[G.R. No. 192708. October 2, 2017.] d.
Accept as proof of employee premium share payment and
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (MPSTA),
TEACHERS' DIGNITY COALITION (TDC), MELCHOR V. CAYABYAB,
EVA V. FERIA, ELCIRA A. PONFERRADA, AND NATIVIDAD P.
TALASTAS, IN THEIR BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF ALL GSIS
MEMBERS AND RETIREES SIMILARLY
SITUATED, petitioners, vs. MR. WINSTON F. GARCIA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER OF THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), GSIS BOARD
OF TRUSTEES, AND SEC. ARMIN LUISTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, respondents.
SERENO, C.J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision 2 rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 105797. The CA issued a writ of Prohibition
against the immediate and retroactive application of the Premium-Based Policy
(PBP), Automatic Policy Loan and Policy Lapse (APL) and Claims and Loans
Interdependency Policy (CLIP) to the teacher-petitioners' claims, without or prior
to a complete determination and reconciliation of the employer-share liabilities of
the Department of Education (DepEd). 3 The appellate court, however, did not
grant the following prayers, which petitioners reiterate before this Court: HTcADC
1. Nullify the PBP, APL and CLIP
2. Order the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to do the
following:
a. Restore the creditable service of all GSIS members (not just
teachers), reckoned simply from the date of their
respective original appointments or elections;
b. Compute and grant the creditable service, benefits, and claims
of GSIS members based on their period of service,
regardless of any deficiency in the employer premium
share contributions;
c. Account the automatic deduction of the employee premium
share contributions from their salaries as conclusive
compliance with their obligation of premium share
payments, and thus entitle them to their full benefits
and claims, regardless of the remittance thereof by the
agency-employer to the GSIS;
loan repayments the pay slips of the employees and/or
remittance lists or certifications from the agency-
employer, or other proof of payment as may be
provided by the employee and/or the agency, and to
update the employee's service records using these
documents; and
e. Refund to the GSIS members those amounts that were
deducted from their claims and benefits arising from
the implementation of the PBP, APL, and CLIP, with
interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the
time of withholding of each such amount.
3. Order DepEd to procure the appropriation in the national budget of the
amounts needed to keep current its employer premium share
contributions, and to remit all payment deficiencies to the
GSIS. 4
FACTS
On 14 November 1936, a government service insurance system was
created by virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 186 in order to promote the
efficiency and welfare of the employees of the government of the Philippines. On
31 May 1977, then President Marcos approved Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1146 amending, expanding, increasing, and integrating the social security and
insurance benefits of government employees and facilitating the payment thereof
under C.A. No. 186. More than 20 years later, P.D. 1146 was amended,
and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8291, or the "The GSIS Act of 1997," took effect.
Under this Act, the employee-member and the employer-agency are
required by law to pay monthly contributions to the system. 5 The share of the
employer ("GS," or government share) is sourced from the national budget, while
that of the employee ("PS," or personal share) is automatically deducted by the
former from the employee's salary. 6 The employer is mandated to remit the GS
and PS directly to the GSIS within the first 10 days of the calendar month following
the month to which the contributions apply. 7
One of the changes made in R.A. 8291 was the increase in the employer's
contribution from 9.5% to 12%. 8 However, there was no concomitant increase in
the budget appropriation. 9 As a result, DepEd was unable to pay GSIS the
equivalent of the 2.5% increase in the employer's share. 10
Based on the figures provided in the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) 11 executed by DBM, DepEd and GSIS on 11 September 2012, DepEd
incurred premium deficiencies totalling P6,923,369,633.15 from 1 July 1997 to 31
December 2010 pertaining to the GS. 12 GSIS alleges that for the same period,
DepEd personnel incurred premium deficiencies totalling P4,511,907,486.98
pertaining to the PS. 13
In the meantime, GSIS issued the assailed Resolutions, to wit:
1. Resolution No. 238 14 — In 2002, the GSIS Board introduced CLIP, by
which the arrears incurred by members from their overdue loans
are deducted from the proceeds of their new loan or retirement
benefits. CLIP also involves the collective suspension of the loan
privileges of the member when a loan account is in default,
except when its proceeds are used to pay for the arrearages.
2. Resolution No. 90 15 — In 2003, the GSIS Board adopted
the PBP whereby for the purpose of computing GSIS benefits,
the creditable service of a member is determined by the
corresponding monthly premium contributions that were timely
and correctly remitted or paid to GSIS.
Petitioners claim that the policy shifted the basis for the claims and
benefits of GSIS members from the actual length of service to the creditable years
of service. 16 Section 10 of R.A. 8291, which provided for the computation of
service, states:
SECTION 10. Computation of Service. —
(a) The computation of service for the purpose of
determining the amount of benefits payable under this Act shall
be from the date of original appointment/election, including
periods of service at different times under one or more
employers, those performed overseas under the authority of the
Republic of the Philippines, and those that may be prescribed by
the GSIS in coordination with the Civil Service
Commission. aScITE
(b) All service credited for retirement, resignation or
separation for which corresponding benefits have been awarded
under this Act or other laws shall be excluded in the computation
of service in case of reinstatement in the service of an employer
and subsequent retirement or separation which is compensable
under this Act.
For the purpose of this section the term service shall
include full time service with compensation: Provided, That part
time and other services with compensation may be included
under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
GSIS.
It must be noted that neither DepEd nor GSIS denies that there is a
problem with the reconciliation of their records, such that the GSIS database might
reflect nonpayment of the PS despite its automatic deduction from the employee's
salary and its remittance by DepEd. As for the GS, it is also possible that the
database might reflect nonpayment despite remittance. In fact, GSIS itself
admitted that "it is public knowledge that previous problems in the Information
Technology infrastructure of GSIS have severely affected the efficient servicing of
members['] claims." 17 Further, instead of denying that its nonposting may result
in the nonpayment of benefits, GSIS merely offered an excuse:
x x x. The GSIS has around 1,500,000 member-employees.
Continuous efforts to make its records accurate are being
earnestly taken. The GSIS does not claim perfection and one
hundred percent fool-proof precision in its database recording.
When millions of entries are involved, a few mistakes due to
human error cannot be avoided. What the GSIS assures this
Honorable Court is that errors brought to its attention and shown
to be existing are promptly rectified. Where benefits are
concerned, expeditious corrections of records and payments are
done. 18
3. Resolution No. 179 19 — In 2007, the GSIS Board approved the APL,
which is "a feature of a GSIS life insurance policy that keeps the
policy in force in case of nonpayment of premiums by taking out
a loan amount against the unrestricted portion of the policy's
accumulated cash value (CV) or the termination value
(TV)" 20 until the total APL and policy loan balances exceed the
CV of the Life Endowment Policy or the TV of the Enhanced Life
Policy. A 6% interest per annum compounded monthly is
imposed on the APL, which is independent of the 2% interest per
month compounded annually charged to the agency for delayed
remittances. 21
These Resolutions were not published in a newspaper of general
circulation and were enforced before they were even filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register. 22
Petitioners seek to nullify the resolutions for being
"intrinsically unconstitutional, illegal, unjust, oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory,
immoral, ultra vires, and unconscionable." 23 They make the following factual
allegations to demonstrate how the policies were applied:
1. CLIP — Petitioners Eva Feria, Elcira Ponferrada, and Natividad Talastas
obtained policy and/or emergency loans, which they have fully
paid for. The loan repayments have been automatically deducted
 from their salaries as certified by DepEd. Despite full payment, Interests P20,758.82
their vouchers indicate underpayment of the loans. 24
Policy Loan P0.00
2. PBP — Petitioner Melchor Cayabyab is also a public school
teacher. 25 As of 11 June 2008, his Premium and Loan Accounts Interests on Policy P0.00
Balances Index showed that he had the following arrearages: Loan

PS P44,206.73 Net Proceeds P0.00

GS P61,327.67
Another case in point is petitioner Ponferrada, whose
EC P3,411.70 Life Insurance Claim Voucher showed that the premium in
arrears was deducted from the face value of her policy despite
TOTAL P108,946.10 DepEd's certification that she had paid the monthly
contributions, including the GS and the EC, from January 2000 to
On the other hand, DepEd certified that the monthly contributions for the December 2006. 28
GS, PS and EC had been deducted from Cayabyab's salary from
On 7 July 2008, respondent Garcia, who was then the president of GSIS,
January 2001 to July 2006. 26
wrote a letter 29 to DepEd alleging that the agency's unpaid premiums, as of 30
Because of the PBP, Cayabyab's creditable service was June 2008, had reached P21.3 billion, to wit: HEITAD
reduced as follows:
Unpaid premiums (GS) P4,451,361,535.55
Total Length of Service 7.72678 years
Unpaid premium (PS) P2,946,674,455.57
Less: Equivalent Years of Service yet to be
Interest P13,926,610,685.47
reconciled with Agency and Member's Records 4.15462 years
Total Premium arrearages of DepEd P21,324,646,676.59
Provisional/Tentative Creditable Years of Service
with Retirement Premium Payments 3.57216 years
In its reply letter dated 15 July 2008, 30 DepEd asked the GSIS to break
down the P21.3 billion lump sum by naming each and every one of the employees
3. APL — As of 6 June 2005, before the APL was approved, the cash who supposedly had unpaid premiums and thereafter providing the Service
surrender value of petitioner Talastas' policy amounted to Records indicating the months or years in which the PS or the GS of these
P51,252.53. In 2008, she inquired about the cash surrender value employees were not paid. DepEd also suggested that the official receipts issued to
of her policy and was apprised by GSIS that her policy had it by GSIS be reconciled with the latter's records. 31
resulted in zero proceeds because of the following
deductions: 27 Petitioners claim that while DepEd was still discussing its alleged
arrearages with GSIS, the latter converted the entire P21,324,646,676.59 into
Cash Value as of P51,252.53 personal loans of the teachers through the APL, earning interest at 6% per annum
6/6/2005 compounded monthly, while also effectively reducing the teachers' creditable
Less: Underpayments years of service through the PBP. 32
In response to the alleged "chronic" non-remittance of premium
Personal Share P9,045.48
contributions resulting in premium deficiencies based on the GSIS records of
Interests P11,737.88 creditable service, the DBM, DepEd, and the GSIS executed a MOA on 11
September 2012. 33 The following terms and conditions were agreed upon:
Government Share P9,710.35
1. The DBM will settle the government share in the premium arrearages
of DepEd from 1 July 1997 to 31 December 2010 in the amount
 of P6,923,369,633.15, half of which shall be advanced upon
submission by the GSIS of a billing statement, list of employees
covered, and request letter;
2. The GSIS will condone, in its entirety, the interests due on the aforesaid
premium deficiencies amounting to 14,041,029,495.73; and
3. Upon release of the advance payment, the GSIS will lift the suspension
of loan privileges and other benefits applicable to the covered
DepEd personnel and make the proportionate adjustment in
their records of creditable service.
On 31 May 2013, respondents informed the Court of the developments in
the reconciliation of membership records of DepEd personnel, the execution of the
MOA, and the national appropriation for the settlement of DepEd's GSIS premium
arrearages.
Petitioners asserted that regardless of the execution of the MOA, the
Resolutions must still be nullified, because "most of the initiatives described in the
GSIS Manifestation appeared to be merely operational x x x which do not amend,
modify, or reverse any of the GSIS policies, and which are thus still in
place." 34 Moreover, the MOA refers only to the DepEd, one of the many agency-
employers in the government, without "similar reported endeavours to address
the internal arrangements between the GSIS and the rest of the agency-employers
in the Government." 35
In a Resolution dated 17 June 2015, 36 the Court required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. All memoranda were received by 9 October
2015.
OUR RULING
The policies are invalid due to lack of publication.
As early as 1986, the Court in Tañada v. Tuvera 37 already laid down a
definitive interpretation of Article 2 38 of the Civil Code:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued
by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to
be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. 39
After Tañada, the Administrative Code of 1987 40 was enacted, with
Section 3 (1) of Chapter 2, Book VII, specifically providing that:
Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall
not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons.
In Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., 41 this Court held that the
requirements of publication and filing must be strictly complied with, as these were
designed to safeguard against abuses on the part of lawmakers and to guarantee
the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public
concern. Even in cases where the parties participated in the public consultation
and submitted their respective comments, strict compliance with the requirement
of publication cannot be dispensed with. 42 ATICcS
While GSIS filed copies of the subject resolutions with the Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR), it only did so after the claims of the
retirees and beneficiaries had already been lodged. 43 The resolutions were not
published in either the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation in the
country.
GSIS maintains that the publication of the resolutions was unnecessary,
because the policies were "just a mere reiteration of the time-honored principles
of insurance law." 44 According to GSIS, the PBP is actually contained in R.A. 8291,
which allegedly contemplates the actual payment of premiums. 45 It alludes to the
records of the Senate, which was supposedly clearly in support of its position that
the payment of premium contributions is a precondition for the availment of
benefits from the system. 46 The cited excerpt reads:
Senator Romulo: As I understand it, Mr. President, after they
have served in their respective offices for three years, or after
they have paid their contributions within a period of three years,
they are entitled to the benefits under this proposed measure.
Senator Enrile: Yes, Mr. President, with certain limitations. My
understanding is that there must be at least three years of
 service, which means three years of contributions to the
system. 47
Regarding the APL Policy and CLIP, respondent GSIS made a general
statement that those are "part and parcel of the business of insurance." 48
The GSIS admits that the Certificate of Membership 49 contains the
following provision:
4.3. Creditable services
For purposes of determining his length of service, all services
with compensation rendered by the members from the date of
his original employment whether full-time or part-time shall be
credited.
However, the agency downplays its own words by adding that the certificate "does
not discount Section 5 and 6 of R.A. 8291 which emphasize the need for the correct
and prompt payment and remittance of the premium contributions." 50
A reading of the resolutions convinces us that these cannot be viewed
simply as a construction of R.A. 8291, as they, in fact, substantially increase the
burden of GSIS members. It must now be proven that the PS or GS for the PBP and
the APL, and loan amortization payments for CLIP, have been remitted by DepEd
and posted by GSIS.
GSIS cannot deny that it has made posting a prerequisite for the crediting
of the period of service and loan repayments. 51 Specifically, the PBP guidelines
provide: 52
POLICIES:
xxx xxx xxx
4. For services in government where the corresponding
premium contributions were not paid, or if the amounts remitted
or paid were less than what should be paid, such services can
only be recognized as creditable services if the following
conditions are observed:
Competent proof that the member actually rendered
those services and received fixed basic compensation.
Actual payment or remittance of the unpaid premium
balances, including the interest imposed above for their delayed
payment, both for government and/or personal share.
PROCEDURAL GUIDELINE:
xxx xxx xxx
6. The Record of Creditable Services shall be the member's
record of services in government where the corresponding
premium contributions, including interest, if any, have been duly
paid or remitted to GSIS.
xxx xxx xxx
9. The RCS shall be the basis for computing the GSIS benefits due
the member x x x
In case of error in the Record of Creditable Service, GSIS says that the
following documents are acceptable to correct the discrepancy: 53
Conflict Documentary Proof
Monthly premium payments or Statement of Account/Remittance
Salary List and Official Receipt
Years of Service Statement of Account/Remittance
List and Official Receipt/Monthly
Premiums Posted
GSIS does not consider the certifications issued by DepEd as substantial
proof of payment, as these were "clearly self-serving." 54
In its Comment, the GSIS admits that employees are "momentarily made
to pay for the unremitted and/or unposted government share in the premium
obligation." 55 The agency views this occurrence acceptable and even boasts that
because of the APL, the unpaid period is still credited to employees. Note,
however, that under the APL, any unpaid or unposted government share is
considered a loan by the employee, and interests thereon will be charged
to both the government and the employee.
According to the Court in Veterans Federation of the Philippines v.
Reyes, 56 interpretative regulations that do not add anything to the law or affect
substantial rights of any person do not entail publication. This is because "they give
no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed." 57 However, "when x x x an administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law." 58
In this case, the resolutions additionally obligate member-employees to
ensure that their employer-agency includes the GS in the budget, deducts the PS,
as well as loan amortizations, and timely remits them; and that the GSIS receives,
processes, and posts the payments. These processes are beyond the control of the
employees; yet they are being made to bear the consequences of any misstep or
delay by either their agency or GSIS. As aptly observed by the CA, "the fault lies
with how the deficiencies in payment by the DepEd, real or imagined, are
attributed to the employees-members." 59 TIADCc
Surely, this was not the scenario contemplated by law. The statutorily
prescribed mechanism — through salary deduction — is a clear indication that the
law's intent is precisely to make contribution by members less cumbersome.
Considering the heavy burden imposed, the requirements of notice, hearing, and
publication should have been observed.
The Court has invalidated administrative issuances as a consequence of
their non-publication. In De Jesus v. COA, 60 this Court declared DBM Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 ineffective. It may be recalled that in implementing
Section 12 of R.A. 6758, 61 the DBM ordered the discontinuance of all allowances
and fringe benefits granted on top of the basic salary beginning 1 November 1989.
The circular was not published. This Court pointed out that since it was more than
a mere interpretative or internal regulation, the circular should have been
published to be effective and enforceable:
x x x And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers
of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed
to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said
circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce
their income, the government officials and employees concerned
should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject
circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines — to the end that they be given
amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may
have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach
is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of
fairness and transparency.
Similarly in the present case, the resolutions effectively diminish, and in
some instances, even absolutely deprive retirees of their retirement benefits —
albeit "momentarily," as GSIS claims — when these were meant as their reward for
giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country. In GSIS v.
Montesclaros, 62 this Court expounded on the nature of retirement benefits as
property interest in this wise:
Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government
employee to pay monthly contributions. PD 1146 mandates the
government to include in its annual appropriation the necessary
amounts for its share of the contributions. It is compulsory on
the government employer to take off and withhold from the
employees' monthly salaries their contributions and to remit the
same to GSIS. The government employer must also remit its
corresponding share to GSIS. Considering the mandatory salary
deductions from the government employee, the government
pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of
compensation.
In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory,
the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested
rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of
employment. The reason for providing retirement benefits is to
compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to
government employees are part of emolument to encourage and
retain qualified employees in the government service.
Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for
giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country.
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected
property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate
payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a
vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under
the terms of the public employees' pension statute. No law can
deprive such person of his pension rights without due process
of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be
heard. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
If presidential decrees that name a public place after a favored individual
or exempt that individual from certain prohibitions or requirements must be
published, 63 how much more these resolutions that involve vested property
rights of public officers?
Aside from seeking the nullification of the Resolutions, petitioners are also
praying that this Court order respondent GSIS to 1) restore the creditable service
of all GSIS members (not just teachers), reckoned simply from the date of their
respective original appointments or elections; 2) compute and grant the creditable
service, benefits, and claims of GSIS members based on their periods of service and
regardless of any deficiency in the GS; 3) account the automatic deduction of the
PS from their salaries as conclusive compliance with their obligation of premium
share payments, and thus entitle them to their full benefits and claims, regardless
of the remittance thereof by the agency-employer to the GSIS; and 4) accept as
proof of employee premium share payment and loan repayment the pay slips of
the employees and/or remittance lists or certifications from the agency-employer,
or other proof of payment as may be provided by the employee and/or the agency;
and to update the employee's service records using these documents. Petitioners
are also asking us to order the refund to GSIS members of those amounts that were
deducted from their claims and benefits arising from the implementation of the
PBP, APL, and CLIP, with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the time
of withholding of each of those amounts.
Much as we commiserate with the plight of petitioners, this Court is not
in a position to intrude into the operational processes of respondents, which are
under the control of the executive department. We are constrained to refrain from
intruding upon purely executive and administrative matters, which are properly
within the purview of other branches of government.
Petitioners themselves accurately trace the root of this controversy to
"the internal logistical and administrative problems of the GSIS and the [DepEd],
specifically, in their remittance, reconciliation, posting, and budgetary processes
for premium payments, which are wreaking havoc upon the GSIS members." 64 On
the other hand, respondents claim that they are in the process of updating and
reconciling their records. It bears emphasis that this Court is one of law and, as
such, tasked with resolving legal controversies.
The prayer to order the department to procure the appropriation in the
national budget of the amounts needed to keep the employer's premium share
contributions current must be denied on the ground of mootness. Petitioners do
not dispute that DepEd executed a MOA with the DBM on 11 September 2012 for
the settlement of premium deficiencies pertaining to the government share from
1 July 1997 to 31 December 2010.
On a last note, we forward the concerns of petitioners to Congress, which
holds the power of the purse, for its consideration to fund the payment of premium
deficiencies pertaining to the PS for the same period, July 1997 to 31 December
2010. We refer to those amounts that had been deducted from the salaries of the
employees, but remain unremitted by their respective agencies.
We likewise forward a copy of this Decision to the Ombudsman for
consideration to file the appropriate cases against the officials and persons
responsible for the non-remittance or delayed remittance of premiums and loan
repayment. AIDSTE
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. GSIS Resolutions Nos.
238, 90, and 179, which respectively embody the Claims and Loans
Interdependency Policy, Premium-Based Policy, and Automatic Policy Loan and
Policy Lapse, are declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT.
Let a copy of this Decision be forwarded to the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and the Department of Budget and Management for their
consideration on the matter of funding the payment of the portion pertaining to
the personal share of the employees. A copy should likewise be furnished the
Office of the Ombudsman for its consideration on the matter of filing the
appropriate cases against the officials and persons responsible for the non-
remittance or delayed remittance of premiums and loan repayment.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo, Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ., concur.
||| (Manila Public School Teachers' Association v. Garcia, G.R. No. 192708, [October 2,
2017])
[G.R. No. 222095. August 7, 2017.]
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF
CERTIFICATES OF LIVE BIRTH OF YUHARES JAN BARCELOTE
TINITIGAN AND AVEE KYNNA NOELLE BARCELOTE
TINITIGAN JONNA KARLA BAGUIO
BARCELOTE, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RICKY
O. TINITIGAN, and LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, DAVAO
CITY, respondents.
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This petition for review 1 assails the 5 March 2015 Decision 2 and the 3
December 2015 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 03223-
MIN reversing the 28 February 2013 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 15 (RTC) in SPC. PROC. No. 12,007-12.
The Facts
In an Amended Petition 5 dated 20 September 2012 filed before the RTC,
petitioner Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote (Barcelote) stated the following facts:
On 24 June 2008, she bore a child out of wedlock with a married man
named Ricky O. Tinitigan (Tinitigan) in her relative's residence in Sibulan, Santa
Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to register the birth of their child, whom she
named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a hospital. To hide
her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while
Tinitigan lived with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her. On
24 August 2011, she bore another child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua
Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule,
and possible criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and she
returned to Davao City.
When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission,
Barcelote finally decided to register the births of both children. She, then, returned
to Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur to register their births. The Local Civil Registrar of
Santa Cruz approved the late registration of the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote
and Joshua Miguel Barcelote, with Registry Nos. 2012-1344 and 2012-1335,
respectively, after submitting proof that the National Statistics Office (NSO) has no
record of both births on file.
However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the
births to the NSO, Barcelote was informed that there were two certificates of live
birth (subject birth certificates) with the same name of the mother and the years
of birth of the children in their office. The subject birth certificates registered by
the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City state the following:
1. Birth Certificate with Registry No. 2008-21709:
a. Name: Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan;
b. Date of Birth: June 4, 2008;
c. Place of Birth: EUP Family Care Clinic, Holy Cross Agdao
Davao City;
d. Informant: Ricky O. Tinitigan.
2. Birth Certificate with Registry No. 2011-28329:
a. Name: Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan;
b. Date of Birth: August 14, 2011; 6
c. Place of Birth: EUP Family Care Clinic, Holy Cross Agdao
Davao City;
d. Informant: Ricky O. Tinitigan.
Thus, Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the
subject birth certificates registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and
participation, and for containing erroneous entries.
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, Barcelote was
allowed to present evidence ex parte. In her testimony, Barcelote reiterated her
allegations in the petition and emphasized that the subject birth certificates were
registered by her children's biological father, Tinitigan, without her knowledge. She
also testified that the subject birth certificates reflected wrong entries, but she did
not present any other evidence.
The Ruling of the RTC
On 28 February 2013, the RTC ruled in favor of Barcelote and ordered the
cancellation of the subject birth certificates, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the registration of the Certificate
of Live Birth of Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan and Avee Kynna
Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan, respectively intended for Joshua
Miguel Barcelote and Yohan Grace Barcelote, by their putative
father Ricky Tinitigan at the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City
without the con[s]ent or knowledge of their mother, herein
petitioner, Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote, is hereby ordered
cancelled. AaCTcI
The Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registry
of Davao City is directed/ordered to cause the cancellation of:
[i] the birth certificate of Avee Kynna
Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan under Registry No.
2008-21709, and
[ii] the certificate of live birth of
Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan under Registry
No. 2011-28329.
SO ORDERED. 7
The RTC ruled that the subject birth certificates are legally infirm, because
they were registered unilaterally by Tinitigan without the knowledge and signature
of Barcelote in violation of Section 5, Act No. 3753. The RTC also held that the
subject birth certificates contain void and illegal entries, because the children use
the surname of Tinitigan, contrary to the mandate of Article 176 of the Family
Code stating that illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother.
Moreover, the RTC found that it is not for the best interest of the children
to use the surname of their father, for there is always a possibility that the
legitimate children or wife may ask the illegitimate children to refrain from using
the surname of their father. The RTC further held that the subject birth certificates
are not reflective of the correct personal circumstances of the children because of
the glaring differences in the names and other vital information entered in it.
The Ruling of the CA
On 5 March 2015, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
The CA ruled that the registrations of the children's births, caused by Tinitigan and
certified by a registered midwife, Erlinda Padilla, were valid under Act No. 3753,
and such registrations did not require the consent of Barcelote. The CA further
ruled that the children can legally and validly use the surname of Tinitigan,
since Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, amending Article 176 of the Family Code, allows
illegitimate children to use the surname of their father if the latter had expressly
recognized them through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, such as
in this case where Barcelote admitted that Tinitigan personally registered the
children's births and affixed his surname on the subject birth certificates.
 Moreover, the CA found that Barcelote failed to discharge the burden of
proving the falsity of the entries in the subject birth certificates and to adduce
evidence that the information she provided in the late registration are the true
personal circumstances of her children.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
FOR THESE REASONS, the Decision dated 28 February
201[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Davao City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 12,007-12 for cancellation of certificates
of live birth of her children, registered as Yuhares Jan Barcelote
Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan in the
records of the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 8
In a Resolution dated 3 December 2015, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration. 9
Hence, this present petition.
The Issues
Barcelote raises the following issues for resolution:
I.
The CA erred in not cancelling the certificates of live birth for
YUHARES JAN BARCELOTE TINITIGAN and AVEE KYNNA
BARCELOTE TINITIGAN.
A. Under the Family Code, illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother. Being the mother with parental authority, [Barcelote]'s
choice of names for her children upon birth should prevail.
B. The CA gravely erred and abused its discretion when it ruled
that the RTC did not have basis for its ruling that the certificates
of birth registered by [Tinitigan] are not reflective of the true and
correct personal circumstances of the [children].
C. The CA misinterpreted the provisions of Act No. 3753,
otherwise known as the Law on Registry of Civil Status. It is clear
under this law that in case of an illegitimate child, the birth
certificate must be signed and sworn to by the mother. Since the
certificates of live birth registered by [Tinitigan] were not signed
by [Barcelote], the same are void.
D. The cancellation of the certificates of live birth, registered by
a father who is married to another and who abandoned his
illegitimate children, is for the interest and welfare of [the
children.]
II.
In the alternative, the CA was incorrect in dismissing the petition
for cancellation on the procedural ground that [Barcelote] could
have filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. In this case, the petition for cancellation was
filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which governs both
"Petition for Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry". Under this rule, even substantial errors in a civil
register may be corrected and the true facts established,
provided the party aggrieved by the error avail of the appropriate
adversary proceeding, which [Barcelote] did. Instead of
dismissing the petition outright, considering that the
jurisdictional requirements for correction [have] also been
complied with, at the very least, the CA should have treated the
petition for cancellation as one for correction and ordered the
necessary corrections, especially as to the names of [the
children]. 10
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
Prior to its amendment, Article 176 of the Family Code 11 reads:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of
a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall
remain in force. (Emphasis supplied)
This has been implemented in the National Statistics Office Administrative
Order No. 1-93 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act No. 3753 and
Other Laws on Civil Registration (IRR of Act No. 3753), 12 to wit:
RULE 23. Birth Registration of Illegitimate children. — (1)
Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents
are legitimate. Children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage unless otherwise provided in the Family Code are
illegitimate.
 (2) An illegitimate child born before 3 August 1988 and
acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname
of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, the
illegitimate child shall carry the surname of the acknowledging
parent. If no parent acknowledged the child, he shall carry the
surname of the mother.
(3) The name/s of the acknowledging parent/s, shall be indicated
in the Certificate of Live Birth.
(4) An illegitimate child born on or after 3 August 1988 shall
bear the surname of the mother. (Emphasis supplied)
Upon the effectivity of RA 9255, 13 the provision that illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother
was retained, with an added provision that they may use the surname of their
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father. Thus, Article
176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides: EcTCAD
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Grande v. Antonio, 14 we held that "the use of the word 'may' in [Article
176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255] readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. The word 'may' is permissive and operates to confer discretion
upon the illegitimate children." 15 Thus, the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255, which apply to all illegitimate children born during
the effectivity of RA 9255, state:
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 As a rule, an illegitimate child not acknowledged by the father
shall use the surname of the mother.
8.2 Illegitimate child acknowledged by the father shall use the
surname of the mother if no [Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father] (AUSF) is executed.
8.3 An illegitimate child aged 0-6 years old acknowledged by the
father shall use the surname of the father, if the mother or the
guardian, in the absence of the mother, executes the AUSF.
8.4 An illegitimate child aged 7 to 17 years old acknowledged by
the father shall use the surname of the father if the child
executes an AUSF fully aware of its consequence as attested by
the mother or guardian.
8.5 Upon reaching the age of majority, an illegitimate child
acknowledged by the father shall use the surname of his father
provided that he executes an AUSF without need of any
attestation.
The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother. The use of the
word "shall" underscores its mandatory character. The discretion on the part of
the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional upon proof of
compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR.
Since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside a
valid marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011,
respectively, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The
children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject
birth certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their
surname should have been "Barcelote" and not "Tinitigan."
We do not agree with the CA that the subject birth certificates are the
express recognition of the children's filiation by Tinitigan, because they were not
duly registered in accordance with the law.
Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, 16 states:
Section 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. — The
declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth
or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the
newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in
the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil
registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the
physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newly born child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall
certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex
and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone;
(d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; (f)
 and such other data may be required in the regulation to be
issued.
In the case of an exposed child, the person who found
the same shall report to the local civil registrar the place, date
and hour of finding and other attendant circumstances.
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate
shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant
or only the mother if the father refuses.
In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or
reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by
which such father could be identified.
Any fetus having human features which dies after
twenty four hours of existence completely disengaged from the
maternal womb shall be entered in the proper registers as having
been born and having died. (Emphasis supplied)
In Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz, 17 we held that "under Section 5 of Act
No. 3753, the declaration of either parent of the [newborn] legitimate child shall
be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the
registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth
certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by
the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child." 18
The first paragraph of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 assumes that the
newborn child is legitimate since our law accords a strong presumption in favor of
legitimacy of children. 19 On the other hand, the fourth paragraph of Section 5
specifically provides that in case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall
be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if
the father refuses. The fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically applies to an
illegitimate child and likewise underscores its mandatory character with the use of
the word "shall." Lex specialis derogat generali. Where there is in the same statute
a particular enactment and also a general one which, in its most comprehensive
sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment
must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such
cases within its general language which are not within the provision of the
particular enactment. 20
Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the
birth certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father
recognizes the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate
child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries
the blood of the mother. 21 Thus, this provision ensures that individuals are not
falsely named as parents. 22
The mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth
certificate because she has the parental authority and custody of the illegitimate
child. In Briones v. Miguel, 23 we held that an illegitimate child is under the sole
parental authority of the mother, and the mother is entitled to have custody of the
child. The right of custody springs from the exercise of parental
authority. 24 Parental authority is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their
heart and senses. 25
Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the
mother did not sign the documents, the local civil registrar had no authority to
register the subject birth certificates. Under the IRR of Act No. 3753, the civil
registrar shall see to it that the Certificate of Live Birth presented for registration
is properly and completely filled up, and the entries are correct. 26 In case the
entries are found incomplete or incorrect, the civil registrar shall require the
person concerned to fill up the document completely or to correct the entries, as
the case may be. 27
Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with
the provisions of the law respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children.
Aside from the fact that the entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname
of the children is incorrect since it should have been that of the mother, the subject
birth certificates are also incomplete as they lacked the signature of the
mother. HSAcaE
Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws
shall be void. 28 In Babiera v. Catotal, 29 we declared as void and cancelled a birth
certificate, which showed that the mother was already 54 years old at the time of
the child's birth and which was not signed either by the civil registrar or by the
supposed mother.
Accordingly, we declare the subject birth certificates void and order their
cancellation for being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family
Code requiring the use of the mother's surname for her illegitimate children
and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of the mother in her children's birth
certificates.
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be the primary
consideration. 30
 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the 5
March 2015 Decision and the 3 December 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 03223-MIN. We REINSTATE the 28 February 2013 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, in SPC. PROC. No. 12,007-12. The
Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Davao City is ordered
to CANCEL: (1) the Certificate of Live Birth of Avee Kynna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan
under Registry No. 2008-21709 and (2) the Certificate of Live Birth of Yuhares Jan
Barcelote Tinitigan under Registry No. 2011-28329.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Mendoza, Leonen and Martires, JJ., concur.
||| (In re: Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan, G.R. No. 222095, [August 7, 2017])
[G.R. No. 231998. November 20, 2017.]
ERIC SIBAYAN CHUA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J p:
Nature of the Case
For consideration of the Court is the Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the November 7, 2016
Decision 1 and May 19, 2017 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 102624. The assailed rulings disallowed petitioner from changing the name
registered in his birth certificate from "Eric Sibayan Kiat" (Eric) to "Eric
Sibayan Chua."
The Facts
On January 7, 2013, Eric filed a petition for change of surname from "Kiat"
to "Chua." In his petition, 3 Eric alleged that he was born on November 8, 1973 to
a Chinese father named "Cheong Kiat" (Cheong) and a Filipino mother named
"Melania Sibayan" (Melania). However, after his birth, his father Cheong allegedly
secured a favorable judgment allowing him (Cheong) to change his surname from
"Kiat" to "Chua." Thus, Eric adopted the new surname of his father, "Chua," and
had been using the name "Eric Sibayan Chua" in all of his credentials. Eric likewise
averred in his petition that he is known in their community as "Eric Chua" instead
of "Eric Kiat." The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 907 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.
After the RTC found that the petition is sufficient in form and substance,
and upon establishing the requisite jurisdictional facts, trial ensued on May 21,
2013. Eric testified that he was not able to secure a copy of his father's birth
certificate since the latter was born in China; that his mother Melania told him that
his father Cheong changed his surname from "Kiat" to "Chua;" 4 and that his
Certificate of Live Birth is the only document where his surname appears as "Kiat."
Offered in evidence were his Certificate of Baptism, Voter Certification, Police
Clearance, National Bureau of Investigation Clearance, Passport, High School
Diploma, and the Certificates of Live Birth of his children, which all state Eric's name
to be "Eric Sibayan Chua." 5
Melania also testified in support of the petition, claiming that Cheong
used the surname "Kiat" in China, but used "Chua" in the Philippines; that "Chua"
is the surname Cheong used when they married; that it was her uncle who
erroneously caused the registration of Eric's name as "Eric Kiat;" and that when
Eric was 16, Cheong, who was already weak, returned to China and contacted them
no longer. 6
The asseveration that Eric is known in their community as "Eric Chua" was
corroborated by his neighbor, Avelino Fernandez. 7
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Finding the change of name as nothing more than a straightening of the
records, the RTC rendered its January 22, 2014 Decision 8 granting the petition in
the following wise:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby
orders the Local Civil Registrar of Balaoan, La Union to change
the name of the petitioner from ERIC S. KIAT to ERIC S. CHUA in
his Certificate of Live Birth under Registry No. 422-K-73 of the
Local Civil Registrar of Balaoan, La Union.
Let a copy of the judgment be furnished the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar, Balaoan, La Union and the National
Statistics Office (NSO), Quezon City, Metro Manila for guidance,
information and execution of the necessary corrections and the
subsequent issuance of the updated/corrected Certificate of Live
Birth.
SO ORDERED. 9
 The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
interposed an appeal from the foregoing ruling.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On November 7, 2016, the CA rendered the assailed Decision reversing
the RTC, thusly:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.
The January 22, 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
34, Balaoan, La Union in Special Proceedings Case No. 907 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for change of name filed
by petitioner-appellee Eric Sibayan Kiat is DISMISSED for lack of
factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED. 10
According to the CA, Eric failed to establish a compelling ground for
changing his name. The CA deemed that there was no proof offered tending to
establish that Eric's father, Cheong, was able to secure a court judgment allowing
him to officially change his surname from "Kiat" to "Chua." Eric and Melania's
testimonies were seen as mere allegations that do not satisfy the requisite
quantum of evidence to establish such fact. There was then no basis for Eric's
adoption of the surname "Chua." 11 The appellate court likewise held that no
proof was offered to show that Eric will be prejudiced by his use of his registered
name. 12 Thus, since Eric's evidence fell short of preponderant, his petition for
change of name must necessarily be dismissed, so the CA ruled.
Through its May 19, 2017 Resolution, the CA denied Eric's motion for
reconsideration from the above-ruling. Hence, the instant recourse.
The Issue
The issue to be resolved herein is simply whether or not the appellate
court erred in disallowing petitioner from officially changing his name.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, there is legal and factual basis for granting
Eric's petition for change of name. To recall, his petition is not only anchored on
his father's alleged change of surname from "Kiat" to "Chua," but also on the fact
that he (Eric) had been using the surname "Chua" in all of his credentials. Thus, it
may be that Eric and Melania's testimonies are not preponderant proof of Cheong's
change of surname, but this should not foreclose the possibility of granting the
petition on a different ground.
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 13 the Court enumerated several
recognized grounds that can be invoked by a person desirous of changing his
name, viz.:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by
a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that
the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public
interest. 14 (emphasis added)
Avoidance of confusion was invoked in Alfon v. Republic, 15 wherein the
Court granted the petition for change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. In allowing the change of name, the Court held that:
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since
childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth
records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was
enrolled in the schools from the grades up to college under the
name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this name; she
finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and
given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of
suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample
justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but
on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to
avoid confusion. 16
The same circumstances are attendant in the case at bar. As Eric has
established, he is known in his community as "Eric Chua," rather than "Eric Kiat."
Moreover, all of his credentials exhibited before the Court, other than his
Certificate of Live Birth, bear the name "Eric Chua." Guilty of reiteration, Eric's
Certificate of Baptism, Voter Certification, Police Clearance, National Bureau of
 Investigation Clearance, Passport, and High School Diploma all reflect his surname
to be "Chua." Thus, to compel him to use the name "Eric Kiat" at this point would
inevitably lead to confusion. It would result in an alteration of all of his official
documents, save for his Certificate of Live Birth. His children, too, will
correspondingly be compelled to have their records changed. For even their own
Certificates of Live Birth state that their father's surname is "Chua." To deny this
petition would then have ramifications not only to Eric's identity in his community,
but also to that of his children.
The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition be
granted. Additionally, public respondent failed to demonstrate that allowing
petitioner to change his surname will prejudice the State, strengthening Our
resolve to grant the sought-after relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
November 7, 2016 Decision and May 19, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102624 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January
22, 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 34, Balaoan, La Union,
in Special Proceeding Case No. 907 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Chua v. Republic, G.R. No. 231998, [November 20, 2017])
[G.R. No. 210580. April 18, 2018.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LUDYSON C.
CATUBAG, respondent.
REYES, JR., J p:
Nature of the Petition
Challenged before this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Resolutions 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 131269 dated September 3, 2013 3 and December 6, 2013. 4 The
assailed Resolutions denied the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for failure
to file a motion for reconsideration. Likewise challenged is the Decision 5 dated
May 23, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11,
declaring Ludyson C. Catubag's (private respondent) spouse, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-
Catubag (Shanaviv), as presumptively dead.
The Antecedent Facts
Prior to the celebration of their marriage in 2003, private respondent and
Shanaviv had been cohabiting with each other as husband and wife. Their union
begot two (2) children named Mark Bryan A. Catubag and Rose Mae A. Catubag,
both of whom were born on May 18, 2000 and May 21, 2001, respectively. 6
In 2001, in order to meet the needs of his family, private respondent took
work overseas. Meanwhile, Shanaviv stayed behind in the Philippines to tend to
the needs of their children. 7
On June 26, 2003, private respondent and Shanaviv tied the knot in Rizal,
Cagayan. The marriage was solemnized by Honorable Judge Tomas D. Lasam at the
Office of the Municipal Judge, Rizal, Cagayan. 8
Sometime in April 2006, private respondent and his family were able to
acquire a housing unit located at Rio del Grande Subdivision, Enrile Cagayan.
Thereafter, private respondent returned overseas to continue his work. While
abroad, he maintained constant communication with his family. 9
On July 12, 2006, while working abroad, private respondent was informed
by his relatives that Shanaviv left their house and never returned. In the meantime,
private respondent's relatives took care of the children. 10
Worried about his wife's sudden disappearance and the welfare of his
children, private respondent took an emergency vacation and flew back home.
Private respondent looked for his wife in Enrile Cagayan, but to no avail. He then
proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close friends and
relatives, but they too could offer no help. Private respondent travelled as far as
Bicol, where Shanaviv was born and raised, but he still could not locate her. 11
Private respondent subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo
Philippines, one of the more well-known radio networks in the Philippines, to
broadcast the fact of his wife's disappearance. Moreover, private respondent
searched various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in Bicol, with no
avail. 12
On May 4, 2012, after almost seven (7) years of waiting, private
respondent filed with the RTC a petition to have his wife declared presumptively
dead. 13
On May 23, 2013, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the Petition. The
dispositive portion of the decision which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. SHANAVIV G.
ALVAREZ-CATUBAG is hereby adjudged PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD
only for the purpose that petitioner LUDYSON C. CATUBAG may
contract a marriage subsequent to what he had with SHANAVIV
 G. ALVAREZ-CATUBAG without prejudice to the reappearance of
the latter.
SO ORDERED. 14
On August 5, 2013, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), elevated the judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner's main
contention is that private respondent failed to establish a "well-founded belief"
that his missing wife was already dead. 15
In its Resolution 16 dated September 3, 2013, the CA dismissed the
petition because no motion for reconsideration was filed with the court a quo. The
CA ruled that such defect was fatal and warranted the immediate dismissal of the
petition. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 17
On September 18, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution 18 dated December 6, 2013.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
The petitioner anchors its plea for the annulment of the assailed
resolutions and the denial of private respondent's petition to declare his wife
presumptively dead on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER
DID NOT PREVIOUSLY FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR [CERTIORARI] ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO ATTACH THERETO COPIES OF ALL PERTINENT AND
RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AND PLEADINGS.
III. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A WELL-FOUNDED
BELIEF THAT HIS WIFE IS PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD.
IV. PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE HIS INTENTION TO RE-
MARRY. 19
In sum, the instant petition rests on the resolution of two issues: (1)
whether or not petitioner's resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to
challenge the decision of the RTC declaring Shanaviv presumptively dead was
proper; and (2) whether or not private respondent complied with the essential
requisites of a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code. CAIHTE
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
Basic is the rule that the nature of the proceeding determines the
appropriate remedy or remedies available. Hence, a party aggrieved by an action
of a court must first correctly determine the nature of the order, resolution, or
decision, in order to properly assail it. 20
Since what is involved in the instant case is a petition for declaration of
presumptive death, the relevant provisions of law are Articles 41, 238, and 253 of
the Family Code. These provisions explicitly provide that actions for presumptive
death are summary in nature. Article 41 provides:
Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Article 238 in relation to Article 253, under Title XI: SUMMARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, of the Family Code provides:
Article 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural
rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
 decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules.
Article 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall
likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41,
51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
(Emphasis Supplied)
Consequently, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal decisions
in summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code because by express
mandate of law, judgments rendered thereunder are immediately final and
executory. 21 As explained by the Court in Republic of the Phils. vs. Bermudez-
Lorino, 22 citing Atty. Veloria vs. Comelec: 23
[T]he right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due
process, for it is merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express
mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments
rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are
"immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not
granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the
Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of
presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no
right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. 24
Further, it is well settled in our laws and jurisprudence that a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 25
While parties are precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration or a
notice of appeal, in a petition for declaration of presumptive death, they may
challenge the decision of the court a quo through a petition for certiorari to
question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 26
In Republic vs. Sareñogon, Jr., 27 the Court outlined the legal remedies
available in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death. If
aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, then filing with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 would be proper. Any subsequent decision by the CA
may then be elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45. 28
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner's resort
to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to challenge the RTC's Order
declaring Shanaviv presumptively dead was proper.
Having determined the propriety of petitioner's mode of challenging the
RTC's Order, the Court shall now proceed to tackle the issue of whether or not
private respondent has sufficiently complied with the essential requisites in a
petition for declaration of presumptive death.
Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out four (4) requisites
under Article 41 of the Family Code that must be complied with for the declaration
of presumptive death to prosper: first, the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of
the Civil Code.29 Second, the present spouse wishes to remarry. Third, the present
spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. Fourth, the present
spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee. 30
In seeking a declaration of presumptive death, it is the present spouse
who has the burden of proving that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family
Code are present. In the instant case, since it is private respondent who asserts the
affirmative of the issue, then it is his duty to substantiate the same. He who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegations will not suffice. 31
Notably, the records reveal that private respondent has complied with the
first, second, and fourth requisites. Thus, what remains to be resolved is whether
or not private respondent successfully discharged the burden of establishing a
well-founded belief that his wife, Shanaviv, is dead.
The Court in Cantor, 32 pointed out that the term, "well-founded belief"
has no exact definition under the law. In fact, the Court notes that such belief
depends on the circumstances of each particular case. As such, each petition must
be judged on a case-to-case basis. 33
This is not to say, however, that there is no guide in establishing the
existence of a well-founded belief that an absent spouse is already dead.
In Republic vs. Orcelino-Villanueva, 34 the Court, through Justice Mendoza,
provided that such belief must result from diligent efforts to locate the absent
spouse. Such diligence entails an active effort on the part of the present spouse to
locate the missing one. The mere absence of a spouse, devoid of any attempt by
the present spouse to locate the former, will not suffice. The Court expounded on
the required diligence, to wit:
The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the
present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and
that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required
by law), lack of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive,
mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of
 absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is
that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement
of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a
showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts
to ascertain not only the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more
importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead. 35 (Citations omitted)
Furthermore, jurisprudence is replete with cases which help determine
whether belief of an absent spouses' death is well-founded or not. A perusal of the
cases of Republic vs. Granada 36 Cantor, 37 and Orcelino-Villanueva 38 reveal the
circumstances which do not meet the Court's standards in establishing a "well-
founded belief."
In Granada, 39 the present spouse alleged that she exerted efforts in
locating her absent spouse by inquiring from the latter's relatives regarding his
whereabouts. The Court ruled against the present spouse and stated that the mere
act of inquiring from relatives falls short of the diligence required by law. It pointed
out that the present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of mass
media. Even worse, the present spouse did not even bother to present any of the
absent spouses' relatives to corroborate her allegations. 40
Similarly in Cantor, 41 the present spouse alleged that she exerted
"earnest efforts" in attempting to locate her missing husband. She claimed that she
made inquiries with their relatives, neighbors, and friends as to his whereabouts.
She even stated that she would take the time to look through the patient's
directory whenever she would visit a hospital. 42
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled otherwise. It
held that the present spouse engaged in a mere "passive-search" Applying the
"stringent-standards" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence, the Court
pointed out four acts of the present spouse which contradict the claim of a diligent
and active search, 43 to wit:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her
missing husband. It can be inferred from the records that her
hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients'
directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely
undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits
were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This
Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a
belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry's absence to the police
nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. While
a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the
situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present
conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse,
whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the
authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the
police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry's relatives
or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts
to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly
made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the
present spouse's bare assertion that he inquired from his friends
about his absent spouse's whereabouts is insufficient as the
names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not
identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to
support the respondent's claim that she conducted a diligent
search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she
had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she
inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband's
whereabouts. 44 (Citations omitted)
The foregoing conduct of the present spouse led the Court to conclude
that her efforts in searching for her absent spouse were insincere. Ultimately, the
Courts considered these attempts insufficient to comply with the requirement of
conducting a reasonable, diligent, and active search. 45
In Orcelino-Villanueva, the Court likewise ruled that the present spouse
failed to prove that she had a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was
already dead. In said case, the present spouse began her "search" by returning
home from her work overseas to look for her missing husband. She then inquired
from her in-laws and common friends as to his whereabouts. The present spouse
even went as far as Negros Oriental, where the absent spouse was born.
Additionally, the present spouse claimed that fifteen (15) years have already lapsed
since her husband's disappearance. 46
In that case, the Court held that the factual circumstances were very
similar to the two aforementioned cases. It further held that it was erroneous for
the lower courts to grant the petition for declaration of presumptive death. The
Court explained why the present spouse's allegations should not have been given
credence, to wit:
Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously
cited cases, particularly Cantor, Edna's efforts failed to satisfy the
required well-founded belief of her absent husband's death.
 Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained
unfounded as it merely consisted of bare assertions without any
corroborative evidence on record. She also failed to present any
person from whom she inquired about the whereabouts of her
husband. She did not even present her children from whom she
learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she was the
lone witness. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof, the Court cannot give
credence to her claims that she indeed exerted diligent efforts to
locate her husband. 47 (Citations omitted)
Having laid out the foregoing jurisprudential guidelines in determining the
existence of a "well-founded belief," the Court now shifts focus to the specific
circumstances surrounding the current case. In the case at bar, private respondent
first took a leave of absence from his work in the United Arab Emirates and
returned to the Philippines to search for Shanaviv. He then proceeded to inquire
about his wife's whereabouts from their friends and relatives in Cagayan and Bicol.
Next, private respondent aired over Bombo Radyo Philippines, a known radio
station, regarding the fact of disappearance of his wife. Finally, he claims to have
visited various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao City and nearby
municipalities. 48
Applying the foregoing standards discussed by the Court
in Cantor, 49 Granada, 50 and Orcelino-Villanueva, 51 the Court finds that private
respondent's efforts falls short of the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence
for the following reasons: DETACa
First, private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing wife's
whereabouts from both friends and relatives. Further, he claims to have carried
out such inquiries in the place where they lived and in the place where his wife was
born and raised. However, private respondent failed to present any of these
alleged friends or relatives to corroborate these "inquiries." Moreover, no
explanation for such omission was given. As held in the previous cases, failure to
present any of the persons from whom inquiries were allegedly made tends to
belie a claim of a diligent search.
Second, private respondent did not seek the help of other concerned
government agencies, namely, the local police authorities and the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI). In Cantor, the Court reasoned that while a finding of well-
founded belief varies with the nature of the situation, it would still be prudent for
the present spouse to seek the aid of the authorities in searching for the missing
spouse. Absent such efforts to employ the help of local authorities, the present
spouse cannot be said to have actively and diligently searched for the absentee
spouse. 52
Finally, aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager, private
respondent bases his "well-founded belief" on bare assertions that he exercised
earnest efforts in looking for his wife. Again, the present spouse's bare assertions,
uncorroborated by any kind of evidence, falls short of the diligence required to
engender a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.
Taken together, the Court is of the view that private respondent's efforts
in searching for his missing wife, Shanaviv, are merely passive. Private respondent
could have easily convinced the Court otherwise by providing evidence which
corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation or justification was given
for these glaring omissions. Again, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it by some other means than mere allegations.
Stripped of private respondent's mere allegations, only the act of
broadcasting his wife's alleged disappearance through a known radio station was
corroborated. 53 This act comes nowhere close to establishing a well-founded
belief that Shanaviv has already passed away. At most, it just reaffirms the
unfortunate theory that she abandoned the family.
To accept private respondent's bare allegations would be to apply a liberal
approach in complying with the requisite of establishing a well-founded belief that
the missing spouse is dead. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.), 54 the
Court cautioned against such a liberal approach. It opined that to do so would allow
easy circumvention and undermining of the Family Code. The Court stated:
There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had
been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well
that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even
possible that those who cannot have their marriages x x x
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort
to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x
summary nature of its proceedings.
Stated otherwise, spouses may easily circumvent the policy of the laws on
marriage by simply agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never
return again. Thus, there is a need for courts to exercise prudence in evaluating
petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse. A lenient
approach in applying the standards of diligence required in establishing a "well-
founded belief" would defeat the State's policy in protecting and strengthening the
institution of marriage. 55
On this basis, it is clear that private respondent failed to fulfill the requisite
of establishing a well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead. Thus, the
RTC should have denied private respondent's petition for declaration of
presumptive death.
 In fine, having determined the propriety of petitioner's resort to a petition
for certiorari and private respondent's failure to meet the stringent standard and
degree of due diligence required by jurisprudence to support his claim of a "well-
founded belief" that his wife, Shanaviv, is already dead, it is proper for the Court
to grant the petition. Consequently, the other issues raised by the petitioner need
not be discussed further.
WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
May 23, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 and the
Resolutions dated September 3, 2013 and December 6, 2013 rendered by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 131269 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the petition of private respondent Ludyson C. Catubag to have his
wife, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag, declared presumptively dead is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Catubag, G.R. No. 210580, [April 18, 2018])
[G.R. No. 230751. April 25, 2018.]
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J p:
This is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated November 28, 2016 and
Resolution 3 dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
129467. cHDAIS
The facts are as follows:
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N. Matias (Wilfredo). 4 The
allegations of the petition read:
1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and
curr[e]ntly a resident of 106 Molave street, Zone B, San
Miguel, Tarlac City;
2. [Wilfredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine
Constabulary and was assigned in Arayat, Pampanga since
August 24, 1967[;]
3. The [p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on
January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;
4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put
up their conjugal home at 106 Molave street, Zone B, San
Miguel, Tarlac City;
5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September
15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to again
serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary;
6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat,
Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or
communicated with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;
7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the
National Police Commission, [Wilfredo] was already
declared missing since 1979 x x x;
8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary
for any news regarding [her] beloved husband [Wilfredo],
but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his
whereabouts, [neither] did they have any news of him
going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place
frequented by the New People's Army;
9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the
[p]etitioner never gave up hope, and after more than
three (3) decades of waiting, the [p]etitioner is still
hopeful, but the times had been tough on her, specially
with a meager source of income coupled with her age, it
is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that
rightfully belong to her in order to survive;
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is
for a proof of death or at least a declaration of
presumptive death by the Honorable Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but
solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No 1638 as
amended.
The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to
Branch 65 of the Tarlac City RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein
respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic). 5
 On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision 6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 Our Ruling
granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: 7
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby We deny the appeal.
declared (sic) WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively
dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for
purposes of claiming financial benefits due to him as former I
military officer.
xxx xxx xxx The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death
filed by the petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
the RTC. The RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside.
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition
RTC Erred in Declaring the
for certiorari. 8
Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under
On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's
the certiorari petition of the Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It Petition for the Declaration of
accordingly disposed: Presumptive Death is Not Based on
Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
Code
for certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 15, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special
A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.
Proceeding No. 4850 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the
petition is DISMISSED. It can be recalled that the RTC, in the fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision,
granted the petitioner's petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under
The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:
Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, the RTC gave the impression that the petition for
1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on the the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was likewise filed pursuant
basis of Article 41 of the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of to Article 41 of the FC. 9 This is wrong.
the FC does not apply to the instant petition as it was clear that
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner
petitioner does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was
is not an action that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of
invoking the presumption of death established under Articles
the FC because petitioner was not seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of
390 and 391 of the Civil Code, and not that provided for under
the FC shows that the presumption of death established therein is only applicable
Article 41 of the FC.
for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law.
2. Be that as it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead Thus:
should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence
authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
to have a person declared presumptively dead under either
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code.As been held by
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present
jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
presume that a person is dead — which presumption may be
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391
invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
subject of an independent action or proceeding.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast.
the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a
Hence, this appeal. ISHCcT
 summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration
of the presumptive death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her
petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated
that the same was filed "not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit
under P.D. No. 1638 as amended." 10
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death
was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the
presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil
Code 11 as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express
the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of
five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for
four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has
been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the
presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper. The petition
for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner was based on
the Civil Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been
Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is
to Declare a Person Presumptively Dead under
the Civil Code, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
before the RTC, is Not a Viable Suit in Our
Jurisdiction
The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its
misleading fallo. The decision itself is objectionable.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of
presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have
dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition
whose sole objective is to have a person declared presumptively dead under
the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to take
cognizance of the same.
The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition
for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw. 12 In the said case, we held that
a rule creating a presumption of death 13 is merely one of evidence that — while
may be invoked in any action or proceeding — cannot be the lone subject of an
independent action or proceeding. Szatraw explained:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which
permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact
that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been
established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and
made in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding,
which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
competent court. Independently of such an action or special
proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor
can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In
this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband.
Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right
or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the
petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven
years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the
petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be
granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively
dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption
is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that
effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima
facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason
 that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or 4. Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead under
declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary. The
case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter presumption in the said articles is already established by law.
must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or
Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take
determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally
cognizance of a petition that — like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at
a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise
bench — only seeks to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil
or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final
Code. Such a petition is not authorized by law. 17 Hence, by acting upon and
judgement, or such right or status determined, or such particular
eventually granting the petitioner's petition for the declaration of presumptive
fact established, by a final decree, then the judgement on the
death, the RTC violated prevailing jurisprudence and thereby committed grave
subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status
abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, was only correct in setting aside the RTC's
of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res
decision.
judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare
instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a
judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because
II
he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot
reach the stage of finality or become final. (Citations omitted and Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a
emphasis supplied) CAacTH few points the Court is minded to make.
The above ruling in Szatraw has since been used by the subsequent cases It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed
of Lukban v. Republic 14 and Gue v. Republic 15 in disallowing petitions for the from the misconception that a court declaration is required in order to establish a
declaration of presumptive death based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, person as presumptively dead for purposes of claiming his death benefits as a
implicitly, also those based on Article 391 of the Civil Code). military serviceman under pertinent laws. 18 This misconception is what moved
petitioner to file her misguided petition for the declaration of presumptive death
Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are
of Wilfredo and what ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in
able to ascertain the considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive
prosecuting an otherwise simple claim for death benefits either before the
death based on the Civil Code was disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz.: 16
Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office (PVAO) or the Armed Forces of the Philippines
1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence (AFP).
that only allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is
What the Court finds deeply disconcerting, however, is the possibility that
dead upon the establishment of certain facts.
such misconception may have been peddled by no less than the PVAO and the AFP
2. Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of themselves; that such agencies, as a matter of practice, had been requiring
evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare a person claimants, such as the petitioner, to first secure a court declaration of presumptive
presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually death before processing the death benefits of a missing serviceman.
presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In
In view of the foregoing circumstance, the Court deems it necessary to
such action, there would be no actual rights to be enforced, no
issue the following guidelines — culled from relevant law and jurisprudential
wrong to be remedied nor any status to be established.
pronouncements — to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead under claims of death benefits which are similar to that of the petitioner:
Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an action
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing
exclusively based thereon, would never really become "final" as
soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce a court
the same only confirms the existence of a prima facie or
declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. In such
disputable presumption. The function of a court to render
claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own determination,
decisions that is supposed to be final and binding between
on the basis of evidence presented by the claimant, whether the
litigants is thereby compromised.
 presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil SP No. 129467 are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court
Code may be applied or not. of law that a person is presumptively dead is not a requirement before the
Philippine Veterans' Affairs Office or the Armed Forces of the Philippines can grant
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles
and pay the benefits under Presidential Decree No. 1638. IAETDc
390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, without
need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions Let a copy of this decision be served to the Philippine Veterans' Affairs
mentioned in the said articles are established. 19 Hence, Office and the Armed Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.
requiring the claimant to further secure a court declaration in
SO ORDERED.
order to establish the presumptive death of a missing soldier is
not proper and contravenes established jurisprudence on the Bersamin, Martires and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
matter. 20
Leonen, J., I dissent. See separate opinion.
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need only
||| (Tadeo-Matias v. Republic, G.R. No. 230751, [April 25, 2018])
present before the PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as
the case may be, any "evidence" 21 which shows that the
concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years
[A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860. April 3, 2018.]
and/or under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-2224-MTJ)
and 391 of the Civil Code.Obviously, the "evidence" referred to
here excludes a court declaration of presumptive death.
ROSILANDA M. KEUPPERS, complainant, vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO
3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the evidence
G. MURCIA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 2,
submitted by the claimant and determine their sufficiency to
ISLAND GARDEN CITY OF SAMAL, respondent.
establish the requisite factual conditions specified under Article
390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of
death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the BERSAMIN, J p:
evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient, they should
not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of his territorial
latter's claim. jurisdiction violates Article 7 of the Family Code, and is guilty of grave misconduct
4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by the and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He should be properly
claimant is not sufficient to invoke the presumption of death sanctioned.
under the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason
thereof, the claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the
President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of The Case
administrative remedies.
If the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a This administrative matter commenced from the 1st Indorsement dated
petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the November 4, 2009, 1 whereby the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao
Court. And finally, should such recourse still fail, the claimant endorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action the
may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court. complete records of the case initiated by affidavit-complaint by complainant
Rosilanda Maningo Keuppers against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, the
While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, in the Island Garden
Court is hopeful that, by the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of City of Samal, Davao del Norte. She thereby charged respondent Judge with estafa;
the petitioner would no longer be replicated in the future. violation of Republic Act No. 6713; and grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November to the best interest of the service. 2
28, 2016 and Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
 The complainant averred in her affidavit-complaint executed on June 6,
2008 3 that on May 12, 2008, she and her husband, Peter Keuppers, went to the
Local Civil Registrar's Office (LCRO) of Davao City to apply for a marriage license
because they wanted to get married before Peter's departure on May 22, 2008 so
that he could bring the marriage certificate with him back to Germany; that Julie
Gasatan, an employee of the LCRO, explained the process for securing the license,
and apprised them that it would be virtually impossible to solemnize their marriage
before May 22, 2008 because of the requirement for the mandatory 10-day posting
of the application for the marriage license; that Gasatan then handed a note with
the advice for the couple to proceed to the office of DLS Travel and Tours
Corporation (DLS Travel and Tours) in Sandawa, Matina, Davao City to look for a
person who might be able to help the couple; that in the office of the DLS Travel
and Tours, Lorna Siega, the owner, told the couple that the marriage processing
fees charged by her office would be higher than the P600.00 fee collected in the
City Hall in Davao City; that Siega assured that the couple would immediately get
the original as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copies of the marriage
certificate; that Siega then required the couple to fill up forms but instructed the
couple to leave the spaces provided for the address and other information blank;
that the couple paid P15,750.00 to Siega purportedly to cover the fees of the
solemnizing Judge, the certification fee, the security fee, the City Hall fee, the
service fee and the passport fee; and that Siega later on confirmed to the couple
the date, time and place of the solemnization of the marriage.
According to the complainant, respondent Judge solemnized the marriage
on May 19, 2008 in the premises of the DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; that
the staff of the DLS Travel and Tours later on handed to the couple the copy of the
marriage certificate for their signatures; that on the following day, May 20, 2008,
the couple returned to the DLS Travel and Tours to pick up the documents as
promised by Siega; that the couple was surprised to find erroneous entries in the
marriage certificate as well as on the application for marriage license, specifically:
(a) the certificate stating "Office of the MTCC Judge, Island Garden City of Samal"
as the place of the solmenization of the marriage although the marriage had been
solemnized in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; (b) the
statement in the application for marriage license that she and her husband had
applied for the marriage license in Sta. Cruz, Davao City on May 8, 2008 although
they had accomplished their application on May 12, 2008 in the office of the DLS
Travel and Tours; and (c) the statement in their application for marriage license on
having appeared before Mario Tizon, the Civil Registrar of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur,
which was untrue.
In his comment dated February 2, 2010, 4 the respondent professed no
knowledge of how the complainant had processed and secured the documents
pertinent to her marriage; denied personally knowing her and the persons she had
supposedly approached to help her fast-track the marriage; insisted that he had
met her only at the time of the solemnization of the marriage, and that the
solemnization of the marriage had been assigned to him; asserted that the
documents necessary for a valid marriage were already duly prepared; and claimed
that he was entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
duties considering that the documents submitted by her had been issued by the
appropriate government agencies. He contended that he should not be blamed for
the erroneous entries in her certificate of marriage because the same had been
merely copied from her marriage license and from the other documents submitted
therewith, and also because he had not been the person who had prepared the
certificate; and that he had only performed the ministerial duty of solemnizing the
marriage based on the proper documents submitted to him, with the real parties
involved having personally signed the certificate of marriage before him.
The respondent also denied receiving any amount for solemnizing the
marriage of the complainant and her husband; and pointed out that he had not
been aware as the solemnizing officer if any of the documents submitted by her
was spurious. He recalled that she had freely and voluntarily signed the certificate
of marriage; and that it was the same document that had been filed in the Local
Civil Registrar's Office of Davao City. He declared that the marriage certificate itself
stated the place of the solemnization of the marriage; and that he did not alter,
modify or amend the entries therein.
Report & Recommendation
of the Investigating Justice
Upon the recommendation of the OCA, 5 the Court referred the
complaint to the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City for investigation, report
and recommendation. The complaint, originally assigned to Associate Justice
Pamela Ann Abella Maxino for such purposes, was re-assigned to Associate Justice
Maria Elisa Sempio Diy in view of the transfer of Associate Justice Maxino to the
Cebu Station of the Court of Appeals.
On August 10, 2012, Investigating Justice Sempio Diy submitted her report
and recommendation as the Investigating Justice, 6 whereby she concluded and
recommended as follows:
The undersigned Investigating Officer, in the course of
the investigation, has been hurled with overwhelming evidence
that the marriage between complainant and Peter Keuppers was
held only in the premises of DLS Travel and Tours Corporation,
Sandawa Road, Matina, Davao City, and was solemnized by
respondent. Several witnesses for complainant affirmed the
same. More importantly, this Office has conducted an ocular
inspection of the premises of DLS Travel and Tours. During said
inspection, it was confirmed that the premises shown in Exhibits
"G", "G-1", "G-2", "G-3", "G-4", and "G-5" where respondent is
seen solemnizing a wedding, is the same place subject of the
ocular inspection. Hence, the DLS Travel and Tours building is, in
fact, the actual venue of complainant's wedding.
It is also of equal importance to note that respondent
admitted that he indeed solemnized the subject marriage
outside of his jurisdiction. In fact, in his testimony, respondent
stated:
A: Rosilanda Maningo was really begging that the
marriage be performed since that was the very
day of the marriage as the German fiancé will be
leaving soon. Because of pity, I accommodated
the parties. I risked your honor because I didn't
want that the marriage be postponed as it was
for the best interest of the couple because
according to Rosilanda Maningo that was the
only day, the German fiancé was leaving for
Germany. So, I decided to solemnize the
marriage in the office of DLS Travel and Tours.
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact that respondent solemnized a marriage outside
of his jurisdiction is further bolstered by his own admission that
he solemnized the marriage of complainant and
Peter Keuppers at DLS Travels and Tours and not in his territorial
jurisdiction in the Island Garden City of Samal.
Indeed, respondent knows the possible consequence of
the aforementioned act when he said:
A: I was thinking your honor that there was a sanction but
because of my honest intention to help the
parties because they were already begging that
the solemnization be performed [sic]. I was
honest with my intention and my conscience was
clear.
However, this Office is also duty bound to specify that
respondent had no hand in the preparation and processing of the
documents pertaining to the subject wedding. The witness for
complainant, Lorna Siega, stated:
Q: Madam, you mentioned a while ago that your
establishment was the one who processed the
documents for Rosilanda Maningo Kuppers and
Peter Keuppers to get married, you confirm that?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Who prepared the certificate of marriage?
A: Orlan.
Q: How about the marriage contract?
A: My employee.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Who supplied the entries in the marriage contract?
A: Based on the marriage license.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So, in relation to this case the once [sic] involving
Peter Keuppers, I have here the copy of the
marriage contract, have you seen this document,
if any?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: You would confirm that the place of marriage typed
there is the office of the MTCC Judge, Branch 2,
Island Garden City of Samal?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And your office supplied the information in the upper
portion in the certificate of marriage which is
Davao del Norte, Island Garden City of Samal?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Be that as it may, this Office is of the opinion that
notwithstanding that respondent had no hand in the preparation
and processing of the subject marriage, he indeed solemnized a
marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction, subject to
sanctions that the Office of the Court Administrator may impose.
The above-quoted Article 8 of the Family Code clearly
states that a marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers
or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of
death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or 3.]
upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement
to this effect.
 Inasmuch as respondent's jurisdiction covers only the
Island Garden City of Samal, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in Davao City.
In this case, there is no pretense that either
complainant or her fiancé Peter Keuppers was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written
request made by the contracting parties to respondent that the
marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or a place other
than his sala. What in fact appears on record that respondent
took pity on the couple and risked sanctions to attend to the
urgency of solemnizing the marriage of complainant and
Peter Keuppers.
In Beso vs. Daguman, the Supreme Court held:
A person presiding over a court of law
must not only apply the law but must also live
and abide by it and render justice at all times
without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled
for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply
the law; he must also be conscientious and
thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the
very delicate nature of their office[,] should be
more circumspect in the performance of their
duties.
The undersigned Investigating Officer believes that
taking pity on the Keuppers couple is not enough reason for
respondent to risk possible sanctions that may be imposed upon
him for not observing the applicable laws under the
circumstances. It is his sworn duty to conscientiously uphold the
law at all times despite the inconvenience that it may cause to
others.
Significantly, Canon 6, Section 7 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates:
-x x x- Judges shall not engage in conduct
incompatible with the diligent discharge of
judicial duties.
It is likewise worth mentioning that respondent cannot
be charged with ignorance of the law considering that he knew
the consequences of his actions and he also cannot be seen as a
judge that demonstrates a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law. Lastly, it also does not appear from the
records that he has been previously charged with any offense or
that there is/are any pending administrative case/s against him.
RECOMMENDATION:
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed
respondent is guilty of solemnizing a marriage outside of his
territorial jurisdiction under circumstances not falling under any
of the exceptions as provided for in Article 8 of the Family Code.
Considering, however, the factual milieu of the instant case and
the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent be meted a fine
of P5,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or a similar offense in the future will be dealt with severely.
Issue
Was respondent Judge liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service?
Ruling of the Court
We hold and find respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for solemnizing the marriage
of the complainant and her husband outside his territorial jurisdiction, and in the
office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City.
Such place of solemnization was a blatant violation of Article 7 of
the Family Code, which pertinently provides:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, in solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her
husband in the office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City despite the
foregoing provision of the Family Code, respondent Judge flagrantly violated the
spirit of the law. Article 8 of the Family Code disallows solemnizing the marriage in
a venue other than the judge's courtroom or chambers, viz.:
Article 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in
the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel
 or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-
consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case
the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated
by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)
Respondent Judge's explanation of having done so only out of pity for the
complainant after she had supposedly claimed that her German fiancé was soon
returning to Germany and wanted to bring with him the certified copy of the
marriage certificate did not diminish his liability, but instead highlighted his
dismissive and cavalier attitude towards express statutory requirements instituted
to secure the solemnization of marriages from abuse. By agreeing to solemnize the
marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction and at a place that had nothing to do
with the performance of his duties as a Municipal Trial Judge, he demeaned and
cheapened the inviolable social institution of marriage. Article 8 of the Family
Code contains the limiting phrase and not elsewhere, which emphasizes that the
place of the solemnization of the marriage by a judge like him should only be in his
office or courtroom. Indeed, the limiting phrase highlighted the nature and status
of the marriage of the complainant and her husband as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman," and as "the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." 7 The only
exceptions to the limitation are when the marriage was to be contracted on the
point of death of one or both of the complainant and her husband, or in a remote
place in accordance with Article 29 of the Family Code, 8 or where both of the
complainant and her husband had requested him as the solemnizing officer in
writing to solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated by them in their
sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent Judge's offense was not his first act of gross misconduct
concerning the discharge of the office of solemnizing marriages. He had been
charged on February 28, 2008 in A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223 entitled Palma v. Judge
George E. Omelio, Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Davao City (then of Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Br. 4, Davao City), Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Br. 2, et al. with having affixed his signature as the solemnizing officer on the
marriage contract without having actually solemnized the marriage. The charge
was in violation of Administrative Order No. 125-2007 dated August 8, 2007
(Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary). The
Court declared him guilty of gross misconduct, and fined him in the amount of
P40,000.00. 9 The present offense was committed on May 19, 2008.
Misconduct consists in the transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, or, more particularly, in an unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
the public officer. It implies wrongful intention, and must not be a mere error of
judgment. Respondent Judge was guilty of grave, not simple, misconduct because
he had at the very least the wilful intent to violate the Family Code on the venue
of a marriage solemnized by a judge, and to flagrantly disregard the relevant rules
for such solemnization set forth in the law. The office of solemnizing marriages
should not be treated as a casual or trivial matter, or as a business activity. For
sure, his act, although not criminal, constituted grave misconduct considering that
crimes involving moral turpitude are treated as separate grounds for dismissal
under the Administrative Code. 10 It is relevant to observe, moreover, that his acts
of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
seriously undermined the faith and confidence of the people in the Judiciary.
The Investigating Justice recommended the imposition on respondent
Judge of the measly fine of P5,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or a similar offense in the future would be dealt with severely. The
recommendation did not take into account that the present charge was the second
offense respondent Judge committed in relation to his office of solemnizing
marriages. Given that the charge was committed with a wilful intent to violate the
letter and the spirit of Article 7 and Article 8 of the Family Code, and to flagrantly
disregard the relevant rules for the solemnization of marriages set by the Family
Code, the proper penalty was dismissal from the service.
Yet, dismissal from the service can no longer be imposed in view of the
intervening retirement from the service of respondent Judge. Instead, the Court
forfeits all his retirement benefits except his accrued leaves.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent JUDGE VIRGILIO
G. MURCIA, the former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 2, in the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
SERVICE; and, ACCORDINGLY, DECLARES as forfeited all his retirement benefits,
except his accrued leaves, with prejudice to his appointment in the government
service.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Keuppers v. Murcia, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860, [April 3, 2018])
[G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO, respondent.
PERALTA, J p:
 This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision 1 and
October 12, 2015 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court
of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC.
NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed
a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on
April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a
week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During
the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence
(consisting of the trial court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of
publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28-March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for
petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed
questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that, based on the
allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court
granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that it is also a petition for
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a
Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their
Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein
[petitioner] in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree
dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x
x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner
and her divorced Japanese husband are no longer living together
and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately
from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage
in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where
the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was
previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore
that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who
is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her;
furthermore, in the event that petitioner decides to be
remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry
of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing
the cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner
and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by
virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the
cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be
allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO. 4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave
for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that were offered and
admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and
its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28-March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former
Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce. 5
 The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the
allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit.
In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it
opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does
not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country
or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have
control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the
determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil
relations, including marriages." 6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of
the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo
who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. 7 ruling
that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and
in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice
to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no
longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed
the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v.
Judge Romillo, Jr. 8 where the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was
dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this
petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which
terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 9 In this jurisdiction, the following
rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. 10
2. Consistent with Articles 15 11 and 17 12 of the New
Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the
Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988. 16 Shortly thereafter, E.O. No.
227 was issued on July 17, 1987. 17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of
the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26. 18 This provision
was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee), but it was
presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No.
209. 19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 20 It
authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. 21 Philippine courts cannot try the
case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. 22 Under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care
and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts. 23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the
idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being
married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the
former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his
or her national law. 24 The aim was that it would solve the problem of many
Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their
alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their
(the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again. 25
 In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a
case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III: 26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in
the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum,
that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To
rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must
be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2
of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. 27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a
Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a
divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her
alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the
recognition and enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court
and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry "in order
that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the
event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed
by said entry of marriage," and to return and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin 28 and Van Dorn 29 already recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended
its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for
the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband, who is a US
citizen, sued his Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only
the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree
is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The
husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his
former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction
to entertain the suit but not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court
said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged
invalidity — not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or
that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the
divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse — to support the
Agreement's enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this
jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly
novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained
abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit
for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and
rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the
Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x. 30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a
complaint was filed by the ex-husband, who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife
to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property
and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion.
On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada
court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially
if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this
case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction,
the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of
divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court
of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without
a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the
other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of
the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under
our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the
Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is
implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al. 32 and Medina v. Koike. 33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a
Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court, which
declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese
national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband
or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize
the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because
the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the
Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is
also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry
of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises
the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve,
in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
 the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the
financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
regime of the marriage. not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in
the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
Property rights are already substantive rights protected
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. 37 "The legislature is
by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
x 34
should be no departure." 38
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be
jointly filed for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition
interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the
before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so
capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the
would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. 39 Laws have ends to
alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be proven in
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
ends and purposes. 40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC,
This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et
et al.: 41
al. 35 and Garcia v. Recio, 36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for The legislative intent is not at all times accurately
appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.
the pertinent factual issues. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a
statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned
absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of
custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging
the law controls its letter.
that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right
to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
freed from the marital bond. rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's
while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce.
country. 42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding
Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given
or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her
effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It
alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
is said that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of
effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
the law, but also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
fit to lift the same.
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
We beg to differ. recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose
marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad
law.
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain
 Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such
principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending
rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the
State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the
nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by
law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature only if they are constitutional. 43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review. 44 The deference
stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the Constitution. 45 When these violations arise,
this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations. 46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a
suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the
least restrictive means to protect such interest. 47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution. 48 It includes the right of procreation, the right to
marry, the right to exercise free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and
so forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote. 49 On the other hand, what
constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 50 It is akin to the paramount
interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It essentially
involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual
rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter. 52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same
principle applies with respect to the acts of the President, which have the force and
effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal
protection clause. 54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign
divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with
a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and
substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political,
economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained
abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree
obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a
divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the
Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same
rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are
alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their
foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a
distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether
they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There
is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be
recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of
the Family Code. 56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino
spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting
that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The
dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she
may still pray for the severance of her marital ties before the RTC in accordance
with the mechanisms now existing under the Family Code" is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better
if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanisms" are and how they
specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the
dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the
reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the
same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the
prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the
indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce
proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever
was shown to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the
presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is
disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other
evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong, 57 that a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, 58 that a person takes ordinary care
of his concerns, 59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing
acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, 61 and that the law has been obeyed. 62 It is whimsical to easily
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just
because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is
presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and
affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice
of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature
and that they are more often the victims or at the losing end of mixed marriages.
And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's decision to
marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and
complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of
life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their
lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and
would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.
Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status,
and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,
are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage. 63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. 64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce
because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by
Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, was categorical about this point. 65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA.
Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS.
Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a
prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to
make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass
a divorce law.
MR. GASCON.
Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My
intention was primarily to encourage the social institution
of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But
now that he mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal
opinion is to discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS.
No, my question is more categorical. Does this carry the
meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON.
No, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS.
Thank you. 66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective
March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on the grounds
of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by
virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature. 67 On March 25, 1943,
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the
Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No.
141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven
grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion
continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed
or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further
living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity. 68 When the
Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it
ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. 69 From August
30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an
absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer
recognized. 70
 Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors
of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the
current 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 116, 71 1062, 72 2380 73 and
6027 74 were filed in the House of Representatives. In substitution of these bills,
H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of
Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by
the House Committee on Population and Family Relations on February 28, 2018. It
was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading — with 134 in favor, 57 against,
and 2 abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute
divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to
compel the petitioner to change religious or
political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of
the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent
to imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or
chronic gambling of the respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a
subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in
the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a
child with another person other than one's
spouse during the marriage, except when upon
the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child
is born to them by in vitro or a similar
procedure or when the wife bears a child after
being a victim of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of
the petitioner, a common child or a child of the
petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent
without justifiable cause for more than one (1)
year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for
more than two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the
proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree
of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of
the Family Code, restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have
the marriage annulled was eighteen (18)
years of age or over but below twenty-
one (21), and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the
parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the
party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one (21),
such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as
husband or wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such
party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, unless such party afterwards with
full knowledge of the facts constituting
the fraud, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by
force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or
ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
 e. Either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the
other and such incapacity continues or
appears to be incurable; and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually
transmissible infection found to be
serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either
at the time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least five (5) years at the time the petition for
absolute divorce is filed, and reconciliation is
highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided
for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or
not the incapacity was present at the time of the
celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender
reassignment surgery or transitions from one sex
to another, the other spouse is entitled to
petition for absolute divorce with the
transgender or transsexual as respondent, or
vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which
have resulted in the total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and
repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic
Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing
it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage
and family as an institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and
solidarity. However, none of our laws should be based on any religious law,
doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be
violated. 75
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what
the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious
sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government
to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can
they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus, establish a state religion. 76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions
on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow
its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. 77 While
marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are
governed by the Family Code. 78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be
read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions.
Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development. 79 It is also obligated to
defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. 80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these
obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those
foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women
and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse
and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if
not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and
similar practices), R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004 "), R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No. 10354 ("The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012"), and R.A. No.
9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in
protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value
the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than
good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce
from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first
avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent
relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as
illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-
marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely,
these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but
also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section
2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and
against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection
and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to to the literal command without regard to its cause and
indigenous customs. 82 consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time.
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
With the advancement of communication and information technology, as well as
the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect xxx xxx xxx
people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that
justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one
imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. 83 Living in a
his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions.
the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of
Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that
existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
are of rotten quality.
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared justice. 86
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of
remains bound to it. 84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be
the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. 87 A statute may, therefore,
served, San Luis v. San Luis 85 quoted:
be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated: come within its spirit or intent. 88
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce
rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the
the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a
in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
suffice. 89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven. 90 Before a foreign divorce
justice.
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91
of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances.
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature
the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or
and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
country.
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law
is obeyed. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots
 (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the
court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the
divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the
Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of
Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner
and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these
documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a
fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's
judgment decreeing the divorce. 93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce
decree is rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign court. 94 As it appears,
the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit
an opportunity to do so. 95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges
the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial
notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. 96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the
pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to
remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are
not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, [April 24, 2018])
[G.R. No. 199515. June 25, 2018.]
RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO, a.k.a. "RHODORA RACHO
TANAKA," petitioner,vs. SEIICHI TANAKA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, and the ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,respondents.
LEONEN, J p:
Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the national law of
the foreign spouse and the divorce decree be pleaded and proved as a fact before
the Regional Trial Court. The Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to
remarry once our courts find that the foreign divorce was validly obtained by the
foreign spouse according to his or her national law, and that the foreign spouse's
national law considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be absolute.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the June 2, 2011
Decision 2 and October 3, 2011 Order 3 of Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las
Piñas City, which denied Rhodora Ilumin Racho's (Racho) Petition for Judicial
Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry. 4 The denial was on the
ground that a Certificate of Divorce issued by the Japanese Embassy was
insufficient to prove the existence of a divorce decree.
Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001 in Las
Piñas City, Metro Manila. They lived together for nine (9) years in Saitama
Prefecture, Japan and did not have any children. 5
Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and
the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate 6 issued by Consul
Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese Consulate in the
Philippines and had it authenticated 7 by an authentication officer of the
Department of Foreign Affairs. 8
She filed the Divorce Certificate with the Philippine Consulate General in
Tokyo, Japan, where she was informed that by reason of certain administrative
changes, she was required to return to the Philippines to report the documents for
registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial recognition of divorce. 9
She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil Registry
of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar since there was no court order
recognizing it. When she went to the Department of Foreign Affairs to renew her
passport, she was likewise told that she needed the proper court order. She was
also informed by the National Statistics Office that her divorce could only be
annotated in the Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order capacitating her
to remarry. 10
She went to the Japanese Embassy, as advised by her lawyer, and secured
a Japanese Law English Version of the Civil Code of Japan, 2000 Edition. 11
On May 19, 2010, she filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and
Declaration of Capacity to Marry 12 with the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City.
On June 2, 2011, Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City rendered
a Decision, 13 finding that Racho failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a
divorce. It stated that while she was able to prove Tanaka's national law, the
Divorce Certificate was not competent evidence since it was not the divorce decree
itself. 14
Racho filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 15 arguing that under Japanese
law, a divorce by agreement becomes effective by oral notification, or by a
document signed by both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. 16
In an Order 17 dated October 3, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied the
Motion, finding that Racho failed to present the notification of divorce and its
acceptance. 18
On December 19, 2011, Racho filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari 19 with this Court. In its January 18, 2012 Resolution, this Court
deferred action on her Petition pending her submission of a duly authenticated
acceptance certificate of the notification of divorce. 20
Petitioner initially submitted a Manifestation, 21 stating that a duly-
authenticated acceptance certificate was not among the documents presented at
the Regional Trial Court because of its unavailability to petitioner during trial. She
also pointed out that the Divorce Certificate issued by the Consulate General of the
Japanese Embassy was sufficient proof of the fact of divorce. 22 She also
manifested that Tanaka had secured a marriage license on the basis of the same
Divorce Certificate and had already remarried another Filipino. Nevertheless, she
has endeavored to secure the document as directed by this Court. 23
On March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her Compliance, 24 attaching a
duly authenticated Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce that she
obtained in Japan. 25 The Office of the Solicitor General thereafter submitted its
Comment 26 on the Petition, to which petitioner submitted her Reply. 27
Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by
agreement becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or written, by both
parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce Certificate
stating "Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of
Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009" is sufficient to prove that
she and her husband have divorced by agreement and have already effected
notification of the divorce. 28
She avers further that under Japanese law, the manner of proving a
divorce by agreement is by record of its notification and by the fact of its
acceptance, both of which were stated in the Divorce Certificate. She maintains
that the Divorce Certificate is signed by Consul Takayama, whom the Department
of Foreign Affairs certified as duly appointed and qualified to sign the document.
She also states that the Divorce Certificate has already been filed and recorded
with the Civil Registry Office of Manila. 29
She insists that she is now legally capacitated to marry since Article 728 of
the Civil Code of Japan states that a matrimonial relationship is terminated by
divorce. 30
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that the
Certificate of Divorce has no probative value since it was not properly
authenticated under Rule 132, Section 24 31 of the Rules of Court. However, it
states that it has no objection to the admission of the Certificate of Acceptance of
the Report of Divorce submitted by petitioner in compliance with this Court's
January 18, 2012 Resolution. 32
It likewise points out that petitioner never mentioned that she and her
husband obtained a divorce by agreement and only mentioned it in her motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court. Thus, petitioner failed to prove
that she is now capacitated to marry since her divorce was not obtained by the
alien spouse. She also failed to point to a specific provision in the Civil Code of
Japan that allows persons who obtained a divorce by agreement the capacity to
remarry. In any case, a divorce by agreement is not the divorce contemplated in
Article 26 of the Family Code. 33
In rebuttal, petitioner insists that all her evidence, including the Divorce
Certificate, was formally offered and held to be admissible as evidence by the
Regional Trial Court. 34 She also argues that the Office of the Solicitor General
should not have concluded that the law does not contemplate divorce by
agreement or consensual divorce since a discriminatory situation will arise if this
type of divorce is not recognized. 35
The issue in this case, initially, was whether or not the Regional Trial Court
erred in dismissing the Petition for Declaration of Capacity to Marry for
insufficiency of evidence. After the submission of Comment, however, the issue
has evolved to whether or not the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce between petitioner Rhodora
Ilumin Racho and respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter
according to his national law.
I for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a
Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained
according to the foreign spouse's national law, thus:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1),(4),(5) and
(6),36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The second paragraph was included to avoid an absurd situation where a
Filipino spouse remains married to the foreign spouse even after a validly obtained
divorce abroad. 37 The addition of the second paragraph gives the Filipino spouse
a substantive right to have the marriage considered as dissolved, and ultimately,
to grant him or her the capacity to remarry. 38
Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable only in issues on the validity of
remarriage. It cannot be the basis for any other liability, whether civil or criminal,
that the Filipino spouse may incur due to remarriage.
Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is
insufficient. 39 In Garcia v. Recio,40 this Court established the principle that before
a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this jurisdiction, a separate action must
be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that the divorce decree and the
national law of the foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like any other fact
before trial courts. 41 Hence, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas:42
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. 43
II
Respondent's national law was duly admitted by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner presented "a copy [of] the English Version of the Civil Code of Japan
(Exh. "K") translated under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and the Code
of Translation Committee." 44 Article 728 (1) of the Civil Code of Japan reads:
Article 728. 1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by
divorce. 45
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the Divorce Certificate
issued by Consul Takayama of Japan on January 18, 2010, which stated in part:
This is to certify that the above statement has been
made on the basis of the Acceptance Certification of Notification
of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama
Pref.,Japan on December 16, 2009. 46
This Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the Acceptance
Certification of Notification of Divorce, exists. It is not the divorce decree itself. The
Regional Trial Court further clarified:
[T]he Civil Law of Japan recognizes two (2) types of divorce,
namely: (1) judicial divorce and (2) divorce by agreement.
Under the same law, the divorce by agreement
becomes effective by notification, orally or in a document signed
by both parties and two or more witnesses of full age, in
accordance with the provisions of Family Registration Law of
Japan. 47
 Thus, while respondent's national law was duly admitted, petitioner failed
to present sufficient evidence before the Regional Trial Court that a divorce was
validly obtained according to the national law of her foreign spouse. The Regional
Trial Court would not have erred in dismissing her Petition.
III
Upon appeal to this Court, however, petitioner submitted a Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce, 48 certifying that the divorce issued by
Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Prefecture, has been accepted on
December 16, 2009. The seal on the document was authenticated by Kazutoyo
Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. 49
The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce is a question of fact that would not ordinarily be within this Court's ambit
to resolve. Issues in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court 50 are limited to questions of law.
In Garcia and Corpuz,this Court remanded the cases to the Regional Trial
Courts for the reception of evidence and for further proceedings. 51 More recently
in Medina v. Koike,52 this Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to
determine the national law of the foreign spouse:
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier
of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. In
this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or
final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on
Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case
to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. — ...
An appeal by certiorari taken to the
Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court
submitting issues of fact may be referred to the
Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate
action. The determination of the Supreme
Court on whether or not issues of fact are
involved shall be final. 53
The court records, however, are already sufficient to fully resolve the
factual issues. 54 Additionally, the Office of the Solicitor General neither posed any
objection to the admission of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce 55 nor argued that the Petition presented questions of fact. In the interest
of judicial economy and efficiency, this Court shall resolve this case on its merits.
IV
Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of
official records that are kept in a foreign country requires that it must be
accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in that foreign country:
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied
by an Authentication 56 issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of
the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The
Authentication further certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine.
Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between petitioner and
respondent.
The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national law of
Japan, a divorce by agreement "becomes effective by notification." 57 Considering
that the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was duly authenticated,
the divorce between petitioner and respondent was validly obtained according to
respondent's national law.
V burden or benefit that is given to men must also be given to women. It does not
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that divorce by
agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code, which
provides:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1),(4),(5) and
(6),36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.58 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse," the Office of the Solicitor General posits that only the
foreign spouse may initiate divorce proceedings.
In a study on foreign marriages in 2007 conducted by the Philippine
Statistics Authority, it was found that "marriages between Filipino brides and
foreign grooms comprised 5,537 or 66.7 percent while those between Filipino
grooms and foreign brides numbered 152 or 1.8 percent of the total marriages
outside the country." 59 It also found that "[a]bout four in every ten interracial
marriages (2,916 or 35.1%) were between Filipino brides and Japanese grooms."
Statistics for foreign marriages in 2016 shows that there were 1,129 marriages
between Filipino men and foreign women but 8,314 marriages between Filipina
women and foreign men. 60 Thus, empirical data demonstrates that
Filipino women are more likely to enter into mixed marriages than
Filipino men.Under Philippine laws relating to mixed marriages, Filipino women are
twice marginalized.
In this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who bears the burden
of this narrow interpretation, which may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14
of our Constitution provides:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men.
This constitutional provision provides a more active application than the
passive orientation of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply
states that no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the laws." Equal
protection, within the context of Article III, Section 1 only provides that any legal
require the State to actively pursue "affirmative ways and means to battle the
patriarchy — that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors that ensure
women's disempowerment." 61
In 1980, our country became a signatory to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).62 Under
Articles 2 (f) and 5 (a) of the treaty, the Philippines as a state party, is required:
Article 2
xxx xxx xxx
(f) to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and
practices which constitute discrimination against women;
xxx xxx xxx
Article 5
xxx xxx xxx
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men
and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women[.]
By enacting the Constitution and signing on the CEDAW, the State has
committed to ensure and to promote gender equality.
In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta for
Women, which provides that the State "shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations." 63 This necessarily includes the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant
for courts to determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad.
Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes "validly obtained" and
capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status should be given to the
Filipino spouse.
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from
initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust
for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from something
that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from
participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.
The Solicitor General's narrow interpretation of Article 26 disregards any
agency on the part of the Filipino spouse. It presumes that the Filipino spouse is
incapable of agreeing to the dissolution of the marital bond. It perpetuates the
notion that all divorce proceedings are protracted litigations fraught with
bitterness and drama. Some marriages can end amicably, without the parties
harboring any ill will against each other. The parties could forgo costly court
proceedings and opt for, if the national law of the foreign spouse allows it, a more
convenient out-of-court divorce process. This ensures amity between the former
spouses, a friendly atmosphere for the children and extended families, and less
financial burden for the family.
Absolute divorce was prohibited in our jurisdiction only in the mid-20th
century. The Philippines had divorce laws in the past. In 1917, Act No. 2710 64 was
enacted which allowed a wife to file for divorce in cases of concubinage or a
husband to file in cases of adultery. 65
Executive Order No. 141, or the New Divorce Law, which was enacted
during the Japanese occupation, provided for 11 grounds for divorce, including
"intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of [a petition for divorce]" and "slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse
against the other to such an extent as to make further living together
impracticable." 66
At the end of World War II, Executive Order No. 141 was declared void
and Act No. 2710 again took effect. 67 It was only until the enactment of the Civil
Code in 1950 that absolute divorce was prohibited in our jurisdiction.
It is unfortunate that legislation from the past appears to be more
progressive than current enactments. Our laws should never be intended to put
Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering that the Constitution guarantees
fundamental equality, this Court should not tolerate an unfeeling and callous
interpretation of laws. To rule that the foreign spouse may remarry, while the
Filipino may not, only contributes to the patriarchy. This interpretation encourages
unequal partnerships and perpetuates abuse in intimate relationships. 68
In any case, the Solicitor General's argument has already been resolved
in Republic v. Manalo,69 where this Court held:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce ...validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it
only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should
be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino
spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to
have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by
the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non
est recedendum,or from the words of a statute there should be
no departure."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still,
the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so
would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes. As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al.
v. COMELEC, et al.:
The legislative intent is not at all times
accurately reflected in the manner in which the
resulting law is couched. Thus, applying
a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of
a statute may render it meaningless and lead
to inconvenience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or
the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort
should be to the rule that the spirit of the law
controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino
spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating
his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A
 Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same
place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving
end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their
alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national
law. 70 (Emphasis in the original)
Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a foreign divorce may be
recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly obtained, regardless of who
among the spouses initiated the divorce proceedings.
The question in this case, therefore, is not who among the spouses
initiated the proceedings but rather if the divorce obtained by petitioner and
respondent was valid.
The Regional Trial Court found that there were two (2) kinds of divorce in
Japan: judicial divorce and divorce by agreement. Petitioner and respondent's
divorce was considered as a divorce by agreement, which is a valid divorce
according to Japan's national law. 71
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise posits that while petitioner was
able to prove that the national law of Japan allows absolute divorce, she was
unable to "point to a specific provision of the Japan[ese] Civil Code which states
that both judicial divorce and divorce by agreement will allow the spouses to
remarry." 72
To prove its argument, the Office of the Solicitor General cites Republic v.
Orbecido III,73 where this Court stated:
[R]espondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that
he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent
is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be
made properly upon respondent's submission of the aforecited
evidence in his favor. 74
The Office of the Solicitor General pointedly ignores that in Orbecido
III,the respondent in that case neither pleaded and proved that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen, nor presented any evidence of the national law
of his alleged foreign spouse that would allow absolute divorce.
In this case, respondent's nationality was not questioned. The Regional
Trial Court duly admitted petitioner's presentation of respondent's national law.
Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan as quoted by the Office of the Solicitor
General states:
Article 728 of the Japan Civil Code reads:
1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated
by divorce.
2. The same shall apply also if after the death
of either husband or wife, the surviving spouse
declares his or her intention to terminate the
matrimonial relationship. 75
The wording of the provision is absolute. The provision contains no other
qualifications that could limit either spouse's capacity to remarry.
In Garcia v. Recio,76 this Court reversed the Regional Trial Court's finding
of the Filipino spouse's capacity to remarry since the national law of the foreign
spouse stated certain conditions before the divorce could be considered absolute:
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are
of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or
a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro.The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing
in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree — a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is
in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although
an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed
period during which no reconciliation is effected.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may
under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be
limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was
 granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after
proof of good behavior.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence
of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter. 77
Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial
relationship is terminated by divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report
of Divorce does not state any qualifications that would restrict the remarriage of
any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation than that the divorce
procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute and completely terminates their
marital tie.
Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the marital
tie is to grant both parties the legal capacity to remarry. Thus, Article 40 of
the Family Code provides:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Petitioner alleges that respondent has since remarried, the National
Statistics Office having found no impediment to the registration of his Marriage
Certificate. 78 The validity of respondent's subsequent marriage is irrelevant for
the resolution of the issues in this case. The existence of respondent's Marriage
Certificate, however, only serves to highlight the absurd situation sought to be
prevented in the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:79
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under
our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. 80
The ruling in Van Dorn was eventually codified in the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code through the issuance of Executive Order No. 227 in
1987. The grant of substantive equal rights to the Filipino spouse was broad
enough that this Court, in the 1985 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals,81 "hinted, by
way of obiter dictum" 82 that it could be applied to Filipinos who have since been
naturalized as foreign citizens.
In Republic v. Orbecido III,83 this Court noted the obiter in Quita and
stated outright that Filipino citizens who later become naturalized as foreign
citizens may validly obtain a divorce from their Filipino spouses:
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To
rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
 literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene
the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent. 84
To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our laws,
petitioner is still married to respondent despite the latter's newfound
companionship with another cannot be just. 85 Justice is better served if she is not
discriminated against in her own country. 86 As much as petitioner is free to seek
fulfillment in the love and devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her
commitment within the institution of marriage.
WHEREFORE,the Petition is GRANTED.The Regional Trial Court June 2,
2011 Decision and October 3, 2011 Order in SP. Proc. No. 10-0032
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. By virtue of Article 26, second paragraph of
the Family Code and the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce dated
December 16, 2009, petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho is declared capacitated to
remarry.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Racho v. Seiichi Tanaka, G.R. No. 199515, [June 25, 2018])
[G.R. No. 214529. July 12, 2017.]
JERRYSUS L. TILAR, petitioner, vs. ELIZABETH A. TILAR and the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PERALTA, J p:
Before us is a direct recourse from the Decision 1 dated June 3, 2014 and
the Order 2 dated August 19, 2014, both issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
14, Baybay City, (RTC) in Special Proceeding (SP) No. B-10-11-39 dismissing the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, and denying reconsideration thereof,
respectively. EcTCAD
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On November 4, 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition 3 for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of private respondent's
(respondent) psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He
alleged that he and respondent were married on June 29, 1996 in a Catholic Church
in Poro, Poro Camotes, Cebu with Rev. Fr. Vicente Igot as the solemnizing officer;
that a son was born of their marriage; that their marriage went well in the first few
months but respondent later became an extremely jealous, violent person which
resulted to frequent quarrels and petitioner being threatened and physically
harmed; that she is a happy-go-lucky and extravagant type of person and a
gambler; that they eventually separated in 2002; and, that respondent is now living
with another man in Cebu City. Petitioner consulted a clinical psychologist and
respondent was said to be suffering from "aggressive personality disorder as well
as histrionic personality disorder" which made her psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations.
Respondent failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons.
The RTC then required the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether
collusion existed. In his Manifestation and Compliance, the Public Prosecutor
certified as to the absence of collusion between the parties. 4 Trial, thereafter,
ensued with petitioner and his witness testifying.
On June 3, 2014, the RTC issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this case is
ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. 5
In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:
x x x the lingering issue that confronts this Court,
whether it can validly [pass] upon the validity of church marriage
in the light of the separation of the Church and the State as
enunciated in Section 6 of Art. (sic) of the 1987 Constitution.
Withal, marriage is a sacrament according to the teaching of the
Catholic Church. Being a sacrament, the same is purely religious.
Declaration of nullity, which is commonly called an annulment in
the Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by an ecclesiastical
tribunal determining that the sacrament of marriage was
invalidly contracted. The procedure is governed by the Church's
Canon Law not by the civil law observed by the State in nullity
cases involving civil marriages. Ergo, the principle of separation
of Church and State finds application in this case. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the State cannot encroach into the domain of
the Church, thus, resolving the validity of the church marriage is
outside the province of its authority. Although the Family
Code did not categorize the marriage subject of the petition for
 nullity or annulment, the Constitution as the fundamental law of
the State laid down the principle of separation, ergo, it is beyond
cavil that nullity of a church marriage cannot be taken out of the
church jurisdiction. The court being an entity of the State is
bereft of any jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. SDHTEC
As the second issue hinges on the affirmative resolution
on the jurisdiction of this Court, the same becomes moot due to
the non-affirmance of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. 6
Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in
an Order dated August 19, 2014.
In denying the motion for reconsideration, the RTC said:
Marriages solemnized and celebrated by the Church
are [per se] governed by its Canon Law. Although the Family
Code provides for some regulations, the same does not follow
that the State is authorized to inquire to its validity,
The Constitution is supreme to the Family Code. Under the
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the Constitution is written
in all laws, acts and transactions, hence, the same must be
upheld. 7
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that:
The Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the case on
the ground that the validity of church marriage is outside of the
province of its authority. 8
Petitioner contends that the RTC had rendered judgment principally on
the ground that the validity of church marriage is outside the province of its
authority, however, it is the civil law, particularly the Family Code, which principally
governs the marriage of the contracting parties.
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment on the
petition for review arguing that the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity
of marriage pursuant to the provision of the Family Code, and that the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving contracts of marriage and marital
relations.
We find merit in this petition.
Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State. HSAcaE
Our Constitution clearly gives value to the sanctity of marriage. Marriage
in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution
the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. 9 Thus, the State is
mandated to protect marriage, being the foundation of the family, which in turn is
the foundation of the nation. 10 The State has surrounded marriage with
safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and
stability of the State are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and
every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that
would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. 11
Our law on marriage, particularly the Family Code, restates the
constitutional provision to protect the inviolability of marriage and the family
relations. In one of the whereas clauses of the Family Code, it is stated:
Whereas, there is a need to implement policies
embodied in the New Constitution that strengthen marriage and
the family as a basic social institution and ensure equality
between men and women.
Accordingly, Article 1 of the Family Code pertinently provides:
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.
As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not
merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting parties but are governed by
law. The Family Code provides for the essential 12 as well as formal 13 requisites
for the validity of marriage. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect
in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. 14 No prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the
contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage
certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and
attested by the solemnizing officer. A marriage license shall be issued by the local
civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, except in marriages where no license is required. 15 The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired
into their capacity to contract marriage. 16
The Family Code also provides on who may solemnize and how marriage
may be solemnized, thus: AScHCD
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or
religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits
of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect
and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs
to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
xxx xxx xxx
Article 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in
the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel
or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-
consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case
the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated
by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the
requirements and formalities prescribed by law. The marriage of petitioner and
respondent which was solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in a church
was in accordance with the above-quoted provisions. Although, marriage is
considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal consequences
which are governed by the Family Code. As petitioner correctly pointed out, the
instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties as
postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of
the parties' marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another
matter. 17 Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance
with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still
considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of
separation of the church and state finds no application in this case. HESIcT
As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just
dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds 18 for the
termination of marriage. These grounds may be invoked and proved in a petition
for annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising jurisdiction over
the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner
filed before the RTC of Baybay City, falls within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the
RTC erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte is ORDERED to PROCEED with
the resolution of the case based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tilar v. Tilar, G.R. No. 214529, [July 12, 2017], 813 PHIL 734-745)
[G.R. No. 210766. January 8, 2018.]
MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N.
SINGSON, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 are the August 29, 2013
Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its January 6, 2014 Resolution 3 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 96662, which reversed and set aside the November 12, 2010
Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Civil
Case No. 07-0070. AcICHD
Factual Antecedents
On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N.
Singson (petitioner) filed a Petition 5 for declaration of nullity of marriage based
on Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines 6 (Family Code). This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L.
Singson (respondent) were married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St.
Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal, that said marriage produced four children, all
of whom are now of legal age; that when they started living together, petitioner
noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense
of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually," 7 and a
compulsive gambler; that respondent was immature, and was unable to perform
his paternal duties; that respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and
guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made him completely
unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her; and that because she
could expect no help or assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to
work doubly hard to support her family as the sole breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent
was confined at Metro Psych Facility, 8 a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and
that respondent's attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-
Ponio), made the following diagnosis on respondent:
Based on history, mental status examination and
observation, he is diagnosed to be suffering from Pathological
Gambling as manifested by:
a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to get
money with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and pawning
jewelries and appliances[;]
b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money
in order to achieve the desired effect[;]
c. lies to family members or others to conceal the extent
of [his] involvement with gambling[;]
d. committed illegal acts such as forging the signature of
his wife, issuing bouncing checks in order to finance his
gambling[;]
e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife, lost the
respect of his children, lost a good career in banking because of
gambling[;]
f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to provide
money to relieve a desperate financial situation caused by
gambling[;]
While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in]
behavioral changes as a young boy, it would be difficult to say
that the psychotic episodes he manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are]
etiologically related to the general medical condition that
occurred in his childhood.
Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of
behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of our
culture as manifested in the following areas:
a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own] self,
other people, and events[;]
b. his emotional response[;]
c. his poor impulse control[;]
Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to
significant impairment in social, occupational and interpersonal
relationship. In [respondent's] case, this has persisted for several
years, and can be traced back [to] his adolescence since he
started gambling while in high school. He is therefore diagnosed
to be suffering from Personality Disorder.
All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing
his marital obligations. 9
Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught"
family and had a "dysfunctional" childhood; 10 that respondent had all the love,
care, and protection of his parents as the youngest child for some time; but that
these parental love, care and protection were, however, transferred to his
youngest brother who was born when respondent was almost five years old; and
that these factors caused respondent emotional devastation from which he never
recovered. TAIaHE
Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school
student, was already betting on jai alai. She also claimed that she tried to adjust to
respondent's personality disorders, but that she did not attain her goal.
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any
ante-nuptial agreement to govern their property relations as husband and wife and
that they had no conjugal assets or debts.
On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer. 11
Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that
"psychological incapacity" must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability, which are not present in the instant case because petitioner's
allegations are not supported by facts.
Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed to render
any help, support or assistance to petitioner and their family; that the family home
where petitioner and their children are living was in fact his own capital property;
that his shortcomings as mentioned by petitioner do not pertain to the most grave
or serious cases of personality disorders that would satisfy the standards required
to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage; that petitioner's complaint is nothing
more than a complaint of a woman with an unsatisfactory marriage who wants to
get out of it; that contrary to petitioner's claim that he is a good-for-nothing fellow,
he has a college degree in business administration, and is a bank employee, and,
that it was money problem, and not his alleged personality disorder, that is the
wall that divided him and petitioner.
Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the basis for the
conclusions of the psychiatrist to the effect that he is suffering from pathological
gambling and personality disorder; that petitioner's allegation that he came from
a distraught family and that he suffered emotional devastation is vague, and bereft
of particular details, and even slanderous; and that assuming that he had not acted
the way petitioner expected him to conduct himself, his actions and behavior are
not psychological illnesses or personality disorders, but simply physical illnesses of
the body, akin to hypertension and allied sicknesses, and that these physical
illnesses are not at all incurable psychiatric disorders that were present at the time
of his marriage with petitioner.
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal
assets and debts; that the land where their family home is built came from his
earnings, hence the family home is their conjugal property; that he and petitioner
also have a house and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts that are in
petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also have investments in shares of
stocks, cars, household appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are
conjugal assets because they came from petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's)
own inheritance money.
Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the present
Petition, petitioner had caused him to be admitted into the Metro Psych Facility
for treatment; that on account of his confinement and treatment in this psychiatric
facility, he has incurred medical expenses and professional medical fees; and that
since it is petitioner who manages all their finances and conjugal assets it stands to
reason that he should be awarded "spousal support."
On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order. 12
Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son,
Jose Angelo Singson (Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.
On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which
included a photocopy of the marriage contract; the birth certificates of their four
children; her son Jose's Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Dr.
Sta. Ana-Ponio's Judicial Affidavit dated June 25, 2008; Clinical Summary of
respondent issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio dated February 11, 2007 (Clinical
Summary); her (petitioner's) own Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 179751 registered in the names of the
parties' four children; and a notarized document entitled "Summary of Sources and
Uses of Funds for the period November 1999 to March 31, 2008" executed by
petitioner and described as a detailed summary of expenses paid for with the
proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of the latter's house in Magallanes
Village. 13
Respondent filed his Comment thereon. 14
On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner's exhibits. 15 cDHAES
On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 16 "on the ground
that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner did not establish [his]
psychological incapacity x x x to comply width the essential marital obligations x x
x." 17 Petitioner filed her Opposition 18 thereto, and respondent tendered his
Comment thereon. 19
On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent's Motion to Dismiss and
stood pat on its March 29, 2010 Order. 20
During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent's counsel manifested
that his client was waiving the right to present countervailing evidence.
Respondent's counsel also moved that the Petition at bar be submitted for decision
on the basis of the evidence already on the record. The RTC thus declared the case
submitted for decision. 21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and
declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the
ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. The RTC disposed thus —
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered[:]
1. DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage
between MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a.
CONCEPCION N. SINGSON and BENJAMIN L.
SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974 in
Mandaluyong City or any other marriage
between them on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the respondent.
2. ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City
and the National Statistics Office to cancel the
marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent as appearing in the Registry of
Marriage.
There are no other issues in this case.
 Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil
Registrars of Mandaluyong City and Para[ñ]aque City, the Office
of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register General
(National Statistics Office) and the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Parañaque City.
SO ORDERED. 22
The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code are present in the instant case
because the totality of evidence showed that respondent is suffering from a
psychological condition that is grave, incurable, and has juridical antecedence.
The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of petitioner and Dr.
Sta. Ana-Ponio convincingly showed that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations; that respondent's
inability to perform his marital obligations as set out in Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code, was essentially due to a psychological abnormality arising from a
pathological and utterly irresistible urge to gamble.
The RTC cited "[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's] findings [which] reveal that
respondent is suffering from Personality Disorder known as Pathological
Gambling." 23 It ruled that it has been shown that this personality disorder was
present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only later; that
because of this personality disorder respondent had already jeopardized his
relationship with his family; and that respondent's psychological disorder hinders
the performance of his obligations as a husband and as a father.
Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in common by the
spouses was donated in favor of the parties' children as evidenced by TCT No.
179751 — a fact not at all controverted, in view of respondent's waiver of his right
to present evidence.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.
But in its Order dated January 6, 2011, 24 the RTC denied respondent's
motion for reconsideration. It reiterated that the expert witness had adequately
established that respondent is suffering from "Pathological Gambling Personality
Disorder" which is grave, permanent, and has juridical antecedence.
On February 4, 2011, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal 25 which was
given due course by the RTC in its Order 26 dated February 28, 2011. ASEcHI
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC, and
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision
dated 12 November 2010 issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 260, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 07-0070, declaring
the marriage between Maria Concepcion N. Singson and
Benjamin L. Singson null and void ab initio, is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 27
The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to
establish respondent's alleged psychological incapacity to perform the essential
marital obligations, which in this case, was not at all proven to be grave or serious,
much less incurable, and furthermore was not existing at the time of the marriage.
What is more, the CA declared that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage, and against its dissolution and nullity,
in obedience to the mandate of the Constitution and statutory laws; and that in
this case, petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that respondent is
suffering from a serious or grave psychological disorder that completely disables
or incapacitates him from understanding and discharging the essential obligations
of the marital union.
According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the downright or utter
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations. The CA did not go along with the RTC, which placed heavy reliance on
Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations due to a personality disorder known as
pathological gambling. The CA held that, contrary to petitioner's claim that
respondent's pathological gambling was grave or serious, the evidence in fact
showed that the latter was truly capable of carrying out the ordinary duties of a
married man because he had a job, had provided money for the family from the
sale of his own property, and he likewise provided the land on which the family
home was built, and he also lives in the family home with petitioner and their
children.
On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere difficulty, refusal
or neglect in the performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of a
spouse, is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; that the evidence at bar showed that respondent's alleged
pathological gambling arose after the marriage; that in fact petitioner admitted
that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they got married;
that petitioner moreover acknowledged that respondent was a kind and a caring
person when he was courting her; that petitioner likewise admitted that
respondent also brought petitioner to the hospital during all four instances when
she gave birth to their four children.
 In other words, the CA found that respondent's purported pathological
gambling was not proven to be incurable or permanent since respondent has been
undergoing treatment since 2003 and has been responding to the treatment.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration 28 of the CA's Decision. But her
motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution of January 6, 2014. 29
Issue
Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the following question
—
[WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE [RTC]. 30
Petitioner's Arguments
In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, and
in asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, petitioner argues in her
Petition, 31 Reply, 32 and Memorandum 33 that respondent's psychological
incapacity had been duly proved in court, including its juridical antecedence,
incurability, and gravity.
First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform the marital
duties of mutual love, respect, and support; that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert
findings are corroborated by the testimonies of petitioner and her son Jose both
of whom demonstrated that respondent's psychological incapacity is grave or
serious rendering him incapable to perform the essential marital obligations; that
for his part, respondent had adduced no proof that he (respondent) is capable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage for the reason that
everything that the family had saved and built had been squandered by
respondent; and that respondent's confinement at the rehabilitation facility is
itself proof of the gravity or seriousness of his psychological incapacity. ITAaHc
Second, petitioner contends that respondent's psychological incapacity
preceded the marriage, as shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary, which
pointed out that such psychological incapacity, which included pathological
gambling, can be traced back when respondent was already betting on jai alai even
in high school, and this was not known to his family; that the Clinical Summary was
based on information provided not only by petitioner, but by respondent's sister,
and by respondent himself; that such juridical antecedence was neither questioned
nor overthrown by countervailing evidence; and that the root cause could be
traced back to respondent's flawed relationship with his parents which developed
into a psychological disorder that existed before the marriage.
Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact
that personality disorders are generally incurable and permanent, and must
continuously be treated medically; that in this case the Clinical Summary had
pointed out that respondent's understanding of his gambling problem is only at the
surface level; and that in point of fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that
personality disorders are incurable.
Respondent's Arguments
In his Comment 34 and Memorandum, 35 respondent counters that the
assailed CA Decision should be affirmed. He argues that the grounds cited by
petitioner are the self-same grounds raised by petitioner before the RTC and the
CA; that petitioner's evidence indeed failed to prove convincingly that he
(respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, hence there is no basis to declare the parties' marriage void ab initio.
Our Ruling
The Petition will not succeed.
It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are
enshrined in our Constitution and statutory laws, hence any doubts attending the
same are to be resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage
and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same rests at all times upon the
petitioner. 36 "The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family.
Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties." 37
Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life" and as "the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution."
In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social
institution by suing out pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides
that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
 Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that
case law rulings interpreting and construing the quoted Article, to wit: respondent's psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by
jurisprudential parameters since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for the
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a
family from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family home was
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no
built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and their
less than a mental — not merely physical — incapacity that
children." 40
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article job as the latter "was working at a certain point." 41 This is consistent with the
68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary and testimony, which were
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity both included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence, respecting the parties'
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the relationship history that petitioner and respondent met at the bank where
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of petitioner was applying for a job and where respondent was employed as a credit
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality investigator prior to their courtship and their marriage. 42
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
her evidence a notarized summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated
In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that
expenses paid for by the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of his parents'
psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity
home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to around P2.9 million. Although
(i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
petitioner was insinuating that this amount was insufficient to cover the family
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the items
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the
for their family budget, such as their children's education, the payments for
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
association dues, and for electric bills came from this money.
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c)
incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party the land upon which the family home was built, thus —
involved). The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the
[Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner]
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known as the Q: Does [respondent] [own] any real property?
Molina guidelines]. These guidelines incorporate the basic
A: No.
requirements that the Court established in Santos. 38 CHTAIc
Q: He does not [own] any real property?
In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner
failed to prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with A: No.
the essential marital obligations because she failed to establish that such incapacity
Q: Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of the
was grave and serious, and that it existed at the time of the marriage, and that it is
Register of Deeds of Rizal which has been transferred with
incurable. We agree.
the Register of Deeds of Parañaque and is now re-
At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of numbered as S-25470, which is in the name of
the conflicting findings between the trial court and the appellate court. 39 We thus [respondent], Filipino, of legal age, single.
did peruse and review the records, and we are satisfied that the CA correctly found
xxx xxx xxx
that respondent has the capability and ability to perform his duties as a husband
and father as against the RTC's rather general statement that respondent's [COURT to the witness, petitioner]
psychological or personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic
Q: Who owned this property?
obligations as a husband and a father.
A: Based on the document, it's Benjamin Singson.
 Q: Where is this property located?
A: It is located in United Parañaque.
Q: Where in United Parañaque?
A: No. 2822 Daang Hari.
Q: Are you staying in that property?
A: We are staying in that property.
xxx xxx xxx
[Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner]
Q: How about the house there, in the United Parañaque [property],
who owns it?
A: It was donated to the children. EATCcI
xxx xxx xxx
[COURT to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Based on the document, who is the registered owner?
A: It says there, [respondent], Your Honor.
Q: Who owns it now?
A: The children because it was donated [to them]. 43
What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as
husband and wife since their marriage on July 6, 1974 (and in the company of their
four children, too). In fact, shunting aside the time that respondent was under
treatment at the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not allege any instance when
respondent failed to live with them.
To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself
admitted, that respondent likewise brought her to the hospital during all four
instances that she gave birth to their children. 44
By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that
respondent's mere confinement at the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity
of the latter's psychological incapacity.
Neither does petitioner's bare claim that respondent is a pathological
gambler, is irresponsible, and is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate into
unassailable proof that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. It is settled that "[p]sychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
will." 45 "[I]t is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be
incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness." 46
Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical
Summary be taken for gospel truth in regard to the charge that respondent is
afflicted with utter inability to appreciate his marital obligations. That much is clear
from the following testimony —
[Petitioner's counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]
Q: Madam witness, do you know the respondent in this case,
Benjamin Singson?
A: Yes, [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003, during
his first admission and again [in] 2006, [S]ir.
Q: So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam witness?
A: Yes, [S]ir.
Q: Why was he confined, Madam witness?
A: He was initially confined because of problems with gambling and
subsequently because of [behavioral] problem, [S]ir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam
[W]itness?
A: Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However, [in]
September of 2006, he knocked on the doors of the maids
in the middle of the night. And in one occasion, he got his
car in the garage and drove out bumping the car parked
right across the garage and he [also kept] taking things out
from his cabinet. And if the maids would clean [these], he
[would] immediately take them out again. So, he was
brought to the facility in October because of his
uncontrolled behavior, [S]ir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the
respondent, Benjamin Singson, Madam witness?
A: Based on history, mental status examination and observations
during his stay, I found that [respondent] is suffering from
pathological gambling. Also, with his history of typhoid
fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the
 behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006.
Aside from pathological gambling, [respondent] is
suffering from a personality disorder, [S]ir. DHITCc
Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality disorder
with [regard] to [respondent's dealings] with other
people, with his wife and his family, [M]adam witness?
A: Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my memory.
COURT:
Go ahead.
A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees [sic] his
problems which [makes] his personal[,] family[,] and social
life[,] and even his vocational pleasure [suffer]. He was
pre-occupied with gambling, thinking of ways to get
money with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and
pawning jewelries and appliances. He needs to gamble
with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve his
desired effects into gambling, [S]ir.
COURT:
Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
[Cross-examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent's counsel]
Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam
witness?
A: I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist did the
psychological testing, [S]ir.
Q: Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam witness,
which we would like to request [from] this Honorable
Court, later on, that you present your credentials as expert
witness, you concluded that the respondent is suffering
from personality disorder?
A.: Yes, [S]ir.
Q: What does this mean in layman's language, [M]adam witness?
A: Personality disorders is a maladaptive pattern of behavior that
has distracted his ability to perform his functions as a
married man to his wife, as a father to his children and as
a person who is supposed to be employed productively,
[S]ir. 47
Furthermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job,
[while undoubtedly negative traits, are nowhere nearly the equivalent of
'psychological incapacity'], in the absence of [incontrovertible] proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness." 48
We now turn to the second point. Again, in view of the contrasting
findings of the trial court and appellate court, 49 we take recourse to the records
to assist us in evaluating the respective postures taken by the parties.
Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent
spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations x x x." 50 "A cause has to
be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity." 51
Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay
down the bases or premises for this particular finding relative to respondent's
psychological incapacity, thus:
Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that
the respondent's inabilities to perform his marital obligations
was a result of not mere intentional refusal on his part but are
caused by psychological abnormality. Such psychological
incapacity of the respondent has been shown as already present
at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only
after the solemnization. x x x. 52
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by
the RTC did not specifically identify the root cause of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to a definite or a
definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever when he was younger, it is
difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and
2006." 53 Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but
another psychologist who conducted the tests. 54 And this psychologist was not
presented by petitioner. More than that, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding
respondent's alleged admission that he was allegedly betting on jai alai when he
was still in high school is essentially hearsay as no witness having personal
knowledge of that fact was called to the witness stand. And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-
Ponio claimed to have interviewed respondent's sister in connection therewith, the
latter did testify in court. And we are taught that "[t]he stringency by which the
Court assesses the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is necessitated
by the pronouncement in our Constitution that marriage is an inviolable institution
protected by the State." 55 cEaSHC
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity could be attributed to the latter's family or childhood,
which are circumstances prior to the parties' marriage; no evidence has been
adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding petitioner's
contention that respondent's family was "distraught" and that respondent's
conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These
are very serious charges which must be substantiated by clear evidence which,
unfortunately, petitioner did not at all adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not
make a specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's alleged inability to
appreciate marital obligations.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that
his father's psychological incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage. It
has been held that the parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36
case as "he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could
not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until
long after his birth." 56
To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced
convincing, competent and trustworthy evidence to establish the cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity and that the same antedated their
marriage. 57 If anything, petitioner failed to successfully dispute the CA's finding
that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they got married
and that respondent was a kind and caring person when he was courting her. 58
Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that
petitioner failed to prove that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity is
serious or grave and that it is incurable or permanent.
To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion
that "personality disorders are generally incurable" as this is not a matter that
courts are mandated to take judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court. 59
"Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the
obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a
marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital
tie." 60 This is the situation here.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and
January 6, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Singson v. Singson, G.R. No. 210766, [January 8, 2018])
[G.R. No. 193544. August 2, 2017.]
YOLANDA E. GARLET, petitioner, vs. VENCIDOR T.
GARLET, respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
Petitioner Yolanda E. Garlet assails in this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court the: (1) Decision 1 dated
June 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89142, which reversed and
set aside the Decision 2 dated November 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 159, Pasig City in JDRC Case No. 6796; and (2) Resolution 3 dated August
24, 2010 of the appellate court in the same case, which denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration. HTcADC
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent Vencidor T. Garlet met each other sometime
in 1988. They became intimately involved and as a result, petitioner became
pregnant. Petitioner gave birth to their son, Michael Vincent Garlet (Michael), out
of wedlock on November 9, 1989. Petitioner and respondent eventually got
married on March 4, 1994. Their union was blessed with a second child, Michelle
Mae Garlet (Michelle), on January 23, 1997. However, petitioner and respondent
started experiencing marital problems. After seven years of marriage, petitioner
and respondent separated in 2001. Petitioner now has custody over their two
children.
On May 6, 2005, petitioner filed a Petition 4 for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity to fulfill his
essential marital obligations to petitioner and their children. The Petition was
docketed as JDRC Case No. 6796. On June 30, 2005, respondent filed his
Answer 5 to the Petition.
At the pre-trial, the parties admitted the following facts:
1. The petitioner and respondent contracted marriage on
[March] 6 4, 1994;
2. The parties' first son was named Michael Vincent Garlet and was
born on November 9, 1989;
 3. The petitioner gave birth to another child named Michelle Mae
Garlet on January 23, 1997;
4. The respondent is aware that the petitioner is working in Japan
as an entertainer;
5. There is no ante-nuptial agreement prior to the celebration of
the marriage;
6. There is no separation of properties during the marriage;
7. The petitioner has the custody and the one supporting the
children from the time the respondent lost
communication with the children as he does not exert
effort to see them;
8. The petitioner admitted that the parties acquired several
properties during cohabitation with qualification that the
same was bought out of the efforts and finances of the
petitioner; and
9. The petitioner likewise admitted that the respondent was not
subjected to psychological examination by the
psychologist sought by the petitioner with qualification
that respondent was given several opportunities to attend
the psychological evaluation but failed to do so. 7
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Testifying for petitioner were petitioner herself; Marites Ereve (Marites),
petitioner's sister who served as the children's nanny from 1993 to 2001; and Ms.
Nimia Hermilia C. De Guzman (De Guzman), the clinical psychologist.
Petitioner and respondent were introduced to each other by a common
friend in 1988. Respondent courted petitioner and they became close. One day,
after partying and drinking liquor with some friends, petitioner and respondent lost
their inhibitions and indulged in sexual intercourse. Petitioner became pregnant as
a result. Respondent doubted if he fathered the unborn child and refused to
support petitioner. Respondent urged petitioner to have an abortion, to which she
did not agree. During petitioner's pregnancy, respondent did not visit her nor did
he give any financial assistance. After giving birth to Michael, respondent visited
petitioner only once. 8
In order to support Michael, petitioner left for Japan to work for six
months as a cultural dancer. Petitioner temporarily entrusted Michael's care and
custody to her mother and siblings in Bicol. Upon returning to the Philippines,
petitioner took Michael back to live in Manila. Petitioner also brought Marites with
them to Manila to serve as the nanny. 9 Respondent visited petitioner and Michael
several times but respondent still did not offer petitioner any monetary help as he
was jobless. 10
From 1990 to 1994, petitioner returned to Japan several more times to
work, but she maintained her relationship with respondent for the sake of their
son. Sometime in 1992, petitioner instructed respondent to scout for a real
property on which she may invest her money. With the money petitioner remitted,
respondent purchased a 210-square meter lot in Morong, Rizal (Morong
property), 11 but registered the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-
38509 12 covering said property in his name. Despite petitioner's pleas,
respondent refused to transfer the certificate of title to the Morong property in
petitioner's name. 13 Later on, respondent, without petitioner's consent, sold a
69-square meter portion of the Morong property to spouses Avelino Garlet
(Avelino) and Cipriana A. Garlet, respondent's brother and sister-in-law,
respectively, who secured TCT No. M-56993 for said portion in their
names. 14 Respondent also mortgaged the Morong property to his sister-in-law's
friend, which forced petitioner to redeem it for P50,000.00. 15
Petitioner bought another parcel of land in Pila, Laguna on March 3, 1994
(Pila property). 16 Respondent insisted on including his name as one of the buyers
in the deed of sale for the Pila property even though he was jobless and had no
money to contribute for the purchase of said property. 17
It was also in 1992 that petitioner and respondent started living together
on the Morong property. They often quarreled but respondent stayed with
petitioner because she was the breadwinner of the family. Respondent later asked
petitioner to marry him. Thinking it was for the best interest of their son, petitioner
agreed and she married respondent on March 4, 1994. 18 aScITE
After their wedding, respondent turned into a "selfish, greedy,
irresponsible, philandering and physically abusive husband." From 1994 to 1997,
their family relied on petitioner's savings for their needs. Petitioner purchased a
jeepney to augment their family's finances but respondent did not ply the
jeepney. 19
Petitioner hoped and asked respondent to change his ways. But even after
the birth of their daughter, Michelle, respondent never bothered to look for a
stable job. Worse, respondent maintained his vices of gambling, drinking, and
womanizing. 20 Respondent neglected Michael and Michelle, and relied on
Marites to take care of the children. 21
In 1998, petitioner was forced to work in Japan again as all her savings had
been exhausted. Petitioner was able to save enough money to invest in a mini-
grocery store. Petitioner placed respondent in charge of the store but the store
suffered losses, which respondent could not account. Petitioner infused additional
capital into the store but it still ultimately closed. 22
 Upon returning to the Philippines in 2000, petitioner felt devastated upon
learning that respondent had squandered her hard-earned money, pawned her
jewelry, and incurred debts in her name. 23 Petitioner also discovered the incident
when respondent allowed a "male friend" to sleep in the master's bedroom.
According to petitioner, this was highly unusual as they never previously allowed
anyone to sleep at their house. 24
Additionally, every time petitioner came home and brought presents for
her parents and siblings, respondent got angry and demanded from petitioner all
her earnings. 25
Petitioner and respondent were fighting constantly. Sometime in 2001,
they had a serious altercation during which, respondent strangled petitioner.
Fortunately, a third person intervened and saved petitioner. 26
Petitioner and respondent tried to settle their marital issues before
the barangay. There, respondent admitted taking petitioner's money and jewelry
because he had no means to support himself and the family. Realizing that there
was no more love and respect between them and that respondent was just using
her, petitioner finally separated from respondent. 27 Petitioner and respondent
executed on September 10, 2001 before the barangay a Kasunduang Pag-
aayos 28 wherein they agreed that respondent would leave the house in exchange
for the jeepney, tricycle, and P300,000.00; and that respondent would have
visitation rights, i.e., twice a week, over their children. Since the separation,
petitioner had been solely supporting their children with the income from her
businesses in Bicol, Bulacan, and Pasig.
Petitioner filed an application for support, alleging that she had been
spending approximately P15,000.00 a month for the two children, and paying the
children's tuition fees in the following amounts: 29
Michael Michelle
Grade 6 P18,118.10 Nursery P18,280.00
1st year high school 20,366.00 Grade 1 21,741.00
2nd year high school 24,241.00 Grade 2 15,050.00
3rd year high school 26,996.00 Grade 3 17,704.00
4th year high school 29,676.00
In addition, petitioner had expended around P15,000.00 for the children's
medical and dental needs and about P100,000.00 for the children's clothing needs
since 2001. As the children would be starting school again, Michael would need
P15,000.00 for his tuition fee for the first semester in college, plus P20,000.00 for
his monthly allowance, books, supplies, and other miscellaneous expenses; while
Michelle would need P30,000.00 for her annual tuition fee, as well as P15,000.00
for food allowance, school supplies, tutorials, clothing, and other miscellaneous
expenses. 30
Considering the children's foregoing expenses, petitioner asserted that
her demand for respondent to pay P20,000.00 per month, or P10,000.00 a month
for each child, was just and reasonable. 31
Clinical psychologist, Ms. De Guzman, reported that she interviewed
petitioner and gathered information from the couple's relatives and
neighbors. 32 Ms. De Guzman's attempts to talk to respondent at his house were
unsuccessful. Ms. De Guzman, however, explained that her failure to personally
interview respondent would not affect her findings, saying that "what is being
tapped in the psychological assessment is the unconscious level, more or less. And
what is represented or uncovered in the unconscious level would be correlated to
the manifested behavior. Having observed the respondent since the time that I
have been appearing in this case, there are some aspects or some attitudes and
behaviors that correlated with the descriptions of those people whom I
interviewed." 33
In her report entitled "Psychological Capacity of Petitioner Yolanda Ereve
Garlet" 34 (Psychological Report), Ms. De Guzman cleared petitioner of any
psychological disorder, saying that petitioner has the capacity to understand and
comply with her marital obligations. In contrast, Ms. De Guzman found respondent
to be suffering from a narcissistic type of personality disorder. Quoted below are
Ms. De Guzman's test results and her evaluation of both petitioner and
respondent:
Petitioner is endowed with an average intellectual
capacity and possesses practical sounding cognitive skills that
enables her to confront her challenges in an efficient manner.
However, her better judgment and analytical functions are
inclined to falter when pressures and stresses overwhelm her.
Personality profile reveals a woman who is overly
submissive to the point of being gullible such that she normally
gets the raw end of a deal in most social situations. As much as
possible, she would want a smooth sailing interaction especially
with her loved ones, trying to compensate for lost time when she
is not around them.
She is however, the type who knows and honors her
commitments and obligations even if the people she trusts, as in
the case of her wayward husband — Respondent have already
betrayed her.
 She is basically goal-focused and independent-minded
but these mature and positive traits easily dwindle when her
sentimental nature gets the better of her. She welcomes praises
and attention accorded to her by her milieu such that she
sometimes fail to decipher who among them are merely taking
advantage of her generosity/kindness. Consequently, she easily
gets fooled, particularly as she could really be too trusting.
Assertiveness and strength of character are the least
among her traits but Petitioner always makes it a point to
maintain a positive outlook and disposition in life despite her
failures. She is very sensitive and considerate of the feelings of
other people.
Pyschosexual adjustment is basically adequate even if
she has developed a wary attitude towards members of the
opposite sex. HEITAD
Over-all analysis of the test data failed to yield traces of
any on-going psychopathological condition nor of any type of
personality disorder. Thus, Petitioner is still Psychologically
Capacitated to understand, comply and execute her marital
obligations.
The same could not be said as true for the Respondent
who is undoubtedly suffering from the Narcissistic Type of
Personality Disorder, as evidenced by the following
symptomatic behavior:
1. He is unable to maintain his own direction in life
without the financial help and support of other
people. He clings to the Petitioner, who is the
breadwinner, sacrificing to be away from home
to be able to build up a stable future, for his
finances. He also maintains an amorous
relationship with different women as a source of
added emotional support, boost of and
satisfaction of his self-directed/immediate needs
and desires.
2. He is not motivated to work and likewise capitalizes on
his physical assets to attain what he wants to
achieve.
3. He is contented with his present lifestyle without
thought of others and has no foresight to prepare
for a healthy family, emotionally and socially. He
is not bothered by his conscience and even
flaunts his indiscretions publicly.
4. He has marked adjustment difficulties with his
immediate relatives.
5. He has a very poor impulse control, easily using
invectives/verbal tirades and at times unable to
control his aggressions that physical fights with
Petitioner arose.
6. He took advantage of Petitioner's kindness,
resourcefulness and industry, by not fulfilling his
part of the marriage covenant. He never cared
nor attended to his children but often delegated
them to whoever would be willing to assist him.
7. He appears not to make use of his judgment and
decision making abilities as he is under the mercy
of his immature impulses where the important
aspect of his life, is himself and immediate
gratification of his needs.
Thus, attending to his responsibility, understanding and
complying with his obligations in marriage are beyond his
capacity. Conclusively, the breakdown of their marriage could be
traced to Respondent's aforementioned traits plus his
inadequacy and insecurity in dealing with mature roles.
Respondent's traits and attitudes have been present even before
marriage so that to effect any change or improvement in his
dispositions, would be difficult to do. The Psychological
Incapacitation is pervasive, permanent and clinically proven to
be incurable. Respondent has accepted it as his means of coping
with stressing life demands and is not aware that it was the
source of their estrangement and final breakdown of their
marital relationship.
The root cause of which started in his early days of
training where ambivalent/matter-of-fact treatment was
received from immediate caregivers. Because of his ordinal
position among the children, being the youngest boy, he was
always given the choice of what to do, favored or praised. He was
not able to overcome such indulgence, carried it to his
adolescent/adult years, as he was always given the most
attention.
Contrarily, they were also somehow neglected because
of financial lack so much so that parents had to work overtime to
 earn adequately for their living. Respondent together with his
younger siblings were left to the care of elder brothers/sisters
who just simply/literally followed what their parents would want
of them. Guidance and discipline were imposed upon the elder
siblings but became oblivious towards the Respondent. It
developed in Respondent on how he would go about his life
without experiencing the deprivation and hardship that he had
undergone. He became self-focused and at the same time
hunted for women vulnerable to his superficialities.
Thus, they are better off apart for the sake of everyone
who are within their bounds of reach for Respondent does not
realize the pain he is causing towards other people, specifically
his legal wife — the Petitioner as well as their children.
It is therefore recommended that their marriage
covenant be dissolved for everyone's peace of mind, through due
process in this Honorable Court. 35
Respondent testified on his own behalf. However, in an Order 36 dated
September 14, 2006, the RTC declared respondent's direct testimony stricken off
the record because of respondent's failure to appear for his cross-examination.
After petitioner submitted her Memorandum, 37 the case was deemed submitted
for decision. 38
In its Decision dated November 27, 2006, the RTC gave weight to Ms. De
Guzman's conclusion that respondent was suffering from a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder and ruled that:
Based on the evidence submitted, the parties never
shared a true married life.
After a careful evaluation of the records, this Court finds
the petition to be impressed with merit. The respondent is
described as suffering from narcissistic personality disorder
found to be permanent, severe, serious, and incurable, rendering
him as psychologically incapacitated to perform the marital
obligations.
Respondent neglected his obligations as a husband and
father to their children. Even prior to the marriage, the
respondent manifested his psychological incapacity. He
suspected the paternity of his son with the petitioner and even
turned his back upon learning it. He has visited only on the day
of giving birth by the petitioner of their son. He never cared for
his son and would only visit him once in a while. He never worked
to support his son. In fact, the respondent was financially
dependent on the petitioner even before the marriage. He
defrauded the petitioner by registering all the properties bought
by the petitioner from the latter's exclusive income under his
name declaring themselves as married. Worst, he sold a portion
of the property in Morong without the knowledge of the
petitioner. ATICcS
During the marriage, the respondent's laziness became
manifest. He focused on his self and does not care who gets hurt
for as long as it satisfies him. He gambles and drinks at the
expense of the petitioner. He was given the chance to earn for
himself and for the family and still, he did not handle it well and
instead continued with his vices.
The respondent disregarded his obligations to spend
quality time with the petitioner and especially with their
children. He even committed infidelities.
All deeds and actions of the respondent are clear
demonstrations of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
By reason of the respondent's immaturity and
irresponsibility stemming from his NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY
DISORDER, he was unable to fulfill his duties and responsibilities
towards his wife and children, thus constituting psychological
incapacity.
The psychological report shows that respondent's
psychological incapacity is characterized by juridical
antecedence as it was found to have existed even prior to the
time he contracted marriage with petitioner. Respondent's
personality disorder, the root cause of which can be traced in his
childhood years was found to be pervasive and permanent. Being
the youngest boy, Respondent was always favored and praised
but was not properly guided and disciplined by his parents as the
latter were pre-occupied with improving their finances.
It also speaks of gravity because respondent is incapable
of rendering marital obligations like commitment, fidelity, trust,
support and love toward the petitioner and their children which
are very vital in a marital relationship. In fact, Ms. De Guzman
stated in her report that attending to his responsibilities,
understanding and complying with his obligations in marriage
are beyond respondent's capacity.
 It is incurable because the psychological incapacity of
the respondent is deeply rooted, it is already in his character. No
amount of therapy, no matter how intensive, can possibly
change the respondent insofar as incapability to perform his
essential marital obligations with the petitioner and to his
children are concerned. Respondent has already accepted such
incapacity as his means of coping with stressing life demands. 39
The RTC further held that all of the properties which were acquired during
the marriage were bought with petitioner's exclusive funds, thus, negating the
presumption of equality of shares between the parties in a void marriage under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The RTC awarded the custody of the children to
petitioner, but granted weekly visitation rights to respondent and ordered
respondent to give support to the children.
In the end, the RTC adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage between YOLANDA EREVE GARLET and VENCIDOR
TAEP GARLET held at the Office of the Mayor, Morong, Rizal on
March 4, 1994, as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO on [the] ground of
psychological incapacity of the respondent to perform the
essential marital obligations in accordance with Article 36 of
the Family Code, with all the legal effects thereon.
The property relation between the petitioner and
respondent under Article 147 of the Family Code is deemed
DISSOLVED. The real properties acquired prior to marriage and
cohabitation is hereby declared exclusive properties of the
petitioner particularly the real property covered by Transfer
Certificate [of Title] No. M-38509 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal; and the tricycle and jeepney covered by Certificate of
Registration Nos. 13175616 and 27224267, respectively.
The parties are directed to submit list of properties for
liquidation, partition and distribution; and the delivery of
presumptive legitime of their common children with notice to
their creditors upon finality of this decision.
The custody of the children, namely: 1) Michael Vincent
E. Garlet; and 2) Michelle Mae E. Garlet is hereby awarded to the
petitioner subject to visitorial right of the respondent once a
week at the most convenient time of the said children. The
respondent is hereby adjudged to give support to the children in
the amount of P3,000.00 a month each to be deposited every 5th
day of the month in their respective bank accounts under trust
of the petitioner; and he is hereby directed to provide at least
one-half of the cost of their education.
The petitioner shall revert to the use of her maiden
name.
The Local Civil Registrars of Morong, Rizal, and Pasig
[City] are directed to cause the entry of the foregoing judgment
in the Book of Marriages upon issuance thereof.
A decree of declaration of nullity of marriage shall be
issued upon compliance with the foregoing judgment. 40
The RTC denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration in its Order
dated February 26, 2007.
Respondent's appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 89142. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated June 21, 2010, reversed
the RTC judgment, reasoning as follows:
[W]e scrutinized the totality of evidence adduced by Yolanda and
found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that
Vencidor was psychologically incapacitated.
In essence, Yolanda wanted to equate Vencidor's
addiction to alcohol, chronic gambling, womanizing, refusal to
find a job and his inability to take care of their children as akin to
psychological incapacity. At best, Yolanda's allegations showed
that Vencidor was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally
immature. The incidents cited by Yolanda did not show that
Vencidor suffered from a psychological malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond.
Yolanda's portrayal of Vencidor as jobless and
irresponsible is not enough. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable
of doing so, due to some psychological illness. Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage
and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated
by this rule. What the law requires to render a marriage void on
the ground of psychological incapacity is downright incapacity,
not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. TIADCc
 In ruling for Yolanda, the trial court gave credence to the
psychological report prepared by Ms. De Guzman. x x x
While it is true that courts rely heavily on psychological
experts for its understanding of human personality, still the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained,
and said incapacity established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial. Likewise, although there is no
requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a
psychologist (as a condition sine qua non), there is nevertheless
still a need to prove the psychological incapacity
through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging
said disorder.
In the instant case, the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature and the
incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained. What can be
perused from the psychological report prepared by Ms. De
Guzman is that it only offered a general evaluation on the
supposed root cause of Vencidor's personality disorder. The
report failed to exhaustively explain the relation between being
a pampered youngest son and suffering from a psychological
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond.
The psychological report failed to reveal that the
personality traits of Vencidor were grave or serious enough to
bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Ms. De Guzman merely stated in the said report that it
is beyond the capacity of Vencidor to attend to his responsibility
and understand and comply with his marital obligations. Such
statement is a mere general conclusion which, unfortunately, is
unsubstantiated. We cannot see how Vencidor's supposed
personality disorder would render him unaware of the essential
marital obligations or to be incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by him.
Also, we cannot help but note that Ms. De Guzman's
conclusions about Vencidor's psychological incapacity were
primarily based on the informations fed to her by Yolanda whose
bias for her cause cannot be doubted. Moreover, Ms. De Guzman
testified that the informations that she obtained from Yolanda
were the result of one-hour interview with Yolanda and initial
testing given at intervals.
While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and
conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent
set of standards. Ms. De Guzman only examined Vencidor from
a third-party account. To make conclusions on x x x Vencidor's
psychological condition based on the information fed by
Yolanda, during a one-hour interview, is not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the
preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity
of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Presumption
is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio. 41
The dispositive portion of the foregoing Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision dated November 27, 2006 and the Order dated
February 26, 2007 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage between herein parties is hereby declared as still
subsisting and valid. 42
Petitioner received a copy of the Decision of the appellate court on June
28, 2010. Petitioner filed a motion 43 seeking an extension of twenty days, or until
August 2, 2010, within which to file a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed
her Motion for Reconsideration on August 2, 2010. However, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution 44 on August 24, 2010 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration for being filed out of time, citing the ruling in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon 45 that the filing of the motion for extension of time does
not toll the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner seeks redress from this Court through the instant Petition,
grounded on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND DECLARING THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN YOLANDA
 GARLET AND VENCIDOR GARLET TO BE SUBSISTING. THE COURT
OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPRECIATED THE
APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CONSEQUENTLY
DECREEING THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS
FILED OUT OF TIME. 46
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in (a) disregarding Ms. De
Guzman's findings for being based solely on petitioner's version of events, which
was a third party account; (b) treating petitioner's evidence as "no different from
hearsay;" (c) finding that the root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity
was not sufficiently explained; and (d) declaring the marriage of petitioner and
respondent as valid.
Petitioner argues that based on Marcos v. Marcos, 47 it is not required
that the psychologist personally examine the spouse who is alleged to be suffering
from a psychological disorder. What matters is that the totality of petitioner's
evidence establish psychological incapacity.
Petitioner asserts that her evidence consists of not just her testimony, but
also those of her witnesses. Petitioner's description of her marriage was
substantiated by the statements of respondent's brother, sister-in-law, and
neighbors, which were incorporated in the Psychological Report. What is more, the
root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity had been properly alleged in
the Petition, clinically identified, and proven by Ms. De Guzman in her testimony
and her Psychological Report. Petitioner points out that the RTC gave considerable
weight to her evidence, and found respondent to be suffering from a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder so permanent, serious, severe, and incurable that it rendered
respondent incapable of performing his marital obligations. Considering that the
RTC had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses when they
testified, its findings are entitled to respect from the appellate courts.
Underscoring the importance of the appreciation of the facts by the trial court in
determining whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated,
petitioner refers to the case of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te 48 wherein the findings
of the trial court were declared to be final and binding on the appellate courts.
Based on the totality of the evidence, petitioner maintains that her marriage
should be declared null and void on account of respondent's psychological
incapacity. AIDSTE
Lastly, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in denying her
Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out of time based on Habaluyas
Enterprises, and pleads for liberality in the application of the rules in the interest
of substantial justice.
The Petition is without merit.
The Court shall first address the procedural issue regarding the denial of
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration by the Court of Appeals for being filed out
of time.
In its Resolution issued on May 30, 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises, the
Court already elucidated, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, that:
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the [Court of Appeals].
Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound
discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. 49
The foregoing rule is still good presently. The Court, in the more recent
case of V.C. Ponce Company, Inc. v. Municipality of Parañaque, 50 still observed
strict adherence to the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises. The Court
acknowledged in said case that it sometimes allowed a liberal reading of the rules
in the interest of equity and justice, so long as the petitioner is able to prove the
existence of cogent reasons to excuse its non-observance. However, the Court also
found therein that petitioner's reason for failing to meet the deadline, i.e., it was
without aid of counsel, did not warrant a relaxation of the rules as "it is incumbent
upon the client to exert all efforts to retain the services of new counsel."
Petitioner's counsel in the instant case sought extension of time to file the
motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision claiming that she had
already started the draft of said motion but was unable to finalize the same "due
to heavy pressure of work in the preparation of pleadings in other equally
important cases requiring immediate attention." 51 The excuse of petitioner's
counsel does not constitute cogent reason or extraordinary circumstance that
warrant a departure from the general rule. Pressure and large volume of legal work
do not excuse a counsel for filing a pleading out of time. It is the counsel's duty to
devote his/her full attention, diligence, skills, and competence to every case that
he/she accepts. 52
The Court stressed in De Leon v. Hercules Agro Industrial
Corporation 53 that compliance with the reglementary period for perfecting an
appeal is not only a procedural issue, but jurisdictional, thus:
As the period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible, petitioner's motion for extension of time to file a
 motion for reconsideration did not toll the reglementary period
to appeal; thus, petitioner had already lost his right to appeal the
September 23, 2005 decision. As such, the RTC decision became
final as to petitioner when no appeal was perfected after the
lapse of the prescribed period.
Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a
statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must
comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting
an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law
must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection
of appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not
only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to
perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory.
The CA correctly ordered that petitioner's appellant's
brief be stricken off the records. As the CA said, the parties who
have not appealed in due time cannot legally ask for the
modification of the judgment or obtain affirmative relief from
the appellate court. A party who fails to question an adverse
decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period
prescribed by law loses his right to do so. As petitioner failed to
perfect his appeal within the period for doing so, the September
23, 2005 decision has become final as against him. The rule is
clear that no modification of judgment could be granted to a
party who did not appeal. It is enshrined as one of the basic
principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid
ambiguity in the presentation of issues, facilitate the setting
forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in making its
determinations. It is not installed in the rules merely to make
litigations laborious and tedious for the parties. It is there for a
reason.
Petitioner received a copy of the Decision dated June 21, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals on June 28, 2010 and the 15-day reglementary period expired on
July 13, 2010 without her filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, hence,
the said judgment already became final.
Moreover, the Court is unconvinced that it should set aside the finality of
the Court of Appeals judgment for the sake of substantive justice, as the appellate
court did not commit reversible error in ruling that the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is subsisting and valid because petitioner failed to establish
respondent's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner insists on respondent's psychological incapacity, a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, 54 which
provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
Jurisprudence had laid down guiding principles in resolving cases for the
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
In Azcueta v. Republic, 55 the Court presented a summation of relevant
jurisprudence on psychological incapacity, reproduced hereunder:
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is
vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens
our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not
the concern alone of the family members.
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals and Molina stringent guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state. AaCTcI
 The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may
be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to
be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage,
like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts x x x.
 In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no
less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage." The intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have
observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down
in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as
well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. Each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage,
it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. With the
advent of Te v. Te, the Court encourages a reexamination of
jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36
although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift
from the Molina doctrine. (Citations omitted.)
It bears to stress that the burden of proving the nullity of the marriage
falls on petitioner. Petitioner's evidence shall still be scrutinized and weighed,
regardless of respondent's failure to present any evidence on his behalf. Any doubt
shall be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage. Tested
against the present guidelines, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
totality of petitioner's evidence is insufficient to establish respondent's
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner imputes almost every imaginable negative character trait
against respondent, but not only do they not satisfactorily constitute
manifestations of respondent's psychological incapacity as contemplated in
the Family Code, petitioner's averments are riddled with inconsistencies that are
sometimes contradicted by her own evidence.
Petitioner avers that respondent tried to persuade her to have an
abortion when she became pregnant with Michael and respondent even
questioned Michael's paternity. Yet, notably, respondent never sought the
correction of Michael's Certificate of Live Birth, which specifically named him as
Michael's father. The following verbal exchanges between the couple in
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos 56 also show that respondent acknowledged his
children with petitioner, namely, Michael and Michelle, and was concerned with
their welfare: EcTCAD
Yoly
Ayoko na nga basta umalis ka sa bahay natin at kung hindi ka
aalis kami ng mga anak mo ang aalis.
Vencidor
Paano mga anak natin, sinong mag-aalaga sa kanila.
Yoly
Ako na ang bahala sa mga anak ko bubuhayin ko sila.
xxx xxx xxx
Yoly
Makikita mo pa naman ang mga anak mo, puwede mo rin
naman dalawin kahit dalawang beses sa isang lingo.
Vencidor
Ayoko yata Yoly na magkahiwalay tayo paano na ako, sino ang
mag-iintindi sa mga anak ko, halimbawa na umalis ka uli
papunta abroad.
Even assuming that respondent initially reacted adversely to petitioner's
pregnancy with Michael, it would appear from respondent's subsequent actuations
that he had come to accept that he is indeed Michael's father.
In her testimony, petitioner claimed that her relationship with respondent
was cut off when she got pregnant; that respondent never visited her during her
pregnancy; and that respondent visited her only once after she gave birth to
Michael on November 9, 1989. According to petitioner, she had no relationship
with respondent until she purchased the Pila property on March 3, 1994. 57 The
records, though, bear out the continuous relationship between petitioner and
respondent. First, petitioner stated in her own Memorandum before the RTC that
she "did not sever her ties with [respondent]." 58 Second, petitioner remitted
money to respondent sometime in 1992 for the purchase of the Morong property,
where they eventually lived. Third, Ms. De Guzman recounted in her Psychological
Report that sometime "[i]n 1992, Petitioner and Respondent started to live [in]
Morong, Rizal." 59 And fourth, petitioner married respondent on March 4, 1994,
which would just be the day after she bought the Pila property.
 Petitioner further alleges that respondent meddled with the purchase and
registration of the Morong and Pila properties. Although he did not make any
monetary contribution at all for the said purchases, respondent registered the TCT
of the Morong property in his name and as one of the owners in the TCT of the Pila
property. In addition, respondent purportedly sold a portion of the Morong
property without petitioner's consent. But the Court notes that petitioner and
respondent had already deported themselves as husband and wife long before the
purchase of the Morong and Pila properties and their actual marriage. Petitioner
had a direct hand in the preparation of Michael's Certificate of Live Birth in 1989
and she made it to appear therein that she and respondent were already married
on December 27, 1988 in Pasay City. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that
petitioner and respondent continued to misrepresent themselves as a married
couple in the purchase of the Pila property and in the case of the Morong property,
the purchase took place when petitioner was then working in Japan. It appears that
petitioner belatedly renounced respondent's authority to purchase and register
the subject properties, as well as to sell a portion of the Morong property, only
after their relationship had gone sour.
Furthermore, petitioner complains about respondent's joblessness,
gambling, alcoholism, sexual infidelity, and neglect of the children during their
marriage.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, it appears that respondent took on
several jobs. As indicated in Michael's Certificate of Live Birth, respondent's
occupation was listed as a "vendor." Respondent was also in-charge of the mini-
grocery store which he and petitioner put up. Most recently, respondent worked
as a jeepney driver. Petitioner's claim that respondent never plied the
jeepney 60 was contradicted by her own sister and witness, Marites, who testified
that respondent sometimes plied the jeepney himself or asked somebody else to
drive it for him. 61 Petitioner criticized respondent for not looking for a stable job,
but did not specify what job suits respondent's qualifications. More importantly, it
is settled in jurisprudence that refusal to look for a job per se is not indicative of a
psychological defect. 62
As for respondent's alleged drinking and gambling vices, petitioner herself
had no personal knowledge of the same, relying only on what relatives relayed to
her while she was in Japan. 63 Being hearsay evidence, petitioner's testimony on
the matter had no probative value 64 even if allowed by the Court as part of her
narration. It is Marites, in her testimony 65 and Sinumpaang Salaysay, 66 who
recounted that petitioner would often play tong-its and mahjong until early
morning, come home drunk, sleep until afternoon, and leave again to gamble.
While respondent could have indulged in the vices of drinking and gambling, it was
not established that it was due to some debilitating psychological condition or
illness or that it was serious enough as to prevent him from performing his essential
marital obligations. As the Court pronounced in Suazo v. Suazo: 67
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a
job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital
obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the
absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
There is utter lack of factual basis for respondent's purported sexual
infidelity. Aside from petitioner's bare allegations, no concrete proof was proffered
in court to establish respondent's unfaithfulness to petitioner. Petitioner failed to
provide details on respondent's supposed affairs, such as the names of the other
women, how the affairs started or developed, and how she discovered the affairs.
Ms. De Guzman, in her Psychological Report, quoted respondent's brother,
Avelino, as saying that different women often looked for and visited respondent at
the latter's house after petitioner and respondent separated, but this is still
insufficient evidence of respondent's marital infidelity.
The Court already declared that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient
proof that a spouse is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown
that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which
makes the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage. 68 In Navales v. Navales, 69 the Court still found no factual basis for the
husband's claim that his wife, being flirtatious and sexually promiscuous, was
psychologically incapacitated, regardless of the submitted psychological report
concluding that the wife was a nymphomaniac. The Court reasoned as
follows: HSAcaE
The Court finds that the psychological report presented
in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's psychological
incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a
nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a
borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are
incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a
very weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a
social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several
occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality
disorder, fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive,
irritable and aggressive, irresponsible and vain. She further
defined "nymphomania" as a psychiatric disorder that involves a
disturbance in motor behavior as shown by her sexual
relationship with various men other than her husband.
The report failed to specify, however, the names of the
men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the circumstances
 surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not Ayoko na nga makisama sa iyo, basta ibalik mo na lang ang pera
even a single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit ko at mga alahas ko.
relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagul
Vencidor
claims, during her testimony, that in coming out with the
report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but also Jojo Paano naman ako dapat tayo ay hati.
Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law
Yoly
and sister, respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain Susan.
Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these O sige ibalik mo ang P150,000.00, at alahas ko.
persons, which information were supplied by whom, and how
Vencidor
they came upon their respective informations. Indeed, the
conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack Gawin mo namang P300,000.00.
sufficient factual bases. As the report lacked specificity, it failed
Yoly
to show the root cause of Nilda's psychological incapacity; and
failed to demonstrate that there was a "natal or supervening O sige gawin mo ng Tatlong daan, pati bahay sa Pila, Laguna jeep
disabling factor" or an "adverse integral element" in Nilda's at trysikel sa iyo na umalis ka lang ng bahay.
character that effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and
Vencidor
thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations, and
that her psychological or mental malady existed even before the Saan naman ako uuwi, pero pansamantala lang ito di ba?
marriage. x x x. (Citations omitted.) Yoly
That respondent delegated the care for the children to Marites, Makikita mo pa naman ang mga anak mo, puwede mo rin
petitioner's sister, does not necessarily constitute neglect. While it is truly ideal naman dalawin kahit dalawang beses sa isang lingo.
that children be reared personally by their parents, in reality, there are various
reasons which compel parents to employ the help of others, such as a relative or Vencidor
hired nanny, to watch after the children. In the instant case, it was actually Ayoko yata Yoly na magkahiwalay tayo paano na ako, sino ang
petitioner who brought Marites from Bicol to Manila to care for Michael, and also mag-iintindi sa mga anak ko, halimbawa na umalis ka uli
later on, for Michelle. Granting that Marites was primarily responsible for the papunta abroad.
children's care, there is no showing that a serious psychological disorder has
rendered respondent incognizant of and incapacitated to perform his parental Yoly
obligations to his children. There is no allegation, much less proof, that the children Ayoko na nga makisama sayo kung [di] ka aalis mapipilitan ako
were deprived of their basic needs or were placed in danger by reason of na itataas ko na ito kaso natin.
respondent's neglect or irresponsibility.
Vencidor
Petitioner additionally accuses respondent of taking her money and
jewelry after their marital dispute sometime in 2001, and submitted O sige kukunin ko ang pera sa bangko at ibibigay ko sa iyo
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos they executed before the barangay in which dadalhin ko sa bahay.
respondent admitted doing so. The submitted document recorded the exchange Yoly
between the couple, thus:
Ang kikita (sic) ko lagi niyang sinisilip.
Vencidor
Vencidor
O sige Yoly ibabalik ko yong alahas mo at pera mo magsimula
uli tayo. Dapat naman mag-asawa naman tayo kung ano ang iyo ay akin
rin yon di ba.
Yoly
Yoly
 Bakit mo kinuha ang pera ko [?]
Vencidor
Ginalaw ko iyon kasi inuunahan mo ako. Di mo ako pinalalapit
pagtulog ay mag-asawa tayo. At yong Hapon palaging
tumatawag, kaya naitago ko ang mga alahas mo. Hinabol
pa niyan ng saksak.
Yoly
Sinisiraan niya ako sa Hapon ay iyon ay mga kustomer ko.
Masasakit ang mga sinasabi niya sa kin. HESIcT
Vencidor
Binabalewala niya ako.
Yoly
Basta umalis ka na sa bahay at naibigay ko na sa iyo ang [b]ahay
sa [L]aguna, jeep, trysikel at pera ano pa ang gusto mo[?]
[S]a amin ng mga anak mo ang bahay sa Natividad St.,
Ibaba. Wala ka pakialam roon at ako ang nagpundar
noon. 70 (Emphases supplied.)
A perusal of the aforequoted verbal exchange between petitioner and
respondent in the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, though, reveals that respondent only
hid petitioner's money and jewelry as a desperate attempt to stop petitioner from
leaving him, taking with her the children. In fact, respondent repeatedly expressed
concern about saving their marriage, offering to return the money and jewelry back
to petitioner as long as they stay together. It was petitioner who categorically
stated that she no longer wanted to live with respondent, offering to the latter
P300,000.00 cash, the Pila property, the jeepney and the tricycle, just for
respondent to leave their marital home.
Petitioner asserts too that she had been physically abused by respondent,
but offers no substantiating evidence, such as details on the instances of abuse,
pictures of her injuries, medico-legal report, or other witness' testimony.
While the Court does not hold respondent totally without blame or free
of shortcomings, but his failings as husband and father are not tantamount to
psychological incapacity which renders their marriage void from the very
beginning. Worthy of reiterating herein is the declaration of the Court
in Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador 71 that:
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that
characterize some marriages. The intent of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders — existing at the time of
the marriage — clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The
psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)
Finally, the Court is not bound by Ms. De Guzman's Psychological Report.
While the Court previously held that "there is no requirement that the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician,"
yet, this is qualified by the phrase, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity." 72 The psychologist's findings
must still be subjected to a careful and serious scrutiny as to the bases of the same,
particularly, the source/s of information, as well as the methodology employed.
In Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 73 the Court did not give credence to
the clinical psychologist's report because:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions
about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on
the information fed to her by only one side — the petitioner —
whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for
reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve
the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in
the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party
account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the
respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to
the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the
petitioner's narrations, and on this basis characterized the
respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful
person who "believes that the world revolves around him"; and
who "used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the
confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." Dr. Tayag then
incorporated her own idea of "love"; made a generalization that
respondent was a person who "lacked commitment, faithfulness,
and remorse," and who engaged "in promiscuous acts that made
the petitioner look like a fool"; and finally concluded that the
respondent's character traits reveal "him to suffer Narcissistic
 Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave and incurable."
We find these observations and conclusions
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented
the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's
narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we
cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her
Report — i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave and incurable — is an unfounded
statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the
various tests administered on the petitioner could have been
used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition,
this same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondent's condition. To make conclusions and generalizations
on the respondent's psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of
the content of such evidence.
The Court similarly rejected the psychiatric evaluation report presented
by the petitioner in Agraviador for the following reasons:
The Court finds that Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation
Report fell short in proving that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate
and examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the
end of his Report for the respondent to "undergo the same
examination [that the petitioner] underwent." Dr. Patac relied
only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties' second
child, Emmanuel, and household helper, Sarah. Largely, the
doctor relied on the information provided by the petitioner.
Thus, while his Report can be used as a fair gauge to assess the
petitioner's own psychological condition (as he was, in fact,
declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot be
made with respect to the respondent's condition. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth
and comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate
a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder. caITAC
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the
party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory.
We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought
to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally
examined by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive
at such declaration. If a psychological disorder can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such independent
proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent
evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in
this case. 74
Much in the same way, the Court finds herein that Ms. De Guzman's
sources and methodology is severely lacking the requisite depth and
comprehensiveness to judicially establish respondent's psychological incapacity.
Ms. De Guzman relied on the information given by petitioner; Avelino,
respondent's brother; Ramil Ereve, petitioner's brother; an anonymous female
cousin of petitioner; 75 and the couple's neighbors who refused to give their
names. 76 On the basis thereof, Ms. De Guzman determined that respondent
suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, the root cause of which, Ms. De
Guzman traced back to respondent, as the youngest child in the family, being
favored, praised, and indulged by his caregivers. From there, Ms. De Guzman
already concluded that respondent's disorder rendered it beyond his capacity to
understand, comply, and attend to his obligations in the marriage; was present
even before marriage; and was "pervasive, permanent and clinically proven to be
incurable." To put it simply, Ms. De Guzman is saying that respondent was a spoiled
child, and while it can be said that respondent has grown up to be a self-centered
and self-indulgent adult, it still falls short of establishing respondent's
psychological incapacity characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability, so as to render respondent's marriage to petitioner void ab initio.
All told, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals in declaring that the
marriage of petitioner and respondent as subsisting and valid. As the Court decreed
in Republic v. Galang: 77
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and
strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved
at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of
 marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented
clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them,
could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a
grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was
celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the
marital tie.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 21, 2010 and Resolution
dated August 24, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89142
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Garlet v. Garlet, G.R. No. 193544, [August 2, 2017])
[G.R. No. 217993. August 9, 2017.]
MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III, petitioner, vs. NORA REYES
BAKUNAWA, respondent.
REYES, JR., J p:
For resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by
Manuel R. Bakunawa III (Manuel) challenging the Decision 2 dated March 27, 2014
and Resolution 3 dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 98579, which upheld the validity of his marriage to Nora Reyes Bakunawa
(Nora). DHIcET
The Facts
Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines where
they were students and became sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she
and Manuel got married on July 26, 1975 at St. Ignatius Church, Camp Aguinaldo,
Quezon City. 4
Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that time,
they lived with Manuel's parents. While Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to
stop his studies to help his father in the family's construction business. Manuel was
assigned to provincial projects and came home only during weekends. This setup
continued even as Nora gave birth to their eldest child, Moncho Manuel (Moncho).
However, whenever Manuel came back from his provincial assignments, he chose
to spend his limited time with friends and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora
resented this and they started quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel
depended on his father and on Nora for their family's needs. 5
In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. It was
during this period that Manuel first observed Nora's passiveness and laziness; she
was moody and mercurial. Their house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus,
Manuel became more irritated with Nora and their verbal quarrels escalated to
physical violence. 6
On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing
changed in their relationship. Manuel spent most of his time with friends and
engaged in drinking sprees. In 1979, he had an extramarital affair and seldom came
home. He eventually left Nora and their children in 1980 to cohabit with his
girlfriend. They considered themselves separated. 7
In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their
children. After Manuel spent a few nights with them in the new house, Nora
became pregnant again and thereafter gave birth to their third child. 8
On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, 9 on the ground that
he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. HDICSa
Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who
testified that Manuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder, characterized by
irritability and aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr.
Villegas diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a
display of negative attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with Manuel.
Her findings were based on her interview with Manuel and the parties' eldest son,
Moncho, because Nora did not participate in the psychological assessment. 10
Manuel alleges in his petition that he continues to live with his common-
law wife and has a son with her, whereas, Nora lives alone in her unit in Cubao,
Quezon City. Their house and lot was already foreclosed following Nora's failure to
pay a loan secured by a mortgage on the said property. 11
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition in its Decision 12 dated March 28, 2011. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage between MANUEL R.
BAKUNAWA III and NORA REYES BAKUNAWA null and void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 The Office of the City Civil Registrar of Quezon City is
hereby ordered to make entries into the records of the
respective parties pursuant to the judgment of the Court.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished upon the Office
of Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, the Office of the Civil Registrars of Quezon City, and the
National Statistics Office, as well as the parties and counsel.
SO ORDERED. 13
Nora appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing inter alia that the RTC
erred in finding that the testimony of the psychiatrist is sufficient to prove the
parties' psychological incapacity.
Ruling of the CA
The CA, in its Decision 14 dated March 27, 2014, granted Nora's appeal
and reversed the RTC decision. The decretal portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
filed by [Nora] is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 28, 2011
of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region in Civil Case No. Q-
08-62822 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. HcDSaT
SO ORDERED. 15
The CA denied Manuel's motion for reconsideration 16 through a
Resolution 17 dated April 22, 2015.
Manuel filed the present petition raising the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE
MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES DESPITE MORE THAN CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO DECLARE ITS NULLITY DUE TO THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF EITHER OR BOTH PARTIES TO
PERFORM THEIR MARITAL OBLIGATIONS; and
II. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECONSIDER ITS
DECISION DATED MARCH 27, 2014 DESPITE MORE THAN
COMPELLING REASONS FOR THE REVERSAL THEREOF. 18
Ruling of the Court
As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by Manuel
comprising of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter's
psychological evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent
Explosive Disorder and that Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder which
render them psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family
Code, 19 is solely based on her interviews with Manuel and the parties' eldest
child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did not err in not according probative value
to her psychological evaluation report and testimony.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang, 20 the Court held that "[i]f the
incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such
independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological
incapacity, independently of a psychologist's examination and report." 21 In Toring
v. Toring, et al., 22 the Court stated that:
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come
from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close
friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on
the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the
time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace
their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of
marriage. 23
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel
for the spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be
considered as a reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his
parents in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been
there at the time his parents were married. ASTcaE
The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological
tests on Manuel despite having had the opportunity to do so. While the Court has
declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a
physician, 24 much less be subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds
application only if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity. In this case, the supposed personality disorder of
Manuel could have been established by means of psychometric and neurological
tests which are objective means designed to measure specific aspects of people's
intelligence, thinking, or personality. 25
With regard to the Confirmatory Decree 26 of the National Tribunal of
Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance
for the Archdiocese of Manila in favor of nullity of the Catholic marriage of Manuel
and Nora, the Court accords the same with great respect but does not consider the
same as controlling and decisive, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 27
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 ||| (Bakunawa III v. Bakunawa, G.R. No. 217993 (Resolution), [August 9,
2017])
[G.R. No. 201988. October 11, 2017.]
MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC-CRUZ, petitioner, vs. NILO
SANTOS CRUZ, respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
The most challenging part of being in a difficult marriage is to thrive in
one. In the case of petitioner Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz (Marivi) and
respondent Nilo Santos Cruz (Nilo), their marriage withered as this was beset with
problems such as the lack of quality time, recriminations, disillusionment, loss of
passion, and infidelity. The estranged spouses considered their union as non-
functional, attributing the failure of their marriage to their respective personality
disorders that repelled each other.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 challenges the November 22, 2011
Decision 2 and May 29, 2012 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 93736 that affirmed the Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
207, Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 05-095 which refused to declare the marriage
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Factual Antecedents
Twenty-two-year-old Marivi met 28-year old Nilo sometime in March
1986. They became steady in August of the same year. Nilo, whose job was then in
Hong Kong, prodded Marivi to marry him so she could join him there soonest.
Marivi agreed. The couple married in a civil ceremony 5 on October 21, 1986
followed by a church wedding 6 on February 8, 1987. The marriage produced two
sons: Antonio Manuel, born on April 25, 1988, and Jose Nilo, born on September
9, 1992.
On July 7, 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage 7 based on psychological incapacity. She averred
that it had been medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from "inadequate
personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved
oedipal complex," 8 while she herself was found to be suffering from a "personality
disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic with immaturity x x x." 9
To show that Nilo failed to provide her with the necessary emotional,
psychological, and physical support, Marivi cited the following:
1. His infidelity and his non-commitment to the marriage as he continued
to act like a bachelor;
2. The lack of 'oneness' in the marriage as Nilo would make decisions (on
financial matters) without consulting or considering her
suggestions; treating her as a housemate or a "mayordoma";
keeping from her his whereabouts, when he would come home
or how much his income was;
3. The lack of sexual contact for more than a decade as Nilo made excuses;
4. Putting up a façade that he is a caring, concerned, and loving husband,
especially to his bosses; and
5. Preference towards the company of his peers/friends. 10
In his Answer, 11 Nilo claimed that he was madly in love with Marivi; that
at the start of their relationship, both he and Marivi would exhibit negative
personality traits which they overlooked; that he believed that both he and Marivi
were suffering from psychological incapacity; and that he was not singularly
responsible for the breakdown of their marriage. He stressed that Marivi also
contributed to the deterioration of their union, to wit:
1. Marivi would demand that he behave in ways he was not accustomed
to or inconsistent with his career position;
2. Marivi was jealous of his friends; and would often make hasty
conclusions that he was having an affair with other women;
3. Marivi would exhibit volatile temperament if things did not go her way;
would not admit mistakes, and blame others instead;
4. Marivi would make decisions impulsively, such as changing an item she
gets tired of, or demanding that Nilo change a motor vehicle
simply because she did not like it; and
5. She lacked respect for Nilo, and would speak to him degradingly, and
even accuse him of being gay or a homosexual. 12
On October 11, 2006, the trial court rendered a Partial
Decision 13 approving the parties' Compromise Agreement 14 pertaining to
custody, support, and dissolution of the properties. Trial on the issue of the nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity ensued.
Marivi's Version
Marivi narrated that when they were still going steady, Nilo would only
spend Saturdays and Sundays with her and devote the weekdays to partying with
his friends; that even after their engagement, Nilo would still meet other women
and accept invitations to beauty pageants and cocktails; 15 that Nilo was not the
type who would kiss passionately; that Nilo would not engage in foreplay during
sex, but wished only to satisfy himself; that Nilo would engage in anal sex and
would only stop when she complained that it was painful; that Nilo would
thereafter sleep, leaving her feeling "used," and that Nilo was impulsive, daring,
and adventurous. 16
She also claimed that Nilo would habitually come home late; that Friday
nights were Nilo's boys' night out; that unless she would ask him to take her out on
a date, Nilo would not do so; and that Nilo would call her a "nagger" even if she
was merely asking him to come home early. 17
Marivi further narrated that Nilo would engage in extramarital affairs;
that a few months into their marriage, Nilo had an affair with an unmarried female
officemate; 18 that Nilo ended the affair only after she (Marivi) threatened to tell
his employer/supervisor; 19 that Nilo had another affair a few weeks after the
birth of their second son; that when confronted with his womanizing and made to
choose between her and the children or the other women, Nilo replied that he was
"confused," 20 which prompted her to leave and stay in Cebu with her parents;
and that she heard from her friends that while she was in Cebu, Nilo was living a
bachelor's life. 21
Marivi added that she eventually reconciled with Nilo but despite the
reconciliation, Nilo never really changed, and that he remained indifferent,
insensitive, and unappreciative. According to Marivi, she would instead call up her
parents and sisters to talk about their family problems; 22 that while he (Nilo) told
people that he was proud of her, he never gave her the emotional, psychological,
and physical support she needed. 23 She felt like she was no more than
a mayordoma to him, and that they were just "housemates." Nilo would come
home late on weekdays and preferred to go out with his friends. Their quarrels
were frequent and their conversations were superficial; Nilo would rather talk
about himself, instead of asking Marivi about her day or about their children. He
was controlling and domineering, 24 and refused to consider her suggestions; he
would not want his money mingled with her (Marivi's) money. 25 Nilo would shell
out money when he wanted to buy things, but would make excuses when it came
to Marivi's suggestion for a family vacation. 26 Marivi also claimed that Nilo had
no sense of companionship with their children; and that Nilo even told their son
that their brand new house was everything to him. 27
Marivi was moreover bothered by Nilo's effeminate ways; he was vain and
would have weekly "beauty" treatments. 28 Furthermore, they no longer had sex
after the birth of their second son. While they tried to have sex twice, Nilo failed
to have an erection. After that, Nilo would refuse to have sex with her which made
her (Marivi) question his sexual orientation, so much so that Nilo physically hurt
her when she questioned his virility. 29
Marivi's father, Manuel, likewise stated that Marivi would call them up for
help because Nilo had hurt her during the couple's quarrel; that their marriage was
not harmonious due to Marivi's youth and her unfamiliarity with Nilo's personality
and family values. He considered Nilo only as a provider, not as a husband and a
good father to his sons. 30
Marivi's younger sister, Margarita Ledesma (Margarita), who lived for four
years with Nilo and Marivi, claimed to have witnessed how lonely Marivi was. She
alleged that Nilo was absent when Marivi gave birth to their second son; that Nilo
was short-tempered when driving; and that the couple would often fight because
Nilo would always come home late or because Marivi suspected Nilo of infidelity.
Margarita believed that Nilo did not really want to save the marriage, although he
told her that he loves Marivi and the children. 31
Nilo's Version
Nilo acknowledged his contribution to the breakdown of the marriage
because his job required him to come home late, his inability to sexually perform
adequately, his failure to be the "ideal husband," 32 and because he had had
extramarital affairs in the years 1992, 2002, and 2006. 33 At the same time, Nilo
insisted that Marivi also contributed to the collapse of their union.
According to Nilo, Marivi would always want to know his companions and
whereabouts; would demand information about his female acquaintances; and
would even call up his workplace to ask where he was. Moreover, her conceit and
her "prima donna" attitude embarrassed him. Marivi would order him to act in
accordance with their stature in life, and would demand that he instruct his office
staff to accord her special treatment as Hewlett Packard's "first lady" during the
time that he was Hewlett Packard's President. Marivi would also instruct their
housemaids to call him "señorito;" and she would make a "big deal" out of her
being a "mestiza," and would think of herself a "trophy wife." 34
Nilo claimed that Marivi was "unappreciative" of him, had a misdirected
sense of self-entitlement, and would complain if she did not get her own way, as
she was used to, she being her father's favorite daughter; Marivi did not even care
about discussing family finances with him as long as she got what she wanted. She
also had a violent temper and would hurl things at him during their fights; that she
would blame him for everything, and would keep on reciting his past mistakes.
Marivi did not understand the demands of his job, and unfairly compared his work
to her father's job, the operation of which was limited to a single area, a compound
in a mine site in Cebu. He explained that the multinational companies he then
worked for required him to work beyond the normal office hours because he has
to meet "sales quotas in millions of dollars," entertain people from different
headquarters, and meet with different clients from areas far from his residence. 35
 Worse, Nilo was turned off by Marivi's act of broadcasting to her whole
clan his inadequacies during their intimate sexual relations, which began after he
witnessed Marivi giving birth to their first child. When he confided to Marivi about
this, she instead accused him of having another affair. Since then, he did not feel
any sexual excitement and attraction toward her when they were together. Instead
of discussing the problem with him candidly, she accused him of being gay. Nilo
stated that the last time they had sex was in 1997 or in 1998. 36
The Clinical Findings
In support of her claim that she and Nilo were suffering from psychological
incapacity, Marivi presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), a psychiatrist, and Dr.
Ruben Encarnacion (Dr. Encarnacion), a clinical psychologist.
Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nilo to have "inadequate personality disorder
related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal
complex," 37 while she diagnosed Marivi to have "personality disorder of the
mixed type, [h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic, with immaturity x x x." 38
In the March 21, 2005 Psychiatric Report, 39 Dr. Villegas stated:
The root cause of the above clinical conditions, on the
part of Marivi Cruz, were the overindulgence and over attention
of her parents, in a prolonged manner, carried over to adult
adjustments. On the part of Nilo Cruz, his negative identification
and resentments towards his father and close attachments to his
mother, continued by his long-time maid, to the point of an
oedipal situation led to his inadequacy, along masculine strivings,
with difficult assertions of his authority and power.
The above clinical conditions existed prior [to] marriage
but became manifest only after the celebration due to marital
stresses and demands. Both are considered as permanent in
nature, because they started early in their developmental stage,
and therefore became so deeply engrained into their personality
structures. Both are considered grave in degree, because they
hampered, interfered and disrupted their normal functioning
related to heterosexual adjustments. 40
According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate each others'
weaknesses and that the incapacities of the parties are grave because they
preferred to satisfy their own needs rather than to give in to the other's needs. 41
She claimed that Nilo's lack of a father figure weakened his masculinity.
He cross-identified himself with his mother because his father, a disciplinarian and
the thrifty one, was often absent because of his military service. While he was still
a teenager, his mother migrated to Canada and their long-time maid acted as his
surrogate mother. Nilo sought from his wife his mother's nurturing qualities, but
he felt hostility when Marivi failed to meet his ego ideal. His aggression was in the
form of passivity, punishing his wife by not sexually performing. 42
Dr. Villegas noted that Nilo would put on a facade, a compensatory
mechanism according to social norms. While he was not exactly a homosexual, he
covered up his weak masculine traits by being a "playboy." Nilo could only comply
with the financial obligation of marital life, but not the psychological and emotional
parts of it. 43 Nilo likewise was an inadequate father figure to his own two sons,
especially the younger, who has already manifested strong feminine traits. 44
Marivi, on the other hand, expected that her interactions with the world
would be like that of her own close-knit family, a perception attributable to her
parents' prolonged gratification of her dependency needs. Her father was a
dedicated, devoted, and responsible family man who regularly came home to
spend time with them, while her mother was a good housewife, who always found
time to personally attend to their needs. Dr. Villegas described Marivi as one with
strong mood fluctuations, emotionally immature, with low self-esteem, has
difficulty neutralizing the outbreak of negativity in her behavior, is suggestible,
egocentric, and impelled by a desire to "extort" from others. To Dr. Villegas, the
couple's respective personality disorders were mutually repelling, their brain
waves not being in sync because what Marivi expected from Nilo happened to be
Nilo's weakest point. 45
Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas' diagnosis. On the basis of Nilo's
five-to-six sessions and Marivi's eight bi-weekly psychotherapy sessions with him,
Dr. Encarnacion concluded that there was no chance of a successful marriage in a
dysfunctional union when there is double psychological incapacity. He categorically
stated that Nilo was incapable of being a good husband and a good father. Nilo
lacked an individual coherent identity and instead went by the standards of general
society, which is driven by the desire to gain material wealth, power, and control.
Nilo did not like close relationships and was incapable of forming some; his social
anxiety, associated with paranoid fears, was manifested by excessive vanity. Nilo
projected an image of a wealthy, successful, handsome man surrounded by
women, in none of whom, however, he was interested in a long-term sexual
relationship; he saw himself as a performer-provider and was disinterested in
spending quality time with his family, in carrying on conversations with members
of his family, insensitive, intolerant, and demanding. 46
Dr. Encarnacion attributed respondent's psychological disorder to his
childhood, in which he did not have fond memories of tender moments and
vacation times with his family. Nilo grew up very close to his mother who always
listened to his complaints and with whom he sympathized, hence his unresolved
oedipal issues; even as he patterned his masculinity strivings after his stingy father,
the family provider, but whom he nonetheless described as "unappreciative,
undemonstrative, and quite materialistic." At the age of 18, when his parents
migrated to Canada and left him in the Philippines, he then lost his role models,
incapacitating him from creating his own identity. Thus, when he began working at
the age of 21, he imbibed the values of his workplace, where feelings and
emotional discussions were absent, factors that nonetheless somehow worked to
his advantage in his job. 47 Dr. Encarnacion opined that Nilo's incapacity was his
"rigidity," which drove him into imposing his family upbringing on his own family,
instead of adjusting to the modern family setup, i.e., that the modern father should
take on new roles and be part of family activities where his family needs him to
be, e.g., taking the children to the pediatrician or to the park, camping with the
family, or being with them in church, instead of strictly confining himself to being
a provider. 48
As for Marivi, Dr. Encarnacion found that she exhibited "Histrionic
Personality Behaviors and Features" as manifested by her impressionistic speech,
her exaggerated expression of emotions, and her suggestibility. He stated that
Marivi's "inflexibility" consisted in her expecting a high standard of faithfulness
from all men as exemplified by her dad, who was also very devoted to her mother.
However, because dissatisfied and frustrated by her actual marital situation, she
sought attention, externalized blame, displayed anger, mistrust, resentment, and
self-indulgence. 49
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its October 13, 2008 Decision, 50 the RTC denied the Petition.
The RTC took a dim view of the expert witnesses' attribution of a double
psychological incapacity to Marivi's nature of being a "father figure woman," and
to Nilo's "oedipal complex." The court noted that Marivi already disengaged herself
from her father as her standard of an ideal husband when she married Nilo, despite
the latter's limitations and his then being already very focused on his job. Marivi's
need for assurance that she is loved, vis-à-vis her looking up to her father as her
standard, was not by itself sufficient to declare her psychologically incapacitated.
As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of "oedipal complex"; the
RTC held that prioritizing his work over the emotional needs of his family was not
reflective of his psychological incapacity because what he did was still for his
family's benefit. Neither was Nilo's lack of sexual interest in Marivi a case of
psychological incapacity, for this was a result of his being turned off by Marivi's
unabated naggings and her revelations to her family of his sexual inadequacies.
From the RTC's verdict, petitioner appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its November 22, 2011 Decision, 51 the CA united with the RTC in
rejecting the alleged existence of psychological incapacity pointed out by Dr.
Villegas and by Dr. Encarnacion.
The CA found that Dr. Villegas and Dr. Encarnacion failed to paint a clear
picture of the supposed gravity or seriousness of Nilo's psychological incapacity,
and that it was unconvinced of the doctors' conclusion that Nilo had a deep
propensity to cover up for his serious inadequacies.
It ruled that Marivi failed to prove that Nilo's failure to comply with his
sexual obligation was due to some psychological condition or makeup, as this could
very well be explained by the stress brought about by Marivi's negative attitude
toward Nilo, who was turned off by her act of revealing to her clan their bedroom
secrets instead of privately resolving the problem with him. Moreover, the CA said
it is a non sequitur, that just because he could not sexually perform according to
Marivi's standard, he should thus be labelled a gay or homosexual. It appears that
Nilo has "selective" impotency, for while he could not have an erection for Marivi,
he nevertheless had had extramarital affairs. Neither did the CA see anything
wrong with Nilo's "put-on façade" of a happy marriage to protect the family's
privacy.
The CA did not even consider Marivi's alleged histrionic traits as reflected
in her behavior, e.g., her persistent demand as to Nilo's whereabouts, her constant
naggings, her attention-seeking acts, grave or serious enough to qualify as
psychological incapacity. The CA ruled that it was the couple's irreconcilable
differences that marred their marriage; that the negative acts or actions of one
spouse were neutralized or offset by the other's negative acts or actions, and that
these are "mere character flaws or bad habits that the spouses developed over the
years [which] can be modified or changed depending on the desire of either spouse
to do so." 52 The CA thereafter disposed of the appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court in CV No. 05-095 denying the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage between appellant Maria
Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz and appellee Nilo Santos Cruz for
insufficiency of evidence is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 53
Marivi moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in the CA's May 29,
2012 Resolution. 54
Issue
At issue before us is whether the psychological conditions of the parties
fall under Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Our Ruling
We sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
 Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying this provision.
In Republic v. De Gracia, 55 we reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 56 "that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity
(i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e.,
it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved)." Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 57 we
reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage, as embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 58 viz.:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x
x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the
time of the celebration' of the marriage. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted as
root causes. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. x x x.
Notably, "mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting
personalities' [as in the present case,] in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity." 59 "Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons" amount to psychological incapacity. 60 We further
elucidated in Yambao v. Republic 61 that the psychological condition should
render the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic marital obligations:
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not
merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the
following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must
be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough
to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty
as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. 62
In Marcos v. Marcos, 63 the actual medical examination of the one
claimed to have psychological incapacity is not a condition sine qua non, for what
matters is the totality of evidence to sustain a finding of such psychological
incapacity. While it behooves this Court to weigh the clinical findings of psychology
experts as part of the evidence, the court's hands are nonetheless free to make its
own independent factual findings. "It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all
the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert
opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the
course of the proceedings." 64
With specific reference to the case before us, even granting that both
parties did suffer from personality disorders as evaluated by the expert witnesses,
we find that the conclusions reached by these expert witnesses do not irresistibly
point to the fact that the personality disorders which plague the spouses antedated
the marriage; that these personality disorders are indeed grave or serious; or that
these personality disorders are incurable or permanent as to render the parties
psychologically incapacitated to carry out and carry on their marital duties. What
can be inferred from the totality of evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility.
For a personality disorder to be declared clinically or medically incurable or
permanent is one thing; for a spouse to refuse or to be reluctant to perform his/her
marital duties is another. 65
Indeed, we are loath to overturn the findings of the RTC and the CA. More
than that, too, the evidence on record do not square with the existence of
psychological incapacity as contemplated by law and jurisprudence. In the case of
Nilo, what brought about the breakdown of his relationship with Marivi was not
necessarily attributable to his so-called "psychological disorder" but can be
imputed to his work and marital stress, and his ordinary human failings.
With regard to his failure to sexually perform "adequately," the same
appeared to be a case of "selective impotency," as he was turned off by Marivi's
disclosure of their bed secrets to her family. Furthermore, Nilo testified that the
sexual problem with Marivi did not crop up until the birth of their second son, and
that he felt that the blame was invariably and unfairly laid on upon him, thus:
THE COURT:
The Court has just some questions with regard to the main issue.
During your direct testimony, Mr. Witness, you mentioned
some of your faults which [may be] the reason why the
instant case was filed. x x x one of those faults is no sex.
When did that happen? x x x
A. If I recall it right, Your Honor, I [had] some challenge[s]
immediately after the first birth of my eldest son which I x
x x shared with the psychologist or psychiatrist who [had]
examined me.
THE COURT:
But when you got married with your wife that was not a problem
until the birth of your last son?
A. Yes, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx 66
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:
Q. So it is attributable to the petitioner though you claim that it is
your fault, is that correct?
A. Because, your Honor, that kind of situation, I always get blamed,
so for the purpose of settling all these questions, when
you make that mistake, you'll always be the one to be
blamed although as per the psychologist and the
psychiatrist, there's also a reason why I am not able to
perform sex to my wife because in those ten (10) years
that we were together, after the first one, [didn't] have
any other affairs but I kept being blamed that I [had] just
because I [was] not able to perform sex to her. The whole
family, her family knows that in that premise because I
got, one time, in one of our quarrels x x x told me, "maybe
you're not making love with my daughter because you are
having an affair with another woman." So, I know I made
a mistake in the past, but if I'm x x x kept [being] reminded
of it, it's a punishment, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What you initially said was your fault was . . . as you're now
talking before this Honorable Court, is really the fault of
the petitioner; is that what you are saying?
A. There [were] times, your Honor, I would say it was my fault.
There [were] times it was caused by her faults as well. It's
not one plus one it was hers and one plus one it was mine,
it depends on the situation. We've been dealing with cases
before so not all the time it's the fault of Mrs. Cruz. And
not all the time it's the fault of Mr. Cruz. It's a relationship,
there are times it's hers, there are times, it's mine but
we're able to fix it until this annulment situation came.
xxx xxx xxx 67
Nor can it be said that Nilo's failure to provide quality time for the family
was caused by his "inadequate personality disorder" or "unresolved oedipal
complex." Nilo explained that he has a taxing and demanding job, and that
unfortunately, with his working hours eating up his home life, while he was able to
provide his family with an adequate standard of living, the lack of quality time for
his wife became attenuated and resulted in severing his bond with Marivi, who
failed to understand the nature of his job. They were a happy couple during the
period of courtship, and even during the early years of their marriage. Nilo
testified:
ATTY. REVILLA:
Q. x x x What was the reason why you had to stay up late?
A. Ma'am, I'm . . . in those I.T. companies that I worked for whether
manager or managing director, my companies are . . . the
companies are involved in sales and marketing and
support so it entails entertainment of clients,
entertainment of principals coming from headquarters
and entertainment of customers with my staff and other
company.
Q. When you say I.T., what does it stand for?
A. Information Technology.
Q. You also referred to a headquarters. What do you mean by
headquarters?
A. Headquarters, if you work in a multinational company like
companies I worked for, they have headquarters in Hong
Kong, they have headquarters in Singapore, they have
headquarters in the U.S.
Q. So you had to entertain principals coming from [these]
headquarters?
A. As a part of the job as required by the principals who [visit] us.
Q. How often were you required to stay out late because of your
job?
A. Ma'am, it is unpredictable. Sometimes, we were required to stay
for dinner and entertainment thereafter. Sometimes, we
can go home early also.
Q. Could you not refuse the invitations of going out and just go
home and spend time with your family?
A. Sometimes I can refuse, sometimes I cannot. Because it becomes
a condition of sale of the clients x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So x x x what's the latest time of the night that you usually come
home?
A. My objective as a husband and as a father is to really come as
early as I can which I have explained on and on, your
Honor. But to meet my million dollar targets of the
country, I have to do things beyond 5 o'clock. In several
occasions when I tried to go home early, to my
disappointment, my kids are not at home because they
were borrowed by my in-laws to have merienda. That's
why I complained to my wife that time that "please tell me
if they are going with my in-laws because I don't want to
deprive them also of the few times I'm able to go home
early."
Q. So, you are saying that you only have few times of coming home
early?
A. Well, yes, but not very few.
Q. Okay. Have you tried to make an effort to remedy the situation?
A. Well, if I have my way to be able to direct my appointments in
the South, my meetings in Amkor Anam, Mamplasan, in
Sta. Rosa then that will allow me to be home at least 5-6
o'clock. But most of my meetings in Makati, Quezon City,
Manila especially with government clients [do] allow me
to go home early, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx 68
THE COURT:
What about another fault you mentioned which is staying late,
when did this thing happen?
A. When I came back from my assignment in Hong Kong in 1988
when I was given a new job in sales and marketing.
xxx xxx xxx
THE COURT:
So before the birth of your children, that is after your marriage
with the petitioner, this was not a problem?
A. Because, your Honor, I was assigned in Hong Kong and I was only
twelve (12) minutes [away] by [foot] to our office x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
And I was not in [sales] and marketing, I was the
Administrative Assistant of the President of IBM in Southeast
Asia so it's the . . . purely management administrative work as an
administrative assistant so there's [not] much of entertaining 10 to be able to watch the 10:00 o'clock news and be able
done in Hong Kong. to enjoy my ice cream while watching it.
THE COURT: THE COURT:
Okay, so in other words, at that time, that was not a problem. It Well, one of those faults you mentioned is also working hard,
was only a problem when you were appointed to your why did you say that it is your fault?
position in. . .
A. In our industry, your Honor, when you work out, you will
A. IBM. definitely end up late several couple of times, but not all
the time.
THE COURT:
xxx xxx xxx
That was so many years after you got married with your wife?
Your Honor, sometimes, I get all these complaints. But
A. We got married, your Honor, in 1987 then we went back to the
when they saw my picture in the newspaper or in the TV having
Philippines in July 1988 [when] I was given a new
success stories and contract signing, they are proud of me.
marketing and [sales] role as a manager of general
marketing which is . . . which encompasses all industries THE COURT:
aside [from] the government.
When you say "so proud of me," to whom are you referring x x
THE COURT: x?
So you mean to say that this problem of staying late only A. My family. They call me, they congratulate me, we have dinners
happened lately? together to celebrate but to get to that, is the working
hard and staying away from the family.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
A. The definition, your Honor, of my family . . . late is when you
don't make it at 7:00 o'clock or . . . [with] the family at 7:00 THE COURT:
o'clock in the evening. So if I don't make it at seven, I
How long did you court your wife?
considered myself late.
A. Six (6) months, your Honor.
THE COURT:
xxx xxx xxx 69
What is the reason why you have been late?
THE COURT:
A. Your Honor, my job is not a 9 to 5 job because we . . . we call on
customers, we entertain customers, partners, principals, Could you say that you were a perfect couple at that time?
we also have fellowship with our teams. So, we either
A. When we were starting, your Honor, we [were] happy, and
have dinner or we have happy hours. We also see friends
during the time that we were in Hong Kong. But when we
after. So but, physically I cannot do that everyday, your
went back to Manila, there are times (the witness is in
Honor, because I also wake up automatically at 6:00
tears) . . . adjusting to work and family that is why it
everyday whether I have a drink, or have dinner, or I
affected my relationship to her family and combination of
worked out in the evening or play[ed] basketball during
mistakes happened which I admitted.
that time, I always wake up at six. So if I stayed up late like
previously . . . like 2, 3, it's gonna be a burden for me THE COURT:
physically and [I would be] unable to perform my job well.
How would you describe your wife during your first years of
So, like I mentioned earlier in a hearing, your Honor, many
marriage?
times I tried to be home by 10 to be able to watch. Before
 A. [She was] a very good wife.
THE COURT:
Did she perform her duties as a wife and as a mother?
A. Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT:
And was she that independent from her parents or she was too
dependent [on] her parents?
A. On her performing her duties, with the . . . as a wife and as a
friend, she's independent. When it comes to our
problems, she would consult her family.
THE COURT:
So only those times when you have a problem. Like what
problems, Mr. Witness?
A. Our relationship, your Honor.
THE COURT:
But most of the time, you were able to patch up your problems?
A. Yes, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx 70
Interestingly, when asked if there was no more functional marital life
between him and Marivi, Nilo candidly highlighted his different perception from
his estranged wife:
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:
Q. So, Mr. Witness, well in reality today, Mr. Witness, even the
petitioner believes that there is no more functional
marital life in this relationship, would you agree with that?
A. If that's the way she thinks, I . . . I will have my own way of looking
at things because. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Even . . . as I was saying since she was asking for nullity and you
were asking for nullity, it's a fact of life as of today, as you
speak today that there is no more functional marital life
between the two (2) of you?
A. You see, your Honor, that's why we're different. Her style is
conclude and conclude. I have a different style because of
my background. I will only stop till death. I cannot share
her legal counsel's statement with my own thinking, your
Honor.
xxx xxx xxx 71
Even the psychiatrist Dr. Villegas pinpointed the differences of the
estranged couple which led to squabbles —
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:
Q. Doctor, from your examination of both respondent and
petitioner the obligation of trust and respect for each
other, how did it not manifest in this relationship?
A. The respondent [sees] the petitioner as one who's very
negativistic on him or who's very demanding and who is
also trying to put him down because according to him, the
petitioner would always see his weak points rather than
his strong points.
Q. Are you saying that this developed a non-trust just between
them?
A. None trust. They do not trust each other anymore. On the part
of the petitioner, because of his womanizing activities and
on the part of the respondent, that the petitioner is always
looking at his weak points rather than his strong points.
xxx xxx xxx 72
It is significant to note that Marivi failed to substantiate Nilo's penchant
for womanizing as a manifestation of his psychological incapacity. Aside from her
bare allegations, which were chiefly based on what other people told her, she
never presented irrefutable proof to corroborate her claims of his sexual
proclivities, i.e., that these proclivities were already existing before the marriage
and during the first years of their marriage. Nilo, on the other hand, categorically
admitted to having extramarital affairs in 1992, 2002, and 2006, the period when
the marriage was already on the rocks. Neither is there evidence of Nilo's alleged
oedipal complex, the manifestations of which were not cited by the experts, that
caused the couple to fall out of love.
Anent Marivi's case, based on her family history as reflected in the
experts' clinical evaluation, she grew up in a well-functioning, supportive, and
emotionally healthy family environment. Even Nilo himself attested that she was a
good wife and a good mother to their children. Her demand for attention, time,
love, and fidelity is normal for a wife. The anger she felt within her is also a
legitimate reaction.
 Yet the psychologist Dr. Encarnacion himself acknowledged that Marivi's
so-called psychological incapacity is in fact, curable. Thus:
ATTY. REVILLA:
Q. So even without the respondent, Nilo Cruz, petitioner would still
be psychologically incapacitated?
A. I beg to [differ] from that because the needs were not fulfilled in
this particular marriage, it's like a tendency to have
cancer, but if you take care of yourself with the right
environment, you will not catch cancer. Those were
previous positions, that's why I called them Histrionic
Personality Traits Behaviors and Features not a full blown
Histrionic Personality Disorder, the needs were badly
unfulfilled in this marriage because she married a man
who did not know the language of feeling of showing
some attention towards his spouse, meaning, if she is put
in a relationship with a man who is able to address these
needs, she would be better, she would be better in a
marriage.
Q. So this psychological incapacity of the petitioner is only dormant
at the time that she was not yet married?
A. Well, it's grave. . .
Q. Was it grave already at the time. . .
A. Yes, it is, it's grave but. . .
Q. Even before the marriage?
A. . . . but not incurable, that is the only adjective, grave, pre-
existing. . .
Q. Pre-existing?
A. Grave and pre-existing, yes, incurable, no, in the sense that if she
married properly if her needs were addressed, it would
not appear in that marriage.
Q. But because of her marriage to the respondent, are you saying
now that her psychological incapacity now. . .
A. Became an incapacity, yes.
Q. . . . became incurable?
A. No.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Okay. I am quite curious about the curability of the personality
disorder of the petitioner. Now, if her needs are satisfied
with . . . in case, assuming the petitioner enters into
another relationship and her needs are satisfied then her
incapacity is cured, is that what you're saying?
A. In effect, yes, in effect, yes.
Q. Would you say, what are these needs of the petitioner that
[you're] . . . not satisfied of the respondent?
A. Need to be paid attention to, need to be valued, need to have
an effect on someone, it is a universal need. She was made
to feel that she did not have any effect on him and so are
the children, x x x well, the father made the children feel
that they, wife and two sons did not have any effect on
him, ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx 73
Q. One last question. The needs of the petitioner, like you say, do
you think she was able to convey, clearly convey her needs
to the respondent, properly convey?
A. Very clearly, yes, and then when they were still not being heard,
well, iyon na nga eh, yung hostility niya and resentment
would get the better of her as a ano . . . so it would
become dysfunctional reaction upon reaction. That's a
good question. 74
Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court believes that the
protagonists in this case are in reality simply unwilling to work out a solution for
each other's personality differences, and have thus become overwhelmed by
feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward one another. Sadly, a
marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. 75
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 201988, [October 11, 2017])
[G.R. No. 218630. January 11, 2018.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. KATRINA S.
TOBORA-TIONGLICO, ** respondent.
TIJAM, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 dated May 27,
2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the
May 8, 2012 Decision 2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus Cavite,
Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-
Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.
Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual
friends. After a brief courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she got
pregnant, the two panicked as both their parents were very strict and conservative.
Lawrence did not receive the news well as he was worried how it would affect his
image and how his parents would take the situation. 3 Nevertheless, they got
married on July 22, 2000. 4
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering
and quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they were fighting so much that they
went their separate ways most of the time and Katrina found herself wandering
the streets of Hong Kong alone. 5
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until
the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30,
2000. 6 Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their child, saying he knew
nothing about children and how to run a family. 7 Lawrence spent almost every
night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees. 8 Katrina noticed that
Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high
degree of immaturity. 9 Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him
and they lost all intimacy between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their
bedroom every night to see to the needs of Lanz. 10
Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's
decisions — from the manner by which she took care of Lanz, to the way she
treated the household help. Most fights ended up in full blown arguments, often
in front of Lanz. One time, when Katrina remembered and missed her youngest
brother who was then committed in a substance rehabilitation center, Lawrence
told her to stop crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center if she will not stop. 11
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave
his parents' home and never to come back. They have been separated in fact since
then. 12
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who
confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based
on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened sense of self-importance and
grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way. 13
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent,
incurable, and deeply integrated within his psyche; 14 and that it was present but
repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the onset was in early
adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors interfered in his capacity
to provide mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and support to his wife. 15
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and
Lawrence as void ab initio. It disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C.
Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a necessary consequence of
this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of
her husband having lost the right over the same and so as to
avoid the misconception that she is still the legal wife of
respondent. Custody over the couple's minor child is awarded to
petitioner, with reasonable visitation rights accorded to
respondent, preferably Saturday and Sunday, or as the parties
may agree among themselves.
Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-
General, the National Statistics Office and the Local Civil
Registrar of Imus, Cavite who, in turn, shall endorse a copy of the
same to the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City, Metro
Manila, so that the appropriate amendment and/or cancellation
of the parties' marriage can be effected in its registry. Furnish,
likewise, the parties and counsel.
SO ORDERED. 16
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in
Civil Case No. 4903-11 dated 8 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED. 17
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a
myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the
information coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case, the
psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.
Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding circumstances of
each and every case for the nullity is different from the other and must be
appreciated for its distinctiveness. She points out that the psychological report of
Dr. Arellano clearly outlined well-accepted scientific and reliable tests 18 to come
up with his findings. In any case, the decision must be based not solely on the
expert opinions but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings, which the RTC and the CA have found to have been sufficient in
proving Lawrence's psychological incapacity.
The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of evidence presented
by Katrina supports the findings or both the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, meriting
the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.
Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule in the
negative.
Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been
intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage,
and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved. 19
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 20 has set out
the guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all declaration of
nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity cases that We have
decided:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. x x x
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. x x x
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. x x x 21
Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove
that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of
a husband.
Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other
cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions
presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
their proceedings. 22 Here, We find the totality of evidence clearly wanting.
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated
were based solely on Katrina's statements. It bears to stress that Lawrence, despite
notice, did not participate in the proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr.
Arellano despite being invited to do so.
The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn
B. Matudan 23 is instructive on the matter:
Just like his own statements and testimony, the
assessment and finding of the clinical psychologist cannot [be]
relied upon to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of
the psychological incapacity of his wife.
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the
proceedings below. The clinical psychologist's evaluation of the
respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the
information supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to
some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy,
however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at
the time the respondent left and therefore cannot be expected
to know her mother well. Also, Maricel would not have been very
reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because she could not
have been there when the spouses were married and could not
have been expected to know what was happening between her
parents until long after her birth. On the other hand, as the
petitioning spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature
would certainly be biased, and a psychological evaluation based
on this one-sided description can hardly be considered as
credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v. Angelito Suazo, et al., is
illuminating on this score:
We first note a critical factor in
appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion
evidence — the psychologist's testimony and
the psychological evaluation report — that
Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations
in open court, the psychologist evaluated
Angelito's psychological condition only in an
indirect manner — she derived all her
conclusions from information coming from
Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of
course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist
heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate
the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due
care and with the application of the more rigid
and stringent set of standards outlined
above i.e., that there must be a thorough and
in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is
grave, severe and incurable.
xxx xxx xxx
From these perspectives, we
conclude that the psychologist, using meager
information coming from a directly interested
party, could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis of Angelito's psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may
be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's
psychological condition, this is not true for
Angelito's. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required
to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from
a psychological disorder. In short, this is not
the psychological report that the Court can rely
on as basis for the conclusion that
psychological incapacity exists.
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v.
Edward Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that '[t]o make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.'
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical
psychologist on the psychological condition of the respondent-
appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said
report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis
of what she perceives as manifestations of the same. The report
neither explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder, nor showed that the respondent-appellee was really
incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological, not physical, nature. (Emphasis Ours)
The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by
Dr. Arellano can most certainly be conclusive of the psychological disposition of
Katrina, but cannot be said to be indicative of the psychological condition of
Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that
Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital
obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements. To make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed
by only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence. 24
 Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence
hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated husband. Their
frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be
said to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of
the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be distinguished
from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. 25 It is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person;
it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume. 26
Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hard-
pressed to affirm the RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to
support the factual and legal conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is
void ab initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove
Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are
not evidence. 27 Here, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did
not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's
psychological incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and
had no serious evidentiary value. 28
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
The Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985,
which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of
Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
docketed as Civil Case No. 4903-11 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Tobora-Tionglico, G.R. No. 218630, [January 11, 2018])
[G.R. No. 209031. April 16, 2018.]
ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN, petitioner, vs. MARCO
DAN, respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the December
14, 2012 Decision 2 and August 29, 2013 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
denying the Petition in CA-G.R. CV No. 95112 and herein petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, 4 respectively, thus affirming the January 4, 2010 Decision 5 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 254, in Civil Case No. LP-07-
0155.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent Marco Dan — an Italian
national — met "in a chatroom [o]n the internet" 6 sometime in May, 2005. They
soon became "chatmates" and "began exchanging letters which further drew them
emotionally closer to each other" 7 even though petitioner was in the Philippines
while respondent lived in Italy.
In November, 2005, respondent proposed marriage. The following year,
he flew in from Italy and tied the knot with petitioner on January 23, 2006.
Soon after the wedding, respondent returned to Italy. Petitioner followed
thereafter, or on February 23, 2006. The couple lived together in Italy.
On April 18, 2007, petitioner left respondent and flew back into the
country.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition 8 for declaration of
nullity of her marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-07-0155 with the RTC of Las
Piñas City, Branch 254. The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic
of the Philippines opposed the petition.
On January 4, 2010, the RTC issued its Decision dismissing the petition on
the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to adequately prove respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity. It held, thus:
Testifying thru her Judicial Affidavit x x x petitioner
stated that sometime in May 2005, she chanced upon the
respondent, an Italian, in the internet x x x and they became
regular chatmates. x x x In their exchanges of chat messages and
letters, she found respondent to be sweet, kind and jolly. He
made her feel that he really cared for her. He was romantic. x x x
[A]lthough at times, respondent was impatient and easily got
irritated, x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
 On 9 January 2006, respondent flew in to the Philippines
and x x x they got married on 23 January 2006 x x x. During their
honeymoon, petitioner noticed that the respondent was not
circumcised, x x x [R]espondent [also] asked her where to find
marijuana since he had to sniff some. This made petitioner angry
and she quarrelled with him. Respondent apologized later.
On 29 January 2006, x x x respondent flew back to Italy
and on 26 February 2006, x x x petitioner left to join respondent
in Italy. x x x After a few days, respondent started displaying
traits, character and attitude different from that of Marco whom
she had known thru the internet. He was immature, childish,
irresponsible and dependent. He depended on his mother to do
or to decide things for him. It was even his mother who decided
where they lived and how the house should be arranged. When
they transferred to a separate house, it was respondent's mother
who managed the household.
Respondent was also addicted to video games. During
work days, playing video games was always the first thing he
does when he wakes up and the last thing he does before
retiring. During rest days, he would play video games the whole
day. There was never a quality time he spent with her, the kind
of time that a responsible husband would spend with his wife.
Respondent was extremely lazy that he never helped
her in doing all the household chores. He also has extremely poor
hygiene. He seldom takes a bath and brushes his teeth. For him
to be able to take a bath, petitioner would literally push him to
the bathroom or hand him his toothbrush with toothpaste to
brush his teeth. She had to put deodorant on his underarms for
he would not do it himself. He refused circumcision.
Sometime in May 2006, she caught him in their house
while using marijuana. When confronted, he got mad and
pushed her [hard] and hit her in the arm, [and told] her to go
back to the Philippines. x x x
In October 2006, x x x they transferred to another
house. Living in a separate house from his mother did not
improve their marital relationship. His addiction to video games
worsened. They seldom talk to each other as he did not want to
be disturbed while playing games. His addiction to drugs likewise
worsened. He would often invite his friends to their house for pot
sessions, x x x to her extreme fright and discomfort.
xxx xxx xxx
On 18 April 2007, she flew back to the Philippines. x x x
Since then, there was no communication between them. x x x
Petitioner took this as lack of interest on his part to save their
marriage, reason why she decided to file this petition (TSN,
August 11, 2008, pp. 6-10).
xxx xxx xxx
She further stated that respondent x x x only gave her
money for food. He spent most of his income for video games. If
they ran out of food, it was her mother-in-law who supported
them.
xxx xxx xxx
Next presented was NEDY TAYAG, a clinical
psychologist, who testified x x x in her direct-examination that
petitioner x x x was subjected to a series of psychological tests,
written and oral form. She likewise subjected the mother of the
petitioner to clarificatory analysis x x x.
In her evaluation, she found no sign or symptom of
major psychological incapacity of the petitioner, while
respondent is suffering from a x x x Dependent Personality
Disorder with Underlying Anti-Social Trait, by his parasitic
attitude, allowing other people to be the handler of his own
personal sustenance, even hygienic wise, which somehow
distorted the notion on how to handle marital obligations in
terms of mutual understanding, communication and emotional
intent. She was able to arrive at these findings on respondent
although he did not submit himself for the same psychological
tests, through the clinical assessments and information supplied
by the petitioner, and the description of the petitioner's mother
regarding how she perceived the respondent.
On cross-examination, x x x [s]he described respondent
x x x as "Mama's Boy," which attitude can be narcissistic because
of his attachment to the mother. He can do whatever he wants
because the mother will always be at his back. She likewise
stated that the respondent is an unhygienic person and the
reason why he opted to lure herein petitioner to be his wife was
because he wanted her to be an extension of his maternal needs
to sustain his own desire. CAIHTE
On clarificatory questions of the Court x x x Ms. Tayag
testified that she was able to describe the respondent x x x
because of the description made by the petitioner and her
mother. She however, admitted that as disclosed to her by the
petitioner, she (petitioner) was not able to have a bonding or to
know well the respondent because more often than not the
respondent was always in the company of the mother that a
pathological symbiotic relationship developed between the
mother and son.
Last witness presented was MS. VIOLETA G. ESPINA, the
mother of herein petitioner. Her Judicial Affidavit x x x was
adopted as her direct-testimony, which was entirely in
corroboration of the testimony of petitioner Abigael An Espina-
Dan.
On cross-examination x x x. She testified that
respondent had not assumed his responsibilities as a married
man, his dependency on drugs, his dependency on his mother
with regard to their finances were just told by her daughter,
petitioner herein, during their conversations in the internet and
therefore she has no personal knowledge to what happened to
her daughter, petitioner herein.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 36 of the Family Code x x x provides:
A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration of
marriage, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The Supreme Court in the case of Santos v. Court of
Appeals, (240 SCRA 20, 24) declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) insurability. The incapacity must be grave
or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
In the instant case, the clinical psychologist found
respondent to be suffering from x x x Dependent Personality
Disorder with underlying Anti-social traits, x x x which x x x is
'grave, severe, long lasting and incurable by any treatment.' x x x
xxx xxx xxx
The clinical psychologist['s] findings and conclusion
were derived from her interviews of petitioner and her mother.
However, from petitioner's Judicial Affidavit x x x, it was gathered
that respondent's failure to establish a common life with her
stems from his refusal, not incapacity to do so. It is downright
incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,
which renders a marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. How she arrived at the conclusion that respondent
was totally dependent [on] his mother, his propensity [with]
illegal substance, his instability to maintain even his personal
hygiene, and his neglect to assume his responsibilities as a
husband, Nedy Tayag failed to explain. It bears recalling that
petitioner and respondent were chatmates in 2005 and
contracted marriage in 2006 when respondent was already 35
years old, far removed from adolescent years.
Noteworthy is petitioner's admission that she and
respondent met in a chat room in the internet. Respondent was
very sweet, kind and jolly. He was romantic. He made her feel
that he cared even if they were apart. He remembered important
occasions and he would always send her sweet messages and
funny jokes x x x which revealed the harmonious relationship of
the couple before their marriage. From this, it can be inferred
how responsible respondent was to faithfully comply with his
obligations as a boyfriend. During marriage, respondent was
working and giving her money though not enough as she said
(TSN, August 11, 2008, p. 15). With this premise, it is therefore
safe to conclude that no matter how hard respondent would try
to show his best, to show his capability as husband to petitioner,
she would always find reason to say otherwise.
As to her allegation that respondent was unhygienic; x x
x it was admitted by no less than the psychologist, Nedy Tayag
that in a country like Italy wherein the weather is different from
the Philippines, the people there do not bathe regularly x x x.
With respect to circumcision, we all know that circumcision is not
common in European countries. You cannot compel respondent
to undergo circumcision since it is against their culture. However,
respondent expressed his willingness to be circumcised, but later
on, changed his mind.
 As to her allegation that respondent was a drug
dependent, petitioner never showed that she exerted effort to
seek medical help for her husband. Undeniably, drug addiction is
curable and therefore it can hardly be considered as a
manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity
contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
With regard to the dependency of respondent to his
mother, it was not well established by the petitioner. x x x What
is clear was that respondent's mother was all out in helping them
since the salary of the respondent was not sufficient to sustain
their needs.
All told, the Court cannot see how the personality
disorder of respondent would render him unaware of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by him. At the most, the psychological evaluation of
the parties proved only incompatibility and irreconcilable
differences, considering also their culture differences, which
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. Along this line,
the aforesaid psychological evaluation made by Ms. Tayag is
unfortunately one sided [and] based only on the narrations made
by petitioner who had known respondent only for a short period
of time and too general to notice these specific facts thereby
failing to serve its purpose in aiding the Court in arriving at a just
resolution of this case.
In sum, inasmuch as the evidence adduced by petitioner
in support of her petition is miserably wanting in force to
convince this Court that her marriage with respondent comes
and qualifies under the provision of Article 36 of the Family
Code and hence unable to discharge completely her burden of
overcoming the legal presumption of validity and the
continuance of her marriage with respondent, declaration of
nullity of same marriage is not in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage is hereby DENIED, for lack of
merit and accordingly, the same petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office
of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City, for their information and
guidance. 9
Petitioner moved to reconsider, 10 but in an April 28, 2010 Order, 11 the
RTC held its ground.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
95112. In its assailed December 14, 2012 Decision, however the CA denied the
appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision, declaring thus:
x x x There is no ground to declare the marriage x x x null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code. Thus, the court a quo correctly denied the
petition for annulment of marriage x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
In Toring v. Toring, the Supreme Court held that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) insurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a
marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage.
It further expounded on Article 36 x x x in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina and laid down definitive guidelines
in the interpretation and application of this article. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability established in the Santos case, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity
applied these basic guidelines to varying factual situations, thus
confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. [Insofar]
as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be
lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent
of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family
Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these
are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability
of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the
marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological
illness and its root cause must have been them from the
inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the
concept that Article 36 x x x does not really dissolve a marriage;
it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first
place because the affliction — already then existing — was so
grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.
In the present case, We find the totality of the
petitioner-appellant's evidence insufficient to prove respondent-
appellee was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. Petitioner-appellant's depiction of
respondent-appellee as irresponsible, childish, overly dependent
on his mother, addicted to video games, addicted to drugs, lazy,
had poor hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage, are not enough. These traits do
not equate to an inability to perform marital obligations due to a
psychological illness present at the time the marriage was
solemnized. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. It is not enough the respondent-appellee,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to
perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor — an adverse integral element in the
respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations — must
be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of the spouse, is
different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity x x x, as the same may only be
due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. It is essential that the spouse must be
shown to be incapable of performing marital obligations, due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. Respondent-appellee's condition or personality
disorder has not been shown to be a malady rooted on some
incapacitating psychological condition.
It will be noted [that] Ms. Tayag did not administer
psychological tests on respondent-appellee. The conclusion in
the psychological report of Ms. Tayag that respondent-appellee
was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder, with
underlying Anti-Social traits, was based merely on information
supplied by petitioner-appellant and Violeta (mother of the
petitioner-appellant).
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as
conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. The court must
evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and
with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of
standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is
grave, severe, and incurable. Thus, We cannot credit Ms. Tayag's
findings as conclusive, as she did not conduct an actual
psychological examination on respondent-appellee. The
information relied upon by Ms. Tayag could not have secured a
complete personality profile and could not have conclusively
formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of respondent-
appellee's psychological condition. The methodology employed
(i.e., gathering information regarding respondent-appellee from
petitioner-appellant and Violeta, without interviewing
respondent-appellee himself), simply cannot satisfy the required
depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder.
Plaintiff-appellant failed to prove the root cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity, and to establish the
requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
The psychological report, was based entirely on petitioner-
appellant's assumed knowledge of respondent-appellee's family
background and upbringing. Ms. Tayag was not able to establish
with certainty that respondent-appellee's alleged psychological
incapacity was grave enough to bring about the inability of the
respondent-appellee to assume the essential obligations of
marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or
incurable. Also, it did not fully explain the details of respondent-
appellee's alleged disorder and its root cause; how Ms. Tayag
came to the conclusion that respondent-appellee's condition
was incurable; and how it related to the essential marital
obligations that respondent-appellee failed to assume.
In this case, the only proof which bears on the claim that
respondent-appellee is psychologically incapacitated, is his
allegedly being irresponsible, childish, overly dependent on his
mother, addicted to video games, addicted to drugs, lazy, had
poor hygiene, and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It is worthy to emphasize that
Article 36 x x x contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations;
 not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.
This Court finds the totality of evidence presented by
petitioner-appellant failed to establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband x x x. Therefore, there is no basis to
declare their marriage null and void x x x.
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and
strengthening the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved
at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City dated 4
January 2010, in Civil Case No. LP-07-0155, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 12 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 29, 2013
Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issue
Petitioner mainly contends that —
THE TOTALITY OF PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT AND SATISFIED
THE STANDARDS OF REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MOLINA AND OTHER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE IN POINT. 13
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner argues that the root cause of respondent's psychological
incapacity was clinically identified, sufficiently alleged in the petition, and proved
by adequate evidence; that respondent's psychological incapacity was shown to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and that the same is
medically permanent, incurable, and grave enough as to bring about the inability
of respondent to assume his obligations in marriage; and that as a consequence,
respondent is incapable of fulfilling his duties as a husband under the obligation to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support to her.
Petitioner adds that her allegations in the petition for declaration of
nullity are specifically linked to medical and clinical causes as diagnosed by Dr.
Tayag, which diagnosis is contained in the latter's report which forms part of the
evidence in the case; that such diagnosis is backed by scientific tests and expert
determination, which sufficiently prove respondent's psychological incapacity; that
Dr. Tayag has adequately determined that respondent's condition is grave,
incurable, and existed prior to and at the time of his marriage to petitioner; that
respondent has been suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder with
Underlying Anti-Social Trait which deterred him from appropriately discharging his
duties and responsibilities as a married man; that despite considerable efforts
exerted by petitioner, respondent remained true to his propensities and even
defiant, to the point of exhibiting violence; that no amount of therapy — no matter
how intensive — can possibly change respondent, but rather he would always be
in denial of his own condition and resist any form of treatment; and that
respondent's condition is deep-rooted and stems from his formative years — a
product of faulty child-rearing practices and unhealthy familial constellation that
altered his emotional and moral development.
Finally, petitioner argues that it is not necessary that personal
examination of respondent be conducted in order that he may be diagnosed or
declared as psychologically incapacitated. She cites the cases of Marcos v.
Marcos 14 and Antonio v. Reyes, 15 as well as the case of Suazo v. Suazo, 16 in
which latter case it was held that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is not necessarily mandatory, but merely desirable,
as it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations
between the parties. She suggests instead that pursuant to the ruling in Ngo Te v.
Gutierrez, Yu-Te, 17 "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori presumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own
facts" 18 and that courts "should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines x x x." 19
The State's Arguments
In its Comment 20 praying for denial, the State calls for affirmance of the
CA dispositions, arguing that no new issues that merit reversal have been raised in
the Petition. It contends that petitioner failed to prove the elements of gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability; that quite the contrary, petitioner even
admitted that incipiently, respondent was romantic, funny, responsible, working,
and giving money to her; that petitioner's allegations of video game and drug
addiction are uncorroborated, and her failure to seek medical treatment therefor
in behalf of her husband must be considered against her; that such addictions are
curable and could not be the basis for a declaration of psychological incapacity;
that respondent's irresponsibility, immaturity, and over-dependence on his
mother do not automatically justify a conclusion of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code; that the intent of the law is to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders —
existing at the time of the marriage — clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and depriving the
spouse of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the marital bond one is
about to assume; that the psychological evaluation of respondent was based on
one-sided information supplied by petitioner and her mother — which renders the
same of doubtful credibility; and that while personal examination of respondent is
indeed not mandatory, there are instances where it is required — such as in this
case, where the information supplied to the psychologist unilaterally comes from
the side of the petitioner, which renders such information biased and partial as
would materially affect the psychologist's assessment.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No.
LP-07-0155 on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to enter marriage at the time.
They held that while petitioner alleged such condition, she was unable to establish
its existence, gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability based solely on her
testimony, which is insufficient, self-serving, unreliable, and uncorroborated, as
she did not know respondent very well enough — having been with him only for a
short period of time; Dr. Tayag's psychological report — which is practically one-
sided for the latter's failure to include respondent in the study; and the account of
petitioner's mother, which is deemed biased and thus of doubtful credibility.
The Court agrees.
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and
testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of her mother and Dr. Tayag; and
Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the psychological condition of both
petitioner and respondent. The determination of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity was based solely on petitioner's account and that of her
mother, since respondent was presumably in Italy and did not participate in the
proceedings.
This is insufficient.
At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during
their marriage, respondent was working and giving money to her; that respondent
was romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and
respondent enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that
petitioner was psychologically unfit for marriage. As correctly observed by the trial
and appellate courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a result of irreconcilable
differences and basic incompatibility owing to differences in culture and
upbringing, and the very short period that they spent together prior to their tying
the knot. As for respondent's claimed addiction to video games and cannabis, the
trial and appellate courts are correct in their ruling that these are not an incurable
condition, and petitioner has not shown that she helped her husband overcome
them — as part of her marital obligation to render support and aid to respondent.
"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition." 21 "[T]he complete facts should
allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage" 22 such that "[i]f the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to." 23
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no
less than a mental — not merely physical — incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of die basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article
68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 24
With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her
witness, the weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag's expert
findings. However, her determinations were not based on actual tests or interviews
conducted on respondent himself — but on personal accounts of petitioner alone.
This will not do as well. DETACa
x x x Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the
courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or
psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr.
Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's
psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side — the
petitioner — whose bias in favor of her cause
cannot be doubted. While this circumstance
alone does not disqualify the psychologist for
reasons of bias, her report, testimony and
conclusions deserve the application of a more
rigid and stringent set of standards in the
manner we discussed above. For, effectively,
Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from
the prism of a third party account; she did not
actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent
and how he would have reacted and
responded to the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely
summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on
this basis characterized the respondent to be a
self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful
person who 'believes that the world revolves
around him'; and who 'used love as a . . .
deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence
[petitioner] extended towards him.' . . . .
We find these observations and
conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that
a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented the respondent from complying
with the essential obligations of marriage. It
failed to identify the root cause of the
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder
and to prove that it existed at the inception of
the marriage. Neither did it explain the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder,
nor show that the respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological, not physical,
nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude
that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report — i.e.,
that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial
Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
incurable' — is an unfounded statement, not a
necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests
administered on the petitioner could have
been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement
cannot be made with respect to the
respondent's condition. To make conclusions
and generalizations on the respondent's
psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side is, to our
mind, no different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence. 25
Concomitantly, the rulings of the trial and appellate courts — identical in
most respects — are entitled to respect and finality. The same being correct, this
Court finds no need to disturb them.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this
Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or
weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such
factual determination. It is a well-established principle that
factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling
and cogent reasons x x x. 26
To reiterate, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. "The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved." 27 Finally, the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the
petitioner.
x x x Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the
totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent
upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the
psychological incapacity. 28
With petitioner's failure to prove her case, her petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage was correctly dismissed by the courts below.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 14, 2012 Decision
and August 29, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95112
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Espina-Dan v. Dan, G.R. No. 209031, [April 16, 2018])
[G.R. No. 210518. April 18, 2018.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARTIN NIKOLAI Z.
JAVIER and MICHELLE K. MERCADO-JAVIER, respondents.
REYES, JR., J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals' (CA)
Decision 2 dated July 10, 2013, and Resolution 3 dated November 28, 2013,
rendered in relation to CA-G.R. CV No. 98015. In these assailed issuances, the CA
reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, which dismissed
the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent Martin
Nikolai Z. Javier (Martin) against respondent Michelle K. Mercado-Javier (Michelle)
under Article 36 of the Family Code. aScITE
Factual Antecedents
Martin and Michelle were married on February 8, 2002. 4
On November 20, 2008, Martin filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage and Joint Custody of Common Minor Child under Article 36 of
the Family Code. 5 Martin alleged that both he and Michelle were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. 6 He thus
prayed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, and for the joint custody of
their minor child, Amanda M. Javier. 7
In order to support the allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his
own behalf, 8 and presented the psychological findings of Dr. Elias D. Adamos (Dr.
Adamos) (i.e., Psychological Evaluation Report on Martin and Psychological
Impression Report on Michelle). 9
In the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, Dr. Adamos
diagnosed her with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. 10 Likewise, Dr. Adamos
concluded in the Psychological Evaluation Report that Martin suffered from the
same disorder. 11 Their disorder was considered grave and incurable, and
rendered Martin and Michelle incapacitated to perform the essential obligations
of marriage. Dr. Adamos further testified before the RTC to provide his expert
opinion, and stated that with respect to the Psychological Impression Report on
Michelle, the informants were Martin and the respondents' common friend, Jose
Vicente Luis Serra (Jose Vicente). 12 He was unable to evaluate Michelle because
she did not respond to Dr. Adamos' earlier request to come in for psychological
evaluation. 13
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision 14 dated March 10, 2011, the RTC dismissed the petition
for failure to establish a sufficient basis for the declaration of nullity of the
respondents' marriage. The relevant portions of the RTC's decision reads:
Upon the other hand, though Dr. Adamos diagnosed
[Martin] to be afflicted with a narcissistic personality disorder,
which rendered him incapacitated to comply with his essential
marital obligations of observing love, trust and respect.
[Martin's] testimony is found by the Court to be not supportive
of such finding and vice-versa. In fact, on the basis of [Martin's]
declarations, the Court came up with an impression that [Martin]
is a man gifted with a lot of patience; that he was righteous, that
he laudably performed his role as husband and father, and that
in spite of [Michelle's] alleged wrongdoings, he still exerted his
best efforts to save their marriage.
Thus, as to [Michelle's] alleged psychological incapacity,
the Court finds [Martin's] testimony to be self-serving and Dr.
Adamos' findings to be without sufficient basis.
Taking all the foregoing into consideration, the Court
finds no sufficient basis for granting the relief prayed for in the
petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 15
Martin moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's decision on May 18,
2011. 16 Finding the arguments in the motion unmeritorious, the RTC denied the
motion in its Order 17 dated September 7, 2011:
In the case at bar, the Court found no sufficient basis for
making a finding that either petitioner or respondent or both
 were afflicted with a psychological disorder within the
contemplation of existing law and jurisprudence. Such being the
case, there was no need to resort to Dr. Adamos' findings.
Having said this, the Court finds no compelling reason
to set aside its March 10, 2011 Decision.
Wherefore, premises considered, the pending Motion
for Reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 18
Unsatisfied with the RTC's ruling, Martin appealed the denial of his
petition to the CA. 19 In his Appellant's Brief, Martin submitted that it is not
necessary for the psychologist to personally examine the incapacitated spouse, or
Michelle in this case, before the court may rule on the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. 20 He also argued that, at the very least, there was sufficient
evidence to support his own diagnosis of psychological incapacity. 21 Martin thus
claimed that the RTC committed a reversible error in dismissing his petition.
The Republic filed its own brief opposing the appeal of Martin. Arguing
that there was no basis for Dr. Adamos' findings as to Michelle's psychological
incapacity, the Republic asserts that there was no independent proof to establish
this claim. Furthermore, the Republic argued that Martin supported his petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with self-serving testimonies and hearsay
evidence. 22
Ruling of the CA
On review, Martin's appeal was granted. In its Decision 23 dated July 10,
2013, the CA held that:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated March 10, 2011 and the Resolution dated
September 07, 2011, respectively, issued by the [RTC] of Pasig
City, Branch 261, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the marriage between [Martin] and [Michelle] is
hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
SO ORDERED. 24
The CA found that there was sufficient evidence to support Martin's claim
that he is psychologically incapacitated. The CA also negated the RTC's ruling by
referring to Martin's own testimony, in which he narrated his tendency to impose
his own unrealistic standards on Michelle. 25 In its challenged decision, the CA
likewise ruled that Michelle's diagnosis was adequately supported by the
narrations of Martin and Jose Vicente. 26 HEITAD
Aggrieved, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration from the CA's
Decision dated July 10, 2013. 27 The CA denied the motion in its
Resolution 28 dated November 28, 2013 for being a mere rehash of its earlier
arguments.
The Republic is now before this Court, arguing that there was no basis for
the CA's ruling granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It argues
that the testimony of Martin was self-serving, especially in relation to Dr. Adamos'
diagnosis that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code. According to the Republic,
there were no other witnesses that were presented in court, who could have
testified on Michelle's behavior. 29
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the present petition partially unmeritorious. The totality
of evidence supports the finding that Martin is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
The psychological incapacity of a spouse must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability, which the Court discussed
in Santos v. CA, et al. 30 as follows:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved. 31
The Court later clarified in Marcos v. Marcos 32 that for purposes of
establishing the psychological incapacity of a spouse, it is not required that a
physician conduct an actual medical examination of the person concerned. It is
enough that the totality of evidence is strong enough to sustain the finding of
psychological incapacity. In such case, however, the petitioner bears a greater
burden in proving the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the other
spouse's psychological incapacity. 33
While the Court has consistently followed the parameters in Republic v.
Molina, 34 these guidelines are not meant to straightjacket all petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The merits of each case are determined on a
case-to-case basis, as no case is on all fours with another. 35
Martin, as the petitioner in this case, submitted several pieces of evidence
to support his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. He testified as to his
own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, Michelle. In particular, he
stated that Michelle was confrontational even before their marriage. 36 He alleged
that Michelle always challenged his opinions on what he thinks is proper, which he
insisted on because he witnessed the abuse that his mother went through with his
biological father. 37 He also thought that Michelle was highly impressionable and
easily influenced by friends, as a result of which, Martin alleged that Michelle acted
recklessly and without consideration of his feelings. 38
The psychological findings of Dr. Adamos were also presented in the trial
court to corroborate his claim. According to Dr. Adamos, Michelle suffered from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder as a result of childhood trauma and defective
child-rearing practices. 39 This disorder was supposedly aggravated by her
marriage with Martin, who she constantly lied to. It was also alleged in the
Psychological Impression Report that Michelle openly had extra-marital affairs. 40
The basis of Dr. Adamos' findings on the psychological incapacity of
Michelle was the information provided by Martin and Jose Vicente. Jose Vicente
was a close friend of the respondents, having introduced them to each other
before their marriage. 41 Jose Vicente was also allegedly a regular confidant of
Michelle. 42
While it is true that Michelle was not personally examined or evaluated
for purposes of the psychological report, the trial court was incorrect in ruling that
Dr. Adamos' findings were based solely on the interview with Martin. 43 Even if
that were the case, the findings of the psychologist are not immediately invalidated
for this reason alone. Because a marriage necessarily involves only two persons,
the spouse who witnessed the other spouse's behavior may "validly relay" the
pattern of behavior to the psychologist. 44
This notwithstanding, the Court disagrees with the CA's findings that
Michelle was psychologically incapacitated. We cannot absolutely rely on the
Psychological Impression Report on Michelle. There were no other independent
evidence establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's alleged
psychological incapacity. While this Court cannot discount their first-hand
observations, it is highly unlikely that they were able to paint Dr. Adamos a
complete picture of Michelle's family and childhood history. The records do not
show that Michelle and Jose Vicente were childhood friends, while Martin, on the
other hand, was introduced to Michelle during their adulthood. Either Martin or
Jose Vicente, as third persons outside the family of Michelle, could not have known
about her childhood, how she was raised, and the dysfunctional nature of her
family. 45 Without a credible source of her supposed childhood trauma, Dr.
Adamos was not equipped with enough information from which he may
reasonably conclude that Michelle is suffering from a chronic and persistent
disorder that is grave and incurable.
The Court's explanation in Rumbaua v. Rumbaua 46 judiciously discussed
the dangers of relying on the narrations of a petitioner-spouse to the
psychologist, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions
about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on
the information fed to her by only one side — the petitioner —
whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for
reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve
the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in
the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party
account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the
respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to
the doctor's probes.
xxx xxx xxx
We find these observations and conclusions
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented
the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's
narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the
respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we
cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her
Report — i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave and incurable" — is an unfounded
statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the
various tests administered on the petitioner could have been
used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition,
this same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondent's condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition
based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind,
not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
 truthfulness of the content of such evidence. 47 (Citations
omitted and emphasis Ours) ATICcS
It does not escape our attention, however, that Martin was also subjected
to several psychological tests, as a result of which, Dr. Adamos diagnosed him with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. 48 Additionally, the diagnosis was based on Dr.
Adamos' personal interviews of Martin, who underwent several — or to be
accurate, more than 10-counselling sessions with Dr. Adamos from 2008 to
2009. 49 These facts were uncontroverted by the Republic.
In his testimony, Dr. Adamos explained that Martin had a "grandiose self[-
]existence," which proceeded from his "ideas of preference towards ideal love and
ideal marriage." 50 Dr. Adamos also found that Martin lacked empathy, leading
him to disregard and ignore the feelings of Michelle. 51
As a result, Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
with tendencies toward sadism. 52 Dr. Adamos concluded from the tests
administered on Martin that this disorder was rooted in the traumatic experiences
he experienced during his childhood, having grown up around a violent father who
was abusive of his mother. 53 This adversely affected Martin in such a manner that
he formed unrealistic values and standards on his own marriage, and proposed
unconventional sexual practices. When Michelle would disagree with his ideals,
Martin would not only quarrel with Michelle, but would also inflict harm on
her. 54 Other manifestations include excessive love for himself, self-entitlement,
immaturity, and self-centeredness. 55
These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential
characteristics of psychological incapacity on the part of Martin. As such, insofar
as the psychological incapacity of Martin is concerned, the CA did not commit a
reversible error in declaring the marriage of the respondents null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
As a final note, the Court emphasizes that the factual circumstances
obtaining in this specific case warrant the declaration that Martin is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his
marriage to Michelle. This is neither a relaxation nor abandonment of previous
doctrines relating to Article 36 of the Family Code. The guidelines in Molina still
apply to all petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage inasmuch as this Court
does not lose sight of the constitutional protection to the institution of marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as the psychological incapacity of
respondent Michelle K. Mercado-Javier is concerned. The Decision dated July 10,
2013 and Resolution dated November 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 98015 are MODIFIED to the extent that the marriage of the respondents on
February 8, 2002 is declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological
incapacity of respondent Martin Nikolai Z. Javier, pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Javier, G.R. No. 210518, [April 18, 2018])
[G.R. No. 202578. September 27, 2017.]
HEIRS OF GILBERTO ROLDAN, NAMELY: ADELINA ROLDAN,
ROLANDO ROLDAN, GILBERTO ROLDAN, JR., MARIO ROLDAN,
DANNY ROLDAN, LEONARDO ROLDAN, ELSA ROLDAN, ERLINDA
ROLDAN-CARAOS, THELMA ROLDAN-MASINSIN, GILDA ROLDAN-
DAWAL and RHODORA ROLDAN-ICAMINA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS
OF SILVELA ROLDAN, NAMELY: ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN,
AUGUSTO R. DE GUZMAN, ALICIA R. VALDORIA-PINEDA, and
SALLY R. VALDORIA, and HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO MAGTULIS,
NAMELY: CYNTHIA YORAC-MAGTULIS, LEA JOYCE MAGTULIS-
MALABORBOR, DHANCY MAGTULIS, FRANCES DIANE MAGTULIS,
and JULIERTO MAGTULIS-PLACER, respondents.
SERENO, C.J p:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 and Resolution, 3 which affirmed the
Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC ruled that petitioner heirs of
Gilberto Roldan, respondent heirs of Silvela Roldan, 5 and respondent heirs of
Leopoldo Magtulis are co-owners of Lot No. 4696. HTcADC
FACTS OF THE CASE
Natalia Magtulis 6 owned Lot No. 4696, an agricultural land in Kalibo,
Aklan, which had an area of 21,739 square meters, and was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-7711. 7 Her heirs included Gilberto Roldan and Silvela
Roldan, her two children by her first marriage; and, allegedly, Leopoldo Magtulis
— her child with another man named Juan Aguirre. 8 After her death in 1961,
Natalia left the lot to her children. However, Gilberto and his heirs took possession
of the property to the exclusion of respondents.
On 19 May 2003, respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Partition and Damages against petitioners. 9 The latter refused to yield the
property on these grounds: (1) respondent heirs of Silvela had already sold her
share to Gilberto; and (2) respondent heirs of Leopoldo had no cause of action,
given that he was not a child of Natalia.
 During trial, petitioners failed to show any document evidencing the sale
of Silvela's share to Gilberto. Thus, in its Decision dated 14 December 2007, the
RTC ruled that the heirs of Silvela remained co-owners of the property they had
inherited from Natalia. As regards Leopoldo Magtulis, the trial court concluded that
he was a son of Natalia based on his Certificate of Baptism 10 and Marriage
Contract. 11
Considering that Gilberto, Silvela, and Leopoldo were all descendants of
Natalia, the RTC declared each set of their respective heirs entitled to one-third
share of the property. Consequently, it ordered petitioners to account and deliver
to respondents their equal share to the produce of the land.
Petitioners appealed to the CA. They reiterated that Silvela had sold her
share of the property to her brother Gilberto. They asserted that the RTC could not
have considered Leopoldo the son of Natalia on the mere basis of his Certificate of
Baptism. Emphasizing that filiation required a high standard of proof, petitioners
argued that the baptismal certificate of Leopoldo served only as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament.
In its Decision dated 20 December 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the
RTC that Gilberto, Silvela, and Leopoldo remained co-owners of Lot No. 4696. The
appellate court refused to conclude that Silvela had sold her shares to Gilberto
without any document evidencing a sales transaction. It also held that Leopoldo
was the son of Natalia, since his Certificate of Baptism and Marriage Contract
indicated her as his mother.
Petitioner heirs of Gilberto moved for reconsideration, 12 but to no avail.
Before this Court, they reiterate that Silvela sold her shares to Gilberto, and that
Leopoldo was not the son of Natalia. They emphasize that the certificates of
baptism and marriage do not prove Natalia to be the mother of Leopoldo since
these documents were executed without her participation. CAIHTE
Petitioners additionally contend that respondents lost their rights over
the property, since the action for partition was lodged before the RTC only in 2003,
or 42 years since Gilberto occupied the property in 1961. For the heirs of Gilberto,
prescription and laches already preclude the heirs of Silvela and the heirs of
Leopoldo from claiming co-ownership over Lot No. 4696.
In their Comment, 13 respondents assert that the arguments raised by
petitioners involve questions of fact not cognizable by this Court. As regards the
issue of prescription and laches, they insist that petitioners cannot invoke a new
theory for the first time on appeal.
ISSUES OF THE CASE
The following issues are presented to this Court for resolution:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's finding that Silvela did not
sell her share of the property to Gilberto
2. Whether the courts a quo correctly appreciated Leopoldo to be the son
of Natalia based on his baptismal and marriage certificates
3. Whether prescription and laches bar respondents from claiming co-
ownership over Lot No. 4696
RULING OF THE COURT
Sale of the Shares of Silvela to
Gilberto
Petitioners argue before us that Silvela had a perfected contract of sale
with Gilberto over her shares of Lot No. 4696. That argument is obviously a
question of fact, 14 as it delves into the truth of whether she conveyed her rights
in favor of her brother.
The assessment of the existence of the sale requires the calibration of the
evidence on record and the probative weight thereof. The RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, already performed its function and found that the heirs of Gilberto had not
presented any document or witness to prove the fact of sale.
The factual determination of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the
CA, is final and conclusive on this Court except if unsupported by the evidence on
record. 15 In this case, the exception does not apply, as petitioners merely alleged
that Silvela "sold, transferred and conveyed her share in the land in question to
Gilberto Roldan for a valuable consideration" without particularizing the details or
referring to any proof of the transaction. 16 Therefore, we sustain the conclusion
that she remains co-owner of Lot No. 4696.
Filiation of Leopoldo to Natalia
In resolving the issue of filiation, the RTC and the CA referred to Articles
172 and 175 of the Family Code, viz.:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
 (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The parties concede that there is no record of Leopoldo's birth in either
the National Statistics Office 17 or in the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Kalibo,
Aklan. 18 The RTC and the CA then referred to other means to prove the status of
Leopoldo: his Certificate of Baptism and his Marriage Contract. Since both
documents indicate Natalia as the mother of Leopoldo, the courts a quo concluded
that respondent heirs of Leopoldo had sufficiently proven the filiation of their
ancestor to the original owner of Lot No. 4696. For this reason, the RTC and the CA
maintained that the heirs of Leopoldo are entitled to an equal share of the
property, together with the heirs of Gilberto and heirs of Silvela.
We disagree.
Jurisprudence has already assessed the probative value of baptismal
certificates. In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, 19 which referred to our earlier
rulings in Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System 20 and Macadangdang
v. Court of Appeals, 21 the Court explained that because the putative parent has
no hand in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, that document has scant
evidentiary value. The canonical certificate is simply a proof of the act to which the
priest may certify, i.e., the administration of the sacrament. In other words, a
baptismal certificate is "no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to
the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require
separate and concrete evidence." 22
In cases that followed Fernandez, we reiterated that a baptismal
certificate is insufficient to prove filiation. 23 But in Makati Shangri-La Hotel and
Resort, Inc. v. Harper, 24 this Court clarified that a baptismal certificate has
evidentiary value to prove kinship "if considered alongside other evidence of
filiation." 25 Therefore, to resolve one's lineage, courts must peruse other pieces
of evidence instead of relying only on a canonical record. By way of example, we
have considered the combination of testimonial evidence, 26 family pictures, 27 as
well as family books or charts, 28 alongside the baptismal certificates of the
claimants, in proving kinship.
In this case, the courts below did not appreciate any other material proof
related to the baptismal certificate of Leopoldo that would establish his filiation
with Natalia, whether as a legitimate or as an illegitimate son. DETACa
The only other document considered by the RTC and the CA was the
Marriage Contract of Leopoldo. But, like his baptismal certificate, his Marriage
Contract also lacks probative value as the latter was prepared without the
participation of Natalia. In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 29 we held that even if the
marriage contract therein stated that the alleged father of the bride was the bride's
father, that document could not be taken as evidence of filiation, because it was
not signed by the alleged father of the bride.
The instant case is similar to an issue raised in Paa v. Chan. 30 The
claimant in that case relied upon baptismal and marriage certificates to argue
filiation. The Court said:
As regards the baptismal and marriage certificates of Leoncio
Chan, the same are not competent evidence to prove that he was
the illegitimate child of Bartola Maglaya by a Chinese father.
While these certificates may be considered public documents,
they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified — which in this case
were the baptism and marriage, respectively, of Leoncio Chan —
but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made
therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship.
All told, the Baptismal Certificate and the Marriage Contract of Leopoldo,
which merely stated that Natalia is his mother, are inadequate to prove his filiation
with the property owner. Moreover, by virtue of these documents alone, the RTC
and the CA could not have justly concluded that Leopoldo and his successors-in-
interest were entitled to a one-third share of the property left by Natalia, equal to
that of each of her undisputed legitimate children — Gilberto and Silvela. As held
in Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 31 a baptismal certificate is certainly not
proof of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the claimant. Therefore, the CA
erred in presuming the hereditary rights of Leopoldo to be equal to those of the
legitimate heirs of Natalia.
Prescription and Laches
According to petitioners, prescription and laches have clearly set in given
their continued occupation of the property in the last 42 years. Prescription cannot
be appreciated against the co-owners of a property, absent any conclusive act of
repudiation made clearly known to the other co-owners. 32
Here, petitioners merely allege that the purported co-ownership "was
already repudiated by one of the parties" without supporting evidence. Aside from
the mere passage of time, there was failure on the part of petitioners to
substantiate their allegation of laches by proving that respondents slept on their
rights. 33 Nevertheless, had they done so, two grounds deter them from
successfully claiming the existence of prescription and laches.
First, as demanded by the repudiation requisite for prescription to be
appreciated, there is a need to determine the veracity of factual matters such as
the date when the period to bring the action commenced to run. In Macababbad,
Jr. v. Masirag, 34 we considered that determination as factual in nature. The same
is true in relation to finding the existence of laches. We held in Crisostomo v.
Garcia, Jr. 35 that matters like estoppel, laches, and fraud require the presentation
of evidence and the determination of facts. Since petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as in this case, entertain questions
of law, 36 petitioners claim of prescription and laches fail.
Second, petitioners have alleged prescription and laches only before this
Court. Raising a new ground for the first time on appeal contravenes due process,
as that act deprives the adverse party of the opportunity to contest the assertion
of the claimant. 37 Since respondents were not able to refute the issue of
prescription and laches, this Court denies the newly raised contention of
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner heirs
of Gilberto Roldan is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 02327 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
1. Only the heirs of Gilberto Roldan and Silvela Roldan are declared co-
owners of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-7711, which should
be partitioned among them in the following proportions:
a. One-half share to the heirs of Gilberto Roldan; and
b. One-half share to the heirs of Silvela Roldan.
2. Petitioners are ordered to account for and deliver to the heirs of Silvela
Roldan their one-half share on the produce of the land.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Heirs of Roldan v. Heirs of Roldan, G.R. No. 202578, [September 27,
2017])
[G.R. No. 206647. August 9, 2017.]
RICHELLE P. ABELLA, for and in behalf of her minor daughter,
MARL JHORYLLE ABELLA, petitioner, vs. POLICARPIO
CABAÑERO, respondent.
LEONEN, J p:
Filiation must be established for a child to claim support from a putative
father. When "filiation is beyond question, support follows as [a] matter of
obligation." 1 To establish filiation, an action for compulsory recognition may be
filed against the putative father ahead of an action for support. In the alternative,
an action for support may be directly filed, where the matter of filiation shall be
integrated and resolved. 2
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 3 under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the assailed August 25, 2011
Decision 4 and January 15, 2013 Resolution 5 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 02687 be reversed and set aside.
The assailed Court of Appeals August 25, 2011 Decision sustained the
March 19, 2007 Decision 6 of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Antique in
Civil Case No. 2005-4-3496. The Regional Trial Court Decision dismissed petitioner
Richelle P. Abella's (Richelle) action for support of her minor daughter, Marl
Jhorylle Abella (Jhorylle) against respondent Policarpio Cabañero (Cabañero). The
assailed Court of Appeals January 15, 2013 Resolution denied petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration. 7
In a Complaint 8 for Support (Complaint) filed on April 22, 2005, petitioner
Richelle alleged that while she was still a minor in the years 2000 to 2002, she was
repeatedly sexually abused by respondent Cabañero inside his rest house at
Barangay Masayo, Tobias Fornier, Antique. 9 As a result, she allegedly gave birth
to a child on August 21, 2002. 10
Richelle added that on February 27, 2002, she initiated a criminal case for
rape against Cabañero, This, however, was dismissed. Later, she initiated another
criminal case, this time for child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. This,
too, was dismissed. 11
Richelle prayed for the child's monthly allowance in the amount of
P3,000.00. 12
In his Answer, Cabañero denied sexually abusing Richelle, or otherwise
having any sexual relations with her. Thus, he asserted that he could not have been
the father of Richelle's child. 13
After two (2) re-settings, pre-trial was held on February 21, 2007. Only
Richelle's counsel appeared. Richelle's motion to present her evidence ex
parte was granted. 14
In her testimony, Richelle noted that Cabañero was related to her mother
and that she treated him as her uncle. She narrated how she was sexually abused
by Cabañero on July 25, 2000, September 10, 2000, and February 8, 2002 and how
Cabañero threatened her to keep her silent. She added that during this period,
Cabañero sent her three (3) letters. She testified that she bore her and Cabañero's
child, whom she named Marl Jhorylle Abella, on August 21, 2002. She insisted on
her certainty that Cabañero was the father of the child as she supposedly had no
sexual relations with any other man. 15
In its March 19, 2007 Decision, 16 the Regional Trial Court dismissed
Richelle's Complaint without prejudice, on account of her failure to implead her
minor child, Jhorylle, as plaintiff.
Richelle filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of
Appeals. 17
In its assailed August 25, 2011 Decision, 18 the Court of Appeals sustained
the dismissal of the Complaint.
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Regional Trial Court's
basis for dismissing the Complaint. It emphasized that non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and added that it would have
sufficed for the Regional Trial Court to have "ordered the amendment of the
caption of the [C]omplaint to implead the minor child." 19 The Court of Appeals
still ruled that the dismissal of the Complaint was proper as the filiation and
paternity of the child had not been previously established. As the child's birth
certificate did not indicate that Cabañero was the father and as Cabañero had not
done anything to voluntarily recognize the child as his own, the Court of Appeals
asserted that Richelle "should have first instituted filiation proceedings to
adjudicate the minor child's paternity." 20
Following the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Richelle filed this
Petition.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that filiation proceedings should have first been separately instituted to
ascertain the minor child's paternity and that without these proceedings having
first been resolved in favor of the child's paternity claim, petitioner Richelle P.
Abella's action for support could not prosper.
This Court reverses the Court of Appeals Decision.
While it is true that the grant of support was contingent on ascertaining
paternal relations between respondent and petitioner's daughter, Jhorylle, it was
unnecessary for petitioner's action for support to have been dismissed and
terminated by the Court of Appeals in the manner that it did. Instead of dismissing
the case, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the Regional Trial
Court. There, petitioner and her daughter should have been enabled to present
evidence to establish their cause of action — inclusive of their underlying claim of
paternal relations — against respondent.
I
Article 194 of the Family Code delineates the extent of support among
family members, while Article 195 identifies family members who "are obliged to
support each other":
Article 194. Support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling
or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond
the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in
going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding
articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the
whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and
the legitimate and illegitimate children of the
latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and
the legitimate and illegitimate children of the
latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of
the full or half-blood. (Emphasis supplied)
Lim-Lua v. Lua 21 echoed Article 201 of the Family Code 22 and stated
that the "amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient." 23 Article 202
of the Family Code adds, however, that support may be adjusted and that it "shall
be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of
the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged
to furnish the same." 24
II
 The obligation to give support shall only be demandable from the time the
person entitled to it needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from
the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. 25 Support pendente lite may also be
claimed, in conformity with the manner stipulated by the Rules of Court. 26
An illegitimate child, "conceived and born outside a valid marriage," as is
the admitted case with petitioner's daughter, is entitled to support. 27 To claim it,
however, a child should have first been acknowledged by the putative parent or
must have otherwise previously established his or her filiation with the putative
parent. 28 When "filiation is beyond question, support [shall then follow] as [a]
matter of obligation." 29
The judicial remedy to enable this is an action for compulsory
recognition. 30 Filiation proceedings do not merely resolve the matter of
relationship with a parent but also secure the legal rights associated with that
relationship: citizenship, support, and inheritance, among others. 31
The paramount consideration in the resolution of questions affecting a
child is the child's welfare, 32 and it is "[t]he policy of the Family Code to liberalize
the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children." 33 Nevertheless, in keeping with basic judicial principles, the
burden of proof in proceedings seeking to establish paternity is upon the "person
who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the
child." 34 Likewise, a liberal application of rules should not be "without prejudice
to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses." 35
III
Illegitimate children establish their filiation "in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children," 36 that is, by:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. 37
In the absence of these, illegitimate filiation, as with legitimate filiation,
may be established by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. 38
In keeping with these, the recognition of an illegitimate child through a
birth certificate, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing, has been held to be "in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further court action is required." 39
IV
Having thus far only presented her child's birth certificate, which made no
reference to respondent as the child's father, the Court of Appeals correctly noted
that the necessary condition of filiation had yet to be established. The Court of
Appeals later affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's Complaint, insisting that
separate filiation proceedings and their termination in petitioner's daughter's favor
were imperative.
While ably noting that filiation had yet to be established, the Court of
Appeals' discussion and final disposition are not in keeping with jurisprudence.
Dolina v. Vallecera 40 clarified that since an action for compulsory
recognition may be filed ahead of an action for support, the direct filing of an action
for support, "where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and
resolved," 41 is an equally valid alternative:
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in
proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same
is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina's demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera's
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he
had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his
relation to him. The child's remedy is to file through her mother
a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If
filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of
obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support
and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.
Dolina's remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an
action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to
establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she
may directly file an action for support, where the issue of
compulsory recognition may be integrated and
resolved. 42 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Agustin v. Court of Appeals 43 extensively discussed the deep
jurisprudential roots that buttress the validity of this alternative.
 Agustin concerned an action for support and support pendente lite filed had acknowledged and recognized the
by a child, represented by his mother. The putative father, Arnel Agustin, illegitimate child because such
vehemently denied paternal relations with the child. He disavowed his apparent acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis
signature on the child's birth certificate, which indicated him as the father. Agustin of the right to inherit. There being no
"moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his allegation of such acknowledgment, the action
signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an becomes one to compel recognition which
illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative cannot be brought after the death of the
father." 44 The Regional Trial Court denied Agustin's motion to dismiss; it was putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino,
subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. therefore, is not the absence of a cause of
action for failure of the petitioner to allege the
In sustaining the lower courts' decisions, this Court noted that enabling
fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but
the mother and her child to establish paternity and filiation in the course of an
the prescription of the action.
action for support was merely a permission "to prove their cause of action against
[Agustin,] who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of Applying the foregoing principles to
acknowledgement." 45 the case at bar, although petitioner contends
that the complaint filed by herein private
This Court added that an action to compel recognition could very well be
respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad
integrated with an action for support. This Court drew analogies with extant
Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased
jurisprudence that sustained the integration of an action to compel recognition
and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the
with an action to claim inheritance and emphasized that "the basis or rationale for
allegations therein the same may be
integrating them remains the same." 46 This Court explained:
considered as one to compel recognition.
[Petitioner] claims that the order and resolution . . . effectively Further, that the two causes of action, one to
converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, compel recognition and the other to claim
which is supposedly proscribed by law. According to petitioner, inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is
Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support not new in our jurisprudence.
and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit . . . As early as [1922] we had occasion to
rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. . . . wherein
The petitioner's contentions are without merit.
we said:
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the Th question whether a
action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed person in the position of the present
the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner plaintiff can in any event maintain a
who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary complex action to compel recognition
evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed as a natural child and at the same time
resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel to obtain ulterior relief in the
recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in character of heir, is one which in the
accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals, we opinion of this court must be
allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with answered in the affirmative, provided
an action to claim one's inheritance: always that the conditions justifying
the joinder of the two distinct causes
. . . In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate
of action are present in the particular
child, to be entitled to support and
case. In other words, there is no
successional rights from the putative or
absolute necessity requiring that the
presumed parent, must prove his filiation to
action to compel acknowledgment
the latter. We also said that it is necessary to
should have been instituted and
allege in the complaint that the putative father
 prosecuted to a successful conclusion filiation is entirely appropriate to these
prior to the action in which that same proceedings. 47 (Citations omitted)
plaintiff seeks additional relief in the
Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely
character of heir. Certainly, there is
appropriate" 48 to the action for support filed by petitioner Richelle for her child.
nothing so peculiar to the action to
An action for support may very well resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it
compel acknowledgment as to
involves the same parties, is brought before a court with the proper jurisdiction,
require that a rule should be here
prays to impel recognition of paternal relations, and invokes judicial intervention
applied different from that generally
to do so. This does not run afoul of any rule. To the contrary, and consistent
applicable in other cases . . .
with Briz v. Briz, 49 this is in keeping with the rules on proper joinder of causes of
The conclusion above stated,
action. 50 This also serves the interest of judicial economy — avoiding multiplicity
though not heretofore explicitly
of suits and cushioning litigants from the vexation and costs of a protracted
formulated by this court, is
pleading of their cause.
undoubtedly to some extent
supported by our prior decisions. Thus, it was improper to rule here, as the Court of Appeals did, that it was
Thus, we have held in numerous impossible to entertain petitioner's child's plea for support without her and
cases, and the doctrine must be petitioner first surmounting the encumbrance of an entirely different judicial
considered well settled, that a natural proceeding. Without meaning to lend credence to the minutiae of petitioner's
child having a right to compel claims, it is quite apparent that the rigors of judicial proceedings have been taxing
acknowledgment, but who has not enough for a mother and her daughter whose claim for support amounts to a
been in fact legally acknowledged, modest P3,000.00 every month. When petitioner initiated her action, her daughter
may maintain partition proceedings was a toddler; she is, by now, well into her adolescence. The primordial interest of
for the division of the inheritance justice and the basic dictum that procedural rules are to be "liberally construed in
against his coheirs . . .; and the same order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
person may intervene in proceedings disposition of every action and proceeding" 51 impel us to grant the present
for the distribution of the estate of his Petition.
deceased natural father, or mother . .
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
. In neither of these situations has it
assailed August 25, 2011 Decision and January 15, 2013 Resolution of the Court of
been thought necessary for the
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02687 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
plaintiff to show a prior decree
is REMANDED to Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Antique for it to settle
compelling acknowledgment. The
in Civil Case No. 2005-4-3496 the matter of Marl Jhorylle Abella's purported
obvious reason is that in partition
paternal relation with respondent Policarpio Cabañero and, in the event of a
suits and distribution proceedings the
favorable determination on this, to later rule on the matter of support.
other persons who might take by
inheritance are before the court; and SO ORDERED.
the declaration of heirship is
||| (Abella v. Cabañero, G.R. No. 206647, [August 9, 2017])
appropriate to such proceedings.
Although the instant case deals with support rather
than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for
integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent
Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the
determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues
in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of