing/casing annulus) must be isolated with one tested mechanical barrier installed
below wellhead or tubing hanger level - see examples - section 3.10.
3.3 Deviation From Policy
There may be cases where the costs, difficulty and exposure to further risk of installing more
than one mechanical barrier to flow (if a kill weight fluid is also considered) or more than two
mechanical barriers to flow (if no kill weight fluid is considered) is grossly out of proportion to
the reduction in risk likely to be achieved by implementing the precaution. In such cases,
after careful consideration, justification and conducting a risk assessment, less stringent
requirements may be adopted on the approval of the relevant (Drilling or WEO) manager.
Such dispensations must be recorded and filed in the relevant well files. Programmes
proceeding under such dispensations must make reference to the granted dispensation,
boundary conditions and mitigation steps as defined in the dispensation process.
Page 8
Applications for deviation from policy must contain the following:
i. Why the dispensation is required.

ii. What is the programme that is to be followed with the dispensation in place.
iii. What additional risks does this incur and how will they be mitigated (a risk assessment
must support this requirement).
iv. Cost Impact analysis.
v. What are the boundary conditions of the dispensation (to what events and time
restrictions does the dispensation apply) - permanent or temporary dispensation
requirements must be defined.
The appropriate process and procedure to be used for dispensations to this policy is that for
Management of Change as defined in “BPXC - WELL OPERATIONS -Change/Modification
Control Procedure - HWG-PR-07 30th September 1996.
Reference should also be made to BPX Wells Policy D Draft-3 (Oct 97) section 3.5
As this is a company policy, contravention of the defined rules and/or failure to follow
defined dispensation requirements will be a disciplinary offence.
3.4 Clarification of Barriers
i. Mechanical barriers will be tested from the direction in which they will be subjected to
the highest pressure :
a) The lower mechanical barrier and annulus packer/PBR supporting a kill weight
fluid will be pressure tested from above.
b) The lower mechanical barrier and annulus packer/PBR not supporting a kill weight
fluid will be integrity tested from below (ie. through the completion).
c) Tubing hanger annulus seals and upper barriers should have proven integrity from
the reservoir side (ie: pressure tested from below).
Page 9
ii. The location and selection of a downhole tubing barrier should minimise potential
problems in:
a) Killing the well

b) Bringing the well back onto production should the barrier be impossible to retrieve.
iii. Kill weight * fluid may only be considered a barrier if:
a) It is isolated from the reservoir by a mechanical barrier,

or
b) It is isolated from the reservoir by a semi-permeable filter cake (ie. Losses are
controlled to the reservoir by a wall cake or bridging agents - ref. Clauses 3.7.1.a
and 3.7.2.b)
and
c) It is of sufficient density and that sufficient quantity is placed in the well bore to
ensure that the fluid hydrostatic pressure exceeds the highest reservoir pressure.
(note this shall normally be to surface in order to confirm the height of the fluid
column).
* Kill weight fluids will normally be solids free unless used for drilling (muds) or kill pills (for killing live wells).
iv. This policy applies equally to Xmas tree valve repairs where the principle of double
valve isolation must be adhered to.
v. An integrity tested SSSV (zero leakage in this instance) shall only be considered as a
barrier in a water injection well or in a well having its contents displaced to water or
brine.
vi. For wireline or coiled tubing operations on a live well, the lubricator, tree master valves
and BOPs (wireline or Coiled tubing) are considered to provide the barriers required.
Shear rams must be capable of cutting the wire or coil. The lower master valve should
be capable of cutting wire.
Page 10
The following Table summarises acceptable barriers for different operational conditions
Department Operational Status Acceptable Barriers

DRILLING Drilling Ahead • Tested BOP - as per BPX Wells Policy ref. : section
10.3 (Tested within 14 days)
• Kill weight Drilling Fluid
• (Does not include Under-balanced Drilling
requirements)
Temporary Suspension • Closed BOP - Shear Blind Rams or pipe rams around
pipe.
• Kill Weight Drilling Fluid
• Preferably additional plug set within last casing string
- Cement, RTTS or Bridge Plug.
Hand-Over Unperforated • Tested Production liner and casing /Completion
Well To Operations annulus
• Tested completion string
• Tested Two way check valve installed in Tubing
hanger
• Blind flange (tested) with gauge installed
Hand-Over Perforated • Kill weight fluid
Well To Operations • Tested Deep set plug (deep enough to allow sufficient
hydrostatic above plug to kill well)
• Tested Two way check valve installed in tubing
hanger
• Blind flange (tested) with gauge installed or Tested
Xmas Tree with all valves closed
OPERATIONS Wire-line Well Work - • Tested Wireline BOP. Double BOP required. Ref
Live Well BPXC Pet Eng. Policy 1996.
• Tested Wireline lubricator suitable sized to allow
retrieval of full logging tool assembly - No tool longer
than ¾ length of Lubricator shall be run)
Coiled Tubing Work - Live • Tested Coiled Tubing BOP as per BPX Wells Policy
Well ref. section 27.
• Tested Coiled Tubing Lubricator - suitably sized to
allow retrieval of full BHA.
• Double check valves must be used (unless well full of
kill weight fluid and reverse operations required)
Removal of Tree • Tested Deep set plug
• Kill fluid above plug with sufficient hydrostatic head to
kill well
• Tested Two way check valve set in tubing hanger
Hand-Over Perforated • Kill weight fluid
Well to Drilling • Tested Deep set plug (deep enough to allow sufficient
hydrostatic above plug to kill well)
• Tested Two way check valve installed in tubing
hanger
• Blind flange (tested) with gauge installed.
Page 11
3.5 Drill-By
During drilling operations conducted from a well site, the trajectory of the new well may pass
close to existing wells as defined below. All wells will be drilled and surveyed according to
BPX Drilling Policy and the BPXC Basis of Design for Directional Drilling (6th May 1996).
When wells breach the acceptable limits of collision uncertainty (through plan or occurring
during drilling) and when the drill by depth is predicted to be greater than the SSSV depth,
then
a) A deep set plug will be run below the point of intersection

b) The SSSV will be closed
c) The lower master valve on the Xmas tree will be closed
d) The Upper master valve on the Xmas tree will be closed.
When wells breach the acceptable limits of collision uncertainty (through plan or occurring
during drilling) and when the drill by depth is predicted to be shallower than the SSSV depth,
then
a) The SSSV shall be closed, or the SSSV shall be pulled and a plug set in the SSSV
nipple.
b) The Lower Master valve shall be closed
c) The Upper Master valve shall be closed.
If any of the above criteria fail to meet required basis of design , then the well will be plugged
back and re-drilled.
3.6 Heavy Lifts
A heavy lift is a load that is being elevated, in the proximity of a surface pressure
containment vessel, that is large enough, high enough and/or heavy enough that if
accidentally dropped, could damage the mechanical integrity of that vessel.
As a general rule, no heavy lifts will be made over an unprotected wellhead or associated
pipe work. However many of our operations involve moving heavy equipment, rigs or coiled
tubing units etc., over wellheads on a day to day basis.
A general risk assessment should be carried out to identify and minimise the risks and
hazards associated with each type of operation in question and be used as a standard for
such operations. Modifications can only be made to this standard (to cover the different
situations which come up on the well-site) after a full review and the risk assessment has
been revisited, modified and approval by the Well/Flowlines Superintendent. The PE
Supervisor and Field Supervisor (for well work) and the Drilling Supervisor (for rig work) are
responsible to make sure a copy of the general risk assessment is employed on the site and
modified according to the above requirements if the situations so requires.
Page 12
In the event that the heavy lift is identified as being sufficient to damage or sever the
wellhead or pipe work if dropped, the following minimum actions must be taken.
a) Function test safety control panel and make sure SHSV, SSSV, and SHWV, and ESDV
all work prior to performing lift.
b) Station suitably trained and experienced individual at panel during lifts to shut well in
should an emergency arise
In the event that, as a result of a risk analysis, the risks are deemed high enough that the
above is not considered as acceptable to mitigate the risks, the following should be
undertaken.
a) SSSV closed and the tubing downstream of the SSSV de-pressurised.

b) A plug installed below the wellhead.
c) Lower Master Valve closed
d) Upper Master Valve closed
e) Flow line and Xmas tree upstream of headers to be fully de-pressurised and isolated
from headers. (or downstream of headers in the case of injectors).
3.6.1 Protection of Wellheads for SIMOPS
Where producing wells are close to or are impacted by drilling or other heavy operations, a
protective cover for the wellhead should be installed in addition to taking the above
precautions. A risk assessment should be carried out to determine the requirement for the
protective device. The protective device should be designed and constructed to be able to
take the likely impacts from the operations in question.
Note: Risk assessments should be conducted by the team or supervisor undertaking the
heavy lifting operation. A written record of the risk assessment must be filed in the relevant
well file and a copy sent to the WEO Manager.
Page 13
3.7 Xmas Tree or BOP Removal (including well handed over to Drilling for Work-Over)
3.7.1 Xmas Tree Removal
Prior to Work-over operations, and the removal of the Xmas tree, the following steps must
be taken to secure the well.
a) Well killed with a minimum of 75 psi overbalance *using a suitably designed kill pill or
fluid. Well should be flow checked for 30 minutes and be without losses or gains. (an
acceptable alternative is to set the deep plug first (b) and then circulate kill weight fluid
above the plug (this avoids having to squeeze perforations and possibly damage the
formation).
b) A deep set plug run into a nipple in or below the production packer (tested to tubing test
pressure)
c) An two way check valve installed in the tubing hanger.
d) Lower master valve closed
e) Upper master valve closed
f) Flow line from the active wing valve to header to be de-pressurised and purged of
hydrocarbons with water.
Note: In the case of hand-over of well to Drilling, the hand-over requirements should be
followed and the well status, in terms of barriers set, clearly stated on the hand-over
certificate.
3.7.2 BOP Removal
Prior to the unplanned removal of the BOP on a well being drilled or worked over with kill
weight fluid, the following steps must be taken to secure the well (it is assumed here that
there is open hole below the last set casing/liner shoe)
a) The well filled to surface with a kill fluid with a minimum overbalance * of 75 psi.
b) The well to be without losses or gains. A flow check of at least 30 minutes must be
used to confirm this.
c) A mechanical plug (RTTS, retrievable bridge plug, cement etc.) set as deep as
practicably possible within the last casing string and pressure tested from above to
1000 psi over the last leak off pressure or equal to the last casing test pressure
(whichever is the lower).
Note: In this case the kill fluid shall be considered as a barrier provided operations involving
the removal of the BOP, without setting a second mechanical barrier, are able to be
comfortably conducted during daylight hours.
* 75 psi equivalent to 0.1 ppg at 15,000 ft TVD
Page 14
3.8 Well Handed Over from Drilling to Well Operations (Prior to Perforating)
Following installation and testing of the completion, and prior to hand-over of the well to Well
Operations for installation of the Xmas tree and perforating, the well will be left as follows:
a) The tubing and annulus will be left full of kill weight brine. (However it is acceptable that
the tubing be left with diesel oil to facilitate under-balanced perforating)
b) A tubing hanger plug/two way check valve will be installed in the tubing hanger.
c) The wellhead will be protected by a suspension cap with a gauge installed. Note: The
suspension cap is not considered as a barrier.
Note: In the case of hand-over of well to Well Operations, the hand-over requirements should
be followed and the well status, in terms of barriers set, clearly stated on the hand-over
certificate.
3.9 Well Handed Over from Drilling to Well Operations (with open perforations)
After work-over operations, or handing a perforated well over to Well Operations, the well will
be left as follows:
a) Well killed with a minimum of 75 psi overbalance *using a suitably designed kill pill or
fluid. Well should be flow checked for 30 minutes and be without losses or gains. (an
acceptable alternative is to set the deep plug first (b) and then circulate kill weight fluid
above the plug (this avoids having to squeeze perforations and possibly damage the
formation).
b) A deep set plug run into a nipple in or below the production packer (tested to tubing test
pressure)
c) An two way check valve installed in the tubing hanger.
d) The wellhead will be protected by a suspension cap with a gauge installed. The
suspension cap is not considered as a barrier.
Note: In the case of hand-over of well to Well Operations, the hand-over requirements should
be followed and the well status, in terms of barriers set, clearly stated on the hand-over
certificate.
3.10 Examples of Mechanical Barriers
The following diagrams illustrate examples of acceptable mechanical barriers for the
following:
a) Normally Completed Well (hand-over to Well Operations) PBR Completion

b) Well prior to workover (hand-over to drilling) PBR Completion
(Also applies as an example of well handed over to Well Ops after a workover)
c) Normally Completed Well (hand-over to Well Operations) Packer Completion
d) Well prior to workover (hand-over to drilling) Packer Completion
Page 15
Note: In the examples shown, there are optional or multiple barriers shown for annulus barriers - in the case of PBR completions, and
tubing barriers - in the case of Packer completions. These primarily involve cement and/or a ZXP liner top packer. In all cases, the cement
should be regarded as the primary barrier. ZXP packers can only be regarded as a primary barrier where the cement is of poor quality.
Page 16
a) Normally Completed Well (hand-over to Well Operations) - PBR Completion
Blind Flange
T ested but not
considered a barrier (with
Gauge)
Annulus Barrier 2
CONDUCT OR T ubing Hanger Pack-off
30", 234.3# /FT (T ested)
GR-5L
Tubing Barrier 2
SURFACE 2 W ay Check Valve
CASING 20",106.5 (T ested from above)
LBS/FT , K-55,
BUT T RES SSSV
not considered as a barrier
PRODUCT ION CASING (Integrity T ested)
10 3/4", 60.7 lbs/ft, P-
110, NEW VAM; Tubing Barrier 3
Clean Inhibited Kill
W eight Fluid
INT ERMEDIAT E.
CASING
13 3/8", 72 LBS/FT , Annulus Barrier 3
N-80, BT C.
W eight Fluid
PRODUCT ION CASING

9 5/8", 53.5 lbs/ft, P-110,
NEW VAM
T OP OF 7" LINER@ 14,900
Annulus Barrier 1B
Optional Liner T op
Packer, Considered as
Secondary to Cement
(Positive T ested)
7"x9 5/8" ZXP
PACKER
Annulus Barrier 1A
Liner Lap Cement
(positive tested (if no
LINER HANGER
packer)
Tubing Barrier 1
Unperforated Liner
(T ested)
9 5/8" Casing shoe
RESERVOIR
7" LINER, 32 LB/FT

L-80, 13% Cr, NEW
VAM
Page 17
b) Well Prior to Work-over (hand-over to Drilling) - PBR Completion

Blind Flange
T ested but not
Gauge)
Annulus Barrier 2
30", 234.3# /FT (T ested)
GR-5L
Tubing Barrier 2
LBS/FT , K-55,
BUT T RES SSSV
10 3/4", 60.7 lbs/ft, P-
W eight Fluid
INT ERMEDIAT E.
CASING
N-80, BT C.
W eight Fluid
Tubing Barrier 1
PRODUCT ION CASING Deep Set Plug
9 5/8", 53.5 lbs/ft, P-110, (T ested from Above)
NEW VAM
T OP OF 7" LINER@ 14,900
Annulus Barrier 1B
Optional Liner T op
Secondary to Cement
(Positive T ested)
7"x9 5/8" ZXP Tubing Barrier
PACKER
Annulus Barrier1C
1A
Liner Lap
Liner Lap Cement
Cement
(positive
(positive & Draw-down
tested (if no
LINER HANGER tested (if no packer)
packer)
9 5/8" Casing shoe

@15 400FT
Plugged Perforations
W ith Calcium Carbonate
kill pill
RESERVOIR
7" LINER, 32 LB/FT

L-80, 13% Cr, NEW
VAM
Page 18
c) Normally Completed Well (hand-over to Well Operations) - Packer Completion

Blind Flange
T ested but not
Gauge)
Annulus Barrier 2
30", 234.3# /FT (T ested)
GR-5L
Tubing Barrier 2
LBS/FT , K-55,
BUT T RES SSSV
10 3/4", 60.7 lbs/ft, P-
W eight Fluid
INT ERMEDIAT E.
CASING
N-80, BT C.
W eight Fluid
PRODUCT ION CASING

9 5/8", 53.5 lbs/ft, P-110,
NEW VAM
Annulus Barrier 1
Production Packer
(T ested - above & below)
Tubing Barrier 1C
SBT PRODUCT ION Optional Liner T op
PACKER Packer, Considered as
Secondary to Cement
T OP OF 7" LINER (Positive & Draw-
downT ested)
7"x9 5/8" ZXP
PACKER
Tubing Barrier 1B
Liner Lap Cement
LINER HANGER tested (if no packer)
Tubing Barrier 1A
Unperforated Liner
(T ested)
9 5/8" Casing shoe
RESERVOIR
7" LINER, 32 LB/FT

L-80, 13% Cr, NEW
VAM
d) Well Prior to Work-over (hand-over to Drilling) - Packer Completion
Page 19
Blind Flange
T ested but not
Gauge)
Annulus Barrier 2
CONDUCT OR T ubing Hanger P ack-off
30", 234.3# /FT (T ested)
GR-5L
Tubing Barrier 2
SURFACE CASING 2 W ay Check Valve
20",106.5 LBS/FT , (T ested from above)
K-55, BUT T RES
SSSV
10 3/4", 60.7 lbs/ft, P-
W eight Fluid
INT ERMEDIAT E.
CASING
N-80, BT C. Clean Inhibited Kill
W eight Fluid
Tubing Barrier 1A
Deep Set Plug
(T ested - above)
PRODUCT ION CASING Set deep enough to
9 5/8", 53.5 lbs/ft, P-110, allow sufficient kill fluid
NEW VAM
hydrostatic to kill well
Annulus Barrier 1
Production Packer
(T ested - above & below)
SBT PRODUCT ION

Tubing Barrier 1C
PACKER Optional Liner T op
T OP OF 7" LINER Secondary to Cement
(Positive & Draw-
downT ested)
7"x9 5/8" ZXP
PACKER
Tubing Barrier 1B
Liner Lap Cement
LINER HANGER
tested (if no packer)
9 5/8" Casing shoe
Plugged Perforations
W ith Calcium Carbonate kill
pill
RES ERVOIR
7" LINER, 32 LB/FT

L-80, 13% Cr, NEW
VAM
Page 20
3.11 Drawings of Wellhead and Xmas Tree
Swab Cap
Swab Valve
Adjustable
Flow Wing Choke
Valve
Xmas
Tree
Actuated Upper
Master Valve
Lower Master Actuated Flow

Valve Wing Valve
Flow Line
Tubing Head Adaptor
Tubing
C Section
A Annulus
Wellhead
B Section
B Annulus
A Section
Page 21
4. Pressure & Integrity Testing
4.1 Pressure Testing Requirements for Well Completion
4.1.1 Summary
The following are the pressure test requirements for typical BPXC wells completed with a
liner top PBR completion: All the tests are assumed to be over completion fluid (water or
brine)
Positive Pressure Cusiana Cusiana Cupiagua Cupiagua Piedemonte Piedemonte Cusiana

Test Producer Gas Producer Gas Injector Producer Injector Water
Injector Injector
Tubing test 4,500 psi 5,500 psi 5,000 psi 6,000 psi 4500 psi 6500 psi 6000 psi
Annulus test (*) 4,000 psi 4,000 psi 4,000 psi 4,000 psi 4000 psi 4000 psi 4000 psi
Casing test 4,500 psi 5,500 psi 5,000 psi 6,000 psi 4500 psi 6500 psi 6000 psi
Production liner 4,500 psi 5,500 psi 5,000 psi 6,000 psi 4500 psi 6500 psi 6000 psi
test
(*) Depending on the maximum allowable pressure test from the well specific tubing stress
analysis.
For wells completed with a production packer style completion, any liner laps and production
casing exposed to production drawdown pressures must in addition be inflow pressure tested
to a bottom hole pressure equivalent to the minimum expected bottom hole flowing pressure
for the life well (including clean-up flow for gas injectors) ref sections4.2.2 & 4.2.3.:
Drawdown Cusiana Cusiana Cupiagua Cupiagua Piedemonte Piedemonte Cusiana
Test Producer Gas Producer Gas Injector Producer Injector Water
Injector Injector
Minimum 2,000 psi 2,500 psi 2,000 psi 2,500 psi 2000 psi 2500 psi 2,000 psi
BHFP
For pressure test durations refer to section 4.2.1 to 4.2.4.2 inclusive.
4.1.2 Pressure Testing Philosophy
The basic criteria to be used when deciding on pressure tests required for a well completion,
is that the well should be pressure tested to the highest expected future service load
conditions in order to ensure full well integrity for the whole well life. The purpose of the
pressure testing is to prove initial well integrity.
For completion tubing test, an absolute pressure test to the highest expected differential
pressure is accepted, i.e. a tubing pressure test to 5,000 psi is sufficient to cover a future
stimulation pressure of 8,000 psi where 3,000 psi is kept on the inner annulus as back-up
pressure.
Page 22
A full well specific triaxial tubing stress analysis must be conducted by the Completions
Team for every upcoming completion to ensure that it has sufficient strength to cover all load
conditions. In addition to this, the pressure ratings of the Xmas tree and downhole
completion components will have to be reviewed to ensure that there are no weak links in the
completion string. Design factors must be in accordance with the BPX Wells Policy and
Completions Manual
The pressure tests should also cover unforeseen events like a tubing leak near surface due
to the potential severe consequences of such an event.
4.1.3 Completion Tubing Pressure Test
The completion tubing test is dictated by the maximum expected tubing pressure for any
service load conditions throughout the well life, i.e.:
a) stimulation treatments (e.g. hydraulic fracture treatments in producers/injectors), where

a pressure test to the maximum pressure differential will suffice.
b) well shut-in condition (producers)
c) gas injection service (gas injectors)
4.1.4 Completion Annulus Pressure Test
The completion annulus test is normally dictated by the maximum expected annulus back-up
pressure required to support the tubing during a high pressure stimulation treatment. For
Cusiana/Cupiagua completions, this is normally 4 ,000 psi.
The triaxial tubing stress analysis undertaken by the Completions Team must identify the
maximum allowable annulus pressure test due to the negative effect from tension on the
tubing collapse resistance. For example, for some of the deep 7” completions in Cupiagua,
the tension effect on the tubing reduces the maximum allowable annulus pressure test to
around 3,700 psi. Design factors must be in accordance with the BPX Wells Policy and
Completions Manual.
Page 23
4.1.5 Production Casing Pressure Test (including liner laps not exposed to production)
This pressure test must, as a minimum, satisfy either the completion annulus pressure test
requirement as outlined above or the equivalent of shut in tubing pressure on top of the
annulus packer fluid (shallow tubing leak) - whichever is the greater.
For worn casing, the pressure test should only be made to within 80% of the calculated burst
based on the minimum wall thickness as determined by the USIT log (refer section 5.1).
4.1.6 Production Liner Pressure Test (including liner laps exposed to production)
4.1.6.1 Liner
Since the liner top PBR completion is normally pressure tested against the unperforated
production liner, the production liner will have to be pressure tested to a bottom hole
pressure equivalent to the tubing pressure test.
4.1.6.2 Fraccing
For high pressure stimulation treatments, e.g. hydraulic frac treatments, it is not practical to
pressure test the production liner and/or exposed liner laps to these high pressures. The
maximum allowable stimulation treatment pressure will be based on the calculated strength
of the exposed liner and completion components, rather than on previous pressure tests.
The justification for this statement is the fact that peak fracturing pressures occur for only a
very short period of time and the majority of the pressure is only seen by surface well
components due to frictional pressure losses during the dynamic stage of the fraccing
operation. However all fracturing jobs are to be individually assessed by the Fraccing and
Completions Teams to determine the risks involved. In cases where BPX standard Casing
and Completion design factors are likely to be exceeded, a full risk assessment must be
conducted and dispensation applied for from the WEO Manager.
4.1.6.3 Liner Lap
If the completion has any liner laps which are exposed to production drawdown pressures,
e.g. a packer style completion, this liner lap must be inflow tested to a bottom hole pressure
equal to the lowest expected bottom hole flowing pressure during the life of the well. (refer
section 4.2.4)
4.1.7 Future Well Conversions
If there is a definite plan for a non-rig well conversion within the near future, e.g. from an oil
producer to a gas injector, it is recommended to conduct initial pressure tests to reflect the
higher service load conditions. However, this does not remove the requirement to repeat
these pressure tests prior to making the well conversion, which must be undertaken.
Page 24
4.2 Pressure Testing Requirements - Well Tubulars
4.2.1 Basic Pressure Testing Requirements
Pressure tests on well components (e.g. annuli, casings, liner laps) must be conducted to the
following basic criteria to ensure that the pressure test represents a sound demonstration of
well integrity :
a) Volumes pumped for pressure tests must be compared to basic calculations for fluid
compressibility.
b) The fluid returned on bleed down must be the same as that pumped (within 0.5 bbl)
c) The pressure test must be of sufficient duration to ensure that stability and equilibrium
of pressure imbalances (e.g. due to trapped air) are accounted for. (This will normally
be 30 minutes or more for a flat line on the recorder chart).
d) All tests must include a low pressure test of 200 to 300 psi for 5 minutes before
proceeding to the full pressure test.
Pressure tests will not exceed the following criteria:
i. 80% of net burst pressure rating

ii. Wellhead rated pressure
iii. BOP rated pressure
Due consideration must be given to the following
• The burst rating of the weakest component in the casing or completion string
• The density of the fluid column inside and outside of the casing/completion string.
• The minimum design factors assumed in the casing design and those stated in the BP
Casing and Completion design manuals
• Casing wear - this should always be determined using a USIT log and the casing burst,
collapse etc. re-determined using API formulae and using the minimum wall thickness -
refer section 5.1
In the event that BPX Casing or Completion design factors are likely to be deviated from, a
full risk assessment must be conducted and Drilling/WEO/RDG management approval
obtained in writing before commencement of the operation involved.
For BPX design factors reference should be made to the BPX Wells Policy D Draft-3 (Oct 97) section 14.1, the
BXP Casing Design Manual and the BPX Completion Design Manual.
If there are any doubts about the pressure test, the test must be repeated. If doubts
continue, or the pressure tests confirm lack of integrity, actions must to be taken to re-
establish integrity. In the case of testing the well prior to hand-over to Well Operations, and
Page 25
the removal of the rig, the rig must not be moved from the well until integrity has been
confirmed or corrective actions to re-establish integrity have been taken.
All gauges used for pressure testing (including those provided by third parties) must be
covered by maintenance schedules that include calibration intervals. Gauges should be
suitably sized for the pressures involved. Chart recorders, suitably calibrated and sized for
the pressures involved must be used and the chart record of the test must be suitably and
clearly annotated, signed off by the relevant site supervisor and filed in the relevant well file.
For pressure testing reference should also be made to BPX Wells Policy D Draft-3 (Oct 97) sections 9.9, 19.1.9,
& 23.
4.2.2 Production Casing, Drilling Liners and Production Liners
A minimum of a 30 minute straight line positive pressure test must be conducted to the
maximum expected pressure for the life of the well. The requirement for fraccing should be
considered on a case by case basis - refer section 4.1.6.2
4.2.3 Liner Laps - not exposed to Production
4.2.3.1 Production Liner Laps
For production liner laps not exposed to production, but which are exposed to the A annulus
(Nominally for PBR completions) a minimum 30 minute straight line positive pressure test to
the maximum required pressure must be conducted (including back-up for fraccing and
tubing leak at surface).
The liner laps must also be tested to confirm integrity with the minimum weight fluid to be
placed as a packer fluid (water or brine). This can be achieved either with :
a) a drawdown test or
b) as a flow test after displacement to the packer fluid.
Under normal circumstances the packer fluid will be kill weight over reservoir pressure, in
these cases the second option should be sufficient to establish integrity unless there is a risk
of exposure to C7 pressure.
4.2.3.2 Drilling and Scab Liner Laps
For drilling Liner laps and scab liner laps a minimum of a 6 (six) hour draw-down (inflow)
must be conducted using an RTTS packer with a suitable cushion in the string designed to
represent the hydrostatic of the packer fluid less 500 psi. The test will commence on the
opening of the test valve. Down-hole gauges must be run and the chart must be examined
to ensure a straight line test has been achieved.
Page 26
Following the draw-down test, a 30 minute straight line positive test to the maximum
expected pressure - normally tubing test pressure, must be conducted.
The requirement for a drawdown test is due to the fact that the packer fluid will not have
sufficient density to kill a flow form the C7 formation if exposed through a leak. Drilling and
scab liners are, in most cases, run to cover the C7 formation.
4.2.4 Liner Laps exposed to Production
4.2.4.1 Oil Producer
For production, drilling or scab liner laps exposed to production pressures, a minimum of a 6
(six) hour draw-down (inflow) test must be conducted using an RTTS packer with a suitable
cushion in the string designed to represent minimum expected bottom hole pressures during
life of well production. The test will commence on the opening of the test valve. Down-hole
gauges must be run and the chart must be examined to ensure a straight line test has been
achieved.
Following the draw-down test, a 30 minute straight line positive test to the maximum
expected pressure - normally tubing test pressure, must be conducted.
Note: The drawdown test will also suffice as a test for production casing exposed to
production.
4.2.4.2 Gas Injector
For liner laps exposed to gas injection pressures, a minimum of a 30 minute straight line
positive test must be conducted to the maximum expected pressure for injection service or
fraccing.
Additionally a 6 (six) hr draw down test as in 4.2.4.1 above must be conducted if the well is
to be flowed for clean up prior to injection. Note: this should always be assumed to be the
case unless the contrary is confirmed in writing on the signed off SOR.
4.3 Wellhead and Xmas Tree Testing
reference should also be made to BPX Wells Policy D Draft-3 (Oct 97) section 2.7
4.3.1 Installation
On installation of the Xmas tree onto the well, a full pressure and integrity test must be
conducted on all valves prior to the removal of the two way check valve in the tubing hanger.
A summary table of tests required is provided at the end of this section.
Page 27
Pressure and function tests shall be conducted on all valves and connections, including the
connections to the well-head and the flow-line.
The test pressures shall conform to the rating of the Xmas tree in use.
4.3.2 Xmas Tree & Wellhead Maintenance
The following maintenance and testing must be conducted on all BPXC wells on active
service:
a) All valves will be greased and function tested every 3 months. These will include
wellhead wing valves on the A and B annuli.
b) All Xmas tree valves will be fully integrity pressure tested every 6 months.
c) Wellhead packer seals on the A and B annuli will be hydraulically tested every 12
months. (Tests to measure pressure within the annuli and above the annular seals
should be conducted prior to the hydraulic test).
In the event the above tests and/or maintenance cannot be carried out due to production or
other reasons, dispensation from the Wells/Flowlines Superintendent will be required in
writing and the WEO Manager consulted/advised. Every effort should be made to ensure
planning is conducted to allow these tests to be performed within the required time frame.
No test shall be omitted for a period of more that 1 month beyond the required date.
Adequate records of all pressure tests and maintenance must be placed in the relevant well
files.
All tests, maintenance and reporting shall be in accordance with “The BPXC Basic
Operations, Maintenance and Service Manual for Wellheads & Xmas Trees” - 15th January
1997. Ref HWG-SP-16.
Pressure Test Requirements for Xmas Trees

Xmas Tree Valve Test Type Test Duration Test Frequency
All Valves Full Working Pressure : 5 minutes at full pressure On tree Installation or re-
Test3,000/5,000/10,000 psi installation
depending on tree rating.
Valves to be tested against
tested two way check valve.
All Valves Low Pressure Test - 250 psi 5 minutes at test pressure On tree installation or re-
installation
All Valves against tested two
way check valve
Integrity Testing Of Xmas Tree Valves - In Order of Test
Swab Valve and Integrity test from below 5 minutes at stabilised every 6 months
A t t d Fl Wi i t Sh t i T bi H d
Page 28
Actuated Flow Wing against Shut in Tubing Head pressure

Valve Pressure - zero psi above
Flow Wing Valve Integrity test from below 5 minutes at stabilised every 6 months
against Shut in Tubing Head pressure
Pressure - zero psi above
Upper Master Valve Integrity test from below 5 minutes at stabilised every 6 months
against Shut in Tubing Head pressure
Lower Master Valve Integrity test from below 5 minutes at stabilised every 6 months
* against Shut in Tubing Head pressure
* Note - If the Lower Gate Valve is found to have a leak during the integrity test, repair must be effected
immediately following requirements for well plugging - refer section 3.7
4.3.3 SSSV Testing
The Sub Surface Safety Valve (SSSV) in all production and gas injection wells must be
tested as follows:
a) The SSSV Control line should be tested every 6 months *.

b) A SSSV slam shut seal test will be conducted every 6 months.
c) Any observed leak greater than that defined as acceptable in API RP 14B shall be
reported and suitable action taken to repair or replace the valve.
d) In the case of wireline retrievable valves, any valve leaking above acceptable rates will
be removed and replaced within a one month period. In the case of tubing retrievable
valves, the valve will be locked open and an insert valve installed within a one month
period.
e) If for any reason the SSSV becomes inoperable, suitable action will be taken within a
one month period to recover the effective operation of the valve.
f) The SSSV will be tested according to Section 4 of “The BPXC Basic Operations,
th
Maintenance and Service Manual for Wellheads & Xmas Trees” - 15 January 1997.
Ref HWG-SP-16.
* Note : Where the SSSV has closed for whatever reason, and has been proven to have
integrity, then the 6 month period will commence from that closure/proven integrity date.
Such occurrences must be recorded in the relevant well files.
In the event that the one month period for valve replacement or repair is exceeded, the well
will be shut in and a deep plug set and repairs conducted prior to the well being put back on
production.
4.4 Notification of Integrity Failures
In the event that during pressure testing, or well operation, an integrity failure occurs, then
the appropriate Superintendent, (Drilling or Well/Flowlines) must be informed by the site
Page 29
supervisor and a record filed in the relevant well file. An integrity failure will consist of a failed
pressure test or a failure of a well component during operation/intervention. Pressure on the
A or B annulus will constitute a well component failure. The Superintendent (Drilling or
Well/Flowlines) must then take the appropriate action as defined in this policy.
Page 30
5. Measures to Ensure Integrity
Prior to well hand-over to Well Operations for production, all reasonable steps must be taken
to guarantee well integrity. The following items address actions which need to be taken to
address specific circumstances.
5.1 Production Casing Integrity
5.1.1 Steps to Take to Reduce the Risk of Integrity Problems with Production Casing
5.1.1.1 Casing Wear
All precautions must be taken to minimise casing wear while drilling through the production
casing string. Side forces and loads must be modelled and appropriate measure taken to
ensure that the high risk areas are protected with the suitable number pipe protectors. Pipe
protectors must be routinely inspected and changed out when showing signs of wear.
Recommended models to run are C-Wear (Maurer) and DSS (DEAP for side forces).
Casing wear must be monitored on a daily basis when rotating the drill string. Ditch
magnet’s must be used and the caught metal weighed and recorded on a daily basis. The
amount of metal recovered (Per day and cumulative) must be recorded on the Daily report.
There are no “norms” for acceptable amounts of metal worn from the casing on a daily or
cumulative basis as wear can be spread out or localised, and time spent drilling within a
casing string can vary significantly. Therefore consideration of action needs to be made on a
case by case basis. This may mean increasing the use of pipe protectors or even stopping
drilling and running a USIT log if risk of wear is considered to be significant.
5.1.1.2 Casing Deformation
Casing deformation, aligned to the direction of highest horizontal stress has been seen on
several Cusiana wells. To reduce the risk of this occurring consideration should be given to
avoid cementation of the casing across the zones of highest risk which are the Carbonera
C5, C6 and C7 formations. Cementing programmes should thus be designed with this in
mind. The risks of taking this approach and their management must be reviewed with the
Cementing Group. The two main issues are the small volume of cement and the risk of
failing to get a decent cement job at the shoe, and failure to isolate C7 pressure from the C5
and/or 13 3/8” shoe.
In addition to not cementing the casing across these zones, consideration should also be
given to the routine use of cemented scab liners to increase the strength of the well bore.
Page 31
Indications are that casing strength is increased by 150% through the use of cemented
concentric stings.
5.1.1.3 Cement bond quality - First & Second Stages
Annulus integrity is dependent upon the successful cementation of the production casing for
the first and second stage jobs. The first stage job, as stated above should be limited to a tail
slurry either to achieve a hydraulic seal to isolate the C7 from the production casing shoe.
The second stage cement job is designed to isolate the C7 overpressure from surface and
therefore avoid the risk of annulus B pressures.
The ability to achieve sufficient leak off at the shoe and absence of annulus pressure are the
only true reflectors of achieving sufficient bond.
5.1.2 Re-Establishing Integrity of Production Casing
In the event that casing integrity is found to be compromised the most suitable of the
following steps must be taken to re-establish integrity:
5.1.2.1 Additional Liner Lap
If damage to the casing (wear or deformation) is seen to have occurred within a reasonable
distance of the casing shoe (nominally 1000 ft), then the liner lap must be extended to cover
the effected zone with a minimum clearance of 300 ft (unless the length of the overall liner
does not allow) and the cement programme compensated to ensure the full liner lap is
cemented. Consideration should be given to extending the lap up to 500 ft above the
damaged zone.
Refer to Case A - Option 1 (figure next page)
In the event that the overall liner length is too great to cover the damage zone with the liner
lap plus 300 ft, then a separate scab liner run should be made (see below).
Refer to Case A - Option 2 (figure next page)
5.1.2.2 Scab Liner
If damage to the casing is seen to have occurred beyond a reasonable distance above the
casing shoe (nominally 1000ft), then a scab liner must be run from the top of the liner to a
minimum distance of 300 ft above the damaged zone. The scab liner should be cemented for
its entire length. Consideration should be given to extending the lap up to 500 ft above the
damaged zone.
Refer to Case B (figure next page)
Page 32
(Note: Scab liners should be long and heavy enough to ensure that there is sufficient weight
to allow back off of the running tool)
It is emphasised that there is a need for a good quality job on the scab since we can create
trapped volume issues if not fully cemented. The centralisation and displacement must be
modelled and the results followed to allow for optimum cementing conditions. There is a
need to ensure that the ID of the casing is measured and that the cement volume reflects the
actual casing dimensions. If no measurement is possible then the average calliper ID from
casing inspections must be used and add 10% XS Vol.”
Case A - Case B -
Production Casing Damage Less Production Casing Damage More
Than 1000ft Above Shoe Than 1000ft Above Shoe
Option 1 Option 2
Extend Liner Lap Scab Liner
300 ft Minimum
above Damage
Damage
Zone
300 ft Minimum
above Damage
Greater Than
Damage Damage 1000 ft
Zone Limit above
Zone
shoe
Scab
Nominall Liner
1000 ft
Limit above
shoe
Scab
Liner
Production Casing Shoe Production Casing

Shoe
Liner Liner
5.2 Liner Lap Integrity
Liner lap integrity is critical for :
a) Drilling ahead - in the case of drilling liners

b) Well Life integrity for production - in the case of production and drilling liners
Liner laps will be exposed to a range of pressures during well life
i. Differential pressure between drilling/packer fluids and formation/reservoir pressure -

PBR style completions - Production & Drilling liners.
ii. Production drawdown - Packer style completions - Production liners.
Page 33
iii. Annulus pressures (typically 4000 psi) used as back up to limit loads on completion
tubing during frac jobs - PBR style completions - drilling and production liners.
iv. Direct exposure to frac pressures (6000 to 8000 psi) - Packer style completions -
Production liners
5.2.1 Steps to Take to Reduce the Risk of Integrity Problems with Liner Laps
The primary seal for drilling and production liners is the cement. Liner top packers can be
considered as a secondary seal or barrier to flow, however they cannot be considered as an
alternative, or replacement, for the cement. Indeed the reliability of liner top packers is
subject to concern and current study.
All practical measures must be taken to ensure liner lap integrity and the correct processes
followed to ensure risks to liner lap integrity are effectively assessed and managed.
5.2.2 Re-Establishing Integrity of Liner Laps
Liner lap integrity failure is normally due to lack of effective cement in the liner lap and
additional failure of the integral liner top packer (if run). It is unacceptable not to have
effective liner lap integrity, thus if a leak is detected, it must be fixed.
5.3 Liner/Reservoir Cement Bond
Good cement bond and zonal isolation through good bond is required for the following:
a) Effective isolation for fraccing specific zones

b) Effective isolation to avoid water channelling
c) Effective isolation to avoid gas channelling
Precautions taken to ensure optimum cement bond across the reservoir must be taken using
the same steps to ensure liner lap integrity (refer section 5.2.1).
5.3.1 Cement Bond Evaluation
A cement bond log must be run across the entire length of the production liner and the
results evaluated by team representative from WEO & RDG prior to running the completion.
If the quality of cement is poor or insufficient for the purposes of the well, then steps must be
taken to conduct remedial operations. Such remedial operations will be reviewed on a case
by case basis.
5.4 Change of Well Service
All wells, where there is a change of service planned (e.g.: from oil producer to gas injector)
must be subject to a vigorous risk assessment and re-design to ensure well integrity. Prior to
conversion a full assessment of the tubing and casing strings in the well, either through a
Page 34
USIT log and/or and pressure test, depending on available access, must be carried out.
Following this a full casing design review, completion component and tubing stress analysis
must be performed to address the new load cases bearing in mind the condition of the
casing and tubing strings.
Additionally, liner integrity in terms of sufficient cement bond isolation and liner lap integrity
must be assessed for increased load requirements.
The operations programme must reflect the results of the revised casing design and tubing
stress analysis constraints.
Any change to requirements for a well must be covered following the Change Control
Procedure - “BPXC - WELL OPERATIONS -Change/Modification Control Procedure - HWG-
PR-07 3oth September 1996.
Page 35
6.0 Annulus Integrity & Pressure Limitations
This section covers the integrity of the well annuli as opposed to the completion itself and the
actions required to establish integrity. Two annuli are addressed :
i) The “A” Annulus - (Tubing x Production casing Annulus)

ii) The “B” Annulus - (The Production Casing x Intermediate Casing Annulus)
Reference should also be made to BPX Wells Policy D Draft-3 (Oct 97) sections 2.6 & 19.1.8
6.1 “A” Annulus Integrity
The integrity of the “A” annulus is provided through several barriers (refer section 3). These
are the Production Packer or Production PBR, the liner lap, the kill weight packer fluid , the
wellhead tubing hanger pack-off, the production casing and the production tubing.
Failure of any of these (tested) seals/barriers will compromise the integrity of the annulus.
The policy statement for “A” Annulus pressures is that the pressure should be limited to
thermal expansion only. The well must not be handed over to Well Operations with A
annulus pressure.
If during the life of a well, pressure is detected in the “A” annulus, then the source and leak
rate must be determined. An acceptable leak rate is based on that used by API for SSSVs
(API PR 14B). Refer Appendix 9.1.
6.1.1 Failure of the Production Packer, PBR or Liner Lap.
Failure of the production packer (and its PBR), the production PBR or the liner lap,
depending on the completion design, will result in loss of “A” annulus integrity. Under normal
circumstances, with the well on production and with the kill weight packer fluid, the “A”
annulus will either be subjected to drawdown with the risk of collapse of the production
casing, or subject to gas percolation with the risk of collapse of the production tubing or burst
of the 9 5/8” production casing.
In BPXC, all wells are designed to withstand these loads, however if any of these events
occur during well production, immediate steps must be taken to assess the situation and
undertake a risk assessment to determine the feasibility of continued production from the
well. The leak rate should be determined and compared to that specified for SSSVs in API
RP 14B (refer appendix). In the event that the leak rate is in excess of API RP 14B, and risks
are considered too high for production, production must be suspended from the well, and a
deep set plug set below the failed component and the well prepared for workover.
Page 36
6.1.2 Failure of the Production casing
Due to the low weight nature of the kill weight packer fluid (nominally water) failure of the
production casing will normally result in the transmittance of pressure from behind the
production casing into the “A” annulus. In the worst case this can result in the transmittance
of pressure from the Carbonera C7 formation which has a pore pressure of 16.0 ppg. Such
events have occurred , for example of well G-19 where “A” annulus pressures built up to
4,300 psi due to communication with the C7 through a leak in the production casing.
Where such events occur, an analysis of the pressures and their impact on well integrity
must be made before continuing with production from the well. Following such analyses, a
risk assessment should be performed and dispensation sought from the WEO Manager to
allow production to continue.
Where pressures are detected on the “A” Annulus they should be allowed to stabilise and
then small amounts of packer fluid should be bled off. (1 to 5 bbls). If the pressure is reduced
and remains stable, further bleed off can be undertaken and thermal effects confirmed. If the
pressures rise back up to the original pressure (or higher) then steps must be taken to
determine the cause of the pressure and the above mentioned analyses performed. In such
cases, further bleed off must be avoided until a full understanding of the implications has
been determined. (refer to section 6.4).
Where integrity of the production casing is in question, and the pressures are determined
high enough to impact the integrity of the well or completion, then steps must be taken to
suspend production from the well, and the well prepared for a workover to repair the damage
and re-establish integrity.
Note: API RP 14B should not be considered for this case due to the significance of the C7
overpressure.
6.1.3 Failure of The Production Tubing
In the event of a leak or failure in the production tubing, the worst case being a leak or failure
near surface, then the leak rate from the tubing must be determined and compared to that
allowable based on API RP 14B (refer Appendix). In the event that the leak rate is in excess
of this criteria, then production from the well must be suspended immediately and the well
killed and preparations made for a rig workover.
The well is designed to be able to withstand a tubing leak at or near surface. However in the
event of a tubing leak, there remains only one barrier to contain flow from the well, this being
the tubing hanger pack-off and tubing head seals.
6.1.4 Failure of the Tubing Head Seals
Page 37
In the event of a failure in the integrity of the tubing head seals on the “A” annulus,
production must be immediately suspended, the well killed or plugged, and preparations
made to replace the seals. Failure in these seals will result in only one barrier (the PBR or
Production Packer) capable of containing flow to surface. API RP 14B should not be
considered in this instance.
6.2 “B” Annulus Integrity
6.2.1 Effect of Pressure on the “B” Annulus
There are two potential sources of pressure on the “B” annulus
a) Thermal Expansion
b) Connectivity with the Carbonera C7 formation
Pressure solely due to thermal expansion is no threat to well integrity provided it is limited
and that it is bled off.
Pressure due to connectivity with the C7 overpressure water flows can be threatening to “B”
annulus and well integrity if it is not correctly managed.
In many cases in the world, “B” annulus pressures can be “controlled” on the basis of
formation leak off at the Intermediate casing shoe. However, experience in Colombia has
shown that leak off in the Upper and Lower Carbonera Formations is extremely variable, and
can “heal” with time. Thus leak off cannot be a controlling factor in determining “B” annulus
pressure limitations.
The effects of pressure on the “B” annulus, if not controlled will impact on:
i) Intermediate Casing Burst

ii) Production Casing Collapse
The policy statement for “B” Annulus pressures is that the pressure should be limited to
thermal expansion only. If B annulus pressure is recorded at any time, a proper risk
assessment must be made to determine well operability.
6.2.2 Carbonera C7 Overpressure
In the Cusiana and Cupiagua wells in Colombia our greatest exposure to “B” Annulus
integrity problems is with the Carbonera C7 over-pressure. For design purposes, based on
pressures experienced on several wells, the C7 pressure is assumed to be equivalent to 16.0
Page 38
ppg. All wells must reflect this pore pressure in their design, from both a casing and
completion viewpoint.
The C7 is primarily a water bearing formation with occasional traces of gas. The C7
formation is permeable but to varying degrees. Flows measured are typically in the Zero to
20 bbl per hour range. Historically the biggest problem associated with the C7, apart from
water flows while drilling, is in transmittance of pressure up the “B” annulus after cementation
of the production casing string (nominally set in the C8 directly above the Mirador Reservoir).
These pressures are dependant on the permeability of the C7, the pore pressure (16.00 ppg
is taken as a design case based on worst case pressures experienced) and the weight of the
mud in the “B” annulus. There are many instances where no water flow from the C7 has
been experienced while drilling, but on cementation of the casing, pressure has built up on
the annulus, most likely due to the behaviour of the cement and loss of hydrostatic head
when it sets.
The production casing string must be cemented in two stages, the second stage being to
isolate the possible C7 flow from surface. The second stage cement tool is set 300 ft below
the intermediate casing shoe. In the majority of wells, this practice has succeeded in avoiding
any pressure build up in the “B” annulus.
Historically the production casing was not cemented in two stages and there are several
wells in Cusiana and Cupiagua which have “B” annulus pressure due to C7 connectivity.
For bleed off of “B” annulus pressures, refer to section 6.4
If connectivity with C7 is established then a risk assessment must be performed. If the risk
assessment identifies that well integrity is at risk, then the well will not be produced and steps
must be taken to re-establish “B” annulus integrity by control and isolation of the pressure.
A good example is that of BA A-23 where “B” annulus pressures of 2,800 psi were
experienced - (see appendix 9.2)
6.3 Annulus Pressure Monitoring & Recording
6.3.1 Well Operations
In order to ensure that adequate safety and integrity standards are maintained, the Well
Operations Team must ensure that accurate records of all integrity testing and maintenance
activities are formally recorded and available for review. This requires the implementation of
a programme of regular monitoring and evaluation.
All well annulus pressures must be monitored and recorded on a weekly basis by the Well
Pads engineers. Where new annulus pressure, or changes to annulus pressures are noted,
action must be taken to notify the Well/Flowlines Superintendent who will then discuss the
Page 39
need for further action with the WEO Manager. Regardless, annulus pressures must be
reviewed and analysed by the Well Management Team Leader on a weekly basis.
6.3.2 Drilling
After running and cementing the production casing, the B annulus pressure must be
monitored on a daily basis through to hand-over of the well to Well Operations. Records
must kept of the pressures in the well file and reported to the Drilling Superintendent on a
daily basis.
6.4 Bleed off of Annulus Pressures
When annulus pressures are encountered an initial controlled bleed down is required to
establish the cause of annulus pressure and the rate of the leak. (refer appendix 9.1).
Calibrated chart recorders must be used to monitor annulus pressures on bleed down and
on pressure build up. Charts must be correctly and fully annotated and a record filed in the
well file.
An initial controlled volume bleed down of 1 to 5 bbls should be made and the annulus then
shut in to monitor pressures over a minimum 48 hr period (pressures will take time to
stabilise). Additionally the nature of the fluids returned should be recorded - ie: packer fluid,
water, mud , oil or gas.
If the pressures don’t increase from the final bleed down pressure, and the fluid returned is
packer fluid (in the case of the “A” annulus) or mud (in the case of “B” annulus), this is a
good indication that the pressures are due to thermal expansion. If this is the case the
annulus should be bled to zero (provided there are no annulus pressure stipulations
pertaining to the well in question) and the volume recorded. Annulus pressures should
continue to be monitored to ensure no further build up occurs.
If the pressures increase from the initial bled down pressure, or even return or increase
beyond the initial recorded pressure, and/or the fluids returned are hydrocarbon/gas (in the
“A” annulus) or water or hydrocarbon/gas (in the “B” annulus), this is a strong indication that
the pressures are due to communication with the C7 formation or with the reservoir. If this is
the case no further bleed off of the annulus pressure must be undertaken as the shut in
pressures will increase beyond those initially encountered. The Wells/Flowlines
Superintendent must be consulted, who will then require an investigation team to determine
the best course of action and undertake a risk assessment. This must assess the cause of
the pressures, the rate of the leak, the effect on the collapse and burst of the
completion/production casing, and the overall manageability of the well. The Wells/Flowlines
Superintendent must inform the WEO Manager of the well status.
Annulus pressures should only be bled off further if there is an immediate threat to well
integrity.
Page 40
6.5 Annulus Action Decision Trees
See next Page
Page 41
A Annulus Pressures
Weekly annulus
pressure record to Well
Monitor Well Management Team
annuli Leader
Review annulus
Pressure on A
No Yes pressures with Well/
annulus?
Flowline Superintendent
Undertake risk Determine fluids type

Are pressures
assessment prior and leak rate
No threatening Well Integrity Yes
to continuing to (Refer to Bleed Off ?
produce well Tree)
Is flow from Leak

Production Casing Tubing Is Leak rate Greater
in Tubing or from Yes
(Water) Oil/Gas than API RP 14B?
Production Casing?
No
Conduct risk
assessment, continue to Shut Well in, set deep
monitor Well and check set plug below leak and
leak rate on a monthly prepare for work-over
basis
Page 42
B Annulus Pressures
Weekly annulus
pressure record to Well
Monitor Well Management Team
annuli Leader
Review annulus
Pressure on B
No Yes pressures with Well/
annulus?
Flowline Superintendent
Determine fluids type

Are pressures
and leak rate
No threatening Well Integrity Yes
(Refer to
Bleed Off ?
Tree)
Is Leak rate Greater

Water Is flow water of Oil/Gas? Oil/Gas Yes
than API RP 14B?
No
Undertake risk analysis

Shut Well in, set deep
and continue to monitor
set plug below leak and
Well and check leak
prepare for work-over
rate on a monthly basis
Page 43
Annulus Bleed Off
Bleed off small amount

Monitor Annulus
of Fluid (< 1bbl) and
Pressures
record fluid type
Bleed annulus press

Bleed of 5 bbls and Is fluid
down to zero. Close
observe pressures over
Water/Mud water/mud/brine Oil/Gas
or oil/gas ? and monitor pressur
48 hrs
increase over time
Is pressure Determine Leak rat

Bleed off further 5 bbls
lower or higher than against API RP 14B
initial pressure before
Lower and observe pressures
(refer to A and B
bleed off ? over 48 hr period
Annulus Decsion Tre
Higher
Pressure likely to b
Pressure probably due Is pressure due to thermal
lower or higher than
to connectivity with C7 Higher initial pressure before
Lower expansion. Bleed do
formation bleed off ? annulus pressure to
zero.
Do notbleed off
pressure further. Bleed
Undertake risk
off will introduce more Continue to Monito
assessment to
water into annulus and annulus for pressur
determine operability of
thus reduce hydrostatic build up
well
head and pressures will
increase further
Page 44
7.0 Well Suspension and Abandonment
7.1 Well Suspension
Wells suspended for eventual abandonment or for potential future re-entry and completion
will follow the following suspension requirements:
a) Prior to suspension, the well should be filled with a fluid that has sufficient density to
overbalance the most highly pressured exposed formation by a minimum of 150 psi. (0.2
ppg at 15,000 ft).
b) Open hole hydrocarbon bearing permeable formations will be sealed with a cement plug
from their base and to a minimum of 50 ft above. If the hydrocarbon bearing permeable
horizons are extensive then several plugs can be set back to back. The uppermost
cement plug will be dressed off to confirm firm cement and pressure tested to 500 psi
above the last shoe leak off pressure if the plug comes inside casing, or weight tested to
25,000 lbs if the plug is still in open hole.
c) All open holes (regardless of permeability) will be sealed with a minimum of 300 ft of
cement plug which has a minimum of 100 ft of cement back into the last casing or liner
string and a minimum of 100 ft across the open hole. The cement plug will be dressed off
to confirm the minimum length criteria inside casing and will be pressure tested to 500 psi
above the last shoe leak off pressure. Note: An acceptable alternative to b and c is the
use of a squeeze through a cement retainer provide sufficient cement is squeezed to
theoretically cover the perforations.
d) All liner laps will be sealed with a 300 ft cement plug with a minimum of 100 ft above and
below the liner lap. The cement plug will be dressed off to confirm the minimum length
criteria above the liner lap and will be pressure tested to 500 psi above the last shoe leak
off pressure.
e) Above the open hole and/or the liner lap tested cement plugs, a drillable bridge plug will
be set in the production casing a minimum of 1000 ft below the wellhead and with a
minimum of 300 ft of cement placed above it. The cement plug should be dressed off and
weight tested to 25,000 lbs.
f) The wellhead should be covered and secured with a blind flange/suspension cap on the
last set spool The blind flange/suspension cap should have a needle valve and a coiled
tubing valve adapter installed.
g) The cellar should be protected in such a way as to avoid any potential damage to the
wellhead. Ideally this should include filling the cellar with gravel up to ground level
h) The suspended well should be marked with a metal plaque indicating the operator’s
name, the concession, contribution or private property, well number, co-ordinates, depth
of same and date of suspension. (This is a requirement of Colombian legislation).
Page 45
i) A detailed diagram of how the well was abandoned, with all details of casing and plug
depths etc. must be filed in the well file
j) Pressures on the annuli and on the well should be monitored on a monthly basis for the
duration of the suspension. Appropriate actions must be taken in the event pressure
changes are noted.
Reference should also be made to BPX Wells Policy D Draft-3 (Oct 97) sections 28.2.2 and 28.2.3
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 graphically summarise Abandonment requirements
Page 46
Figure 7.1
Illustration of Correctly Suspended Well
Blind Flange
Coiled Tubing
Adaptor Valve Gauge, or Needle Valve
Conductor
Final Suspension Plug

Weight Tested
Surface Casing
Bridge Plug
Intermediate Casing
Kill Weight Fluid
(+ 150 psi min)
Suspension Plug 2
Production Casing Dressed ansd Pressure Tested
Kill Weight Fluid

(+ 150 psi min)
Production or
Suspension Plug 1b
Drilling Liner
Dressed and Pressure Tested
Suspension Plug 1a
Open Hole Hydrocarbon

Bearing
Foramtion
Page 47
7.2 Well Abandonment
Well abandonment shall mean permanent abandonment of the well such that the well below
surface is secured for all time and that the surface facilities for that given well will be returned
to green field status. The following requirements for permanent well abandonment will apply :
a) Prior to permanent abandonment, the well should be filled with a fluid that has sufficient
density to overbalance the pressure of the last exposed formation by a minimum of 150
psi. (0.2 ppg at 15,000 ft).
b) Open hole hydrocarbon bearing permeable formations will be sealed with a cement plug
from their base and to a minimum of 50 ft above. If the hydrocarbon bearing permeable
horizons are extensive then several plugs can be set back to back. The uppermost
cement plug will be dressed off to confirm firm cement and pressure tested to 500 psi
above the last shoe leak off pressure if the plug comes inside casing, or weight tested to
25,000 lbs if the plug is still in open hole.
c) All open holes (regardless of permeability) will be sealed with a minimum of 300 ft of
cement plug which has a minimum of 100 ft of cement back into the last casing or liner
string and a minimum of 100 ft across the open hole. The cement plug will be dressed off
to confirm the minimum length criteria inside casing and will be pressure tested to 500 psi
above the last shoe leak off pressure. Note: An acceptable alternative to b and c is the
use of a squeeze through a cement retainer provide sufficient cement is squeezed to
theoretically cover the perforations.
d) All liner laps will be sealed with a 300 ft cement plug with a minimum of 100 ft above and
below the liner lap. The cement plug will be dressed off to confirm the minimum length
criteria above the liner lap and will be pressure tested to 500 psi above the last shoe leak
off pressure.
e) Above the open hole and/or the liner lap tested cement plugs, a drillable bridge plug will
be set in the production casing a minimum of 1000 ft below the wellhead and with a
minimum of 300 ft of cement placed above it. The cement plug should be dressed off and
weight tested to 25,000 lbs.
f) Clauses (g) to (l) cover requirements if pressures are found on the production and
intermediate casing annuli. (refer figure 7.2)
g) The pressure behind the production casing should be measured via the wellhead side
arm entry valve. If there is pressure on the annulus due to connectivity with an exposed
formation, the production casing will be perforated at a suitable point for access and
pressure control and the annulus killed by circulation of a kill weight fluid into the exposed
annulus. Once the annulus has been confirmed to be killed, the kill weight fluid should be
followed with cement to provide a minimum of 500 ft of cement inside the annulus.
Page 48
h) At this point the pressure behind the intermediate casing should be measured via the side
arm entry valve. If there is pressure behind the intermediate casing then the production
casing should be cut and recovered at a point which provides sufficient depth of access
to the intermediate casing to perforate and control the pressures through circulation of kill
fluid.
i) On retrieval of the production casing, a minimum of 300 ft off cement plug will be placed
across the production casing stub inside the intermediate casing such that a minimum of
100 ft of cement is left above the stub inside the intermediate casing. This cement plug
will be dressed off to ensure the correct height of cement and will be pressure tested to
500 psi over that achieved for the Intermediate shoe leak off.
j) If there was pressure recorded behind the Intermediate casing, then the intermediate
casing will be perforated and kill weight fluid circulated to kill the pressure. Once the
annulus has been confirmed to be killed, the kill weight fluid should be followed with a
minimum of 500 ft of cement.
k) The Intermediate casing string will be cut at a minimum depth of 300 ft below the cellar
floor and retrieved to surface.
l) On retrieval of the intermediate casing a minimum of 300 ft of cement will be placed

across the casing stub such that there is a minimum of 100 ft of cement above the stub,
inside the surface casing string. This cement plug will be dressed off to ensure the correct
height of cement and will be pressure tested to 500 psi over that achieved for the surface
casing shoe leak off.
m) Clause (n) covers requirements if no pressures are found on the production and
intermediate casing annuli. (refer figure 7.3)
n) If no pressures are found behind the production or intermediate casing strings, the two
casings can be cut together and a 300 ft cement plug placed across the casing stubs
such that a minimum of 100 ft of cement above the two stubs. The cement will be
dressed off to ensure the correct height of cement and will be pressure tested to 500 psi
over that achieved for the intermediate or surface casing shoe leak off’s whichever was
the higher.
o) The wellhead will be cut and removed from the Surface and Conductor casing strings at
the depth corresponding to the base of the cellar.
p) On recovery, cementation and testing of all the casings strings and annuli, the well cellar
and well site will be suitably reclaimed on a green field basis.
q) A detailed diagram of how the well was abandoned, with all details of casing and plug
depths etc. must be filed in the well file.
r) Figures 7.2 and 7.3 graphically summarise Abandonment requirements.
Page 49
Figure 7.2
Illustration of Correctly Permanently Abandoned Well

(In the case of pressure on annuli)
Cellar :
Wellhead cut from
Surface & Conductor
Cellar Floor Casings and filled in.
Conductor
Cement Plug across Intermediate/
Surface Casing Annulus
Intermediate Casing Cut & Retrieved
Surface Casing
Cement Plug across Production/
Intermediate Casing Annulus
Production Casing Cut & Retrieved
Intermediate Bridge Plug

Casing
Kill Weight Fluid
(+ 150 psi min)
Suspension Plug 2
Production Casing Dressed ansd Pressure Tested
Kill Weight Fluid

(+ 150 psi min)
Production or
Suspension Plug 1b
Drilling Liner
Suspension Plug 1a

Bearing
Foramtion
Page 50
Figure 7.3
Illustration of Correctly Permanently Abandoned Well
(In the case of pressure on annuli)
Cellar :
Wellhead cut from
Surface & Conductor
Cellar Floor Casings and filled in.
Conductor
Cement Plug across Cut Intermediate/
Production Strings
Intermediate Casing Cut & Retrieved
Surface Casing
Production Casing Cut & Retrieved
Bridge Plug
Intermediate
Casing
Kill Weight Fluid
(+ 150 psi min)
Suspension Plug 2
Production Casing Dressed and Pressure Tested
Kill Weight Fluid

(+ 150 psi min)
Production or
Suspension Plug 1b
Drilling Liner
Suspension Plug 1a

Bearing
Foramtion
Page 51
8.0 Roles & Responsibilities
The following are the agreed roles and responsibilities pertaining to the application of this
policy: (refer to summary table at end of section for dispensation approval levels)
8.1 Well Pads Engineers & Supervisors
The Well Pads Engineers and Supervisors will be responsible for measuring and monitoring
annulus pressures in accordance with this policy. They are also responsible for ensuring that
all annulus pressure data is recorded and reported to the Wells/Flowlines Superintendent.
8.2 Field PEs and PE Supervisors
The field PEs and PE Supervisors are responsible for ensuring that all well intervention work
is conducted in accordance with this policy. They shall ensure that no work is conducted in
contravention of the policy unless clear directions have been given by the Wells/Flowlines
Superintendent with supporting dispensation documentation. In the event that they cannot
conduct well intervention operations within the confines of this policy, and no dispensation
authorisation has been provided, they will suspend work on the well and make it safe prior to
seeking further advice from the Wells/Flowlines Superintendent. Operations PEs are
responsible in ensuring that all dispensation documentation and approvals are correctly filed
in the well files
8.3 Well Management Team Leader
The Well Management Tea leader will ensure that all programmes for well work and well
interventions are prepared in accordance with this policy. Where policy cannot be followed,
the Well Management Team Leader will ensure that dispensation documentation, duly
signed by the recognised authorities, has been issued and included in the work programme
and highlighted to the Operations PEs who will conduct the work. The well management
team leader will also be responsible for working with the Completions, Drilling and Production
Technology Teams to identify suitable courses of action in the event of well integrity issues.
The Well Management Team Leader is responsible for collating and reviewing all annulus
pressure data and highlighting any changes to the Wells/Flowlines Superintendent.
8.4 Wells/Flowlines Superintendent
The Wells/Flowlines Superintendent is responsible for ensuring that all well/flowline work is
conducted in accordance with this policy by signing off on all well operations programmes.
He is responsible for ensuring that his team (Well Pads Engineers & Supervisors, Field PEs
and PE Supervisors, Well Management Engineers and Team Leaders) are all fully
conversant with the policy and understand its requirements. The Wells/Flowlines
Superintendents will ensure that all well work conducted by Well Operations during SIMOPS
with drilling is conducted in accordance with this policy. He is also responsible for ensuring
Page 52
that the correct dispensations are duly applied for and implemented with the correct
documentation when the policy cannot be fully applied. If emergency situations arise during
well entry work, the Wells/Flowlines Superintendent has full authority to act to control the
situation until a dispensation can be requested. The Wells/Flowline Superintendent is
accountable for any dispensations he gives to this policy and is responsible for justifying
such action. He is responsible for informing the WEO Manager when he believes major
dispensations are required.
8.5 Production Technologists (including Fraccing & Production Technology)
The Production Technology Engineers and Team leaders are responsible for ensuring that
all their discipline associated engineering and programming conducted in Bogota is in
accordance with this policy. The Production Technology Team leader will also be responsible
for working with the Completions, Drilling and Well Management Teams to identify suitable
courses of action in the event of well integrity issues.
8.6 Drilling Technologists (including Fluids, Cementing & Well Design)
The Drilling Technology Engineers and Team leaders (Fluids, Cement, etc.) are responsible
for ensuring that all their discipline associated engineering and programming conducted in
Bogota is in accordance with this policy. The Drilling Technology Team leaders will also be
responsible for working with the Completions, Drilling and Well Management Teams to
identify suitable courses of action in the event of well integrity issues.
8.7 Completion Engineers and Team Leader
The Completion Engineers and Completion Team Leader are responsible for ensuring that
all completion designs and programmes are prepared in accordance with this policy. Where
Completions cannot fulfil the policy requirements, it is the responsibility of the Completions
Team Leader to ensure that the required dispensations are duly applied for with the correct
documentation when the policy cannot be fully applied. He will also ensure that any
Completion programme affected by such dispensation includes the relevant dispensation
documentation, duly signed of by the relevant authority. The Completions team leader will
also be responsible for working with the Well Management, Drilling and Production
Technology Teams to identify suitable courses of action in the event of well integrity issues.
8.8 Drilling Engineers
All Drilling Engineers will be responsible for ensuring that all well designs address all aspects
of this policy. Where they identify that policy cannot be followed, they should bring this to the
attention of the Drilling Superintendent. The Drilling Engineers will also be responsible to
ensure that all dispensation documentation and approvals are correctly filed in the well files.
8.9 Cusiana, Cupiagua and Piedemonte Senior Drilling Engineers
Page 53
The Senior Engineers for Cusiana, Cupiagua and Piedemonte are responsible for ensuring
that all well designs and drilling programmes fulfil the requirements of this policy. They are
responsible for ensuring that all drilling engineers are fully conversant with the policy. The
Senior Drilling Engineers will also be responsible for working with the Well Management,
Completions and Production Technology Teams to identify suitable courses of action in the
event of well integrity issues.
8.10 Drilling Supervisors
The Drilling Supervisors on all rigs are responsible for ensuring that the wells are drilled and
completed in accordance with the policy requirements. As site managers during SIMOPS
operations, they will also ensure that all well work conducted by Well Operations is
conducted in accordance with this policy. If Well Operations plans do not follow policy should
shut the job down and consult with the Drilling Superintendent. If emergency situations arise
during the drilling of a well, the Drilling Supervisor has full authority to act to control the
situation until a dispensation can be requested.
8.11 Drilling Superintendents
The Drilling Superintendents are responsible for ensuring that all Drilling and Completion
planning & operations are conducted in accordance with this policy by signing off on all
drilling operations programmes. They will ensure that all well integrity issues and problems
are addressed and that the wells are delivered to well operations in accordance with the
policy. They are also responsible for ensuring that the correct dispensations are duly applied
for and implemented with the correct documentation when the policy cannot be fully applied
The drilling Superintendents are responsible for ensuring that the Drilling Supervisors are
fully conversant with the policy. If emergency situations arise during the drilling of a well, the
Drilling Superintendent has full authority to act to control the situation until a dispensation
can be requested. The Drilling Superintendent is accountable for any dispensations he gives
to this policy and is responsible for justifying such action. He is responsible for informing the
Drilling Manager when he believes major dispensations are required.
8.12 Field Manager
The Filed Managers for Cusiana and Cupiagua are accountable for the safe operations
within their fields and must be familiar with this policy. They will be advised of any instances
where the policy cannot be followed and of dispensations for well work applied for.
8.13 Well Engineering & Operations Manager
The Well Engineering & Operations Manager is accountable to ensure that all well work is
designed, planned and conducted in accordance with this policy. He is accountable for
ensuring that any delegation of any level of dispensation authority is given to persons of
adequate technical and managerial competency. He shall also be responsible for the
Page 54
approval of high level dispensations for well work which for justifiable circumstances requires
to be conducted without full adherence to this policy.
8.14 Drilling Manager
The Drilling Manager is accountable to ensure that all drilling and well construction work is
planned and conducted in accordance with this policy. He is accountable for ensuring that
any delegation of any level of dispensation authority is given to persons of adequate
technical and managerial competency. He shall also be responsible for the approval of high
level dispensations for drilling and well construction work which for justifiable circumstances
requires to be conducted without full adherence to this policy.
8.15 Operations and Asset Managers
The Operations and Asset managers must be advised by the Well Engineering and Drilling
Managers on special circumstances where dispensations are required to this policy and risks
are significant. In such cases the Operations and/or Asset Manager will be required to
provide policy dispensation for such operations prior to proceeding.
Page 55
8.16 Dispensations Requirements Summary
8.16.1 Drilling
Dispensation Method of Dispensation Person Able to Persons requiring

Requirement application Provide Notification of
Dispensation Dispensation
Removal of BOP Change Modification Drilling Manager Global Consultant for
without sufficient Procedure (Risk Wells Policy
Barriers Assessment, Forward
Programme and reasons for
dispensation).
Hand over of Well with Change Modification Well/Flowlines Well Engineering &
A Annulus Pressure Procedure (Cause, Risk Superintendent Operations Manager
Assessment, Forward
(not normally Drilling (& Recorded in Well
acceptable) Superintendent Hand-over certificate)
dispensation).
Hand over of Well with Change Modification Well/Flowlines Well Engineering &
B Annulus Pressure Procedure (Cause, Risk Superintendent Operations Manager
Assessment, Forward
Drilling (& Recorded in Well
Superintendent Hand-over certificate)
dispensation).
Hand over of well to Change Modification Well/Flowlines Well Engineering &
Operations without Procedure (Cause, Risk Superintendent Operations Manager
sufficient Barriers Assessment, Forward
dispensation).
Hand Over of Well Change Modification Well/Flowlines Well Engineering &
without full integrity Procedure (Cause, Risk Superintendent Operations Manager
Assessment, Forward
dispensation).
Hand over of well Change Modification Sub Surface Team Well Engineering &
without Full Zonal Procedure (Cause, Risk Leader Operations Manager
Isolation Assessment, Forward
Well/Flowlines Frac Team Leader
Superintendent
dispensation). (& Recorded in Well
Hand-over certificate)
Page 56
8.16.2 Well Operations
Dispensation Method of Dispensation Person Able to Persons requiring

Requirement application Provide Notification of
Dispensation Dispensation
Operation of Well w/o Change Modification Procedure Well Engineering & Field Manager
functional SSSV (Cause, Risk Assessment, Operations Manager
Forward Programme and Asset Manager
reasons for dispensation).
Removal of Tree Change Modification Procedure Well Engineering & Global Consultant for
without sufficient (Cause, Risk Assessment, Operations Manager Wells Policy
Forward Programme and
barriers
Operation of Well with Change Modification Procedure Wells/Flowlines Well Engineering &
A Annulus Pressure (Cause, Risk Assessment, Superintendent Operations Manager
Operation of Well with Change Modification Procedure Wells/Flowlines Well Engineering &
B Annulus Pressure (Cause, Risk Assessment, Superintendent Operations Manager
Delays to Xmas Tree Change Modification Procedure Wells/Flowlines Well Engineering &
Testing (Cause, Risk Assessment, Superintendent Operations Manager
Delays to SSSV testing Change Modification Procedure Well Engineering & Field Manager
(Cause, Risk Assessment, Operations Manager
Hand over of well to Change Modification Procedure Well/Flowlines Drilling Manager

Drilling without (Cause, Risk Assessment, Superintendent
Sufficient Barriers Drilling
Superintendent
Any Other Change Modification Procedure Well Engineering & Filed Manager
Dispensations (Cause, Risk Assessment, Operations Manager
Forward Programme and Asset Manager
There may be instances where a full QRA is required in combination with a full cost benefit analysis in order to
adequately and scientifically assess levels of societal risk.
Page 57
9.0 Appendix
9.1 Acceptable SSSV and Annulus Leak Rates
9.1.1 Liquid Leak - Oil Producers
API RP 14B (Appendix G Clause G8) states that the maximum allowable liquid leak rate
across a closed SSSV is 400 cc/min = 0.0025 US bbls/min. It is logical that we can apply the
same philosophy to leak rates from the tubing to the A Annulus, provided that well integrity is
not compromised by cumulative pressure build up. In the event that a leak occurs, a pressure
build up rate will be observed. From this we can determine if the leak rate is acceptable.
If the A annulus is full of water or low salinity brine and the level of fluid influx is small we can
calculate the theoretical pressure increase rate using the API RP 14B 0.0025 bbl/min
allowable leak rate.
The compressibility of water is given by :
1  ∂V 
Cw = −  
V  ∂P 
Rearranging this equation gives :
∆V
∆P = −
∆VCw
Where :
∆P = Pressure rise (psi)

∆V = Influx Volume (US barrels)
V = Annulus Volume (US Barrels)
Cw = Compressibility of water (vol/vol/psi)
The following pressure built up rates should be used as guidelines only. In the event that
such build up rates are observed on oil producer A Annuli, checks should be made with the
actual annulus volumes for the given well and actions taken accordingly.
Firstly an example : Cusiana VA-12

A Annulus Volume :
10 ¾” Casing at 60.7 lb/ft to 3,200 ft x 7” tubing

9 5/8” Casing at 53.5 lb/ft to Top 7” Liner at 13,708 ft
Page 58
7” Tubing From top 7” Liner PBR Completion.
10 ¾ x 7” annulus = 0.0433 bbls/ft x 3200 = 138 bbls

9 5/8 x 7” annuls = 0.0232 bbls/ft x (13708 - 3,200) = 244 bbls
Total A annulus volume = 138 + 244 = 382 bbls
Acceptable pressure build up rate :
0.0025
∆P = = 218
. psi / min = 131psi/ hr
382 × 3 × 10 −6
The following table covers guidelines for allowable A annulus pressure build up rates with the
various completions we have in the field:
Field Completion Type A Annulus Volume Allowable Pressure Build

BBLS Up Rate psi/hr
Cusiana/Buenos Aires * 5 ½” Completion 631 79
7” Completion 244 131
Cupiagua ** 7” Completion 435 115
7 5/8” Completion 300 166
* Based on Cus Va-12 ** Based on Cupiagua U-13
9.1.2 Gas Leak - Gas Injectors
API RP 14B (Appendix G Clause G8) states that the maximum allowable gas leak rate
across a closed SSSV is 15 SCF/min = 900 SCF/hr. As for fluids, it is logical that we can
apply the same philosophy to gas leak rates from the tubing to the A Annulus for gas
injectors, provided that well integrity is not compromised by cumulative pressure build up. In
the event that a leak occurs, a pressure build up rate will be observed. From this we can
determine if the leak rate is acceptable.
Gas leaking into the liquid filled annulus will result in a gas head in the annulus. If a large gas
head develops in the annulus, pressure build up alone will not be a conclusive indicator of
the leak rate. In such situations echometer readings will be required to determine the volume
of the gas head. The compressibility will be driven by the gas in the annulus, thus all wells
will be equal, the only variables being gas head volume and wellhead temperature.
For the purpose of calculation of guideline rates, we have used a gas head of 5 bbls = 28.1
SCF.
From API PR 14 B :
Page 59
 ∂P   V 
Q g = 2122 ×   ×  
 ∂Z   T × t 
Rearranging this equation and assuming Z2 = 1 gives :
Q×Z×T ×t
∆P =
2122 × V
Where :
∆P = Pressure rise (psi)

V = Gas Head Volume = 28.1 SCF
T = Absolute Temperature (Deg F + 460)
Z = Gas Deviation Factor (0.9)
t = Change in time (1 minute)
Qg = Gas Leak Rate (API) = 900 SCF/hr
The following pressure built up rate should be used as a guideline only. In the event that
such build up rates are observed on gas injector A Annuli, checks should be made with the
actual gas head volumes in the annulus for the given well, the actual wellhead temperature
and actions taken accordingly.
Using a wellhead temperature of 120 degrees F
Acceptable pressure build up rate :
900 × 0.9 × 580 × 1

∆P = = 7.88 psi/min = 472 psi / hr
2122 × 281 .
Page 60
9.2 Buenos Aires A-23 “B” Annulus Pressure Example
The following is a transcript of the Report files on work conducted to review and determine
future handling of the “B” annulus pressure encountered on well Buenos Aires A-23 -
November 1996. This serves as an example of the correct approach to be taken when such
pressures are encountered prior to acceptance of the well for production, or to determine if
production can continue.
Analysis of Buenos Aires A-23 Wellhead Pressures and a Review of

Casing Design to Determine Well Integrity Status
T Bailey
November 21st 1996
Summary
The high pressures associated from communication the with high pressure C7 sands experienced on the B
annulus of well BA A-23 have been reviewed in association with the casing design for the well. The review
identifies that the pressures have remained relatively stable since well hand-over to Production in August 1996
and that well integrity has not been compromised. The review also identifies that bleeding off fluid from the B
annulus will increase risk to well integrity and that further bleed off of fluids from the annulus should be avoided.
Introduction
Well Buenos Aires A-23 was completed and handed over to Production department in August 1996. At that time
the B annulus (9 5/8" x 13 3/8") had a recorded 2200 psi wellhead pressure. This pressure originates from the
C7 formation where high pressure water flows are frequently encountered. This pressure equates to a C7 pore
pressure of 15.86 ppg EMW. Although the 9 5/8" casing string was cemented across the C7 sands, pressure
build up occurred after the cement job was completed indicating that seepage of fluids was occurring between
the cement and the formation or through the cement itself. No second stage cementing tools were used on this
well to further isolate C7 pressures.
At the time the high annulus pressures were discussed with Production Department and a review of the casing
design was made. It was agreed that the pressures were acceptable based on the burst strength of the 13 3/8"
casing and the collapse strength of the 9 5/8" casing. Although remedial work could have been made to the well
to isolate the pressures from surface, it was agreed that the well had sufficient integrity to allow production.
Production department accepted the well from Drilling on this basis. This was recorded in a file note Ref )128 on
23rd August 1996.
Historical Record of B Annulus Pressures
A record of pressures monitored on the A-23 B annulus since November 4th 1996 has been provided by the
Well Operations Team in Cusiana. The record is given in Table 1.
The record shows that the annulus pressures have ranged from 2,200 psi from initial well hand-over to a
maximum of 2,800 psi (on 6th November) which reflect a combination of fluid bleed off and thermal expansion of
the fluids in the annulus. It appears that since production from the well was suspended, the annulus pressures
have decreased from 2,550 psi, which appears to be the stable "on production" pressure", back to 2200 psi.
Page 61
The record shows that a total of 18 bbls have been bled off the B annulus since November 4th 1996. It is unclear
if any other fluids have been bled off prior to this period.
The fact that the pressure of the B annulus has now reverted back to 2,200 psi suggests that communication
with the C7 formation may now possibly be bridged off, either by mud solids or formation collapse. This inference
follows an understanding from the analysis of the effect of bleeding off fluids from the annulus on wellhead
pressure (see below). Theoretically the pressure should be stable (no thermal effects) at around 2,250 psi if only
18 bbls have been bled off since the well was handed over from Drilling.
However this only remains a possibility and no more fluids should be bled off from the annulus unless well
integrity is considered to be at risk.
Effect of Bleeding Off Fluids From Annulus
An analysis to determine the effect of bleeding off fluids from the annulus has been made. It clearly
demonstrates the increase in annulus pressures associated with the displacement of heavy mud (12.55 ppg) by
water from the C7 (8.4 ppg). The analysis shows the effect of allowing water ingress up to the 13 3/8" shoe, half
way up the 13 3/8" casing and with the annulus fully displaced to water. Effectively the reduced hydrostatic head
associated with the displacement to a less dense fluid results in increasing wellhead pressures to a maximum of
4,957 psi.
Casing Design
The casing design for Buenos Aires A-23 has been re-visited to determine well integrity with the increased B
annulus pressure. The key elements in the design are Burst for 13 3/8" casing and Collapse for 9 5/8" casing.
13 3/8" Burst Design
With the current status of the B annulus pressure at between 2,200 psi and 2,550 psi, the design factors for the
13 3/8" casing range from 2.1 at surface to 1.09 at the 13 3/8" shoe. At top cement for the 13 3/8" casing the
design factor is 1.85. These design factors are based on the assumption that the water from the C7 has been
displaced (through bleed off) to the 13 3/8" shoe. This appeared to be the case with a wellhead pressure of
2,550 psi which is close to the modelled pressure of 2591 psi unless thermal effects are responsible for the
pressure increase (not clear in the pressure record).
1.08 is the worst case for burst at the 13 3/8" shoe. This does not fully reflect the strength of the 13 3/8" casing
at this point as it is cemented in place. Due to the cement, pore pressure back up has been used. Thus this can
be considered a worst case.
Figure 1 shows the effect of fluid bleed off on well bore pressures and the relationship with the strength of the 13
3/8" casing (net burst).
Impact of 13 3/8" Failure At or Near Shoe
If the 13 3/8" casing failed due to burst at or near the shoe, which is the most likely based on design factors
(1.09), the impact on well integrity would be negligible. It would correspond to leak off of pressure/fluids into
formations exposed in the open hole. If burst did occur, cross flow of C7 fluids would probably occur into the C3
sands. The rate of C7 flow historically has been low.
9 5/8" Collapse Design
The effect of B annulus pressures on collapse design for the 9 5/8" casing, again associated with fluid bleed off
from the annulus, has been reviewed.
Page 62
Two load cases need to be considered for 9 5/8" collapse.
Firstly collapse loads with the 9 5/8" casing full of completion brine (as per the current well status) are
considered. Here with the full range of B annulus pressures calculated for annulus bleed off, the lowest design
factor is 1.29. This also corresponds to the experienced load of 2,550 psi on the annulus.
Secondly collapse loads need to be considered in the event a leak in the PBR occurs. The effect of a PBR leak
would be to expose the A annulus to reservoir draw down with a resultant drop in brine level. This should be
considered as a worst case scenario and certainly not an operating load case. The well was originally designed
to handle this load case in the event of catastrophic failure of the PBR seals. As such a design factor of 1.0 is
considered acceptable. Review of the casing design for the experienced annulus pressures indicate a design
factor of 1.01 for this load.
In addition to the above, the annulus monitoring data provided by Production clearly demonstrates an associated
increase in A annulus pressures (tubing x 9 5/8" annulus) of up to 2500 psi with the well on production. These
pressures will clearly reduce the impact of annulus B pressures on collapse and additionally limit any impact of
thermal expansion pressure in the B annulus.
Figure 2 shows the effect of fluid bleed off on well bore pressures and the relationship with the strength of the 9
5/8" casing (net collapse).
Side Arm Valve Washouts
It has been reported that the outer valves on the B Annulus side arms are washed out. This has likely occurred
due to bleeding off of fluids with the valves partially cracked open. The washed out valves should be replaced
and future annulus bleed off avoided.
Conclusions
1. Review of the casing design for well BA A-23 and the impact of bleeding off fluids from the annulus
indicate that well integrity is not currently at a risk significantly higher than that agreed on well hand-over.
2. Review of the effect of bleed off of fluids from the annulus indicate that pressures are likely to increase,
thus exposing the casings to increased loads.
3. The identified increase in loads indicate that further bleed off of fluid from the B annulus should be
avoided unless the pressures are significantly greater than 2,550 psi and well integrity is considered to
be at risk. Bleeding off fluids will increase the risk to well integrity.
4. There is some evidence to suggest that communication of B annulus to the C7 formation may have
bridged off but this is tenuous and should not be considered from a well integrity and operational
viewpoint.
Tables: Pressure table used to draw figures 1 & 2
Figures 1. Details of B Annulus pressures in relation to 13 3/8" Burst

2. Details of B Annulus pressures in relation to 9 5/8" casing collapse
Page 63
BA A-23 B Annulus Pressures

13 3/ 8" Burst 5380.00 9 5/ 8" Colla pse 7930
15 3/ 8" Burst Depth TVD Ba ck up SG Ba ck up psi Annulus SG Annulus Psi Net Burst Design Factor
At surfa c e : 0 0 0.00 0 2550.00 2550 2.11
a t 13 3/ 8" TOC 7963 11.7 4844.69 12.55 7746.65 2901.96 1.85
a t 13 3/ 8" shoe (mud ) 10963 11.7 6669.89 12.55 9704.45 3034.56 1.77
a t 13 3/ 8" shoe (p ore) 10963 8.33 4748.73 12.55 9704.45 4955.72 1.09
9 5/ 8" colla pse Depth TVD Ba ck up SG Ba ck up psi Annulus SG Annulus Psi Net colla pse Design Fa ctor
9 5/ 8" TOC 12346 8.33 5347.79 12.55 10607.00 5259.21 1.51
Effect on Annulus Pressure through Bleed Off of C7 water .

B Annulus - 13 3/8" Burst - Buenos Aires A-23 .
0.00
2000.00
4000.00
Depth ft TVD
6000.00
8000.00 Start - On Well Handover
Water at shoe - ± 182 bbls

10000.00 Water 1/2 csg - ± 500 bbls
All Water - Fully displaced ± 820 bbls
12000.00 13 3/8" Net Burst - Worst Case
14000.00
0.00 2000.00 4000.00 6000.00 8000.00 10000.00 12000.00
Pressure psi
Figure 1
Page 64
Effect on Annulus Pressure through Bleed Off of C7 water .

B Annulus - 9 5/8" Collapse - Buenos Aires A-23 .
0.00
Start - On Well Handover

2000.00
Water at shoe - ± 182 bbls
Water 1/2 csg - ± 500 bbls
4000.00 All Water - Fully displaced ± 820 bbls
9 5/8" Collapse. No PBR Leak
9 5/8"Net Collapse - PBR Leak
Depth ft TVD
6000.00
8000.00
10000.00
12000.00
14000.00
0.00 2000.00 4000.00 6000.00 8000.00 10000.00 12000.00 14000.00 16000.00 18000.00
Pressure psi
Figure 2
9.3 Relevant Abstracts for Colombian Decree No 1895 September 15th 1973 Pertaining to
Well Integrity, Suspension and Abandonment
9.3.1 Chapter IV - Drilling of Oil and Gas Wells in Concessions, In Contribution and In Private
Property Areas
Article 30 : When drilling a well, all necessary measures must be taken to avoid damages and risks to
people, public or private property and natural resources
Article 37 :3 Placed casing must be sufficiently cemented with the pumping and plugging method, and
submitted to adequate pressure tests that prove the effectiveness of the cementing and
connections. The plug must not be drilled out before twelve (12) hours after having
completed the cementing operation.
Article 38 : If the casing program is inadequate or if the casing is corroded, or cementing is defective and
these lead to underground fluid filtration’s between the oil or gas layers, the operator must
correct these defects immediately. If having exhausted all the resources, the well cannot be
repaired or used for any other useful purpose, it must be conveniently plugged and
abandoned.
Article 39 : If as a result of perforations or any other method, or due to chemical treatment of producing
intervals, these or the casing deteriorate, hindering oil or gas production, the operator must
quickly remedy said situation. If well repair proves to be impossible and the well cannot be
used for other practical purposes, it must be conveniently plugged and abandoned.
Article 41 : Multiple Well Completion Section 2
Page 65
Once the well is completed, the oil and gas explorer or exploiter must perform pressure tests
to determine or confirm that there are no casing leaks.
Article 42 : Every explorer or exploiter to have drilled a dry well, or that had to be abandoned due to
mechanical problems, will plug and abandon it within three (3) months, following the
procedures indicated below:
2. Plugging methods and procedures
a) The well must be filled with mud from the bottom to the top of each producing formation,
or a bridge plug must be placed on top of each producing formation, and in any case, a
cement plug must be placed no less than fifteen (15) feet long, next to each one of the
producing formations.
b) A cement plug with an approximate length of fifty (50) feet must be placed below the
intervals that hold fresh water.
c) A plug must be placed on top of every plugged well as well as a metal plaque indicating
the operator’s name, the concession, contribution or private property, well number, co-
ordinates, depth of same and date of abandonment.
d) The intervals between the plugs must be filled with mud with a weight of no less than 12
pounds per gallon and
e) The explorer or exploiter will choose the method of placing the cement in the well.
Article 44 : Whenever production casing is to be taken out, the well must be left filled with mud or
cement to the base of the surface casing. The mud must have an adequate specific gravity to
seal all non producing formations that contain water, gas or oil. A cement plug no less than
fifteen (15) feet long must be placed at the base of the surface casing.
9.3.2 Oil and Gas Production Methods

Article 55 : All wells completed as producers, injectors or for observations, will have an adequate surface
and subsoil equipment, to allow appropriate control of the production or injection fluid,
measurement of bottom hole pressures and to avoid mixing of hydrocarbon production
initiating form different horizons.
9.3.3 Control of the reservoir

Article 75 : Wells that show abnormal pressures will be submitted to correction works, and if the works
should be unsuccessful, the Ministry will order immediate abandonment of the said wells.
9.3.4 Oil and Gas Conservation

Article 85 : All the operators, drillers, transporters, distributors, service companies or contractors, will at
all times perform drilling operations, assembly and handling of equipment, well plugging and
abandonment, transportation and storage, in such a way as to prevent petroleum or gas
wastes by leaks in the reservoirs, wells, tanks, pipes and other conductors or equipment.
-------------------------- 0 --------------------------
Page 66
Index
“A” Annulus, 4, 36, 37, 38, 41 Conversion, 25, 35
“B” Annulus, 4, 5, 36, 38, 39, 62 Deep set plug, 12, 14, 15, 37
A and B annuli, 28 Design factors, 23, 24, 25, 26, 63, 64
A annulus, 26, 36, 59, 60, 64 Deviation From Policy, 3, 8
Abandonment, 6, 45, 48, 67, 68 Directional Drilling, 12
Annular seals, 28 Dispensation, 6, 9, 24, 28, 37, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58
Annulus Integrity, 4, 36, 38 Displacement, 27, 33, 63
Annulus pressure, 6, 23, 24, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, Ditch magnet’s, 31
53, 60, 62, 63, 64 Draw-down (inflow) test, 27
Annulus Pressure Monitoring, 4, 40 Drawdown pressures, 22, 24
API RP 14B, 30, 37, 38, 59, 60 Drill-By, 3, 12 - see also Well Collision
Back-up pressure, 23 Drilling Ahead, 11
Barriers, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 36, 58 Drilling Engineers, 5, 55
Bleed down, 25, 40, 41 Drilling Manager, 2, 5, 55, 56, 57, 58
Bleed off, 37, 39, 41, 62, 63, 64, 65 Drilling Superintendent, 5, 40, 55, 57, 58
Bleed off of Annulus Pressures, 4, 40 Drilling Supervisor, 5, 13, 55
Blind flange, 45 - see also Suspension Cap Drilling Technologists, 5, 54
BOP Removal, 3, 14 Field Manager, 5, 28, 56, 58
BPX Wells Policy, 6, 9, 10, 11, 23, 26, 28, 31, 35, 36, 46 Field PEs, 5, 53
BPXC Plugging Policy, 3, 8 Field Supervisor, 13
Bridge plug, 14, 45, 48, 67 Filter cake, 10
Burst rating, 25 Fraccing, 3, 5, 24
C7 connectivity, 39 Gas channelling, 34
Carbonera C5, C6 and C7, 31 Gas injection pressures, 28
Carbonera C7 formation, 37, 38 Gas injectors, 22, 23, 60
Carbonera C7 Overpressure, 4, 39 Gauges, 26, 27
Casing deformation, 31 Hand-over certificate, 14, 15- see also Well Handover
Casing design, 25, 35, 62, 63, 64 Heavy lifts, 8, 12
Casing wear, 25, 31 - see also Worn Casing Integrity failure, 30, 34
Cement, 14, 16, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40, Intermediate casing, 39, 48, 49
45, 48, 49, 50, 62, 63, 67, 68 Kill weight fluid, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 48, 49
Cement bond, 34, 35 Leak off, 14, 32, 38, 45, 48, 49, 64
Cement bond quality, 4, 32 Leak rate, 36, 37, 59, 60. - see also API RP 14B
Cement plug, 45, 48, 49, 68 Liner lap integrity, 34
Cement programme, 32 Liner laps, 3, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 34, 35, 36, 45,
Cement retainer, 45, 48 48
Cementation, 31, 32, 39, 50 Liner top packers, 34 - see also ZXP Packers
Cementing, 32, 33, 40, 62, 67 Lower Master valve, 12, 13, 14, 29
Cementing programmes, 31 Management of Change, 9
Cement Squeeze, 14, 15, 45, 48 Minimum overbalance, 14
Centralisation, 33 Moving heavy equipment, 12 - see also Heavy Lifts
Change Control, 35 - see also Management of Change Needle valve, 45
Change of service, 35 - see also Conversion & Well Notification of Integrity Failures, 4, 30
Conversion Operations PEs, 53
Chart recorders, 26, 40 Packer fluid, 24, 26, 27, 34, 36, 37, 41
Coiled tubing, 10, 12, 45 PE Supervisor, 5, 13, 53, 54
Coiled Tubing Work, 11 Pipe protectors, 31 - see also Casing Wear
Completion, 6, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 34, Pressure Test, 3, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29
35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 45, 54, 60, 64 Pressure test requirements, 22
Completion Engineers, 5, 54 Pressure Testing Philosophy, 3, 22
Completion Team Leader, 54
Page 67
Production casing, 22, 27, 31, 32, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 45, Tubing stress analysis, 22, 23, 35
48, 49, 68 Two barrier isolation, 6
Production liner, 24, 26, 34, 35 Two way check valve, 14, 15, 28, 29
Production Packer, 4, 36, 38 Upper master valve, 12, 13, 14, 29
Production PBR, 36 USIT log, 24, 25, 31, 35
Production Technologists, 5, 54 Wall thickness, 24, 25 - see also Casing Wear
Production tubing, 36, 37 Water channelling, 34
Protective cover, 13 - see also Heavy Lifts Water flows, 38, 39, 62 - see also Carbonera C7
Removal of Tree, 11, 58 Well Abandonment, 4, 48
Reservoir, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 27, 34, 35, 41, 64, 68 Well conversion, 25 - see also Cange of Service
Risk assessment, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 24, 26, 35, 36, 37, 39, Well Engineering & Operations Manager, 2, 56, 57, 58
40, 41 Well Engineering Manager, 2, 5
Roles & Responsibilities, 4, 53 Well Collision, 8, 12
RTTS packer, 27 -= see also Draw-down (inflow) Test Well files, 9, 26, 29, 30, 40, 46, 50, 53, 55
Scab liners, 27, 32, 33 Well Hand-Over, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 26, 31,
Senior Drilling Engineers, 5, 55 40, 62, 63, 64 - see also Handover Certificate
Service load conditions, 22, 23, 25 Well Management Team Leader, 5, 40, 53
Side forces and loads, 31 Well Pads Engineers, 5, 40, 53
SIMOPS, 3, 13, 54, 55 Well Suspension, 4, 6, 15, 45, 46
SSSV, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 30, 36, 37, 58, 59, 60 Well/Flowlines Superintendent, 5, 13, 40, 41, 53, 57, 58
Stimulation treatments, 23, 24 - see also Fraccing Wellhead, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 28, 36, 45, 46, 48, 49, 61,
Straight line positive pressure test, 26 62, 63
Suspension cap, 15, 45 - see also Well Suspension WEO Manager, 24, 37, 40, 41, 54 - see also Well
Swab Valve, 29 Engineering & Operations Manager
Technical authorities, 6 Wing Valve, 29
Temporary Suspension, 11 Wireline retrievable valves, 30
Tension, 23 - see also Tubing Stress Analysis Wire-line Well Work, 10, 11
Thermal effects, 37, 63 Workover, 16, 18, 20, 37, 38
Thermal expansion, 36, 38, 39, 41, 63, 64 Worn casing, 24 - see also Casing Wear
Tubing hanger annulus seals, 9 Xmas tree, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 28
Tubing head seals, 38 Xmas Tree & Wellhead Maintenance, 4, 28
Tubing leak, 23, 24, 26, 38 Xmas Tree Removal, 3, 14
Tubing leak at surface, 26 Zonal isolation, 34 - see also Cement Bond
Tubing pressure test, 23, 24 ZXP packers, 16
Page 68

BPXC Policy for Well Integrity Assurance

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Policy for Well Integrity Assurance

Version 1.2 April 1998

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

Well Engineering & Operations Department

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

4.4 Notification of Integrity Failures .................................................................................... 29

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

8.12 Field Manager ............................................................................................................ 54

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

2.0 The Meaning of and the Need for Well Integrity

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

3.0 BPXC Plugging Policy

3.2 Policy Statement

3.3 Deviation From Policy

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

Applications for deviation from policy must contain the following:

i. Why the dispensation is required.

3.4 Clarification of Barriers

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

a) Killing the well

iii. Kill weight * fluid may only be considered a barrier if:

a) It is isolated from the reservoir by a mechanical barrier,

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

Department Operational Status Acceptable Barriers

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

a) A deep set plug will be run below the point of intersection

3.6 Heavy Lifts

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

a) SSSV closed and the tubing downstream of the SSSV de-pressurised.

3.6.1 Protection of Wellheads for SIMOPS

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

3.7.1 Xmas Tree Removal

3.7.2 BOP Removal

* 75 psi equivalent to 0.1 ppg at 15,000 ft TVD

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

3.10 Examples of Mechanical Barriers

a) Normally Completed Well (hand-over to Well Operations) PBR Completion

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

a) Normally Completed Well (hand-over to Well Operations) - PBR Completion

PRODUCT ION CASING

T OP OF 7" LINER@ 14,900

7" LINER, 32 LB/FT

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

b) Well Prior to Work-over (hand-over to Drilling) - PBR Completion

T OP OF 7" LINER@ 14,900

9 5/8" Casing shoe

7" LINER, 32 LB/FT

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

c) Normally Completed Well (hand-over to Well Operations) - Packer Completion

PRODUCT ION CASING

7" LINER, 32 LB/FT

d) Well Prior to Work-over (hand-over to Drilling) - Packer Completion

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

SBT PRODUCT ION

9 5/8" Casing shoe

7" LINER, 32 LB/FT

BPXC Well Integrity Assurance Policy April 1998 Prepared : T Bailey

3.11 Drawings of Wellhead and Xmas Tree

Lower Master Actuated Flow

Tubing Head Adaptor