The Ottoman Resurgence in the

Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean:
The Gamble and its Results

Rhoads Murphey

The subject of Ottoman fleet operations in the Mediterranean during

the second half of the seventeenth century and Ottoman involvement
in a head-on clash with Yenice and its allies for control of Crete in
successive naval campaigns, stretching over a 25-year period
between l 645 and 1669, has attracted the attention ofa significant
number of historians, from naval historians to historians of technol-
ogy, and inevitably also the chroniclers of national glory on either
side of the conflict. 1 The subject holds a particular allure because
these developments follow a period of relative quiet on the
Mediterrariean front, lasting three quarters ofa century after the bat-
tle of Lepanto in 1571.2
In examining the Ottoman accounts of naval encounters, to com-
plement these frontal approaches to the evidence, I have sought

I. The basic chronology of the conflict is provide (ıhough in a raıher pro-Venetian

mode) in K.M. Setıon, Venice, Ausıria, and ıhe Turks in the Sevenıeenıh
Cenıury, Memoirs of the American Philosophical Socieıy , Vol. 192
(Philadelphia, 1991), pp. 104-243.
2. See H. Arweiler, 'lstanbul carrefour des rouıes conıinenıales et maritimes aux
XVe-XIXe siecles', in lsıanbul ala jonction des culıures balkaniques, mediter•
raniennes, slaves eı orienıales aux XV/e-X/Xe siecles, Acıes du colloque inter•
national organise par I'Association lnternationale d'Etudes du Sud-est
Europeen (Bucarest, 1977), pp. 20-21, and R.C. Anderson, Naval Wars in ıhe
Levanı, 1599-1853 (Princeıon, 1952), p. 125.
THE OTIOMAN RESURGENCE 187

answers to a number of related questions. For example, what really

was at stake in this protracted battle, and why were both sides will-
ing to commit resources on so grand a scale to achieve success?
What were the secondary and tertiary effects of the renewal of
Ottoman-Venetian rivalry in the Mediterranean and, more particu-
larly, whaı was the impact on Otıoman society and the economy of
the massive and mounting demands imposed by the escalating naval
conflict which was ultimately ıo spread into three separate theatres
of war? These included trench warfare on the island of Crete, the
naval blockade and battle for control over the Straits of the
Dardanelles, and raids directed against both shores of the northem
Aegean and, intermittently, against the Dalmatian coast of the
Adriatic.
Richard Rapp and Maurice Aymard agree in their judgement that
the two powers, far from engaging in empty sabre-rattling and vain-
glorious attempts to recall and, if successful, restore their faded six-
teenth-century imperial glory, actually fought for more tangible and
immediate material rewards. in the view of these scholars, both
sides were seeking to establish an exclusive control over eastem
Mediterranean markets. Rapp, in particular, concludes that the much
discussed rise of the Atlantic economies based on control of the
transatlantic trade did not materialize nearly so suddenly nar so
completely as is often supposed, and that the Mediterranean
remained the most important destination for the goods of northem
Europe well into the seventeenth century. 3 The analysis which fol-
lows will be framed as a cost-benefit assessment of post-1650
Ottoman investment in the maritime sphere, and an estimation of
what they gained or stood to gain in return.
Before we begin, Jet me emphasize that in addition to the stan-
dard 'official' or chronicle accounts in Turkish, a number of more
personal accounts have survived. These accounts relate the activities
and adventures of Ottoman pirates, renegade European sea captains,

3. See M. Aymard, 'Realisation et repanition du surplus dans les economies

mediterraneennes: Xllle-XVIIle siecles', in Acıes du colloque inıernaıiona/
d'hisıoire: Aıhenes, 18-25 Sepıembre /983 (Athens, 1986), Vol. 2, pp. 27-8, and
R. Rapp, ' Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony ' , Journal of
Ecorwmic Hisıory, 35 (1975), 504 ff.
 188 MEDITERRANEAN 1-IlSTORICAL REYIEW

and captives and galley slaves from both ends of the Mediterranean.
As examples of this kind of literature, one might cite the letter of
the sixteenth-century Ottoman captive Abdi Çelebi published by
Halil Sahillioğlu, and the account of the renegade Christian mariner
who became known as Zindancı Mahmud, evaluated and translated
by Andreas Tietze and later edited and published by Fahir Iz. 4 in
addition, of course, Evliya's travel adventures recorded in the mon-
umental Seyahatname transpire in part at sea. Helped by these and
other sources we are able partially to reconstruct the life of the sea
which constitutes for us the most easily dismissed and forgotten
dimension of the Ottomans' material world, but which played an
important part in the daily routine of many Ottomans and greatly
influenced their collective ethos.
Before attempting any assessment of costs and benefits relating
to Ottoman investment in the sea, a clear distinction should be made
between state-sponsored and state-financed undertakings, and par-
ticipation in those undertakings by free-lance and private agents
acting on their own account, and a11ies and auxiliaries who partici-
pated partly through various forms of compulsion and partly out of
self-interest. it will be possible to determine real costs and benefits
only after we have first decided by which group or groups the costs
were chiefly borne, and to whom the principal benefit accrued.
Judging by examples provided in Naima's chronicle, typical troop
and provisions transport convoys sent to Crete during the Ottoman-
Venetian wars consisted of 150 vessels.5 Of these, some 40 vessels
were oar-powered galleys built at the Imperial arsenal in Istanbul
and financed by its own separate treasury allocation.6 This nucleus

4. See H. Sahillioğlu (ed.), 'Akdeniz Korsanlara esir düşen Abdi Çelebinin mek-
tubu', Tarih Dergisi, 13 (1963), pp. 241-6, and, on Zindancı Mahmud, A.
Tietze (ed.), 'Die Geschichte vom Kerkermeister-Kapitan: Ein Türkischer
Seerauberroman aus dem 17. Jahrhundert;, A cıa Orienıalia, 19 (1942), 152-21 O;
Fahir iz (ed.), 'Makale-i Zindancı Mahmud Kapudan', Türkiyat Mecmuası, 14
(1964), 111 -50.
5. See Mustafa Naima, Tarih-i Naima, 6 vols. (lstanbul, 1281-83), Yol. Y, pp.79-
80 (sub anno 1061 ).
6. On the capacity of ıhe lstanbul arsenal ıo produce up ıo 60 galleys for use in
naval campaigns, see R.C. Anderson (ed.), The Journals of Sir Thomas Allin,
1660-1678, 2 vols., Publications of the Navy Records Society, Yols. 79-80
(London, 1939-40), Yol. 1, p. 21 : entry for 23 Jan. 1660.
 of the fleet was joined by up to 30 galleons, also supplied at gov-
ernment expense, accompanied in full-scale imperial campaigns by
an additional I O galleons supplied by the North African allies of the
Ottomans in Tunis and Algiers. The total convoy escort force sup-
plied directly by the state and its allies thus consisted of some 80
vessels, or a bit more than half the fleet. The remaining 70 vessels
were supplied by the beys of the western Anatolian coastal
provinces. Thus, even if one discounts the participation of allied
forces, the Ottoman navy was effectively divided into two separate
squadrons whose home ports, command structures, and sources of
financing were separate. While this fact resulted in the spreading of
fleet construction and maintenance costs over a broader body, it
also hampered the ability of the fleet to act with swiftness and una-
nimity of purpose.
Let us concentrate for the moment on the cost of building, crew-
ing, and provisioning that portion of the tleet that was provided by
the state. For purposes of easy comparison it will be most conve-
nient of we use the 42 metre (55 zira) galley as the base unit for our
calculations. Figures for the mid-seventeenth century provided by
Katib Çelebi and confirmed by Hüseyn Hezarfen indicate that costs
for launching a single vessel were as shown in Table I below:

Table I

Cost ofBuilding and Operating a Galley circa 1650

Anıt. in akçes % of total cost

Cosı of commissioning 614,000 45 %

Cosı of crews wages during
6-month campaigning season 496,000 38.75 %
Cosı of provisions during one

6-monıh campaigning season 170,0007 13.25 %

TOTALCOST 1,280,0008 100 %

7. The bulk of the 170,000 akçe figure for provisions would have been used for
ıhe puchase ofhardtack. We know that at 1640 prices (cf. Y. Yücel [ed.), 1640
 J'JU MEDITERRANEAN 1-DSTORICAL REVIEW

From data pertaining to the early eighteenth century provided by

Süleyman Nutki, it appears that commissioning costs alone for the
larger galleons amounted to roughly four times as much.9 Thus,
even if we adjust Nutki's figures to account for the effect of post-
1683 wartime inflation, the cost of building and operating a fleet of
galleons was at least five times greater than that of operating galley
fleets. Accordingly, the mobilization ofa state fleet composed of 40
galleys and 30 galleons would have been 40 times 1.28 or 57.2 mil-
lion for the galleys, plus 30 times 6.4 or l 92 million for the
galleons, making a total of approximately 250 million akçes. 10
These theoretical costs were of course never actually bome since
the seventeenth-century Ottoman navy rarely realized its optimal
galleon strength, and was only required each season to repair or
replace a part of and never the full complement of its galley fleet.
None the less, the burden of financing naval conflict was heavy, and
Ottoman security at sea in the period came at a very high price.
Manpower supply in particular posed a major obstacle for the
Ottomans as they mobilized for naval campaigns. Demands for the

Tarihli Es'ar Defteri [Ankara, 1982), p. 4) ıhe cosı of one kile (25.656 kg.) of
hardıack was 65 akçes, while anoıher source (0.L. Barkan [ed.], '1070-
1071/1660-1661 Tarihli Osmanlı Bütçesi ve Bir Mukayese', lstanbul Üniver-
sitesi iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, 17 (1955-56], pp. 304-47, see esp. pp 339-
44, ' Hezarfen'c Nazaran Donanmanın inşa Masraflan, p. 342) indicates that
the usual ration was one-half vukiyye (approx. 640 grams) pcr sailor pcr day.
At this rate of consumption, even relatively modest fleets such as the 52 vessels
which set out for the Danube in 1104/1692 manned by 4,078 sailors, consumed
prodigious amounts. See Abdullah ibn lbrahim (al Üsküdarı), Vaki' at-i
Rul,111erre, IV, fol. 128a (Süleymaniye Library [Istanbul], Ms. Esad Efendi
2437), which records the distribution of 8,202.5 kantars of hardtack worth
more than I million akçes at current market prices.
8. Estimate based on Katib Çelebi, Tufet' al-Kibar fi Esfar al-Bihar (lstanbul,
1329), pp. 154-8 : bir donanma ne kadar mühimmatla olur. Cf. Hezarfen,
'Donanma Masratlan', pp. 339-44: timber costs (kereste), 56,000 akçes; costs
for nails (80 kantars at 616 akçes, 49,280 akçes, ete.
9. Süleyman Nutki , Muharebat-i Bahriye-i Osmaniye (lstanbul, 1307), p. 70, men-
tions the figure of 40,000 gurush (4.8 million akçes) as the commissioning cost
for one galleon.
10. Compare the cost estimate of 1.3 million gurush or 156 million akçes for the
mobilization of a tleet of 93 vessels in 1790, given by Savfeı Bey in an article
entitled, ' 1205 (1790) 'de Donanmamı z', Tarih-i Osmani Encumeni Mecmuası,
22 (1329/ l 913 ), 1370-77. it should be remembered, however, ıhaı only a small
proportion of this Black Sea fleeı (acıually 10 vessels) was made up of galleons.
 THE OTTOMAN RESURGENCE 191

galley fleet were particularly heavy, and occasionally the Ottomans

were called upon to dispatch two fleets simultaneously, one against
Cossack raiders in the Black Sea, and the other to the
Mediterranean. A number of the oarsmen were pTİsoners-of-war
inducted into the ranks of the miri forsaları (state-maintained galley
slaves), but according at least to Namia's chronicle, the govemment
consistently Tesorted during the early 1650s to the abusive practice
of forcible conscription among guileless youth from the Anatolian
hinterland who were seized from the streets of Istanbul and drafted
into service as novices OT mukaddems. 11 The sultan 's one-fifth shaTe
in war booty provided only a small part of the immense and, as the
war dragged on, growing need for able-bodied seamen. For exam-
ple, the 800 prisoneTs pTesented to the sultan at the conclusion of
the successful season of naval campaigning in 1654 would have
been sufficient to man only four galleys for use in the subsequent
year 's campaigns. 12
An idea of the economic value that slaves Tepresented duTing the
era of the Ottoman-Venetian war oveT CTete is provided and corrob-
orated in a numbeT of Ottoman as well as western souTces. The
Ottoman court TecoTds of Galata suggest that a minimum pTİce foT
Tedeeming slaves was a little over 7,000 akçes OT about 90 gurush, 13
while the more usual sum paid was 10,000 akçes OT about 125
14
gurush. These pTices aTe consistent with the infoTmation we have
conceming slave redemption pTices in the sixteenth century provid-
ed by Abdi Çelebi, who speaks ofa usual price of 35 gold pieces

11. See Naima, Tarih, Yol. Y, pp. 200-202 (sub anno 1062).
12. See Nutki, Muharebaı-i Bahriye, p. 59.
13. The offıcial exchange raıe of the gurush for much of the sevenıeenth century
was 80 akçes, but after 1720 it was fixed at 120 akçes (cf. nn. 9-1 O above).
Gold coins of various kinds and values circulated in the Otıoman lands. Thus,
while 120 akçes was the official and basic minimum value for the sıandard
gold coin (alıun) in the sevenıeenth century, exchange values ranging in the
low two hundreds were not uncommon.
14. The registered price of 10,000 akçes for redeeming a capıive is encounıered in
several entries, e.g. Galata Courı Regisıer for 1633 (lsıanbul Müftülüğü,
Galata Mahkemesi Şeriyye Sicilleri, Yol. 58 (1043/ 1633]), fols. 37b and 38a.
But much higher prices ranging between 12,000 and 18,000 akçes seem to have
applied ıo household seıvants (ibid., fol. 60b). A total value of 329,000 akçes is
recorded for 46 slaves belonging ıo a deceased sea captain in the same regisıer
(ibid., fol. 39a), implying an average price per head of7,163 akçes).
 192 MEDITERRANEAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

paid for the release of Ottoman captives held in Malta. Abdi Çelebi
notes however that in the case of high-ranking or socially prominent
captives (such as himself) the ransom fee could be raised to as high
as 200 gold pieces. 15 Evliya Çelebi, speaking of a period some 150
years later, reports the payment of a ransom of I 0,000 gurush,
equivalent - at the rate of 2.5 gurush per altun coin - to 4,000
gold pieces, for the release of a vice-admiral captured during a sea
chase off the Anatolian coast in the vicinity of Kos. 16 While
Evliya 's figure is no doubt much exaggerated, facilitating prisoner
exchanges was undoubtedly a lucrative business throughout the
Mediterranean in this period. Contemporary western accounts such
as the joumal of the English sea captain Thomas Allin confırm that
a usual price charged for the release of rank and file prisoners was
in the range of 80 to 100 dollars (= gurush) or 32-40 gold pieces. 17
it is not clear how far we should trust the accuracy of the fıgures
cited in either the Venetian or the Ottoman sources concerning the
siege of Candia, but it is an indisputable fact that the besiegers in
particular suffered heavy casualties. it is very likely that Ottoman
losses over the course of the war mounted into the hundreds of
thousands. 18 The statistics provided in Table II give an at least
impressionistic account of the rate at which manpower resources
were being depleted during the war in Crete.

15. See Abdi Çelebi, 'Mekıub' (cf. n. 4 above), pp. 247-8.

16. See Evliya Çelebi, Seyıihatrıame, 1O vols (lsıanbul , 1314 (1896)· 1938), Vol.
, VIII, p. 232, on ıhe ıenns for ıhe release of the riyale kopudani.
17. See Anderson (ed.), Journals, Vol. 2, p . 242 : enıry for 16 Dec. 1669 and ibid.,
Vol. 1, p.178 : entry for 15 Nov. 1664.
18. The chronicler Hasan Ağa (Mühürdar), Tarih-i Fazıl Ahmed Fatih-i Kandiye
(Istanbul University Library, Ms. T.Y. 6062), fol. 97b, puıs the ıoll for the final
phases of the war between May 1667 and Sepi. 1669 aı 259,000 (see Table 11),
while 8.J. Sloı, Archipelagus Turbatus: Les Cyclades enıre colonisaıion /atine
et occupation otıomane c. 1500-1718, 2 vols., Uiıgaven Van Het Nederlands
Historisch-Archaelogisch Jnsıiıuı Te lstanbul, No. 51 (Leiden, 1982); Vol. 1, p.
ı 63 (presumably based on Veneıian sources) estimaıes 1 10,000 Ottoman as
compared with 40,000 Veneıian casualıies. Setton (Yenice, Austria, and the
Turks, p. 241) gives stili different casualıy figures : 130,000 for the besiegers
and 100,000 for ıhe defenders of Candia.
 THE OITOMAN RESURGENCE 193

Table II

Ottoman Casualties at the Siege of Candia, /667-1669

Name of unit or category of soldier No. of casualties

1. pashas (generals) 15
2. chorbadjis Uanissary company commanders) 84
3. cavushes Uanissary guards) 164
4. janissary infantrymen 39,939
5. timariots and zaims (provincial cavalry) 37,645
6. serden geçti sipahis (commandos attached ıo
cavalry regimenıs at the Porte) 49,635
7. alay beys (district commanders of the
timariot forces) 799
8. djebedjis (annourers) 69,850
9. topdjus (artillerymen) 22,965
10. humbaradjis (bombardiers) 41
11. laghimdjis (miners and sappers) 29,965
12. garib yighitler (members of 5th &
6th cavalry regiments at the Porte) 7,900

TOTAL 259,002 19

üne of the most important functions performed by the Ottoman

navy throughout the long war with Yenice was the delivery of men
and supplies to Crete. Thus avoidance of frontal confrontation with
Yenice 's naval forces was the chief mission of the Ottoman fleet.
The principal task of Ottoman commanders was to slip through the
enemy blockade and convoy men and supplies to Crete. From the
foregoing account it can be clearly seen that the manpower question
constituted the critical variable affecting Ottoman performance in

l 9. The source for Table il is Mühürdar's history; see n. 18 above. The same fig-
ures are listed in the ms copy of Mühürdar's history found in the Topkapı
Palace Library (Ms. 111 Ahmed 3605, fol. 57a). Note in parıicular the heavy
casualties among the groups working with explosives, e.g. Nos. 8, 9, and l 1.
 194 MEDilERRANEAN HJSTORICAL REVIEW

seventeenth-century military operations both on land and at sea.

This point is often overlooked in the rush to ascribe Ottoman diffi-
culties to their lack of technological sophistication, or to the corrup-
tion and incompetence·of their leaders.
What we have considered so far conceming the state's role and
stake in maritime affairs is of course only a part of the overall pic-
ture. it remains for us to consider what kind of scenario emerges
when we examine the cost-benefit ratio from the standpoint of pri-
vate investment and entrepreneurship. Examined from the stand-
point of immediate retum on its investment, the state's interest in
naval engagements was negligible. For example, in the campaign
launched by the Ottomans in I 619 against the ltalian coastal town
of Manfredonia the expeditionary force of 40 galleys20 (for its cost
at the rate of 1.28 million per vessel, see Table I above) yielded the
treasury only 5,000 gurush or 400,000 akçes for its one-fifth share
of the prize money. 21 However, the flow of capital resulting from
naval warfare had a very considerable impact both on private for-
tunes and on the economic development of regions situated near the
front. For instance both insular Patmos, favoured by corsairs as a
centre for the disposing of captured vessels and redeeming of pris-
oners, and coastal Kuş Adası, serving as a kind of labour exchange
and centre for the recruitment of replacement crews, owed their
prosperity to the war raging in the Aegean.22 Above ali Chios served
as a major clearing-house, functioning not only as the main base of
operations for the Ottoman imperial fleet while on manoeuvres, but
also as the dockyards and chandlery for the auxiliary fleet of the
Aegean. in addition to playing a role in the provisioning and prepar-
ing of the Ottoman fleets for campaigns at sea, Chios also absorbed
a large share of the proceeds of war, in the form of both slaves and
captured enemy vessels. While one is disinclined to believe unre-
servedly everything that Evliya has to say about the economic con-
dition of the Aegean islands in the third quarter of the seventeenth
century, his observations are none the less suggestive. For example,

20. See Naima, Tarih, Yol. il, p. 185.

21. See Halil Paşa , Menaldb-i Halil Paşa (Topkapı Palace Library [I sıanbul] , Ms.
Revan 1482), fol. 155b.
22. See Zindancı Mahmud , ' Makale ' (cf. n. 4 above}, p. 142.
 Evliya cites the case of Ak Mehıned Pasha, a retired Ottoman offi-
cial and nephew of the one-time Grand Vizier Receb Pasha, whose
estates in Chios, composed mostly of vineyards, employed 2,000
slaves, acquired in part, it mııy be presumed, during the course of
his govemorship in Tunis.23 At the conservative rate of 8,000 akçes
per head for his slaves alone, Ak Mehmed thus achieved the status
of multimillionaire. Evliya further describes Chios as a flourishing
and populous place whose equal he had not encountered during 31
years of touring the Ottoman domains. 24
While one might well question the factual basis and statistical
accuracy of Evliya's account, the substance of his remarks accurate-
ly reflects contemporary conditions. When, for example, Evliya
states that the tax-farm of the customs revenue of Chios yielded an
annual sum of 4 million akçes, the figure is expressive of popular
expectations as much as it is of official realities.25 Official assess-
ments and data on Ottoman revenue collections clearly teli only a
part of the story. Whatever the graph for treasury receipts from the
island might look like during the 1650s and 1660s, it seems clear
that private sector and mercantile interests benefited greatly from
the flourishing trade both in legal supplies for the Ottoman fleets
and illegal commerce with the enemy.26
in considering those groups which benefıted most from the
renewal of the naval rivalry between the Ottomans and the
Venetians in the mid-seventeenth century, serious thought should
also be given to the role played by turncoats, renegades, and mer-
cantile and military adventurers. There is abundant evidence to sug-
gest that service both directly with Ottoman forces and indirectly on
behalf of Ottoman interests in the Mediterranean held considerable

23. Evliya, Seyahatname, Yol. IX, p. 111.

24. lbid., p. 124.
25. Cf. ibid., p. 115, with the subsıantially lower valuations for ıhe early seven-
teenth century in D. Goffman, /zmir and ıhe Levanıine World, 1550-1650
(Seaıtle, 1990), p. 58 (Table 6).
26. Foran idea of the scale of the illegal trade, especially during ıhe early stages of
the war with Yenice, see Naima, Tarih, Vol. V, pp. 38-9: 'Vak' a-i İzmir' (sub
anno 1060) and Abd al Aziz Efendi Karaçelebi-zade, Zeyl-i Ravzaı al-Ebrar
(Ösıerreichische Nationalbibliothek [Vienna), Ms. H.O. 76), fol. 29a (sub anno
1061).
 196 MEDITERRANEAN lllSTORICAL REVIEW

attraction for western sea captains and even, though more excep-
tionally, for naval officers from the rival fleets. Naima cites one par-
ticularly celebrated case of defection, indicating that the Ottomans
made sure to capitalize on the propaganda value offered in such
exceptional circumstances by rewarding the deserter with a high-
ranking appointment in the Ottoman navy.27 Zindancı Mahmud, who
provides a detailed account of a voyage started in the year 1673
which developed into a three-year career of prize hunting on behalf
of the Dey of Tunis, gives us another well-documented example of
the service of Christian renegades in the Ottoman Empire. These
more celebrated Mediterranean mercenaries, mutineers, and defec-
tors were joined by a host of other lower profile small-time opera-
tors whose activities are described in captains' logs that have sur-
vived from the period. The following excerpt, taken from the jour-
nals of Thomas Allin and dated November 1669, describes the tak-
ing of a prize ship in the westem Mediterranean, but it reflects con-
ditions prevalent throughout the Mediterranean:

The ship Milford coming to Cape Palos [on the southern

Mediterranean coast of Spain] met a small vessel of Algiers.
Capt. Hubbard of the Milford took her and found in her Ali
Reis, a Lubeck renegade captain and Moors, Turks and rene-
gades, two slaves and an English lad. Capt. Hubbard put one
Mr. John Tempest, a midshipman, in to command her. 28

it appears from this account that the hope of rapid advancement

through pursuing a career in the Mediterranean had sufficient pull to
draw in the unidentified 'English lad' in whose judgment, we may
presume, prospects either at home or in the service of his own coun-
try 's navy held considerably less promise of reward.29

27. See Naima, Tarih, Yol. VI, p. 183 (sub anno 1066): kuffar donanmasından bir
be-nam kapudan 30 kadar ittibaiyle firar edip [...] şeref-i islam ile ser-bülend
olup, ziyade vazife ile tersane-i amirede kapuda nlık rütbesiyle behremend
oldu ' .
28. Anderson, Journals, Yol. 2, p. 241.
29. For an account of conditions in the Mediterranean a century later, see J.C.
Dann (ed.), The Nagle Journal: A Diary of the Life of Jacob Nagle, Sailor,
from ıhe Year 1775 to 1841 (New York, 1988), pp. 191-211. On the potential
THE OITOMAN RESURGENCE 197

The bulk of the evidence we have considered thus far leads us to

the conclusion that while the costs of Mediterranean warfare in the
seventeenth century were bome mostly by the state, aided inevitably
by the taxpayer and the rank and file citizenry, benefıts, at least
short term, accrued mostly to the entrepreneurs and other risk-tak-
ers. But we have still to consider the net impact of conducting war
on state and economy ata more macrocosmic level before attempt-
ing a definitive formulation of our conclusions. What was witnessed
in the seventeenth-century Mediterranean was a broadening of par-
ticipation in intemational trade. The entry of England (after 1580)
and Holland (after 1612) to the arena of east Mediterranean trade
ushered in a new era both of intercompany competition 30, and of
intemational rivalry. ln the new multilateral trade era, even before
the outbreak of the Cretan wars in 1645, the Ottomans had become
adept at using the periodic disputes that arose between the three
principal European trading powers (the Dutch, the English, and the
French) to their own advantage. 31 Ottoman supply demands during
the course of the war itself played their own part in shaping new
trade alliances and alignments. At the war's conclusion, some
European trading partners were better positioned than others to
maintain and expand their commercial activities in the Levant.32 The

(or at leası a westem percepıion of thaı potential) for upward mobility in the
less class-conscious and socially rigid countries of the Muslim Near East, see
also the remarks of Guillet de St. George, Aıhenes Ancienne et Nouvel/e eı
/' esıaı presenı de /' Empire des Turcs (Paris, 1675), p. 438: 'Chez )es
Chrestiens, un homme de naissance sans merite ne manqueroit guere de faire
fortune; chez les Turcs, une homme de meriıe sans naissance ne manque guere
son esıablissement ' .
30. On inıercompany rivalry, see A.H. De Groot, 'The Organization of Westem
European Trade in the Levanı, 1500-1800', in L. Blusse and F. Gaastra (eds.),
Companies and Trade: Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the
Anden Regime, Comparative Studies in Overseas History (Leiden, 1981), pp.
231-41, esp. pp. 232-4 conceming the jealousies stirred up in mercantile circles
by the granıing of new and semi-monopolistic trading privileges ıo chartered
trading companies.
31. On the Ottomans' readiness to interpose themselves as 'arbitrators' in
European commercial disputes (especially with reference to consulage fees),
see Goffman, lzmir and the Levantine World, pp. 123-6.
32. See S.P. Anderson, An Eng/ish Cansu/ in Turkey: Pau/ Rycauı at Smyrna, 1667-
1678 (Oxford, 1989), p. 119: 'By 1667, according ıo Venetian sources, the
English enjoyed twice the trade of their nearest rivals the Dutch [... ] The
 198 MEDITERRANEAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

new economic relationship that had emerged between the Ottoman

Empire and England during the cmırse of the war was formalized in
the renewal, under terms very favourable to the English, of existing
trading agreements or Çapitulations in 1675.33
For their part, the Ottomans also realized a number of tangible
and intangible indirect benefits from their experience during the
Cretan wars. Early in the war they became conscious of the need to
modernize their navy and set for themselves the objective of achiev-
ing closer parity between sailing vessels and oar-powered galleys in
their fleet. 34 Fiscal constraints during the actual war years delayed
the ful) achievement of this goal of fleet modemization until the
1680s, but the realization of the need was the product of their
wartime experience three decades earlier.
Over the span of the seven decades between 1645 and 1718, the
Ottomans made a serious bid to reassert their claim to hegemony
over the eastem Mediterranean. While the rise of imperial Russia in
the eighteenth century would later divert rnost of their policy con-
cems and naval resources to the Black Sea, their seventeenth-centu-
ry experience in the Aegean and Mediterranean provided a solid
foundation for pursuing their strategic concems in other spheres. in
general, one should not underestimate the educational value of
defeat for the Ottomans. The setback endured by their land forces at
Vienna in 1683 strengthened the resolve of Ottoman military lead-
ers to impose higher standards of army discipline, while the mari-
time incident at the harbour of Chios (July 1681 ), in which a small
French detachment attacked a group of Tripolitanian vessels that
were lying at anchor, hastened the decision to commit the resources

English trade continued to make headway, and afıer the Treaty of Wesıminster
[marking the end of the war with Holland] in 1674 lefı ali competition far
behind'.
33. The printed texı of the 67 articles and 9 amendments in English ıranslation was
published in London in 1679 under the title The Capitu/ations and Artic/es of
Peace Between The Majesty of the King of Great Britain, France, and /re/and,
Ete. and The SULTAN of the Ottoman Empire fsic.], giving concrete expres-
sion to the satisfactory conclusion of the firsı century of officially sanctioned
Anglo-Ottoman trading relations.
34. Anderson, Naval Wars, p. 142 (referring to the year 1651) : 'Taught by the
lessons of the pası few campaigns the Turks had made great efforts ıo add ıo
the number of their sailing ships •.
THE OITOMAN RESURGENCE 199

necessary for a ful) modernization of the fleet without further

delay. 35 Contemporary western evidence indeed confirrns that the
Ottomans kept pace successfully with late seventeenth-century
improvements in naval engineering introduced in England, France,
and Holland.36 üne observer, an English sea captain named Bollard
who travelled to the Mediterranean in 1675, even complained of an
incident in which his English-built vessel was so completely outdis-
tanced by a Turkish frigate of local design that he was moved to
make recommendations for improvements along similar lines to
contemporary English boatbuilders.37 Detailed evidence concerning
the improved condition and performance of the Ottoman navy by
around 1700 is provided in the Istanbul dispatches of the Venetian
haili during the early part of Ahmed III's reign. The overall assess-
ment of the Venetians, stili the Ottomans' most formidable rival in
the Mediterranean, was that the Ottomans were, more than ever, a
credible adversary. 38 The results achieved by the Ottomans' fleet
modernization programme begun in the l 680s were apparent to for-
eign observers writing in the J720s.
From the foregoing analysis it seems clear that short-term bene-
fıts and profıts from naval warfare accrued to merchants, corsairs
(in a variety of local guises from Adriatic Uskoks to Black Sea and
riverine Kazaks), and enterprising individuals as well as to the
regional economies of the zones situated near the front. But, in
developments of longue duree, the state reaped a number of unseen
rewards. in the case of the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire,
one gain came from a refamiliarization with its Mediterranean envi-

35. On the repercussions of the Chios incident of Receb 1092, see Mehmed Raşid,
Tarih-i Raşid, 5 vols. (lsıanbul,1282), Vol. I, pp. 369 ff.
36. For an account of these developments, see the contemporary works by Edward
Battine (Method of Building and Rigging Ship of War [London, 1684]), F.
Dassie (L' Architecture Navale [Paris, 1677]), and Sir Anthony Deane
(Doctrine of Naval Architecture [Cambridge Universiıy, Magdalene College,
Ms. dated 1684 in the Pepsian Library]); cf. G.S. Laird Clowes, Sailing Ships:
Their History and Developmenı, 2 pts. (London, 1932-36), Pt. I, p. 93.
37. See Clowes, Sailing Ships, Pt. il, p. 78.
38. See the dispatches of Giovanni and Angelo Emo in M.L. Shay (ed. and trans.),
The Ottoman Empire jrom 1720 ıo 1734 as Revealed in the Despatches of the
Venetian Bai/i, lllinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. 27 (Urbana, 1944),
pp. 73-83.
200 MEDITERRANEAN HJSTUK!CAL Kh V1h W

ronment after a long periocl of preoc&ıpation with the affairs of the

eastern provinces along the borderland with Iran and lraq .
Confronting its own weaknesses and striving to overcome them
through experimentatiori · and, if the truth be told, trial and error,
proved a necessary if painful experience for the empire and one
which helped to see it through the final two and a half centuries of
its existence between 1670 and 1920.