Magno vs.

CA

Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

Facts:

Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.

VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party
who could lend him that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no
sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the
equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

Issue:

Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:

RTC Ruling:

finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22
and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695
and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp.
25, 27)

It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same
court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the
crime charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has already been
taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in the transaction, besides
being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the
value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she had in her
possession the checks that "bounced".

No

Ratio:

To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own
account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.

Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner
never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a
matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom
petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not
communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was
covered by L.S. Finance Management.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Pic cp Rogelio vs roque

Pic deguzman vs perez

Title: Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326

Subject Matter: Attempted v. Frustrated Murder, Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

As Ruben Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food, Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being jobless and
dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a heated exchange of
words ensued. In the following day, when Ruben and his three year old daughter went to the store to
buy food, Edgardo together with his brother Esmeraldo and Ismael Rivera emerged from their house
and ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows. And as he fell to the
ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. The Rivera brothers fled
when policemen came. The doctor declared that the wounds were slight and superficial, though the
victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened.

Issues:

(1) WON there was intent to kill.

(2) WON the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder.

(3) WON the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.

Held:

(1) Yes. The Court held that there was intent to kill as Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with
fist blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though the wounds sustained by
the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death, intent to kill is presumed.

(2) Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct since based on Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an attempt when the
offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.

(3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no opportunity for
the victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present case, the sudden attack to the victim caused him
to be overwhelmed and had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.

RTC:

That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hit with a
piece of hollow block, one RUBEN RODIL who thereby sustained a non-mortal injury on his head and on
the different parts of his body, the accused thus commenced the commission of the felony directly by
overt acts, but failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by
reason of some causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the said Ruben Rodil was
able to ran (sic) away and the timely response of the policemen, to his damage and prejudice.SO
ORDERED.

CA: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, is MODIFIED in that
the appellants are convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2
years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. In all other
respects, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[9]
SC:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that petitioners are sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum,
to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Villareal vs. PeopleGR No. 151258February 1, 2012664 scraFACTS: Seven Freshmen Law students of
Ateneo de Manila University School of Law havebeen initiated by the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity on
February 1991. The initiation rites startedwhen the neophytes were met by some members of the
mentioned fraternity at the lobby of theAteneo Law School. They were consequently brought to a house
and briefed on what will behappening during the days when they will be initiated. They were informed
that there will bephysical beatings and that the neophytes can quit anytime they want. They were
brought toanother house to commence their initiation.The neophytes were insulted and threatened
evenbefore they got off the van. Members of the fraternity delivered blows to the neophytes as
theyalighted from the van. Several initiation rites were experienced by the neophytes like the Indianrun,
Bicol express and rounds. They were asked to recite provisions and principles of thefraternity and were
hit everytime they made a mistake. Accused fraternity members, Dizon andVillareal, asked the head of
the initiation rites (Victorino) to reopen the initiation. Fraternitymembers subjected neophytes to
paddling and additional hours of physical pain. After the lastsession of beatings, Lenny Villa could not
walk. Later that night, he was feeling cold and hiscondition worsened. He was brought to the hospital
but was declared dead on arrival. Criminalcase was filed against 26 fraternity members and
was subsequently found guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and penalized with
reclusion perpetua. On January 102002, CA modified the criminal liability of each of the
accused according to individualparticipation. 19 of the the accused were acquitted, 4 of the
appellants were found guilty of slightphysical injuries, and 2 of the accused-appellants (Dizon and
Villareal) were found guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Accused Villareal
petitioned for review on Certrioriunder Rue 45 on the grounds that the CA made 2 reversible errors:
first, denial of due processand second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently,
petitioner Villarealdied on 13 March 2011 and filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.ISSUE:
Whether or not criminal liability for personal penalties of the accused is extinguished bydeathDoctrine:
Yes, criminal liability of the accused is extinguished by death. The Court took note ofcounsel for
petitioner’s Notice of Death when it has been received while the petition waspending resolution.
Personal penalties refer to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,while pecuniary penalties
refer to fines, costs, civil liability. Article 89 of the Revised PenalCode states that the criminal liability of a
convict for personal penalties is totally extinguished bydeath of the convict. His pecuniary penalty has
been extinguished since the death of the accusedhappened before his final judgment. Therefore, the
death of the petitioner for both personal andpecuniary penalties including his civil liability has ended.
His petition has also been dismissedand the criminal case against him has been closed and terminatedS
U.S. vs Ah Chong

Facts:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in one of the Officers’

quarters at Fort McKinley, Rizal Province. Together living with him in the said quarters was thedeceased,
Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a houseboy. There had been severalrobberies in Fort McKinley
prior to the incident thus prompting the defendant and his roommateto reinforce the flimsy hook used
to lock the door of their room by placing a chair against it. Thedefendant and the deceased had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he shouldknock on the door and say his name. On the
night of Aug. 14, 1908, Ah Chong, who was alonein his room, was awakened by someone trying to force
open the door of the room. Thedefendant called out twice, asking the identity of the person but heard
no answer. Fearing thatthe intruder was a robber or a thief, the defendant called out that he would kill
the intruder if hetried to enter. At that moment, the door was forced open and the defendant was
struck firstabove the knee by the edge of the chair. Because of the darkness of the room, the
defendantthought he was being hit by the intruder and tried to defend himself by striking wildly at
theintruder using a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow. It turned out that the
saidintruder was actually the defendant’s roommate, Pascual Gualberto. The roommate wasbrought to
the military hospital where he died from the effects of the wound the following day.

Issue:

WON the defendant was criminally liable for committing a felony.

Held:

Defendant was not criminally liable and exonerated.In order for mistake of fact to be held as a valid
defense, there has to be several requisites.One, that the act done would have been lawful had the facts
been as the accused believedthem to be. Two, that the intention of the accused in performing the act
should be lawful, andlastly, that the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the
accused.In the case at bar, had the intruder been a robber as the defendant believed him to be, then
AhChong acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent, and would have been whollyexempt
from criminal liability and that he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence orrecklessness

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs
of both instance de oficio. So ordered.

Loney vs. PeopleG.R. No. 152644, Feb. 10, 2006Facts:

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. Hernandez are the Pres.and CEO, Senior
Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corp., a
corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.Marcopper had been storing tailings
(mine waste) from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage
tunnel leading to the Boac andMakulapnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug
at the tunnel’s end.On March 24, 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days,
Mt. Tapianpit had discharged millions of tons of tailings in to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.In August
1996, the DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac,Marinduque with violation of Art. 91
(B), subparagraphs 5 and 6 of P.D. No. 1067 or theWater code of the Phil., Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 984 or the
National Pollution Decree of 1976, Sec.108 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Phil. Mining Act of 1995, and Art. 365
of the RPC for RecklessImprudence Resulting to Damage to Property.In the Consolidated Order of MTC,
granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Orderquashing the information for violation of PD 1067 and
PD 984. The MTC maintained theInformations for violation of RA 7942 and Art. 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently fileda petition for certiorari with the RTC assailing that the portion of the
Consolidated Ordermaintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and the petition was raffled to
Br. 94while public respondent’s appeal assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashingthe
Info. for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984 and this appeal was consolidated withpetitioners
petition.MTC Br. 94 granted the public respondent’s appeal but denied petitioner’s petition.Petitioners
then filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Br. 94 acted withgrave abuse of discretion
because 1.the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA7942 and the Art. 365 of the RPC
“proceeded from are based on a single act or incident of polluting the rivers thru dumping of mine
tailings, and the charge for violation of Art 365 of the RPC absorbs the other charges since the element
of “lack of necessary or adequateprotection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence” is common
among them, 2. theduplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.
The Courtof Appeals affirmed the Br. 94 ruling.

Issue:

1. Whether or not all the charges filed against petitioners except one should bequashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting inDamage to Property should stand2.
whether or not Br. 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenesPeople v. Relova.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges
morethan one offense, as Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. As early asthe
start of the last century, the court ruled that a single act or incident might offend againsttwo or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecutionof the accused for more
than one offense and the only limit is the Constitutional prohibitionthat no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishing for the same offense. In People vs.Doriquez, the court held that two or more
offenses arising form the same act are not thesame. And so, double jeopardy is not an issue because not
all its elements are present.On petitioners claim that the charges for violation of Art. 365 of the RPC
“absorbs”the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in
sefelony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property) cannot absorb malaprohibita
crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942). What makes theformer felony is criminal
intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa) and what makes the lattercrimes are the special laws enacting
them.Petitioners reiterate their contention in that their prosecution contravenes ruling inPeople vs.
Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the court’s statement in Relova that the lawseeks to prevent
harassment of the accused by “multiple prosecutions for offenses whichthough different from one
another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set oroverlapping sets of technical elements.
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claimagainst multiple prosecutions based on a single act not
only because the question of double jeopardy is not an issue here, but also because, as the Court of
Appeals held, petitioners arebeing prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes
and not by anordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever fall under the first sentence
of Sec. 21, Art. III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as inRelova, for
offenses arising from the same incident

484 SCRA 617 – Criminal Law – Felonies – Mala In Se vs Mala Prohibita Crimes – Defense of Good Faith

In 1995, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., ran for the senatorial elections.

Meanwhile, in Alaminos, Pangasinan, Arsenia Garcia was one of the designated election officers. Garcia
was accused by Pimentel of violating the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. Pimentel alleged that Garcia
decreased Pimentel’s vote by 5,000 votes.

The trial court found Garcia guilty. On appeal, Garcia invoked that the trial court erred in ruling that her
defense of good faith was not properly appreciated. She averred that due to the workload given to her
during said elections, she got fatigued and that caused the error in the tabulation of Pimentel’s votes.

Pimentel argued that the Electoral Reforms Law is a special law hence it is a malum prohibitum law and
therefore, good faith is not a defense.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged violation of Garcia of the Electoral Reforms Law is a malum
prohibitum.

HELD: No. Generally, mala in se crimes refer to those felonies in violation of the Revised Penal Code.
However, it must be noted that mala in se are crimes which are inherently immoral. Hence, even if the
crime is punished by a special law, if it is inherently immoral, then it is still a crime mala in se.

In this case, the said violation of the Electoral Reforms Law is a mala in se crime because it is inherently
immoral to decrease the vote of a candidate. Note also that what is being punished is the intentional
decreasing of a candidate’s votes and not those arising from errors and mistakes. Since a violation of this
special law is a malum in se, good faith can be raised as a defense.

However, Garcia’s defense of good faith was not proven. Facts show that the decreasing of Pimentel’s
vote was not due to error or mistake. It was shown that she willingly handled certain duties which were
not supposed to be hers to perform. That’s a clear sign that she facilitated the erroneous entry.

This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24547[1] that
affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court[2] of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch
54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.[3]
n a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence,
except petitioner who was convicted as follows:

x x x5. And finally, on the person of ARSENIA B. GARCIA, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes
of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a
violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as
maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree
lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused ARSENIA B. GARCIA is not entitled to probation;
further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her
right of suffrage.

The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to
commit her person to the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further
orders from the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision,
thus,

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION,
increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Case Digest: Amado Alvarado Garcia vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 171951 28 August 2009

FACTS:

The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down to which
Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on him. Two days
later, the group decided to drink at a store owned by Chy’s sister, Esquibel. Chy was about to come out
of his house and upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched him. Chy continued to parry the
blows and when he found an opportunity to escape, he ran home and phoned his wife to call the police
regarding the mauling. He also complained of difficulty in breathing. He was found later unconscious on
the kitchen floor, salivating.

Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he caused were not as violent in
nature as to have caused the death of Chy. Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide. The
autopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the victim could not have
caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the victim’s heart is healthy. What could
have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions concerning the violence inflicted upon him.

ISSUE:

Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should
be appreciated

RULING:

The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not
exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said
condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code.
Nevertheless, said circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner. The fact that the
physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally and logically caused the actual death
of the victim, if the latter’s heart is in good condition.

Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is,
reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court
properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR
No. 27544 affirming the Decision2 dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, Aparri,
Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Contested
as well is the appellate court’s Resolution3 dated March 13, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.4

That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bottle, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K. Chy, inflicting upon the latter fatal injuries which
caused his death.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision dated December 20, 2005, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the July 2, 2003 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is hereby AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.

SO ORDERED.11
Urbano v. IAC

Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place
where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the
elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass.
Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on
the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980,
Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On
November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The
doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm.
He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial
court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit
of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation
canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is
more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days.
Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the
time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not
yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected
by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of
his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure
to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED

People of the Philippines vs Orlito Villacorta

657 SCRA 270 – Criminal Law – Criminal Liability – Proximate Cause – Efficient Intervening Cause

On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store to buy bread. Out of nowhere, Orlito Villacorta
appeared and thereafter stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz with a sharpened bamboo stick. After
that, Villacorta fled.

Cruz was helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital where he was treated as out-
patient. He was discharged on the same day but on February 14, 2002, or 21 days after the stabbing
incident, he returned to the same hospital where he was treated for severe tetanus. The next day on
February 15, 2002, Cruz died. The medical report states that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to
stab wound.

The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted Villacorta for murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty of murder.

HELD: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not the stabbing done by Villacorta upon
Cruz. There was an efficient intervening cause which appeared between the time of the stabbing and
the time of the death of Cruz.

In explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the fact that severe tetanus (the kind of
tetanus which causes immediate death) has an incubation period of 14 days or less. In this case, the
stabbing made by Vilalcorta could not have caused the tetanus infection as 22 days already lapsed from
the time of the stabbing until the date of death of Cruz. Something else caused the tetanus other than
the stabbing – in short, Cruz acquired the tetanus 14 days or less before February 15, 2003 and not on
the date of stabbing.

The court explained further:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim’s death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time [Cruz] was wounded to the time of
his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries based on the facts. Neither is he guilty of attempted
nor frustrated murder, his intent to kill was not proven by the prosecution.

People of the Philippines vs Adriano

In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Adriano Dagundong, Melchor Lao, Federico Bulaon, Ricardo
Serrano and Joseph Ebrada were charged with the crime of frustrated robbery in band with homicide.
Upon motion of the provincial fiscal, the court ordered Ebrada discharged from the information order
that he could be utilized as a state witness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After due trial with respect to the rest of the accused, the court found all the defendants, except
Dagundong, guilty of frustrated robbery with homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, abuse or superior strength, and commission of the crime with the aid of a motor vehicle,
without any mitigating circumstances, and sentenced each of the three defendants, Melchor Lao,
Federico Bulaon and Ricardo Serrano to reclusion perpetua; found Adriano Dagundong guilty of murder,
qualified by treachery, with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, in band, abuse or superior
strength and commission of the offense with the aid of a motor vehicle, without any mitigating
circumstances, and sentenced him to death; and also sentenced all of the four accused to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Mamey Lake Hewell in the amount of P6,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the accessories of law, and to pay the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We agree with the lower court that appellants Bulaon and Serrano are guilty of the crime of frustrated
robbery with homicide, under Article 297, Revised Penal Code, in relation with Article 296, Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 12 inasmuch as it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that
they actually took part in the commission thereof, appellant Serrano by standing guard outside the
victim's house while appellant Dagundong inside the house and helped him ransack the victim's
room.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We believe, however, that the lower court erred in finding appellant Dagundong guilty of murder. It was
established that it was he who had fired the fatal shots at Mrs. Hewell. But though that slaying was
attended by treachery, his crime was not murder. The term "homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294,
Revised Penal Code, is used in its generic sense and the offense defined therein comprehends not only
robbery with homicide in its limited sense, but also robbery with murder. So, an offense is not taken out
of the purview of this article merely because the homicide "rises to the atrocity of murder" (People vs.
Manuel, et al., 44 Phil., 333). And the same definition must be given to the term as it is used in Article
297, Revised Penal Code, which penalizes frustrated robbery with homicide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, we find appellant Dagundong guilty of frustrated robbery with homicide and sentence him
to life imprisonment. Thus modified, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with
costs against appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

People of the Philippines v. Noel Sales

father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not employ sadistic
beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Joint Decision,[13] the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical
injuries in the manner described in the Informations. In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not
consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since there is no
proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive
portion of said Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond
reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC03-782 and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000,00 as exemplary damages and
to pay the costs.
Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight
physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of
Arresto Menor in its medium period.

Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised Penal Code.
Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in the
service of his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive imprisonment in accordance with
and subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[15] which was given due course in an Order[16] dated September 21,
2005.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of its Decision[17] reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated August 3, 2005 in
Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, is
AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal
this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.

SO ORDERED.[18]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627
that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in
Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and
slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is
increased to P30,000.00. In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

INTOD VS. CA

FACTS:Ponente: Justice Campos, JR. 1992Petitioner:

Sulpicio IntodRespondent

:Court of AppealsVictim:

Bernardina PalangpanganAccessories:Pangasian,Tubio,Daligdig
MandayaEvents:

Intod, Pangasian, Tubio, and Daligdig went to Mandaya’s house

and asked the latter to comewith them in killing Palangpangan or else he would also be killed

Intod wanted to kill Palangpangan because of a land dispute between them.

10:00pm of that same day, Petitioner, together with his accessories, commenced in performingtheir
planned crime. Mandaya pointed to the room of Palangpangan and petitioner andcompany fired at the
said room.

It turned out that Palangpangan was in another city, no one was in the room when the accusedfired
shots, and no one was hit by the gun fire.Filling of the Case:

Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of Attempted Murder.

The decision of RTC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.ISSUES:

Intod filed a petition for review of the affirmation made by the Court of Appeals of the decisionheld by
the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner seeks from this court a modification of judgment byholding him
liable only for an impossible crime.

W/N the act committed by Intod and his accomplices constitutes an Impossible Crime.

RULING:

Intod’s

petition was granted, the crime committed by Intod was modified from AttemptedMurder to an
Impossible Crime.

Article 4 Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code States:Criminal Liability shall be incurred:b. By a person
committing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were itnot for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment, or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.

The case at far constitutes an inherent impossibility to perform the act due to factual or
physicalimpossibility, that is, extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor beyond his controlprevent
the consummation of the intended crime.

Impossible Crime is recognized and punished here in the Philippines, as compared to, UnitedStates,
thus, judgment rendered by the US in similar nature with the case at bar should notapplied.

Impossible Crimes constitutes a criminal liability, in order to, punish the criminal intent

G.R. No. 162540

July 13, 2009

GEMMA T. JACINTO,

Petitionervs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RespondentPERALTA,

A petition for review on

certiorari

filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appealsaffirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Facts:

Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of
P10,000.00. The check waspayment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
petitioner was then the collector of MegaFoam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank
account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and
the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.Later, Rowena Ricablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank,who was looking for
Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO checkdeposited in
his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then called and relayed the message through accusedAnita
Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but
theycould be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at
Mega Foam.Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquinoto replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to
take the cash and divide it equally intofour: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline
Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam'saccountant, reported the matter to the owner of
Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to
confirm that the latter indeed handedpetitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as payment for her
purchases from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino furthertestified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the
phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced. Verificationfrom company records showed that
petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, BabyAquino said that she had
already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the dishonored check.Dyhengco filed a
Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapmentoperation with
its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted withfluorescent
powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that
shewas going along with Valencia's plan.Ricablanca, petitioner, her husband, and Valencia then boarded
petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino'sfactory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and
entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that shewas getting cash from Baby Aquino. However,
the cash she actually brought out from the premises was theP10,000.00 marked money previously given
to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and uponreturning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each
to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia werearrested by NBI agents, who had
been watching the whole time.A case was filed against the three accused, Jacinto, Valencia and Capitle.
RTC rendered its Decisionfinding them

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and sentenced eachimprisonment
of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS,as minimum, to SIX(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS,as maximum.The three appealed to the CA and the decision of the
trial court was

MODIFIED

, in that:(a) thesentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence against accused Anita
Valencia isreduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium, and (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is
acquitted. Hence,the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone,

Issue:

Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.

Held:

As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code,the personal property
subject of thetheft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gainfrom the thing stolen
This isfurther bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the
accused isdependent on the value of the thing stolen.In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the
postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparentlywithout value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theftwas actually
produced. The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.